text:
    In re Sam Jude HOLLOWAY
    No. 2011-OB-0778.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 2, 2012.
    Rehearing Denied Sept. 21, 2012.
    Pascal F. Calogero, Jr., New Orleans, LA, Sehiff, Scheckman & White, Leslie J. Schiff, for Applicant.
    Monique Rene Drake, Lawrence Joseph Centola, Jr., for Respondent.
   ON APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO THE BAR

PER CURIAM.

| jThe Committee on Bar Admissions opposed the application of petitioner, Sam Jude Holloway, to sit for the Louisiana Bar Examination based on character and fitness concerns relating to adversary proceedings initiated against him in his bankruptcy. We subsequently granted petitioner permission to sit for the bar exam, with the condition that upon his successful completion of the exam, he apply to the court for the appointment of a commissioner to take character and fitness evidence. In re: Holloway, 08-2984 (La.1/7/09), 998 So.2d 711.

Petitioner thereafter successfully passed the essay portion of the bar exam, and upon his application, we remanded this matter to the Committee on Bar Admissions Panel on Character and Fitness to conduct an investigation and appointed a commissioner to take character and fitness evidence. Following the proceedings, the commissioner filed his report with this court, recommending admission be denied. Petitioner objected to that recommendation, and oral argument was conducted before this court pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XVII, § 9(D)(11).

After hearing oral argument, reviewing the evidence, and considering the law, we conclude petitioner has failed to meet his burden of proving that he has “good moral character” to be admitted to the Louisiana State Bar Association. See |2Supreme Court Rule XVII, § 5(E). The record of this matter reflects a pattern of misrepresentations and fraud on the part of petitioner in connection with a business endeavor known as H & W Welding Services, Inc. Petitioner egregiously misspent the funds entrusted to him by his business partner for the benefit of the company and essentially used those funds as his own. Furthermore, the commissioner accepted as true testimony by petitioner’s business partner that petitioner “conned and deceived” him regarding the company’s business affairs. Under these circumstances, we find petitioner does not possess the requisite good moral character to practice law in Louisiana.

Accordingly, it is ordered that the application for admission be and hereby is denied.

ADMISSION DENIED.

Retired Judge THOMAS C. WICKER, JR., sitting Justice ad hoc for WEIMER, J., recused.

       Retired Judge Thomas C. Wicker, Jr., assigned as Justice ad hoc, sitting for Associate Justice John L. Weimer, recused.

      . This court generally gives deference to the credibility findings of the commissioner, although we make the ultimate decision regarding admission. See In re: Hinson-Lyles, 02-2578, n. 6 (La.12/3/03), 864 So.2d 108 (‘‘[w]hile we afford some deference to the commissioner’s recommendation, making due allowance for the commissioner’s opportunity to observe and evaluate the demeanor of the applicant and the witnesses, the ultimate decision regarding admission rests with this court.”).


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: PER CURIAM.

license: Public Domain

text:
    In re Christy M. RHOADES.
    No. 2011-OB-2484.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 6, 2012.
    Christy M. Rhoades (In Proper Person), Hymel Davis & Petersen, L.L.C., Glen Richard Petersen, Baton Rouge, LA, for Applicant.
    Committee on Bar Admissions, Lawrence Joseph Centola, Jr., Monique Rene Drake, for Respondent.
   ON APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO THE BAR

PER CURIAM.

11Petitioner, Christy M. Rhoades, an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Texas, successfully passed the Louisiana Bar Examination. Thereafter, the Committee on Bar Admissions (“Committee”) advised petitioner that she would not be certified for admission, citing allegations that she had engaged in the unauthorized practice of law in this state.

Upon petitioner’s application, we remanded this matter to the Committee on Bar Admissions Panel on Character and Fitness to conduct an investigation and appointed a commissioner to take character and fitness evidence. Following the proceedings, the commissioner filed his report with this court, concluding that the allegations of the unauthorized practice of law by petitioner are unfounded, and recommending that she be admitted to the practice of law. The Committee objected to that recommendation, and oral argument was conducted before this court pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XVII, § 9(D)(11).

After hearing oral argument, reviewing the evidence, and considering the law, we conclude petitioner is eligible to be admitted to the practice of law in Louisiana. Accordingly, it is ordered that the application for admission be and hereby is granted.

ADMISSION GRANTED.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Edward AUGUSTINE.
    No. 2012-KD-1925.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 25, 2012.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. F, No. 504-596; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2012-K-1270.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Dorance FLEMING.
    No. 2012-KD-1928.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 26, 2012.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans; Criminal District Court Div. D, No. 491-742; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2012-K-1281.

Stay denied. Writ denied.


text:
    In re MSE (Minor Child).
    No. 2012-CJ-1927.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 27, 2012.
   In re Herbert, Dennis J.; — Other; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 698-893; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 12-C-658.

Stay recalled. Writ denied.


text:
    Emily Catherine Clarke BOLEN v. Douglas Andrew CLARKE.
    No. 2012-CJ-1970.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 5, 2012.
   In re S.C.; Z.C.; — Other(s); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. K, No. 2012-13474; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 CW 1205.

Stay denied. Writ denied.


text:
    Adelené V. BULLARD, et al. v. DAIGLE’S CRANE SERVICE, INC., et al.
    No. 2012-CC-1798.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 6, 2012.
   In re Bullard, Adelene V. et al.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Cameron, 38th Judicial District Court Div. O, Nos. 10-18457, 10-18550; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW 12-00429.

Stay denied. Writ denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Frankie BASKIN.
    No. 2012-KK-1912.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 6, 2012.
   In re Baskin, Frankie; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. John, 40th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 2010-CR-346; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 12-K-499.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Angelo HOLMES.
    No. 2012-KH-2007.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 11, 2012.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans; Criminal District Court Div. J, No. 489-557; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2012-K-1335.

Stay denied; writ denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Eugene ROBINSON.
    No. 2012-KD-1909.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 12, 2012.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. H, No. 511-012; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2012-K-1247.

Writ granted. The ruling of the trial court on the suppress is reversed.

JOHNSON, J., would deny the writ. WEIMER, J., concurs.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. John Kevin O’DOWD.
    No. 2012-KK-2013.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 12, 2012.
   In re O’Dowd, John Kevin; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 506284; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 KW 1465.

Stay denied; Writ Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. William HENDERSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KK-0843.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 12, 2012.
   In re Henderson, William; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Terrebonne, 32nd Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 557,867; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011 KW 2345.

Denied.


text:
    Melissa C. DIAMAND v. Bruce DAVIS, Kathy Davis and David Z. Diamand.
    No. 2012-CJ-1922.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 12, 2012.
   In re Diamand, David Z.; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Bossier, 26th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 118155; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 47,-332-CA.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Joshua DAIGREPONT.
    No. 2012-KK-1929.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 12, 2012.
   In re Daigrepont, Joshua; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedíal Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. E, No. 511-354; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2012-K-1085.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Kevin THOMPSON.
    No. 2012-KD-2034.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 13, 2012.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. G, No. 507-813; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2012-K-1353.

Writ denied as moot.


text:
    Joseph WILLIAMS v. CITY OF NATCHITOCHES, et al.
    No. 2012-CC-1127.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 14, 2012.
   In re Williams, Joseph; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Natchitoches, 10th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 68,926-B; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW 12-00461.

Denied.


text:
    Gilda FISHER v. STATE of Louisiana, through the DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HOSPITALS.
    No. 2012-CC-1128.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 14, 2012.
   In re Fisher, Gilda; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 560,925; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011 CW 1727.

Denied.


text:
    Lorin B. FLEMING, et al. v. Otis JACKSON, et al.
    No. 2012-CC-1132.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 14, 2012.
   In re Fleming, Camilla; Fleming, Lorin B. et al.; — Plaintiff(s); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. I, No. 2009-9984; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2012-C-0030.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Elizabeth STOKES.
    No. 2012-KK-1134.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 14, 2012.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. D, No. 500-787; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2012-K-0187.

Denied.


text:
    Karen Kaltenbach USRY, etc. v. BAHA TOWERS LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, et al.
    No. 2012-CC-1147.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 14, 2012.
   In re Monticello Insurance Company;— Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. D, No. 2006-00859; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2012-C-0039.

Denied.


text:
    Michelle DOMINGUE, Wife of and Brian Domingue. v. IMPERIAL MANAGEMENT CORPORATION d/b/a Imperial Fire & Casualty Insurance.
    No. 2012-CC-1155.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 14, 2012.
   In re Domingue, Brian; Domingue, Michelle et al.; — Plaintiff(s); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 2010-14538; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011 CW 2355.

Denied.


text:
    Kenneth C. USNER, et al. v. Bernard BAGERT, Jr., et al.
    No. 2012-CC-1160.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 14, 2012.

   In re Bagert Jr., Bernard et al.; Bernard J. Bagert Jr. APLC; — Defendant(s); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. K, No. 2010-5479; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2012-C-0403.

Denied.

KNOLL, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Stephanie CHAPMAN.
    No. 2012-KK-1165.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 14, 2012.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. F, Nos. 492-604, 493-328; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2012-K-0207.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Vershawn WILLIAMS.
    No. 2012-KK-1170.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 14, 2012.
   In re Williams, Vershawn; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 11-151; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 12-KH-234.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Timothy JOHNSON.
    No. 2012-KK-1174.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 14, 2012.
   In re Johnson, Timothy; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 11-1728; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 12-K-362.

Denied.


text:
    LODWICK, L.L.C., et al. v. CHEVRON USA, INC., et al.
    No. 2012-CC-1175.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 14, 2012.
   In re Admiral Insurance Company;— Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. 1, No. 501,-879-C; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 47391-CW.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Corey LANOIR, et al.
    No. 2012-KK-1182.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 14, 2012.
   In re Morris, Donald; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. A, No. 508-487; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2012-K-0574.

Denied.

WEIMER, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Corey LANOIR, et al.
    No. 2012-KK-1204.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 14, 2012.
   In re Porter, Shannon; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. A, No. 503-487; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2012-K-0574.

Denied.

WEIMER, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Eddie FOREMAN, Jr. v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-2571.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 14, 2012.
   In re Foreman Jr., Eddie; Applying for Reconsideration of this Court’s action dated July 27, 2012, and from Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. L, No. 65,685.

Reconsideration denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Dana MILES.
    No. 2012-KP-0832.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 14, 2012.
   In re Miles, Dana; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. L, No. 04-97-0133; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011 KW 2132.

Granted. The ruling of the court of appeal is reversed and the trial court’s order of an evidentiary hearing on relator’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel as it relates to witnesses Davis and Sanders is reinstated.


text:
    Louie SCHEXNAYDER, Jr. v. Burl CAIN, et al.
    No. 2011-CI-0938.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 14, 2012.
   In re Schexnayder Jr., Louie; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 597452; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011 CW 0374.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Keith BREWER v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-1413.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 14, 2012.
   In re Brewer, Keith; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. K, No. 466-807; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-K-0477.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Montraygo Latron DRAKE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-2309.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 14, 2012.
   In re Drake, Montraygo Latron; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Ouachita, 4th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 08F1744; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 46,813-KH.

Denied.

JOHNSON, J., would grant with order.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Howell EALY v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-2497.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 14, 2012.
   In re Ealy, Howell; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 257,538; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 46,800-KH.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Ronald G. JENNINGS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-2504.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 14, 2012.
   In re Jennings, Ronald G.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 14260-05; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH-01325.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Cleopha FREDERICK v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-0118.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 14, 2012.
   In re Frederick, Cleopha; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedíal Writs, Parish of Tangipahoa, 21st Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 62878; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011 KW 1722.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2380 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Michael MILLER v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-0176.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 14, 2012.
   In re Miller, Michael; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 09-5395; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 11-KA-498.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Antoine SMITH v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-0367.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 14, 2012.
   In re Smith, Antoine; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. O, No. 08-06-0653; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011 KW 2045.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Herman PIERRE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-0445.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 14, 2012.
   In re Pierre, Herman; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 12-06-400; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011 KW 1927.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Gillispie ETHRIDGE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-0497.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 14, 2012.
   In re Ethridge, Gillispie; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div., No. 10251-95; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 11-01249.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Clemon LINDSEY v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-0531.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 14, 2012.
   In re Lindsey, Clemon; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. K, No. 388-564; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-K-1655.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Charles B. ANDERSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-0549.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 14, 2012.
   In re Anderson, Charles B.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Rapides, 9th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 294,876; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 10-01532.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Robbie Lee GUILLEARD v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-0576.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 14, 2012.
   In re Guilleard, Robbie Lee; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 251,891; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 47,-215-KH.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. George MORGAN, Sr. v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-0592.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 14, 2012.
   In re Morgan Sr., George; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Landry, 27th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 08-K-2836; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 11-01528.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Mario A. FUNES v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-0611.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 14, 2012.
   In re Funes, Mario A.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 08-5641; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 11-KA-595.

Denied.

GUIDRY, J., recused.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Alfred JONES.
    No. 2012-KO-0632.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 14, 2012.
   In re Jones, Alfred; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. B, No. 470-161; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-KA-0409.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Samuel REED.
    No. 2012-KO-0644.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 14, 2012.
   In re Reed, Samuel; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Charles, 29th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. KM17; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 11-KA-507.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. John D. LATHAN v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-0648.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 14, 2012.
   In re Lathan, John D.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Bienville, 2nd Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 42,480; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 47,-196-KH.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Yancy BRANCH v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-0649.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 14, 2012.
   In re Branch, Yancy; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. G, No. 498-085; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2012-K-0115.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Brandon J. FONTENOT.
    No. 2012-KO-0650.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 14, 2012.
   In re Fontenot, Brandon J.; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. G, No. 483-565; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-KA-0742.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Michael David GORDON.
    No. 2012-K-0659.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 14, 2012.
   In re Gordon, Michael David; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Avoyelles, 12th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 2010-CR-159939; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 11-898.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Richard MIKKELSON, Jr. v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-0671.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 14, 2012.
   In re Mikkelson Jr., Richard; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Rapides, 9th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 173-545.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; State v. Parker, 98-0256 (La.5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Shardae D. PITTMAN.
    No. 2012-KO-0680.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 14, 2012.
   In re Pittman, Shardae D.; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. K, No. 497-675; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-KA-0741.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Larry Richard BROWN a/k/a “Dike”.
    No. 2012-KO-0724.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 14, 2012.
   In re Brown, Larry Richard a/k/a “Dike”; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of East Carroll, 6th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 83,401; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 46,669-KA.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Roosevelt HOLMES v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-0752.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 14, 2012.
   In re Holmes, Roosevelt; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. I, No. 402-512; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2012-K-0327.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; State v. Parker, 98-0256 (La.5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694; La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Boris STOGNER v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-0758.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 14, 2012.
   In re Stogner, Boris; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Washington, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. J, No. 06-CR-10-94953; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011 KW 2389.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Joe STEPHENS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-0767.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 14, 2012.
   In re Stephens, Joe; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of West Feliciana, 20th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 06-9-337.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; cf. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4(D).


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Brian DANIELS.
    No. 2012-KP-0812.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 14, 2012.
   In re Daniels, Brian; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. L, No. 10-767; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 12-KH-116.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Terry J. BRADLEY v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-0816.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 14, 2012.
   In re Bradley, Terry J.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 07-02-0096; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011 KW 2885.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2380 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Roderick BETZ v. STATE Of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-0817.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 14, 2012.
   In re Betz, Roderick; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 02-99-111; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011-KW-2423.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.

WEIMER, J., recused.


author: TERRI F. LOVE, Judge. |! LEDET, J.,

text:
    Matthew BARRIOS v. SAFEWAY INSURANCE COMPANY, State Farm Insurance Company and Darrell Cuti.
    No. 2011-CA-1028.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.
    March 21, 2012.

      Richard V. Kohnke, Richard V. Kohnke, Sr. and Associates, New Orleans, LA, for PlaintiffAppellee.
    Nichole Laborde Romero, Borne & Wilkes, L.L.P., Lafayette, LA, for Defendant/Appellant.
    (Court composed of Judge JAMES F. McKAY, III, Judge DENNIS R. BAGNERIS, SR., Judge TERRI F. LOVE, Judge ROLAND L. BELSOME, Judge ROSEMARY LEDET).
   TERRI F. LOVE, Judge.

11 This is a tort suit for damages resulting from the loss of a pet dog that was killed in a pedestrian-motorist accident. The defendant, Safeway Insurance Company of Louisiana, appeals the trial court’s judgment that found their insured, Darrell Cuti, was solely at fault and awarded the dog’s owners, Ellen Dobson Barrios and Austin “Sonny” Barrios, Jr., $5,000.00 each in damages. We find that the evidence supports the assessment of fault against Mr. Cuti and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in its award of damages. Therefore, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On January 19, 2009, at approximately 7:30 p.m., the front end of the vehicle being operated by Mr. Cuti struck Sonny and Ellen Barrios’ seventeen-year old son, Matthew Barrios, and their twelve-year old Labrador retriever, Yellow. As a result of the accident, Matthew Barrios sustained personal injuries, and Yellow died on the scene.

The accident occurred on Main Street in Belle Chasse, Louisiana. Main Street is a residential two-way street without sidewalks. The posted speed limit on |2Main Street is fifteen miles per hour. At the time of the accident, Matthew Barrios was walking Yellow with a leash on Main Street in an easterly direction. Mr. Cuti’s vehicle was also traveling on Main Street in an easterly direction. Thus, Matthew Barrios was walking with his back facing Mr. Cuti’s oncoming vehicle.

At the accident scene, Mr. Cutí gave a statement to the investigating officer in which he admitted to speeding (driving thirty to thirty-three miles per hour in a fifteen miles per hour zone) and failing to keep a proper look-out (looking away from the roadway). According to the police report, Mr. Cutí admitted to the officer that “he looked away from the road for a second and when he looked back, he struck a pedestrian.” The pedestrian, Matthew Barrios, was unable to give a statement to the officers. There were apparently no witnesses to the accident.

Matthew Barrios commenced this suit against, among others, Mr. Cuti’s insurer, Safeway, seeking to recover for his own personal injuries. He filed a supplemental and amending petition that added his parents as plaintiffs in their capacity as owners of the dog. His parents asserted a claim for their mental anguish and property damage resulting from the loss of their dog. Before trial, Matthew Barrios’ personal injury claim was settled. His parents’ claim for the loss of their dog proceeded to trial.

The only issues tried were the “negligence of the parties and the valuation of damages for the loss of Yellow.” The parties stipulated to submit the matter on briefs, deposition testimony, and exhibits. The depositions of Matthew, Ellen, and Austin Barrios were introduced. Mr. Cutí died of unrelated causes before being | .¿deposed. Following the bench trial on briefs, the trial court found Mr. Cutí was solely at fault and awarded Sonny and Ellen Barrios each $5,000.00 for “the value of [their] lost pet and the mental anguish which [they] suffered” due to Mr. Cuti’s negligence. This appeal by Mr. Cuti’s insurer, Safeway, followed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

In Garcia v. Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development, this Court followed the standard of review for appellate courts as articulated in Stobart v. State, Through DOTD, 617 So.2d 880, 882 (La.1993):

A court of appeal may not set aside a trial court’s or a jury’s finding of fact in the absence of “manifest error” or unless it is clearly wrong.” Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So.2d 840 (La.1989). This court has announced a two-part test for the reversal of a factfinder’s determinations:
1) The appellate court must find from the record that a reasonable factual basis does not exist for the finding of the trial court; and
2) The appellate court must further determine that the record establishes that the finding is clearly wrong (manifestly erroneous). See Mart v. Hill, 505 So.2d 1120,1127 (La.1987).
This test dictates that a reviewing court must do more than simply review the record for some evidence which supports or controverts the trial court’s finding. Id. The reviewing court must review the record in its entirety to determine whether the trial court’s finding was clearly wrong or manifestly erroneous.

00-0930, pp. 3-4 (La.App. 4 Cir. 5/16/01), 787 So.2d 1142,1145.

| ¿FAULT ALLOCATION

Safeway’s first assignment of error argues that the trial court erred in finding its insured, Darrell Cutí, at fault and in not assessing any fault on the part of Matthew Barrios. Safeway claims that Matthew Barrios was at fault because he was in the middle of Mr. Cuti’s lane of travel and because he violated Louisiana Revised Statute 32:216. That statute discusses the duty of pedestrians to walk only on the left side of the highway facing traffic. In pertinent part, that statute states:

Where sidewalks are not provided, any pedestrian walking along and upon a highway shall, when practicable, walk only on the left side of the highway or its shoulder, facing traffic which may approach from the opposite direction.

The trial court has a great deal of discretion when allocating fault. Clement v. Frey, 95-1119, 95-1163, p. 5 (La.1/16/96), 666 So.2d 607, 609. Factual findings cannot be disturbed in the absence of manifest error. Stobart v. State of Louisiana, Through the DOTD, 617 So.2d 880 (La.1993). The issue to be resolved by this court is not whether the trial court was right or wrong, but whether the fact finder’s conclusion was a reasonable one. Id.

In allocating fault, the trial court found that Mr. Cutí breached his duty as a driver to maintain a careful lookout and to drive within the legal limit. See Parker v. Continental Insurance Co., 341 So.2d 593 (La.App. 2 Cir.1977). It determined that Mr. Cutí did not maintain a careful lookout and was driving fifteen to twenty miles over the speed limit prior to striking Matthew Barrios and Yellow. The trial court reasoned that the accident likely could have been avoided if Mr. Cutí had maintained a careful lookout and had driven within the legal speed limit of 15 miles per hour. Mr. Cutí admitted to speeding and to looking away prior to the accident.

LThe trial court declined to place any fault on the part of Matthew Barrios. It noted that he was on the far right side of the roadway and that he wore light blue jeans and a gray sweatshirt. The trial court stated its reasons for judgment that walking with a dog on the side of the lit roadway in the evening was not negligent. These findings by the trial court contradict Safeway’s claim that a violation of La. R.S. 32:216 was a cause in fact of the accident.

There is sufficient evidence in the record to support the trial court’s conclusion that Mr. Cuti’s conduct was the sole cause of the accident. Considering the record, we cannot say that the trial court’s assessment of sole negligence against Mr. Cutí was manifest error. We find no merit in this assignment of error.

DAMAGES

Safeway’s second assignment of error alleges that the trial court erred in awarding total damages of $10,000.00 to Ellen and Sonny Barrios for the loss of their dog.

In Louisiana, a domestic animal is considered corporeal movable property. Holland v. Teague, 43,496, p. 8 (La.App. 2 Cir. 9/17/08), 996 So.2d 325 at 329. An award for mental anguish, allegedly resulting from property damage, is permissible only when the property is damaged 1) by an intentional or illegal act; 2) by an act for which the tortfeasor will be strictly or absolutely liable; 3) by acts constituting a continuing nuisance; or 4) when the owner is present or nearby and suffers psychic trauma as a result. Holder v. State Farm Ins. Co., 520 So.2d 960 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 1987). The degree of mental stress suffered as a result of damage to property must be more than minimal worry and inconvenience over the consequences of the damage. Robertson v. Geophysical Service, Inc., 469 So.2d 22 (La.App. 1st Cir.1985). Every incident of property damage is necessarily | r,accompanied by some degree of worry and consternation, and the owner of damaged property may not recover for such mental anguish unless she proves that she has suffered a psychic trauma in the nature of or similar to a physical injury, as a direct result of the property damage. Trim v. South Eastern Exp., Inc., 562 So.2d 26 (La.App. 5 Cir. 1990).

The scope of review of factual findings of the trial court is well settled. In Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So.2d 840, 844 (La.1989), the Louisiana Supreme Court stated:

“[A] court of appeal may not set aside a trial court’s or a jury’s finding of fact in the absence of “manifest error” or unless it is “clearly wrong,” and where there is conflict in the testimony, reasonable evaluations of credibility and reasonable inferences of fact should not be disturbed upon review, even though the appellate court may feel that its own evaluations and inferences are as reasonable .... Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them cannot be manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong (emphasis supplied). In applying the manifestly erroneous-elearly wrong standard to the findings below, appellate courts must constantly have in mind that their initial review function is not to decide factual issues de novo.”

Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So.2d 840, 844.

In the matter subjudice, Ellen and Sonny Barrios allege that they suffered mental anguish as a result of the accident which brought about the demise of Yellow, a family pet. Safeway’s assignment of error contends that the record does not support the award of damages because the Barrioses did not experience severe mental anguish to merit recovery. It maintains that they were not present at the time of the accident and that they did not see a physician or psychiatrist as a result of their dog’s death, but only experienced the “natural human process of grieving.” Alternatively, Safeway argues that in the event the level of evidence rose to the ^standard of severe mental anguish, the trial court’s award of $5,000.00 each to the Barrioses was excessive.

In deciding the damages award, the trial judge found that Yellow was killed as a result of Mr. Cuti’s negligence. The trial judge noted that the plaintiffs were nearby and they immediately arrived at the accident scene to find their beloved dog deceased. The trial judge cited testimony from Mr. and Mrs. Barrios that established that Yellow was loved by the Barri-oses and was extremely valuable to them. Mr. Barrios retrieved Yellow’s remains the day after the accident from Animal Control and buried Yellow on his property. The trial judge reasoned that the plaintiffs suffered a severe loss and severe emotional distress as a result of the loss of their pet.

In her reasons for judgment, the trial judge stated the following:

The plaintiffs testified that they both have suffered severe emotional distress as a result of the loss of their beloved pet Ellen Barrios stated that Yellow was part of the family and that they are still grieving. Austin Barrios stated that he spent a lot of time with the dog as a member of the family and that he was still grieving over the loss of Yellow. The car accident that resulted in Yellow’s death was on Yellow’s birthday, a day that the family celebrated with a cook-out and a cake. Yellow was viewed by its owners as more than property, but as a member of the family. Austin Barrios testified that if he was not working then he was with Yellow.

Although a pet is considered corporeal movable property in Louisiana, clearly, pets are not inanimate objects. This Court takes judicial notice of the emotional bond that exists between some pets and their owners and the “family” status awarded some pets by their owners. In the present matter, the trial judge based her award of $5,000.00 each to the Barri-oses on her finding that they had a close family-like relationship with Yellow; that the dog was a part of their lives for approximately twelve years and that his loss caused them psychic trauma.

|8In appellate review of general damage awards, the court must accord much discretion to the trial court judge or jury. Reck v. Stevens, 373 So.2d 498 (La.1979). Reversal of a general damages award requires a showing that the trier of fact abused the great discretion accorded in awarding damages; the award must be so high or low in proportion to the injury that it shocks the conscience. Lino v. Allstate Ins. Co., 06-0166, p. 8 (La.App. 4 Cir. 8/2/06), 937 So.2d 888, 894. In deciding whether a trial court award is excessive, reviewing courts must first consider the individual circumstances of the subject case to determine whether the trial court abused its much discretion in setting the award. Only after determining that the award in the subject case was improper, may the reviewing court consider awards in similar cases. Brodtmann v. Duke, 96-0257, p. 21 (La.App. 4 Cir. 2/11/98), 708 So.2d 447, 459-460. In the instant matter, we do not find that the factual determinations that supported the awards were manifestly erroneous. Therefore, under the circumstances of this particular case, the damage awards do not constitute an abuse of the trial court’s discretion. This assignment of error lacks merit.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

I9BAGNERIS, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with reasons assigned by Judge LEDET.

LEDET, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with reasons.

|! LEDET, J.,

concurs in part and dissents in part with reasons.

I agree with the majority that the trial court did not err in allocating one hundred percent of the fault to the defendant, Darrell Cuti. However, I disagree with the majority’s finding that the trial court’s damage award “for the loss of the dog, Yellow, is supported by the record. The trial court awarded Ellen and Austin Barrios each $5,000 for the value of the lost pet and the mental anguish suffered” due to Mr. Cuti’s negligence. Despite the trial court’s wording of the damage award as a lump sum for both mental anguish damages and the value of the loss of the pet, the record does not support an award of property damages for the loss of Yellow.

Both Sonny and Ellen Barrios in their depositions denied sustaining any property damage as a result of Yellow’s death. Yellow was given to Sonny and Ellen Barrios as a puppy; they did not pay anything for Yellow. Although Yellow was full breed, Yellow was not registered. Yellow was not replaced with a new dog. Thus, the record does not support attributing any of the damage award to property damages. The dispositive issue is whether the entire award of $10,000 1 g($5,000 to both Sonny and Ellen Barrios) is supportable for mental anguish damages.

As the majority acknowledges, it is well settled under Louisiana law that a dog is a corporeal movable. Smith v. University Animal Clinic, Inc., 09-745, p. 1 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/10/10), 30 So.3d 1154, 1156 (citing Holland v. Teague, 43,496 (La.App. 2 Cir. 9/17/08), 996 So.2d 325). The jurisprudence has limited the recovery of mental anguish damages for damages to property to four categories of cases:

(1) when the property was damaged by an intentional or illegal act;
(2) when the property was damaged by acts giving rise to strict or absolute liability;
(3) when the property was damaged by activities amounting to a continuous nuisance; and
(4) under circumstances where the owner was present or nearby at the time the damage occurred and suffered psychic trauma in the nature of or similar to a physical injury as a direct result of the incident itself.

Doerr v. Mobil Oil Corp., 04-1789, pp. 8-9 (La.App. 4 Cir. 6/14/06), 935 So.2d 231, 237 (citing Frank L. Maraist and Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Louisiana Tort Law § 7.02[6] (2d ed.2004)). The jurisprudence has further limited such recovery by requiring a showing of severe emotional distress as opposed to the usual worry or anxiety that results from damage to one’s property. Smith, 09-745, p. 2, 30 So.3d at 1156 (citingDoerr, supra).

Noting that “Yellow was killed when the plaintiffs were nearby” and that Sonny and Ellen Barrios arrived immediately after the accident and saw Yellow dead on the road, the trial court found this case fell within the fourth category — “situated nearby.” Given the facts of this case, it is debatable whether the requirement for the fourth category was satisfied. See Freyou v. Iberia Parish | ^School Bd., 94-1371 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/3/95), 657 So.2d 161(denying mental anguish claim resulting from damage to sugarcane fields because the plaintiffs residence located eight miles away did not equate to “nearby.”)

The record reflects that when the accident occurred Sonny and Ellen Barrios were at home. A Domino’s pizza driver came to their home and informed them of the accident. They immediately drove to the accident scene. According to Sonny Barrios, the drive from their home to the accident scene took about two minutes. When they arrived at the accident scene, they saw Yellow’s body, which was not covered, lying on the street quite a distance from where their son’s body was located. At the accident scene, Sonny and Ellen Barrios’ attention was focused not on Yellow, but on their injured son. Indeed, Sonny Barrios testified that he did not walk over to check on Yellow until after the ambulance departed with his son. Sonny Barrios further testified that the police took care of removing Yellow’s body from the accident scene. The next day he retrieved Yellow’s body from Animal Control and took it to be buried.

Assuming the facts of this ease satisfy the requirement for being nearby, the issue is whether the record supports a finding that Sonny and Ellen Barrios “suffered psychic trauma in the nature of or similar to a physical injury as a direct result of the incident itself,” as required to recover mental anguish damages. Simply stated, the mental anguish which gives rise to a claim for damages must be real mental injury. Heard v. Affordable Movers, Inc., 40,432, pp. 5-8 (La.App. 2 Cir. 12/14/05), 917 So.2d 722, 726-27 (collecting and discussing cases). Based on the record in this case, I cannot conclude that Sonny and Ellen Barrios established |4they suffered a real mental injury or a “psychic trauma in the nature of or similar to a physical injury.”

Neither Sonny nor Ellen Barrios sought medical, psychiatric, or psychological treatment following the accident; neither of them took any prescription drugs or medication. In their testimony, Sonny and Ellen Barrios failed to articulate any particular symptoms they suffered other than their long-term grieving. Indeed, Sonny Barrios described his loss as a result of Yellow’s demise as follows: “[u]nder the circumstances that happened probably we never got to grieve Yellow.” Ellen Barrios described the emotional distress and psychological pain and suffering she suffered as a result of Yellow’s demise as follows: “the hard thing, the family as whole — you know, like Sonny said, we didn’t get to grieve him because at the time that we lost him — I mean, he was a loved family pet.... And having Matthew [(their son) ] go through what he did and being concerned that we were going to lose our child and losing our dog it was — it was really hard on all of us.” She further testified that the family was “still grieving.”

Although I sympathize with Sonny and Ellen Barrios regarding the loss of their dog, who the majority and the trial court emphasized was like a family member, the record does not support an award of mental anguish damages to them. Accordingly, I would reverse the trial court’s damage award.

For these reasons, I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part.


author: GUIDRY, J.

text:
    Ernie L. VALLERY v. LOUISIANA STATE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY.
    No. 2011 CA 1315.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.
    May 2, 2012.
    Rehearing Denied Aug. 15, 2012.

      Ernie L. Vallery, Pollack, LA, Plaintiff Pro Se.
    Lisa W. Jordan, New Orleans, LA, for Appellants The Louisiana Environmental Action Network and Howard Charrier.
    Ann B. Hill, Jackie M. Marve, Baton Rouge, LA, for Defendant/Appellee Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality.
    Richard E. Matheny, Steven J. Levine, J. Alan Harrell, Patrick O’Hara, Baton Rouge, LA, for Defendant/Appellee Vanguard Synfuels, LLC.
    Before WHIPPLE, KUHN, and GUIDRY, JJ.
   GUIDRY, J.

12At issue in this appeal is simply a procedural question of whether a party may file a petition to intervene in an action on judicial review after the time delay allowed for filing a petition for judicial review has elapsed.

On January 16, 2007, Ernie Vallery filed a petition for judicial review against the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality (LDEQ) seeking review of the LDEQ’s denial of a public hearing on a Louisiana Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (LPDES) permit issued to Vanguard Synfuels, LLC on December 13, 2006. Pursuant to articles 1033 and 1091 of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure, the prospective intervenors, the Louisiana Environmental Action Network (LEAN) and Howard Charrier, fax filed a petition on April 5, 2007, seeking to intervene in the action for judicial review filed by Val-lery. In addition to contesting the LDEQ’s failure to grant a public hearing, however, the prospective intervenors also challenged the issuance of the LPDES permit on grounds that the permit was issued in violation of state constitutional provisions and state water quality regulations.

In response to the petition for intervention, Vanguard filed peremptory exceptions raising the objections of no cause of action, no right of action and peremption. In the meantime, a hearing on Vallery’s original petition seeking a public hearing was held on April 16, 2007, following which, the district court rendered judgment in open court remanding the matter to the LDEQ to conduct a public hearing on the permit that had been issued.

|sAs a result of the remand and applications for supervisory writs filed by the LDEQ and Vanguard, which were denied by this court, a hearing on Vanguard’s exceptions objecting to the prospective in-tervenors’ petition was not held until December 14, 2009. At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court found merit in the objections urged by Vanguard and sustained the exceptions. Following the denial of their motion for new trial, the prospective intervenors filed the instant appeal.

We find no error in the district court’s ruling. The Louisiana Supreme Court has held that judicial review of a decision of an administrative agency is an exercise of a court’s appellate jurisdiction pursuant to La. Const, art. V, § 16(B), rather than a district court’s original jurisdiction under La. Const, art. V, § 16(A). Willows v. State, Department of Health & Hospitals, 08-2357, p. 6 (La.5/5/09), 15 So.3d 56, 60; In re American Waste & Pollution Control Co., 588 So.2d 367, 370-71 (La.1991). The grant of original jurisdiction refers to judicial adjudications in the first instance with the adjudicative tribunal being the forum in which the initial adjudication is made. It does not refer to judicial review of decisions of administrative agencies. Metro Riverboat Associates, Inc. v. Louisiana Gaming Control Board, 01-0185, p. 5 (La.10/16/01), 797 So.2d 656, 660. Therefore, consistent with this court’s opinion in Matter of BASF Corporation, Chemical Division, 533 So.2d 971 (La.App. 1st Cir.1988), writs denied, 539 So.2d 624 (La.1989) and 541 So.2d 900 (La.1989), we find the prospective interve-nors do not have a right to intervene at the judicial review stage of the subject administrative proceedings, as an action for intervention pursuant to the Code of Civil Procedure pertains to ordinary proceedings and typically is an incidental 14demand to a pending principal action prior to the rendition of a final judgment in the principal action. See Matter of BASF Corporation, 533 So.2d at 974 n. 4.

According to La. R.S. 30:2050.11, an aggrieved person is granted the right to intervene as a party in an environmental regulatory proceeding at the adjudicatory hearing stage; however, once an adjudication has occurred, the proper remedy for an aggrieved person to contest a final decision or order of the LDEQ is to appeal the decision or order in accordance with La. R.S. 30:2050.21. See Matter of BASF Corporation, 533 So.2d at 974. Louisiana Revised Statute 30:2050.21 expressly provides that “[a] petition for review must be filed in the [Nineteenth Judicial District Court] within thirty days after notice of the action or ruling being appealed has been given.” (Emphasis added.) The prospective inter-venors fax filed their petition on April 5, 2007, which was more than 30 days after the December 15, 2006 notice of the LDEQ’s action of granting the final LPDES permit. Thus, their petition, filed outside of the 80-day time period provided in La. R.S. 30:2050.21, was untimely, and the district court properly sustained Vanguard’s exceptions objecting to the petition of the prospective intervenors on this basis.

We therefore affirm the January 19, 2010 judgment of the district court sustaining the peremptory exceptions based on the objections of no cause of action and peremption. All costs of this appeal are cast to the prospective intervenors, Louisiana Environmental Action Network and Howard Charrier.

AFFIRMED.

      . The LDEQ notified Vanguard and Mr. Val-lery of its decision by certified letters dated December 15, 2006.

      . The district court also denied a motion to dismiss and overruled exceptions to Mr. Val-lery's petition for judicial review filed by the LDEQ and adopted by Vanguard. Prior to the district court’s signing of a written judgment in conformity with its April 16, 2007 ruling, Vallery amended his petition for judicial review to challenge the issuance of the LPDES permit as being in violation of state constitutional provisions and state water quality regulations.

      . See Vallery v. Louisiana State Department of Environmental Quality, 07-0934 (La.App. 1st Cir.08/21/07) and Vallery v. Louisiana State Department of Environmental Quality, 07-0944 (La.App. 1st Cir.08/21/07) (unpublished writ actions).

      . Although the December 15, 2006 notices were sent only to Vanguard and Vallery, La. R.S. 30:2050.23(0 lists the persons generally entitled to notice, and at the time the December 15, 2006 notices were sent, the prospective intervenors had not presented themselves in any manner by which the LDEQ would be obligated to provide them notice in accordance with La. R.S. 30:2050.23. From our review of the record, as of December 15, 2006, only Vallery had submitted a public comment in response to the LDEQ’s July 2006 published notice soliciting public comments in connection with the draft LPDES permit prepared for Vanguard, which therefore entitled him to notice of the final permit action. See A to Z Paper Company, Inc. v. State, Department of Environmental Quality, 99-1710, p. 4 (La.App. 1st Cir.9/22/00), 770 So.2d 445, 447.


author: MARION F. EDWARDS, Chief Judge.

text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Brendan KING.
    No. 11-KA-985.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fifth Circuit.
    May 31, 2012.

      Frank Sloan, Attorney at Law, Louisiana Appellate Project, Mandeville, LA, for Defendant/Appellant.
    Panel composed of Judges MARION F. EDWARDS, SUSAN M. CHEHARDY, and MARC E. JOHNSON.
   MARION F. EDWARDS, Chief Judge.

12Pefendant/appellant, Brendan King (“King”), appeals his conviction and sentence on a charge of theft of a value of more than $500 in violation of La. R.S. 14:67. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

King, who is a car mechanic by profession, was restoring a recently purchased car for Joyce LeBlanc (“Ms. LeBlanc”). During the restoration process, Ms. Le-Blanc allowed King to live in her home. Subsequently, Ms. LeBlanc received a call from her bank, notifying her that her account was overdrawn. Upon investigation, Ms. LeBlanc discovered that King had gained access to her checkbook and written several checks to “Cash” totaling $4,390. King forged Ms. LeBlanc’s signature and cashed the checks. King endorsed the checks using his driver’s license for identification.

After Ms. LeBlanc reported the theft, the St. John the Baptist Parish District Attorney’s Office filed a bill of information charging King with theft of $500 or more in violation of La. R.S. 14:67. On November 30, 2009, King pled guilty as charged, and the trial judge sentenced him to imprisonment at hard labor for five years that was suspended and deferred under La.C.Cr.P. art. 893. That article allows suspension and deferral of sentence and probation under certain [«¡circumstances. King was accepted into a drug court program on December 3, 2009.

On August 17, 2011, the trial judge revoked King’s drug court probation for lack of compliance with the conditions of the drug court probation and sentenced him to imprisonment at hard labor for five years, the original sentence imposed and deferred. King filed a timely motion for appeal on August 19, 2011 that was granted.

During the guilty plea colloquy, the trial judge stated that the factual circumstances indicated King stole eleven checks from an individual and named himself as the payee on those checks. When the trial judge asked King if those facts were correct, King answered affirmatively. The bill of information alleged that the offenses occurred on or between January 8 and February 1, 2009. Additionally, the waiver of rights form indicates that the amount stolen was $4,390.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

In brief to this Court, King asserts the trial court abused its discretion in failing to permit him to withdraw his guilty plea before sentencing. King argues that the trial judge erred by not allowing him to withdraw his guilty plea before imposing the five-year sentence. He asks this Court to vacate his sentence or, alternatively, to conditionally vacate his sentence and remand the matter so the trial court can conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the plea bargain ought to be enforced or whether he ought to be provided with an opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea.

King does not assign any error regarding the revocation of the drug court probation or suggest that he complete the program. His arguments are restricted to |4the issue of whether, after the revocation, he should have been allowed to withdraw his guilty plea.

At the drug court revocation hearing, the prosecutor said there had been some conversation at sidebar at the last court hearing regarding King’s understanding of whether he had pled into the drug court program. The prosecutor produced the transcript of King’s plea and argued that it clearly showed it was a drug court plea.

Defense counsel responded that the issue was whether or not King had the ability and the right to file a motion to withdraw the guilty plea based on the fact that he originally agreed to a one-year drug court program, but that was not what was assigned or imposed upon him. The prosecutor countered that it was a two-year drug court program. The prosecutor noted that, on the conditions of drug court form, Judge Jasmine had crossed out the one-year and put two years.

Alternatively, the prosecutor argued that that issue was moot because King did not even last one year in the program. She additionally asserted that the minutes reflected that he had a thirty-day opt-out period to question anything. She stated that each minute entry indicated King was advised of the opt-out period and that he could have asked any questions, or questioned the time period for the drug court program during those thirty days. The prosecutor noted that King had signed the conditions of drug court form agreeing to the two years after Judge Jasmine crossed out the one year. Finally, the prosecutor asked the trial judge to sentence King to five years in the Department of Corrections since he was “revoked out of the drug court program.”

After hearing arguments of counsel and reviewing the transcript of the Boykin colloquy, the trial judge stated:

IsClearly, in my discussion with him, I’m mentioning Judge Jasmine many times. I’m mentioning drug court many times. I’m mentioning the fact that Judge Jasmine will actually take actions at drug court. And clearly there’s no, “Stop, Your Honor, I don’t think I’m worried about drug court here.”
So really, I’m agreeing with Ms. Din-vaut today, that I’m going to revoke and impose those first five years as originally contemplated in this Boykin. I know he differs in his appreciation of what the Boykin may or may not have contained, but here it is in black and white.
And so I see my way through to now sentencing him to those five years and not permitting him to take his plea away.... But at this point, based on what I’m hearing today and the argument and the condition of this Record, I am going to impose the original suspended term of five years giving him credit for all time served.

If a defendant pleads guilty, he normally waives all non-jurisdictional defects in the proceedings leading up to the guilty plea, and precludes review of such defects either by appeal or post-conviction relief. Additionally, once a defendant is sentenced, only those guilty pleas that are constitutionally infirm may be withdrawn by appeal or post-conviction relief. A guilty plea is constitutionally infirm if it is not entered freely and voluntarily, if the Boykin colloquy is inadequate, or when a defendant is induced to enter the plea by a plea bargain or what he justifiably believes was a plea bargain and that bargain is not kept.

Although King did not file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea in the district court, he is not prohibited from challenging a constitutionally infirm guilty plea either by means of appeal or post-conviction relief.

The record shows that, on November 30, 2009, the prosecutor informed the trial judge that King wanted to plead guilty “pursuant to going into the drug program.” The trial judge then engaged in a colloquy with King where he advised King of his rights and ascertained that King understood them and wanted to waive | (¡them. The trial court explained that probation was the minimum and twelve years of imprisonment was the maximum sentence for the crime to which King was pleading guilty. King indicated his attorney had informed him of the possible sentencing range. The trial court informed King that his sentence was five years, suspended and deferred under the terms of La.C.Cr.P. art. 893. Afterward, the trial judge found that King knowingly, intelligently, freely, and voluntarily waived his rights, and then he accepted King’s plea.

The trial judge subsequently asked King, “You’re hoping to get into adult drug court?” King responded, ‘Tes, Your Hon- or.” The trial judge then stated that there were a number of conditions of probation that would be imposed by the drug court judge, Judge Jasmine. The trial judge also stated that he was going to ask Judge Jasmine to “complete sentencing in forms of probation and imposing the formal conditions of drug court probation.” The trial judge told King that if he successfully completed drug court, his case would “go away.”

On December 3, 2009, King appeared before Judge Jasmine. The judge confirmed that King was there to be placed on probation and advised of the conditions of probation. Before conditions of probation were imposed, Judge Jasmine asked King if he had any questions, and he said, “No, ma’am.” Judge Jasmine then advised King of the conditions of probation. Afterward, she advised King of the drug court conditions.

Judge Jasmine stated that King must enter the Intensive Drug Court Program. When she asked if that was for one or two years, the prosecutor responded that it was for two years. Judge Jasmine said,

“It says two but this says one. So I’m making this two, a minimum period of two years, and successfully complete the program.” She advised King that, at any time within thirty days of the taking of the plea, King, the judge, or the State could rescind this agreement, at |7which time King would withdraw from the drug court program, withdraw his plea, and return to the regular criminal trial docket. King indicated he understood. Judge Jasmine asked King if he understood all the conditions she had just read, and King said, “Yes, ma’am.” She asked King if he had any questions about any of them, and he said, “No.” When Judge Jasmine asked defense counsel if he was satisfied that King understood, defense counsel replied, “Yes, Judge.” Afterward, Judge Jasmine welcomed King to drug court.

The waiver of rights form and the Boykin colloquy adequately show that King was informed of his rights and the consequences of his plea, and that the plea was entered into freely and voluntarily. Also, King was sentenced in conformity with the plea agreement, which called for a five-year sentence that would be suspended and deferred under La.C.Cr.P. art. 893.

Additionally, there is nothing in the record to indicate that King was induced to enter the plea by a plea bargain, or what he justifiably believed was a plea bargain, and that bargain was not kept. The “Conditions of Drug Court Probation” form shows that King agreed to enter the drug court program for a minimum period of two years. Although the form provided for a one-year period, the “one” was crossed out, and the number “two” was written above it. Judge Jasmine also advised King during the colloquy that the drug court probation program was for two years. Further, the form shows that King agreed that, in the event he failed to complete the program, his drug court probation would be revoked, and he would be sentenced in accordance with the plea agreement. Also, the prosecutor asserted, without contradiction, that King did not comply with the drug court program for even one year.

Moreover, the Drug Court form provided that, at any time within thirty days of the taking of the plea, King, the court, or the State could rescind the plea |sagreement, at which time King would withdraw from the drug court program, withdraw his plea, and return to the regular criminal docket. The “Conditions of Drug Court Probation” form was signed by King indicating that he understood the conditions of drug court probation and agreed to them. That form was also signed by King’s attorney indicating that he read and explained the conditions of probation to King. Judge Jasmine gave King the opportunity to ask questions regarding the drug court probation program, but he had none.

Under the circumstances of this case, we do not find the trial court erred in refusing to allow King to withdraw his guilty plea.

ERRORS PATENT

The record was reviewed for errors patent. In that review, we find that the transcript shows the trial judge correctly advised King that he had “two years to file an application for post-conviction relief after the trajectory of the sentencing and conviction become final.” However, the minute entry reflects that King was advised he had “2 yrs. to file Post Conviction relief after this sentence becomes final.” The transcript prevails. Accordingly, we remand this matter to the trial court with instructions to amend and correct the minute entry to conform to the transcript.

AFFIRMED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS

      . State v. Wingerter, 05-697 (La.App. 5 Cir. 3/14/06), 926 So.2d 662, 664.

      . State v. McCoil, 05-658 (La.App. 5 Cir. 2/27/06), 924 So.2d 1120, 1124.

      . Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969).

      . McCoil, supra, at 1124.

      . Id.

      . La.C.Cr.P. art. 920; State v. Oliveaux, 312 So.2d 337 (La.1975).

      . State v. Lynch, 441 So.2d 732, 734 (La.1983).