author: WHIPPLE, J. McDONALD, J.

text:
    LOUISIANA LOCAL GOVERNMENT ENVIRONMENTAL FACILITIES and Community Development Authority v. ALL TAXPAYERS, Property Owners, Citizens of the State of Louisiana and Non-Residents Owning Property or Subject to Taxation therein and all other Persons Interested in or Affected in any way by the Issuance of Bonds or other Evidences of Indebtedness by the Louisiana Local Government Environmental Facilities & Community Development Authority.
    No. 2011 CA 0027.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.
    Feb. 2, 2011.
    Rehearing Denied Feb. 22, 2011.

      Linda S. Akchin, Christopher J. Dichar-ry, Baton Rouge, LA, for Defendants/First Appellants, PCS Nitrogen Fertilizer, et al.
    James R. Lewis, Michael T. Durham, Donald L. Cunningham, Baton Rouge, LA, for Plaintiff/Second Appellant, Louisiana Local Government Environmental Facilities and Community Development Authority-
    Gordon Dallon Bush, II, Gonzales, LA, for Plaintiff/Third Appellant City of St. Gabriel.
    Russell J. Stutes, Jr., Lake Charles, LA, for Defendant/Appellee, Iberville Parish Sales & Use Tax Department.
    Before WHIPPLE, GAIDRY, and McDonald, jj.
   WHIPPLE, J.

|sThis matter arises from a suit brought by the Louisiana Local Government Environmental Facilities and Community Development Authority (the LCDA), to establish the validity and legality of the issuance of Series 2010 Bonds for the benefit of the City of St. Gabriel pursuant to the Bond Validation Act, La.Rev.Stat. Ann. §§ 13:5121, et seq. The appeals from the trial court’s denial of the motion for judgment are being given expedited consideration in accordance with La.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 13:5128. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the trial court’s denial of the motion for judgment, render judgment declaring the Series 2010 Bonds valid, and remand this matter to the trial court for disposition, as may be appropriate, of the pending “Reconventional Demand and/or Third-Party Demand and/or Cross-Claim” and any other unresolved matters.

The Senes 2010 Bonds

The LCDA seeks to issue $14,500,000.00 in revenue bonds on behalf of the City of St. Gabriel (the City). The Series 2010 Bonds are to be used to fund various infrastructure projects, including sewage, wastewater, and highway improvements.

This financing endeavor began on May 20, 2010, when the City passed Resolution No.2010-0001-0520, requesting the LCDA issue revenue bonds in an amount not to exceed $14,500,000.00. An application was filed with the LCDA, and on June 10, 2010, the LCDA adopted a resolution granting preliminary approval to the issuance of the Series 2010 Bonds.

The State Bond Commission asked the LCDA and the City to adopt amending resolutions clarifying the security for the Series 2010 Bonds and |4to include certain bond covenants and language. In response, the LCDA adopted an Amending Resolution on July 8, 2010. The Amending Resolution specified that the LCDA would fund a loan to the City through proceeds obtained from the issuance of the Series 2010 Bonds and that the City would service its obligation under the loan agreement by a pledge of the “lawfully available funds” of the City, including a 1% sales and use tax imposed and levied by the City.

The City also adopted Resolution 2010-0002-0916, establishing that any debt obligation of the City related to the issuance of the Series 2010 Bonds would be repayable from and secured by the 1% sales and use tax earlier approved by the voters and collected in the City. If the taxes collected were insufficient to meet the payments, the City would utilize all sources of lawfully available funds to satisfy the obligations resulting from the Series 2010 Bonds. Without revenue generated by the 1% sales and use tax, the City will be unable to pay back the bond obligation.

The City’s 1% Sales and, Use Tax

For a complete understanding of the legal issues herein, the history of the City’s 1% sales and use tax must be explored. On April 18, 1996, the City passed a resolution requesting a special election to authorize implementation of the 1% sales and use tax. The voters approved the tax, and thereafter, on August 1, 1996, the City enacted Ordinance # 1996-10, imposing a 1% sales and use tax within the incorporated limits of the City, from and after October 1,1996.

A group of corporate taxpayers within the city, including predecessors to the seven taxpayers herein, filed suit, disputing the validity of the 1% Usales and use tax. The dispute reached this court in the matter of Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. Town of St. Gabriel ex rel. Grace, 98-0935 (La.App. 1 Cir. 4/1/99); 740 So.2d 147, writ granted, 99-1223 (La.5/28/99); 743 So.2d 676 (application for cert. dismissed by the parties on October 13, 1999) (St. Gabriel I). In St. Gabriel I, this court declared the tax “unlawful,” because the 1% sales and use tax when added to the aggregate rate of sales tax within the municipality exceeded the then-applicable 4% aggregate maximum for sales and use taxes set by La.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 33:2721.6. St. Gabriel I, 740 So.2d at 150. The City successfully applied to the Louisiana Supreme Court for writs of certiorari and review; however, in 1999, the City and the corporate taxpayers entered into a settlement agreement, and as part of that agreement, the City voluntarily dismissed its action pending in the Louisiana Supreme Court. The City agreed to suspend the levy and collection of 2/3 of the 1% sales and use tax with respect to the corporate taxpayers for ten years (October 1999-October 2009). The compromise was memorialized on November 18, 1999, in Ordinance # 1999-3, which provided that the City would roll back the 1% tax to a 1/3% tax within the incorporated limits.

Approximately three months after this court’s decision in St Gabriel I, and prior to the compromise agreement, the Louisiana Legislature amended La.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 33:2721.6 to increase the maximum aggregate sales tax rate from 4% to 5%. See 1999 La. Acts No. 679 (eff.07/1/99).

On November 15, 2007, the City .passed Ordinance # 2007-0001-1115. Ordinance # 2007-0001-1115 rescinded Ordinance # 1999-3 and ratified all [¿provisions of earlier Ordinance # 1996-10 (imposing the 1% sales and use tax). In response, the Parish of Iberville Sales Tax Department (the Collector) sued the City, seeking in-junctive relief precluding collection of the full 1% sales and use tax. The Collector maintained that, because in 2006 the Parish of Iberville passed an additional 1% sales tax to be implemented in 1/3% increments over three years, the City’s 1% sales and use tax again caused the aggregate tax levy to exceed the 5% statutory aggregate maximum found in R.S. 33:2721.6. The Collector was successful at the trial court, and the City appealed.

Sitting en banc, this court expressly overruled its prior decision in St Gabriel I. Parish of Iberville Sales Tax Department v. City of St. Gabriel, 08-1780 (La. App. 1 Cir. 7/22/09); 21 So.3d 955, 961 (St. Gabriel II). In reversing the trial court judgment in favor of the Collector, the majority concluded that, “pursuant to LSA-R.S. 33:2711, incorporated municipalities are authorized to levy and collect sales and use taxes not in excess of 2 1/2% upon satisfying the procedural requirements of that statute, without reference to the limitations imposed on parishes and school boards by LSA-R.S. 33:2721.6(A)(2).” St. Gabriel II, 21 So.3d at 961. Thus, the City was not limited by the statutory maximum set forth in La. Rev.Stat. Ann. § 33:2721.6.

However, the litigation over the City’s 1% sales and use tax did not end with this court’s decision in St. Gabriel II. On December 11, 2009, the |7City filed suit against the Collector, seeking injunctive relief directing the Collector to collect the full 1% sales and use tax (City of St. Gabriel v. Iberville Parish Sales Tax Department, 68,512-A, Eighteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Iberville). Six taxpayers intervened, challenging the legality of the tax in light of the City’s 1% sales and use tax causing the aggregate sales and use tax to exceed La.Rev.Stat. Ann.' § 33:2721.6(A)(2)’s aggregate maximum, now set at 5%. Additional litigation has also been filed in the Eighteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Iberville, between March and May of 2010, by individual corporate taxpayers. The corporate taxpayers have paid taxes under protest and filed suits seeking refunds. The corporate taxpayers allege the City’s 1% sales and use tax is illegal as written, as it exceeds the 5% limitation on aggregate taxes imposed by La.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 33:2721.6.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Turning again to the present litigation, the City, by Resolution # 2010-0002-0916, authorized the filing of the present suit in accordance with the Bond Validation Act. On October 20, 2010, the LCDA filed the Motion for Judgment in the Nineteenth Judicial District Court. The LCDA sought a judgment declaring:

1. The Series 2010 Bonds to be valid and legal;
2. The means provided for the payment and security of the Series 2010 Bonds to be valid and legal;
3. The pledges of revenues securing the Series 2010 Bonds to be valid and legal;
|84. All covenants and provisions of the resolutions and ordinances associated with the issuance of the Series 2010 Bonds to be valid and legal;
5. The Collector must remit the tax to the City to ensure the City can satisfy its obligations under the loan agreement with the LCDA, as well as to ensure the pledge of revenues under the Series 2010 Bonds will be available as security to the bondholders; and
6. That all of the proceedings and matters upon which the validity and legality of the foregoing is based are valid and legal.

Lastly, the LCDA sought a permanent injunction to prevent any person from instituting any action or proceeding contesting the validity of the Series 2010 Bonds, the security for the Series 2010 Bonds, the validity and collection of the Tax, and the validity of the resolutions or ordinances, or any other proceedings or matters.

Notice of the hearing on the Motion for Judgment was published in the newspapers, and a certified copy of the Motion for Judgment was provided to the State Bond Commission and the Louisiana Attorney General. On November 15, 2010, seven taxpayers responded to the Motion for Judgment, to wit: PCS Nitrogen Fertilizer, LP; Williams Olefins, L.L.C; Cos-Mar Company; Total Petrochemicals USA, Inc.; Syngenta Crop Protection, Inc.; In-eos Fluor Americas, LLC; and Taminco Higher Amines, Inc. (collectively referred to as the Taxpayers). The Taxpayers filed 1 flnumerous pleadings, including peremptory exceptions objecting to nonjoinder and res judicata, a motion to consolidate, and a “Reconventional Demand and/or Third-Party Demand and/or Cross-Claim.” Broadly stated, the Taxpayers object to the Series 2010 Bonds on the basis that the City’s 1% sales and use tax proposed as the means of payment and security for the bonds “is illegal, both as written and as applied to them.” The Taxpayers named the LCDA, the City, and the Collector as defendants in their third-party demands.

On December 16, 2010, the trial court heard arguments concerning the exceptions and motions. At the hearing, the trial court:

1. Denied the Taxpayers’ motion to consolidate;
2. Denied the Taxpayers’ peremptory exception raising the objection of res judicata;
3. Sustained the Taxpayers’ peremptory exception of nonjoinder as to the City and ordered the City joined as a party plaintiff.
4. Denied the Taxpayers’ peremptory exception of nonjoinder as to the Collector.

At the trial of the Motion for Judgment, the LCDA and the Taxpayers submitted a joint stipulation and introduced numerous documents into evidence. The LCDA also presented testimony from several witnesses. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court denied the LCDA’s Motion for Judgment. The trial court explained that the validity of the City’s 1% sales and use tax has been the source of litigation since 1996. The trial court concluded that St. Gabriel I and II are valid yet “conflicting decisions.” The hncourt reasoned that the two First Circuit decisions and the pending lawsuits in Iberville Parish, do not “afford the stability and reliability that the financial market is really looking for, and I would be doing everyone a disservice to validate this bond issue at this time.”

A written judgment was signed on December 22, 2010. The judgment memorialized the trial court’s interlocutory rulings and denied the LCDA’s Motion for Judgment, entering judgment on the Motion for Judgment in favor of the Taxpayers. The judgment denying the Motion for Judgment was expressly designated by the trial court as final and immediately appealable under La.Code Civ. Proc. Ann. art. 1915(B).

THE INSTANT APPEALS

Despite the trial court’s denial of the LCDA’s “Motion for Judgment,” the Taxpayers filed an appeal with this court, asserting three assignments of error, and eight legal issues for consideration. The assignments of error are:

1. The trial court erred in denying the Taxpayers’ peremptory exception of res judicata and not declaring the St. Gabriel 1% sales and use tax non-collectible from the Taxpayers.
2. The trial court erred in denying the Taxpayers’ peremptory exception of nonjoinder, in part, as to the joinder of the Tax Collector, not declaring the back taxes non-collectible from Taxpayers, and not ordering the Collector to refund the Taxpayers the amount of tax paid under protest since January 2010, plus accrued interest.
| n3. The trial court erred in failing to either (a) recognize that St. Gabriel II is neither binding nor controlling; or (b) address the question of the illegality of the 1% sales and use tax on its merits; or (c) declare the 1% sales and use tax illegal; or (d) order a refund to the Taxpayers of all tax paid under protest, plus accrued statutory interest.

The LCDA also appealed, asserting the following three issues for review:

1. Did the trial court err in denying the Motion for Judgment and invalidating the proposed issuance of the Series 2010 Bonds, as there were no substantial defects or material errors and omissions in the issue?
2. Did the trial court err in concluding that St. Gabriel I and St. Gabriel II are conflicting final judgments, potentially restricting the tax base to be used by the City as payment and security for the Series 2010 Bonds?
3. Did the trial court commit manifest error in failing to certify the denial of the Taxpayers’ peremptory exceptions of res judicata and nonjoinder, and their motion to consolidate, as final and immediately appealable?

The City also obtained an order for appeal; however, no brief was filed with this court. Assignments of error that are not briefed are deemed |]2abandoned under Rule 2-12.4 of the Uniform Rules of Courts of Appeal. Accordingly, the City’s appeal is deemed abandoned.

DISCUSSION

Appellate Jurisdiction

As a preliminary matter, this court must first determine which issues are properly before us. The LCDA correctly points out that the trial court certified only the denial of its primary demand, i.e., the Motion for Judgment, as immediately ap-pealable under La.Code Civ. Proc. art. 1915(B).

On review, we find no error in the trial court’s designation, as the denial of the Motion for Judgment clearly decides the merits of the primary action. Moreover, the expeditious treatment afforded to actions brought pursuant to the Bond Validation Act supports the need for immediate review. La.Code Civ. Proc. Ann. art. 1915; R.J. Messinger, Inc. v. Rosenblum, 04-1664 (La.3/2/05); 894 So.2d 1113, 1122.

The LCDA maintains the Taxpayers have no right to appeal the denial of their exception raising the objection of res judi-cata, as the trial court’s ruling was interlocutory, and La.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 13:5128 only allows for an appeal to the court of appeal, or the Louisiana Supreme Court, where |iapermitted by the constitution, “from a final judgment.” Lastly, the LCDA observes that the trial court did not designate the denial of the Taxpayers’ exception of res judicata as a final judgment for the purpose of an immediate appeal under La.Code Civ. Proc. Ann. art. 1915.

The denial of the exception objecting to res judicata is interlocutory. Tolis v. Board of Supervisors of LSU, 95-1529 (La.10/16/95); 660 So.2d 1206, 1207 (per curiam). A party may appeal from an interlocutory judgment only when expressly provided by law. La.Code Civ. Proc. Ann. art. 2083. Moreover, La.Code Civ. Proc. Ann. art. 1915 does not authorize a trial court to designate a judgment denying an exception as final. Young v. City of Plaquemine, 04-2305 (La.App. 1 Cir. 11/4/05); 927 So.2d 408, 411.

Although interlocutory judgments are generally not appealable, when an unrestricted appeal is taken from a final judgment, an appellant is entitled to seek review of all adverse interlocutory judgments prejudicial to him in addition to the review of the final judgment. Judson v. Davis, 04-1699 (La.App. 1 Cir. 6/29/05); 916 So.2d 1106, 1112, writ denied, 05-1998 (La.2/10/06); 924 So.2d 167. In this instance, the denial of the Taxpayers’ peremptory exception raising the objection of res judicata was made in the course of deciding the primary demand, and the correctness of the trial court’s denial of the Motion for Judgment cannot be reviewed without 1 ^consideration of the objections raised thereto. Accordingly, the issue is properly before this court.

Res Judicata

The Taxpayers argue that their peremptory exception raising the objection of res judicata was improperly denied, given the finality of the St. Gabriel I decision and the settlement agreement entered into between the City and the Taxpayers.

The litigation in St. Gabriel I ended when the City and the Taxpayers entered into a settlement agreement (a compromise). A compromise is a contract whereby the parties, through concessions made by one or more of them, settle a dispute or an uncertainty concerning an obligation or other legal relationship. La. Civ.Code Ann. art. 3071. A compromise precludes the parties from bringing a subsequent action based upon the matter that- was compromised. La. Civ.Code Ann. art. 3080. Thus, a valid compromise may form the basis of a plea of res judicata. Leray v. Nissan Motor Corp, in U.S.A., 05-2051 (La.App. 1 Cir. 11/3/06); 950 So.2d 707, 710.

The burden of proving the facts essential to sustaining the objection of res judicata is on the party pleading the objection. Union Planters Bank v. Commercial Capital Holding Corp., 04-0871 (La.App. 1 Cir. 3/24/05); 907 So.2d 129, 130. If any doubt exists as to its application, the exception must be overruled and the second lawsuit maintained. Denkmann Associates v. IP Timberlands Operating Co., 96-2209 (La.App. 1 Cir. 2/20/98); 710 So.2d 1091, 1096, writ denied, 98-1398 (La.7/2/98), 724 So.2d 738. When an objection of res judicata is raised before the case is submitted, and evidence is received on the objection, the standard of review on appeal is manifest error. Leray, 950 So.2d at 710.

The settlement agreement herein was entered in October 1999 for the purpose of putting an end to the litigation then pending before the Louisiana Supreme Court between the Town of St. Gabriel and ten named taxpayers (St. Gabriel I). The parties stipulated that the seven Taxpayers in this proceeding are successor corporations to original plaintiffs in St. Gabriel I and original parties to the settlement agreement.

Nonetheless, the compromise agreement entered into between the City and the Taxpayers is not binding on the LCDA because the LCDA, although sharing a common interest with the City, was not a party to the settlement agreement. A compromise entered into by one of multi-pie persons with an interest in the same matter does not bind the others, nor can it be raised by them as a defense, unless the matter compromised is a solidary obligation. La. Civ.Code Ann. art. 3075.

Furthermore, we agree with the trial court that, although the LCDA’s Motion for Judgment necessarily involves the validity of the City’s 1% sales and use tax, this bond validation action is “a completely different claim.” |mBond validation proceedings are of an expedited nature and limited scope. Council of City of New Orleans v. All Taxpayers, Property Owners, 08-0189 (La.App. 4 Cir. 2/24/03); 841 So.2d 72, 77, unit denied, 03-0626 (La.4/4/03); 840 So.2d 1221. The purpose of the Bond Validation Act is to “provide a uniform, expeditious and equitable procedure with due regard for the public fisc and rights of persons in interest for the judicial determination of the validity of bonds and related proceedings where material and substantial questions with regard thereto are involved or a judicial determination of issues relating to bonds is necessary to insure the marketability of bonds in investment channels.” La.Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13:5122. The Bond Validation Act provides for a decree validating or invalidating the bonds and expressly sets forth the legal effects, or relief, resulting from a final judgment validating the bonds in La.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 13:5129, which provides:

In the event the decree of the court validates the bonds or validates the action taken to provide a new or different source of payment for the bonds, and no appeal is taken within the time above prescribed, or if appeal is taken and the decree of the court is affirmed, such decree shall be forever binding and con-elusive as to the validity of the bonds, the validity of the tax, any lease or other means provided for the payment of such bonds and the validity of all pledges of revenues and of all covenants and provisions contained in the instrument or proceedings authorizing or providing for the issuance of such bonds, and as to all matters adjudicated and as to all objections presented or which might have been presented in such proceeding, and shall constitute a permanent injunction against the institution by any person of any action or proceeding contesting the validity of the bonds or any other matter adjudicated or which might have been called in question in such proceedings.

| i7For the above-stated reasons, we find no manifest error in the trial court’s overruling of the peremptory exception raising the objection of res judicata.

Motion for Judgment under the Bond Validation Act

Although numerous procedural issues have been raised, the relevant facts are not disputed. Therefore, the doctrine of manifest error does not apply to this court’s review of the trial court’s denial of the Motion for Judgment. See Cangelosi v. Allstate Insurance Co., 96-0159 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/27/96); 680 So.2d 1358, 1360, writ denied, 96-2586 (La.12/13/96); 692 So.2d 375. Appellate review of questions of law is simply to determine whether the trial court was legally correct. Cangelosi, 680 So.2d at 1360.

The LCDA bears the burden of establishing the validity of the proposed bond issue. Council of City of New Orleans, 841 So.2d at 75. The Bond Validation Act is silent as to what evidence must be introduced by the governmental unit in order to meet its burden. Council of City of New Orleans, 841 So.2d at 75. However, the legislature instructs in La.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 18:5130:

No court in which a proceeding to invalidate or sustain bonds is brought shall invalidate the bonds unless it finds substantial defects, material errors and omissions in the incidents of such bond issue. Matters of form shall be disregarded. (Emphasis supplied.)

Accordingly, this court must decide whether the trial court erred in concluding, under the uncontested facts, that a substantial defect, material error, or omission exists such that the Series 2010 Bonds should be declared invalid.

11sThe LCDA first maintains that a challenge to the legality of a tax is not a substantial defect. The LCDA further argues that even if it were to be considered a substantial defect, the legality of the City’s 1% sales and use tax, the revenue stream which will support these bonds if validated, was resolved by this court in St. Gabriel II. The Taxpayers maintain that they are not bound by this court’s decision in St. Gabriel II, that this court’s decision in St. Gabriel II is an absolute nullity, and that the City’s 1% sales and use tax is illegal as the taxing scheme is ambiguous due to inherent conflicts between La.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 83:2711 and La.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 33:2721.6.

The Bond Validation Act specifically recognizes the right of a governmental unit proposing to issue bonds to bring an action to establish the validity of the bonds, as well as “the validity of the tax” provided for payment of such bonds. La.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 13:5123. As such, we agree, in part, with the Taxpayers in that the validity of a tax is a matter properly before a district court in deciding whether it should enter a judgment validating a proposed bond issue. However, we also agree with the LCDA that the legality of the tax levied by St. Gabriel Ordinance # 1996-10 was resolved by an en banc panel of this court in St. Gabriel II, and said judgment is final. St. Gabriel II, 21 So.3d at 961-62. There is no conflict between St. Gabriel I and St. Gabriel II because St. Gabriel II expressly overruled St. Gabriel I. As stated therein:

[P]ursuant to LSA-R.S. 33:2711, incorporated municipalities are authorized to levy and collect sales and use taxes not in excess of 2 1/2% upon satisfying the procedural requirements of that statute, without reference to the limitations imposed on parishes and school boards by LSA-R.S. 33:2721.6(A)(2), and we overrule this court’s earlier opinion to Imthe contrary as stated in [Si. Gabriel I ]. Therefore, we conclude that the district court erred in finding that St. Gabriel was not entitled to collection of the tax levied by Ordinance 1996-10 and in enjoining the city’s attempts to have the tax collected.

St. Gabriel II, 21 So.3d at 961. Whether the Taxpayers individually can prove their entitlement to a refund of taxes paid under protest in light of the earlier ruling in St. Gabriel I or under the terms of the 1999 settlement agreement does not affect the finality of this court’s decision in St. Gabriel II.

Other than the challenge to the legality of the City’s 1% sales and use tax, no specific challenges were raised to the issuance of the Series 2010 Bonds. The LCDA is a governmental unit and political subdivision of the State of Louisiana. La. Rev.Stat. Ann. § 33:4548.4(A). The LCDA is authorized and empowered to issue and sell bonds on behalf of political subdivisions within the state, such as the City, for the projected costs of authorized projects. La.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 33:4548.6(A).

The City’s taxing authority is set forth in La.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 33:2711. The funds of a political subdivision may be pledged for a public purpose “with respect to the issuance of bonds or other evidences of indebtedness to meet public obligations as provided by law.” La. Const. Ann. art. VII, § 14(B)(3).

The record establishes that the LCDA authorized and adopted the June 10, 2010, LCDA Resolution and the July 8, 2010, LCDA Amending | ^Resolution to fund the City’s infrastructure projects by the issuance of the Series 2010 Bonds, to be secured and paid by the 1% sales and use tax revenues. The City authorized and adopted Resolution 2010-0001-0520 on May 20, 2010, and Resolution 2010-0002-0916 (which amended Resolution 2010-0001-0520) on September 16, 2010, authorizing the LCDA to proceed with the financing by issuing the Series 2010 Bonds, to be secured and repaid by the City’s 1% sales and use tax.

The City’s 1% sales and use tax was established by resolution of the City, approved by the voters, and memorialized in Ordinances 1996-10 and 2007-0001-1155. See St Gabriel II, 21 So.3d at 956, 961-62. This court, sitting en banc in St. Gabriel II recognized the validity of the 1% sales and use tax, and that judgment is final. See St Gabriel II, 21 So.3d at 961.

The LCDA properly noticed the hearing on the Motion for Judgment and properly provided a certified copy of the Motion for Judgment and notice of hearing to the State Bond Commission. See La.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 13:5124. At the hearing, the LCDA offered testimony regarding the general purpose of the Series 2010 Bond issue to fund infrastructure projects and further explained that the funds generated by the bond sale will be used to match funds procured from other sources.

The legislature cautions its intent is not “to require or to encourage the validation of all bonds by the judiciary.” La.Rev. Stat. Ann. 13:5122. However, we find in this instance the trial court erred in denying the LCDA’s Motion for Judgment. This court’s en banc final decision in St Gabriel II held that the City’s 1% sales and use tax is valid and collectible. 1⅞15⅛ Gabriel II, 21 So.3d at 961. As such, the 1% tax is valid security and a valid source of repayment of the Series 2010 Bonds.

The record reveals no substantial defect, material error, or omission in the Series 2010 Bond issue. To the contrary, the revenue stream offered to secure and pay the Series 2010 Bonds when issued is based on a currently valid and collectible tax, as per this court’s en banc and final decision in St Gabriel II.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the decision of the trial court denying the Motion for Judgment and enter judgment in favor of the Louisiana Local Government Environmental Facilities and Community Development Authority granting the Motion for Judgment and ordering, adjudging, and decreeing that the Series 2010 Bonds are legal and valid. We decline to grant the Louisiana Local Government Environmental Facilities and Community Development Authority relief beyond that set forth in the Bond Validation Act, La.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 13:5129. This matter is remanded to the trial court for disposition of the “Reconventional Demand and/or Third-Party Demand and/or Cross-Claim” and any other unresolved matters.

Costs of this appeal are assessed to PCS Nitrogen Fertilizer, LP; Williams Olefins, LLC; Cos-Mar Company; Total Petrochemicals USA, Inc.; Syngenta Crop Protection, Inc.; Ineos Fluor Americas, LLC; and Taminco Higher Amines, Inc.

REVERSED, RENDERED, AND REMANDED.

McDONALD, J. concurs and assigns reasons.

McDONALD, J.

concurring.

hi reluctantly concur with the majority’s reversal of the trial court’s denial of the LCDA’s Motion for Judgment. Louisiana Revised Statutes Annotated section 13:5122 explicitly provides for a judicial determination of issues relating to bonds to insure their marketability in investment channels. The court is not given the impossible task of determining the marketability of the bonds, but determines issues that affect their marketability. As the astute trial judge pointed out, the City’s 1% sales and use tax has been the subject of litigation for over ten years, and the litigation continues. Serious questions remain regarding whether the City can actually collect the tax. Both the Mayor of St. Gabriel and Tommy LeJeune, an accountant for the City, testified that nothing less than the full 1% of the sales and use tax must be collected by the Collector and remitted to the City, and without the full remittance, the City cannot fund the bond issue. As the majority notes, I dissented in St Gabriel II and still believe there are problems with the ratification of the tax by this court some ten years after it had originally been declared invalid. Regardless, no court “shall invalidate the bonds unless it finds substantial defects, 12material errors and omissions in the incidents of such bond issue.” La.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 13:5130. Both sides agree that there are no defects in the procedure or language or any omissions or material errors in the issuance of the Series 2010 Bond issue. As the majority observes, the revenue stream offered to secure and pay the Series 2010 Bond issue is based on a presently valid and collectible tax, as per this court’s en banc and final decision in St Gabriel II. That is the last judicial pronouncement on the subject. For these reasons, I reluctantly concur.

      . Judge Michael McDonald was the sole dissent. In reasons. Judge McDonald explained that although he agreed with the majority’s analysis, he disagreed with the result. Judge McDonald opined that "it is the electorate who has the right to decide whether [the 1% sales and use] tax should be imposed.” St. Gabriel II, 21 So.3d at 963 (McDonald, J. dissenting).

      . The request for a writ of mandamus against the Collector was "waived” at the hearing of this matter and is no longer at issue.

      . The City timely filed a response brief in their capacity as appellee to the Taxpayers’ appeal.

      . We are mindful that the denial of a motion for summary judgment cannot be designated as final for purposes of an immediate appeal under La.Code Civ. Proc. Ann. art. 1915(B). Young v. City of Plaquemine, 04-2305 (La. App. 1 Cir. 11/4/05); 927 So.2d 408, 411. The pleading to instigate judicial review under the Bond Validation Act is specifically referred to as a "Motion for Judgment.” La.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 13:5123. Unlike the denial of a motion for summary judgment, the denial of the LCDA’s motion for judgment disposed of the primary action.

      .The LCDA also challenges the Taxpayers' right to seek appellate review of the denial of their peremptory exception objecting to non-joinder and the denial of their motion to consolidate. Although the issue of the nonjoinder of the Collector as a party plaintiff in the present litigation was assigned as error by the Taxpayers in their appeal herein, the issue was not briefed. A mere statement of an assignment of error in a brief does not constitute briefing of the assignment. State v. Williams, 632 So.2d 351, 353 (La.App. 1st Cir.1993); writ denied, 94-1009 (La.9/2/94), 643 So.2d 139. Thus, under Rule 2-12.4 of the Uniform Rules of Courts of Appeal, it is deemed abandoned. The denial of the Taxpayers' motion to consolidate was not assigned as error or briefed.

      . In their appellate brief, the Taxpayers further seek entry of a judgment "declaring the St. Gabriel Tax illegal and ordering that the City and its Tax Collector refund to Taxpayers all taxes paid under protest, with accrued statutory interest.” Clearly, the issue of whether the Taxpayers are entitled to this requested relief goes beyond the scope of the proceedings in the Motion for Judgment and, thus, will not be considered as part of this appeal. So holding, the LCDA’s motion to strike the Taxpayers’ brief is denied as moot.

      . The Taxpayers submit that the City is now a party to this bond validation proceeding, as the trial court granted in part the Taxpayers' peremptory exception objecting to the non-joinder of the City as a party plaintiff. The correctness of the trial court's ruling joining the City as a party plaintiff in this litigation has not been raised as part of this appeal. Regardless, the City’s position as party plaintiff does not change the fact that the LCDA was not a party to the prior settlement agreement.

      . The Louisiana Supreme Court has set forth an excellent summary of the bond validation procedure in Denham Springs Economic Development Dist. v. All Taxpayers, Property Owners and Citizens of Denham Springs Economic Development Dist., 05-2274 (La. 10/17/06); 945 So.2d 665, 676-77.

      . In response to the LCDA’s Motion for Judgment, the Taxpayers filed declinatory exceptions raising the objections of insufficiency of service of process and lack of personal jurisdiction. By Joint Stipulation, filed into evidence, the Taxpayers withdrew these exceptions and agreed to relinquish "any claim of untimeliness of the publications of the LCDA’s Motion for Judgment.” The LCDA similarly waived the right to file any objections based on timeliness.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: GREMILLION, Judge.

license: Public Domain

text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Veronica McCoy PULLARD.
    No. 10-863.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.
    Feb. 9, 2011.

      John Foster DeRosier, District Attorney, Lake Charles, LA, for Appellee, State of Louisiana.
    Carla Sue Sigler, Assistant District Attorney, Lake Charles, LA, for Appellee, State of Louisiana.
    Mark Owen Foster, Louisiana Appellate Project, Natchitoches, LA, for Defendant/Appellant, Veronica McCoy Pullard.
    Court composed of SYLVIA R. COOKS, BILLY HOWARD EZELL, and SHANNON J. GREMILLION, Judges.
   GREMILLION, Judge.

f Defendant was charged by bill of information with cruelty to the infirm, a violation of La.R.S. 14:93.3. Defendant entered an Alford plea. In exchange for her plea, the State nolle prossed charges of forgery and issuing worthless checks. Defendant was sentenced to serve ten years at hard labor. A motion to reconsider sentence was summarily denied.

Defendant is now before this court on appeal, asserting only that her sentence is excessive. There are no errors patent. For the following reasons, we affirm.

At Defendant’s guilty plea hearing, the State established that on or about July 22, 2009, Defendant, a live-in caregiver, criminally neglected and/or mistreated the victim, causing him unjustifiable pain, malnourishment, and suffering. More specifically, Defendant’s actions and/or omissions contributed to the victim’s malnourishment, cardiac arrhythmia, dehydration, urinary tract and kidney infection, and bedsores. Also, as the victim’s caregiver, Defendant held the sole medical power of attorney regarding the victim’s access to medical care, medications, adequate nourishment, and a sanitary home environment.

Defendant complains that the maximum sentence was imposed upon a first time offender who was not a professional healthcare provider as generally provided for in La.R.S. 14:93.3. According to Defendant, the victim had a substance abuse problem, and as his girlfriend, she was attempting to help him.

The trial court has wide discretion in imposing a sentence, and a sentence imposed within the statutory limits will not be deemed constitutionally excessive absent a manifest abuse of discretion. State v. Evans, 97-504 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/29/97); 702 So.2d 1148, writ denied, 97-2979 (La.4/3/98); 717 So.2d 231. | ^Furthermore, a sentence may only be found to be excessive when it 1) is so grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime as to shock our sense of justice; and/or 2) makes no measurable contribution to acceptable penal goals; and, therefore 3) is nothing more than needless imposition of pain and suffering. See State v. Campbell, 404 So.2d 1205 (La.1981). It is, however, necessary to remember that “[a]s a general rule, maximum sentences are appropriate in cases involving the most serious violation of the offense and the worst type of offender.” State v. Hall, 35,151, p. 4 (La.App. 2 Cir. 9/26/01), 796 So.2d 164, 169.

The penalty for cruelty to the infirm, first offense, is not more than ten years, with or without hard labor, or a fíne of not more than ten thousand dollars, or both. La.R.S. 14:93.3(E)(1). As such, Defendant’s ten-year sentence was the maximum possible sentence. She was, however, spared a substantial fine. Additionally, Defendant’s sentencing exposure was reduced by her plea agreement which resulted in the dismissal of charges for forgery and issuing worthless checks.

At sentencing, the trial court noted that Defendant was forty-two years old, has a high school education, and has previous employment as a sitter and housekeeper. The trial court also confirmed receipt of Defendant’s presentence investigation report (PSI) and that neither party objected to the information contained therein. Additionally, the trial court indicated it received and reviewed correspondence submitted on behalf of the deceased victim by his sister.

Next, the State urged the trial court to impose the maximum sentence, asserting the evidence supported the contention that the victim died as a direct result of the criminally negligent mistreatment of the victim in his home and in the hospital. Defense counsel responded, stating that although Defendant had been arrested before,_|^she had never been convicted of anything. With regard to the victim, defense counsel asserted that he had problems with alcohol and was very difficult to control. He also maintained that Defendant was not a professional caretaker, but was the victim’s live-in girlfriend who tried to give the victim medication and help, yet he refused. Although the children of the victim were very upset with the matter, defense counsel suggested that they should have cared for the victim in their homes if they were unhappy with the victim’s situation. Lastly, defense counsel averred that any additional incarceration beyond the time already served since her arrest would amount to punitive vengeance on behalf of the family.

Defendant testified that she, too, suffered a loss as a result of the victim’s death and was unable to mourn his death due to her incarceration. She maintained that she was not a caregiver, but was his girlfriend. According to Defendant, she met the victim, a severe alcoholic, five years prior, and that he had saved her from an abusive marriage. During the five years she lived with the victim, he became ill in April 2009, and was told by his primary physician that he would die within a year or so if he did not stop drinking. Defendant testified that the victim was admitted to the hospital and rehabilitation several times before he died, and he refused to be admitted into a nursing home. Defendant insisted she did the best she could and would have given her life for him because he had been there for her.

The trial court then questioned Defendant about her statement to the probation offíeei’ found in the PSI wherein she reported that she was the victim’s caregiver. Defendant denied making the statement, but admitted to stating that she started out as the victim’s housekeeper. The trial court then confirmed that Defendant was a | certified nurse aide and had worked in various nursing homes and rehabilitation centers.

The victim’s daughter, Belinda Jones, testified that Defendant took advantage of her father while she was living with him as a partner, taking his money and medication. According to Belinda, Defendant exhausted all of the victim’s resources. Although she had no proof, Belinda suspected that Defendant was tainting something in her father’s drink. Belinda also stated that Defendant had the beneficiaries to the victim’s insurance policies changed from the names of his children to her name. After taking everything of worth from the victim, Belinda believed Defendant left him there to die. In response, defense counsel asserted that Defendant did not get any insurance money and that no evidence was introduced to show she had taken money from the victim’s bank account.

The trial court then considered the mitigating and aggravating facts as follows:

It is noted that if the defendant’s been convicted of a felony the Court should impose a sentence of imprisonment if any of the following occur. If there’s an undue risk that during the period of a suspended sentence or probation would the defendant commit another offense. It is noted that she has never had any prior convictions, is a first time felony offender, and the Court would have to answer that in the negative. Is the defendant in need of correctional treatment or a custodial environment that can be provided most effectively by her commitment to an institution. Again, without having the history the Court would say a negative, but with regard to the facts of this case the Court would answer in the affirmative, so that could go either way. Would a lesser sentence deprecate the seriousness of the defendant’s crime. In that case the Court has answered that also in the affirmative, based on the facts as were reviewed by the Court. Aggravating and mitigating circumstances to be reviewed, the Court finds the following. That the offender’s conduct during the commission of this offense manifested deliberate cruelty to the victim. It’s apparent that on a number of occasions the victim, who is now the decedent, was found in dire straits, naked and covered with urine and feces and a number of other injuries on his body. The offender knew or should have known the victim was vulnerable or incapable of resistance due to extreme age, also disability, and ill health. Those matters are apparent. The offender offered or has been offered or | ¿received something of value for the commission of the offense. The Court is satisfied that there was significant monetary interest with Ms. McCoy in the dealings with the decedent, based on statements from the neighbors in the area, the facts, even the treating physician of the last days of Mr. Jones. It’s also apparent that Ms. McCoy has a substance abuse problem, has had one in the past, that’s been verified, and it appears that it may not be resolved, based again on doctors’ observations at the time. Apparently the incident that gave rise to this led to significant medical treatment for Mr. Jones and within 30 days of the last finding and the basis of the offense for which she has entered her guilty plea passed on. There are allegations, at least basically on statements made by the decedent, that there was physical violence on his person but that’s been denied by the defendant, that’s not been substantiated, but it is a concern. This offense resulted in significant permanent injury to the victims— to the family, in the loss of their father as well as the Court’s impression that the actions of the defendant led substantially to the demise of the victim, and as such, received considerable benefit by the charges that were placed upon her and which she pled guilty under North Caroline versus Alford. She has made consistent constant denial of the allegations, however the statements, the other evidence, is substantial, that it is contrary to her position. I find that to be an aggravating [sic]; in fact, there’s still denial as well as inconsistency with statements that she’s given under the pre-sentence investigation.
In looking at mitigating circumstances, the defendant has no history and has basically led a law-abiding life. She has had a number of run-ins with the law enforcement over the past ten or fifteen years, but doesn’t have any convictions, and apparently does have a history of drug abuse that’s been established, but, again, no convictions. Is the defendant likely to respond affirmatively to probationary treatment. The Court would have to answer that in the affirmative, nothing [sic] that she’s never had the opportunity. If they were not considered they were either deemed insignificant or inapplicable to the instant offense.
At this time the defendant has pleaded guilty to the charge of cruelty to the infirm, a violation of 14:93.3. I think in the 11 years that I’ve been on the bench, Ms. McCoy, I have never given a first offender the maximum offense- — the maximum sentence, however, the facts of this case I think demand that consideration, ....

In support of her argument that the maximum sentence is excessive, Defendant refers this court to State v. Browhow, 41,-686 (La.App. 2 Cir. 12/13/06), 945 So.2d 890, asserting that the facts are similar to those of the instant case. We note, however, that the defendant in Browhow was convicted of the lesser offense, [ ^attempted cruelty to the infirm, and was sentenced to the maximum five years at hard labor. As such, the conviction and sentence are not analogous to the instant case for comparison purposes.

Only a few reported cases involving a conviction for cruelty to the infirm were found in the jurisprudence. The facts of the cases reviewed involved either a professional caretaker working in such capacity or a relative that may or may not have been responsible for the victim’s care. Although Defendant herein alleges she was not working for the victim in a professional capacity, she does not deny that she was his caregiver and had experience in caring for elderly patients as a certified nurse aide.

The lengthiest sentence for a conviction of cruelty to the infirm was imposed in State v. Echeverria, 02-2592 (La.App. 1 Cir. 6/27/03), 858 So.2d 632, writ denied, 03-2332 (La.8/20/04), 882 So.2d 580. In Echeverría, the defendant, using both hands, pushed his eighty-four and one-half-year-old grandmother into the kitchen furniture. The victim reported that the defendant arrived at her home intoxicated and called her names before getting in her face and pushing her down. The victim suffered from soreness and bruises from the incident. Photographs of the victim introduced into evidence showed large bruises on the right side of her back and on her right hip. Following a bench trial, the defendant was convicted of cruelty to the infirm and sentenced to five years at hard labor. After his adjudication as a third felony habitual offender, his sentence was vacated, and he was then sentenced to seven years at hard labor. On appeal, the court held that the sentence imposed was |7not unconstitutionally excessive or grossly disproportionate to the severity of the offense.

In State v. Booker, 42,596 (La.App. 2 Cir. 10/31/07), 968 So.2d 1190, writ denied, 07-2295 (La.4/25/08), 978 So.2d 364, the defendant was sentenced to three years at hard labor for cruelty to the infirm. The defendant was living with his ninety-five-year-old grandmother who was found home alone by emergency personnel dispatched to the home when she failed to answer the door. Upon forced entry, the victim was discovered sitting nude in her own waste with roaches crawling on her, unable to get up from her couch. She was then transported to a hospital and diagnosed with dehydration and malnutrition. Photos of the home introduced at trial depicted a home in deplorable condition. The defendant acknowledged to police at the scene and in his subsequent statement that he was the victim’s caregiver. He paid the bills with the victim’s money and was the only person living with the victim. Also, the defendant and the victim had no other family in the area. The defendant asserted he was doing the best he could and admitted that he needed some help caring for the victim. On appeal, the court noted that the sentence imposed was in the minimum range and concluded it was not excessive viewed in light of the harm done to society by cruelty to the aged and infirm.

In two cases, the defendants received suspended sentences. First, in State v. Pratt, 573 So.2d 607 (La.App. 2 Cir.1991), the defendant was convicted of three counts of cruelty to the infirm and was sentenced on each count to three years at hard labor, to be served concurrently. The sentences were suspended, and the defendant was placed on supervised probation for three years. The defendant was working at a nursing home as a nurse’s aide where she physically assaulted three patients, 1 ¡¡repeatedly slapping and pinching them. The three female victims were ages seventy, eighty-four, and eighty-nine years old. The victims sustained bruising and/or swelling to their faces, and one victim was choked. Although the defendant had no prior felony convictions, the trial court found aggravating the fact that she denied the occurrences despite the testimony of co-workers who witnessed the abuse. Also, the defendant frequently used alcohol while on the job. Although there were no lasting physical injuries to the victims, the trial court concluded that the offenses were serious as they both threatened and caused serious harm. On appeal, the court did not find the sentences to be an abuse of the trial court’s discretion.

Also, in State v. Baker, 41,325 (La.App. 2 Cir. 11/1/06), 942 So.2d 677, the defendant was convicted of cruelty to the infirm and sentenced to two years at hard labor, suspended, and was given three years of probation. Defendant was employed as a certified nurse aide at an assisted living facility and nursing home for veterans. The victim became angry with the defendant when she tried to rouse him from his sleep. He also became upset with the defendant and then argued with her when she placed him in his wheelchair in a hard manner. During the argument, the victim had his hand in front of the defendant’s face and called her a “black b — h.” The defendant then grabbed the victim’s hand and bent his fingers backwards. When the victim told the defendant to stop, she released his hand. The victim’s hand was later found to be swollen and bruised. The defendant did not challenge her sentence on appeal.

13Lastly, the shortest sentence imposed for cruelty to the infirm was found in State v. Scott, 582 So.2d 864 (La.App. 5 Cir.), writ denied, 584 So.2d 1171 (La.1991). The defendant in Scott was convicted of four counts of cruelty to the infirm and was sentenced to one year in parish prison on each count, the sentences to run consecutively, and fined $10,000, plus costs. The defendant worked at a home for mentally retarded individuals as an Assistant Home Manager. During his employ, two of the defendant’s clients were found to have burns caused by an electric iron. Also, there was testimony that the defendant hit, pushed, and tied up some of his clients, in addition to physical evidence of injurious marks. The defendant did not challenge his sentences on appeal.

Defendant’s sentence in the instant case, the maximum possible sentence, is twice that of the longest sentence imposed for cruelty to the infirm found in the jurisprudence. Echeverria, 858 So.2d 632. Only the enhanced sentence of seven years imposed in Echeverría compares to the maximum sentence imposed upon Defendant, a first felony offender.

There is, however, a significant distinction between the instant case and the related jurisprudence. First, the instant case involved the death of the victim, an aggravating factor not seen in the cases discussed herein. Indeed, the trial court found that, “the actions of the defendant led substantially to the demise of the victim.”

The trial court also noted aggravating factors unique to this case. First, the trial court found that Defendant clearly knew or should have known the victim was vulnerable or incapable of resistance due to his extreme age, disability, and ill health. This finding is further supported by the fact that Defendant is a certified nurse aide, | l0a contradiction to Defendant’s argument that she is not a professional healthcare provider.

Regardless of Defendant’s training as a certified nurse aide, the provisions of La. R.S. 14:93.3 apply to anyone, including a caregiver. A caregiver is defined in La.R.S. 14:93.3 as follows:

[A]ny person or persons who temporarily or permanently is responsible for the care of the infirmed, physically or mentally disabled adult, or aged person, whether such care is voluntarily assumed or is assigned. Caregiver includes but is not limited to adult children, parents, relatives, neighbors, daycare institutions and facilities, adult congregate living facilities, and nursing homes which or who have voluntarily assumed or been assigned the care of an aged or infirmed person or disabled adult, or have assumed voluntary residence with an aged or infirmed person or disabled adult.

Accordingly, the trial court was not required to conclude that Defendant was a professional healthcare provider to justify imposition of a maximum sentence.

The trial court also found aggravating that a significant monetary interest was involved in Defendant’s relationship with the victim. Along those same lines it is important to note that Defendant’s sentencing exposure related to misusing the victim’s money was essentially wiped away by virtue of the plea agreement. Lastly, the trial court found most offensive Defendant’s continued denial of the allegations despite the evidence contrary to her position.

This is a severe sentence. However, it is clear to this court that the trial court did not impose it lightly. We are moved by the trial court’s divulgence that this matter represents the first occasion wherein it has imposed a maximum sentence on a first time offender. Therefore, in light of the victim’s death and the other aggravating factors identified by the trial court at sentencing, this court finds that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it imposed the maximum sentence.

InRULING

Defendant’s sentence is affirmed.

      . The defendant was also convicted of simple battery for slapping another resident and was sentenced to six months imprisonment to be served consecutively to her sentence for attempted cruelty to the infirm.

      . The defendant was also convicted of a misdemeanor charge of negligent injury and sentenced to two years at hard labor to run concurrently with her sentence for cruelty to the infirm. The conviction was reversed on appeal.


author: SAUNDERS, Judge.

text:
    Mille S. McFADDEN v. IMPORT ONE, INC., et al.
    No. 10-952.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.
    Feb. 9, 2011.

      Michael Benny Miller, Miller & Miller, Crowley, LA, for Plaintiff/Appellee, Millie S. McFadden.
    Harry Washington Ezim Jr., Dean Michael Esposito, Bianca L. Lee, Harry W. Ezim, Jr. & Assoc. Baton Rouge, LA, Mark David Plaisance, Attorney at Law, Baker, LA, for Defendants/Appellants, Import One, Inc., Kim Guidry.
    Court composed of Ulysses GENE THIBODEAUX, Chief Judge, JOHN D. SAUNDERS, and PHYLLIS M. KEATY, Judges.
   SAUNDERS, Judge.

|! This is a case where a consumer wishing to purchase a vehicle and a business that sells vehicles negotiated a sales agreement that was dependant upon the business obtaining financing for the consumer in order to perfect the sale. As part of the purported sale, the business took the consumer’s vehicle as a trade-in.

The business was unable to obtain financing according to the agreed upon terms. However, the business was able to obtain financing for the consumer at a higher interest rate with a longer life of the loan. The business did this in order to keep the monthly payments close to the original agreed upon financing terms. The consumer refused to enter into second financing agreement and requested that she return the vehicle to the business and the business return her vehicle to her. The business refused and sent a letter to the consumer threatening to report the business’ vehicle in the consumer’s possession as stolen if the consumer did not agree to enter into a sale.

The business reported the vehicle as stolen, as it had threatened. Law enforcement seized the vehicle at the consumer’s workplace in front of the consumer’s coworkers and clients. After the business obtained possession of the vehicle, it refused to return the consumer’s vehicle to her.

Thereafter, the consumer filed suit against the business alleging, inter alia, that the business had engaged in unfair trade practices under La.R.S. 51:1401, et seq. and that the business committed conversion of her vehicle. The consumer filed suit and also filed a complaint with the Louisiana Attorney General’s office against the business for unfair trade practices under La.R.S. 51:1401, et seq. After a trial, the trial court awarded the consumer damages for conversion, loss of use of the vehicle, insurance payments made on the vehicle, humiliation and embarrassment, and ^attorney’s fees under La.R.S. 51:1409(A).

Both parties appealed. We affirm, as amended, and award the consumer attorney’s fees for work done on appeal.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY:

In January 2008, Millie S. McFadden (McFadden) went to the Lafayette, Louisiana location of Import One, Inc. (Import One) to purchase a vehicle. She selected a 2005 Infiniti G35 and signed a sales agreement that reflected a purchase price of $27,462.86 with a condition that Import One would obtain the financing for McFadden at an interest rate of 7.82% from Capital One Bank. Also part of the sales agreement was that McFadden agreed to trade in her 2002 Saturn L300. Although the sales agreement was not contemporaneously signed by Import One, it allowed McFadden to leave with the Infiniti while it retained possession of the Saturn.

Later, Import One learned that Capital One refused to finance McFadden’s loan. At that point, Kim Guidry, Import One’s general manager, obtained financing for McFadden from Trustmark National Bank at a rate of 9.69%. Import One informed McFadden of this change and attempted to enter into a second sales agreement with her for the Infiniti. McFadden refused and told Import One that she would either abide by the first financing agreement or that she wanted her Saturn returned.

McFadden, on multiple occasions, attempted to return the Infiniti to Import One in exchange for her Saturn. Import One refused, instead attempting to force McFadden to agree to purchase the Infini-ti. Import One then sent a letter to McFadden wherein it stated that it would report the Infiniti as stolen if McFadden did not return the vehicle. In response, McFadden again attempted to arrange that she lsreturn the Infiniti in exchange for the Saturn. Rather than make this exchange, Import One reported the Infiniti as stolen.

In early March 2008, the Crowley Police went to McFadden’s workplace due to the report filed by Import One and took possession of the Infiniti. Thereafter, the police returned the Infiniti to Import One. After Import One gained possession of the Infiniti, it still refused to return McFadden’s Saturn.

On March 25, 2008, McFadden filed suit against Import One seeking return of her vehicle and damages for, inter alia, conversion, insurance payments, car payments, loss of use, humiliation and embarrassment, and attorney’s fees. On June 19, 2008, the Louisiana Attorney General’s office sent a letter to Import One notifying it that McFadden sought the return of her vehicle and that McFadden alleged that Import One had engaged in unfair trade practices under La.R.S. 51:1401, et seq. Still, Import One did not return McFadden’s Saturn until September 2008.

After a trial on the merits, the trial court awarded McFadden damages for conversion, embarrassment and humiliation, loss of use of her vehicle, insurance and car payments made on her vehicle, and attorney’s fees. The trial court denied McFadden’s claim to entitlement of treble damages under La.R.S. 51:1401, et seq. Both parties appealed the judgment of the trial court, alleging the following assignments of error:

IMPORT ONE’S ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR:

1. The trial court erred in ruling that Import One committed the act of conversion.
2. The trial court erred in awarding McFadden damages for insurance payments, car payments, and conversion since it awarded specific damages for loss of use and embarrassment and humiliation.
3. The trial court erred in awarding McFadden attorney’s fees.

LMcFADDEN’S ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:

1. The trial court erred in failing to award treble damages under La.R.S. 51:1409(A) which allows treble the actual damages as well as reasonable attorney’s fees.

IMPORT ONE’S ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER ONE:

Import One alleges in its first assignment of error that the trial court erred in ruling that Import One committed the act of conversion.

The facts at issue on this particular assignment are not in dispute. We must determine, given the undisputed facts, whether the trial court was legally correct in finding that Import One committed conversion on McFadden’s Saturn. When conducting a review of such questions of law, appellate courts merely determine whether the lower court was legally correct. Sanchez v. La. Nursery, 09-1247 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/7/10), 34 So.3d 1047.

The Louisiana Supreme Court, in Dual Drilling Co. v. Mills Equipment Investments, Inc., 98-843, pp. 4-5 (La.12/1/98), 721 So.2d 853, 857, defined conversion as the following (emphasis added):

A conversion is committed when any of the following occurs: 1) possession is acquired in an unauthorized manner; 2) the chattel is removed from one place to another with the intent to exercise control over it; 3) possession of the chattel is transferred without authority; 4) possession is withheld from the owner or possessor; 5) the chattel is altered or destroyed; 6) the chattel is used improperly; or 7) ownership is asserted over the chattel. FraNK L. Maraist & Thomas C. Galligan, Louisiana Tort Law § 1-2, at 3 (1996 & Supp.1998); Import-sales, Inc. v. Lindeman, 231 La. 663, 92 So.2d 574 (La.1957); see also Louisiana State Bar Assoc. v. Hinrichs, 486 So.2d 116 (La.1986).

Import One argues that no conversion took place because McFadden offered the Saturn as trade-in for the Infiniti, and, at that time, she voluntarily executed documents to complete her intended purchase of the Infiniti. It contends that Import One was justified in the subsequent withholding of McFadden’s Saturn because the | .^parties were involved in a bona fide dispute as to whether McFadden had purchased the Infiniti, and Import One “continued to operate under the good faith belief that a sale had taken place and that it had the rightful ownership to McFadden’s Saturn.”

First, this court has stated, in a case that is cited in Import One’s brief, that “good faith on the part of the defendant is not a defense to the tort of conversion.” Ducote v. City of Alexandria, 95-1269, p. 5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 7/17/96), 677 So.2d 1118, 1122 (citations omitted). Thus, Import One’s argument is misguided.

Second, this argument raised by Import One is disingenuous. On one hand, Import One argues that it was justified in keeping the Saturn because of a bona fide dispute whether there was a sale based on a good faith belief that it owned the Saturn. On the other hand, Import One argues that it was also justified in reporting to law enforcement that the Infiniti was stolen by McFadden and have it seized from her at her workplace because Import One always owned the Infiniti.

We take issue with this argument because Import One had the Infiniti seized months prior to returning the Saturn to McFadden. Thus, its “good faith belief that it owned the Saturn” is counterintui-tive. In order to genuinely make this argument, Import One must have believed that it owned both cars at the same time. Import One is a sophisticated entity that engages in the sale of vehicles as a business. Surely, such a belief could not have been held in good faith.

Focusing on the case before us, the trial court based its judgment that Import One committed conversion on a finding that no sale had taken place between Import One and McFadden. Thus, the trial court found that McFadden was the owner of the Saturn throughout the dispute. Import One did not assign as error, nor did it argue that the trial court erred in finding that no sale had taken place between the parties. | ^Further, Import One admittedly withheld possession of the Saturn from McFadden even after McFadden tried to return the Infiniti in order to retrieve her Saturn, and even after law enforcement seized the Infiniti and returned it to Import One at Import One’s behest. Given these facts, it is abundantly clear that Import One committed conversion of McFadden’s Saturn, as McFadden’s possession of the Saturn was withheld from her. Accordingly, we find that the trial court did not err as a matter of law, and the judgment of the trial court in this regard is upheld. IMPORT ONE’S ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER TWO:

In its second assignment of error, Import One argues that the trial court erred in awarding McFadden damages for insurance payments, car payments, and conversion since it awarded specific damages for loss of use and embarrassment and humiliation. Import One’s contention in this assignment is two-fold: that the trial court improperly awarded duplicitous damages; and that the trial court awarded excessive damages.

The standard of review applicable to these two contentions is different. Damages for conversion are awarded under La.Civ.Code art. 2315(A). As is clear from the language of La.Civ.Code art. 2315, its goal is to make the plaintiff whole. See Roman Catholic Church of Archdiocese of New Orleans v. La. Gas Serv. Co., 618 So.2d 874 (La.1993). As such, an award of duplicate damages under La.Civ.Code art. 2315, as Import One contends occurred in the case before us, is an error of law, and an appellate review of such errors of law are via de novo review. Sanchez, 34 So.3d 1047.

Import One first contends that the trial court erred in awarding duplicate 17damages. We agree.

Import One fails to specifically address which items it deems duplicitous. However, our review of the record indicates that the award for loss of use of the Saturn and for reimbursement of car payments McFadden made on the Saturn are close enough in kind to support a finding by this court that the trial court erred in awarding both to McFadden.

Had the Saturn properly been returned to McFadden, she would still have had to make the payments on the vehicle per her previous financing arrangements, yet she would not have made payments for a rental vehicle. Alternatively, McFadden would have had to make payments on the Infiniti or for a rental vehicle. Thus, she would have been making payments on whichever vehicle she was using while she was using it. The award by the trial court absolves McFadden from making any type of payments on any vehicle, while still having use of at least one vehicle, either the Infiniti or the rental. This position makes McFadden more than whole, and, therefore, is an error of law.

Accordingly, we amend the judgment awarded to McFadden by removing the award of $2,446.60 for reimbursement of car payments, as it is duplicitous. We find no other error by the trial court in awarding duplicate damages to McFadden.

Next, we must address the propriety of the amounts of damages awarded for each item properly given to McFadden. Whether the lower court, in properly choosing to award damages, does so excessively is merely a quantum assessment that is reviewed on appeal by the much discretion standard. Reck v. Stevens, 373 So.2d 498 (La.1979). Thus, on the second contention, our function is not to replace the judgment of the trial court with our own. However, if an abuse of discretion is found, |swe can lower the award to the highest point reasonably within the discretion afforded the trial court. Coco v. Winston Industries, Inc., 341 So.2d 332 (La.1976).

As before, Import One fails to address which award it asserts was abusively high. Thus, we will look to the record and analyze each item.

The award of insurance payments was specifically proven to be that exact amount by McFadden. Likewise, the award for conversion was fixed at the value of the Saturn at the time it was withheld from McFadden by Import One: $5,000.00. The award for loss of use of the vehicle $1,250.00 was calculated by using the actual cost incurred by McFadden in retaining a rental vehicle. Therefore, there is a basis in the record for these awards, and they are not abusively high.

An award of $1,000.00 for the embarrassment and humiliation for having a vehicle taken by police as it was maliciously reported as stolen by Import One, to this court, is certainly not abusively high. In fact, the opposite may be true, given that these events transpired in view of McFadden’s coworkers and clients. However, McFadden has not raised as error that this award was abusively low. Accordingly, we uphold the amount awarded by the trial court.

Finally, the trial court awarded McFadden $11,475.00 in attorney’s fees. The evidence in the record is such that McFadden’s attorney worked fifty-one hours on the case. This calculates to a $225.00 per hour rate. A review of work performed at the trial level suggests that this hourly rate and the number of hours that McFadden’s counsel claimed to have worked on the case are both reasonable and, thus, not abusively high.

In summation, we find that the trial court erred in awarding duplicate damages to McFadden for the loss of use of her Saturn and for reimbursement of the payments |3made on loan for her Saturn. We amend the judgment to remove the award of reimbursement to McFadden for car payments she made on the Saturn while it was in the possession of Import One. We find no other duplicate damages. Further, we find that none of the remaining awards given by the trial court were abusively high.

IMPORT ONE’S ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER THREE:

In its final assignment of error, Import One asserts that the trial court erred in awarding McFadden attorney’s fees. We do not agree.

By law, it is necessary that an award of attorney’s fees is authorized by statute or contract. State, Dept. of Transp. and Dev. v. Wagner, 10-50 (La.5/28/10), 38 So.3d 240. Louisiana Revised Statutes 51:1409(A) (emphasis added) states in pertinent part:

Any person who suffers any ascertainable loss of money or movable property, corporeal or incorporeal, as a result of the use or employment by another person of an unfair or deceptive method, act, or practice declared unlawful by [La.JR.S. 51:1405 may bring an action individually but not in a representative capacity to recover actual damages.... In the event that damages are awarded under this Section, the court shall award to the person bringing such action reasonable attorney fees and costs.

The language of La.R.S. 51:1409(A) is clear. If an entity utilizes unfair trade practices and a consumer is awarded damages based on the consumer’s loss of property or money as a result of those practices, then it is mandatory that the trial court award attorney’s fees to the consumer.

Thus, the first step in our review is limited to whether the trial court’s finding that Import One employed unfair trade practices is correct. “The determination of what constitutes an unfair trade practice is fact-sensitive and, as such, can only be decided on a case-by-case basis.” Doland v. ACM Gaming Co., 05-427, p. 8 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/30/05), 921 So.2d 196, 202.

I m“[C]onduct that violates the Unfair Trade Practices Act must involve fraud, misrepresentation, deception, or unethical conduct.” Glod v. Baker, 04-1483, p. II (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/23/05), 899 So.2d 642, 649[, unit denied, 05-1574 (La.1/13/06), 920 So.2d 238] “A trade practice is considered unfair when it offends established public policy and when it is immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially injurious to consumers.” Laurents v. La. Mobile Homes, Inc., 96-976, p. 10 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/5/97), 689 So.2d 536, 542 (citing Thomas v. Busby, 95-1147 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/6/96, 670 So.2d 603), unit granted and judgment vacated, 96 — [ ]891 (La.5/17/96), 673 So.2d 601, aff'd on remand, 95-1147 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/13/96), 682 So.2d 1025, unit denied, 96-2990 (La.2/21/97), 688 So.2d 517).

Brown v. Romero, 05-1016, pp. 6-7 (La. App. 3 Cir. 2/1/06), 922 So.2d 742, 746-47, unit denied, 06-480 (La.5/5/06), 927 So.2d 315.

Given that the seminal determination of whether an entity is in violation of La.R.S. 51:1405 is fact based, the standard of review applicable to the first step in reviewing this assignment is manifest error. Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So.2d 840 (La.1989).

In the case before us, both Import One and McFadden argue extensively regarding whether it was proper for the trial court to find that Import One wrongfully seized the Infiniti from McFadden. The trial court did state that it found Import One wrongfully seized the Infiniti from McFadden while orally giving reasons for its eventual ruling. However, the final judgment rendered by the trial court made no mention of damages awarded to McFadden due to wrongful seizure, and the final judgment was for Import One committing conversion on McFadden’s Saturn. This court, in LaRocca v. Bailey, 01-618, p. 12 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/7/01), 799 So.2d 1263, 1270-71, stated the following:

“When the oral reasons or minute entry conflicts with the written judgment, the latter governs. The trial judge may, within his authority, render judgment which differs substantially from his prior oral statements. Such oral reasoning forms no part of the judgment. It is the formal, signed judgment which governs the controversy.” Marino v. Marino, 576 So.2d 1196, 1198 (La.App. 5 Cir.1991)[ ] ([c]itation omitted). Even written reasons for judgment contained in the record are unappealable until qualified within the context of a written, final, and appealable judgment. City of Kaplan v. Mayard, 616 So.2d 826 (La.App. 3 Cir.1993).

Therefore, we will not address the issue of wrongful seizure of the Infiniti, as that issue is not properly before this court. Rather, we will address whether Import One’s actions in committing conversion on McFadden’s Saturn throughout the dispute can reasonably be characterized as a violation of La.R.S. 51:1404.

After a thorough review of the record, we find that a reasonable basis exists in the record for the trial court to find that Import One violated La.R.S. 51:1404. Neither party argues that the trial court was incorrect in finding that there was never a sale due to Import One’s inability to gain financing for McFadden under the agreed upon terms of the sales agreement. It is from this point that Import One’s actions can reasonably deemed in violation of La. R.S. 51:1404. After failing to secure financing for McFadden at the agreed upon terms, Import One tried to coerce McFadden into a sale with different financing terms. Once McFadden refused to enter into the second sale offered by Import One, she notified Import One of her intention to return the Infiniti in exchange for her Saturn in a letter sent on February 8, 2008. McFadden then sent Import One another letter on February 18, 2008, wherein she tried to arrange the return of the vehicles to their rightful owners on February 15, 2008. She tried to make the exchange to no avail, as Import One refused to return her Saturn to her.

Import One, through its general manager, Kim Guidry, sent McFadden a letter on February 29, 2008, that contained the following language (emphasis added):

This is to notify you that you are in possession of an Infiniti G35 |12VIN# [ ] that is the property of Import One, Inc. We have made numerous requests to you individually and through your counsel for payment of this vehicle. As of today[,] February 29, 2008[,] you have failed to satisfy your required participation according to the bill of sale contracted between Import One[] Inc. and you dated January 26, 2008.
This is the last request that will be sent to you. If you fail to consummate your responsibilities in accordance with this bill of sale by Monday[,] March 3, 2008[,] at 10:00 a.m., this vehicle will be reported to the Acadia Parish Sheriffs Department as a stolen vehicle[,][a]nd Import One will assist in every way with the prosecution of this crime.

We find the contents of this letter shocking. Import One, a sophisticated entity in the business of selling vehicles, clearly had knowledge that no sale had taken place on January 26, 2008. Yet, it chose to memorialize via writing a threat to a consumer, i.e. McFadden, that if she would not “satisfy” her “required participation” in a sale that was not legally binding, it would falsely accuse her of a crime. Clearly this conduct alone is “immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially injurious.” See Brown, 922 So.2d at 747

However, Import One did not stop there. McFadden’s attorney then sent a letter to Import One on March 2, 2008, again offering to exchange the vehicles. Import One did not accept that offer. Instead, it actually reported the Infiniti as stolen. From that false report, the Crowley Police went to McFadden’s work environment and questioned her regarding the reported theft in front of coworkers and clients. Thankfully, the Crowley Police exercised exorbitantly better judgment than Import One, as once they were made aware of the circumstances, they simply repossessed the vehicle rather than arrest McFadden.

This conduct alone clearly validates the trial court’s finding that Import One violated La.R.S. 51:1404 as reasonable, but Import One was not finished. Once Import One had the Infiniti in its possession, it continued to violate La.R.S. 51:1404 |isby refusing to return McFadden’s Saturn to her. It was not until September 2008, when Import One relinquished the Saturn to McFadden, that its conduct could no longer reasonably be considered in violation of La.R.S. 51:1404.

We note that not all actions for conversion will amount to unfair trade practices under La.R.S. 51:1401, et. seq. However, as cited above in Doland v. ACM Gaming Co., 921 So.2d 196, whether conduct rises to a level so as to be deemed unfair trade practices is left up to the courts to decide on a case-by-case basis. Given the disgraceful conduct displayed by Import One in this case, essentially holding McFadden’s vehicle hostage in an attempt to coerce a sale from her, it is clear that this conduct violates La.R.S. 51:1401, et. seq., regardless of the moniker attached to the conduct.

Import One attempts to minimize its actions to get McFadden to agree to the altered terms in the second sale by stating that the payments according to the terms of the second financial arrangement would only result in McFadden paying an extra eighty-three cents monthly. While this may be true, Import One neglects to point out that the interest rate was increased nearly two percentage points on the second loan. We are not told the length of the proposed second financial arrangement and, given an increase in nearly two percentage points, it well may be that the life of the loan was much greater. However, the second financial arrangement is certainly different from the first, and it is less favorable to McFadden. Thus, she was justified in refusing to accept the terms of the second financial arrangement.

Having concluded that Import One unequivocally violated La.R.S. 51:1404, we must now determine whether the trial court awarded any damages to McFadden based on her loss of property or money as a result of those practices. We find that it did.

114The trial court awarded McFadden $5,000.00 for conversion of the Saturn as a result Import One’s improper conduct and $1,250.00 as compensation for McFadden’s loss of use of the Saturn. The Saturn was the property of McFadden. Thus, the attorney’s fees awarded to McFadden were proper by the trial court as La.R.S. 51:1409(A) mandates an award of attorney’s fees to McFadden. Accordingly, we find that this assignment of error raised by Import One is without merit.

McFADDEN’S ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:

McFadden argues that the trial court erred in failing to award treble damages under La.R.S. 51:1409(A). We find that this assignment has merit.

McFadden’s assignment posits a question of law. As such, we will conduct a de novo review of the record to determine whether the trial court was legally correct in failing to award McFadden treble damages under La.R.S. 51:1409. Sanchez, 34 So.3d 1047.

Louisiana Revised Statutes 51:1409(A) states, in pertinent part:

Any person who suffers any ascertainable loss of money or movable property, corporeal or incorporeal, as a result of the use or employment by another person of an unfair or deceptive method, act, or practice declared unlawful by [La.]R.S. 51:1405 may bring an action individually but not in a representative capacity to recover actual damages. If the court finds the unfair or deceptive method, act, or practice was knowingly used, after being put on notice by the attorney general, the court shall award three times the actual damages sustained.

A letter was sent by the Louisiana Attorney General to Import One and “Kim A. Landry” with a notice date of June 19, 2008. That letter states (emphasis in original),

[t]he purpose of this notice is to place Import One, Inc. and Kim A. 11sLandry on notice of [McFadden’s] claim, and provide the defendant the opportunity to evaluate its position and[,] if necessaryf,] to cease such activity. Having received this notice, should the same be found, by a court of competent jurisdiction, to constitute a violation of Louisiana Revised Statute 51:1401, et seq., the Unfair Trade Practices Act and Consumer Protection Law, the petitioner in said suit will have fulfilled the notice requirement under La.R.S. 51:1409, and may be entitled to treble damages under the statutes.

The language of La.R.S. 51:1409(A) is clear. If the conduct in violation of La. R.S. 51:1409(A) continued after the attorney general’s notice, treble damages shall be awarded. The award of treble damages is mandatory if the criteria are met, not discretionary.

The trial court awarded $5,000.00 to McFadden for Import One’s conversion as well as $1,250.00 for the loss of use of her Saturn, yet did not award McFadden treble damages. The conduct that gave rise to these damages continued after Import One was placed on notice of exposure to treble damages.

Import One first argues against the award of treble damages by contending that any conduct in violation of La.R.S. 51:1405 that it had was prior to that date. This contention lacks merit. Import One continued its conversion of McFadden’s Saturn causing McFadden damages for the loss of use of her Saturn in an attempt to coerce McFadden into a sale until September 2008. Thus, the conduct continued after June 19, 2008, the date notice was received by Import One.

Next, Import One argues that it did not receive proper notice as person referenced in the letter was Kim A. Landry rather than Kim Guidry, Import One’s general manager. This argument is without merit in two regards. First, the trial court’s judgment was against Import One, not Kim Guidry who was dismissed by the judgment. Thus, the argument on Gui-dry’s behalf is moot, as the notice for potential | ^exposure of treble damages needs to be properly given to Import One, not Guidry. Second, the letter was sent to the proper address of Import One, and the letter clearly references the pending case at the trial court level and the name of the individual filing the complaint. To claim that Import One had no notice of the potential for treble damages is unreasonable considering the letter specifically states that McFadden “will have fulfilled the notice requirement under La.R.S. 51:1409, and may be entitled to treble damages under the statutes.”

Accordingly, we find that the trial court committed legal error by not awarding McFadden treble damages. Accordingly, we amend the judgment to reflect that McFadden is awarded $15,000.00 for conversion and $3,750.00 for loss of use of her Saturn in accordance with the treble damages provision in La.R.S. 51:1409(A).

ANCILLARY MATTER:

In brief, McFadden requests additional attorney’s fees for work done on appeal. We grant this request.

When an award for attorney’s fees is granted at a lower court level, the recipient of those fees is entitled to additional fees for work done on appeal. This keeps the appellate judgment consistent with the underlying judgment. Wilczewski v. Brookshire Grocery Store, 08-718, p. 18 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1/28/09), 2 So.3d 1214, 1226, writ denied, 09-456 (La.4/13/09), 5 So.3d 170.

A review of work performed on appeal suggests that $5,000.00 in attorney’s fees is reasonable. Accordingly, we grant this request and award McFadden $5,000.00 in additional attorney’s fees for work done on this appeal.

CONCLUSION:

| |7Import One raises three assignments of error. We find that the trial court improperly awarded McFadden for the loss of use of the Saturn and for reimbursement for car payments she made on the Saturn, as they are duplicitous. Thus, we amend the judgment to remove the award to McFadden for reimbursement of the car payments she made on the Saturn. The remaining assignments of error raised by Import One are without merit.

McFadden raised one assignment of error, that the trial court was in legal error in failing to award her treble damages under La.R.S. 51:1409(A). We found that the trial court failed to award McFadden treble damages for conversion and loss of use of her Saturn, as Import One’s conduct in violation of La.R.S. 51:1401, et seq. continued after the Louisiana Attorney General had properly put Import One on notice of this potential. The statute mandates that these damages are awarded after the criteria for their award have been met, and the trial court failed to do so. Thus, we amend the judgment to reflect that McFadden is awarded $15,000.00 for conversion and $3,750.00 for loss of use of her Saturn in accordance to the treble damages provision in La.R.S. 51:1409(A).

Finally, McFadden requested and was awarded attorney’s fees for work done on this appeal in the amount of $5,000.00. All costs of this appeal are taxed to Import One.

AFFIRMED, AS AMENDED.

      . Louisiana Civil Code Article 2315(A) states, "[e]very act whatever of man that causes damage to another obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it."