author: CARLTON, J.,

text:
    Susan Kristine (Gregory) JENKINS, Appellant v. Robert Wayne JENKINS Jr., Appellee.
    No. 2010-CA-00129-COA.
    Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
    June 21, 2011.

      Terry L. Caves, Laurel, attorney for appellant.
    Thomas T. Buchanan, Laurel, John D. Smallwood, attorneys for appellee.
    Before GRIFFIS, P.J., MYERS and CARLTON, JJ.
   CARLTON, J.,

for the Court:

¶ 1. Susan Kristine Gregory Jenkins (Kris) appeals the judgment of the Jones County Chancery Court, which granted her an irreconcilable-differences divorce from her husband, Robert Wayne Jenkins Jr. (Bobby). Aggrieved with the chancellor’s property division, Kris appeals. Finding no abuse of discretion by the chancellor, we affirm.

FACTS

¶2. Bobby and Kris were married on November 18, 1999, and separated on April 5, 2007. On April 11, 2007, Bobby filed for divorce in the Jones County Chancery Court alleging irreconcilable differences. Shortly thereafter, Bobby filed an amended complaint wherein he sought a divorce on the ground of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment or, in the alternative, irreconcilable differences. On June 11, 2007, Bobby and Kris entered into an agreed temporary order. Then, on January 7, 2008, Kris filed an answer to Bobby’s amended complaint for divorce denying: that she exhibited cruel and inhuman treatment toward Bobby and that irreconcilable differences existed between the parties. Thereafter, Kris propounded discovery upon Bobby. Bobby then moved to quash Kris’s discovery and requested that the court enter a protective order finding that Kris’s discovery was propounded in a delinquent manner and outside the time period specified by the Uniform Chancery Court Rules. The Jones County Chancery Court entered a judgment granting Bobby’s motion to quash Kris’s propounded discovery and allowing Bobby’s motion for a protective order. Kris then filed a motion in limine on June 11, 2009, requesting that the court hold any and all distribution of marital assets until it had sufficient information and documentation to aid the court in determining what were the marital assets, what the basis was for each asset, and the fair market value of any asset or debt. On that same day, Bobby and Kris filed a joint motion requesting that the court grant a divorce on the ground of irreconcilable differences, leaving the contested issues of identifying and dividing the couple’s marital assets and debts for the court to resolve. The chancellor then conducted a trial on these contested matters.

¶ 3. At trial, Bobby testified that he was self-employed, prior to and at the time of his marriage to Kris. Bobby testified that in 1986, he founded and was the sole-owner of Mid-Mississippi Sales and Service, Inc. Bobby also testified that in 1993, he founded Industrial Steel Corporation with one partner and obtained a forty-nine percent ownership interest in the company.

¶ 4. Kris testified that she worked as a nurse at Laurel Bone & Joint Clinic from the time of the marriage until August 2006. Kris testified that, in addition to her nursing career, she took care of Bobby’s daughter, Michelle, who lived with them for two or three years; and she maintained the couple’s home, tending to the cleaning, laundry, and grocery shopping. Kris further testified that she left Laurel Bone & Joint Clinic due to a cervical disc rupture, and after she took a period of time off to rehabilitate her cervical disc, she worked at Wesley Medical Center. Kris testified that after she began work at Wesley Medical Center, she temporarily left to seek treatment for severe depression. Kris testified that her employers at Wesley Medical Center told her that she would be eligible for rehire after she received treatment for her depression and completed an intensive out-patient program for substance abuse. Kris testified that during the time that she was attending the out-patient program, she sustained a fall while visiting a friend in Jackson and had to undergo surgery on her shoulder and rotator cuffs, which ultimately prevented her from being able to perform her nursing duties. Kris testified that she filed an application for social security disability benefits in November 2008, but it was still pending at the time of trial.

¶ 5. Bobby and Kris testified that until their separation in 2007, they lived in a home on 175 acres that Bobby paid for and owned prior to the marriage. Bobby testified that improvements toward the property were made during the marriage, including fencing and the construction of a barn, and that he purchased farm equipment for the property. Bobby also testified that he purchased cattle and horses during the marriage. Bobby testified that he also owned 3.8 acres of real property in Forest, Mississippi, at the time of marriage. Bobby also testified that he purchased 240 acres of real property in Jones County on or about April 18, 2007, using funds from the couple’s joint checking account to make a partial payment toward the purchase price, and financed the balance.

¶ 6. The record reflects that Bobby and Kris shared the responsibility of managing the couple’s finances during the marriage. Bobby testified that he possessed his own separate checking account, which he used to pay the couple’s taxes and insurance, the home’s maintenance and improvements, and vacation expenses. Bobby and Kris testified that they also had a joint checking account which was used for household expenses. Bobby and Kris further testified that Kris contributed a portion of her salary to their joint checking account each month, and she placed the remainder of her salary into her retirement account.

¶ 7. After the trial, the chancellor granted the divorce, classified the couple’s separate and marital property, then equitably divided and distributed the marital assets. Dissatisfied, Kris filed her motion for reconsideration on November 10, 2009, and her amended motion for reconsideration on November 13, 2009. After a hearing on Kris’s motion, the chancellor denied Kris’s motion for reconsideration. Feeling aggrieved, Kris appeals and raises the following issues for the Court’s review: whether the chancellor committed reversible error in his division of the marital assets and marital debts; whether the chancellor committed reversible error in his determination of the fair market value of the marital assets; and whether the chancellor committed reversible error in his determination of the valuation date for the division of marital property.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 8. This Court’s standard of review regarding property division and distribution in divorce cases is a limited one. Oswalt v. Oswalt, 981 So.2d 993, 996 (¶ 11) (Miss.Ct.App.2007) (citing Reddell v. Reddell, 696 So.2d 287, 288 (Miss.1997)). “A chancellor’s division and distribution will be upheld if it is supported by substantial credible evidence. However, this Court will not hesitate to reverse if it finds the chancellor’s decision is manifestly wrong, or that the court applied an erroneous legal standard.” Id. (citing Carrow v. Carrow, 642 So.2d 901, 904 (Miss.1994)).

DISCUSSION

I. Did the chancellor commit reversible error in his division of the marital property?

¶ 9. Kris argues that the chancellor committed reversible error in his division of the marital assets and marital debts. Specifically, Kris argues that the chancellor erred: by finding that only the appreciation of the homestead property was subject to equitable division; by classifying Industrial Steel Corporation and the 3.8 acres of land as non-marital assets; by failing to consider Kris’s total disability and health condition at the time of trial; and by inadequately dividing all of the marital assets and marital debts.

¶ 10. “When attempting to equitably divide property at issue in a divorce, the chancellor should first classify the parties’ assets as marital or non-marital based on Hemsley v. Hemsley, 639 So.2d 909 (Miss.1994).” Boutwell v. Boutwell, 829 So.2d 1216, 1221 (¶ 19) (Miss.2002). The Mississippi Supreme Court held in Hems-ley that “[ajssets acquired or accumulated during the course of a marriage are subject to equitable division unless it can be shown by proof that such assets are attributable to one of the parties’ separate estates prior to the marriage or outside the marriage.” Hemsley, 639 So.2d at 914. Thus, the chancellor may equitably divide only the property that is deemed marital property. Curry v. Curry, 45 So.3d 724, 726 (¶ 8) (Miss.Ct.App.2010) (citing Messer v. Messer, 850 So.2d 161, 167 (¶ 24) (Miss.Ct.App.2003)).

¶ 11. “After classifying the parties’ assets as either marital or non-marital, the chancellor should then proceed to equitably divide the property using the factors set forth by the supreme court in Ferguson v. Ferguson, 639 So.2d 921, 928 (Miss.1994).” Curry, 45 So.3d at 726 (¶ 9). Lastly, the chancellor should determine “whether the equitable division of the marital property, considered in light of the non-marital assets, adequately provides for both parties. If the distribution of the parties’ assets, including any separate property, fails to adequately provide for the parties, the chancellor then considers whether to award alimony to one of the parties.” Id. at 727 (¶ 9) (internal citations omitted).

¶ 12. While considering the above-stated guidelines, we now turn to a review of the property division and distribution in the case at hand. The record contains the chancellor’s order dividing and distributing the marital property. The chancellor provided as follows:

Division of marital assets is governed under the law as stated in Hemsley v. Hemsley, 639 So.2d 909 (Miss.1994) and Ferguson v. Ferguson, 639 So.2d 921 (Miss.1994).
First, the character of the parties[’j assets, i.e., marital or non-marital, must be determined pursuant to Hemsley and subsequent cases. The property determined to be marital is then equitably divided, employing the Ferguson factors as guidelines.
Assets acquired during the course of a marriage are subject to an equitable division unless it can be shown by proof that such assets are attributable to one of the parties[’] separate estates prior to the marriage or outside the marriage. Even an asset attributable to one party’s separate estate may lose its character as non-marital property if it is commingled with marital assets or used for familial purposes. Such converted assets are then subject to equitable distribution by the Court. Johnson v. Johnson, 650 So.2d 1281 (Miss.1994) and subsequent cases. See McDuffie v. McDuffie, [21 So.3d 685 (Miss.Ct.App.2009) ] [No.] 2008-CP-00033-COA September 22, 2009 hand-down, Mississippi] Court of Appeals.
The Court finds that the marital assets consist of:
1. The home and 2⅛0 acres in Jones County.
2. Kris’[s] retirement account accumulated during the marriage. ($105,-835.00)
3. Certain household furnishings.
Ip. Farm equipment.
5. Livestock.
In applying the Ferguson factors the Court finds as follows:
1.Bobby made the vast majority of the financial contributions to the acquisition of the property. He owned the home and land prior to the marriage[,] and he used funds owned by him prior to the marriage or earned by him during the marriage to improve the property and acquired the other marital assets. Kris did make financial contributions toward the family’s living expenses by contributions to a joint checking account. The marriage lasted seven years and five months. It appears without dispute that Kris’[s] addiction to prescription medications was the cause of the separation.
2. There was no evidence that either spouse had expensed, withdrawn or otherwise disposed [of] marital assets.
3. The value of the marital assets is reflected in Trial Exhibit 3 which is incorporated herein by reference.
4. All of the property was either owned by Bobby prior to the marriage or purchased by him using separate funds owned by him prior to the marriage or earned by him during the marriage.
5. No evidence was presented as to tax or other consequences to third parties.
6. Kris did not request alimony.
7. Bobby continues to operate his businesses which presumably will provide him with the same or similar income he earned during the marriage. Kris is unemployed. She has a pending application for Social Security Disability Benefits pending since November, 2008. Her drug dependency caused her nursing license to be restricted and her injury to her shoulder may interfere with her ability to perform general nursing duties. However, her injury occurred after separation of the parties and the Court finds that it should not be considered as part of the Ferguson factors. Kris was able to work and did work as a nurse after the separation and before her injury.
8. This is a case in which one partner to a marriage (Bobby) not only owned the bulk of marital assets prior to the marriage but expended premarital earnings on improvements to the property during the marriage'. But in making a division of marital property, the Court is not required to divide the property equally. The division should be fair based upon the facts of the case.
The Court concludes that an equitable division of marital assets is as follows:
1. Kris shall receive all of her retirement account. ($105,835[.00] of which is a marital asset).
2. Bobby shall receive ownership of the marital home and acreage and the acreage he purchased after separation of the parties.
3. Bobby shall receive ownership of all farm equipment.
4. Kris shall receive one-half (1/2) of all remaining livestock (horses) based on Bobby’s agreement to [the] same during his trial testimony.
5. Kris shall receive all of the household furnishings she requested during her testimony at trial.
6. Bobby shall pay Kris the sum of $50,000.00 payable at the rate of $1,000.00 per month until paid in full.
Bobby and Kris are granted a divorce on the grounds of irreconcilable differences.

(Emphasis added).

¶ 13. “Equitable distribution does not mean equal distribution.” Seymour v. Seymour, 960 So.2d 513, 519 (¶ 15) (Miss.Ct.App.2006) (quoting Lauro v. Lauro, 924 So.2d 584, 590 (¶ 23) (Miss.Ct.App.2006)). No requirement exists dictating that Kris must receive half of the equity in the marital home. As we noted in Seymour, the goal as it pertains to equitable division is “a fair division of marital property based on the facts of each case[.]” Seymour, 960 So.2d at 519 (¶ 15) (citing Ferguson, 639 So.2d at 929)). The record herein shows substantial evidence supporting the chancellor’s exercise of discretion in equitably dividing the marital property and awarding a larger share of the property to Bobby. More specifically, the chancellor’s opinion, as shown in the excerpts set forth herein, reflects that the chancellor considered the homestead to constitute marital property, as opposed to Kris’s assertion that the chancellor only considered the value in appreciation of the homestead as marital property.

¶ 14. Further, in his opinion dividing the marital property, the chancellor stated that he considered the contributions and expenditures of each spouse to the seven-year marriage and to the acquisition of the marital property. The chancellor also acknowledged in his opinion that Bobby owned the bulk of the marital assets prior to the marriage and also expended pre-marital earnings on improvements to the property during the marriage. The chancellor then noted that the evidence was without dispute that Kris’s addiction to prescription medications caused the marital separation. In ordering an equitable distribution of property, chancellors must apply the Ferguson factors, which include:

(1) contribution to the accumulation of property, (2) dissipation of assets, (3) the market or emotional value of assets subject to distribution, (4) the value of assets not subject to distribution, (5) the tax and economic consequences of the distribution, (6) the extent to which property division may eliminate the need for alimony, (7) the financial security needs of the parties, and (8) any other factor that in equity should be considered.

Vaughn v. Vaughn, 56 So.3d 1283, 1289 (¶ 20) (Miss.Ct.App.2011) (citing Hults v. Hults, 11 So.3d 1273, 1281 (¶ 36) (Miss.Ct.App.2009)). Additionally, in applying the Ferguson factors, the chancellor properly considers three sub-factors in determining the parties’ contributions for purposes of marital distribution:

(a) direct or indirect economic contribution to the acquisition of the property; (b) contribution to the stability and harmony of the marital and family relationships as measured by quality, quantity of time spent on family duties and duration of the marriage; and (c) contribution to the education, training or other accomplishment bearing on the earning power of the spouse accumulating the assets.

Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, 2 So.3d 720, 726 (¶ 11) (Miss.Ct.App.2009) (citing Ferguson, 639 So.2d at 928)).

¶ 15. This Court recognizes the limited standard of review that appellate courts utilize when reviewing a chancellor’s equitable division of the marital property. We additionally acknowledge that appellate courts lack the authority to overrule a chancellor’s property division and distribution absent a finding of manifest error. Parker v. Parker, 641 So.2d 1133, 1137 (Miss.1994). We also note that Mississippi is not a community property state; thus, the chancellor holds no obligation to divide the marital property equally. Id. After examining the property division as a whole, we find that the chancellor’s findings are supported by credible evidence; therefore, we affirm the chancellor’s equitable division of the marital property.

¶ 16. Further, we recognize that the chancellor awarded Kris a smaller percentage of the parties’ assets; however, we find, in light of our highly deferential standard of review, this fact, standing alone, is an insufficient ground for reversal. See Redd v. Redd, 774 So.2d 492, 496 (¶ 15) (Miss.Ct.App.2000) (affirming a chancellor’s division of marital property which resulted in the wife’s receiving only twenty-three percent of the entire marital estate). As such, we find no manifest error in the chancellor’s property division. This issue lacks merit.

II. Did the chancellor commit reversible error in his detennination of the fair market value of assets?

¶ 17. Kris next argues that the chancellor erred by not appointing an expert to opine as to the fair market value of several of the couple’s assets. Specifically, Kris argues that the chancellor should have appointed an expert to conduct an appraisal of the following assets: the home; the 3.8 acres of land; Mid-Mississippi Sales and Service, Inc.; Industrial Steel Corporation; livestock; farm equipment; and household furniture.

¶ 18. Bobby responds that he submitted documents supporting his valuation of all assets at issue to Kris’s counsel prior to trial and also introduced the same documents into evidence at trial without objection. Bobby further claims that Kris failed to offer any evidence at trial related to the valuation of Mid-Mississippi Sales and Service, Inc. or Industrial Steel Corporation, even though she took the deposition of Andrew E. Gay, Bobby’s CPA. Also, as to the values of the other property, Bobby contends, as the purchaser of the property, he was in a position to give the court an estimated value.

¶ 19. It is the chancellor’s responsibility in a divorce proceeding to make an adequate investigation into the value of the marital property that is subject to division: “Property division should be based upon a determination of fair market value of the assets, and these valuations should be the initial step before determining division.” King v. King, 946 So.2d 395, 403 (¶ 20) (Miss.Ct.App.2006) (citing Ferguson, 639 So.2d at 929). While we note that “expert testimony may be essential to establish valuation sufficient to equitably divide property, particularly when the assets are [diverse],” Redd, 774 So.2d at 495 (¶ 9), we also recognize and reiterate the principle that “findings on valuation do not require expert testimony and may be accomplished by adopting the values cited in the parties’ 8.05 financial disclosures, in the testimony, or in other evidence.” Horn v. Horn, 909 So.2d 1151, 1165 (¶ 49) (Miss.Ct.App.2005) (citing Ward v. Ward, 825 So.2d 713, 719 (¶ 21) (Miss.Ct.App.2002); Dunaway v. Dunaway, 749 So.2d 1112, 1118 (¶ 14) (Miss.Ct.App.1999)).

¶ 20. In the present case, the record reflects that only Bobby attempted to provide the chancellor with evidence regarding the valuations of the marital property. By contrast, the record shows that Kris failed to present any documents indicating her assets or liabilities, and she failed to place any valuation whatsoever on the marital property at issue. The chancellor’s opinion reflects that he utilized valuations set forth in trial exhibit three. Kris argues that the chancellor committed reversible error by not appointing experts to appraise the couple’s assets. However, this Court refuses to blame the chancellor for a party’s failure to present sufficient evidence of property valuation. Faced with similar circumstances, we provided as follows in Dunaway, 749 So.2d at 1121 (¶ 28), stating:

It is our conclusion that the chancellor, faced with proof from both parties that was something less than ideal, made valuation judgments that find some ev-identiary support in the record. To the extent that the evidence on which the chancellor based his opinion was less informative than it could have been, we lay that at the feet of the litigants and not the chancellor. The chancellor appears to have fully explored the available proof and arrived at the best conclusions that he could, and we can discover no abuse of discretion in those efforts that would require us to reverse his valuation determinations.

¶ 21. As explained in Dunaway, 749 So.2d at 1121 (¶ 28), it is not the chancellor’s duty to obtain appraisals of the marital property. Kris cannot now complain that the chancellor’s valuations are unfair when no reliable evidence of the value of the property was presented by her at trial, especially after she'provided no objection at trial as to the valuations provided by Bobby. As in Dunaway, the chancellor in the present case was faced with less than ideal proof, but he classified and divided the marital property in a way that was supported by the evidence presented by Bobby and testimony at trial. In the absence of any evidence as to the marital property valuations presented on Kris’s behalf, we decline to find that the chancellor abused his discretion. See Common v. Common, 42 So.3d 59, 63 (¶ 13) (Miss.Ct.App.2010) (“It [i]s not the chancellor’s duty to obtain appraisals of the marital property.”). We again note that while expert testimony as to valuations of property might be helpful in some cases, it is not required. Further, the chancellor may consider other evidence presented by the parties, as done in the present case. Accordingly, this issue is without merit.

III. Did the chancellor commit reversible error in his determination of the valuation date for the division of marital assets and marital debts?

¶ 22. Lastly, Kris argues that the chancellor committed reversible error in his determination of the date of evaluation for the marital property. Kris contends that the chancellor should have used the date of trial, rather than the date the temporary order was entered, in setting the valuation date for the property division. In response, Bobby contends that the valuation date is within the discretion of the chancellor, see Hensarling v. Hensarling, 824 So.2d 583, 591 (¶ 25) (Miss.2002); thus, the date set by the chancellor was wholly proper.

¶ 23. Because we have held that the valuation date falls within the discretion of the chancellor when equitably dividing marital property upon divorce, Bullock v. Bullock, 733 So.2d 292, 298-99 (¶ 37) (Miss.Ct.App.1998) (citing MacDonald v. MacDonald, 698 So.2d 1079, 1086 (Miss.1997)), we must find that the chancellor in the present case did not abuse his discretion in setting the date of valuation as the date the temporary order was entered. See also Hensarling, 824 So.2d at 591 (¶ 25) (finding the chancellor’s use of the date of separation as the date of valuation to be proper since the selection of the date of valuation falls within the discretion of the chancellor). As such, we find this issue without merit.

¶ 24. THE JUDGMENT OF THE JONES COUNTY CHANCERY COURT IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE APPELLANT.

LEE, C.J., IRVING AND GRIFFIS, P.JJ., MYERS, BARNES, ISHEE, ROBERTS AND MAXWELL, JJ„ CONCUR. RUSSELL, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.

      . The couple have no children together.

      . The agreed temporary order provided Bobby with use and possession of the former marital abode and required him to be responsible for any expenses relating to the home. The temporary order also provided Bobby and Kris with the use and possession of the automobile he/she usually drove; required each to be responsible for the expenses related to his/her automobile; and prohibited each party from disposing of any marital assets, other than by paying for usual living expenses.

      . While the record reflects that Kris filed this motion in limine with the court, no ruling on such motion appears in the record.

      . Kris returned to work at Wesley Medical Center after the couple’s separation in 2007.

      . Bobby testified he moved into the house in 1996.

      . Bobby testified he conducts Mid-Mississippi Sales and Service, Inc. on this property.

      .The amount which Kris contributed to the joint checking account is disputed between the parties.

      . We pause to note that the record shows that neither party requested alimony during the divorce proceedings.

      . See Smith v. Smith, 994 So.2d 882, 886 (¶ 12) (Miss.Ct.App.2008) (finding that the chancellor did not abuse his discretion in awarding one-half of the value of a van and a truck to each spouse, even though the chancellor did not classify the vehicles as marital property; by dividing them as marital property, the chancellor clearly regarded them as such, and testimony that the vehicles were owned and used during the marriage supported this decision).

      . In Lowrey v. Lowrey, 25 So.3d 274, 285 (¶ 26) (Miss.2009), the Mississippi Supreme Court found that marital misconduct is a "viable factor” deserving of weight by the chancellor in the distribution of marital assets in a divorce case when the misconduct places a burden on the marital and family relationship’s stability and harmony. The supreme court also stated that an equitable division of property does not necessarily mean an equal division of property; rather, "fairness is the prevailing guideline” in the division of marital property. Id.

      . In Vaughn, 56 So.3d at 1289 (¶ 20), this Court provided that, in addition to the Ferguson factors, the chancellor should also consider marital fault, citing Singley v. Singley, 846 So.2d 1004, 1013-14 (¶ 26) (Miss.2002).

      . See Hults, 11 So.3d at 1281 (¶ 38) (classifying any property acquired or debt incurred after entry of temporary support order as separate property).


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: BARNES, J.,

license: Public Domain

text:
    S.E.B., Appellant v. R.E.B. Appellee.
    No. 2010-CA-00074-COA.
    Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
    June 28, 2011.

      Julie Ann Epps, Canton, E. Michael Marks, Jackson, attorneys for appellant.
    John D. Fike, attorney for appellee.
    Before LEE, C.J., BARNES and MAXWELL, JJ.
   BARNES, J.,

for the Court:

¶ 1. The Chancery Court of Hinds County granted R.E.B. (“Ray”) a divorce from S.E.B. (“Sara”) on the ground of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment. The chancellor also awarded physical custody of the two minor children to Ray and made certain determinations regarding the distribution of the marital property. Sara appealed, raising four issues, two of which relate to Ray’s grant of divorce. The other two issues regard the chancellor’s failure to award Sara separate maintenance or alimony and the chancellor’s offsetting of Ray’s credit-card debt with equity owed to Sara from her share of Ray’s retirement account. Because the chancellor failed to rule on the issue of child support, and she did not certify her judgment as final pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), this Court lacks appellate jurisdiction. Therefore, we must dismiss this appeal.

STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2. Sara and Ray separated in April 2006, after approximately twenty-one years of marriage. Three children were born of the marriage — a son and two daughters. At the time of trial, their son was emancipated, and their two minor daughters were sixteen and nine years old. The parties own a marital residence on Daniel Lake Boulevard in Jackson, Mississippi.

¶ 8. In April 2008, Sara filed a complaint for separate maintenance, which also included a request for custody of the two daughters, child support, and equitable distribution of certain property. In response, Ray answered and counterclaimed for divorce on the grounds of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment, adultery, insanity, or, alternatively, irreconcilable differences. He also requested custody of the two minor children and child support.

¶ 4. In December 2009, the chancery court held a hearing on Sara’s complaint for separate maintenance and Ray’s counter-complaint for divorce. At the end of the hearing, the chancellor ruled that Ray was entitled to a divorce based on habitual cruel and inhuman treatment; thus, it was not necessary to address the grounds for Sara’s separate maintenance claim. The chancery court also found that Ray did not prove grounds for divorce based on insanity or adultery. Sara was awarded a lien to one-half of Ray’s retirement account, which had a balance of approximately $41,637 at the time of the hearing. The chancellor ruled Ray would assume the $11,000 in credit-card debt, which was deemed marital, but he was entitled to an offset of $5,500 for any equity owed to Sara from Ray’s retirement account. Regarding child support, the chancellor declined to make a ruling as Sara is unemployed.

¶ 5. Sara appealed.

ANALYSIS

¶ 6. While the parties have not raised the issue as to whether the trial court’s judgment is appealable, the appellate court must address the question on its own initiative. M.W.F. v. D.D.F., 926 So.2d 897, 899 (¶ 4) (Miss.2006) (citing Williams v. Delta Reg’l Med. Ctr., 740 So.2d 284, 285 (¶ 5) (Miss.1999)).

¶ 7. Sara and Ray both requested child support in their respective complaint and counter-complaint; however, the chancellor did not rule on the issue of child support in either her bench opinion or written judgment. From her bench ruling, the chancellor mentioned child support twice, but she made no definitive ruling. Initially, she stated: “With regard to the equitable distribution of the marital assets and the request for support and maintenance of the children and of [Sara], [Sara] is currently not employed, and at this point I do understand that we are in a type of recession; however, under the circumstances, at some point, since there’s been no finding of disability, [Sara] is an able-bodied person and is able to seek employment.” Later, the chancellor mentioned that “[Ray] is currently supporting the minor children. He has received no support from [Sara] because she is currently unemployed.” At the end of her ruling, the chancellor stated that she “covered everything. If I haven’t, because everybody is rushed today, then we can address that in terms of drafting.”

¶ 8. In the judgment of divorce, the chancellor wrote: “Due to [Sara] not being employed at this time, the issue of child support will not be ruled on until such time in the future as the Court deems proper.” Because the chancellor did not rule on the issue of child support, we find this judgment was not a final judgment. '

¶ 9. “Generally, only final judgments are appealable.” M.W.F., 926 So.2d at 899 (¶ 4). We find M.W.F. instructive. There, as here, the parties raised various claims of divorce, child custody, child support, alimony, and property division. Id. However, in his judgment, the chancellor only addressed the divorce claim and expressly held the other matters in abeyance pending appeal. Id. at (¶ 3). The Mississippi Supreme Court noted that although the chancellor’s temporary order discussed an appeal, it did not use the express language required by Rule 54(b). Accordingly, the order was interlocutory and not ripe for appellate review. Id. at 900 (¶ 5).

¶ 10. Rule 54(b) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure states:

When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim, counter-claim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an expressed determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an expressed direction for the entry of the judgment. In the absence of such determination and direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated which adjudicates fewer than all of the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties.

The comment to Rule 54(b) adds that the rule “gives the court discretion to enter a final judgment in these circumstances and it provides much needed certainty in determining when a final and appealable judgment has been entered. If the court chooses to enter such a final order, it must do so in a definite, unmistakable manner.” M.R.C.P. 54(b) cmt. “Without the entry of a Rule 54(b) certificate, a trial court order which disposes of less than all of the claims against all of the parties in a multiple party or multiple claim action, is interlocutory.” M.W.F., 926 So.2d at 900 (¶ 4) (quoting Owens v. Nasco Int'l, Inc., 744 So.2d 772, 774 (¶ 8) (Miss.1999)).

¶ 11. Here, the chancellor expressly declined to rule on the issue of child support. Further, she failed to certify the order as a final judgment under Rule 54(b). Accordingly, this Court has no jurisdiction. We also note that Sara asserts in her appeal that the chancellor failed to address her claim for alimony. “Support” for Sara was only mentioned in conjunction with general statements about the support of the children in the chancellor’s bench ruling, and that discussion was in relation to the fact Sara was not employed, but able-bodied and able to seek employment.

¶ 12. However, Sara’s claim for alimony might not have been properly before the chancery court because the only time Sara mentioned a request for alimony was in her original complaint for separate maintenance. The request was made on the fifth page of a six-page pleading, within a page-long paragraph containing her prayer for relief. The request for alimony was not a proper alternative request for relief to separate maintenance as the two means of support are available in different situations. See Chapel v. Chapel, 876 So.2d 290, 295 (¶ 16) (Miss.2004). While there is “nothing inherent in the substance of the claims to prevent the separate maintenance action from being converted to one for alimony,” Sara did not request alimony in her answer to Ray’s counterclaim for divorce, nor did she mention it at trial or in any post-trial motions. See id. (quoting Weiss v. Weiss, 579 So.2d 539, 542 (Miss.1991)). Accordingly, we acknowledge that the chancellor might not have been aware a claim for alimony was before her at the time of her ruling. As we must dismiss this appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction, we note that the chancery court would need to determine if Sara’s claim for alimony was properly before the court, and if so, whether she was entitled to any alimony.

CONCLUSION

¶ 13. Because the chancellor did not make a “definite, unmistakable” ruling on the parties’ request for child support, the judgment was not final, but interlocutory; thus, it was not appealable. Nor was the judgment certified as a final judgment under Rule 54(b). Therefore, we must dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

¶ 14. THE APPEAL IS DISMISSED FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE APPELLANT.

LEE, C.J., IRVING AND GRIFFIS, P.JJ., MYERS, ISHEE, ROBERTS, MAXWELL AND RUSSELL, JJ., CONCUR. CARLTON, J., CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY.

      . Because R.E.B.’s claim for divorce was based upon S.E.B.’s conviction of child neglect for allowing the sexual abuse of their fourteen-year-old daughter with a twenty-four-year-old man, fictitious names have been used for the parties to protect the identity of the minor children.

      . Subsequent to this action, in April 2007, Sara filed for a divorce based on the ground of adultery, but the chancellor dismissed the case for insufficient evidence.


author: GRIFFIS, P.J.,

text:
    Satyadev MEKA, Appellant v. GRANT PLUMBING & AIR CONDITIONING COMPANY and Albert Grube, Appellee.
    No. 2009-CA-01921-COA.
    Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
    June 28, 2011.

      James Ashley Ogden, Jackson, attorney for appellant.
    Cecil Maison Heidelberg, Ridgeland, Ginny Y. Kennedy, attorneys for appellee.
    Before GRIFFIS, P.J., MYERS and CARLTON, JJ.
   GRIFFIS, P.J.,

for the Court:

¶ 1. Satyadev Meka sued Grant Plumbing & Air Conditioning Company and its employee Albert Grube (collectively, “Grant Plumbing”) for injuries he sustained in an automobile accident. A jury determined that Meka suffered $100,000 in damages, but it assessed Meka with forty-percent comparative fault for the accident. Accordingly, the trial court entered a judgment awarding Meka $60,000 in total damages. Meka filed a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, a new trial or an additur of the damages awarded. The trial court denied the motion, and this appeal followed. We find no reversible error and affirm.

FACTS

¶ 2. On February 17, 2006, shortly before 8:00 a.m., Meka and his daughter, Pam Meka, were driving north in the right-hand lane on Interstate 55 in Meka’s sport utility vehicle, on their way to Mississippi College, where Pam was a student. Traveling in the same lane immediately behind Meka’s SUV was a UtiliQuest truck, driven by Jeffrey Koontz. Following immediately behind the UtiliQuest truck, was Grant Plumbing’s truck, driven by Grube.

¶ 3. Meka testified at trial that as he approached the Adkins Boulevard exit, he felt some discomfort in his chest area. Meka turned on his right-turn signal, slowed the SUV, and pulled the vehicle into the “white-striped triangular area” just past the concrete divider that separates 1-55 and the northbound on-ramp from Adkins Boulevard. According to Meka, he had stopped the SUV almost completely when his SUV was struck from behind by the Grant Plumbing truck. The impact caused Meka’s SUV to roll over on its side and then upside down. Pam removed herself from the vehicle; she and a passerby then helped Meka out of the vehicle — both Meka and Pam were wearing their seat belts • at the time of the accident. An ambulance arrived at the scene soon afterwards; however, neither Meka nor Pam felt the need to go to the hospital. Meka began feeling soreness in his back later that day after he had gotten home. He said the soreness progressed into severe pain a couple of days later. Meka eventually sought treatment for the pain a couple months after the accident.

¶ 4. Koontz testified that immediately prior to the accident he was traveling approximately four to five car lengths behind Meka’s SUV at a rate of speed of fifty-five miles per hour. Koontz stated that as Meka’s SUV approached the Adkins Boulevard on-ramp, he observed the SUV’s brake lights and its right-turn signal activate. He said the SUV then moved over to the right where the concrete divider ends, and it came to a complete stop in the triangular area between 1-55 and the on-ramp. Koontz told the jury that the rear portion of Meka’s SUV “was sticking out” onto 1-55 (approximately ten percent of the vehicle according to Koontz). According to Koontz, enough of Meka’s SUV obstructed the right lane that he could not stay in that lane and pass the SUV safely. So Koontz slowed the UtiliQuest truck and proceeded over into the left lane. As he did so, the UtiliQuest truck was struck in the rear-passenger side by the Grant Plumbing truck. Koontz said the impact “jolted” him, which caused him to briefly lose full control of the UtiliQuest truck for a short distance. The UtiliQuest truck made no contact with Meka’s SUV.

¶ 5. Grube testified that he was traveling five or six car lengths behind the Utili-Quest truck at approximately fifty-five to sixty miles per hour. Grube said he remembered seeing the brake lights on the UtiliQuest truck brighten, and the Utili-Quest truck then veered over to the left lane. Grube said it was at that point he first saw Meka’s SUV sitting at an angle in the triangular area to the right, and he said that a portion of the SUV obstructed his lane of travel. Grube estimated that he was approximately three to four car lengths away from Meka’s SUV the moment he realized the SUV had stopped. According to Grube, he slowed the Grant Plumbing truck and tried to maneuver around the UtiliQuest truck, but he hit the back-right corner of the UtiliQuest truck.

¶ 6. The record is unclear as to what exactly happened next, but the Grant Plumbing truck ultimately collided with Meka’s SUV. Grube testified that the Grant Plumbing truck was approximately one to two feet over into the triangular section when it hit Meka’s SUV.

¶ 7. Two experts testified at trial, both on behalf of Meka. Dr. Dinesh Goel, board certified in general surgery and an expert in family medicine, testified both as a medical expert and as Meka’s treating physician. Dr. Glenda Glover, qualified as an expert in economics, testified as an economic-loss expert.

¶ 8. Dr. Goel testified that he first saw Meka in June 2007, when Meka presented to his medical office with a hurt back. Dr. Goel diagnosed Meka as suffering from two bulging discs in his back, “at the L-5, S — 1 and the L-4, L-5” vertebrae, which were causing Meka severe pain in his left leg and “neuropathy.” Using the American Medical Association guidelines for permanent impairment, Dr. Goel determined that Meka had a ten percent disability rating as a result of his back condition. Dr. Goel, who disclosed that he does not perform back surgeries and no longer practices general surgery, estimated that the type of surgery needed to repair Meka’s back injury would cost anywhere from $80,000 to $100,000. According to Dr. Goel, Meka likely would require additional medical treatment along with the surgery, which he, Dr. Goel, could administer. He estimated that such treatment could cost approximately $3,000 to $4,000 per year.

¶9. Dr. Glover testified that based on Meka’s age and qualifications as a computer engineer, Meka’s total loss of earnings — were he never able to work again— would be approximately $1,359,000. Dr. Glover arrived at this figure by taking into account Meka’s age, which was forty-seven at the time of the accident; a progressive salary index beginning at $55,000 per year; and the fact that Meka had approximately twenty years left in the workforce.

¶ 10. Evidence also was presented to the jury that Meka has not been employed by anyone since the year 2002. In 2007, Meka applied for a job with a company called Quality Matrix, located in New Jersey. That same year, Quality Matrix offered Meka employment with the company as a computer systems analyst, at a salary of $55,000 per year. According to Meka, the reason why he applied for the job at Quality Matrix was in order to test the job market; he did not intend to work for Quality Matrix because he was medically unable to do so due to his back problems.

¶ 11. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Meka, and it determined that Meka suffered $100,000 in damages as a result of the accident. That amount was diminished by $40,000 based on the jury’s determination that Meka was forty percent at fault for the accident.

¶ 12. On appeal, Meka argues that he is entitled to a new trial, and he asserts a number of issues in support thereof, which we have narrowed down to four and rephrased to avoid repetition. Meka contends that the trial court erred by: (1) allowing the jury to apportion fault; (2) granting certain jury instructions proposed by Grant Plumbing; (3) refusing his proposed jury instruction that set forth his second theory of liability — Grant Plumbing’s failure to teach Grube safe-driving habits; and (4) allowing testimony regarding Meka’s citizenship status in the United States.

DISCUSSION

¶ 13. This Court reviews a trial court’s grant or denial of a motion for a new trial for an abuse of discretion. Gober v. Lee, 8 So.3d 912, 915 (¶ 13) (Miss.Ct.App.2009). The Mississippi Supreme Court has held that “a new trial becomes appropriate when a trial court determines that error within the trial mechanism itself has caused a legally incorrect or unjust verdict to be rendered.” White v. Stewman, 932 So.2d 27, 33 (¶ 15) (Miss.2006). The supreme court has also held that:

A new trial may be granted in a number of circumstances, such as when the verdict is against the overwhelming weight of the evidence, or when the jury has been confused by faulty jury instructions, or when the jury has departed from its oath and its verdict is a result of bias, passion, and prejudice.

Solanki v. Ervin, 21 So.3d 552, 569 (¶ 46) (Miss.2009) (quoting Bobby Kitchens, Inc. v. Miss. Ins. Guar. Ass’n, 560 So.2d 129, 132 (Miss.1989)).

I. Apportionment of Fault

¶ 14. Meka argues that Grant Plumbing failed to present any evidence showing he acted negligently or caused or contributed to his injuries; thus, the jury should not have been allowed to consider apportioning fault to him. We disagree.

¶ 15. Mississippi is a pure comparative-negligence state. Miss.Code Ann. § 11-7-15 (Rev.2004). See also Blackmon v. Payne, 510 So.2d 483, 486 (Miss.1987). “Under the comparative negligence doctrine, negligence is measured in terms of percentage, and any damages allowed shall be diminished in proportion to amount of negligence attributable to the person for whose injury, damage or death recovery is sought.” Coho Res., Inc. v. Chapman, 913 So.2d 899, 911 (¶ 36) (Miss.2005). ‘Where negligence by both parties is concurrent and contributes to injury, recovery is not barred under such doctrine, but [the] plaintiffs damages are diminished proportionately!.]” Burton ex rel. Bradford v. Barnett, 615 So.2d 580, 582 (Miss.1993). This holds true “even to the extent that negligence on the part of the plaintiff was ninety percent (90%) and on the part of the defendant was ten percent (10%)”; in such an instance, “the plaintiff [still] would be entitled to recover theoretically that ten percent.” Id. Thus, even though the plaintiff was negligent, the plaintiff may recover from a defendant whose negligence contributed to the plaintiffs injury. Id.

¶ 16. Grant Plumbing’s theory of the case was that Meka was negligent per se for violating Mississippi Code Annotated section 63-3-903 (Rev.2004), which states, in pertinent part, that:

No person shall stop, park or leave standing any vehicle, whether attended or unattended, upon the paved or improved or main traveled part of any highway outside of a business or residence district when it is practical to stop, park or so leave such vehicle off such part of said highway. In every event, however, a clear and unobstructed width of at least twenty (20) feet of such part of the highway opposite such standing vehicle shall be left for the free passage of other vehicles and a clear view of such stopped vehicle be available from a distance of two hundred (200) feet in each direction upon such highway.

Grant Plumbing attempted to demonstrate a violation of section 63-3-903, at trial, by the agreed upon terms contained in the trial court’s pretrial order, which set forth each parties’ theory of the case, and which amended the parties’ respective pleadings, accordingly.

¶ 17. In Teche Lines, Inc. v. Danforth, 195 Miss. 226, 12 So.2d 784 (1943), the Mississippi Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of section 63-3-903’s predecessor, Section 90 of Chapter 200, Laws of 1938. Speaking to the twenty-foot requirement provision, Danforth took judicial notice that at least eighty-five percent of Mississippi’s highways at the time were of such a width that a motorist could stop only occasionally without violating the law. Id. at 254, 12 So.2d at 788. This result, according to the Danforth court, “would be an unreasonable and arbitrary abridgment of the right to travel, thus rendering the statute unconstitutional when so interpreted.” Id. To save the statute as written, Danforth held that the word “practical” should be given operation throughout the entire section; the court concluded as follows:

Our ruling is that when twenty feet of clearance is impossible, the vehicle shall turn as far to the right as practical including sound and safe shoulders, but must not stop upon any part of the traveled highway unless and until at least 200 feet clear view is available in each direction from the point where the stop is made, save when the vehicle is disabled....

Id. at 255, 12 So.2d at 788.

¶ 18. In Stong v. Freeman Truck Line, Inc., 456 So.2d 698, 707 n. 7 (Miss.1984), the supreme court reiterated that section 63-3-903 furnishes the “standard of care of a reasonable man[,]” the deviation of which “constitute[s] negligence per se.” Stong was a negligence action arising from a collision on 1-55 between an automobile and a stalled truck, which occurred in the southbound lanes of 1-55, a short distance south from where the accident at issue occurred. The Stong court examined the “business or residence district” language contained in the statute, holding that “as a matter of law, a limited-access interstate highway such as 1-55 is not within a business or residence district within the meaning ... of the Uniform Highway Traffic Regulation Law, codified in §§ 63-3-1 et seq.” Id. at 704-06. In so holding, the Stong court explained:

An interstate expressway that goes through heavily populated municipal areas is designed to speed the flow of traffic and, as much as possible, to simulate the traffic conditions found on all other parts of the interstate system. Motorists reasonably expect that they will encounter no stopped vehicles within regular lanes of travel. Indeed, the system is designed so that the driver will be free from worry about turning, slow moving[,] or stalled automobiles.

Id. at 705-06.

¶ 19. In Stong, the supreme court said the effect of section 63-3-903 “is to provide that no person shall stop his motor vehicle on ‘the main traveled part’ of the highway ‘when it is practical’ to stop off the highway.” Id. at 707 (citations omitted). Stong reiterated that the construction of the statute requires consideration of whether under the facts and circumstances of a particular case it is reasonably practical for a driver to pull his or her vehicle off the main traveled part of the highway. Id. at 708. “This question is ordinarily one of fact to be submitted to a jury on proper instructions.” Id.

¶ 20. Here, the trial court instructed the jury through jury instruction C-ll (originally jury instruction D-13), as follows:

You are instructed that Mississippi law prohibits stopping a vehicle in the paved or main traveled portion of a public highway, whether attended or unattended, when it is practical to stop such vehicle off the paved or main traveled portion of the highway.
If you find that the Plaintiff, Satyadev Meka, stopped his vehicle in a place and manner where it was unreasonably practical for him to stop his vehicle, then Satyadev Meka was negligent.
If you find that Satyadev Meka’s negligence was a proximate contributing cause of the accident and his own injuries, then you shall apportion liability (fault) to Satyadev Meka in accordance with the further instructions of this [cjourt.
If, however, you find that Satyadev Meka’s negligence was the sole proximate cause of the accident and Satyadev Meka’s injuries, then you shall return a verdict in favor of the Defendant, Albert Grube.

¶ 21. A similar instruction was given in Solanki, which read as follows:

The Court instructs the jury that according to Mississippi law no person shall stop, park or leave standing any vehicle, whether attended or unattended, upon the paved or main traveled part of any highway, unless it is impossible to avoid stopping in the roadway.
Therefore, if you find from a preponderance of the evidence in this case that the decedent, Nilima Solanki, allowed her vehicle to stop in a lane of travel on the highway when it was possible or reasonably practicable for her to steer her vehicle onto the shoulder of the highway, then the Court instructs the jury that such acts constitute negligence on behalf of the decedent, and if you find from a preponderance of the evidence that such negligence was the sole proximate cause of the accident, then it is your sworn duty to return a verdict for Melvin Ervin and The Merchants Company.
If you find that such negligence of the decedent Nilima Solanki was a proximate contributing cause of the accident and that the negligence of Melvin Ervin was also a proximate contributing cause of the accident, then it is your sworn duty to decide the amount you would have awarded for her death, if any, and then reduce that amount by the percentage of Nilima Solanki’s negligence.

Solanki, 21 So.3d at 561-62 (¶ 22).

¶ 22. The Solanki court found that the trial court properly granted this instruction because it correctly stated the law and was warranted by the evidence. Id. at 562 (¶ 26). Likewise, we find that jury instruction C-ll, though not perfect as written, contains a correct statement of the law and is supported by the evidence.

¶ 23. The record discloses that there was adequate space in the base of the white-striped triangular area for Meka to remove his vehicle completely from the lane of travel. The shoulders lining the right-hand lane leading up to and past this particular area also provided enough space for Meka to stop his vehicle without obstructing the lane of travel.

¶ 24. Throughout his argument to this Court on this issue, Meka maintains that he was in the “process” of pulling his SUV out of the lane of travel and into the “safety zone” when the Grant Plumbing truck collided with his vehicle. Meka’s factual contentions notwithstanding, evidence was presented both by Grube and Koontz, a disinterested witness, that Meka’s SUV had already come to a complete stop prior to the accident, and a portion of Meka’s SUV remained in the lane of travel. This, according to Koontz’s testimony, made it necessary for Koontz to change lanes. Grube did not see the stopped SUV until Koontz proceeded into the other lane, and he had little time to react at that point.

¶ 25. Here, in analyzing the evidence in a light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, we find that Meka partly obstructed the right-hand lane of travel in violation of section 63-3-903. His act in so doing was a proximate and contributing cause to the complained-of accident. Meka’s argument that the trial court erred by allowing the jury to apportion fault is without merit.

II. Erroneous Jury Instructions Given

¶ 26. Meka argues the trial court erred by giving jury instruction C-ll, jury instruction 19, jury instruction 20, and jury instruction 21. Meka’s argument, as to each erroneous instruction, is that no evidence was presented that he did anything negligent.

¶ 27. On jury instruction C-ll, related in the previous issue, we point out that the phrase “where it was unreasonably practical,” is ambiguous. Originally, before it was modified by the trial court for reasons not disclosed by the record, the second paragraph in proposed jury instruction C-ll (then D-13) read: “If you find that the Plaintiff, Satyadev Meka, stopped his vehicle in the right lane of Interstate 55 when it was reasonably practical for him to stop his vehicle off the highway, then Satyadev Meka was negligent.” The pre-modified version accurately articulates the test reiterated in Stong.

¶ 28. Nevertheless, we are of the opinion that the language contained in the first paragraph of jury instruction C-ll, cured any faulty language used in the second paragraph. Further, as previously mentioned, the evidence illustrates that there was adequate space available for Meka to remove his vehicle completely out of the lane of travel. Thus, there was no danger of the jury going outside the limitations prescribed by Danforth in determining whether Meka violated Mississippi law.

¶ 29. Also, the record indicates that a jury instruction conference was conducted off the record before final instructions were submitted to the jury for its deliberation. The parties did not make their respective objections, which we assume were made to the trial court during the instruction conference, known for the record until after the case was submitted to the jury. On jury instruction C-ll, Meka merely entered a general objection on the grounds that the instruction as a whole was a misstatement of the law, was a misstatement of the facts in evidence, was a peremptory for the defendant, was a composite instruction that was covered by another instruction, and contained the wrong legal standard. There is no indication that Meka specifically challenged the language of the second paragraph at trial; thus, we deem any error with respect to the construction of jury instruction C-ll, to be waived. As to the other grounds asserted by Meka for the erroneousness of jury instruction C-ll, we find each without merit for the reasons discussed in the previous issue.

¶ 30. Meka also argues that jury instruction 19 was improper on the basis that no evidence was presented to establish that he was negligent. Jury instruction 19 is a general form-of-the-verdict instruction that allowed the jury to find for Grant Plumbing if they found Meka to be the sole proximate cause of the accident. Because evidence was presented that Meka was negligent, we find that jury instruction 19 was proper.

¶ 31. The same holds true for both jury instructions 20 and 21. Jury instruction 20, likewise, is a general form-of-the-verdict instruction that instructed the jury to apportion fault if Meka and Grant Plumbing both were negligent. Jury instruction 21 specifically instructed the jury to determine the percentage of fault, if any, assigned to either Meka or Grant Plumbing. Both were proper.

¶ 32. Meka also argues that the trial court erred by giving the aforementioned instructions in the order they were given, as it likely confused the jury. “How jury instructions are arranged and whether the arrangement might have been confusing is not the applicable standard set for this Court.” O’Flynn v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas, 759 So.2d 526, 536 (¶ 31) (Miss.Ct.App.2000). “Rather, our job, as an appellate court, is to review the jury instructions as a whole to determine whether ‘the aggregate of the instructions, taken as a whole, fairly, though not necessarily perfectly, express the applicable primary rules of law.’ ” Id. (quoting Splain v. Hines, 609 So.2d 1234, 1239 (Miss.1992)). Reading the jury instructions submitted in this case as a whole, we find that the jury was correctly guided on the law. We find no merit to this issue.

III. Jury Instruction Erroneously Denied

¶ 33. Meka next asserts that the trial court erred in refusing to grant proposed jury instruction 22, which reads:

You are instructed that [Grant Plumbing] did not provide any driving safety training to its employee [ (Grube) ], and did not instruct [Grube] on safe driving habits while operating [Grant Plumbing’s] vehicle.
Therefore, if you find from preponderance of the evidence in this case that [Grant Plumbing’s] failure to not provide any safety training to its employee [ (Grube) ], or failure to not instruct [Grube] on safe driving habits while operating a [Grant Plumbing] vehicle was the sole proximate cause or proximate contributing cause of [Meka’s] injuries, then your verdict shall be for [Meka].
•However, if you believe that [Meka] has failed to prove any one of these elements by a preponderance of evidence in this case, then your verdict shall be for [Grant Plumbing] as to this theory of liability.

¶ 34. Meka fails to explain to this Court how the trial court’s failure to grant this instruction affected the outcome of the trial. In O’Flynn, this Court stated that, “[t]he trial court will not be held to have erred unless the complaining party can show that the denial of the instruction probably did cause an improper judgment.” O’Flynn, 759 So.2d at 531 (¶ 6).

¶ 35. Moreover, as Grant Plumbing points out on appeal, the jury found against Grant Plumbing on Meka’s respondeat superior claim. This was the most favorable result that Meka could have received against Grant Plumbing; thus, any alleged error in the trial court’s failure to grant proposed jury instruction 22 is moot. See Pickering v. Industria Masina I Traktora, 740 So.2d 836, 843 (¶ 25) (“errors in jury instructions are moot where the plaintiff receives the most favorable result he could have received if the [omitted] instruction had been given”). Accordingly, we find this issue is without merit.

IV. Meka’s Citizenship Status

¶ 36. Meka, who is from India and is not a United States citizen, argues that despite having been granted a motion in limine to exclude testimony and evidence regarding his citizenship status, Grant Plumbing “was allowed to question [his] Indian citizenship and to make him tell the jury that at one point his work permit status after the accident was withheld for a year.”

¶ 37. During the pretrial conference on the matter, following Meka’s request to exclude the mention of Meka’s “status as a green card holder as opposed to a natural born American,” Grant Plumbing informed the trial court that there was an issue with respect to Meka’s work-authorization status. Grant Plumbing stated that it would not bring up Meka’s citizenship status unless an issue arose about Meka’s inability to work based on Meka’s alleged injury. The trial court thereafter granted Meka’s motion in limine as to Meka’s “citizenship or the fact that he’s here on a green card.”

¶ 38. At trial, Meka testified during direct examination that he was unable to work solely because of his injury. On cross-examination, Grant Plumbing questioned Meka as follows:

Q. I think the question was, Mr. Meka, that outside of saying that you were unable physically to work because of the injuries that you’re claiming in this case, there was actually at least another reason that you could not accept this job from Quality Matrix; is that correct?
A. That’s correct.
Q. And could you tell us what that reason was?
A. At that point in time I didn’t have a work authorization.

¶ 39. We find the fact that Meka was not authorized to work in the United States relevant evidence to the issues of causation and damages. When Meka asserted at trial that he has suffered, and will continue to suffer, loss wages solely because of his back injury, Grant Plumbing had the right to raise the issue of Meka’s work-authorization status.

¶ 40. According to the record, the only time Meka’s nationality was highlighted was when his own attorney made the following statement to the jury during his closing argument:

Now. I’ll be honest "with you. I told the [cjourt I wanted to stay away from the fact that this man’s nationality is Indian because let’s face it, some people just don’t like Indians. Some people do. Some people don’t like African-Americans. So[me] people don’t like red necks. People have prejudices. Unfortunately for the world_ we live in, we have to deal with the prejudices.

¶41. The Mississippi Supreme Court has stated that:

One may not complain on review of errors for which he was responsible ... (a)n appellant will not be permitted to take advantage of errors for the commission of which he was responsible, or which he himself committed, caused, brought about, provoked, participated in, created, or helped to create, or contributed to.

DeMyers v. DeMyers, 742 So.2d 1157, 1160 (¶ 7) (Miss.1999) (quoting Planters Bank v. Garrott, 239 Miss. 248, 264, 122 So.2d 256, 261 (1960)).

¶ 42. We find nothing in the record that suggests the jury was prejudiced against Meka because of his national origin or his lack of citizenship. This issue has no merit.

¶ 43. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HINDS COUNTY IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE APPELLANT.

LEE, C.J., IRVING, P.J., MYERS, BARNES, ISHEE, ROBERTS, CARLTON, MAXWELL AND RUSSELL, JJ., CONCUR.

      . The cause of Meka's discomfort was not developed at trial.

      . According to the record, the speed limit at this particular section of 1-55 is sixty miles per hour.

      . According to the record, the impact with the UtiliQuest truck resulted in a broken tail light and a small dent to the UtiliQuest truck’s rear bumper.