author: ISHEE, J„

text:
    In the Matter of the Adoption of a Child: C.K. and K.K., Appellants v. N.F., Appellee.
    No. 2009-CA-01059-COA.
    Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
    Feb. 8, 2011.

      James Eldred Renfroe, Roy J. Perilloux, Jackson, Mark C. Carlson, attorneys for appellants.
    John M. Mooney Jr., Jackson, attorney for appellee.
    Before LEE, P.J., ISHEE and MAXWELL, JJ.
   ISHEE, J„

for the Court:

¶ 1. Approximately one year after the adoption of a minor child, Z.F., by N.F., the child’s former parents, C.K. and K.K., moved to set aside the adoption and/or terminate N.F.’s parental rights and appoint themselves as guardians for Z.F. Thereafter, N.F. filed a motion to dismiss. The Hinds County Chancery Court granted a full investigation into the child’s well-being and subsequently granted N.F.’s motion to dismiss. C.K. and K.K. then filed a motion to reconsider and again sought termination of N.F.’s parental rights. The chancery court denied the motion; C.K. and K.K. now appeal. Finding no error, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2. In April 2001, C.K. and K.K. adopted Z.F. from Kazakhstan when the child was approximately fourteen months old. After returning with the child to their home state of California, C.K. and K.K. assert that Z.F. began exhibiting signs of severe behavioral problems and was abusive toward them and their other three children. Thereafter, Z.F. was evaluated by several medical providers who speculated that Z.F. had conditions including Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, Reactive Attachment Disorder, Oppositional Defiance Disorder, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, Autism, Obsessive Compulsive Disorder, Adjustment Disorder with Depressed Mood by History, and As-perger Syndrome.

¶3. C.K. and K.K. eventually determined that they could no longer care for Z.F. Accordingly, they placed the child in foster care; he lived in several different homes over a period of several years. Meanwhile, C.K. and K.K. placed a notice on the Internet seeking to find Z.F. a new adoptive home.

¶ 4. In early 2007, a Florida resident, T.S., responded to the Internet post and expressed her willingness to care for Z.F. C.K. and K.K. executed a power of attorney in favor of T.S. and sent Z.F. to live with T.S. However, three months later, T.S. informed C.K. and K.K. that she could no longer keep Z.F. and requested that they take the child back to California. C.K. and K.K. informed T.S. that Z.F. was no longer welcome in their home and that T.S. needed to locate a new family for the child.

¶ 5. Thereafter, T.S. enlisted the help of an adoption agency in Ohio, which, in turn, contacted N.F. N.F. agreed to adopt Z.F. in June 2007; C.K. and K.K. executed a special power of attorney for child care in favor of N.F. Z.F. subsequently moved to Jackson, Mississippi, to live with N.F. and her other adopted children. Following Z.F.’s move to Mississippi, C.K. and K.K. voluntarily consented to the adoption of Z.F. by N.F. and joined in N.F.’s petition for adoption, which was filed in the Hinds County Chancery Court.

¶ 6. The chancery court ordered an investigation by a guardian ad litem regarding N.F.’s ability to care for Z.F. After reviewing the guardian ad litem’s investigatory report, the chancery court approved the adoption and waived the usual six-month waiting pei'iod in order to provide “finality and stability for the child.” The judgment of adoption was entered on September 25, 2007.

¶ 7. Ten months later, after K.K. visited Z.F. in Jackson, C.K. and K.K. filed a petition to unseal Z.F.’s adoption record. The chancery court agreed to an in-camera review, but the court found no problems with the adoption. On' September 23, 2008, almost a full year after the entry of the judgment of adoption, C.K. and K.K. sought to set aside the adoption, terminate N.F.’s parental rights, appoint themselves guardians of Z.F., and, alternatively, have a guardian ad litem provided for the child. N.F. promptly filed a motion to dismiss the case on the grounds that C.K. and K.K. were estopped from contesting the adoption because they voluntarily consented to the adoption and failed to bring the action within six months of the entry of judgment of adoption. C.K. and K.K. then requested discovery from N.F. N.F. filed for a protective order requesting relief from answering the voluminous discovery as she claimed it was a “fishing expedition,” among other things. Thereafter, C.K. and K.K. filed a motion to compel discovery; N.F. argued that this motion was C.K. and K.K.’s attempt at a “fishing expedition.” C.K. also requested a hearing on the discovery matters.

¶ 8. The chancery court declined to hold a hearing on the discovery matters and granted N.F.’s motion for a protective order. Although investigations at the request of former parents are not required when the former parents have surrendered a child for adoption, the chancery court, in an abundance of caution, appointed a guardian ad litem and ordered another full investigation into Z.F.’s well-being and into N.F.’s care of Z.F. The chancery court then granted a hearing on N.F.’s motion to dismiss. After carefully considering all of the parties’ submissions, the guardian ad litem’s investigatory report, and testimony from the guardian ad litem, the chancery court was “more satisfied than even before that the adoption at issue should not be set aside.” C.K. and K.K.’s motions to set aside the adoption, terminate N.F.’s parental rights, and/or appoint themselves as guardians were dismissed with prejudice.

¶ 9. Thereafter, C.K. and K.K. filed a motion to reconsider and again requested that N.F.’s parental rights be terminated. The chancery court denied the motion. Aggrieved, C.K. and K.K. appeal and assert that: (1) the chancery court abused its discretion by dismissing their case;, (2) the chancery court abused its discretion by granting N.F.’s request for a protective order from responding to C.K. and KK.’s discovery requests and by declining to hold a hearing on the discovery matters; and (3) the chancery court abused its discretion by denying C.K. and K.K.’s motion to reconsider. Finding no error, we affirm.

DISCUSSION

I. Granting N.F.’s Motion to Dismiss

¶ 10. This Court utilizes “a de novo standard of review when considering whether a trial court erred when it granted a motion to dismiss.” Walton v. Walton, 44 So.3d 1035, 1038 (¶ 10) (Miss.Ct.App.2010) (citing Harris v. Miss. Valley State Univ., 873 So.2d 970, 988 (¶ 54) (Miss.2004)). Additionally, statutory authority and the Mississippi Supreme Court’s interpretation of the law provide a strict six-month statute of limitations for challenging adoption actions after the judgment of adoption has been entered. Miss.Code Ann. § 93-17-15 (Rev.2004); In re Adoption of J.E.B., 822 So.2d 949, 953 (¶ 15) (Miss.2002). Only upon a showing of jurisdictional defect can a petitioner obviate the six-month time bar and attempt to set aside an adoption. Matter of Adoption of R.M.P.C., 512 So.2d 702, 706 (Miss.1987). Furthermore, as a matter of public policy, “setting aside adoption decrees is disfavored even before six months has expired.” In re Adoption of J.E.B., 822 So.2d at 951 (¶ 6). As stated by the supreme court, “[t]he very nature of an adoption is to create a legally binding and unbreakable bond between the adoptive parents and the adopted child.” Id. at 953 (¶ 14).

¶ 11. Additionally, “[t]he reasons for which parental rights may be terminated are controlled by the Legislature. The courts have no right, authority or power to add to those reasons.” L.O. v. G.V., 37 So.3d 1248, 1251 (¶ 16) (Miss.Ct.App.2010) (quoting Gunter v. Gray, 876 So.2d 315, 319 (¶ 19) (Miss.2004)). In order to terminate parental rights, at least one of the following circumstances must be found:

(a) A parent has deserted without means of identification or abandoned a child ...; or (b) A parent has made no contact with a child under the age of three (3) for six (6) months or a child three (3) years of age or older for a period of one (1) year; or (c) A parent has been responsible for a series of abusive incidents concerning one or more children; or (d) When the child has been in the care and custody of a licensed child caring agency or the Department of Human Services for at least one (1) year, that agency or department has made diligent efforts to develop and implement a plan for return of the child to its parents, and ... [t]he parent has failed to exercise reasonable available visitation with the child; or ... [t]he parent, having agreed to a plan to effect placement of the child with the parent, fails to implement the plan so that the child caring agency is unable to return the child to said parent; or (e) The parent exhibits ongoing behavior which would make it impossible to return the child to the parent’s care and custody ...; or (f) When there is an extreme and deep-seated antipathy by the child toward the parent or when there is some other substantial erosion of the relationship between the parent and child which was caused at least in part by the parent’s serious neglect, abuse, prolonged and unreasonable absence, unreasonable failure to visit or communicate, or prolonged imprisonment; or (g) When a parent has been convicted of ... rape of a child[,] ... sexual battery of a child[,] ... touching a child for lustful purposes!;,] ... exploitation of a child[,] ... felonious abuse or battery of a child[,] ... carnal knowledge of a step or adopted child or a child of a cohabitating partner[,] ... murder of another child of such parent, voluntary manslaughter of another child of such parent, aided or abetted, attempted, conspired or solicited to commit such murder or voluntary manslaughter, or a felony assault that results in the serious bodily injury to the surviving child or another child of such parent; or (h) The child has been adjudicated to have been abused or neglected and custody has been transferred from the child’s parent(s) for placement ... and a court of competent jurisdiction has determined that reunification shall not be in the child’s best interest.

Miss.Code Ann. § 93-15-103(3) (Rev.2004).

¶ 12. In this case, C.K. and K.K. did not contest the adoption of Z.F. until approximately one year after the final entry of adoption. Additionally, C.K. and K.K. cite Mississippi Code Annotated section 93-13-l, alleging that N.F. is “unsuitable to discharge the duties of guardianship” and that it is within the court’s discretion to remove an unsuitable guardian at any time, regardless of the time bar. They also claim that they were not afforded the opportunity to address or argue their claims before their case was dismissed.

¶ 13. Nonetheless, even after looking at the facts in a light most favorable to C.K. and K.K., the filing of the case occurred well past the six-month statute of limitations. C.K. and K.K. fail to provide any substantive evidence of a jurisdictional defect that would negate the time bar. Additionally, even if we were to ignore the procedural bar on C.K. and K.K.’s claim, N.F. is now Z.F.’s parent, not simply his court-appointed guardian. C.K. and K.K. voluntarily surrendered the child to N.F. and joined in the petition for adoption. After the final entry of the adoption, N.F. became Z.F.’s parent with full parental rights regarding the child. Hence, N.F. is subject to the terms of Mississippi Code Annotated section 93-15-103(3) regarding termination of her parental rights.

¶ 14. Regardless of whether N.F. should have been analyzed under standards of a guardian, as encouraged by C.K. and K.K., or under standards of a parent, the chancery court went so far as to order a second investigation by a guardian ad litem into N.F.’s care of Z.F. after the adoption. Indeed, when asked what evidence C.K. and K.K. relied upon in determining that N.F. was an unfit parent, C.K. and K.K.’s counsel advised the court that their evidence was couched in the guardian ad litem’s findings. However, said findings were wholly in favor of N.F.

¶ 15. The guardian ad litem testified to the following: “I have seen absolutely nothing to indicate that [N.F.] is unfit or that [she] is not the proper adoptive parent for [Z.F.] [The child] seems to be thriving in [N.F.’s] care.... [N.F.] has been one of those saviors who comes in and does adopt children from disruptive homes.... I have not found anything that causes me concern about [Z.F.] in [N.F.’s] care.” After independently reviewing the record, and, specifically, the testimony and the report of the guardian ad litem, we are in agreement with the chancery court that no evidence exists which would support setting aside the adoption of Z.F. by N.F., terminating N.F.’s parental rights to the child, or appointing a guardian ad litem for the child. Accordingly, we find no error in the chancery court’s dismissal of C.K. and K.K.’s case. This issue lacks merit.

II. Granting N.F. Motion for a Protective Order Against C.K. and K.K. Discoverg Requests

¶ 16. The Mississippi Supreme Court has stated that: “discovery is left to the discretion of the trial court, and a ruling may only be reversed if there has been an abuse of discretion.” Cole ex rel. Cole v. Buckner, 819 So.2d 527, 529 (¶ 6) (Miss.2002). In this case, N.F. was granted a protective order against C.K. and K.K.’s discovery requests on the grounds that the requests were overly burdensome and a “fishing expedition.”

¶ 17. After granting N.F.’s request, the chancellor chose to order a full investigation into N.F.’s care of Z.F. and Z.F.’s well-being, and he also ordered a hearing on all substantive matters in the case. In doing so, the chancellor was able to garner all information necessary to make a ruling and was further able to question the investigator first-hand, thus making the discovery requests moot. Indeed, the chancery court stated the following with regard to the discovery requests:

Petitioners [C.K. and K.K.] incorrectly assert that their discovery requests propounded to Respondent [N.F.] are the only method to assure this Chancellor that all facts needed for the child’s best interests are brought to his attention. In truth, this Court has fully availed itself of all available sources of information to determine the best interest ] of the minor child.... After exercising all due diligence, [a Mississippi Department of Human Services] worker determined that there was no evidence to support any allegation of neglect or abuse. Likewise, this Court has reviewed the carefully considered report of the appointed Guardian Ad Litem in this matter. The GAL was privy to all parties, all documentation, and all known influences of the minor child.... From all accounts and evidence, this Court is convinced that the minor child is happy, healthy and well cared for by his adopted mother. Allowing Petitioners to continue with unnecessary discovery will accomplish no good purpose and will, in fact, continue to cause turmoil in the minor child’s life.

¶ 18. Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion in the chancellor’s decision to grant N.F. protection from C.K. and K.K.’s discovery requests; therefore, this issue is without merit.

III. Denying C.K. and K.K.’s Motion to Reconsider

¶ 19. Motions to reconsider are reviewed under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Knight v. State, 14 So.3d 76, 79 (¶ 5) (Miss.Ct.App.2009). In this case, the chancery court handed down a three-page order denying C.K. and K.K.’s motion to reconsider. In the order, the chancellor fully addressed all of C.K. and K.K.’s assertions and cited applicable law on the issues. In conclusion, the chancellor stated: “This Court is charged with determining the best interest[ ] of the minor child. Clearly, it is in the best interest of the child to cease these unnecessary litigation stresses and to allow the child to continue to flourish in his new home.”

¶ 20. We agree and find that the chancellor thoroughly considered C.K. and K.K.’s motion to reconsider and did not abuse his discretion in denying the motion. Accordingly, this issue is meritless.

¶ 21. THE JUDGMENT OF THE HINDS COUNTY CHANCERY COURT IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE APPELLANTS.

KING, C.J., LEE AND MYERS, P.JJ., IRVING, GRIFFIS, BARNES, CARLTON AND MAXWELL, JJ„ CONCUR. ROBERTS, J, CONCURS IN PART AND IN THE RESULT WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION.

      . This Court declines to identify minors in adoption cases. In the interest of the child's privacy, the minor’s name, as well as the names of family members and other relevant parties, have been substituted with initials.

      . Mississippi Code Annotated section 93-13-1 (Rev.2004) states in relevant part: "[I]f any father or mother be unsuitable to discharge the duties of guardianship, then the court, or chancellor in vacation, may appoint some suitable person, or having appointed the father or mother, may remove him or her if it appearfs] that such person is unsuitable, and appoint a suitable person."


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: STUART, Justice.

license: Public Domain

text:
    Ex parte Christopher Taft LANDERS (In re Christopher Taft Landers v. State of Alabama).
    1071740.
    Supreme Court of Alabama.
    May 15, 2009.
    Christopher Taft Landers, pro se.
    Troy King, atty. gen., and Kristi O. Wilkerson, asst. atty. gen., for respondent.

       Justice Shaw was a member of the Court of Criminal Appeals when that court considered this case.

   STUART, Justice.

In December 2007, Christopher Taft Landers petitioned the Morgan Circuit Court for postconviction relief pursuant to Rule 32, Ala. R.Crim. P., asserting ineffective assistance of trial counsel. On May 16, 2008, the circuit court dismissed the petition. On May 30, 2008, Landers moved the circuit court to reconsider its decision. On June 6, 2008, the circuit court entered an order vacating the May 16, 2008, order and ordering Landers to file within 30 days an affidavit from Christy Miller, Landers’s trial counsel, in support of the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim pleaded in his Rule 32 petition. On July 2, 2008, Landers responded to the circuit court’s order, indicating that Miller had refused to provide the requested affidavit. In his response, Landers asked the circuit court to hold an eviden-tiary hearing at which he could subpoena Miller to testify. On July 28, 2008, the circuit court issued an order purporting to vacate its June 6, 2008, order and purporting to reinstate the May 16, 2008, order dismissing Landers’s Rule 32 petition. On August 1, 2008, Landers filed a notice of appeal with the Court of Criminal Appeals. In materials filed with the Court of Criminal Appeals, the circuit court clerk indicated that the date of the dismissal of Lan-ders’s Rule 32 petition was May 16, 2008. On August 14, 2008, the Court of Criminal Appeals ordered Landers to show cause why his appeal should not be dismissed as untimely. On August 20, 2008, Landers filed a response in the Court of Criminal Appeals, explaining that he did not file a notice of appeal after the May 16, 2008, order because that order was vacated on June 6, 2008. Landers reasoned that the July 28, 2008, order was the proper order to appeal from because before that date he had no decision from which to appeal. He stated:

“[Landers] would ask that [the Court of Criminal Appeals] consider the propriety of the trial judge vacating the order dismissing the Rule 32, Ala. R.Crim. P., petition AND then issuing a subsequent order reinstating the previous order that dismissed the Rule 32, Ala. R.Crim. P., petition. All this has done is cause confusion and chaos in the appeal process, and it would seem the trial court would have been required to issue a new order dismissing the Rule 32, Ala. R.Crim. P., petition.”

On August 26, 2008, the Court of Criminal Appeals, by order, dismissed Landers’s appeal as untimely. Landers v. State, 27 So.3d 638 (Ala.Crim.App.2008)(table). In the order dismissing Landers’s appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals stated: “The Court notes that a postjudgment motion does not toll the time for filing a notice of appeal in a postconviction proceeding. See Loggins v. State, 910 So.2d 146 (Ala.Crim.App.2005).”

After the Court of Criminal Appeals overruled Landers’s application for a rehearing, Landers filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in this Court. We granted the writ.

The State in its response to Landers’s petition for certiorari review recognizes that although the filing of a motion for reconsideration does not toll the time for filing a notice of appeal, this principle alone may not be dispositive of this case and Landers may have justifiably relied on the circuit court’s June 6, 2008, order vacating its earlier dismissal of his Rule 32 petition as a proper reason not to appeal the May 16, 2008, order.

We agree with the State; Landers’s reliance on the circuit court’s June 6, 2008, order vacating the May 16, 2008, dismissal of his Rule 32 petition was justified. Lan-ders’s postjudgment motion did not toll the time for filing a notice of appeal. However, the circuit court’s June 6, 2008, order, which vacated its May 16, 2008, order, did reinstate the case in the circuit court. Thus, at that time, Landers did not have a final judgment from which to appeal. On July 28, 2008, the circuit entered a final judgment from which Landers could appeal. Consequently, as a matter of law, Landers’s notice of appeal filed on August 1, 2008, was timely, and the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in dismissing Landers’s appeal. See Rule 4, Ala. R.App. P. (stating that a notice of appeal is timely if filed within 42 days of entry of the final judgment or appealable order).

Therefore, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed, and this case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

COBB, C.J., and LYONS, WOODALL, SMITH, BOLIN, PARKER, and MURDOCK, JJ., concur.

SHAW, J., recuses himself.

       Note from the reporter of decisions: On October 2, 2009, on remand from the Alabama Supreme Court, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed, without opinion. On October 30, 2009, that court denied rehearing, without opinion. On February 12, 2010, the Supreme Court denied certiorari review, without opinion (1090182).


author: LYONS, Justice.

text:
    Rosa HUNTER and Herbert Hunter, Jr. v. MOORING TAX ASSET GROUP, LLC.
    1080335.
    Supreme Court of Alabama.
    Aug. 21, 2009.

      William B. Jackson II of Stokes & Clinton, P.C., Mobile, for appellants.
    William S. Hereford and Julie W. Pittman of Burr & Forman LLP, Birmingham, for appellee.
   LYONS, Justice.

Rosa Hunter and her son, Herbert Hunter, Jr., appeal from a summary judgment entered against them on their claim of malicious prosecution against Mooring Tax Asset Group, LLC (“Mooring”). We reverse and remand.

Procedural History and Factual Background

On April 23, 2008, the Hunters sued Mooring in the Mobile Circuit Court. They asserted a claim of malicious prosecution relating to a 2007 action against them by Mooring to quiet title to and obtain possession of certain property. On May 28, 2008, Mooring moved to dismiss the Hunters’ action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ. P. Because Mooring’s motion attached supporting documents, it was treated as a motion for a summary judgment pursuant to Rule 12(b). The Hunters responded to Mooring’s motion on October 17, 2008, and supported their response with an affidavit and other evidence. On November 2, 2008, without stating the reasons for its decision, the trial court granted Mooring’s motion and entered a summary judgment against the Hunters. The Hunters appealed.

The evidence presented to the trial court showed the following facts. On June 6, 2002, the Mobile County Revenue Commissioner (“the Commissioner”) sold property identified as “Parcel R023205400007070.02, Key # 1018437” (“Parcel 70.02”) to First Liberty National Bank (“First Liberty”) because the owner had failed to pay taxes on the property. The tax deed identified the owners as “Neal, Willie & Ethel M.W.” and stated the parcel number, the key number, and a metes and bounds description of Parcel 70.02. First Liberty subsequently sold Parcel 70.02 to Mooring. The quitclaim deed reflecting that sale included the same parcel number, key number, and metes and bounds description as the tax deed. It is unclear precisely when First Liberty transferred Parcel 70.02 to Mooring.

It is undisputed that, at all times relevant to this action, the Commissioner’s records showed that Parcel 70.02 was located at 1119 Hannon Road in Mobile. However, the Commissioner’s records also showed that property identified as “Parcel R023205400007070” (“Parcel 70”) was owned by Herbert Hunter, Jr., and was located at the same address. The record indicates that Parcel 70 was actually located at the 1119 Hannon Road address and that the Commissioner’s record regarding the location of Parcel 70.02 was mistaken. It is unclear from the record whether Parcel 70 was owned by Herbert Hunter, Jr., or by Rosa Hunter, or by both jointly. It is also unclear from the record who, if anyone, resided on Parcel 70.

In response to Mooring’s motion, the Hunters presented an affidavit from Norma Hunter, Herbert’s wife and Rosa’s daughter-in-law, in which Norma stated:

“[W]e had ... been contacted by telephone sometime during 2005, and someone had indicated that our property located at 1119 Hannon Road in Mobile, Alabama, had been purchased at a tax sale. I told whoever was calling then, that there must be some mistake because we had always paid our property taxes, and that our property had not ever been foreclosed on by anyone.”

(Emphasis omitted.) Later in her affidavit, Norma implied that the “someone” she had spoken with was an employee of Mooring. The record does not contain any other evidence identifying to whom Norma spoke in 2005.

On January 16, 2006, based on the Commissioner’s records showing that Parcel 70.02 was located at 1119 Hannon Road, Mooring’s regional manager, Jeremy Martin, wrote to “Owner/Occupant, 1119 Han-non Road.” In the letter, Martin explained that “1119 Hannon Rd., Mobile, AL; County Parcel ID No. R023205400007070.02” had been sold at a tax sale and that Mooring now owned the property. On Mooring’s behalf, Martin demanded possession of the property and advised the “Owner/Occupant” of his or her rights.

In her affidavit, Norma stated that she assisted Rosa in responding to the January 16, 2006, letter. Norma stated that she contacted Martin by telephone, advised him that “they had the wrong property,” and gave him the parcel number and key number of “the property.” Norma stated that Martin asked her to send the parcel and key numbers to him via facsimile transmission and that she did so on January 23, 2006. The record includes a facsimile transmission cover sheet addressed to Martin with a handwritten note stating simply: “Pis. check key # & county parcel ID #’s.” The cover sheet does not indicate whether the facsimile transmission was actually sent or received. Mooring did not submit any evidence confirming or denying Norma’s testimony regarding those communications.

Subsequently, on November 8, 2006, through counsel, Mooring wrote to “Ms. Rosa Hunter” at the 1119 Hannon Road address concerning: “Mobile County Parcel I.D.: R023205400007070.02, Property Address: 1119 Hannon Rd., Mobile, AL.” In her affidavit, Norma stated that neither she, Rosa, nor Herbert received any communications from Mooring between the January 16, 2006, letter and the November 8, 2006, letter. The November 8,- 2006, letter referenced the January 16, 2006, letter and advised Rosa that Mooring was going to “move forward with obtaining possession of the property.” The letter advised Rosa that if she did not take action to purchase Mooring’s interest in the property, Mooring would “take appropriate legal action to obtain possession.” Norma stated in her affidavit: “I personally contacted this law firm, [i.e., Mooring’s counsel,] for my mother-in-law ... within a week after we received this letter, and furnished them with all of the very same information showing them that the Key # and County Parcel # was different from the one that they had.” Once again, Mooring did not submit any evidence confirming or denying Norma’s testimony as to those communications.

On July 20, 2007, Mooring sued Rosa and several fictitiously named defendants in the Mobile Circuit Court (“the 2007 action”). Mooring stated in its complaint: “Defendants occupy, possess, or claim an interest in the property located at 1119 Hannon Road, Mobile, Alabama ..., and more particularly described” in the 2002 tax deed, which was attached. The complaint also attached a copy of the 2006 quitclaim deed to Mooring. Mooring sought to eject Rosa from the property under § 40-10-74, Ala.Code 1975, and to quiet title to the property. In a subsequent pleading, Mooring stated that Rosa was named as a defendant “[biased on information obtained from the ... Commissioner’s office indicating that R. Hunter resided at the address of the property.”

In her answer to Mooring’s complaint, Rosa stated: “[T]he real property located at 1119 Hannon Road, Mobile, Alabama is owned by Herbert Hunter, Jr., and not the Plaintiff.” She did not indicate that the property at 1119 Hannon Road was different from that property in which Mooring claimed an interest. It is undisputed that Mooring subsequently added Herbert as a defendant in its action.

The litigation progressed and, apparently through the discovery process and its own investigation, Mooring discovered that Rosa and Herbert did not in fact own an interest in Parcel 70.02. It is undisputed that Mooring then moved to dismiss its action against Rosa and Herbert. The trial court did so, with prejudice, on March 4, 2008.

In her affidavit, Norma stated that, before Mooring commenced the 2007 action, she had advised Mooring or its agents at least three times that “they were wrong and had to have the wrong piece of property.” She testified:

“They were given the information and/or documents confirming that the Key # and County Parcel # of our property was different. There is absolutely no way that they could claim that this was just an innocent ‘mistake’ on their part, because I had personally given them the correct information to confirm that our property was different a number of times.... That is why the lawsuit that was filed on July 20, 2007, ... had to be malicious, and not just some innocent mistake.”

Norma then stated that Rosa and Herbert had suffered stress and emotional problems as a result of the 2007 action, that they had incurred legal fees in defending the action, and that Mooring “should be punished and prevented from doing things like this to others.”

Analysis
“Our review of a summary judgment is de novo. ‘A motion for summary judgment is granted only when the evidence demonstrates that “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Rule 56(c), Ala. R. Civ. P.’ Reichert v. City of Mobile, 776 So.2d 761, 764 (Ala.2000). We apply ‘the same standard as that of the trial court in determining whether the evidence before the court made out a genuine issue of material fact.’ Bussey v. John Deere Co., 531 So.2d 860, 862 (Ala.1988); System Dynamics Int’l, Inc. v. Boykin, 683 So.2d 419, 420 (Ala.1996). In order to defeat a properly supported motion for a summary judgment, the nonmoving party must present substantial evidence that creates a genuine issue of material fact. ‘Substantial evidence’ is ‘evidence of such weight and quality that fair-minded persons in the exercise of impartial judgment can reasonably infer the existence of the fact sought to be proved.’ West v. Founders Life Assurance Co. of Florida, 547 So.2d 870, 871 (Ala.1989).”

Borders v. City of Huntsville, 875 So.2d 1168, 1176-77 (Ala.2003).

This Court has explained the elements of a malicious-prosecution claim as follows:

“In order for a claim of malicious prosecution to be submitted to a jury, the trial court must determine that the plaintiff has presented substantial evidence of the following elements: (1) that a prior judicial proceeding was instituted by the present defendant, (2) that in the prior proceeding the present defendant acted without probable cause and with malice, (3) that the prior proceeding ended in favor of the present plaintiff, and (4) that the present plaintiff was damaged as a result of the prior proceeding.”

Delchamps, Inc. v. Bryant, 738 So.2d 824, 831-32 (Ala.1999). Malicious-prosecution actions are “disfavored in the law.” 738 So.2d at 832.

It is undisputed that the Hunters have satisfied the first and third elements of their malicious-prosecution claim. Regarding the fourth element, although Mooring implies in its brief on appeal that the Hunters suffered no real damage because the 2007 action was ultimately dismissed, the Hunters, through Norma’s affidavit, described sufficient injury to create a jury question. Therefore, the parties’ primary dispute on appeal is whether Mooring acted without probable cause and with malice in filing the 2007 action.

Regarding probable cause, in a case involving malicious prosecution, this Court has stated:

“In malicious prosecution cases, ‘probable cause’ is defined as ‘such a state of facts in the mind of the prosecutor as would lead a man of ordinary caution and prudence to believe or entertain an honest and strong suspicion that the person arrested is guilty.’ Delchamps, Inc. v. Morgan, 601 So.2d 442, 445 (Ala.1992) (citation omitted [in Goodman ]).”

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Goodman, 789 So.2d 166, 174 (Ala.2000). “Thus, the determination of probable cause does not hinge upon whether [the Hunters] in fact [owned Parcel 70.02], but whether [Mooring’s] subjective belief under the circumstances led [it] to believe that [they did].” Id.

The Hunters turn our attention to the facsimile cover sheet sent to Martin by Norma and to Norma’s statement that she advised Mooring multiple times that it “had the wrong property” and provided it with the parcel identification number for Parcel 70. Mooring relies on the Commissioner’s records, which showed that Parcel 70.02 was located at 1119 Hannon Road. Mooring also notes the vague nature of many of the statements in Norma’s affidavit and directs attention to Rosa’s answer to its 2007 complaint in which she stated only that Herbert, not she, owned the property located at 1119 Hannon Road.

In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Goodman, supra, a Wal-Mart employee, Milner, accused Goodman of shoplifting and had her arrested. At the time of her arrest, Goodman had in her possession a receipt showing that she had purchased the item she was accused of shoplifting — a telephone. Goodman testified that she presented the receipt to Milner, but she was nonetheless arrested. Milner testified that she “gave no credence to the receipt” because she had observed Goodman in the act of shoplifting. The cause was submitted to a jury, which returned a verdict in Goodman’s favor and awarded her compensatory and punitive damages. 789 So.2d at 170-72. In considering whether the trial court erred in denying Wal-Mart’s post-judgment motion for a judgment as a matter of law, this Court explained:

“Goodman’s version of the event presented a jury question as to whether a reasonably prudent person acting in good faith would have made further inquiry before prosecuting. Dean Prosser wrote, on determining reasonableness:
“ ‘The appearances must be such as to lead a reasonable man to set the criminal proceedings in motion. The defendant is not necessarily required to verify his information where it appears to be reliable; but where a reasonable man would investigate further before beginning the prosecution, he may be liable for failure to do so.... ’
“William L. Prosser, Law of Torts, § 119 at 842 (4th ed.1971) (quoted in Atlantic Zayre, Inc. v. Meeks, 194 Ga.App. 267, 390 S.E.2d 398 (1990)) (using Prosser, Law of Torts, § 119, as a basis for its rationale that a store security guard could be found to have acted unreasonably in arresting a customer: the customer had offered ‘over and over to give an explanation and to fetch [his] receipts [from his car], but was not permitted to.’). We find the reasoning of the Court of Appeals of Georgia persuasive under the circumstances presented by this case.
“The record reflects that Goodman, at the time of the apprehension, presented to Milner a receipt that matched the product code of the merchandise Goodman had allegedly concealed. Although the receipt was dated seven days before the date of the apprehension, Milner made no effort to verify its legitimacy. Before calling the police, she did not confirm with the customer-service-desk employees whether Goodman had, in fact, attempted to exchange the telephone; nor did she confirm with the store greeter whether Goodman had entered the store with the telephone. Therefore, the question whether a reasonable person acting in good faith would have investigated the situation further before proceeding with the arrest was disputed; the trial court correctly allowed the jury to decide the issue of probable cause.”

789 So.2d at 174-75.

Similarly, in this case, the question whether a reasonable person acting in good faith would have investigated the situation further before proceeding with the 2007 action was disputed. The Hunters presented evidence indicating that they communicated with Mooring in early 2006, denied that the property at 1119 Hannon Road had been sold in a tax sale, and provided Mooring with a parcel identification number for the property located at 1119 Hannon Road, Parcel 70. Mooring did not present evidence showing that it took any steps in response to this information, such as inquiring further of the Hunters, performing a title search of Parcel 70.02, or confronting the Commissioner with the conflicting information. Such evidence may ultimately be submitted at trial, and a jury may conclude that Mooring in fact had probable cause to initiate the 2007 action; however, the Hunters have presented sufficient evidence of a lack of probable cause to submit the question to the jury.

Even so, the Hunters must also present substantial evidence indicating that Mooring acted with malice. Bryant, 738 So.2d at 832 (“[W]hen probable cause is shown to be lacking, malice is essential to recovery.”); see also Willis v. Parker, 814 So.2d 857, 864 (Ala.2001) (“[I]n order for Parker to succeed on his malicious prosecution claim, he must have proved that Willis pursued the first eviction action both with a lack of probable cause and with the presence of malice”).

This Court has explained: “Malice in [a malicious-prosecution] action implies the intentional doing of a wrongful act to the injury of another.” Huffstutler v. Edge, 254 Ala. 102, 104, 47 So.2d 197, 199 (1950). However, malice does not require “evidence of a desire to injure.” Bryant, 738 So.2d at 833 (citing Lunsford v. Dietrich, 93 Ala. 565, 569, 9 So. 308, 310 (1891)).

“Malice in a malicious prosecution action has been defined as whatever is done willfully and purposely, whether the motive is to injur[e the] accused, to gain some advantage to the prosecutor, or through mere wantonness or carelessness, if at the same time wrong and unlawful within the knowledge of the actor. Gulsby v. Louisville & Nashville RR Co., 167 Ala. 122, 52 So. 392 [ (1910) ].”

Dillon v. Nix, 55 Ala.App. 611, 613-14, 318 So.2d 308, 310 (Ala.Civ.App.1975); see also Willis, 814 So.2d at 863-64 (quoting Dil lon). This Court has more fully explained:

“ ‘There need be no personal ill will, hate, desire for revenge, or other base and malignant passion. Whatever is done willfully and purposely, whether the motive be to injure the accused, to gain some advantage to the prosecutor, or through mere wantonness or carelessness, if it be at the same time wrong and unlawful within the knowledge of the actor, is in legal contemplation maliciously done.’
“[Lunsford v. Dietrich, 93 Ala. 565, 569, 9 So. 308, 310 (1891) ] (emphasis added). This standard suggests the low threshold for proof of malice, by including in the litany of predicates ‘wantonness or carelessness ’ (emphasis added). It also is tied, however, to circumstances where the conduct is ‘at the same time wrong and unlawful within the knowledge of the actor.’ Id. Alabama Pattern Jury Instructions: Civil (2d ed. 1993) (‘APJI’), Instruction 24.04, preserves the concept that recklessness, standing alone, is not sufficient to allow recovery:
“‘Malice may be inferred by the reckless institution of a criminal prosecution without information leading to a bona-fide belief that the person charged was guilty as claimed.’
“(Emphasis added.) ...
“Simple negligence alone, therefore, may underlie a decision to institute a proceeding that later is shown to suffer from a want of probable cause, but an inference of malice cannot be drawn solely from such negligence, because the good faith of the actor under such circumstances can constitute a defense. This Court, consistent with the foregoing analysis of the requirement of proof of more than simple negligence in actions alleging malicious prosecution, has declined to permit actions against municipalities alleging malicious prosecution because the liability is not within the traditional categories of ‘neglect, carelessness or unskillfulness’ appropriate for such actions. See Scott v. City of Mountain Brook, 602 So.2d 893, 894 (Ala.1992). Were it otherwise, the tort would be called ‘negligent prosecution.’ Bahakel v. City of Birmingham, 427 So.2d 143 (Ala.1983), overruled on other grounds, Franklin v. City of Huntsville, 670 So.2d 848 (Ala.1995).”

Bryant, 738 So.2d at 833-34. In Goodman, 789 So.2d at 174, this Court explained:

“Malice is an inference of fact, and it may be inferred from a lack of probable cause or from mere wantonness or carelessness if the actor, when doing the act, knows it to be wrong or unlawful. Bryant, 738 So.2d at 833. Personal ill will or a desire for revenge is not essential for a finding of malice. Delchamps, Inc. v. Larry, 613 So.2d 1235, 1239 (Ala.1992). However, an inference of malice drawn from the lack of probable cause may be rebutted by evidence showing that the defendant acted in good faith. Bryant, 738 So.2d at 832.”

Applying these principles to the facts of this case, we conclude that Mooring was certainly mistaken to the point of negligence in filing the 2007 action against Rosa and in later adding Herbert as a defendant. Mooring reminds us that nothing in the record shows that Mooring had actual knowledge that the Hunters did not own an interest in Parcel 70.02. However, see Hamme v. CSX Transp., Inc., 621 So.2d 281, 283 (Ala.1993), stating that to show wantonness “[t]he actor’s knowledge may be proved by showing circumstances from which the fact of knowledge is a reasonable inference.” As previously noted, Norma testified that she contacted a representative of Mooring by telephone, advised him that “they had the wrong property,” and gave him the parcel number and key number of “the property.” Norma stated that the representative asked her to send the parcel and key numbers to him via facsimile transmission and that she did so on January 23, 2006. A jury could conclude that the information presented by Norma early in 2006 was so inconsistent with the view that the Commissioner’s records on which Mooring relied were accurate that failure to seek verification from the Commissioner’s office deprived Mooring of the basis for a bona fide belief in the accuracy of those records at the time it commenced the 2007 action. Accordingly, a jury could conclude that Mooring acted with wantonness and carelessness sufficient to support a finding of malice in the context of a malicious-prosecution action.

Conclusion

The evidence presented to the trial court created a question of fact for the jury as to the second element of the Hunters’ malicious-prosecution claim — that, in the prior proceeding, the present defendant acted without probable cause and with malice. Accordingly, the trial court erred in entering a summary judgment for Mooring. We therefore reverse the judgement and remand the cause to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

COBB, C.J., and STUART, BOLIN, and MURDOCK, JJ., concur.

      . Rule 12(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., states, in part:
      “If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.”

      . There are two dates on the quitclaim deed reflecting the transfer of parcel 70.02 from First Liberty to Mooring: February 10, 2006, and February 10, 2005. The Mobile Probate Court’s stamp shows that the deed was filed in March, but the day and year are illegible.

      . An unauthenticated map in the record seems to show that Parcel 70 and Parcel 70.02 are adjacent to one another. The record does not show at what address Parcel 70.02 is actually located.

      . The cover sheet also did not indicate how many, if any, documents were attached. However, the four pages following the cover sheet in the record are a deed, a Commissioner's record, and the unauthenticated map identified in note 3, supra. The deed shows a 2002 transfer of property to Herbert Hunter, Jr.; it includes only a metes and bounds description, but it identifies the address of the grantee as 1119 Hannon Road. The Commissioner's record states that Parcel 70 is located at 1119 Hannon Road and identifies Herbert as the owner. The map appears to have been prepared later, perhaps by the Hunters’ attorney, because it includes handwritten notes stating: “client's prop Lot 70; property described in comp, is 70.02.’’ Presumably, "client” refers to the Hunters and "comp.” refers to Mooring's complaint in its action to quiet title.

      . The parties do not dispute that Mooring dismissed the 2007 action when it discovered the mistake in the Commissioner's records. Therefore, Mooring’s conduct at issue on appeal relates to its filing of the 2007 action, not to any continuance of the action after discovery of the mistake. See, e.g., Laney v. Glidden Co., 239 Ala. 396, 399, 194 So. 849, 851 (1940) ("A suit for malicious prosecution may lie, not only for the commencement of the original proceeding, but for its continuance as well.”).


author: MURDOCK, Justice.

text:
    Ex parte Michael SHELLEY (In re Michelle Irvin, as representative of the estate of Terry Irvin, deceased v. Michael Shelley et al.) Ex parte Michael Shelley (In re John Rice v. Houston County et al.).
    1080588 and 1080863.
    Supreme Court of Alabama.
    Sept. 18, 2009.
    Rehearing Applications Denied Nov. 24, 2009.

      Kendrick E. Webb, Joseph L. Hubbard, Jr., and Jamie K. Hill of Webb & Eley, P.C., Montgomery, for petitioner.
    James R. Pratt III and Bruce J. McKee of Hare, Wynn, Newell & Newton, LLP, Birmingham, for respondent Michelle Irvin.
    Kenneth J. Mendelsohn of Jemison & Mendelsohn, P.C., Montgomery, for respondent John Rice.
   MURDOCK, Justice.

Michael Shelley petitions this Court for a writ of mandamus directing the Montgomery Circuit Court to vacate its order denying Shelley’s motion to dismiss the negligence and wantonness claims filed against him by Michelle Irvin on behalf of Terry Irvin, who is deceased. Shelley also petitions this Court for a writ of mandamus directing the Montgomery Circuit Court to vacate its orders denying Shelley’s motions to dismiss and to stay discovery concerning the negligence and wantonness claims filed against him by John Rice. In both petitions, Shelley asks this Court to direct the trial courts to enter orders granting his motions to dismiss. We deny the petitions.

I. Factual Background and Procedural History

For purposes of these petitions, the parties agree that the facts are not in dispute. At the time of the incident in question, Michael Shelley was a jailer at the Houston County jail, which is operated by the Houston County Sheriffs Office. Terry Irvin was a prisoner in the custody of the Houston County Sheriffs Office. On July 22, 2008, Shelley — acting in the line and scope of his duties as a jailer — was transporting Irvin from the Kilby Correctional Facility to the Houston County jail. Rice was driving west on Alabama Highway 110/Vaughn Road in Montgomery County when he reached the intersection of Highway 110 and Pike Road. Shelley was driving south on Pike Road when he reached the intersection. Both Michelle Irvin and Rice allege that Shelley ran a red light at the intersection of Pike Road and Highway 110 and, as a result, Shelley’s vehicle collided with Rice’s vehicle. The accident killed Terry Irvin, and Rice suffered injuries that required surgery.

On October 8, 2008, Michelle Irvin, as administrator of the estate of Terry Irvin, filed an action against Shelley and the Houston County Commission in the Montgomery Circuit Court, alleging negligence and wantonness (“the Irvin action”). Irvin sued Shelley in Shelley’s individual capacity, seeking an award of money damages. The Houston County Commission filed a motion to dismiss based in part on Irvin’s failure to file a notice of claim with Houston County. Shelley filed a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, a motion for a summary judgment based on the doctrine of State immunity under Art. I, § 14, Ala. Const.1901.

The trial court dismissed the Houston County Commission as a defendant on the ground that Irvin failed to first file a notice of claim with Houston County as required by §§ 6-5-20 and 11-12-8, Ala. Code 1975. The trial court denied Shelley’s motion, however, stating, in pertinent part:

“The existing Alabama caselaw holds that sheriffs, with certain exceptions, are absolutely immune, as executive officers of the state. The Alabama Supreme Court has extended this absolute sovereign immunity to deputy sheriffs, e.g., on the rationale that deputies are alter egos or legal extensions of the sheriff. Defendant Shelley’s motion is denied because no Alabama case has extended this absolute immunity beyond individuals who are either sheriffs or deputy sheriffs.”

On November 24, 2008, Rice filed an action in the Montgomery Circuit Court alleging negligence and wantonness against Shelley and Houston County (“the Rice action”). As in the Irvin action, Rice sued Shelley in Shelley’s individual capacity, seeking an award of money damages.

On December 23, 2008, Shelley filed a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, a motion for a summary judgment in the Rice action based on the doctrine of State immunity under Art. I, § 14, Ala. Const. 1901. Shelley simultaneously filed a motion to stay discovery pending resolution of the immunity issue.

On February 12, 2009, the trial court denied Shelley’s motion to stay discovery without explaining its reasons for doing so. Shelley filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate that order on February 27, 2009, arguing that allowing discovery to proceed effectively abrogated his immunity defense. The trial court likewise denied that motion without elaboration. On April 9, 2009, the trial court denied Shelley’s motion to dismiss without further explanation and set a hearing on his motion for a summary judgment for May 5, 2009.

Shelley has petitioned this Court for writs of mandamus in both the Irvin action and the Rice action, requesting that this Court order the trial courts in those respective actions to vacate their orders denying his motions to dismiss and to grant those motions based on his assertion that he is entitled to State immunity under Art. 1, § 14, Ala. Const.1901.

II.Standard, of Review

“ ‘The writ of mandamus is an extraordinary legal remedy. Ex parte Mobile Fixture & Equip. Co., 630 So.2d 358, 360 (Ala.1993). Therefore, this Court will not grant mandamus relief unless the petitioner shows: (1) a clear legal right to the order sought; (2) an imperative duty upon the trial court to perform, accompanied by its refusal to do so; (3) the lack of another adequate remedy; and (4) the properly invoked jurisdiction of the Court. See Ex parte Wood, 852 So.2d 705, 708 (Ala.2002).’
“Ex parte Davis, 930 So.2d [498,] at 499 [ (Ala.2005) ]. ‘ “[I]f an action is an action against the State within the meaning of § 14, such a case ‘presents a question of subject-matter jurisdiction, which cannot be waived or conferred by consent.’ ” ’ Ex parte Davis, 930 So.2d at 499 (quoting Haley v. Barbour County, 885 So.2d 783, 788 (Ala.2004), quoting in turn Patterson v. Gladwin Corp., 835 So.2d 137, 142-43 (Ala.2002)). ‘ “Therefore, a court’s failure to dismiss a case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity may properly be addressed by a petition for the writ of mandamus.” ’ Ex parte Davis, 930 So.2d at 499-500 (quoting Ex parte Alabama Dep’t of Mental Health & Retardation, 837 So.2d 808, 810-11 (Ala.2002)).”

Ex parte Hale, 6 So.3d 452, 456 (Ala.2008).

III.Analysis

Article I, § 14, Const, of Ala.1901, states that “the State of Alabama shall never be made a defendant in any court of law or equity.” This constitutional provision “has been described as a ‘nearly impregnable’ and ‘almost invincible’ ‘wall’ that provides the State an unwaivable, absolute immunity from suit in any court.” Ex parte Town of Lowndesboro, 950 So.2d 1203, 1206 (Ala.2006) (quoting Alabama Agric. & Mech. Univ. v. Jones, 895 So.2d 867, 872 (Ala.2004); Patterson v. Gladwin Corp., 835 So.2d 137, 142 (Ala.2002); and Alabama State Docks v. Saxon, 631 So.2d 943, 946 (Ala.1994)).

Article Y, § 112, Ala. Const.1901, provides in part that “[t]he executive department” of the State of Alabama “shall consist of a governor ... and a sheriff for each county.” Based on §§ 14 and 112 of the Alabama Constitution, this Court concluded in Parker v. Amerson, 519 So.2d 442, 442-43 (Ala.1987), that, aside from certain recognized exceptions not applicable here, “[a] sheriff is an executive officer of the State of Alabama, who is immune from suit under Article I, § 14, Alabama Constitution of 1901, in the execution of the duties of his office.... ”

“We have also held that deputy sheriffs are immune from suit to the same extent as sheriffs. ‘In general, the acts of the deputy sheriff are the acts of the sheriff. The deputy sheriff is the alter ego of the sheriff.’ Carr v. City of Florence, Alabama, 916 F.2d 1521, 1526 (11th Cir.1990), quoted with approval in Drain v. Odom, 631 So.2d 971, 972 (Ala.1994), and Wright v. Bailey, 611 So.2d 300, 303 (Ala.1992). ‘[Under Alabama law, a] deputy is legally an extension of the sheriff. If the deputy’s acts are generally considered the acts of the sheriff, it is logical that those acts should enjoy the same immunity covering the sheriffs own acts.’ Carr, at 1526, quoted with approval in Wright v. Bailey, at 303.”

Alexander v. Hatfield, 652 So.2d 1142, 1144 (Ala.1994).

Shelley contends that because he was acting in the line and scope of his employment with the Houston County Sheriffs Office when the accident occurred, he is entitled to “State immunity” under Art. I, § 14. Among other things, he cites Ex parte Sumter County, 953 So.2d 1235, 1239 (Ala.2006), for the proposition that “ ‘[djeputies and jailers are alter egos of the Sheriff and are state employees. Mosely v. Kennedy, 245 Ala. 448, 17 So.2d 536, 537 (1944).’ ” (Quoting plaintiffs motion for partial summary judgment.)

With respect to Shelley’s reliance on Sumter County, we first note that the case of Mosely v. Kennedy, 245 Ala. 448, 17 So.2d 536 (1944), cited in Sumter County for the proposition that deputy sheriffs and jailers are alter egos of a sheriff does not state that a jailer is such an alter ego. The above-quoted passage, which this Court actually was quoting from the motion for partial summary judgment filed by the plaintiff in Sumter County, appears to reflect an inaccurate combining by that plaintiff of the positions of deputy sheriff and jailer because the deputy sheriffs sued in Sumter County were acting as jailers at the time of the incident at issue.

Moreover, in Sumter County itself, the issue of the liability of a jailer was not presented. The import of that portion of the analysis in which the Court quoted the above-quoted statement was to reject the plaintiffs argument that the County was vicariously liable for the acts of its deputy sheriffs; it was only to that end, and not for the purpose of addressing a deputy sheriffs (much less a jailer’s) amenability to suit in his individual capacity, that the opinion points out what the Court essentially considered a concession by the plaintiff in that case.

In that portion of the Sumter County opinion that actually addresses the immunity of the sheriff and his deputies, the Court makes no mention of jailers:

“As stated above, sheriffs and deputy sheriffs are executive officers of this State, pursuant to the Ala. Const.1901, Art. V, § 112. Parker, 519 So.2d at 443. Moreover, claims against sheriffs and deputy sheriffs are ‘barred by the absolute immunity of Article I, § 14, of the Alabama Constitution of 1901,’ Coleman v. City of Dothan, 598 So.2d 873, 875 (Ala.1992) (quoting White v. Birchfield, 582 So.2d 1085, 1088 (Ala.1991)), when the sheriffs or the deputies were ‘acting within the line and scope of their employment.’ Ex parte Purvis, 689 So.2d 794, 795 (Ala.1996).”

953 So.2d at 1239. We therefore do not find Sumter County to provide support for Shelley’s position.

We also note that Shelley does not seek any protection from suit under the doctrine of “State-agent immunity” recognized in the plurality opinion in Ex parte Cranman, 792 So.2d 392 (Ala.2000), with respect to actions against State officials and employees in their individual capacities. Specifically, Shelley does not seek State-agent immunity for “[ejxercising judgment in the enforcement of the criminal laws of the State.” Cranman, 792 So.2d at 405. Instead, Shelley asserts protection under the doctrine of State immunity for sheriffs as recognized in Ex parte Purvis, 689 So.2d 794 (Ala.1996). As the Court in Sumter County explained:

“This State immunity afforded sheriffs and deputies is not affected by this Court’s decision on State-agent immunity in Ex parte Cranman, 792 So.2d 392 (Ala.2000): ‘We do not deal here with the absolute immunity of witnesses, judges, prosecutors and legislators, nor do we overrule Ex parte Purvis, 689 So.2d 794 (Ala.1996).’ 792 So.2d at 396 n. 2; see also Ex parte Haralson, 853 So.2d at 930 n. 1 (‘In Cranman, although we restated the rule governing State-agent immunity, we did not address the State immunity afforded to sheriffs and deputy sheriffs for actions taken while working in the line and scope of their employment, and we did not overrule Ex parte Purvis, 689 So.2d 794 (Ala.1996).’).”

953 So.2d at 1239-40.

The fact remains, however, that Shelley is neither a sheriff nor a deputy sheriff. We turn, therefore, to Shelley’s argument that this Court should adopt the rule enunciated by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in Lancaster v. Monroe County, 116 F.3d 1419 (11th Cir.1997), which purported to extend “State immunity” beyond sheriffs and deputy sheriffs to jailers working for a sheriffs office.

Lancaster arose out of the death of Harold Michael Lancaster while he was in custody at the Monroe County jail. Lancaster had been arrested and jailed for driving under the influence of alcohol. Lancaster’s family repeatedly warned a jailer at the Monroe County jail in Mon-roeville where Lancaster was being kept that Lancaster was going through alcohol withdrawal and that if he did not receive treatment when the alcohol in his system wore off, he would have life-threatening seizures. Despite these warnings, and despite promises from the jailer that he would monitor Lancaster closely, the jailers at the Monroe County jail rarely checked on Lancaster. Lancaster indeed had a seizure and suffered a fatal head injury as a result.

Cynthia Lancaster, as administratrix of Lancaster’s estate, sued several defendants, including Monroe County Sheriff Thomas Tate and the jailers who were on duty during Lancaster’s stay in the Monroe County jail. She alleged that those defendants were liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violating Lancaster’s rights under the First, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments and that they were liable under Alabama tort law for causing Lancaster’s wrongful death.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama concluded that both Sheriff Tate and the jailers were entitled to immunity in their official and individual capacities. On appeal, Cynthia Lancaster did not dispute that Sheriff Tate was a State official and that he was therefore entitled to immunity in his official capacity. She argued, however, that the jailers were not entitled to immunity in either their official or individual capacities.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit first observed that

“[a] state official may not be sued in his official capacity unless the state has waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity, or Congress has abrogated the state’s immunity. Alabama has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity, and Congress has not abrogated Alabama’s immunity. Therefore, Alabama state officials are immune from claims brought against them in their official capacities.”

Lancaster, 116 F.3d at 1429 (citations omitted). Thus, the court of appeals reasoned, if the jailers were State officials, they were entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity in their official capacities.

The Lancaster court noted that

“ ‘[t]o determine whether a state official is covered by Eleventh Amendment immunity, we consider the laws of the state.’ Carr [v. City of Florence, 916 F.2d 1521, 1525 (11th Cir.1990)]. In Carr, we held that under Alabama law deputy sheriffs are state officials entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity when sued in their official capacities. 916 F.2d at 1526. We reached that conclusion after considering three factors: (1) the relationship between sheriffs and deputies under Alabama law; (2) the control that the county exercises over sheriffs and deputies; and (3) whether an award of damages against the deputies in their official capacities would be paid with state funds. See id. at 1525-26.”

116 F.3d at 1429. Applying the factors from Carr v. City of Florence, 916 F.2d 1521 (11th Cir.1990), the Lancaster court

“agree[d] with the district court that Alabama jailers are state officials entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity when sued in their official capacities. As the district court noted, under Alabama law jailers carry out the sheriffs duty to maintain ‘legal custody and charge of the jail in his county and all prisoners committed thereto.’ See Ala. Code § 14-6-1 (1975).[] Although jailers may not function as an ‘extension’ of the sheriff to the same degree that deputies do, because a jailer cannot undertake every act that the sheriff could perform, cf. Carr, 916 F.2d at 1526 (deputies are a legal extension of the sheriff because they act as sheriffs agent and can perform any act within sheriffs authority), nevertheless, jailers are responsible to the sheriff for their performance of state-mandated duties. Sheriffs and jailers have a close working relationship under Alabama law.
“That working relationship is not sufficiently intruded upon by county control to deny jailers Eleventh Amendment immunity for official capacity claims.”

116 F.3d at 1429-30.

Regarding immunity from Lancaster’s state-law claims in the jailers’ individual capacities, the Lancaster court stated:

“Like sheriffs, jailers have a statutory duty to obtain medical care for sick prisoners. See Ala.Code § 14-6-19 (1975). The Alabama Supreme Court has never addressed whether a suit brought against a jailer in his individual capacity alleging negligent performance of his statutory duties should be treated as a suit against the state. Yet, given our holding that jailers are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity for official capacity claims, we find no reasonable basis for distinguishing claims against the jailers from claims against the sheriff. In deciding whether an action against a state officer is, in fact, an action against the state, Alabama law instructs us to consider the nature of the action and the relief sought. See Phillips [v. Thomas ], 555 So.2d [81] at 83 [ (Ala.1989) ]. According to Parker v. Amerson[, 519 So.2d 442 (Ala.1987) ], if the ‘nature of the action’ is a suit against a state official for the negligent performance of his statutory duties, that action is in reality a suit against the state. See 519 So.2d at 446....
“We believe the Alabama Supreme Court would accord the same treatment to Ms. Lancaster’s claims of negligence and wrongful death against the jailers that it has given claims against sheriffs and deputy sheriffs. Accordingly, we hold that those claims are barred by Alabama’s absolute sovereign immunity.”

116 F.3d at 1431. It is this ruling from Lancaster that Shelley urges this Court to adopt.

As the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit noted in Lancaster, this Court had not considered whether a county jailer, like a sheriff and his deputies, is entitled to absolute immunity under § 14. Thus, Lancaster is, at best, persuasive authority on this issue. Moreover, because the doctrine of sovereign immunity denies plaintiffs a recovery for injuries from otherwise potentially liable defendants, this Court must be deliberate about extending the doctrine. See City of Anniston v. Hillman, 220 Ala. 505, 509, 126 So. 169, 172 (1930) (stating that “the courts, from an impelling sense of justice, have sought to define a line beyond which the doctrine of immunity shall not be extended”).

Shelley’s argument for extending State immunity to cover a jailer employed by a sheriff hinges on this Court’s determination in Hereford v. Jefferson County, 586 So.2d 209 (Ala.1991), that deputy sheriffs are immune from suit to the same extent as are sheriffs. Shelley contends that, like a deputy sheriff, he carries out some of the duties of the sheriff on behalf of the sheriff; he reasons that, therefore, when he is acting in the line and scope of his employment, he should be clothed with the immunity sheriffs possess as executive officers of the State.

Shelley’s argument, based on the duties he performs for the sheriffs office, misunderstands, however, the nature of § 14 immunity. A sheriff is entitled to State immunity because of his status as a constitutional officer as detailed in Art. V, § 112, Ala. Const. 1901. Suits against such officers for actions taken in the line and scope of their employment inherently constitute actions against the State, and such actions are prohibited by § 14. See Haralson, 853 So.2d at 932 (reiterating that “[a] sheriff is an executive officer of this State pursuant to the Alabama Constitution of 1901, Art. V, § 112 [and a]s an executive officer, a sheriff is immune from being sued in the execution of the duties of his office under Art. I, § 14, Alabama Const. 1901”).

Shelley contends that no rational distinction exists between the extension of immunity to deputy sheriffs in cases such as Ex parte Blankenship, 893 So.2d 303 (Ala.2004), and Ex parte Davis, 9 So.3d 480 (Ala.2008), and his claim to immunity in this case. In Blankenship, this Court deemed a deputy sheriff to be immune from a suit resulting from his involvement in an automobile accident because the allegations in the complaint stated that the deputy was acting in the line and scope of his employment when he caused the collision. In Davis, this Court deemed two deputy sheriffs to be immune from suit in an action arising out of their alleged failure to care for an inmate at the Jefferson County jail who they had been informed had Graves disease and needed medical attention. The inmate died from complications from Graves disease shortly after being released from the jail.

Shelley contends that Blankenship and Davis involve situations where deputies were carrying out duties of the sheriff in a vehicle or as jailers, both of which Shelley says he was doing in the present case. Shelley argues that the Court applied State immunity in those cases because the actions taken by the deputies were taken pursuant to the sheriffs executive power; Shelly insists that because he was also acting on behalf of the sheriff when the events occurred that resulted in Terry Irvin’s death and Rice’s injuries, he should also be immune.

This Court has stated on several occasions, however, that “deputy sheriffs are immune to the same extent sheriffs are immune because ‘ “[t]he deputy sheriff is the alter ego of the sheriff.” ’ ” Haralson, 853 So.2d at 932 (quoting Hereford, 586 So.2d at 210, quoting in turn Mosely v. Kennedy, 245 Ala. at 450, 17 So.2d at 537). An alter ego is, by definition, a second self; the deputy is “ ‘legally an extension of the sheriff.’” Wright, 611 So.2d at 303 (quoting Carr, 916 F.2d at 1526 (emphasis added)).

In Mosely, this Court cited Rogers v. Carroll, 111 Ala. 610, 20 So. 602 (1896), for the proposition that a deputy sheriff is the alter ego of the sheriff. Rogers explained the nature of the relationship between a sheriff and the sheriffs deputy, as opposed to others employed by a sheriff to carry out particular tasks:

“On all the evidence, Reeves was a general deputy of Carroll the sheriff. He was a deputy sheriff, as distinguished from a specially deputized agent of the sheriff for a particular purpose. His powers, generally speaking, were those of the sheriff himself, and his acts were those of the sheriff. He had the same power to receive and to execute all ordinary process as had the sheriff, and his acts or omissions under or in respect of process were the acts or omissions of the sheriff. In legal contemplation, he and the sheriff were one officer, so far as third persons are concerned, as to all questions of civil responsibility. Standing thus in the stead of the sheriff, and being the sheriff for all practical purposes affecting third persons, the public have a right to assume that he has all the powers incident to the office he holds....”

Rogers, 111 Ala. at 613, 20 So. at 602 (emphasis omitted). Thus, because “[i]n legal contemplation, [a deputy] and the sheriff [are] one officer, so far as third persons are concerned,” it is logical that a deputy shares in the immunity afforded to sheriffs. Id. (emphasis added). Compare Wheeler v. George, 39 So.3d 1061, 1093 (Ala.2009) (acknowledging the “long-standing precedent treating the deputy as an alter ego of the sheriff,” but declining to embrace a more general notion that State officials serving in the executive branch are “deputy governors” for purposes of State immunity as to suits against them in them individual capacities for money damages).

In contrast, a jailer working for a sheriffs office cannot properly be viewed “in legal contemplation” as “an extension of the sheriff’ or as “one officer” with the sheriff. The Lancaster court itself acknowledged that “jailers may not function as an ‘extension’ of the sheriff to the same degree that deputies do, because a jailer cannot undertake every act that the sheriff could perform.” Lancaster, 116 F.3d at 1429. Moreover, as the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit explained in Terry v. Cook, 866 F.2d 373, 378 (11th Cir.1989), the positions appointed by a sheriff of clerk, investigator, dispatcher, jailer, and process server “traditionally revolve around limited objectives and defined duties and do not require those holding them to function as the alter ego of the sheriff or ensure that the policies and goals of the office are implemented.” Accordingly, we do not consider a jailer in Shelley’s position to be an alter ego of the sheriff as are deputy sheriffs.

The doctrine of State immunity under § 14 of the Alabama Constitution, insofar as it operates to provide absolute immunity to certain State actors with respect to suits against them in their individual capacity for money damages, is a doctrine that is applicable to constitutional officers. Distinguishing between the immunity afforded in this regard by the doctrine of State immunity and that afforded by the doctrine of State-agent immunity, this Court has observed:

“When determining whether a State interest in an action against a state official or employee in his or her individual capacity is sufficient to trigger the immunity granted by § 14, our cases distinguish between the standards applied to those state agents or employees whose positions exist by virtue of legislative pronouncement and those who serve as the constitutional officers of this State. We have held that State-agent immunity may bar an action against a state agent or employee under the principles announced in Ex parte Cranman, 792 So,2d 392 (Ala.2000).... However, this Court has consistently held that a claim for monetary damages made against a constitutional officer in the officer’s individual capacity is barred by State immunity whenever the acts that are the basis of the alleged liability were performed within the course and scope of the officer’s employment.”

Ex parte Davis, 930 So.2d 497, 500-01 (Ala.2005) (emphasis added). Shelley’s position as a jailer simply does not meet this requirement.

IV. Conclusion

None of this Court’s cases have extended the State immunity afforded a sheriff to any sheriffs employees other than deputy sheriffs. We decline to extend State immunity beyond that limit in this case. Accordingly, we deny Shelley’s petitions for the writs of mandamus in both the Irvin action and the Rice action seeking to direct the respective trial courts to set aside their orders denying his motions to dismiss the claims brought against him by Irvin and Rice.

1080588 — PETITION DENIED.

1080863 — PETITION DENIED.

COBB, C.J., and LYONS, STUART, and BOLIN, JJ., concur.

      . This Court has consolidated these actions solely for purposes of appellate review because they involve the same defendant and stem from the same incident, and Shelley requests mandamus relief on identical grounds in both actions.

      . Houston County also filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that Shelley was never employed by Houston County and that Houston County had complied with all duties with respect to the prisoner-transport vehicle. The trial court denied Houston County's motion without elaboration. Rice’s claims against Houston County are not before us in this petition, however.

      . On April 30, 2009, when this Court ordered answers and briefs on Shelley's petition in the Rice action, it stayed all proceedings in the trial court pending disposition of the petition for the writ of mandamus.

      . Parker explained that § 14 immunity does not shield a sheriff from an action brought
      "(1) to compel him to perform his duties, (2) to compel him to perform ministerial acts, (3) to enjoin him from enforcing unconstitutional laws, (4) to enjoin him from acting in bad faith, fraudulently, beyond his authority, or under mistaken interpretation of the law, or (5) to seek construction of a statute under the Declaratory Judgment Act if he is a necessary party for the construction of the statute.”

        Parker, 519 So.2d at 443. Our decisions have recognized another category of actions against State officials in which the official is not shielded from immunity, i.e., " 'valid inverse condemnation actions brought against State officials in their representative capacity.' " Alabama Dep’t of Transp. v. Harbert Int’l, Inc., 990 So.2d 831, 840 (Ala.2008) (other citations omitted). It does not appear that this Court has ever had occasion to consider whether this latter category would, in an appropriate circumstance, apply to a sheriff.

      . Sumter County concerned a wrongful-death action filed by the administrator ad litem for the estate of Jeffrey D. Fenner. According to the administrator ad litem, Fenner was traveling by bus from Dallas, Texas, through Alabama, on March 15, 2003, when he allegedly suffered an episode of paranoia and delusions and had to leave the bus near Cuba, Alabama, in Sumter County. Fenner made his way to the McBride Truck Stop in Cuba. His behavior was such that employees summoned Cuba Police Chief Chris Vaughan, who arrested Fenner for assault and disorderly conduct. Fenner was transported to the Sumter County jail and placed in a cell. Sometime thereafter, Fenner committed suicide by hanging himself. The administrator ad litem sued the sheriff and his deputies, alleging that their lack of care for Fenner in the county jail resulted in his death.

      . See Ex parte Butts, 775 So.2d 173 (Ala.2000), in which a majority of this Court adopted the Cranman restatement of the rule governing State-agent immunity.

      . This Court explained in Ex parte Haralson,
        853 So.2d 928, 931 n. 1 (Ala.2003), that "[t]he immunity available to the State in an action against the State is now referred to as 'State immunity.’ ” The immunity available to defendants sued in their individual capacity for actions taken on behalf of the State is now referred to as “State-agent immunity.’1 See Cranman, 792 So.2d at 397 (distinguishing between State immunity and State-agent immunity).

      . In Parker, this Court declared § 14-6-1, Ala. Code 1975, unconstitutional under § 14 of the Alabama Constitution to the extent that it purports to hold sheriffs liable for the actions of their jailers. See Parker, 519 So.2d at 446.

      . We have, of course, previously rejected the notion that the immunity provided the State in Art. I, § 14, infringes upon the right to legal remedies provided in Art. I, § 13. See Jones v. Alabama State Docks, 443 So.2d 902, 905 (Ala.1983) (rejecting the contention that our courts must narrowly construe § 14 to permit actions for damages against State agencies because it would "constitute[ ] an impermissible erosion of the 'almost invincible’ ‘wall’ of the state's immunity, as established ‘by the people through their Constitution' ” (quoting Hutchinson v. Board of Trs. of Univ. of Alabama, 288 Ala. 20, 24, 256 So.2d 281, 284 (1971))). There is a difference, however, between imposing a narrow. construction upon § 14 and ensuring that the limits of immunity are clearly defined. We take the latter as our charge in the present case.

      . That the immunity at issue here may be extended only to one who is the executive officer's alter ego is not surprising given that such immunity as is provided by § 14 may be considered "purely personal” and "it is the relation between the persons concerned or the office that the privileged person holds that is important and there can be no delegation." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 891, Comment (b) (1979). This is so because the immunity belongs to the State, not the individual, and extends to executive officers only because of their close connection with the State. See Cranman, 792 So.2d at 401 (noting that § 14 "speaks only to a prohibition of lawsuits against the State and does not mention lawsuits against individuals”). Likewise, the same immunity extends to deputies because their position — unlike that of a jailer— mirrors that of the sheriff, who is an executive officer.