author: GRIFFIS, P.J.,

text:
    In the Matter of the ADOPTION OF M.C. and B.C., Minors. K.C., Appellant v. M.W., K.Z. and J.Z., Appellees.
    No. 2011-CA-00188-COA.
    Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
    July 17, 2012.

      E. Foley Ranson, Ocean Springs, attorney for appellant.
    Charliene Roemer, Biloxi, attorney for appellees.
    Before GRIFFIS, P.J., ROBERTS and CARLTON, JJ.
   GRIFFIS, P.J.,

for the Court:

¶ 1. Kyle appeals the Harrison County Chancery Court’s judgment that terminated his parental rights relating to his daughters, Meghan and Bethany, and ordered their adoption by Karen and Jack. On appeal, Kyle argues that the appellees failed to meet the burden of proof. We find no error in the chancellor’s judgment and affirm.

FACTS

¶ 2. Kyle is the biological father of Meghan, born December 18, 2001, and Bethany, born July 15, 2003. Brooke, the children’s mother, and Kyle were never married. In 2005, Brooke left Kyle and the children.

¶ 3. From their birth, Meghan and Bethany have occasionally lived with Kyle at the home of his mother, Mae, in Gulfport, Mississippi. Mae’s home became the permanent residence for Kyle and the children from December 2005 until December 2007. During this time, Mae was the children’s primary caregiver and provided financially for Kyle and the children'.

¶4. Since 2008, Mae has had physical custody of the children. Early in 2008, Karen and Jack began to assist Mae in the care of the children. Karen and Jack took the girls to church and to other activities, kept the girls at their home, and transported the girls to school.

¶ 5. Shortly thereafter, Mae filed a complaint in the chancery court to establish a guardianship for Meghan and Bethany. A guardian ad litem was appointed. The chancellor entered a judgment reflecting that Kyle admitted he had used marijuana within four months of the hearing date. Nevertheless, Kyle was awarded unsupervised visitation with his daughters, but he was required to submit a hair follicle for drug testing prior to the visitation. He was also ordered to pay $280 per month in child support.

¶ 6. During this guardianship proceeding, Mae, Karen, and Jack filed a complaint that asked that Karen and Jack be appointed co-guardians, along with Mae. On March 13, 2009, over Kyle’s objection, the chancellor entered a judgment that appointed Karen and Jack as co-guardians of Meghan and Bethany.

¶ 7. In May 2009, the girls began to live with Karen and Jack. They continued to spend time with Mae on the weekends. Kyle would visit his daughters on some of the weekends, when they were at his mother’s home. Mae would supervise Kyle’s visits, but on occasion she allowed Kyle to take the girls on outings.

¶ 8. On May 25, 2010, Karen and Jack filed a complaint for adoption. In the complaint, they asked that the parental rights of the children’s parents be terminated. Karen and Jack also requested to be allowed to adopt Meghan and Bethany.

¶ 9. On August 30, 2010, Kyle’s attorney filed a motion for an extension of time. On September 1, 2010, the chancellor entered an order that continued the hearing until October 22, 2010. The order determined that the children’s mother, Brooke, had been properly served with process and had not responded to the complaint. The chancellor, therefore, terminated Brooke’s parental rights.

¶ 10. The order also acknowledged that Kyle’s visitation was conditioned on the submission of a hair follicle for a drug screening. The chancellor noted that Kyle had not complied with this condition and ordered the screen be performed immediately. The record includes a report, filed October 4, 2010, which indicated that Kyle’s hair follicle drug screen was performed, and he tested positive for marijuana. A urine test was performed the day before the hearing, and it did not indicate the presence of any illegal substances.

¶ 11. At the hearing on this matter, Mae testified that Kyle had become angry with her and yelled at her in the presence of the children. She testified that she does not know if Kyle is clinically depressed or is bipolar, but he resents her and lashes out at her. The guardian ad litem reported that the girls said their father had a bad temper, and he was mean to their grandmother. Once, Kyle became angry and kicked his mother’s stove. In 2007, Mae obtained a restraining order on Kyle, and she had him removed from her home.

¶ 12. Kyle paid child support from the time the guardianship order was entered in July 2008 until September 2009. He testified that he was forced to stop working in September 2009 at the direction of his doctor. Kyle had developed a medical condition known as pustular dyschidrosis, an auto-immune disease. This condition prevented him from working. Kyle also testified he received medical disability benefits from his employer until February 2010. He also said that he had applied for social security disability, but he had been turned down three times. At the time of the hearing, Kyle had not worked in over a year.

¶ 13. Mae testified that her son had a history of drug use. She confirmed that he had been in rehab before the girls were born. She also testified that, although she had never seen him use drugs on her property, she believed he had brought drugs and drug users onto her property. The guardian ad litem and Karen both testified that Meghan had told them she saw her father smoking “stinky cigarettes” in the garage. Kyle admitted that he had used drugs three or four times in the years prior to the trial. His new wife, Traci, stated she did not tolerate drug use in her home and that she had once kicked Kyle out of her home for having a bag of marijuana.

¶ 14. At the time of the hearing, Karen and Jack provided Meghan and Bethany with a home, food, clothing, and medical care. Karen and Jack each testified that they loved the girls and were willing and able to continue caring for them.

¶ 15. Kyle could not testify that he had done anything to put himself in a position to provide full-time, day-to-day care for his daughters, but he expressed the desire to continue visitation with the girls.

¶ 16. The guardian ad litem’s report recommended that Kyle’s parental rights be terminated and that the adoption be ordered by the court.

¶ 17. By letter to the attorneys, dated January 5, 2011, the chancellor indicated his decision that “the termination of parental rights is warranted and that the adoption of these children should go forward.” On January 7, 2011, the chancellor entered a judgment, which included findings of fact and conclusions of law, that terminated the parental rights of Kyle and granted the adoption of Meghan and Bethany by Karen and Jack. It is from this order that Kyle now appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 18. In cases where parental rights have been terminated, our scope of review is limited. We review the chancellor’s factual findings under the manifest error/substantial credible evidence test. S.N.C. v. J.R.D., Jr., 755 So.2d 1077, 1080 (¶ 7) (Miss.2000) (citing Vance v. Lincoln County Dep’t. of Pub. Welfare, 582 So.2d 414, 417 (Miss.1991)). “This Court -will not overturn a chancellor’s findings of fact when supported by substantial evidence unless an erroneous legal standard is applied or is manifestly wrong.” Grafe v. Olds, 556 So.2d 690, 692 (Miss.1990). Under this standard, the court asks “not how we would have decided the case ab initio but whether there be credible proof’ to support the chancellor’s findings of fact “by clear and convincing evidence.” S.N.C., 755 So.2d at 1080 (¶7) (citing Ethredge v. Yawn, 605 So.2d 761, 764 (Miss.1992)). Additionally, the Court on appeal “ask[s] not how we would have decided the case ab initio but whether there be credible proof from which a rational trier of fact may have found abandonment by clear and convincing evidence.”

ANALYSIS

¶ 19. In this appeal, Kyle argues that the appellees failed to meet their burden of proof. Kyle concedes that he was “less than an ideal parent,” but argues that there was not sufficient evidence to terminate his parental rights and allow the adoption of his children.

¶ 20. Mississippi law allows a child to be adopted over the objection of a natural parent in limited circumstances. Mississippi Code Annotated section 93-17-7 (Rev.2004) provides:

(1)No infant shall be adopted to any person if either parent, after having been summoned, shall appear and object thereto before the making of a decree for adoption, unless it shall be made to appear to the court from evidence touching such matters that the parent so objecting had abandoned or deserted such infant or is mentally, or morally, or otherwise unfit to rear and train it, including, but not limited to, those matters set out in subsection (2) of this section, in either of which cases the adoption may be decreed notwithstanding the objection of such parent, first considering the welfare of the child, or children sought to be adopted....
(2) An adoption may be allowed over the objection of a parent where:
(b) The parent has not consistently offered to provide reasonably necessary food, clothing, appropriate shelter and treatment for the child. For purposes of this paragraph, treatment means medical care or other health services provided in accordance with the tenets of a well-recognized religious method of healing with a reasonable, proven record of success.
(e) The parent suffers from a medical or emotional illness, mental deficiency, behavior or conduct disorder, severe physical disability, substance abuse or chemical dependency which makes him unable or unwilling to provide an adequate permanent home for the child at the present time or in the reasonably near future based upon expert opinion or based upon an established pattern of behavior.
(d) Viewed in its entirety, the parent’s past or present conduct, including his criminal convictions, would pose a risk of substantial harm to the physical, mental or emotional health of the child.

¶ 21. Whether a person should be permitted to adopt a child is a two-step process. The court must first find that one of the grounds for adoption is present: desertion or abandonment, or moral unfitness. Natural Mother v. Paternal Aunt, 583 So.2d 614, 618 (Miss.1991). Then, there must be a definite adjudication that the best interest of the child is promoted or enhanced by the proposed adoption. Ainsworth v. Natural Father, 414 So.2d 417, 420-21 (Miss.1982).

¶ 22. Here, the chancellor relied on Petit v. Holifield, 443 So.2d 874, 878 (Miss.1984), to determine that Kyle had not abandoned his daughters. In Petit, the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court granting an adoption that was based upon the fact that the father was $7,000 in arrears in child support and had only visited with his children a few times. At trial, the father proved that he was able to support himself and his wife, but he was unable to purge himself of the contempt charges against him. Id. at 878-79. The supreme court reversed the adoption but commented that the conduct of the father did not evince a settled purpose to forego all parental rights and relinquish all parental claim to his children. Id. The supreme court, however, went on to state that the father’s conduct was “teetering” on the brink insofar as his duty to support his children was concerned. The supreme court found that if circumstances continued as they were without improvement, a court would be justified in allowing an adoption despite the father’s protest. Id.

¶ 23. Instead, here, the chancellor found that Kyle’s behavior, like that of the father in Petit, “teetered” on the edge of evincing a settled purpose to forego all parental rights and responsibilities. The chancellor noted that unlike the father in Petit, Kyle’s behavior had been continuing for some time, and he had shown no evidence of making an effort to effect change. Kyle testified that he had made no effort to put himself in a position to care for his children. He had not worked in two years and presented no evidence at trial to support his medical condition. He also provided little to no evidence of his willingness to assume full parental responsibility of his children.

¶ 24. We find guidance in the supreme court’s opinion in In re Adoption of a Minor Child, 931 So.2d 566, 570-71 (¶5) (Miss.2006). There, the Holmeses had temporary legal custody of a young child by virtue of a court order. Id. at 570 (¶ 1). They later filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of the natural mother and father in hopes of adopting the child. Id. While the natural father joined in this request, the mother objected and requested custody of the child or modified visitation. Id. The chancellor held that termination of the mother’s parental rights was justified. Id. at (¶ 5). The chancellor found that the mother “was lacking in stability, discipline, purpose, ambition, and parental responsibility.” Id. at 581 (¶ 44). The mother “had been largely unemployed,” was “dependent on SSI disability,” and had “provided no significant care or support for” her child. Id. The chancellor determined a statutory ground existed for terminating the mother’s parental rights because she “suffered from ‘an emotional illness or mental deficiency, and behavior or conduct disorder’ that would prevent her from providing an adequate home for [her child] at present or in the near future.” Id. at 581 (¶ 45). The supreme court upheld the chancellor’s findings and ruled that there was sufficient evidence to support the termination of parental rights. Id.

¶ 25. Similarly, here, the chancellor determined that Kyle has largely been unemployed. Kyle was dependent on others to support him and his children financially. Kyle has also relied on others to take care of his children. He has been dependent on medical disability benefits, and he has not had a job or income in over a year. He has also made no significant contribution to the care and support of his children.

¶26. Kyle has admitted to drug use, and he has tested positive for marijuana throughout his children’s lives and within the time period of these court proceedings. His mother testified to his continued drug use, and his children indicated that he has smoked marijuana around them. His wife also indicated that she is suspicious that Kyle is still doing drugs, and she kicked him out of her home for having marijuana in his possession. We find that this is sufficient evidence to support the chancellor’s finding that Kyle suffers from substance abuse or a chemical dependency, which makes him unwilling or unable to provide an adequate permanent home for his children at the present time or in the reasonable near future based upon his established pattern of drug use. See Miss. Code. Ann. § 93-17-7(2)(c).

¶ 27. Kyle also admitted that he has done nothing to put himself in a position to take on the full responsibility of his children. From their birth, he has depended on others to take care of them, and he has been satisfied with his children being raised by his mother, Mae, as well as Karen and Jack.

¶ 28. There is certainly sufficient evidence to support the chancellor’s finding that Kyle is a forty-five-year-old man who has not consistently offered to provide reasonably necessary food, clothing, shelter, and treatment for his daughters. Thus, the chancellor concluded this satisfied another statutory ground to permit the adoption of Meghan and Bethany over their father’s objection. See Miss.Code Ann. § 93 — 17—7(2)(b).

¶ 29. Upon determination that there is a statutory ground for termination of parental rights, a court must then consider the best interest and welfare of the child. Miss.Code Ann. § 93-17-7. The chancellor found that it was in the best interests of the children to allow Karen and Jack to adopt Meghan and Bethany. The chancellor’s decision was based upon the testimony of Mae, the guardian ad litem, Karen, Jack, and another witness who took care of the children. All the witnesses testified that Meghan and Bethany were well loved, well fed, doing well in school, properly clothed, attending church and extracurricular activities, and happy and thriving. The chancellor also found that Karen and Jack were willing to be responsible parents and were in a position to care for the children when their own father had proven he was unwilling and unable to care for them.

¶30. For these reasons, we find that the chancellor’s decision was based on substantial credible evidence. The chancellor considered all of the testimony and evidence to conclude that Mae, Karen, and Jack presented clear and convincing evidence that Kyle’s parental rights should be terminated and that Karen and Jack should be allowed to adopt Meghan and Bethany. Therefore, we find no merit in Kyle’s appeal. We affirm the chancellor’s judgment.

¶ 31. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CHANCERY COURT OF HARRISON COUNTY IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE APPELLANT.

LEE, C.J., IRVING, P.J., BARNES, ISHEE, ROBERTS, CARLTON, MAXWELL, RUSSELL AND FAIR, JJ„ CONCUR.

      . In this opinion, fictitious names are used for all of the parties.

      . The report of the guardian ad litem in this case sheds some light on why Karen and Jack became involved in the children's care. Mae told the guardian ad litem that she could hardly take care of herself at age eighty. She said that she would raise her granddaughters if she could, but she needed help. Karen and Jack stepped in to assist. As we discuss later, the guardian ad litem found that Karen and Jack were providing the best home and the best life imaginable for the children, and she recommended that parental rights be terminated.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: DICKINSON, Presiding Justice, PIERCE, Justice,

license: Public Domain

text:
    MISSISSIPPI INSURANCE GUARANTY ASSOCIATION a/k/a MIGA v. MISSISSIPPI WORKERS’ COMPENSATION INDIVIDUAL SELF-INSURER GUARANTY ASSOCIATION f/k/a Mississippi Workers’ Compensation Self-Insurer Guaranty Association.
    No. 2010-CA-01615-SCT.
    Supreme Court of Mississippi.
    April 19, 2012.
    Rehearing Denied Aug. 9, 2012.
    Jan F. Gadow, James D. Holland, Jackson, attorneys for appellant.
    A. Spencer Gilbert, III, attorney for ap-pellee.
   DICKINSON, Presiding Justice,

for the Court:

¶ 1. The Mississippi Legislature created the Mississippi Workers’ Compensation Self-Insurers Guaranty Association (“SIGA”) to pay workers’ compensation claims on behalf of insolvent self-insured employers; and it created the Mississippi Insurance Guaranty Association (“MIGA”) to pay claims on behalf of insolvent insurers. After an insolvent employer’s insurance company also became insolvent, SIGA made workers’ compensation payments to an injured worker. SIGA sued MIGA for reimbursement of those payments, and the trial court ordered reimbursement. But because SIGA’s claim against MIGA does not fall within the statutory definition of a “covered claim,” we reverse.

BACKGROUND

¶ 2. The Legislature abolished most lawsuits by injured employees against their employers, and provided compensation through the workers’ compensation statutes. Most employers cover all their workers’ compensation claims filed against them with insurance; some “self-insure,” that is, they pay the workers’ compensation claims without benefit of any insurance coverage; and some employers — such as B.C. Rogers Poultry, Inc., the employer involved in today’s case — self-insure up to a certain limit and then cover claims that exceed that limit with insurance.

¶ 3. The Legislature created MIGA to provide for the payment of benefits due under insurance policies issued by insurance companies that become insolvent, (with statutory restrictions); and it created SIGA to pay workers’ compensation benefits on behalf of self-insured employers that become insolvent. Today’s case presents the unusual scenario in which both a partially self-insured employer and its insurance company became insolvent while a workers’ compensation claim was pending.

¶ 4. After Bobby Warren was injured on the job, his self-insured employer, B.C. Rogers Poultry, Inc., paid $225,000 in workers’ compensation benefits and then turned the claim over to its excess insur-anee carrier, Reliance National Indemnity Company.

¶ 5. Reliance paid $129,205.73 in benefits but then became insolvent, requiring Rogers again to assume responsibility for the claim. Rogers paid an additional $167,419.53, but then it became insolvent and ceased payments, prompting SIGA to step in and pay Warren’s claim. After paying benefits exceeding $100,000, SIGA suggested that MIGA consider stepping into Reliance’s shoes and pay the amount Reliance should have paid, effectively reimbursing SIGA. MIGA refused, so SIGA filed suit. Meanwhile, Warren sued the other driver from the accident for personal injuries and collected more than $4 million from uninsured motorist (“UM”) carriers.

¶ 6. SIGA argued to the trial court that MIGA should reimburse it for the money it paid to Warren, because MIGA had a statutory duty to step into Reliance’s shoes when Reliance became insolvent. MIGA responded that it was not obligated to pay SIGA, because SIGA was not a “claimant” or “policyholder” and did not have a “covered claim” under its laws. MIGA also argued that the Reliance excess policy was not “direct insurance” as to SIGA.

¶ 7. Finally, MIGA argued that any reimbursement SIGA might be entitled to must be reduced, or offset, by the amount Warren received in UM benefits — effectively wiping out the claim. SIGA responded that, because it stepped into Rogers’s shoes, it should be paid what Rogers would have been paid had Reliance not become insolvent.

¶ 8. SIGA filed a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court granted, holding that the Reliance excess insurance policy was “direct insurance” and that SIGA had a “covered claim.” The trial court also found that SIGA’s claim could not be offset by the amount recovered by Warren under the UM policies.

¶ 9. MIGA appealed, asking us to consider whether MIGA is obligated to pay SIGA; whether MIGA is entitled to a reduction, setoff, or credit for the amount Warren received from UM policies; and whether SIGA is entitled to an award of interest and costs. Because we hold that MIGA is not obligated to pay SIGA, we decline to address the other issues.

ANALYSIS

¶ 10. We follow our usual standards of review: Summary judgment is appropriate where “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact” and “the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” We review motions for summary judgment de novo, and although we view the evidence in' the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, statutory interpretation is a question of law and must be reviewed de novo.

¶ 11. The Legislature created MIGA to “provide a mechanism for the payment of covered claims under certain insurance policies to avoid excessive delay in payment and to avoid financial loss to claimants or policyholders because of the insolvency of an insurer... ,” And according to Mississippi Code Section 83-23-107, we interpret MIGA’s laws according to MIGA’s statutory purpose.

MIGA is not obligated to reimburse SIGA for its payments to Warren, because SIGA does not have a “covered claim.”

¶ 12. Under Mississippi Code Section 83 — 23—115(1)(a), MIGA is “obligated to the extent of the covered claims existing prior to the determination of insolvency....” The statute further provides that “[i]n no event shall the association be obligated to a policyholder or claimant in an amount in excess of the obligation of the insolvent insurer under the policy from which the claim arises.” And Mississippi Code Section 83 — 23—109(f) defines “covered claim” as

an unpaid claim, including one of unearned premiums, which arises out of and is within the coverage and not in excess of the applicable limits of an insurance policy to which this articles applies issued by an insurer, if such insurer becomes an insolvent insurer....

¶ 13. Thus, to obligate MIGA to pay SIGA, SIGA must be a claimant or policyholder with an unpaid claim. SIGA argues that its payments to Warren — in satisfaction of its obligation to take over Rogers’s workers’ compensation obligations — are unpaid claims. MIGA, however, argues that SIGA cannot have an “unpaid claim,” because SIGA is not a “claimant” or “policyholder” under the statute; we agree.

¶ 14. MIGA’s laws define “claimant” as “any insured making a first-party claim or any person instituting a liability claim....” Here, Rogers was the named insured under the Reliance excess policy— not SIGA. SIGA, however, argues that, under Mississippi Code Section 71-3-163, it is “deemed the self-insurer to the extent of obligations on its covered claims and to such extent shall have all rights, duties and obligations of the individual self-insurer in default or insolvent group self-insurer in default as if such self-insurer were not in default.” SIGA, therefore, argues that, because it was obligated to step into the shoes of Rogers, it also has a right to reimbursement under Rogers’s policy with Reliance as a claimant or policyholder; and since MIGA is obligated to step into Reliance’s shoes, MIGA should pay SIGA for payments made to Warren. But as this Court has explained, “an insolvent insurer’s shoes are not always a perfect fit.”

¶ 15. The MIGA statutes must be interpreted according to the association’s purpose:

[T]o provide a mechanism for the payment of covered claims under certain insurance policies to avoid excessive delay in payment and to avoid financial loss to claimants or policyholders because of the insolvency of an insurer, to assist in the detection and prevention of insurer insolvencies, and to provide an association to assess the cost of such protection among insurers.

¶ 16. MIGA’s purpose, though, is not achieved by ordering MIGA to reimburse SIGA, because doing so would not prevent financial losses to a claimant or policyholder. SIGA is not seeking money for Rogers (the actual claimant or policyholder); instead, it is seeking reimbursement for complying with its own statutory duties. While the dissent correctly observes that SIGA steps into Rogers’s shoes and inherits its rights and obligations, it overlooks the fact that — with respect to SIGA’s payment to Warren — Rogers has no outstanding rights or obligations. Rogers — were it not insolvent — would have no right of reimbursement for SIGA’s payments to Warren; so SIGA has no right of reimbursement and no unpaid claim. And no statutory provision allows, or requires, one guaranty association to pay another. SIGA and the dissent ignore the one avenue of reimbursement authorized by SIGA’s statute: “An association may recover from the self-insurer in default ... all amounts paid by such association on account of covered claims of employees of the member self-insurer in default....”

¶ 17. SIGA is not an “insured making a first-party claim,” as the definition of “claimant” requires; instead, Rogers is the insured. Nor is SIGA “instituting a liability claim”; instead, it seeks reimbursement only. So MIGA’s statutes neither authorize nor obligate it to pay SIGA.

¶ 18. The dissent says that Rogers’s claim against Reliance remains unpaid. But we find nothing in the record before us concerning any claim Rogers has, or is asserting, against Reliance, MIGA, or anyone else. The claim presented today — and the only claim presented for our consideration — is SIGA’s claim against MIGA: a claim for payments SIGA made in fulfillment of its statutory duties. Any payment Rogers may have made — after Reliance’s insolvency — is not relevant to this appeal.

¶ 19. SIGA’s claim against MIGA is best characterized as an attempt at no-vation. Novation may occur where one debtor is substituted by another in a contract, which requires an express agreement or implied assent. Here, no evidence exists — and SIGA does not argue— that Rogers or Reliance expressly or implicitly assented to a novation. Simply because SIGA’s statute deems it the self-insurer does not mean that SIGA’s name is supplanted into Rogers’s contract with Reliance.

¶ 20. Contrary to the dissent’s assertion, our decision today does not favor the MIGA statutes over the SIGA statutes. MIGA’s authority to make payments is limited by the statutes that created it, and those statutes do not authorize it to reimburse SIGA. Because SIGA is not a claimant or policyholder with an unpaid claim, it does not have a “covered claim” under MIGA’s statute.

CONCLUSION

¶ 21. MIGA is not obligated to reimburse SIGA for SIGA’s statutorily obligated payments to Warren. Neither party has presented a genuine issue of material fact. Thus, MIGA is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s ruling and find that the trial court erred in granting SIGA’s motion for summary judgment and in denying MIGA’s motion for summary judgment. MIGA’s motion for summary judgment is granted.

¶ 22. REVERSED AND RENDERED.

WALLER, C.J., CARLSON, P.J., RANDOLPH, LAMAR, CHANDLER AND KING, JJ., CONCUR. PIERCE, J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY KITCHENS, J.

PIERCE, Justice,

dissenting:

¶ 23. This is a case of first impression for this Court. Never before has this Court been presented a situation in which a self-insured and a direct insurer became insolvent on the same claim involving the same transaction. The Mississippi Insurance Guaranty Association (“MIGA”) and the Mississippi Workers’ Compensation Individual Self-insurer Guaranty Association (“SIGA”) are legal entities with similar duties and obligations. In fact, each’s respective statute mimics the other but for some select wording in each statute.

¶ 24. Throughout this case, words “claimant” and “covered claim” were often used. Yet, each word has a specific meaning as announced by both SIGA’s and MIGA’s respective statutes. SIGA’s statute does not define “claimant,” but defines “covered claim” as:

“Covered claim” means an unpaid claim upon which compensation or medical is payable by an individual self-insurer or a group self-insurer under the Worker’s Compensation Law.

MIGA’s statute defines “claimant” and “covered claim” as:

“Claimant” means any insured making a first-party claim or any person instituting a liability claim, provided that no person who is an affiliate of the insolvent insurer may be a claimant. “Covered Claim” means an unpaid claim, including one of unearned premiums, which arises out of and is within the coverage and not in excess of the applicable limits of an insurance policy to which this article applies issued by an insurer, if such insurer becomes an insolvent insurer.... “Covered Claim” shall not include any amount awarded as punitive or exemplary damages; or sought as a return of premium under any retrospective rating plan; or due any reinsurer, insurer, insurance pool, or underwriting association, as subrogation recoveries or otherwise and shall preclude recovery thereof from the insured of any insolvent carrier to the extent of the policy limits.

¶ 25. Looking at SIGA’s statute specifically, it commands that SIGA must “have all rights, duties and obligations” of the insolvent self-insurer — B.C. Rogers — “as if such self-insurer were not in default.” Thus, it seems logical that SIGA should be able to enforce whatever rights, duties, and obligations B.C. Rogers possessed. MIGA admitted that B.C. Rogers could bring a claim under the excess policy held with Reliance, but that SIGA could not. Yet, MIGA provided no authority to support that assertion. Rather, MIGA insists that SIGA does not meet the requirements listed in MIGA’s statute to be paid.

¶ 26. The majority opinion favors MIGA’s statute, yet casts aside SIGA’s statute. Quite frankly, the majority fails to recognize the importance of SIGA’s statute when aligned with MIGA’s. As mentioned previously, never before has a self-insured and a direct insurer become insolvent on the same claim involving the same transaction. Therefore, each respective statute must be applied accordingly.

¶ 27. The majority is correct that, “[t]he Legislature created MIGA to ‘provide a mechanism for the payment of covered claims under certain insurance policies to avoid excessive delay in payment and to avoid financial loss to claimants or policyholders, because of the insolvency of an insurer....’” This Court must “liberally” construe the MIGA statutes “to effect the purpose under Section 83-23-103, which shall constitute as an aid and guide to interpretation.”

¶ 28. The majoi’ity reasons that “to obligate MIGA to pay SIGA, SIGA must be a claimant or policyholder with an unpaid claim.” MIGA’s statute defines “claimant” as “any insured” or “any person instituting a liability claim.” The majority ignores SIGA’s statute that commands that it shall:

Be deemed the self-insurer to the extent of obligations on its covered claims and to such extent shall have the rights, duties and obligations of the individual self-insurer in default or insolvent group self-insurer in default as if such self-insurer were not in default.

SIGA’s statute provides for the same liberal reading and application as MIGA’s, and one statute should not be given any more effect than the other..

¶ 29. Reading SIGA’s statute and reconciling it with MIGA’s, SIGA could be considered both a claimant and a policyholder. First, SIGA’s statute allows it to cloak itself as the self-insured, entitling it to the same coverage as B.C. Rogers under the Reliance policy. Because B.C. Rogers would be treated as “any insured making a first-party claim,” SIGA should be afforded similar treatment. Secondly, SIGA could also be considered a policyholder, because SIGA’s statute allows it to possess the rights, duties and obligations of the individual self-insurer in default. Ultimately, SIGA paid out money on B.C. Rogers’s behalf, and it wants that money to be returned through an insurance policy B.C. Rogers purchased to cover its liability-

11 30. We must be mindful of what took place. B.C. Rogers was a self-insured employer up to $225,000. To cover any liability on workers’ compensation claims in excess of $225,000, B.C. Rogers purchased a policy with Reliance National Indemnity Company. One of B.C. Rogers’s employees, Warren, was injured during his employment. As a result, B.C. Rogers paid $225,000, and then filed a claim with Reliance for the excess amount. Reliance paid $129,205.73 before becoming insolvent. Because of Reliance’s insolvency, B.C. Rogers began repaying Warren’s claim, and paid $167,419.53. But then, B.C. Rogers became insolvent, and SIGA assumed responsibility, paying $111,739.78 to satisfy the rest of Warren’s claim against B.C. Rogers. Therefore, a total of $279,159.31 was paid by B.C. Rogers and SIGA, when that amount should have been paid by Reliance under the policy B.C. Rogers purchased to cover its excess liability.

¶ 31. Interestingly, the majority admits that SIGA inherited the rights and obligations of B.C. Rogers, but found that B.C. Rogers did not possess any outstanding rights or obligations, even though Reliance only partially had met its contractual duty under the policy with B.C. Rogers. The majority goes further and reasons that if B.C. Rogers were not insolvent, it would have no right of reimbursement for SIGA’s payment to Warren, and thus, SIGA cannot be reimbursed either. But this is faulty logic, because the majority fails to recognize that if B.C. Rogers were not insolvent, SIGA would not have had to pay anything to anyone.

¶ 32. Of note, MIGA admitted in its brief that B.C. Rogers could bring a claim under the excess policy held with Reliance, but that SIGA could not do so without providing authority as to why. The majority fails to recognize MIGA’s admission. And I am unable to reconcile how B.C. Rogers could bring a claim, yet SIGA cannot, even though all agree that SIGA inherits the rights, duties, and obligations of the defaulted self-insurer.

¶ 33. Additionally, the majority states that SIGA has only one avenue for reimbursement in that it can recover only from the self-insurer in default. However, Mississippi Code Section 71-3-169(2) is not as absolute as the majority characterizes. Section 71-3-169(2) clearly uses the word “may.” “May” is not an absolute term, and thus, the statute is not the only route that SIGA can follow to obtain reimbursement.

¶ 34. During oral argument, Presiding Justice Dickinson asked if the excess claim was the claim that is unpaid. The answer was, emphatically, “yes.” B.C. Rogers’s claim against Reliance remains unpaid, because $279,159.31 had to be paid once Reliance became insolvent. Now, both B.C. Rogers and Reliance are insolvent, placing SIGA in the shoes of B.C. Rogers, and MIGA in the shoes of Reliance. Since Reliance would be obligated to pay B.C. Rogers, MIGA should be obligated to pay SIGA, irrespective of SIGA’s reasons for seeking reimbursement. We must remember, SIGA’s statute permits such action.

¶ 35. SIGA’s statute commands that SIGA be treated with the same pleasantries of the self-insurer as if that self-insurer were not in default. If we read that statute under its plain meaning, then SIGA’s statute transforms it into B.C. Rogers, allowing SIGA to be reimbursed by MIGA. And therefore, here, “an insolvent insurer’s shoes are” a perfect fit. If this Court subtracts from SIGA’s statute its right to be treated as the self-insurer, what authority does SIGA have to possess the rights, duties, and obligations of the self-insurer as its statute commands going forward? But of most importance, the majority admits that SIGA inherits the rights and obligations of B.C. Rogers. Consequently, SIGA is entitled to that to which B.C. Rogers would be entitled — a claim against MIGA because of Reliance’s insolvency.

¶ 36. The questions to be answered are: 1) what is the claim; and 2) who is the claimant? The “claim” is that which B.C. Rogers would have received under its policy with Reliance. MIGA misconstrued who the claimant is, as it reasoned that Warren was the “claimant.” Although it is true that Warren is a claimant, he is, unmistakably, a workers’ compensation claimant, not a “claimant” with regard to the policy B.C. Rogers had with Reliance. MIGA’s statute defines “claimant” as “any insured making a first-party claim or any person instituting a liability claim....” Therefore, Warren cannot be a “claimant” in the manner MIGA suggested, because Warren cannot make a claim on B.C. Rogers’s policy with Reliance. Instead, Warren could only be a “claimant” in that he sought payment from an insolvent B.C. Rogers.

¶ 37. And the issue to be decided now is, who is the “claimant” with respect to the Reliance policy held and purchased by B.C. Rogers? The “claimant,” as defined by MIGA’s own statute, was and is B.C. Rogers. B.C. Rogers owned the policy. B.C. Rogers was liable to Warren in excess of $225,000, and thus, B.C. Rogers made a claim on its policy with Reliance. Due to B.C. Rogers’s insolvency, SIGA is now cloaked with B.C. Rogers’s rights, duties, and obligations. Therefore, SIGA inherits the ability to be the “claimant” under MIGA’s statutory scheme up to the amount it paid on B.C. Rogers’s behalf, not to exceed $300,000.

¶ 38. After reviewing caselaw in other jurisdictions, we do not find any case directly on point with the issues presented here. However, in other states, it seems to be an emerging trend NOT to expand the language of a guaranty association statute beyond that of the statute. Specifically, Pennsylvania, Nebraska, California, Virginia, and Wyoming all have held that a guaranty association does not step into the shoes of the self-insured except as to the extent provided for within the statute affecting that association. But Mississippi is different from those states, and here, we are not expanding SIGA’s statute beyond its respective language, because SIGA’s statute specifically allows it to assume the rights, duties, and obligations of a self-insurer as though no default had occurred.

¶ 39. However, in one interesting case from Pennsylvania from 2009 — General Reinsurance Corporation v. American Bankers Insurance Company of Florida, the Pennsylvania court decided an issue regarding our own MIGA. There, MIGA brought an interpleader action, seeking a determination as to whether a statutory liquidator of a workers’ compensation insurer or MIGA was owed $2,488,336.19 pursuant to a reinsurance agreement between the reinsurer and the liquidated workers’ compensation insurer. The court found that MIGA could not stand in the shoes of another with regard to the reinsurance proceeds subject to the inter-pleader complaint. Here, it seems that MIGA attempts to employ that same argument, but to an entirely different set of circumstances. At this juncture, we have a self-insurer who would lay claim to proceeds from an insurance policy but for insolvency, and a statute which specifically allows a guaranty association to step into the shoes of the insolvent self-insurer as if it were not in default. Ultimately, the question turns on how broadly this Court will construe SIGA’s statute in regard to “rights, duties and obligations.”

¶40. B.C. Rogers’s claim on its policy with Reliance remains unsatisfied. Otherwise, SIGA would have no right to enforce the claim on B.C. Rogers’s behalf. We must remember that B.C. Rogers purchased a policy with Reliance to cover all its liability on workers’ compensation claims in excess of $225,000. B.C. Rogers’s claim has been only partially paid by Reliance, as Reliance paid $129,205.73 before becoming insolvent, leaving $279,159.31 to be paid in order to satisfy Warren’s workers’ compensation claim. SIGA stated at oral argument that neither it nor B.C. Rogers had received anything on the Reliance policy, but as shown above, B.C. Rogers did receive a partial amount from Reliance. Nevertheless, SIGA seeks to recoup what it was obligated to pay on B.C. Rogers’s behalf because of Reliance’s insolvency. Statutorily, MIGA is to step into the shoes of Reliance and pay the liabilities of Reliance. Yet here, MIGA does not desire to wear those shoes, even though they are a perfect fit.

¶ 41. The majority concludes by characterizing SIGA’s attempt at reimbursement as a novation. Although the majority properly defines novation, it still fails to recognize what SIGA’s statute allows. SIGA’s statute specifically directs it to stand in the shoes of the self-insurer as if that self-insurer had never defaulted. MIGA conceded that B.C. Rogers may have an unpaid claim, but claimed that, since SIGA is making a claim for itself, MIGA is not obligated to pay. This logic is faulty and allows MIGA to escape the liability it would have had to pay B.C. Rogers. If B.C. Rogers had not become insolvent and SIGA was out of the picture, MIGA would have had to pay B.C. Rogers on the Reliance claim. Accordingly, MIGA should have to pay SIGA, and the decision of the trial court should be affirmed.

KITCHENS, J., JOINS THIS OPINION.

      . Miss.Code Ann. § 83-23-103 (Rev.2011).

      . Miss.Code Ann. § 71-3-153 (Rev.2011).

      . Miss. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

      . Crist v. Loyacono, 65 So.3d 837, 842 (Miss.2011).

      . Id.

      . Delta Reg’l Med. Ctr. v. Green, 43 So.3d 1099, 1100 (Miss.2010).

      . Miss.Code Ann. § 83-23-103 (Rev.2011).

      . Miss.Code Ann. § 83-23-107 (Rev.2011). The dissent incorrectly attributes the statute’s phrase "liberally construe” to this majority.

      . Miss.Code Ann. § 83-23-115(1)(a) (Rev. 2011) (emphasis added).

      . Id. (emphasis added).

      . Miss.Code Ann. § 83-23-109(f) (Rev.2011) (emphasis added).

      . Miss. Code Ann. § 83-23-109(c) (Rev. 2011).

      . Miss.Code Ann. § 71 — 3—163(1 )(b) (Rev.2011) (emphasis added).

        .Miss. Ins. Guar. Ass’n v. Blakeney, 54 So.3d 203, 206 (Miss.2011).

      . Miss.Code Ann. § 83-23-103 (Rev.2011).

      . Miss.Code Ann. § 71-3-169(2) (Rev.2011) (emphasis added).

      . Miss. Ins. Guar. Ass’n v. MS Casualty Ins. Co., 947 So.2d 865, 871 (Miss.2006).

      . Id.

      . Regardless, SIGA's definition, even if its statute provided one, is irrelevant to this case, as it is "claimant” under MIGA’s statute that bears directly upon this case.

      . Miss.Code Ann. § 71-3-157(e) (Rev.2011).

      . Miss.Code Ann. § 83-23-109(c) (Rev.2011).

      . Miss.Code Ann. § 83-23-109(f) (Rev.2011).

      . Miss.Code Ann. § 71-3-163(1 )(b) (Rev.2011).

      . Maj. Op. ¶ 11; see also Miss.Code Ann. § 83-12-103 (Rev.2011).

      . Miss.Code Ann. § 83-23-107 (Rev.2011).

      . Maj. Op. ¶ 13.

      . Miss.Code Ann. § 71-3-163(1)(b) (Rev.2011) (emphasis added).

      . Miss.Code Ann. § 71-3-155 (Rev.2011).

      . Maj. Op. ¶ 16.

      . Maj. Op. ¶ 16.

      . Maj. Op. ¶ 16.

      . See Miss.Code Ann. § 71-3-163(1)(b).

      . Id.

      . Maj. Op. ¶ 14; but see Miss. Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. Blakeney, 54 So.3d 203, 206 (Miss.2011) (finding that insolvent insurer's shoes did not fit because the insolvent insurer's duties and obligations passed to MIGA under one subsection of the statute but were limited under another subsection that stated that MIGA may pay covered claims only to the extent of the association's obligation).

      . Maj. Op. ¶ 16.

      . Miss.Code Ann. § 83-23-109(c) (Rev.2011).

      . See Miss.Code Ann. § 71-3-163(1 )(b) (Rev.2011).

      . See Miss.Code Ann. § 83-23-115(1)(a)(iii) (Rev.2011).

      . See Wyoming Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Ins. Guar. Assn, 225 P.3d 1061, 1067-68 (Wyo.2010).

      . See T & N PLC v. Pennsylvania Ins. Guar. Ass’n, 800 F.Supp. 1259, 1263 (E.D.Pa.1992); Nebraska Life & Health Ins. Guar. Ass’n v. Dobias, 247 Neb. 900, 531 N.W.2d 217, 220 (1995); Saylin v. Cal. Ins. Guar. Ass’n, 179 Cal.App.3d 256, 224 Cal.Rptr. 493, 497 (1986); Virginia Property & Casualty Ins. Guar. Ass’n v. International Ins. Co., 238 Va. 702, 385 S.E.2d 614, 616 (1989); Wyoming Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Ins. Guar. Ass’n, 225 P.3d 1061, 1067-68 (Wyo.2010).

      . See Miss.Code Ann. § 71-3-163(1 )(b) (Rev.2011).

      . Gen. Reinsurance Corp. v. Am. Bankers Ins. Co. of Fla., 996 A.2d 26 (2009).

      . Id.

      . Id. at 28.

      . Id. at 36.

      . See Miss.Code Ann. § 83-23-115(1 )(a) (Rev.2011).

      . Maj. Op. ¶ 19.

      . See Miss.Code Ann. § 83-23-115(1)(a) (Rev.2011).


author: CARLSON, Presiding Justice,

text:
    Carolyn EPPERSON v. SOUTHBANK.
    No. 2010-CT-00056-SCT.
    Supreme Court of Mississippi.
    May 24, 2012.
    Rehearing Denied Aug. 9, 2012.

      B. Sean Akins, Ripley, attorney for appellant.
    Luther T. Munford, Jackson, William M. Beasley, Sr., William M. Beasley, Jr., Tu-pelo, attorneys for appellee.
   ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI

CARLSON, Presiding Justice,

for the Court:

¶ 1. Carolyn Epperson filed a complaint against SOUTHBank in the Circuit Court of Alcorn County alleging that the bank had breached its contract with her by failing to give her the funds from certain certificates of deposit upon her request. The bank had denied Epperson’s request because she did not present the original certificates. The trial court granted summary judgment for SOUTHBank, finding that contractual language required presentation of the original certificates for withdrawal. Epperson appealed the trial court’s judgment, and we assigned the case to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s judgment and rendered judgment in favor of Epperson. SOUTHBank filed a petition for writ of certiorari, which we granted.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

¶ 2. This case involves the withdrawal of funds from certain certificates of deposit (CDs) funded by C.K. and Juanita Rick-man for their children, Carolyn Epperson and Randy Thompson. Epperson was C.K.’s daughter from a previous marriage, and Thompson was Juanita’s son from a previous marriage. C.K. and Juanita married and raised Epperson and Thompson as siblings. Epperson referred to Juanita as her mother.

¶ 3. The CDs at issue were opened in 1993 at SOUTHBank in Corinth. The CDs were purchased in the following amounts and held in the following names:

Account No. 9019789 — Issued March 11, 1993, in the name of “C.K. Rickman or Juanita Rickman Trustee for Carolyn Rickman Epperson” with an opening balance of $59,716.02.
Account No. 9019797 — Issued March 11, 1993, in the name of “C.K. Rickman or Juanita Rickman Trustee for Randy Thompson” with an opening balance of $59,716.02.
Account No. 9019810 — Issued March 15, 1993, in the name of “C.K. Rickman or Juanita Rickman Trustees for Carolyn Epperson and Randy Thompson” with an opening balance of $30,748.07.
Account No. 9021984 — Issued in the name of “C.K. Rickman or Juanita Rick-man POD to Carolyn Epperson and Randy Thompson” with an opening balance of $12,356.35. (The issue date cannot be determined from the record.)

¶ 4. Each CD was signed by C.K. Rick-man and Juanita Rickman only. The documents signed by the Rickmans had the following heading on the front: “THIS SIGNATURE CARD GOES WITH YOUR TIME CERTIFICATE OF DEPOSIT NO_YOU MAY REFER TO YOUR CERTIFICATE FOR OTHER DETAILS.” A provision on the back of the signature card required the CD to be endorsed and presented to the bank to make a withdrawal prior to maturity.

¶ 5. C.K. died in December 1999. In January 2000, the beneficiaries of the CDs retitled the first three CDs in the name of “Juanita Rickman or Carolyn Epperson or Randy Thompson.” The fourth CD was retitled “Juanita Rickman POD to Carolyn Epperson and Randy Thompson.” According to Epperson, Juanita called in January 2000 and asked Epperson to come to her house and sign a signature card. Juanita told Epperson this was being done to put Epperson’s name on the CDs. Epper-son had not seen the CDs, so she did not know whose names were on them at that time. Epperson claims that they did not discuss how the CDs would be arranged or how much money was involved, but that Juanita simply gave her a blank index card to sign. Thompson was there also; Thompson and Juanita had already signed the card. Apparently, Juanita, Epperson, and Thompson actually signed a Consumer Account Agreement pertaining to each CD.

¶ 6. By that time, SOUTHBank was using a different form for its signature card. The document was titled “Consumer Account Agreement,” and there was a space on the form to designate the type of account, be it a savings, checking, money market, or time deposit account. SOUTH-Bank used the same document for all accounts. There was no longer a separate form for CDs, as there had been when the accounts were opened in 1993. The language on the back of the new signature card no longer referred to the requirement of presenting the CD for early withdrawal. The relevant language pertaining to withdrawal was as follows:

WITHDRAWALS — Unless otherwise clearly indicated on page 1, any one of you who signs this form including authorized signers, may withdraw or transfer all or any part of the account balance at any time on forms approved by us.... We reserve the right to refuse any withdrawal or transfer request which is attempted by any method not specifically permitted... .Withdrawals from a time deposit prior to maturity or prior to the expiration of any notice period may be restricted and may be subject to penalty....

¶ 7. At some point after C.K.’s death, a family dispute arose among Epperson and her mother and stepbrother. In 2004 or 2005, Thompson sold Juanita’s house. Juanita went to live with Thompson and his wife, Doris. At that time, Epperson was called to get some of her father’s personal items out of Juanita’s house. Among the items was a garbage bag containing personal papers that had been shredded. Epperson went through the bag and found interest statements that had been sent to “C.K. Rickman and Juanita Rickman, trustees for Carolyn Rick-man Epperson.” She literally pieced together the statements and discovered how the CDs had been held.

¶ 8. On February 15, 2005, Epperson went to SOUTHBank and asked for copies of the CDs. She spoke with Margie Franks, Senior Vice President of the Savings Department, who gave her a printout of the CDs that were in Epperson’s name and the amount of each. Franks noted on the printout that one CD would mature in September 2005 and the remaining three CDs would mature in January 2007. Ep-person returned to the bank on October 21, 2005, and spoke with Franks again. Franks gave her another printout listing the CDs, but one CD showed a balance of $0. Franks told Epperson that the CD had been withdrawn on March 8, 2005. Epperson then asked if she could “get [her] part of the money.” Franks told Epperson that she could withdraw the money only if she presented the CDs. Franks testified in her deposition that the bank required a party to present the original CD in order to withdraw funds. Franks said she did not know if that policy was in writing, but it had been the bank’s requirement for the forty-six years she had worked at SOUTHBank.

¶ 9. On February 17, 2006, Juanita, Randy, and Doris went to SOUTHBank, closed the three remaining CDs (prior to the maturity date), and consolidated them into one new CD. Franks testified that Juanita signed a withdrawal slip and presented the original CDs, as required, to cash in the three CDs. The amount of the new CD was $234,164.05, and it was in the name of “Juanita Rickman or Randy Thompson or Doris Thompson.” Epperson called Franks sometime later and was told that her name had been removed from all of the CDs.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 10. On October 16, 2008, Epperson filed a complaint against SOUTHBank in the Circuit Court of Alcorn County. Ep-person alleged that SOUTHBank had breached its contract with her by failing to give her the funds from the CDs when she asked for them on October 21, 2005. She alleged the bank had a duty to provide her access to the funds and that the bank had breached its duty, resulting in her total loss of the funds. She sought the full amount of the consolidated CD ($234,-164.05) plus interest, punitive damages, and attorney’s fees.

¶ 11. SOUTHBank filed a motion for summary judgment and argued that the “Account Agreements executed in connection with the Certificates of Deposit require that the Certificates themselves be presented to bank representatives before the monies can be withdrawn.” Therefore, according to SOUTHBank, because Epper-son admittedly never was in possession of the CDs, she did not have authority to withdraw the funds, and her claims were without merit.

¶ 12. Epperson responded and filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. Ep-person claimed that SOUTHBank was referencing the 1993 CDs, which included language requiring the CDs to be presented, but that the agreement signed by Ep-person in 2000 did not include that language. After a hearing on the motions, the trial court granted SOUTHBank’s motion for summary judgment and denied Epperson’s cross-motion for summary judgment, finding that, based on the language in the agreement, Epperson was required to present the original certificates for withdrawal. The trial court focused on the “forms approved by us” language in the agreement and held that the agreement required the “presentation” of forms approved by the bank, which it interpreted to be the original CDs.

¶ 13. Epperson appealed the trial court’s decision. The Court of Appeals reversed and rendered, finding that the agreement did not require presentation of the original CDs. The Court of Appeals awarded Epperson the value of the CDs on October 21, 2005, the date she tried to withdraw the funds, plus interest accrued since that date. Epperson v. SOUTHBank, 93 So.3d 26 (Miss.Ct.App.2011), reh’g denied (Nov. 1, 2011). SOUTHBank filed a petition for writ of certiorari, and the Mississippi Bankers Association filed an amicus brief in support of SOUTHBank. This Court granted the petition. Epperson v. SOUTHBank, 80 So.3d 111 (Table) (Miss.2012).

DISCUSSION

¶ 14. In its petition for writ of certiora-ri, SOUTHBank contends that it reserved its right to restrict early withdrawal of a CD through the “may be restricted” language in the agreement, and that SOUTHBank’s restriction was to require presentation of the original CD. The issue presented by SOUTHBank is whether language in a bank customer agreement, which says early withdrawal “may be restricted,” can be enforced only if the restrictions in question are more specifically stated. SOUTHBank asserts that interpretation of the “may be restricted” language is an important issue in banking and finance. We now consider whether the Court of Appeals erred by reversing the trial court’s grant of summary judgment and awarding Epperson the full amount of the certificates. This Court applies a de novo standard of review to a circuit court’s grant or denial of summary judgment. Kilhullen v. Kan. City S. Ry., 8 So.3d 168, 174 (Miss.2009).

A. Certificate of Deposit

¶ 15. A certificate of deposit is “an instrument containing an acknowledgment by a bank that a sum of money has been received by the bank and a promise by the bank to repay the sum of money.” Miss.Code Ann. 75-3-104(j) (Rev. 2002). It is generally accepted that a CD is “a note of the bank, payable only according to its terms.” Washington County Mercantile Bank v. Kennedy, 855 S.W.2d 520, 522 (Mo.Ct.App.1993); Holloway v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., N.A., 333 N.C. 94, 423 S.E.2d 752, 757 (1992). The terms and provisions of the CD create a contract, which “determines the manner in which the funds of the depositor may be withdrawn and is subject to the law of contracts.” Gary v. FDIC, 981 F.2d 1256, *2 (5th Cir.1992) (quoting Ames v. Great Southern Bank, 672 S.W.2d 447, 449 (Tex.1984) (citations omitted)). See also Washington County Mercantile Bank, 855 S.W.2d at 522. Thus, CDs are governed by contract law rather than by Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code. Miss.Code Ann. §§ 75-3-102(a), 75-3-104(d) (Rev.2002). See Estate of Isaacson v. Isaacson, 508 So.2d 1131, 1134 (Miss.1987); DeJean v. DeJean, 982 So.2d 443, 447 n. 1 (Miss.Ct.App.2007).

B. Contract Interpretation

¶ 16. A de novo standard of review is applied to questions of contract construction. A & F Properties, LLC v. Madison County Bd. of Supervisors, 933 So.2d 296, 301 (Miss.2006). This Court’s standard regarding review and interpretation of contracts is well-established. Judicial review and interpretation of a contract involves a three-step analysis. Royer Homes of Miss., Inc. v. Chandeleur Homes, Inc., 857 So.2d 748, 752 (Miss.2003).

¶ 17. First, we must determine whether the contract is ambiguous, and if it is not, then it must be enforced as written. Id. In making that determination, the Court must review the express wording of the contract as a whole. Cherokee Ins. Co. v. Babin, 37 So.3d 45, 48 (Miss.2010). If the contract is unambiguous, “the intention of the contracting parties should be gleaned solely from the wording of the contract” and parole evidence should not be considered. Turner v. Terry, 799 So.2d 25, 32 (Miss.2001) (citing Heritage Cablevision v. New Albany Elec. Power Sys., 646 So.2d 1305, 1312 (Miss.1994)). This Court must “accept the plain meaning of a contract as the intent of the parties where no ambiguity exists.” A & F Properties, 933 So.2d at 301 (quoting Ferrara v. Walters, 919 So.2d 876, 882 (Miss.2005)). “ ‘An instrument that is clear, definite, explicit, harmonious in all its provisions, and is free from ambiguity’ will be enforced.” Zumwalt v. Jones County Bd. of Supervisors, 19 So.3d 672, 685 (Miss.2009) (quoting Pursue Energy Corp. v. Perkins, 558 So.2d 349, 352 (Miss.1990)).

¶ 18. “The mere fact that the parties disagree about the meaning of a provision of a contract does not make the contract ambiguous as a matter of law.” Delta Pride Catfish, Inc. v. Home Ins. Co., 697 So.2d 400, 404 (Miss.1997) (quoting Cherry v. Anthony, Gibbs, Sage, 501 So.2d 416, 419 (Miss.1987)). “Where the contract is unambiguous, the ‘parties are bound by the language of the instrument.’ ” Id. Courts should not alter the terms of a valid contract. “The right of persons to contract is fundamental to our jurisprudence and absent mutual mistake, fraud[,] and/or illegality, the courts do not have the authority to modify, add to, or subtract from the terms of a contract validly executed between two parties.” Wallace v. United, Miss. Bank, 726 So.2d 578, 584 (Miss.1998) (quoting First Nat'l Bank of Vicksburg v. Caruthers, 443 So.2d 861, 864 (Miss.1983)). “With limited exceptions, persons enjoy the freedom to contract. When they do, they are bound by the terms of their contracts.” Titan Indem. Co. v. Hood, 895 So.2d 138,147 (Miss.2004). See also Miss. Hill & Delta Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Valley Bank, 392 So.2d 1126, 1129 (Miss.1981) (“... courts will not limit freedom to contract except under certain situations such as the provision being against public policy, made under fraud or duress, and other considerations such as ... unreasonableness of the contract provision.”).

¶ 19. Second, if the Court is unable to ascertain the meaning of the contract and the intent of the parties within the “four corners” of the contract, we will apply the “canons of contract construction.” Cherokee Ins., 37 So.3d at 48. “Where the language of an otherwise enforceable contract is subject to more than one fair reading, the reading applied will be the one most favorable to the non-drafting party.” Royer Homes, 857 So.2d at 753. Third, if the meaning of the contract is still ambiguous, only then is extrinsic evidence considered. Id. “It is only when the review of a contract reaches this point that prior negotiation, agreements^] and conversations might be considered in determining the parties’ intentions in the construction of the contract.” Id. The par-ol evidence rule “provides that where a document is incomplete parol evidence is admissible to explain the terms but, in no event, to contradict them.” Busching v. Griffin, 542 So.2d 860, 865 (Miss.1989).

¶ 20. In a summary judgment case, the reviewing Court need not go through the entire three-step analysis; the Court should determine only whether the contract is ambiguous. Questions of contract construction and ambiguity are “questions of law that are committed to the court rather than questions of fact committed to the fact finder.” Royer Homes, 857 So.2d at 752-53 (internal citations omitted). If the reviewing Court finds the terms of the contract to be ambiguous or subject to more than one interpretation, the case must be submitted to the trier of fact, and summary judgment is not appropriate. Id. See also Pursue Energy, 558 So.2d at 354.

¶ 21. The trial court held that the contract at issue was unambiguous and found that it required presentation of the original CDs. If the trial court was correct that the contract was unambiguous, then summary judgment was appropriate. Only in the event that this Court determines that the contract is unambiguous can the judgment of the trial court be affirmed. If the contract is ambiguous, interpretation of the contract is an issue for the trier of fact.

¶ 22. Although not specifically stated in its opinion, the Court of Appeals clearly found the contract to be ambiguous because it applied the canons of contract construction and used parol evidence to interpret the contract. The Court of Appeals held that the phrase “on forms approved by us” did not “indicate on its face that the original CDs must be presented or signed.” Epperson, 93 So.3d at 31. The Court of Appeals then applied the canons of construction by construing the ambiguity against the drafter. Id. The Court of Appeals also considered the difference in the 1993 agreement as well as testimony by Franks, which is parol evidence. Id. Thus, we first recognize that the Court of Appeals erroneously reversed and rendered the trial court’s decision. If the Court of Appeals found the contract to be ambiguous, the matter should have been remanded to the trial court. Contractual ambiguities are questions to be determined by the trier of fact. Royer Homes, 857 So.2d at 753; Pursue Energy, 558 So.2d at 354.

C. SOUTHBank Agreement

¶ 23. Throughout the summary judgment proceedings, the parties and the trial court focused on the “forms approved by us” language in the agreement. The “may be restricted” language was discussed, but it was not the focus of the arguments or the trial court’s decision. In its brief to the Court of Appeals, SOUTHBank emphasized the “may be restricted” language, but the Court of Appeals continued to focus on the “forms approved by us” language. In its amicus brief, the Mississippi Bankers Association focuses on “[w]e reserve the right to refuse any withdrawal ... which is attempted by any method not specifically permitted.” This case does not turn on any one of these phrases in the contract; the entire contract must be interpreted as a whole. “Particular words should not control; rather, the entire instrument should be examined.” Pursue Energy, 558 So.2d at 352 (internal citations omitted). This Court now reviews the entire contract, without applying the canons of construction or considering parol evidence, to determine whether the contract is ambiguous.

¶ 24. The Court of Appeals held that “[a]bsent specific language requiring that the original CDs be presented for withdrawal, we must find in favor of Epperson.” Epperson, 93 So.3d at 31. However, the Court of Appeals cited no authority in support of the position that such a requirement must be specifically stated or that a general statement that restrictions may be imposed is insufficient. “There is little statutory authority or case law on what a certificate of deposit must contain.” In re Estate of Temple, 780 So.2d 639, 641 (Miss.2001). The relevant provisions in the SOUTHBank agreement are broad and general “boilerplate” contract language. While specific provisions control over general provisions, where there is no specific provision, boilerplate language certainly is enforceable. Titan Indem., 895 So.2d at 147.

¶ 25. SOUTHBank argues that the bank had a right to impose restrictions on early withdrawal of funds based on the language in the agreement. Both SOUTHBank and the Mississippi Bankers Association argue that this decision will have far-reaching implications, because the form used by SOUTHBank was a standard form, which contains general language that is commonly used in banking agreements. SOUTHBank argues that “[t]he need for flexibility is shown by the decisions of courts around the country who have recognized both the usefulness and importance of similar general language restricting withdrawal of time deposits.” SOUTHBank relies primarily on three cases: Karu v. Feldman, 119 N.J. 135, 574 A.2d 420 (1990), Washington County Mercantile Bank v. Kennedy, 855 S.W.2d 520 (Mo.Ct.App.1993), and Ayala v. Jamaica Savings Bank, 121 Misc.2d 564, 468 N.Y.S.2d 306 (N.Y. Sup.Ct., Queens County 1983). Ep-person did not discuss these cases in her response, except to say that they are based on old law and do not apply to this case. Epperson did not cite any cases or other authority in support of her position on this point. While the cases cited by SOUTHBank do indicate some degree of flexibility in a bank’s drafting of contracts, the cases are not exactly on point. Regardless, this Court must determine only whether the terms of the agreement are ambiguous.

¶ 26. A contract is ambiguous if it is “susceptible] to two reasonable interpretations.” Dalton v. Cellular South, Inc., 20 So.3d 1227, 1232 (Miss.2009) (internal citations omitted).

An “ambiguous” word or phrase is one capable of more than one meaning when viewed objectively by a reasonably intelligent person who has examined the context of the entire integrated agreement and who is cognizant of the customs, practices, usages[,] and terminology as generally understood in the particular trade or business.

Id. (quoting Walk-In Med. Ctrs., Inc. v. Breuer Capital Corp., 818 F.2d 260, 263 (2d Cir.1987) (quoting Eskimo Pie Corp. v. Whitelawn Dairies, Inc., 284 F.Supp. 987, 994 (S.D.N.Y.1968))). We find that the language in SOUTHBank’s Consumer Account Agreement is not susceptible to more than one interpretation and, therefore, is not ambiguous.

¶ 27. The agreement clearly states that early withdrawals “may be restricted and may be subject to penalty.” As a restriction on early withdrawal, SOUTHBank requires the original CDs to be presented, and the bank is within its rights to do so under the terms of the agreement. The agreement also provides that SOUTHBank reserves “the right to refuse any withdrawal or transfer request which is attempted by any method not specifically permitted.” The method permitted by SOUTHBank for withdrawal of funds from a CD is presentation of the original certificates. If the consumer does not comply with that method for withdrawal, SOUTH-Bank can refuse the request, as it did when Epperson tried to withdraw the funds without presenting the original certificates.

¶ 28. Epperson claims that such a restriction must be in writing because the agreement provides, “These terms govern the operation of this account unless varied or supplemented in writing.” This claim is without merit. The terms of the agreement already provide that early withdrawal of time deposits “may be restricted.” Thus, the customer is already on notice that restrictions may be imposed on early withdrawals. Epperson did not cite any authority in support of this argument, and this Court finds no requirement that such restrictions must be specifically stated.

¶ 29. Although the language in the agreement does not explicitly require the presentation of the original CDs, as the trial court concluded, the agreement does allow the bank to require certain forms to be used, to implement restrictions and impose penalties on early withdrawals, and to refuse a request for withdrawal if the consumer does not comply with the method permitted for withdrawal. These contractual provisions do not contradict one another or lead to inconsistent results.

¶ 30. Without question, the record reveals that Epperson’s relationship with Juanita, Randy, and Doris was contentious. But any liability that may be imposed on Juanita, Randy, and Doris based on their conduct concerning the handling of the subject CDs is not an issue before us today. We can only address Epperson’s breach of contract claims asserted against SOUTHBank, which we have now done.

CONCLUSION

¶ 31. Based on our discussion today, we find that the contractual language pertaining to withdrawals gave SOUTHBank discretion to require certain forms to be used for withdrawal, to refuse or restrict early withdrawals, and to assess penalties for early withdrawal. These terms are consistent and allow SOUTHBank to require presentation of the original CD or CDs for withdrawal. The contract is unambiguous, and the trial court’s grant of summary judgment was appropriate.

¶ 82. THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IS REVERSED AND THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ALCORN COUNTY IS REINSTATED AND AFFIRMED.

WALLER, C.J., DICKINSON, P.J., RANDOLPH, LAMAR, KITCHENS, CHANDLER, PIERCE AND KING, JJ., CONCUR.

      . "POD” means payable on death.

      . Although Epperson claimed she signed only a blank index card, she did admit that the signature on the Consumer Account Agreement was hers, but she did not know how it got there. However, that was not an issue in this case.

      . The CD with a $0 balance was the CD that had been retitled "Juanita Rickman POD to Carolyn Epperson and Randy Thompson,” which would have matured in September 2005.

      . Epperson did not allege wrongdoing on the part of Juanita, Randy, and Doris for closing the three remaining CDs and consolidating them into one CD in only their names. Nor did Epperson assert wrongdoing by SOUTH-Bank for allowing that to be done.


author: RANDOLPH, Justice, for the Court:

text:
    TOWN CREEK MASTER WATER MANAGEMENT DISTRICT OF LEE, PONTOTOC, PRENTISS, and UNION COUNTIES, Mississippi v. Denton WEBB, Ruby Webb, Rachael Webb and Dan W. Webb.
    Nos. 2010-CA-01104-SCT, 2003-CA-02270-SCT.
    Supreme Court of Mississippi.
    July 26, 2012.

      David R. Sparks, Tupelo, Thomas Henry Freeland, IV, Joyce Freeland, attorneys for appellant.
    Paul Nathan Jenkins, Jr., Tupelo, attorney for appellees.
    Before DICKINSON, P.J., RANDOLPH and PIERCE, JJ.
   RANDOLPH, Justice, for the Court:

¶ 1. Town Creek Water Management District of Lee, Pontotoc, Prentiss, and Union Counties (“Town Creek”) appeals a decision of the Lee County Chancery Court awarding compensatory and punitive damages, attorney fees, and prejudgment interest to the Webbs for Town Creek’s wrongful taking of the Webbs’ property. The case was before the trial court on remand from this Court’s reversal of an earlier grant of summary judgment for Town Creek, with this Court’s instruction to conduct a trial on all issues. See Webb v. Town Creek Master Water Mgmt. Dist. of Lee, Pontotoc, Prentiss and Union Counties, 903 So.2d 701, 703-04 (Miss.2005) (“Town Creek I ”). We find that the trial court erred by limiting the trial to damages alone, rather than holding a trial on all issues. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand to the Lee County Chancery Court for a trial on all issues.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 2. In the earlier appeal, this Court explained the underlying facts as follows:

The Webbs own three tracts of land, A, B, and C in Saltillo, Lee County, Mississippi:
Tract A is owned by Dan and Rachael Webb as joint tenants with rights of survivorship. It contains approximately 28.92 acres and is the residence of Dan and Rachael.
Tract B consists of 42.84 acres and lies east of Tract A. When cause No. 46077 was filed, Tract B was owned by Dan and Rachael Webb subject to a life estate in Denton and Ruby Webb, whose residence was on Tract B. Denton is now deceased.
Tract C consists of 40 acres and lies east of Tract B. This tract was also owned by Dan and Rachael, with Denton and Ruby holding a life estate in the property.
... On October 1, 1992, Town Creek, in conjunction with the Soil Conservation Service, “SCS,” appraised a tract of land located in Saltillo, Lee County, Mississippi, in preparation of obtaining a permanent easement for the construction of Dam No. 48. This appraisal shows the description of Tract A. The appraisal gave the land a before “take” value of $5,173.00 and an after “take” value of $2,618.00, with the difference being $2,555.
... On August 17, 1993, Town Creek filed its petition for approval of the October 1, 1992, appraisal, naming only Dan and Rachael as defendants. The petition described Tract B and did not correlate with the property described in Town Creek’s appraisal, which described Tract A. To date there has not been a hearing on the petition to approve the appraisal. Also, on August 17, 1993, Town Creek obtained an interlocutory decree allowing the taking of the property-
.... After the petition and decree were granted, but before construction on the dam began, Denton and Ruby planted pine trees on the property that was subject to the easement. The Webbs’ complaint against Town Creek was filed on September 22,1995.

Town Creek I, 903 So.2d at 704-05. We set forth the procedural history up to the time of our decision in the prior appeal, as follows:

... This appeal arises from two consolidated cases in the Chancery Court of Lee County, an easement condemnation action by a water district and the landowners’ action against the district for damages and other relief.
Cause No. 46077 filed on August 17, 1993
... This controversy originated in the Chancery Court of Lee County, wherein Town Creek Master Water Management District (Town Creek) filed a petition for approval of appraisement of damages of easement, naming as respondents Dan Webb and his wife Rachael Webb. This petition sought to acquire a permanent easement on which to construct a water retarding structure (Dam No. 48). Dan and Rachael owned a remainder interest in the property, with Denton Webb and Ruby Webb owning a life estate in the property on which the proposed dam was to be located. Denton and Ruby were not made parties to the petition. ... On the same day that Town Creek filed its petition, August 17, 1993, the chancery court entered an interlocutory decree allowing the taking of the property and directing that a hearing for the approval of the appraisal be set down on a date to be set by the Chancellor. The Webbs were neither served with the petition nor the interlocutory decree. Now it is eleven and a half years later, and there has been no hearing for the approval of the appraisal.
... On August 27,1993, Dan and Rachael moved to set aside the interlocutory decree contesting personal jurisdiction because no summons was issued for either of them (nor have they ever been served) and asserting that Town Creek lacked authority for a quick take and that they were deprived of their procedural due process rights guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. There was never a hearing on this motion.
Cause No. 95-1100 filed on September 22,1995
... On September 22, 1995, after construction of the dam had begun, Dan and Rachael (the named respondents in Town Creek’s petition), and Denton and Ruby Webb, filed a complaint in the Chancery Court of Lee County against Town Creek seeking damages for the destruction of their property. The complaint was amended on October 17,1995, and on August 20 and 23, 1996. In the amended complaints the Webbs repeated their prior allegations, and in addition, the Webbs sued the commissioners of Town Creek in their official capacities and alleged that the dam had been completed. The Webbs sued for actual, consequential, punitive damages, attorney’s fees, and for cancellation of the easement and destruction of the dam. Town Creek answered the original and amended complaints admitting the taking and stating that the only relief to which the Webbs were entitled was just compensation for the property taken.
... Ultimately, the matter was set for trial on September 14, 1998, but Town Creek moved for a continuance after having filed a notification of a relevant pending case on August 6, 1998. Further proceedings were delayed because Branaman v. Long Beach Water Management District, 730 So.2d 1146 (Miss.1999), was pending in this Court.
Consolidation of Cause No. 46077 and Cause No. 95-1100
... On October 13, 2000 (almost seven years after the original petition), Town Creek moved to add additional defendants (the Estate of Denton Webb and his widow Ruby Webb) in Cause No. 46077, and moved for the consolidation of the two causes. The chancellor granted the motion to consolidate.
... Cross-motions for summary judgment were filed and the court granted Town Creek’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the Webbs’ claims on September 29, 2003, and certified that judgment as final under M.R.C.P. 54(b). This appeal followed.

Town Creek I, 903 So.2d at 703-04.

¶ 3. On appeal from the trial court’s grant of summary judgment, this Court held that: (1) “[t]he trial court erred in holding that no notice [of the taking of their land] was required to the Webbs[;]” and (2) “the Webbs’ due process rights were violated by the taking of their property without notice and without a pre-deprivation hearing.” Id. at 707, 709. We found that “the Webbs [we]re entitled to pursue their claims, subject to the requisite applicability, proof and damages, as to be determined by the trial court on remand.” Id. at 709. We further held that “[t]he amount of compensation to be awarded the Webbs is a matter that has yet to be tried in the trial court and as such, the issue should be decided on remand.” Id. We remanded the case “for a trial on all issues. ...” Id. at 710 (emphasis added).

¶ 4. Trial began on October 20, 2008. At the beginning of the proceedings, the trial judge stated that:

there has been no taking of the property at this particular time. That being the case, the appropriate matter for this Court to hear would be a value of the property as of the present time. Further, the Court finds that upon remand, the Court is to consider the violation of the constitutional rights of the ... Webbs. And, accordingly, we would move at this time to a hearing on the issue of damages only under 42 U.S.C. 1983.

¶ 5. On July 29, 2009, the trial court entered a final judgment awarding the Webbs compensatory and punitive damages, attorney fees, and prejudgment interest.

¶ 6. Town Creek filed a motion for a new trial or reconsideration on July 30, 2009, and an amended version of the motion on August 10, 2009. The trial court found the motions without merit, except to allow a hearing on punitive damages, which the trial court held on April 9, 2010. On June 2, 2010, the trial court entered an “Opinion as to Punitive Damages” awarding the Webbs $127,500. The order provided that the trial court was “cognizant of the authority to award statutory damages for the removal or destruction of [trees] pursuant to Section 95-5-10 of the Mississippi Code. That notwithstanding, the Court [found] that the award here for punitive damages [was] sufficient and no further penalty should be imposed.” Town Creek timely filed this appeal, and the Webbs cross-appealed.

ISSUES

¶ 7. The following issues were presented to this Court for consideration:

1. Whether Town Creek preserved its claims of error on appeal.
2. Whether the trial court committed reversible error by holding a hearing on the issue of damages only, after this Court remanded for a trial on all issues.
3. Whether the trial court committed reversible error by awarding attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. Sections 1983 and 1988 without addressing all necessary elements for a Section 1983 claim.
4. Whether the trial court committed reversible error by awarding punitive damages.
5. Whether the trial court committed reversible error by awarding prejudgment interest.
6. Whether the trial court committed reversible error by improperly calculating due compensation.
7. Whether the trial -court committed reversible error by failing to award the Webbs compensatory damages for Town Creek’s destruction of pine trees on their property.

¶ 8. Finding the second issue dispositive, we decline to address the remaining issues.

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of review

¶ 9. As we provided in the prior appeal in this case, the standard of review of a trial court’s grant of summary judgment is de novo. See Town Creek I, 903 So.2d at 705. Regardless of whether we view the chancellor’s finding that the Webbs were entitled to damages because their due-process rights were violated as the equivalent of a summary judgment regarding Town Creek’s liability or as a directed verdict as to liability, our standard of review is the same: de novo. See Miss. State Fed’n of Colored Women’s Club Housing for Elderly in Clinton, Inc. v. L.R., 62 So.3d 351, 359 (Miss.2010) (citation omitted) (“[t]he standard of review for a directed verdict ... is de novo.”).

II. The trial court erred by limiting the trial to the issue of damages alone.

¶ 10. The trial court erred by limiting its consideration to the issue of damages after this Court had remanded the case “for a trial on all issues.” Town Creek I, 903 So.2d at 710. We have provided that:

The mandate issued by an appellate court is binding on the trial court on remand.... [T]he trial court has been found to be in error where, on remand, it has refused to follow this Court’s opinion and directions.

Dunn v. Dunn, 695 So.2d 1152,1155 (Miss.1997) (citations omitted). In the prior appeal, we found that the trial court had erred in granting summary judgment, because the Webbs’ due-process rights were violated by Town Creek’s failure to provide notice before exercising dominion and control over their property. Town Creek I, 903 So.2d at 709. We further found that “the Webbs [we]re entitled to pursue their claims, subject to the requisite applicability, proof and damages, as to be determined by the trial court on remand.” Town Creek I, 903 So.2d at 709. Thus, we clearly directed the trial court to hold a “trial on all issues” on remand. Id. at 710.

¶ 11. The trial court, however, did not hold a trial on all issues on remand. At the beginning of the trial on remand, the chancellor declared that he would consider the issue of damages only. Addressing “all issues” on remand requires more than merely measuring damages-it requires addressing all claims properly pleaded, and whether the Webbs sufficiently proved all elements necessary to prevail on the claims as framed in their Third Amended Complaint. Those claims included conversion, trespass, and continuing permanent trespass. All are recognizable under the common law as intentional interference with property. See W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on Torts 67-106 (5th ed.1971). Of course, Town Creek could offer all available defenses to intentional interference with property that it properly pleaded. The Webbs made an additional state-law claim under Mississippi Code Section 95-5-10 for Town Creek’s destruction of pine seedlings on the property. Finally, the Webbs pleaded deprivation of due process under the United States and Mississippi Constitutions. Thus, they made state-law claims of abuse of process and a mixed federal constitutional and statutory claim, i.e. a Section 1983 claim. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983.

¶ 12. Our decision in the prior appeal recognized: (1) that the Webbs possessed constitutional rights to due process under both the federal and state Constitutions and our laws and (2) that there was a deprivation of their due-process rights “by the taking of their property without notice and without a pre-deprivation hearing.” Town Creek I, 903 So.2d at 706, 709. We provided that “the Webbs are entitled to pursue their claims, subject to the requisite applicability, proof and damages, as to be determined by the trial court on remand.” Id. Our decision did not establish that the Webbs had proven a right to recover under any of their claims, Section 1983 or otherwise, but that they were entitled to an opportunity to prove the elements of one or all of their claims and resulting damages on remand. Our disposition — remanding for a trial on all issues — was an instruction to the trial court to consider their claims and, if they met their burden of proof, to what damages they are entitled, if any. Violation of due process does not ipso facto entitle one to damages. Furthermore, a Section 1983 claim was only one of many claims in the Third Amended Complaint. Failure to prevail on a Section 1983 claim does not foreclose success on the remaining claims, if the proof adduced at trial satisfies their requirements. We find that the trial court erred by failing to comply with this Court’s instruction to hold a trial on all issues and limiting the proceedings to a calculation of damages and consideration of only the Section 1983 claim. Accordingly, we again remand to the trial court for a new trial on all issues.

CONCLUSION

¶ 13. The chancellor erred by limiting the trial to damages on one claim. We reverse the decision of the Lee County Chancery Court and remand for a trial on all issues.

¶ 14. ON DIRECT APPEAL: REVERSED AND REMANDED. ON CROSS-APPEAL: REVERSED AND REMANDED.

WALLER, C.J., CARLSON AND DICKINSON, P.JJ., LAMAR, KITCHENS, CHANDLER, PIERCE AND KING, JJ., CONCUR.

      . The relevant sentence fully reads: "The action of Town Creek ... deprived the [Webbs] of their constitutional rights including but not limited to their right of procedural due process guaranteed by the United States Constitution and more specifically through rights pursuant to the 5th and 14th amendments and the Constitution of the State of Mississippi.”

      . To establish a Section 1983 claim, "the plaintiff has the burden of showing by adequate evidence seven elements.” Harris v. Miss. Valley State Univ., 873 So.2d 970, 983 (Miss.2004) (citations omitted).
      The plaintiff must show: (i) There was a clear and constitutional right in the plaintiff. (2) There was a deprivation of that clear right, privilege or immunity secured to the plaintiff by the U.S. Constitution. (3) The defendants acted under color of State law. (4) There exists a direct [causal] connection without intervening factors between the deprivation and some injury to the plaintiff. (5) The act or omission by the defendant was intentional or at least deliberately indifferent to the Constitutional or Federal law rights of the plaintiff. (6) The plaintiff suffered actual injury and (7) Damages as a proximate result of the injury.

        Id.