author: IRVING, J.,

text:
    BLUEWATER LOGISTICS, LLC, Bluewater Bay LLC, Patricia L. Mosser, Marquetta Smith and Michael J. Floyd, Appellants/Cross-Appellees, v. James Stewart WILLIFORD, Jr., Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
    No. 2008-CA-00250-COA.
    Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
    Dec. 15, 2009.
    Rehearing Denied May 4, 2010.

      Robert R. Marshall, West Point, attorney for appellants.
    L. Clark.Hicks Jr., Hattiesburg, attorney for appellee.
    Before KING, C.J., IRVING and CARLTON, JJ.
   IRVING, J.,

for the Court.

¶ 1. This appeal arises out of a dispute between James Stewart Williford Jr., Patricia L. Mosser, Marquetta Smith, and Michael J. Floyd, all of whom are joint owners of a limited liability corporation known as Bluewater Logistics LLC (BLL). In 2006, Mosser, Smith, and Floyd (referred to collectively as “remaining members”) decided to oust Williford from BLL. Thereafter, Williford filed a complaint in the Forrest County Chancery Court, requesting that he be allowed to remain a member of BLL. Sometime after the filing of Williford’s complaint, the remaining members decided to grant Willi-ford’s request rather than oust him. Regardless, the case went to trial, after which the chancery court found that Williford had been improperly ousted from the corporation and granted him $316,768.25 in damages. Feeling aggrieved, BLL and the remaining members filed this appeal, asserting that the chancellor: (1) applied an erroneous legal standard and abused his discretion in his final judgment; (2) adopted Williford’s findings of fact verbatim, thus lessening the deference that his findings are entitled to; (3) erred in granting a legal remedy not authorized in law or equity; (4) erred in granting a judgment outside the scope of the pleadings; (5) erred in granting monetary relief not authorized in the pleadings or by the evidence presented at trial; (6) erred in “not accepting the fact that an attorney can and does act on behalf of the attorney’s clients in litigation;” (7) erred in not granting BLL’s motion to dismiss; and (8) erred “in determining that the pleadings request the relief granted by the court, and erred in determining that any law justifies the relief granted by the court....” Williford cross-appeals and asserts that the court erred in declining to award him attorney’s fees.

¶ 2. We find that all of these issues can be condensed to the following issues: (1) whether we should employ a heightened standard of review due to the court’s adoption of Williford’s proposed findings of fact, (2) whether the relief granted was beyond the scope of Williford’s pleadings, and (3) what effect the Mississippi Limited Liability Company Act (MLLCA) has on the outcome of this case.

¶ 3. We conclude that the chancellor improperly granted relief that was beyond the scope of the pleadings filed by Willi-ford. Therefore, we reverse and render the decision of the chancery court. Since we find against Williford, we necessarily find no merit to his contention that he should have been awarded attorney’s fees.

FACTS

¶ 4. BLL was formed in the summer of 2004 to bid on government contracts. The individuals who formed the corporation were Williford, Mosser, Smith, and Floyd, each of whom owned an equal share in the corporation. In addition to owning the corporation and sharing in its profits, all four worked as employees for the corporation in various capacities. The agreement that established the corporation contained a “right of redemption” whereby:

[T]he Company and the Members agree that the Company may, by a 75% Super Majority Vote of the Members, redeem any Member’s Interest for its then fair market value if the company determines, in its sole and absolute discretion, that that Member has either committed a felony or under any other circumstance that would jeopardize [sic] the Company’s status as an approved government contractor.

¶ 5. On January 31, 2006, Mosser, Smith, and Floyd met and decided to oust Willi-ford from the corporation. Williford was informed of the ouster shortly thereafter. The official notification of ouster stated that Williford would be paid for his one-quarter interest in the corporation as soon as a determination of the-value of BLL had been made. On February 10, 2006, Williford filed a complaint for a preliminary and permanent injunction to prevent his ouster from the corporation. In addition to requesting a temporary preliminary injunction, the complaint stated multiple claims against BLL and the remaining members. In count three, Williford requested “all rights and remedies available under the applicable statute, Miss.Code Ann. § 79-21-101, et seq. [sic].” Willi-ford also asserted a number of tort claims, including negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress, intentional infliction of emotional distress, gross negligence, and intentional and willful breach of contract. Paragraph 17 was titled “DAMAGES AND RELIEF SOUGHT,” and stated, in total:

1. Upon the giving of proper security as the Court deems fit, the plaintiff seeks a preliminary and then permanent injunction against the defendants which enjoins the defendants from the proposed action taken and orders that plaintiff is and remains a member of Bluewater Logistics, LLC and Bluewa-ter Bay, LLC, with all concomitant rights established by the Agreement, statutes[,] and other applicable laws. There is a likelihood of success on the merits, and the plaintiff will suffer irreparable loss and damagefe] in the way of lost income and other benefits if the injunction is not granted.
2. An accounting of all assets, books, documents[,] and other papers relating to Bluewater Logistics, LLC and Blue-water Bay, LLC.
3. An inspection of all documents relating to Bluewater Logistics, LLC and Bluewater Bay, LLC, in accordance with the provisions of the MLLCA.
4. An appraisal of the company to determine the proper current fair market value of the plaintiffs interest in accordance with applicable common law and the MLLCA.
5. Production of all information and records of the company in accordance with Miss.Code Ann. § 79-29-308.
6. Compensatory damages to the plaintiff in the amount of lost income and lost benefits, damages for mental anguish and emotional distress, damages for humiliation, embarrassment, harm to his reputation[,] and other incidental damages caused by the unlawful activity of the defendants, attorney’s fees, interest, court costs, and punitive damages, all in a sum sufficient to compensate the plaintiff for his losses and punish the defendants for their unlawful conduct.
7. An order enjoining the defendants and all members of the LLC from engaging in any similar future conduct.
8. The court should order that the defendants be prohibited from using any LLC funds to pay for the defense of this case (including attorney’s fees and expenses), and further order any and all LLC funds expended in defense of this case be refunded by the individual members to the LLC.
WHEREFORE, for the reasons stated, plaintiff seeks a preliminary and permanent injunction against the defendants which enjoins the defendants from any further attempts to oust him as a member, determines that the plaintiff remains a member of the company, orders continuation of all salary and other benefits to the plaintiff, allows the plaintiff to continue to engage in his activities for and on behalf of the company, awards the plaintiff sufficient compensatory and punitive damages along with attorney’s fees, court costs, and interest, both pre-judgment and post-judgment compounded, orders that member [sic] refrain from further unlawful conduct, and the members be enjoined from expending any LLC funds in defense of this case and/or order refund of such funds to the LLCs. Plaintiff seeks any other relief to which he may be entitled.

¶ 6. On February 15, 2006, BLL and the remaining members filed a motion requesting dismissal of Williford’s motion for injunction, or in the alternative, requested a continuance. On the same day, a hearing was held on the preliminary injunction. At the hearing, it became clear that Willi-ford and the other BLL members had come to disagree over how the corporation should be run. The remaining members contended, however, that Williford was still a member of BLL. On February 27, 2006, the chancery court issued an order granting the temporary injunction, in part. The chancellor ordered that BLL would still be able to maintain its day-to-day operations, as long as a CPA approved of the corporation’s expenditures. However, no member of BLL was allowed to pay himself or herself a salary, distribution, reimbursement, or expenditure without the chancery court’s approval. The parties were also ordered to meet with the CPA and attempt to resolve their dispute prior to trial. All other relief requested by either party was denied pending a hearing on the merits.

¶ 7. On March 10, 2006, BLL and the remaining members filed an answer to Williford’s complaint and a counter-complaint. The pleading denied the factual allegations in Williford’s complaint. BLL also maintained that it had the right to terminate Williford as an employee because Mississippi is an at-will employment state. On April 10, 2006, Williford filed an answer to BLL’s counter-complaint.

¶ 8. On June 13, 2006, a letter was sent from BLL’s attorney to Williford’s attorney, which stated, in pertinent part: “I am meeting with my clients later this week and we will determine all the issues- then, but in the meantime for your information, I am informed that they no longer wish to purchase Mr. Williford’s shares.” On June 16, 2006, Williford’s attorney sent a response letter that stated, in pertinent part: “If I am reading your letter correctly, this means that they [the remaining BLL shareholders] will not offer any money for his shares contrary to statements they have made to him in writing and statements you have made to the Court.” On August 21, 2006, BLL’s attorney again sent a letter to Williford’s attorney, stating: “I met with the three stockholders in Bluewater last week. Based on that meeting, let me reiterate what I had already told you: The offer to purchase Mr. Willi-ford’s stock is withdrawn. His firing as an employee is affirmed and confirmed.”

¶ 9. On August 28, 2006, BLL and the remaining members filed a motion requesting that the temporary injunction be dissolved. The motion alleged that:

The relief sought in the [complaint] was premised on the position by Williford that he wished to remain a member of Bluewater and did not wish to sell his stock.... Bluewater no longer wishes to purchase Mr. Williford’s stock. This decision and position was reiterated in [BLL’s attorney’s] letter dated August 21, 2006, a copy of which is attached hereto.... Since the entire [complaint] is premised on the offer to purchase Williford’s stock (“... [t]his suit arises out of an unlawful effort by the three individual Defendants to oust plaintiff as a member of Bluewater Logistics, LLC[,] and Bluewater Bay LLC ....”) and since there is no longer any offer to purchase Williford’s stock, then the chancery action itself is without any factual basis and the relief demanded is also moot. Williford can remain a member and minority stockholder as he has elected to do, with all the rights and obligations of a member .... No part of the [complaint] is based on Williford’s firing as an employer [sic], which firing as an employee occurred concurrently with the offer to purchase Williford’s interest in Bluewater.... The relief requested by Williford was based on the contemplated sale of his stock to the LLC, whether forced or voluntary, and since there is currently no pending offer to purchase his stock, then the entire chancery action is moot....

(Emphasis added). Three days later, on August 31, 2006, Williford filed a response to BLL’s motion, wherein he stated:

Plaintiff filed his complaint in February of 2006, seeking an appraisal of the company, an accounting, access to documents, and information on the financial records.... Defendants are incorrect when they state throughout their motion that plaintiff has not sought such relief. The defendants officially resolved to pay plaintiff his 25% share after attempting to remove him as a shareholder. Them lawyer erroneously makes repeated references to this buyout as an “offer” which has been “withdrawn.” If the defendants properly removed plaintiff as a shareholder, they are required to pay his interest in the business. This requirement is by contract and is obviously equitable. Counsel for the defendant made numerous representations to the Court that the defendants acknowledged them requirement to pay plaintiff his 25% share. The actions of the defendants in this motion and throughout this litigation have been bizarre and irrational. For instance, the defendant shareholders already invoked the right-of-redemption clause to remove Williford as a member and pay him his share. Yet in defendants’ current motion, defense counsel makes the puzzling statement that “Williford can remain a member and minority stockholder as he has elected to do, with all the rights and obligations of a member.”

On the same day, BLL filed an amended answer to Williford’s complaint. In the amended answer, BLL stated: “Affirmatively, the Defendants’ [sic] would show that members representing seventy-five percent (75%) of the voting shares met and made the decision to fire Williford which was done, and further made the decision to offer to purchase Williford’s stock. The decision to purchase Williford’s stock has been rescinded.”

¶ 10. On September 11, 2006, the parties entered into an agreed order that temporarily stayed all proceedings, continued the trial date, and provided for an independent appraisal of BLL. The trial was ultimately held on July 18, 2007. At trial, BLL’s attorney argued that Williford had never requested any relief other than being allowed to remain a member of BLL, and that there was therefore no issue that was ripe for trial. Williford’s attorney argued that there had been no formal written rescission of the decision to oust Williford, so that there effectively was no rescission of the ouster. The parties ultimately proceeded to trial, where multiple witnesses testified, including CPAs who testified regarding the value of the business. BLL’s attorney objected to the introduction of any evidence establishing the value of BLL, as he contended that any such evidence was moot because Willi-ford had not requested any monetary relief in his complaint. There was testimony by the remaining BLL members to the effect that Williford would be allowed to remain a stockholding member of BLL, but that he was still terminated as an employee.

¶ 11. After hearing all the evidence and arguments from the parties, the chancery court found that Williford was entitled to receive twenty-five percent of the value of BLL, which the court found was $816,768.25. BLL and the remaining shareholders filed a post-trial motion that alleged, among other things, that the chancellor had erred in granting Williford monetary damages when he had not requested such in his complaint. The chancery court denied the motion, and BLL and the shareholders then filed this appeal.

¶ 12. Additional facts, as necessary, will be related during our analysis and discussion of the issues.

ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUES

¶ 13. When reviewing the judgment of a chancellor, “we will not disturb the findings of a chancellor when supported by substantial evidence unless the chancellor abused his discretion, applied an erroneous legal standard, was manifestly wrong, or was clearly erroneous.” Limbert v. Miss. Univ. for Women Alumnae Ass’n, Inc., 998 So.2d 993, 998 (¶ 10) (Miss.2008) (quoting Hamilton v. Hopkins, 834 So.2d 695, 699 (¶ 12) (Miss.2003)). “Thus, where there is substantial evidence to support the chancellor’s findings, [we are] without the authority to disturb his conclusions, although [we] might have found otherwise as an original matter.” Ballard v. Commercial Bank of DeKalb, 991 So.2d 1201, 1205 (¶ 13) (Miss.2008) (citing Dew v. Langford, 666 So.2d 739, 742 (Miss.1995)). Despite our highly deferential standard of review regarding factual findings, “[r]egarding legal questions, [we apply] a de novo standard of review.” Wilburn v. Wilburn, 991 So.2d 1185, 1190 (¶ 10) (Miss.2008) (citing Russell v. Performance Toyota, Inc., 826 So.2d 719, 721 (¶ 5) (Miss.2002)).

1. Verbatim Adoption of Williford’s Findings

¶ 14. Although we accord great deference to a chancellor’s findings of fact, when a court adopts one party’s findings verbatim, we employ a heightened standard of review. As our supreme court has explained:

Unfortunately, in the case sub judice, the chancellor failed to make his own findings of fact and conclusions of law. Rather, the chancellor adopted, verbatim, the findings of fact and conclusions of law prepared by [one party’s attorney]. This Court has explained that such findings “are not the same as findings independently made by the trial judge after impartially and judiciously sifting through the conflicts and nuances of the trial testimony and exhibits.” Rice Researchers, [Inc. v. Hiter,] 512 So.2d [1259,] 1265 [ (Miss.1987) ]. Where the chancellor adopts, verbatim, findings of fact and conclusions of law prepared by a party to the litigation, this Court analyzes such findings with greater care, and the evidence is subjected to heightened scrutiny. Brooks [v. Brooks, 652 So.2d 1113,] 1118 [(Miss.1995)] (citing Omnibank of Mantee v. United S. Bank, 607 So.2d 76, 83 (Miss.1992); In re Estate of Ford, 552 So.2d 1065, 1068 (Miss.1989)).

In re Estate of Grubbs, 753 So.2d 1043, 1046-47 (¶ 8) (Miss.2000). Therefore, we must examine whether the chancellor in this case adopted Williford’s proposed findings verbatim.

¶ 15. The chancery court’s first judgment was entered on July 19, 2007. It stated, in pertinent part:

This matter came on for trial on July 18, 2007, at the Perry County Courthouse in New Augusta, Mississippi. The Court convened the trial on said date, and the parties presented their evidence through the testimony of witnesses, both expert and lay, and documentary evidence. During the course of the trial, the Court heard ore tenus motions and other requests for relief and made rulings during the course of the trial and on the record. All of those findings and the entire transcript of the hearing is incorporated in this final judgment.
After having considered the evidence and having heard arguments of counsel and all of the issues presented by all parties, the Court finds that there were two primary issues for the Court to determine. First, the Court has been called upon to give consideration of the fair market value of Bluewater Logistics, LLC, as it existed as of January 31, 2006, and the one-quarter interest share of James Stewart Williford, Jr. For the reasons stated by the Court on the record, the Court hereby finds that James Stewart Williford, Jr., is entitled to compensation for his one-quarter interest as of that date, and the Court hereby adopts the opinions and conclusions of both experts ... and enters judgment in favor of Plaintiff Williford in the amount of $316,768.25....
The second issue concerns defendants’ motion at the hearing for dissolution of the injunction and argument that the other three shareholders of the Bluewa-ter entity rescinded or withdrew their written decision to remove Williford as a partner. The Court is unpersuaded by this motion and finds it to be unmeritorious for the reasons stated by the Court from the bench. The Courts [sic] finds, among other things, that it would be inequitable and unjust for the Bluewater entity and its members to remove him as a member and not pay him his one-quarter interest.

(Emphasis added). The order is signed by the chancellor, but states that it was submitted by Williford’s attorney. On January 8, 2008, the chancellor entered an amended final judgment with attached findings of fact and conclusions of law. This amended judgment came to the same conclusions as the chancery court’s final judgment. However, in explaining his conclusions, the chancellor stated the following, in pertinent part:

Plaintiff Williford was removed from any involvement in the Bluewater entities following [the vote to oust him]. He has been barred from the premises, has had no participation in the companies, and he has had no involvement in any manner with the Bluewater entities. Despite the vote by the shareholders to pay his twenty-five percent (25%) interest, the shareholders have arguably attempted to revoke this decision. The Court was not provided with any credible official action taken by the company shareholders revoking its decision to pay Wil-liford his twenty-five percent interest.

The amended judgment is signed by the chancellor and there is no indication on it that it was provided by Williford’s attorney. On January 14, 2008, BLL’s attorney filed a motion to set aside the amended final judgment and its findings, on the ground that the findings had been prepared unilaterally by Williford’s attorney, without allowing BLL’s attorney time to submit his own proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law.

¶ 16. On January 28, 2008, Williford’s attorney sent a letter to the chancery court that was subsequently filed in the court’s file. In it, he stated: “I am in receipt of defendants’ motion to set aside your final judgment as amended. Your judgment was consistent with your rulings from the bench following the trial.” Nothing in the letter indicated that Williford’s attorney had written the amended final judgment.

¶ 17. We cannot go outside the record in order to render our decision. Oakwood Homes Corp. v. Randall, 824 So.2d 1292, 1293 (¶ 3) (Miss.2002). Furthermore, “[t]he appellant has ‘the duty of insuring that the record contains sufficient evidence to support his assignments of error on appeal.’ ” Id. at (¶ 4) (quoting Burney v. State, 515 So.2d 1154, 1160 (Miss.1987)). In Oakwood Homes, our supreme court explained as follows:

It is the appellant’s duty to see that all matters necessary to his appeal, such as exhibits, witnesses’ testimony, and so forth, are included in the record, and he may not complain of his own failure in that regard. [An appellate court] may only act on the record presented to it. Shelton v. Kindred, 279 So.2d 642, 644 (Miss.1973). There are adequate procedures and safeguards to assure that incorrect or incomplete records are remedied. The appellant has failed to place the necessary record pertaining to this assignment of error before us, and we are therefore unable to consider it.

Id. at 1293-94 (¶ 4) (quoting Branch v. State, 347 So.2d 957, 958-59 (Miss.1977)).

¶ 18. The record here is inadequate for us to determine whether the chancery court’s final judgment and attached findings were submitted verbatim by Willi-ford’s attorney. The order does not state that it was prepared by the attorney, the attorney’s letter to the court does not state whether the attorney drafted the judgment, and there is no copy of the proposed findings that were submitted to the court and that allegedly became the court’s final judgment. BLL’s brief does not specify in the record where evidence of its allegations may be found. Therefore, we find no merit to this contention of error.

2. Remedy Outside Scope of Pleadings

¶ 19. BLL contends that the chancellor improperly granted Williford relief that was outside the scope of his pleadings when the chancery court granted him monetary damages. BLL contends that the only requested relief in Williford’s complaint was that he be allowed to remain a member of BLL. Having reviewed the record and the pleadings filed by Williford, we agree.

¶ 20. “It is a well settled rule that a party complainant may have relief only on the case made by his bill of complaint and that the allegations of the pleading and proof must correspond.” Barnes v. Barnes, 317 So.2d 387, 388 (Miss.1975). The Banes court ultimately reversed and rendered the portion of the trial court’s order that granted land to one party, because the party’s pleadings did not ask for the land. Id. at 388-89. In fact, this point of law may be seen in Mississippi jurisprudence as early as 1856: “As to moneys received since the death of Nathaniel Buckingham, the bill might be sustained for an account in favor of complainants, if the bill had been framed with that view against Mrs. Buckingham, but it is not so framed.” Tucker v. Cocke, 32 Miss. 184, 190 (1856).

¶21. We have already quoted Willi-ford’s complaint at length. Having reviewed the complaint, we find that the only monetary damages that were sought were for tort claims that were not adjudicated by the chancery court. No monetary damages were sought in response to the ouster itself; the only relief that the complaint requested in that regard was that Williford be allowed to remain a member of BLL. Had Williford requested monetary damages rather than reinstatement as a member, the chancery court would have been authorized to grant him that relief. However, Williford did not request monetary damages. Instead, he requested only reinstatement in BLL, which was made available to him after BLL rescinded its ouster.

¶ 22. Although Williford’s complaint contains a brief general prayer for relief, we find this insufficient to allow the damages granted to him by the chancery court. We find that Williford’s prayer for relief must be considered in the context of his entire complaint and the requests for relief therein. In French v. Davis, 38 Miss. 218, 223 (1859), the High Court of Errors and Appeals of Mississippi ruled on an appeal wherein the appellant claimed that “the amount of the judgment exceeded] the damages claimed in the complaint.” Specifically, the aggrieved party had been ordered to pay over two hundred dollars in damages, whereas the conclusion of the plaintiffs complaint had requested only two hundred dollars in damages. Id. at 221. In ruling on this claim of error, the court stated:

This action was brought under the Statute of 1850, changing the forms of pleadings at common law; which provided that the “complaint,” thereby authorized instead of a declaration, should “conclude with a demand of the relief’ which the plaintiff claims. This complaint conforms to this provision, and the statement of damage in the conclusion, is to be regarded as surplusage, since there was a demand of judgment for the amount of the notes stated in the preceding part of the complaint.

Id. at 224 (emphasis added). In other words, the more general prayer for relief at the conclusion of the plaintiffs complaint was insufficient to overcome the body of the complaint, which had requested, as damages, “judgment for the amount of said notes, with interest.” Id. Finally, we note that other jurisdictions also construe prayers for relief in the context of the complaint they are contained in. See In re City of Dallas, 977 S.W.2d 798, 804-05 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1998) (holding that City of Fort Worth’s prayer for “further relief’ could not be interpreted as a request for a permanent injunction); Design Science Toys, Inc. v. McCann, 981 F.Supp. 282, 283 (S.D.N.Y.1996) (holding that “while [the] prayers for relief ... contain somewhat ambiguous language ... in the context of the rest of the Complaint, the more reasonable reading of these prayers is for relief from contractual and other state-law breaches”); United States v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 620 F.Supp. 1404, 1412 (N.D.Ill.1985) (holding that “prayers for relief should be construed reasonably” and “read in the context of the allegations in the complaint.... ”).

¶ 23. The chancery court found that BLL’s actions were insufficient to withdraw the ouster, as there was no formal written rescission of the ouster decision. However, we find that BLL and the rerhaining members communicated the rescission of the ouster to Williford multiple times. The first instance that appears in the record is the June 13, 2006, letter from BLL’s attorney. In it, he stated that the shareholders no longer wished to purchase Williford’s BLL shares. It appears from the response sent by Williford’s attorney that the communication was not understood as a rescission of Williford’s ouster. The letter sent by BLL’s attorney on August 21, 2006, was not any clearer; it again appears that Williford did not understand that the ouster had been withdrawn.

¶24. Regardless of the clarity of the letters, BLL’s August 28, 2006, motion to dissolve the injunction clearly rescinded Williford’s ouster:

Williford can remain a member and minority stockholder as he has elected to do, with all the rights and obligations of a member.... No part of the [complaint] is based on Williford’s firing as an employer [sic], which firing as an employee occurred concurrently with the offer to purchase Williford’s interest in Bluewater.... The relief requested by Williford was based on the contemplated sale of his stock to the LLC, whether forced or voluntary, and since there is currently no pending offer to purchase his stock, then the entire chancery action is moot....

As seen above, the motion also confirmed Williford’s firing as an employee of BLL and raised the issue of Williford’s ability to proceed after having been granted the only relief that he had requested. BLL’s attorney again raised this latter issue immediately prior to trial on July 18, 2007, when he argued to the chancery court: “in fact, Bluewater and these members confessed that Mr. Williford could remain a member. That’s what he asked for, and that’s what he got.”

¶ 25. We find that this motion, which was filed with the chancery court, was sufficient to rescind Williford’s ouster. Even though it was not filed by BLL or the remaining members, but by their attorney, we find that the motion is sufficient because “[a]n attorney is presumed to have the authority to speak for and bind his client.” Parmley v. 84 Lumber Co., 911 So.2d 569, 573 (¶ 19) (Miss.Ct.App.2005) (citing Fairchild v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 254 Miss. 261, 265, 179 So.2d 185, 187 (1965) (holding that an attorney could bind client to settlement even when client denied having given attorney permission to do so)). This is so even in the context of criminal cases. For example, in Hughes v. State, 807 So.2d 426, 430-31 (¶¶ 8 — 11) (Miss.2001), our supreme court noted that “a defendant’s presence at the peremptory challenges stage [of a trial] would contribute to the fairness of the procedure,” but went on to find that a defendant’s attorney can waive a defendant’s right to be present during that stage of the trial. In short, the law is clear in Mississippi that attorneys can act on behalf of their clients. Therefore, we are satisfied that the correspondence and motions drafted by BLL’s attorney were sufficient to rescind BLL’s decision to oust Williford as a shareholder.

¶26. At trial, Williford’s attorney argued that he had “received nothing in writing. A corporation can only act officially through its minutes and through written action. There’s been no written action taken.” The chancellor then asked, “This is just something [BLL’s attorney]’s verbalizing?” Williford’s attorney responded, ‘Tes, sir.” BLL’s attorney then brought the chancellor’s attention to the letters that had been sent to Williford’s attorney, as well as pointing out that there had also been filings in court. It is not clear from the record what the attorney was referencing, although the chancellor indicated that it was a letter that had been attached to a motion that was filed. However, as we have already discussed, BLL filed a motion, which carries a file stamp, indicating that the ouster had been rescinded. Regarding whether corporations can act only through their minutes, our supreme court has stated: “A corporation speaks and acts through its records and minutes. See 18 C.J.S. Corporations § 191, § 554; 19 C.J.S. Corporations § 751. A formal corporate resolution is not the only evidence of corporate action [;] however, corporate records and minutes constitute the best evidence of corporate action. 32A C.J.S. Evidence, § 810.” Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Purcell Co., 606 So.2d 93, 97 (Miss.1990) (emphasis added). It is clear to this Court that a corporation may act and be bound by its motions and pleadings filed in open court. Floyd testified that the remaining BLL members met and voted to allow Williford to retain his membership in BLL, and that their attorney then wrote a letter to Williford, informing him of that decision. For all the reasons discussed, we find that BLL successfully rescinded Williford’s ouster through a combination of correspondence and written motions.

¶ 27. Williford contends that there was no separation of his status as employee and his status as shareholder of BLL and that, therefore, he cannot be terminated as an employee but retained as a shareholder. However, the other members of BLL testified that each of them had initially worked as employees of BLL. In fact, BLL’s dissatisfaction with Willi-ford arose from his alleged tardiness at job sites and from an allegedly inappropriate remark made during a meeting with Cleco Power, a company with which BLL was trying to negotiate a contract. At trial, Smith testified that Williford would be allowed to remain a member of BLL, but that he had been fired as an employee. Furthermore, Smith, one of the original founders of BLL, testified that, at the time of trial, she had stopped working for BLL as an employee, but still retained her status as a shareholder of BLL. Smith indicated that Williford’s position was the same as her own in that regard. When questioned by Williford’s attorney, Smith testified: “There’s a difference between a partner and an employee.... I no longer have keys to the office ... nor do I have a Blackberry.” When questioned as to the difference between a partner and an employee, Smith stated, “As a partner he’s a member in the LLC. He owns stock, just like I do, but I have no day-to-day input in the business at this point either. I’m not an active member in the company.” Mos-ser also testified that Williford would remain a member of BLL, but that he would no longer work for the business. The evidence was uncontradicted at trial that there was a separate status of BLL members as shareholders and as employees. Therefore, we find that BLL was able to terminate Williford as an employee while allowing him to retain his status as a shareholder of BLL.

3. The MLLCA

¶ 28. Finally, we address the effect, if any, of the MLLCA in this case. Williford urges us to find that the chancery court’s relief was authorized by two provisions in the MLLCA, namely section 79-29-214 (Rev.2001) and section 79-29-306 (Rev.2001).

¶ 29. Section 79-29-214(2) provides a member of a limited liability company interest the right to an appraisal and payment of the fair market value of his interest in a company in the event of certain occurrences. Sections 79-29-214(2)(a)(i, ii) provide no relief to Williford, as they allow for an appraisal and subsequent payment only in the event of a merger, or a “sale, lease, exchange, or other disposition of assets if the disposition would leave the limited liability company without a significant continuing business activity.” There is no evidence in the record to suggest that either of these conditions have been met. Section 79 — 29—214(2)(a)(iii) allows for appraisal and payment in the event of: “Any other action to the extent provided by the certificate of formation or limited liability company agreement.” As we have already found that there was a valid rescission of Williford’s ouster, this provision is also no help to Williford. The company agreement provided for the appraisal and payment of an member’s fair market share only in the event of an ouster. Since the ouster has been rescinded, section 79-29-214(2)(a)(iii) is also of no help to Williford.

¶ 30. Section 79-29-306(3)(a) states that: “A court of equity may enforce a limited liability company agreement by injunction or by such other relief that the court in its discretion determines to be fair and appropriate in the circumstances.” (Emphasis added). This provision is also of no help to Williford, as it merely grants a court of equity the ability to enforce a company agreement. The company agreement here provides for the payment of a member’s share of the company only when the member has been ousted. Since Willi-ford’s ouster was rescinded, there was nothing else in the company agreement to allow for the payment of his share of BLL. Nothing in section 79-29-306 indicates that a court may grant any relief beyond the scope of the company agreement.

¶ 31. This issue is also without merit.

¶ 32. In conclusion, Williford’s complaint requested only a rescission of his ouster, not monetary damages. Williford has since been granted that relief by BLL, thus rendering his suit moot. As such, we reverse and render the judgment of the chancery court, which granted Williford monetary damages that were never asked for in his filed pleadings.

¶ 33. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CHANCERY COURT OF FORREST COUNTY IS REVERSED AND RENDERED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE AP-PELLEE.

KING, C.J., LEE AND MYERS, P.JJ., ISHEE, ROBERTS, CARLTON AND MAXWELL, JJ., CONCUR. BARNES, J., CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION. GRIFFIS, J., DISSENTS WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION.

      . The company at issue refers to its owners as "members," and that terminology is used throughout the record below. Therefore, we also refer to owners as members in the remainder of this opinion.

      . Bluewater Bay LLC is another company owned by some of the owners of BLL.

      . A fifth individual was initially involved in forming BLL, but did not sign the agreement forming BLL and was not a member of BLL at the time this dispute arose.

      . The MLLCA is codified as Mississippi Code Annotated section 79-29-101 to section 79-29-1201 (Rev.2001).


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: ISHEE, J.,

license: Public Domain

text:
    Curtis ERVIN, on behalf of the WRONGFUL DEATH BENEFICIARIES and as Administrator of the Estate of Janice Ervin, Deceased, Appellant v. DELTA REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER, Appellee.
    No. 2008-CA-01816-COA.
    Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
    June 8, 2010.
    Rehearing Denied Dec. 7, 2010.
    Certiorari Denied March 3, 2011.

      George F. Hollowell, Jr., Greenville, attorney for appellant.
    L. Carl Hagwood, Jackson, Christopher Wayne Winter, Mary Frances Stallings-England, attorneys for appellee.
   ISHEE, J.,

for the Court:

¶ 1. Janice Ervin (Janice) died of a pulmonary embolism shortly after a hysterectomy was performed on her in October 2004 at Delta Regional Medical Center (DRMC). Her husband, Curtis Ervin (Curtis), filed a wrongful-death action on behalf of himself, his three children, and Janice’s estate against Dr. James Beck-ham. Once suit was filed, it was discovered that Dr. Beckham worked for DRMC, the party who is ultimately responsible for his actions. After a bench trial, the Circuit Court of Washington County entered a judgment against Curtis and in favor of DRMC. Finding no error, we affirm.

FACTS

¶ 2. Early in 2004, Janice began to experience pelvic pain and heavy bleeding from irregular periods, which in turn made her anemic. The test results following a CT scan suggested uterine fibroid tumors. After hormone-therapy treatment failed to resolve her health issues, her gynecologist, Dr. Beckham, recommended surgery to remove both her uterus and the fibroids. After discussing the procedure, the risks involved, and the benefits of the surgery with Dr. Beckham, the Ervins agreed the procedure was reasonable and necessary, and they gave their informed consent to Dr. Beckham.

¶ 3. On October 15, 2004, Dr. Beckham prepared Janice for a vaginal hysterectomy. However, upon examination of Janice in the operating room, and while Janice was under anaesthesia, it was determined by Dr. Beckham that due to adhesions from prior surgeries, an open abdominal hysterectomy would be necessary. Janice’s surgery lasted one hour and twenty-five minutes, but she was under anaesthe-sia for one hour and fifty-five minutes. After a successful surgery, Janice was returned to her hospital room. Dr. Beck-ham’s post-surgery orders included having Janice turn, cough, and take deep breaths every two hours. He further ordered bed-rest for Janice until the following morning. Dr. Beckham never ordered the use of any prophylactic measures, which, presumably, would have reduced the risk of deep vein thrombosis (DVT) or pulmonary embolism (PE), both of which are known complications of hysterectomy surgery.

¶ 4. The following morning, October 16, 2004, Dr. Beckham ordered Janice’s catheter be discontinued and ordered her to ambulate to the extent it could be tolerated. The catheter was immediately removed. Janice was then helped by a nurse’s aid to the bathroom. While in the bathroom, Janice called out to her husband, who was with her in the hospital room. He opened the door, and she collapsed in his arms. The nurse’s aid pulled the call light, and the nursing staff responded immediately. Janice, who was noted as being cold, clammy, and short of breath, was placed back in her bed. The nursing staff notified Dr. Beckham who promptly returned to Janice’s room. The staff additionally notified Josh Edwards, the nursing supervisor, who also reported to the room.

¶ 5. After Dr. Beckham evaluated Janice’s condition, he ordered that she be transferred to the intensive care unit (ICU). The nursing staff secured her and, with supplemental oxygen via a mobile oxygen bottle, transferred Janice to the ICU. Once the staff and Janice reached the ICU floor, Janice’s breathing had deteriorated even more, prompting the nursing staff to obtain a bag valve mask from the wall of the ICU. The staff then began to implement assisted respirations via a bag valve mask as Janice was being rolled into the ICU. Upon arrival in the doors of the ICU, a Code Blue was initiated. It was at this point that Dr. Beckham gave control to Dr. Parvez Karim. In an attempt to restore her breathing, Janice was given lOOmg of Activase, which is known to dissolve pulmonary emboli.

¶ 6. After an extended period, Janice’s heartbeat returned, but she remained unconscious and unable to react to painful stimuli. She was able to breathe only because she was placed on a ventilator. While there is some disagreement as to the origin and form of the clot and embolism which she had, it is undisputed that Janice died as a result of some form of clot or embolism which traveled to her lung, caused her to stop breathing, and eventually caused her heart to stop.

¶ 7. Despite the best efforts of her doctors, Janice’s condition continued to worsen as she suffered multiple organ failures and eventually brain death. On the morning of October 18, three days after her hysterectomy, and after a discussion between her family and her doctor, Janice was pulled from life support and was pronounced dead. She was forty years old.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 8. On September 6, 2005, Curtis, on behalf of himself, his family, and Janice’s estate, filed suit against DRMC, Dr. Beck-ham, and other DRMC employees alleging negligence. On April 21-23, 2008, the case was tried in the Circuit Court of Washington County, Mississippi. As DRMC is a community hospital entitled to the limitations, protections, and immunities of the Mississippi Tort Claims Act, the trial was conducted as a bench trial, heard before the Honorable Richard A. Smith. On October 14, 2008, the circuit court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law in favor of DRMC. Aggrieved, Curtis, on behalf of his family and Janice’s estate, timely filed this appeal.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 9. Because Curtis’s appeal speaks to the weight of the evidence and the factual determinations made by the trial judge as the sole trier of fact in a bench trial, the standard of review for such factual determinations is “the substantial[-]evidence standard.” Covington County v. G.W., 767 So.2d 187, 189 (¶ 4) (Miss.2000). The findings of the trial judge will not be disturbed unless the judge “abused his discretion, was manifestly wrong, clearly erroneous or an erroneous legal standard was applied.” Id. “A circuit court judge sitting without a jury is accorded the same deference with regard to his findings as a chancellor,” and his findings are safe on appeal where they are supported by substantial, credible, and reasonable evidence. Puckett v. Stuckey, 633 So.2d 978, 982 (Miss.1993); Sweet Home Water & Sewer Ass’n v. Lexington Estates, Ltd., 613 So.2d 864, 872 (Miss.1993); Allied Steel Corp. v. Cooper, 607 So.2d 113, 119 (Miss.1992).

ANALYSIS

I. Nationally-Recognized Standard of Care

¶ 10. The circuit court found that Curtis failed to establish a nationally-recognized standard of care as to the use of sequential compression devices. In medical-malpractice cases, the Mississippi Supreme Court has stated that:

As a result of its resources-based component, the physician’s non-delegable duty of care is this: given the circumstances of each patient, each physician has a duty to use his or her knowledge and therewith treat through maximum reasonable medical recovery, each patient, with such reasonable diligence, skill, competence, and prudence as are practiced by minimally competent physicians in the same specialty or general field of practice throughout the United States, who have available to them the same general facilities, services, equipment and options.

The burden was on Curtis to establish a nationally-recognized standard of care and the breach of that standard. Although Dr. Harold Miller (Curtis’s expert) felt that Dr. Beckham did not follow the standard of care for low-risk patients, the circuit court found that Dr. Miller offered no peer-review literature to support his position and that he also offered no literature or studies to support that his position is the nationally-recognized standard of care. The circuit court further found that, at most, Curtis’s expert showed “two schools of thought” as to whether or not prophylactic measures prior to and after gynecological surgery with low-risk patients should be used.

¶ 11. As we have noted, it is the responsibility of the circuit judge, when sitting as the trier of fact, to determine the credibility of witnesses, and his conclusions will not be disturbed if they are found to be supported by substantial, credible, and reasonable evidence. Puckett, 633 So.2d at 982. Based on our standard of review we find no basis to disturb the circuit court’s findings. This issue is without merit.

II. Janice’s Risk

¶ 12. Dr. Beckham, Janice’s gynecologist, and two other experts, Drs. Carl Reddix and Edward Rigdon, all testified that Janice was a low-risk patient because she was forty years of age; she had no history of cancer or radiation therapy; and she had no prior history of blood clots. On the other hand, the plaintiffs expert, Dr. Miller, argued that because Janice was undergoing a surgery that lasted for more than forty minutes and because she was on birth control pills (estrogen treatment) at the time of the surgery, she was not a low-risk patient.

¶ 13. The circuit court, in its findings of fact, agreed -with Drs. Beckham’s, Red-dix’s, and Rigdon’s assessments of Janice as a low-risk patient for developing pulmonary embolism. The circuit court referred to the ACOG Practice Bulletin which supported the doctors’ classifications of low risk. Further, the circuit court found that Dr. Miller, the plaintiffs expert, failed to testify that Janice was actually a moderate-risk or high-risk patient. The circuit court found that Dr. Miller testified that Janice merely was not a low-risk patient.

¶ 14. Curtis takes issue with regard to the classification of Janice as a low-risk patient for developing DVT/PE, and he contends circuit court judge was clearly erroneous in finding Janice to be such. Had Janice been classified as a moderate-risk or high-risk patient, any type of compression devices, such as TED hoses or sequential compression devices, should have been used to help prevent the possibility of blood clot development.

¶ 15. We find that this argument is without merit. Essentially, Curtis has asked this Court to re-weigh the credibility of the witnesses. This exceeds the scope of our review, because “the trial judge, sitting in a bench tidal as the trier of fact, has sole authority for determining [the] credibility of the witnesses.” Johns v. State, 926 So.2d 188, 194 (¶29) (Miss.2006) (citing Mullins v. Ratcliff, 515 So.2d 1183, 1189 (Miss.1987)). Because the standard is one of such limited scope, we are forced to accept the circuit court’s finding that Janice was, indeed, a low-risk patient.

III. Trial by Ambush and Nurse’s Standard of Care

¶ 16. Next, Curtis argues that it was unfair to allow the use of an errata sheet correcting an error in the deposition testimony of Nurse Natalie Reed (Reed). The circuit court judge addressed this issue when he also addressed the nurse’s standard of care. In the findings of fact, the circuit court found that even if Curtis were given the benefit of Reed’s testimony (that Janice was transferred without supplemental oxygen), the remaining testimony and evidence still showed and proved the contrary. The circuit court found that the respiratory therapy notes, ICU notes, and Code Blue flow sheet reflected that Janice was provided supplemental oxygen while being transferred to the ICU. Because the circuit court’s findings are supported by substantial, credible, and reasonable evidence, we find that this issue is without merit.

IY. Causation

¶ 17. Finally, Curtis takes issue with the circuit court’s finding that he failed to prove causation. In other words, the circuit court found that Curtis failed to show that Janice’s pulmonary embolus originated in her leg; therefore, even if Dr. Beckham had followed Dr. Miller’s stated standard of care in regard to compression devices, applying a compression device to Janice’s legs would not have prevented the embolus from forming in her pelvis and her ultimate death.

¶ 18. Both of the defendant’s experts opined and supported their opinions that the pulmonary embolus in this case originated in the pelvis, not in the leg. All experts agreed that mechanical devices (compression devices) would not have prevented the formation of the blood clot in the pelvis. Once again, because the circuit court’s findings are supported by substantial, credible, and reasonable evidence, the findings must be affirmed. This issue is without merit.

¶ 19. THE JUDGMENT OF THE WASHINGTON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE APPELLANT.

KING, C.J., MYERS, P.J., IRVING, GRIFFIS, BARNES, ROBERTS AND MAXWELL, JJ„ CONCUR. LEE, P.J., AND CARLTON, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.

      . The appellant will be referred to as Curtis unless it is necessary to distinguish.


author: BARNES, J., CARLTON, J.,

text:
    Olivia PROUT, Appellant v. Thelma WILLIAMS, Appellee.
    No. 2009-CA-01099-COA.
    Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
    Jan. 18, 2011.

      Robert 0. Waller, Jackson, attorney for appellant.
    David Ringer, attorney for appellee.
    Before MYERS, P.J., GRIFFIS and BARNES, JJ.
   BARNES, J.,

for the Court:

¶ 1. This appeal involves the determination of the heirs at law of Floyd McIntosh. Floyd died intestate, survived by his widow, Cora Badgett McIntosh. Della Mae McIntosh is Floyd’s daughter, who was born out of wedlock before Floyd married Cora and who predeceased Floyd. Regarding the parties to this appeal, Olivia Prout is one of Della’s five children, and Thelma Williams is Cora’s niece and one of the heirs named in Cora’s will.

¶ 2. Williams filed a petition to adjudicate heirship in the Chancery Court of Simpson County after Della’s children filed a lawsuit claiming that they, as Della’s surviving heirs, should receive an interest in Floyd’s estate. The chancery court determined that Floyd never adopted Della and that during her lifetime, Della did not establish paternity; therefore, Floyd’s sole heir was Cora. Finding no error, we affirm.

STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 3. In 1926, Della was born out of wedlock to Floyd McIntosh and Cletho Mahef-fay in Simpson County, Mississippi. The couple never married, and Della was their only child. On April 9, 1975, Della died intestate. She was survived by her father, Floyd, and her five children from two marriages: Olivia Prout, Linda Prout, Carolyn Prout, Edward Marvin, and Dwight Marvin. On August 1, 1979, Floyd died intestate. He was survived by his widow, Cora. No children were born of their marriage, and Cora bore no children during her lifetime.

¶4. Regarding Della’s right to inherit from Floyd, in 1981, the Mississippi Legislature amended the Mississippi Code of 1972 and adopted section 91 — 1—15, thereby providing a means by which an illegitimate child could inherit through his or her natural father by the laws of descent and distribution, provided that: (1) the natural parents married before the child’s birth; (2) there had been an adjudication of paternity or legitimacy before the death of the intestate; or (3) there had been an adjudication of paternity after the death of the intestate. Miss.Code Ann. § 91 — 1— 15(3)(a)-(c) (Supp.1983 and 2010). For the latter action, an adjudication of paternity must be made within one year of the death of the intestate or within ninety days after the first publication of notice to creditors, whichever is less. Miss.Code Ann. § 91-l-15(3)(c) (Supp.1983 and 2010). Section 91-1-15(3) also created a three-year “catch-up period” from July 1, 1981, to July 1, 1984, when illegitimates could maintain actions to establish rights in estates where the decedent had died prior to July 1, 1981. Robert Weems, Mississippi Practice Series: Wills and Administration of Estates in Mississippi § 1:10 (3d ed.2003). Section 91-1-15’s provisions thus apply to Olivia’s claim since Floyd died in August 1979. However, there was no adjudication of Floyd’s heirs before his death or within the time prescribed by statute following his death. On July 1, 1984, the statutory three-year catch-up period of section 91-1-15(3) expired for any possible illegitimates of Floyd to maintain an action to establish rights to his estate.

¶ 5. On May 16, 1983, Cora deeded one acre of property in Simpson County to Loyal Smith by warranty deed, which was duly recorded in the land records of Simpson County. In November 1994, Cora died testate. Williams was one of the beneficiaries of Cora’s will. Olivia now claims that Cora’s conveyance in 1983 constituted fraudulent concealment because Cora did not have full ownership of the property: Floyd’s interest in the property was conveyed without notice or compensation to the heirs of Floyd, and Cora did not determine Floyd’s heirs at law. Additionally, Olivia claims Cora improperly conveyed the remaining interest in the property through her will to Williams and Williams’s two children. Olivia concludes that Cora acted as an administratrix de son tort and tolled any statute of limitations.

¶ 6. On September 15, 2008, Williams filed a petition for adjudication of heirship. Named as defendants were the known and unknown heirs of Floyd and Della and also Della’s five children (Olivia, Linda, Carolyn, Edward, and Dwight). The petition was filed in response to a lawsuit filed in chancery court by Della’s five children, which claimed that since Della died intestate, they are her surviving heirs; therefore, they should receive Della’s share of Floyd’s estate. In Williams’s petition, however, she claimed that the time for which illegitimates might assert their status as heirs at law had passed according to the statute of limitations provided in section 91 — 1—15(3)(c). In March 2009, the chancellor held a hearing to determine Floyd’s heirs at law. Olivia, Williams, and Helen McIntosh O’Neil (Floyd’s niece) testified.

¶ 7. On June 17, 2009, the chancellor issued a final judgment, finding that Floyd never adopted Della, and Della never established paternity during her lifetime; therefore, Floyd’s sole heir-at-law was Floyd’s widow, Cora. Olivia timely filed a notice of appeal.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 8. A limited standard of review is applied to appeals from chancery court. Miller v. Pannell, 815 So.2d 1117, 1119 (¶ 9) (Miss.2002). It is well established that an appellate court “will not disturb the factual findings of a chancellor unless such findings are manifestly wrong or clearly erroneous.” Estate of Dykes v. Estate of Williams, 864 So.2d 926, 930 (¶ 9) (Miss.2003). “If there is substantial evidence to support the chancellor’s findings of fact, those findings must be affirmed.” Id. Questions of law are reviewed de novo. Id. For an illegitimate to recover as an heir of a decedent’s estate, he or she must prove that heirship exists by clear and convincing evidence. In re Estates of Davidson, 794 So.2d 261, 265 (¶ 10) (Miss.Ct.App.2001) (citing Miss.Code Ann. § 91 — 1—15(3)(c) (Rev.1994)).

ANALYSIS OF THE ISSUES

¶ 9. Olivia raises two issues. First, Olivia claims the chancery court erred in ruling that Della was not legitimized during Della’s lifetime to be Floyd’s daughter and that the sole hem of Floyd is Cora. Second, Olivia argues that Cora acted as an admin-istratrix de son tort when she executed and delivered the 1983 warranty deed, thereby tolling any statute of limitations for the legitimization of Floyd’s heirs at law. We shall discuss each issue in turn.

1. Whether Cora was the Sole Heir-at-Law of Floyd.

¶ 10. Olivia claims that the chancery court erred in ruling that Della did not previously establish Floyd’s paternity during Della’s lifetime; thus, Floyd’s sole heir at law was his widow, Cora. Olivia maintains that Della’s paternity was established prior to Della’s and Floyd’s deaths by the issuance of a document for Della in July 1965 entitled “Delayed Certificate of Birth” which Floyd had signed on November 14, 1964. Additionally, Olivia claims that Floyd acknowledged Della as his daughter throughout his lifetime by his “spoken words and actions.” Olivia further contends that the current heirship proceeding provided clear and convincing evidence that Della was Floyd’s daughter even if the chancery court was correct in determining that Della did not establish paternity prior to Della’s or Floyd’s death.

¶ 11. It is undisputed that section 91 — 1— 15(3) is the controlling statute. It reads in pertinent part:

An illegitimate shall inherit from and through the illegitimate’s natural father and his kindred ... according to the statutes of descent and distribution if:
(a) The natural parents participated in a marriage ceremony before the birth of the child, even though the marriage was subsequently declared null and void or dissolved by a court; or
(b) There has been an adjudication of paternity or legitimacy before the death of the intestate; or
(c) There has been an adjudication of paternity after the death of the intestate, based upon clear and convincing evidence, in an heirship proceeding under Sections 91-1-27 and 91-1-29. However, no such claim of inheritance shall be recognized unless the action seeking an adjudication of paternity is filed within one (1) year after the death of the intestate or within ninety (90) days after the first publication of notice to creditors to present their claims, whichever is less.... This one-year limitation shall be self-executing and may not be tolled for any reason, including lack of notice. If an administrator is appointed for the estate of the intestate and notice to creditors is given, then the limitation period shall be reduced to ninety (90) days after the first publication of notice, if less than one (1) year from the date of the intestate’s death; provided actual, written notice is given to all potential illegitimate heirs who could be located with reasonable diligence.
A remedy is hereby created in favor of all illegitimates having any claim existing prior to July 1, 1981, concerning the estate of an intestate whose death occurred prior to such date by or on behalf of an illegitimate or an alleged illegitimate child to inherit from or through its natural father and ... shall be brought within three (3) years from and after July 1, 1981, and such time period shall run notwithstanding the minority of a child.

Miss.Code Ann. § 91-1-15(3) (Supp.2010).

¶ 12. Olivia claims that because Floyd acknowledged Della as his daughter by executing her delayed birth certifícate in 1964, when Della was thirty-nine years of age, Floyd met his burden of “adjudicating” Della’s paternity before his death under section 91 — 1—15(3)(b). We disagree. The delayed birth certificate is insufficient to meet the requirements for adjudication of paternity before the death of the intestate; thus, it does not toll the time period for Della to adjudicate heirship under section 91-1-15(3). “Adjudicate” means “[t]o settle in the exercise of judicial authority.” Black’s Law Dictionary 42 (6th ed.1990). The only judicial proceeding regarding Floyd’s heirship were filed by Williams in 2008, well after Floyd had died. The delayed birth certificate has no legal effect on how illegitimates become heirs at law; Title 91 of the Mississippi Code does not mention usage of birth certificates to “adjudicate” paternity. Furthermore, the delayed birth certificate does not meet the requirements of a “voluntary acknowledgment” of paternity by Floyd either. Mississippi Code Annotated section 93-9-28 (Rev.2004) is the only statute that provides a procedure whereby the natural father of an illegitimate child may voluntarily acknowledge the child as his own. In re Estate of Farmer ex rel. Farmer, 964 So.2d 498, 500 (¶ 4) (Miss.2007). The statute states that within twenty-four hours of the birth of an illegitimate child, healthcare providers are to provide a form generated by the Mississippi State Department of Health which states “the execution of the acknowledgment of paternity shall result in the same legal effect as if the father and mother had been married at the time of the birth of the child.” The father and mother complete and execute the form before a notary public, and the form is forwarded to the Department of Health. This “voluntary acknowledgment shall constitute a full determination of the legal parentage of the child.” Miss.Code Ann. § 93-9-28 (Rev.2004). However, this statute was enacted in 1994, and it is not applicable here. Therefore, Floyd’s execution of the delayed birth certificate in 1964 does not meet the requirements for adjudication of paternity under section 91 — 1— 15(3).

¶ 13. Olivia claims that because testimony at the hearing showed Floyd acknowledged Della as his daughter by “spoken words and actions,” there is clear and convincing evidence that Della is the natural-born daughter of Floyd. Olivia testified that Floyd was her grandfather; and Floyd acknowledged Della to be his daughter and she, Linda, Carolyn, Edward, and Dwight to be his grandchildren. Further, she testified that Floyd maintained a relationship with them throughout his lifetime. Olivia maintained that: she knew Williams from a young age; Williams slept with Olivia and her other siblings at Floyd’s home; and Williams knew Olivia and her siblings were Della’s children and that Della was Floyd’s child. Olivia stated Williams and Della went to school together. O’Neal, Floyd’s niece, corroborated much of this testimony and added that Cora knew Della was Floyd’s daughter. Further, Floyd treated Della and her children as his daughter and grandchildren, as did everyone else in the family. However, while this evidence may indicate that Floyd acknowledged Della, as his daughter, as stated earlier, this “acknowledgment” of possible paternity is insufficient under section 91-1-15(3) because the paternity was never adjudicated by a court of law, let alone within the appropriate time limits. Olivia cannot now argue that she has met her burden of proof by providing clear and convincing evidence that Floyd was Della’s daughter approximately twenty-five years after the three-year catch-up period had expired.

¶ 14. Neither Olivia nor her siblings brought a claim to prove heirship within the three-year catch-up period of July 1, 1981, to July 1, 1984, as specified by section 91-1-15(3). In fact, Olivia never petitioned to determine heirship at all; instead, Williams brought the petition, approximately twenty-four years after the statute of limitations had run, in response to litigation initiated by Olivia and Olivia’s siblings. Olivia explained that she did not ever file a petition to determine heirship because she was ignorant of “Mississippi adjudication or what have you,” but the statute does not allow the time limit to be tolled for ignorance of the law.

¶ 15. Olivia did not show that the three instances were met under section 91-1-15(3) whereby an illegitimate and her kindred may inherit under the laws of descent and distribution. It is undisputed that Floyd and Cletho never married. Further, there was no “adjudication of paternity or legitimacy” either before Floyd’s death as Olivia argues in this issue or after the death of Floyd within the statutory time limits. Thus, any claim of heirship by Della or her heirs is time-barred. It was not until September 15, 2008, that Williams, not Olivia, filed a petition to adjudicate heirship, approximately twenty-nine years after Floyd’s death. Because Olivia and her siblings did not follow the plain language of section 91-1-15, Olivia has no claim to Floyd’s estate. The chancery court properly found that Olivia failed to prove her possible heirship by clear and convincing evidence. Accordingly, the chancery court did not err in finding that Della’s possible claim of inheritance was barred, and Floyd’s sole was his widow, Cora.

2. Whether the statute of limitations provided in section 91-l-15(c) was tolled.

¶ 16. Olivia next argues that the statute of limitations under section 91 — 1— 15(3) was tolled by Cora’s execution of the 1983 warranty deed. She contends that Cora acted as an administratrix de son tort when she conveyed real property to Smith in 1983 without determining who Floyd’s heirs were; she claims that this should have been done either immediately after Floyd died in 1979 or when Cora conveyed the real property. Olivia maintains that Cora fraudulently concealed this conveyance and the heirship interest in Floyd’s estate, thereby wrongfully taking all of the proceeds from the sale of the property to the disadvantage of Floyd’s heirs. Thus, Olivia reasons that the statute of limitations for determining paternity or legitimacy under section 91-1-15(3) was tolled until Williams filed her petition to determine heirship in September 2008.

¶ 17. The doctrine of executor-ship de son tort has long been recognized in Mississippi. See Hardy v. Thomas, 23 Miss. 544 (1852). An executrix de son tort is generally “[a] person who presumes to act on behalf of an estate but without authority.” Mann v. Buford, 853 So.2d 1217, 1220 (¶ 13) (Miss.2003). The literal meaning of the term is that the person is an executor “of his own wrong.” Black’s Law Dictionary 448 (6th ed.1990). A person is considered an executor de son tort if he takes part in “any intermeddling with the estate of a decedent under a claim of authority” or “any act characteristic of the office of a rightful executor or which evinces legal control” such as “taking possession of the assets without administration and controlling the property as if the taker were the legal representative.” In re Estate of Johnson, 705 So.2d 819, 822 (¶ 28) (Miss.1996). Likewise, “[a]n admin-istratrix de son tort is held to the same standard of trust and fiduciary responsibilities as a duly-appointed administratrix or executrix.” Id.

¶ 18. At the outset, we note that Olivia did not raise this argument before the chancery court; therefore, she is barred from raising it as an issue on appeal. See Albert v. Allied Glove Corp., 944 So.2d 1, 7 (¶ 21) (Miss.2006). Notwithstanding the procedural bar, her argument is also without merit. First, Cora or any interested party had no reason to investigate the possible illegitimate heirs of Floyd at the time of his death in 1979 because, at that time, the laws of Mississippi did not allow illegitimates to inherit from their father or his kindred by the laws of descent and distribution. It was not until the Mississippi Code was amended in 1981 that an illegitimate could inherit from his father and father’s kindred, under certain circumstances. Weems, at § 1:10.

¶ 19. Second, there is no reason that the statute of limitations in section 91-1-15 was tolled. None of Cora’s actions in the record indicate she was acting as an ad-ministratrix de son tort regarding Floyd’s estate. The only evidence Olivia offers of improper meddling or bad faith on the part of Cora is Cora’s conveyance of property to Smith in 1983 without first ascertaining Floyd’s possible heirs. Yet, we note Cora was not acting as an administra-trix of Floyd’s estate when she conveyed this property; instead, she acted as Floyd’s sole heir-at-law, since neither Olivia nor her siblings had made any effort to adjudicate Della’s paternity.

¶ 20. Olivia, however, argues that it was Cora’s duty to ascertain Floyd’s possible heirs when Cora conveyed the property in 1983, regardless of whether Cora was ad-ministratrix of Floyd’s estate or not. Because Cora did not, Olivia argues that any time limits should be tolled. Olivia relies on Estate of Thomas v. Thomas, 883 So.2d 1173, 1177 (¶ 12) (Miss.2004) for the proposition that “the administratrix of an estate is under a duty to use reasonable diligence to ascertain potential heirs,” and her duty is also to provide notice to known illegitimate children who are potential heirs whose claims could be barred by the statute of limitations. (Citing Smith ex rel. Young v. Estate of King, 579 So.2d 1250, 1252 (Miss.1991)). In Thomas, the ninety-day period of section 91-l-15(3)(c) to file an adjudication of paternity following the first publication of notice of creditors for claims to the decedent’s estate was tolled because the illegitimate children lacked notice from the administratrix of their possible claims to Ezell Thomas’s estate, when the administratrix knew of the illegiti-mates’ existence. Id. at 1179 (¶¶ 22-23). Olivia also cites to Leflore ex rel. Primer v. Coleman, 521 So.2d 863, 868 (Miss.1988) for the proposition that the law will not permit a deliberate concealment of potential heirs at law by the administratrix. Olivia concludes that Cora should be held to the same standard as if she were the duly appointed administratrix of Floyd’s estate. We disagree.

¶ 21. Olivia is correct that the mandatory compliance by an illegitimate with the provisions of section 91-1-15(3) “presupposes good faith compliance by administrator with the obligation imposed upon him [or her] by law to advise the court and secure process upon all heirs known to him [or her],” and “neither will the law permit a deliberate concealment by an administrator of a potential lawful heir.” Leflore, 521 So.2d at 868. But Thomas and Leflore are distinguishable from the present case. First, both of these cases deal with the tolling of section 91 — 1—15(3)(c)’s ninety-day statute of limitations once notice to the intestate’s creditors is published, which is inapplicable here, and not the three-year catch-up period from 1981 to 1984, which is at issue here.

¶ 22. Second, as stated earlier, Cora was not acting as the administratrix of Floyd’s estate when she conveyed the property to Smith four years after Floyd had died intestate, and Cora had no legal duty to give notice to Della’s hems of the conveyance. See Leflore, 521 So.2d at 868. On the other hand, the administratrix in Thomas had the duty to give notice to Thomas’s illegitimate children because proof was presented that the administra-trix knew of the existence of the illegiti-mates, but did not give them notice until after the applicable ninety-day and one-year time limits had run. Thomas, 883 So.2d at 1177 (¶ 13).

¶ 23. In this case, we cannot say that Cora, who was not the administratrix of Floyd’s estate, should have notified Della’s children of their possible heirship when she executed the warranty deed in 1983. We also note that neither Thomas nor Leflore dealt with an administratrix de son tort, which is Olivia’s primary argument justifying the tolling of the statute of limitations in this case.

¶ 24. The Mississippi Supreme Court has not hesitated to affirm claims that chancery courts have found time-barred because they were not brought within the three-year catch-up period provided in section 91-1-15(3). Williams directs our attention to a case where the supreme court recently held that an attempt to adjudicate paternity by half siblings was time-barred under the statute of limitations of section 91-1-15(3): Estate of McCullough v. Yates, 32 So.3d 403, 416 (¶ 42) (Miss.2010). While there was no allegation of an administration de son tort by the alleged heirs, we find the case analogous to the present case. The decedent died in 1978, and an estate was never opened. Id. at 407 (¶ 9). The alleged illegitimates argued that the time period for adjudicating heirship began with the date of the death of the decedent’s half sibling in 2003, not the date of the decedent’s death in 1978. Id. at (¶ 12). Because the decedent died in 1978, before the amendment of section 91-1-15, the supreme court stated that the illegiti-mates had three years, from July 1, 1981, until July 1, 1984, to adjudicate paternity under section 91-1-15(3), but it was not done until twenty-five years after the decedent’s death. Id. at 411 (¶ 25). Accordingly, the illegitimates’ claims were time-barred. Id.

¶ 25. Similarly, in Davidson, this Court affirmed the chancery court’s denial of the alleged illegitimate heir’s petition to determine adjudication and become the heir of the decedent’s property because of the time bar under section 91-1-15. In re Estates of Davidson, 794 So.2d at 266 (¶ 14). There, the intestate decedent died in 1975, but the alleged illegitimate daughter did not file her petition to determine heirship until 1998, after the death of the intestate’s wife. Id. at 263 (¶¶ 3, 4). Prior to that, she had never asserted a claim to be the daughter of the intestate. Id. at (¶ 4). This Court held that the claim should have been brought during the three-year period from 1981 until 1984, and since it was not, the claim was time-barred. Id. at 266 (¶ 14).

¶ 26. Olivia, however, contends that In re Estate of Johnson, 705 So.2d 819 (Miss. 1996) is controlling in the present case. In Johnson, the supreme court held the decedent’s half-sister and another individual were acting as administratrices de son tort, and their actions operated as a waiver of the statutory three-year time period provided in section 91-1-15 against the illegitimate heir. Johnson, 705 So.2d at 823 (¶ 36). Robert Johnson, the famed blues musician, died in 1938. Id at 820 (¶ 8). He had an illegitimate child, Claud Johnson, who was born in 1931, and whose birth certificate listed Johnson as his father. Id at (¶ 7). Carrie Thompson was Johnson’s half-sister and held herself as the only known living heir of Robert Johnson from 1974 until her death in 1983. Id at 820, 821 (¶¶ 3, 23). Thompson entered into an agreement in 1974, assigning all of her purported rights to the copyrights of Johnson’s work to an individual in return for fifty percent of the royalties collected. Id at 820 (¶ 9). Thompson died testate in 1983, appointing Annye Anderson, Thompson’s half-sister, who was unrelated to Johnson, as her personal representative, and devising all of her rights and claims to Anderson and Thompson’s grandson. Id at 820 (¶ 13). In 1989, Johnson’s estate was probated, and Anderson was appointed the administratrix of Johnson’s estate. Id at 820-22 (¶¶ 4, 14). Claud timely responded to a petition to determine heirs, claiming he was the sole hem to Johnson’s estate. Id at 821-22 (¶¶ 17,19).

¶ 27. The chancery court dismissed Claud’s claim, but the supreme court reversed, holding that his claim was not time-barred by section 91 — 1—15(3)’s three-year catch-up period, because both Thompson and Anderson assumed the status of executrices de son tort of Johnson’s unpro-bated estate. Id at 823 (¶¶ 31-32). Thompson acquired this status related to Johnson’s unprobated estate when she entered into the agreement in 1974 purporting to be Johnson’s sister and only surviving heir. Id at 823 (¶ 32). Thompson assigned her alleged rights to Johnson’s intellectual property to an individual in return for royalties paid to her and efforts to capitalize on Johnson’s legacy. Id at 820 (¶ 9). Also, Anderson garnered this status by obtaining an irrevocable power of attorney from Thompson and accepting appointment as the personal representative of Thompson’s estate. Id at 823 (¶ 32). She also admitted that in 1981, she was dealing with Johnson’s estate with her sister, Thompson. Id The record showed Anderson was aware of the duties of an administratrix from 1981 to 1984 and had been told by counsel that she should select an attorney in Mississippi to open Johnson’s estate for probate purposes, but she did not. Id at (¶ 33). The supreme court determined both Thompson and Anderson presented themselves as representatives of Johnson’s estate “during the critical window from 1981 to 1984” and “took actions ... which likely chilled any interest ... others would have had in ... locating the rightful heirs.” Id at (¶ 34). Because Anderson and Thompson aggressively in-termeddled in Johnson’s estate, and they took a position which was beneficial to themselves and detrimental to Claud, the supreme court concluded that their actions as administratrices de son tort operated as a waiver of the statutory bar against Claud, based on reasons of equity. Id at (¶ 36). Claud could pursue his claim as the illegitimate son of Johnson to the same extent as if he had filed his claim between July 1,1981, and July 1,1984. Id

¶28. We find Johnson distinguishable from the instant case. In Johnson, the property at issue was personal property, not real property, as in this case. There are certain acts which do not make one liable as an executor de son tort, such as “taking possession of property of the decedent under color of title and in the good faith belief that a right to possession exists.” 31 Am.Jur.2d Executors and Administrators § 38 (2d ed.2002). Furthermore, “[n]o amount of intermeddling with the real estate of a decedent will make one an executor de son tort....” Id. at § 39; see also 34 C.J.S. Executors and Administrators § 1222 (2009) (“Intermeddling with real estate does not constitute a person executor de son tort.”). This limitation of the doctrine is logical as “[r]eal property descends directly to, and title vests in, the heirs at law to enjoy until the contingency arises when it may be needed to pay debts. Administration then covers only the decedent’s personalty and the realty is in no way involved unless and until the personalty becomes insufficient to pay the debts and expenses.” Weems, at § 2:13. Olivia’s argument that Cora acted as an administratrix de son tort involves the conveyance of the real property Cora possessed by operation of law and not as a representative of Floyd’s estate. Olivia makes no claim of intermeddling with any personal property of Floyd’s estate, only real property. Therefore, the doctrine of administratrix de son tort is inapplicable here.

¶ 29. Further analogizing to Johnson, Olivia insists that Cora acted as adminis-tratrix de son tort because Cora, through the 1983 conveyance, improperly took property to the benefit of herself and to the detriment of the potential heirs. Olivia explains that the deed implied Cora owned and conveyed 100% of the real property, when in fact she only owned and conveyed one-half of the interest in the property, and she claims this action is fraudulent concealment. Olivia contends that because the deed to Floyd and Cora is silent about creating a joint tenancy with right of survivorship, it must be construed as an estate in common; thus, Floyd has an undivided one-half interest in the property, which, upon his death, vested in his heirs at law. Cora, on the other hand, maintained her one-half undivided interest plus whatever fraction she received as Floyd’s heir-at-law. Olivia claims that Cora knew, at the time of the conveyance, that she did not own all of the property but “intentionally cut-out” Floyd’s heirs at law.

¶ 30. We find this argument without merit. Regarding the conveyance, there is no evidence in the record of fraudulent concealment on the part of Cora. The deed was duly recorded in the land records of Simpson County. And even if Cora’s conveyance had been fraudulent, in Mann, the supreme court held that “[alleged wrongful conveyances of estate property do not toll the statute of limitations for filing a claim of heirship.” Mann, 853 So.2d at 1220 (¶ 16). In Mann, the alleged heir was aware that the decedent had died in 1981 and that he might have a possible claim to the estate as an illegitimate child, but he waited until the death of the decedent’s widow, which occurred eighteen years later, before filing a petition to determine heirship. Id. The supreme court held the illegitimate son’s heirship claim was barred by the time constraints provided in section 91-1-15. Id.

¶ 31. Similar to the alleged executrices de son tort in Mann, there were no acts by Cora in the record that show she purposefully prevented Olivia and her siblings from determining they might have a claim to Floyd’s estate. Olivia testified that she was aware of Floyd’s death, and she “wondered” about the land in Mississippi upon Cora’s death in 1994. Further, she said she knew of the conveyance of the property by Cora beginning in 1995. Because of the three-year catch-up period stated in section 91-1-15, Olivia and her siblings had from July 1, 1981, until July 1,1984, to file an adjudication of heirship proceeding, but they did not do so. Cora’s conveyance of property in no way prevented Floyd’s heirs from filing such a petition.

¶ 82. The dissent claims that it was Cora’s responsibility as Floyd’s heir to bring a suit to establish heirship prior to her conveyance of the property in 1983. Such is not the law in Mississippi. The Mississippi Supreme Court has stated:

“[Tjhere appears to be no valid reason to require an heir to institute ... costly and time consuming procedures to determine heirship absent a question concerning his status as an heir. An heir is not required to institute proceedings to establish his heirship at any specific time after the death of the decedent. Rather, such proceedings need only be brought when a question arises concerning the status of a person as a lawful heir of the estate. Once such a question arises, then a suit to establish heirship must be brought to establish that person’s claim.”

In re McLeod v. Price, 506 So.2d 289, 292 (Miss.1987) (emphasis added).

¶ 38. When Floyd died intestate in 1979, his share of the property vested in Cora, regardless of how the property was held by the couple. Cora’s status as Floyd’s heir has never been in question. After the law changed in 1981, there was a three-year catch-up period in which Della’s descendants could have sought to establish their right to a share of Floyd’s estate. Della’s descendants had not filed any such action by 1983 when Cora conveyed the property, and there was no dispute as to Floyd’s heirs at that time. As was noted by the chancellor, from the time of Floyd’s death, Cora, at a minimum, owned a one-half undivided interest in the property as Floyd’s widow, even if Della were proven to be Floyd’s illegitimate child. If Cora only owned one-half interest in the property and not the whole property, she would be liable to Smith under her warranty of title. However, her conveyance of at least one-half interest was done as an owner of the property under intestate succession and not as an administrator of Floyd’s estate. Once legal proceedings were initiated regarding Floyd’s heirship, the pertinent statute of limitations had expired, and the claim of Della’s descendants was barred. We find no legal authority to support the dissent’s position that Cora had to initiate a suit to determine heirship prior to transferring property to Smith. It was the responsibility of Della’s descendants to seek to establish their heirship if they chose to do so. They did not. Nothing about Cora’s conveyance of the property gave her any fiduciary duty to Della’s children. She was not the administratrix of the estate. Further, the conveyance was not hidden. It was duly recorded in the land records of Simpson County. Therefore, the statute of limitations was not tolled for Cora’s failure to initiate these legal proceedings.

¶ 34. According to the record, Cora did not engage in any conduct that might render her an administratrix de son tort. Instead, proper and timely steps were not taken by Della’s heirs to preserve their possible claims to Floyd’s estate. This issue is without merit.

¶ 35. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CHANCERY COURT OF SIMPSON COUNTY IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE APPELLANT.

KING, C.J., LEE AND MYERS, P.JJ, IRVING, GRIFFIS, ISHEE, ROBERTS AND MAXWELL, JJ„ CONCUR. CARLTON, J, DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION.

CARLTON, J.,

dissenting:

¶ 86. I respectfully dissent from the majority. I submit that this Court should reverse and remand this case to the chancellor for further review. The record fails to show that Cora Badgett McIntosh possessed a sole ownership interest in Floyd McIntosh’s property when she purported to convey the property, as his sole heir, in 1983 with knowledge of the existence of Floyd’s predeceased heir, his predeceased illegitimate daughter Della Mae McIntosh, and with knowledge of Floyd’s five grandchildren born to Della. The 1988 deed, wherein Cora deeded one acre of the property in dispute, reflects that she represented her status in the conveyance as Floyd’s sole heir. This 1983 conveyance occurred during the three-year window created by Mississippi Code Annotated section 91-1-15 (Supp.2010), wherein illegitimates could bring actions in estates where the decedent died prior to July 1, 1981. During this window, Cora was not the only potential heir of Floyd. “[Ó]nce a question arises as to a person’s status as a lawful heir of the estate, an action to establish heirship must be brought....” Robert A. Weems, Wills and Administration of Estates in Mississippi § 1:21 (3rd ed.2003). Della’s heirs received no prior notice of the 1983 conveyance. Accordingly, I would remand this case to the chancellor for a determination of whether this 1983 conveyance by Della tolled the three-year window set forth in Mississippi Code Annotated section 91-1-15 as to Floyd’s grandchildren, the children of his illegitimate daughter, Della. See Weems, at § 1:5 (addressing heirs at law and the right of representation being conferred on children, grandchildren, and so forth).

¶ 37. Admittedly, a proper administration of Floyd’s intestate estate would have provided notice to any other putative heirs claiming an interest in such property. However, since no such administration occurred prior to Cora’s sale of Floyd’s property in 1983, then proper notice as required by law was not provided to any of Floyd’s putative heirs at that time when the property, wherein they now claim an interest, was conveyed. See generally Weems, at § 1:10 (showing clearly that an administrator, where appointed, would have been required to provide such notice). Hence, I respectfully submit that the chancellor must evaluate whether the lack of notice that occurred at the time of the 1983 conveyance tolled the statute of limitations, or not, in the assertion of rights or claims of any existing putative heirs of Floyd. See In re Estate of Farmer ex rel. Fanner, 964 So.2d 498, 500 (Miss.2007) (holding that acknowledgment satisfying Mississippi Code Annotated section 93-9-28 (Rev.2004) also satisfied the requirements for heirship rights pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated section 91 — 1— 15(3)(a) (Rev.2004)).

¶ 38. A review of the birth certifícate in the record reflects that Floyd voluntarily acknowledged Della on her birth certificate in 1965, when she was thirty-nine years old, because she never possessed a birth certificate prior to that time. Hence, Floyd provided such as his reason for his lack of prior acknowledgment. Moreover, the facts of this case fail to establish that Della’s birth occurred at a hospital or that she possessed any birth certificate prior to 1965.

¶ 39. Based upon the foregoing reasons, I would reverse and remand this case to the chancellor for further consideration.

      . For simplicity's sake, we shall use “adminis-tratrix,” the feminine form of "administrator” throughout this opinion, since Cora is female.

      . We use “executor” and "administrator” interchangeably here.

      . McLeod made clear that if the claimant is an illegitimate, the question as to that person's status arises at the decedent's death. Id. at 292.

      . According to Mississippi Code Annotated section 91-1-3 (Rev.2004), if the descendent dies intestate, the widow receives a child’s share of the estate.

      . The record indicates that Floyd and Cora did not hold the property as joint tenants with rights of survivorship.

      . I submit that Cora should not escape notice requirements simply because she failed to open an administration of Floyd’s estate.

      .Specifically, the chancellor should address whether Cora's representation, or misrepresentation, that she stood as the sole heir of Floyd at the time when she deeded the acre in 1983 served to toll the three-year window for illegitimates to establish rights in estates.

      . I mention this notation on the birth certificate to ensure that no inference is raised to insinuate that Floyd’s delay in providing a public voluntary acknowledgment of Della as his daughter was for any reason other than the mere fact that Della did not have a birth certificate prior to this late date.