text:
    Blake BOONE, Appellant v. Susan Ladette BOONE, Appellee.
    No. 2010-CA-01268-COA.
    Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
    Feb. 7, 2012.

      Damon Scott Gibson, attorney for appellant.
    Herbert J. Stelly, Gulfport, attorney for appellee.
   CARLTON, J.,

for the Court:

¶ 1. On April 7, 2010, the Hancock County Chancery Court entered an Agreed Judgment of Divorce between Blake and Susan Boone on the ground of irreconcilable differences. Shortly thereafter, Susan filed a “Complaint to Cite for Contempt and for Other Relief’ based on the Agreed Judgment of Divorce entered between the parties. After a hearing on June 10, 2010, the Hancock County Chancery Court entered a “Judgment on Corn-plaint to Cite for Contempt and for Other Relief,” (hereinafter referred to “Judgment of Contempt and Other Relief’) in favor of Susan against her former husband, Blake, and the court awarded Susan attorney’s fees. Aggrieved, Blake appeals, raising the following assignments of error: (1) the Judgment of Contempt and Other Relief should be set aside as void because the Agreed Judgment of Divorce is void due to the court’s failure to adjudicate all issues prior to entering the divorce as required by Mississippi Code Annotated section 93-5-2(3) (Supp.2011); (2) the Judgment of Contempt and Other Relief should be set aside as void because the underlying Agreed Judgment of Divorce is void due to the parties’ failure to agree or acknowledge in writing or otherwise that the decision of the court on the issues left to be decided would be a binding and lawful judgment as required by section 93-5-2(3); (3) the Judgment of Contempt and Other Relief is void because the chancery court failed to possess personal jurisdiction over him due to the defectiveness of the summons; (4) the Judgment of Contempt and Other Relief is void due to improper venue; (5) the award of attorney’s fees to Susan is against the overwhelming weight of the evidence; (6) the Judgment of Contempt and Other Relief awarding Susan a judgment in the amount of $11,627.30 on her claims of fraud and misrepresentation is improper due to the defectiveness of the summons; (7) the Judgment of Contempt and Other Relief is improper because it granted relief not requested in the complaint; (8) the court erred in finding him in contempt for his failure to pay child support and lump-sum alimony not yet due when the complaint was filed nor at the time of the trial; and (9) the court erred when it set aside its order pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 62(a) staying execution of the contempt judgment placing him in jail on weekends prior to the entry of the order disposing of the motion for a new trial.

¶ 2. As set forth herein, we find that the order styled Agreed Judgment of Divorce fails to constitute a final judgment since the non-final order fails to comply with the statutory requirements as set forth in Mississippi Code Annotated section 93-5-2(3) due to the chancellor’s grant of the divorce prior to resolving all attendant matters between the parties. We further find that the related Judgment of Contempt and Other Relief is void; therefore, that judgment must be set aside.

FACTS

¶ 3. Blake and Susan married on May 23, 1992. The marriage produced three children: a daughter born in 1994, a son born in 1995, and a daughter born in 1996. The parties separated on April 2, 2008.

¶ 4. On April 7, 2010, the Hancock County Chancery Court filed an Agreed Judgment of Divorce between the parties on the ground of irreconcilable differences. On that same day, the parties entered into a “Child Custody, Child Support!,] and Property Settlement Agreement” (the Settlement Agreement), which the court incorporated into the Agreed Judgment of Divorce. However, the Settlement Agreement as incorporated failed to resolve all matters between the parties as required by Mississippi Code Annotated section 93-5-2(3).

¶ 5. The Settlement Agreement required Blake to pay Susan $1,330 in temporary monthly child support and $96,000 in lump-sum alimony to be paid over a ten-year period at $800 per month. The Settlement Agreement also required Blake to convey to Susan all right, title, and interest in the parties’ eighty acres of land and the trailer, which was the parties’ current family home that sat on the property. The Settlement Agreement further stated that all future payments on the trailer and the taxes and insurance for the land became Susan’s responsibility after the execution of the Settlement Agreement. Additionally, the Settlement Agreement required Blake to bring current the then-delinquent child-support payments and temporary spousal-support payments in the amount of $2,330; attorney’s fees in the amount of $1,553; $177.33 to CitiBank; and $10.22 to Cellular South. These delinquent payments were to be paid out of Blake’s first paycheck with his new place of employment and, if insufficient, from his second paycheck.

¶ 6. As previously noted, the parties agreed in the Settlement Agreement, which was incorporated into the order styled Agreed Judgment of Divorce, to particular terms and conditions therein and submitted the following seven matters for the chancellor to resolve:

1. Who should pay the balance of the CitiCard bill?
2. Who should pay the phone bills for the children and should there be a change in phone service from Verizon to Cellular South[?]
3. Who is to be held responsible for the children’s medical bills incurred during the course of the marriage as well [as] during the course of the pending domestic relations litigation?
4. Should the Husband be required to pay any or all of the attorney’s fees incurred by the Wife during litigation process leading up to this divorce?
5. Should the Husband be held responsible for the outstanding $500 dental bill?
6. The issue of expenditures made out of the insurance fund resulting from Hurricane Katrina is to be reviewed by the [c]ourt and it is to be determined what is equitable with regard to such expenditures^] and if need be adjustments made so that equity may be achieved between both parties.
7. Should the Husband be required to divide the 2008 federal and state income tax refund?

¶ 7. On May 27, 2010, approximately six weeks after the chancery court entered the order styled Agreed Judgment of Divorce, Susan filed a Complaint for Contempt and Other Relief. In her Complaint for Contempt and Other Relief, Susan moved the court to find Blake in willful and contumacious contempt of the prior orders of the court, and she also moved the court to address the seven unresolved matters arising out of the order styled Agreed Judgment of Divorce and identified in the Settlement Agreement. Susan also asked the court to address an additional matter and order Blake to repay $11,627.30 to Green Tree, the mortgage company for the trailer. The $11,627.30 reflects the monetary sum originally paid on the trailer’s mortgage prior to entering into the Settlement Agreement. However, unbeknownst to Susan, Green Tree refunded this money, which had previously been paid on the mortgage, to Blake upon his unilateral request. Blake received notice of the hearing on Susan’s Complaint for Contempt and Other Relief through service of process by Rule 81 summons. See M.R.C.P. 81.

¶8. The hearing on Susan’s Complaint for Contempt and Other Relief commenced on June 10, 2010. Blake failed to appear at this hearing. Susan, however, attended the hearing and presented testimony and various exhibits to the chancery court. During the hearing, the chancellor addressed both the contempt matters and the request for other relief which sought resolution of the unresolved matters arising from the Agreed Judgment of Divorce. At the conclusion of the hearing, the chancellor in his bench opinion found, among other things, that Blake was in contempt of court for his failure to abide by the court’s prior orders and judgment, including the terms of the Settlement Agreement.

¶ 9. In addition to the contempt matter, the chancellor also resolved the seven issues pending in the divorce that the parties had submitted to the chancellor for resolution. The chancellor then awarded Susan attorney’s fees in the amount of $30,220.59 and a judgment in the amount of $11,627.30, the amount refunded by Green Tree to Blake in response to his unilateral request for such refund. The chancery court also ordered Blake be incarcerated in the Hancock County Jail every weekend from 6:00 p.m. on Friday to 6:00 a.m. on Monday until such time as he either fully complied with the court’s judgment or until further order of the court. On June 11, 2010, the chancellor subsequently filed an order that memorialized his detailed bench opinion in which he addressed both the contempt findings and the additional divorce matters previously submitted for his resolution in the Agreed Judgment of Divorce.

¶ 10. On June 21, 2010, Blake filed a “Motion for New Trial and Motion to Reconsider Judgment on Complaint to Cite for Contempt and for Other Relief,” wherein he requested, among other things, that the chancery court enter an order staying the operation of the judgment pursuant to Rule 62(a). While the chancery court initially entered an order staying the June 11, 2010 Judgment for Contempt and Other Relief, the court set aside its order after a status conference on July 1, 2010, and ordered Blake apprehended and incarcerated as previously ordered.

¶ 11. Blake then filed an amended motion for a new trial and motion to reconsider, which the chancery court denied. The amended motion for a new trial asserted several basis for error, including that the Judgment of Contempt and Other Relief was void because the chancery court lacked jurisdiction over him due to insufficient process. Blake also contends the summons issued by the Hancock County Chancery Clerk was void because the hearing on the complaint was held outside of Hancock County, Mississippi, and the Rule 81 summons he had received provided him insufficient notice as to Susan’s Complaint for Contempt and Other Relief since the “other relief’ addressed matters outside the scope of Rule 81.

¶ 12. On July 26, 2010, the chancellor filed an order discharging Blake of the requirement that he report to the county jail to be incarcerated because Blake purged the required amount. Blake then filed his notice of appeal.

¶ 13. Blake asserts in his appellate brief that he failed to raise the validity of the Agreed Judgment of Divorce before the chancery court prior to filing his notice of appeal on August 20, 2010. Blake contends he raised the issues for the first time in his motion under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4). Blake’s Rule 60(b)(4) motion was filed with the chancery court on February 23, 2011, after he had perfected the appeal by filing his notice of appeal on August 20, 2010. We find, however, that Blake’s August 20, 2010, notice of appeal and his amended motion for a new trial sufficiently placed the validity of the Agreed Judgment of Divorce and the resulting Judgment of Contempt and Other Relief before this Court for our review on appeal. Accordingly, we have reviewed issues raised relating to both the Agreed Judgment of Divorce and the Judgment of Contempt and Other Relief in our discussion of this case.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

II14. “We will not disturb a chancellor’s findings of fact ‘unless the chancellor’s decision is manifestly wrong or unsupported by substantial evidence.’ ” Clark v. Clark, 43 So.3d 496, 499 (¶ 9) (Miss.Ct.App.2010) (quoting Bougard v. Bougard, 991 So.2d 646, 648 (¶ 12) (Miss.Ct.App.2008)). However, “when reviewing questions concerning jurisdiction, this court employs a de novo review.” Id. (quoting Sanghi v. Sanghi, 759 So.2d 1250, 1252 (¶ 7) (Miss.Ct. App.2000)). Further, the failure of a chancellor to first resolve all matters prior to granting an irreconcilable-differences divorce acts as a procedural error. Curtis v. Curtis, 59 So.3d 623, 628 (¶ 16) (Miss.Ct.App.2011). See also Rounsaville v. Rounsaville, 732 So.2d 909, 911 (¶¶8-9) (Miss.1999).

¶ 15. Additionally, we recognize that if a judgment is void, the trial court possesses no discretion; the court must set the void judgment aside. Clark, 43 So.3d at 501 (¶ 21) (citing Soriano v. Gillespie, 857 So.2d 64, 69-70 (¶22) (Miss.Ct.App.2003)). “Specifically, a judgment is void ‘if the court that rendered it lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter, or of the parties, or if it acted in a manner inconsistent with due process of law.’” Id. (citation omitted).

¶ 16. Furthermore, the rules pertaining to service of process are to be strictly construed. Kolikas v. Kolikas, 821 So.2d 874, 878 (¶ 16) (Miss.Ct.App.2002) (citing Birindelli v. Egelston, 404 So.2d 322, 323-24 (Miss.1981)).

DISCUSSION

¶ 17. Blake’s assignments of error (1), (2), (3), and (4) assert that the Judgment of Contempt and Other Relief is void on various grounds: attacking the validity of the Agreed Judgment of Divorce, claiming that the Rule 81 summons was defective, and asserting improper venue. We agree with Blake that the Judgment of Contempt and Other Relief is void but reach our result on different grounds than those asserted by Blake. Thus, we consolidate our discussion of Blake’s first four assignments of error relating to the void Judgment of Contempt and Other Relief and the Agreed Judgment of Divorce. We further find the Agreed Judgment of Divorce was not a final order and dismiss the appeal as to the remaining assignments of error.

I. ENFORCEABILITY OF THE AGREED JUDGMENT OF DIVORCE AND THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

¶ 18. Blake first argues that the Judgment of Contempt and Other Relief should be set aside as void because the Agreed Judgment of Divorce is void due to the failure of the parties and the chancery court to comply with the substantive requirements of Mississippi Code Annotated section 93-5-2(3). Specifically, Blake alleges that the parties failed to agree or acknowledge in writing or otherwise that the Agreed Judgment of Divorce and Settlement Agreement would constitute a binding and lawful judgment as required by section 93 — 5—2(3). Blake also claims the chancery court erred by failing to adjudicate all issues prior to entry of the Agreed Judgment of Divorce as required by section 93 — 5—2(3). As discussed below, we find the Settlement Agreement constitutes an agi'eement enforceable by the chancellor with respect to the terms and conditions agreed upon therein by the parties. However, we find that the Agreed Judgment of Divorce entered by the chancellor constitutes a non-final order since it left matters attendant to the divorce remaining before the chancery court. Because we find that the Agreed Judgment of Divorce was not a final judgment from which an appeal could be taken, we must dismiss it due to our lack of jurisdiction.

A. Settlement Agreement

¶ 19. Blake first contends that the Judgment of Contempt and Other Relief is void because the parties did not agree or acknowledge in writing or otherwise that the decision of the chancery court on the issues left to be decided in the Settlement Agi'eement would be a binding and lawful judgment as required by Mississippi Code Annotated section 93-5-2(3). As stated, we find no merit to this claim.

¶ 20. “Property settlements that are incorporated into a divorce decree become part of the final judgment for all legal intents and purposes.” Patterson v. Patterson, 20 So.3d 65, 72 (¶ 21) (Miss.Ct.App.2009) (citing Switzer v. Switzer, 460 So.2d 843, 845 (Miss.1984)). “A true and genuine property settlement agreement is no different from any other contract, and the mere fact that it is between a divorcing husband and wife, and incorporated in a divorce decree, does not change its character.” Id. (quoting East v. East, 493 So.2d 927, 931-32 (Miss.1986)). See Day v. Day, 28 So.3d 672, 676 (¶ 12) (Miss.Ct.App.2010).

¶ 21. In the present case, we find that the Settlement Agreement is an enforceable contract as to the terms and conditions agreed to therein by the parties. The Settlement Agreement on its face shows Blake’s understanding that he became contractually bound to the agreement upon executing it. The Settlement Agreement states, in pertinent part, as follows:

The parties have read and understood the terms and provisions of this agreement[,] by executing this agreement they shall be firmly, contractually bound thereby. Both parties agree to cooperate in performing the terms and conditions of this property settlement, child custody!,] and child support agreement and in the implementation thereof. The parties further represent that they enter into this agreement having fullfy] and completely considered all aspects thereof and having had the benefit of advice of their respective counsel of record. The parties finally agree and acknowledge that this property settlement, child custody!,] and child support agreement shall be enforceable by the Chancery Court of Hancock County!,] Mississippi or any other [c]ourt of competent jurisdiction.

The Settlement Agreement clearly reflects both Blake’s and Susan’s understanding that the Settlement Agreement itself was enforceable by the chancellor or any other court of competent jurisdiction. The Settlement Agreement also reflects that both parties read the terms and conditions which stated that they were contractually bound by the signed agreement. Thus, we find this argument is without merit.

B. Agreed Judgment of Divorce

¶ 22. Blake argues that the Agreed Judgment of Divorce is void due to the chancellor’s failure to adjudicate all issues prior to the entry of divorce in accordance with section 93-5-2(3). While we recognize that a judgment is void if the court acted inconsistent with due process, see Turner v. Turner, 73 So.3d 576, 579 (¶ 13) (Miss.Ct.App.2011), we find that Blake’s claims, regarding the validity of the Agreed Judgment of Divorce, pertain to the chancery court’s failure to complete the statutory requirements as set forth in Mississippi Code Annotated section 93-5-2(3) prior to its entry of the divorce. In reviewing precedent, we must conclude that the Agreed Judgment of Divorce constitutes a non-final order of the chancellor since matters attendant to the divorce were left pending before the court.

¶ 23. This Court in Walters v. Walters, 956 So.2d 1050, 1053 (¶9) (Miss.Ct.App.2007) found that a judgment of divorce constitutes a non-final order where that judgment fails to adjudicate all matters attendant to the divorce. The Walters Court stated that generally “only final judgments are appealable.” Id. at (¶8). The Court then defined a final, appealable judgment as one that “ ‘adjudicates the merits of the controversy which settles all issues as to all the parties’ and requires no further action by the lower court.” Id. The Walters Court proceeded to set forth the many reasons for this rule, stating:

The final judgment rule minimizes appellate court interference with trial court proceedings, reduces the ability of a litigant to wear down an opponent with a succession of time-consuming appeals, and enables the appellate court to view the case as a whole and avoid questions which may be mooted by the shifting fortunes of trial combat.

Id.

¶ 24. Consistent with this Court’s decision in Walters, in Curtis, 59 So.3d at 628 (¶ 16), this Court found the chancellor’s failure to resolve all matters as to the parties’ equity in real property prior to the entry of divorce constituted a procedural error. The Curtis Court recognized that Mississippi Code Annotated section 93-5-2 provides the requirements that must be met before a divorce on the ground of irreconcilable differences may be granted, holding:

No divorce shall be granted pursuant to this subsection until all matters involving custody and maintenance of any child of that marriage and property rights between the parties raised by the pleadings have been either adjudicated by the court or agreed upon by the parties and found to be adequate and sufficient by the court and included in the judgment of divorce.

Miss.Code Ann. § 93-5-2(3). The Curtis Court further found, however, the procedural error to be harmless since no prejudice to the parties occurred. Id.

¶ 25. Based upon precedent, we find the chancellor’s order styled Agreed Judgment of Divorce to be a non-final order, not a void judgment as asserted by Blake. Because we find the Agreed Judgment of Divorce to be a non-final order that fails to constitute an appealable judgment, we must dismiss it for our lack of jurisdiction.

II. JUDGMENT OF CONTEMPT AND OTHER RELIEF SET ASIDE AS VOID

¶26. In contrast to this Court’s finding of no prejudice in Curtis, in this case, we find prejudice arising from the procedural error resulting from the chancellor’s failure to comply with the statutory requirement to resolve all matters attendant to the divorce prior to entry of the divorce and from the comingling of the chancellor’s contempt findings and the resolution of the seven pending divorce matters. We also find prejudice occurred by Susan’s failure to comply with the notice requirements of Rule 5 of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure.

¶ 27. In Curtis, the matters pending in the divorce were resolved after entry of the divorce and before the appeal to the benefit of the appellant, Henry Curtis. Curtis, 59 So.3d at 628 (¶ 16). In this ease, however, the unresolved matters pending in the divorce were litigated, along with contempt matters, at a subsequent contempt hearing on June 10, 2010, with notice by issuance of only service of process pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 81. More specifically, the chancellor, in this case, heard and resolved the seven pending divorce matters at the June 10, 2010 hearing violating Blake’s due-process rights since Susan failed to provide Blake sufficient notice pursuant to Rule 5 of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure.

¶ 28. A Rule 81 summons indeed provides sufficient notice to appear and defend in contempt proceedings. See Hanshaw v. Hanshaw, 55 So.3d 148, 146 (¶ 9) (Miss.2011) (“Because contempt proceedings are distinct actions, they require notice consistent with Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 81(d).”). Rule 81 service of process, however, fails to provide sufficient notice, as required by Rule 5(b), to further litigate unresolved matters of a pending divorce, including property division. See McClain v. White, 738 So.2d 306, 308 (¶¶ 12-14) (Miss.Ct.App.1999) (finding default judgment void for failure to serve notice in accordance with Rule 5). “Rule 5(a) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure requires that orders and written notices ‘shall be served upon each of the parties’ in the method provided by Rule 5(b).” Turner, 73 So.3d at 579 (¶ 14) (quoting M.R.C.P. 5). “Rule 5(b) directs: ‘Whenever under these rules service is required or permitted to be made upon a party who is represented by an attorney of record in the proceedings, the service shall be made upon such attorney unless service upon the party himself is ordered by the court.’ ” Id. (citing M.R.C.P. 5(b)(1)). In accordance with Rule 5(b), service is made upon the attorney with two basic exceptions — the party is not represented or the court orders otherwise. Id. (citation omitted). The record in this case reflects no order from the chancery court directing service on Blake instead of his attorney. Thus, we find that Susan failed to provide the necessary notice of the June 10, 2010 hearing to Blake’s attorney as required by Rule 5 in order to litigate the seven unresolved issues attendant to the divorce as set forth in her Complaint for Contempt and Other Relief, and prejudice resulted to Blake.

¶ 29. Prejudice arising from the procedural error of failing to resolve all matters prior to entry of the divorce is also reflected in the chancellor’s Judgment of Contempt and Other Relief. The Judgment of Contempt and Other Relief states, in pertinent part, as follows:

With regard to the CitiCard bill, due to the failure of the [defendant to pay said bill as and when due, the interest rate as well as late payments are all attributable to the [djefendant’s contempt. Accordingly, the [defendant is hereby ordered to be totally and completely responsible for payment of the CitiCard bill and is hereby ordered to make such payments timely so that the ex-wife’s credit rating will not be prejudiced and adversely affected.

As evidenced in the Judgment of Contempt and Other Relief, the chancellor clearly comingled the resolution of the contempt matters with the seven unresolved matters pending in the underlying divorce.

¶ 30. While we recognize that a judgment of contempt generally constitutes an appealable order, we must find that in this case, due to Susan’s failure to provide Blake with sufficient notice of the June 10, 2010 hearing, the chancellor’s order styled Judgment of Contempt and Other Relief is void. Since we find the Judgment on Contempt and Other Relief to be void, we possess no discretion and must vacate that judgment. See Turner, 73 So.3d at 579 (¶ 13); Clark, 43 So.3d at 501 (¶ 21); Walters, 956 So.2d at 1053 (¶ 9). As a result, we find that the seven unresolved matters submitted to the chancellor prior to entry of the Judgment of Contempt and Other Relief are interlocutory matters still pending in this case.

¶ 31. Upon finding the Judgment of Contempt and Other Relief void and the related order styled Agreed Judgment of Divorce not final, we refrain from addressing Blake’s remaining issues and claims of errors. Based upon the foregoing, we set aside the Judgment of Contempt and Other Relief as void, and we dismiss the appeal as to the remaining issues since the order styled Agreed Judgment of Divorce constitutes a non-final order and is not an appealable judgment.

¶ 32. THE AGREED JUDGMENT OF DIVORCE OF THE CHANCERY COURT OF HANCOCK COUNTY IS DISMISSED FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION. THE JUDGMENT OF CONTEMPT AND OTHER RELIEF IS VACATED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE AP-PELLEE.

LEE, C.J., ISHEE AND RUSSELL, JJ„ CONCUR. IRVING AND GRIFFIS, P.JJ., AND MAXWELL, J., CONCUR IN PART AND IN THE RESULT. BARNES AND ROBERTS, JJ., CONCUR IN RESULT ONLY. FAIR, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.

      . We will hereinafter refer to Susan’s “Complaint to Cite for Contempt and for Other Relief” as "Complaint for Contempt and Other Relief.”

      . See generally Walters v. Walters, 956 So.2d 1050 (Miss.Ct.App.2007) (finding order entered by chancery court styled as final judgment of divorce to be non-final order because issues attendant to the divorce, like property division, remained before court).

      . See Turner v. Turner, 73 So.3d 576, 579 (¶ 13) (Miss.Ct.App.2011); McClain v. White, 738 So.2d 306, 308 (¶¶ 12-14) (Miss.Ct.App.1999).

      . The Settlement Agreement failed to specify a due date for the child-support payments; however, Susan stated in her complaint for contempt that the payments were due on the 15th day of each month.

      . The Settlement Agreement provided that the first payment of the alimony award was due on the first day of the month immediately succeeding the Agreed Judgment of Divorce, "with a similar payment to be made on the first day of each and every day [sic] thereafter until the entire amount hereto set forth is paid in full.”

      . The hearing transcript reflects that Susan's attorney, Herbert J. Stelly Sr., informed the chancellor that he called Blake's attorney informing her of the hearing, but the record reflects no evidence that notice was served in accordance with Rule 5 of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure.

      . Blake asserted error in the parties’ failure to agree in writing or otherwise in his second assignment of error.

      . Blake claimed non-compliance by the chancery court with the statutory requirement to resolve all matters between the parties prior to the entry of the divorce in his first assignment of error.

        .See Rounsaville, 732 So.2d at 911 (¶¶ 8-9); Walters v. Walters, 956 So.2d 1050, 1053 (¶¶ 8-9) (Miss.Ct.App.2007). See also M.R.C.P. 54(b).

      . The Settlement Agreement contains the notarized signatures of both Blake and Susan and reflects a signature date of April 5, 2010, and a filing date of April 7, 2010.

      . See generally Bell v. Bell, 572 So.2d 841 (Miss.1990); Prine v. Prine, 723 So.2d 1236 (Miss.Ct.App.1998).

      . See M.R.C.P. 54(b).

      . See Rounsaville, 732 So.2d at 911 (¶¶ 8-9); Johnston v. Johnston, 111 So.2d 453 (Miss.1998).

      . "Mississippi Code Annotated section 93-5-2 allows divorcing couples to agree in writing to all child-custody, child-maintenance, and property-rights issues, subject to the chancellor finding the provisions of their agreement adequate and sufficient.... [I]f the parties cannot agree on particular child-custody, child-maintenance, or property-rights issues, they may consent to be divorced and permit the chancellor to decide the particular issues not agreed upon.” Curtis, 59 So.3d at 628 n. 1.

      . See Rounsaville, 732 So.2d at 911 (¶¶ 8-9); Johnston, 722 So.2d at 457 (¶¶ 6-10); Curtis, 59 So.3d at 628 (¶ 16); Walters, 956 So.2d at 1053 (¶ 9).

      . Blake also asserts that the Judgment for Contempt and Other Relief is void because of improper venue and lack of personal jurisdiction. Blake contends that the summons issued by the Chancery Clerk of Hancock County commanded him to appear and defend against Susan's Complaint for Contempt and Other Relief in the Chancery Court of Harrison County, rather than the county of his residence and the county of divorce, Hancock County. Blake’s arguments are misplaced, however, because Harrison County is located in the same judicial district as Hancock County. Therefore, the proceedings held by the Hancock County Chancery Court in the courtroom of the Chancery Court of Harrison County were held in an appropriate venue, see Parks v. Parks, 914 So.2d 337, 342 (¶ 12) (Miss.Ct.App.2005), and the summons issued by the Chancery Clerk of Hancock County was proper. See State of Mississippi Judiciary Directory and Court Calendar (2011) (The Chancery Court of the Eighth Chan-eery District includes Harrison (First and Second Judicial Districts), Hancock, and Stone Counties.). Furthermore, we recognize that the Hancock County Chancery Court had personal jurisdiction over Blake because "chancery courts have on-going personal jurisdiction over parties to a divorce proceeding.” Dennis v. Dennis, 824 So.2d 604, 610 (¶ 16) (Miss.2002).

      . See Curtis, 59 So.3d at 629 (¶ 22) ("[I]n contested matters that have yet to be resolved, Rule 5(b) notice 'is all that is required for setting a hearing in the process for reaching the final judgment.’ ”).

      . See Miss.Code Ann. § 11-51-12(1) ("A person ordered by any tribunal, except the Supreme Court, to be punished for a civil contempt, may appeal to the court to which other cases are appealable from said tribunal.”).

      . See Walters, 956 So.2d at 1053 (¶¶ 8-9). See also M.R.C.P. 54(b).


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: BARNES, J.,

license: Public Domain

text:
    Andrew F. ARRINGTON, Appellant v. Shannon ARRINGTON, Appellee.
    No. 2010-CA-00782-COA.
    Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
    Feb. 7, 2012.

      James A. Williams, Brookhaven, Leslie C. Gates, Meridian, attorneys for appellant.
    Thomas L. Tullos, attorney for appellee.
    Before IRVING, P.J., BARNES and ROBERTS, JJ.
   BARNES, J.,

for the Court:

¶ 1. The Chancery Court of Clarke County approved Shannon and Andrew Arrington’s consent to a divorce based on irreconcilable differences. Andrew agreed to pay $656 per month in child support for the couple’s two children. Shannon received possession of the marital home and responsibility for paying the mortgage. The chancery court awarded Shannon rehabilitative alimony in the amount of $450 per month for forty-eight months. Andrew appeals the chancery court’s judgment. Finding no error, we affirm.

STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 2. Andrew and Shannon were married in December 1995 in Heidelberg, Mississippi. Their first son was born in October 1995. In December 1997, Andrew fathered an illegitimate child from an extramarital affair. Shannon, however, forgave Andrew; and in June 2000, their second son was born.

¶ 3. Andrew has been employed as a truck driver for Clarkco Oil Field Service since 2005. For several years the couple enjoyed a measure of financial comfort-Andrew’s income was over $100,000 in 2007 and 2008. He also did extra work for Hayes Petroleum from 2006 until 2008. For several years the family’s finances allowed them to improve their marital home, purchase multiple vehicles, and take regular vacations. Shannon has been employed full-time as a coil helper at Howard Industries since 2005. Her net income, at $1,772.28 per month, is considerably less than Andrew’s. However, near the end of 2008, the Arringtons suffered financial difficulties. Andrew’s hours were reduced, and subsequently, tension increased in the marriage. In 2009, Andrew was still not making as much money as he was prior to 2008, but the situation was improving. At the time of the hearing, his actual gross income was $5,817.61 per month.

¶ 4. In November 2008, Shannon discovered an e-mail where Andrew professed his love to a new female companion. Additionally, Andrew’s mobile telephone records (which were introduced at trial) showed that in January and February 2009, there were approximately 200 telephone calls between Andrew and this other woman. Not surprisingly, in February 2009, Andrew and Shannon separated.

¶ 5. Andrew filed for a divorce based on habitual, cruel and inhuman treatment at the end of January 2009. He requested to receive possession of the marital home and its furnishings and alimony, among other things. Shannon, in turn, filed a complaint for legal separation and separate maintenance, accusing Andrew of uncondoned adultery. She requested custody of the children, child support, and possession of the marital home.

¶ 6. In June 2009, Shannon hired a private investigator to conduct surveillance on Andrew. Shannon and her private investigator caught Andrew and the other woman together in a vehicle at a rendezvous point after a card party at approximately 1:00 a.m. Shannon claims this intervention interrupted Andrew’s opportunity to fulfill his adulterous inclinations. After this encounter, in July 2009, the chancery court granted Shannon permission to amend her complaint of separate maintenance to one of divorce on the grounds of uncondoned adultery and habitual, cruel and inhuman treatment or, in the alternative, irreconcilable differences.

¶ 7. Despite both parties’ fault-based complaints, on October 14, 2009, before trial, Andrew and Shannon executed a consent to divorce on the ground of irreconcilable differences. The parties agreed that Shannon would have primary custody of the minor children, and Andrew would pay Shannon $656 per month in child support. They also agreed that Shannon would receive ownership of the house and pay its mortgage. Andrew was ordered to provide health insurance for the children, and Shannon was ordered to provide dental insurance for the children. Each party would be allowed to claim one child for tax purposes. The remaining contested issues between the parties were whether Andrew would pay Shannon alimony and her attorney’s fees and whether Andrew would be awarded part of the parties’ real property for his sister’s benefit.

¶ 8. At the outset of the hearing, the chancery court accepted and approved the parties’ consent to divorce and all other agreed upon matters. The court also heard testimony on the remaining contested matters and issued an opinion on October 21, 2009. Regarding Andrew’s adulterous behavior, the chancellor noted that under Mississippi law, Shannon’s forgiveness of Andrew’s first adulterous affair and the resulting birth of a child “was conditioned upon Andrew’s continued good behavior.” However, the chancery court found this initial affair showed Andrew had an adulterous disposition. Then, the chancellor noted that, in November 2008, Andrew “professed [his] love and affection” for a new female companion, and he “put himself in at least one situation where he and she were together in circumstances where his adulterous disposition could be carried out.” Therefore, the chancellor found that Andrew’s behavior could “support a finding that, circumstantially, he [was] again guilty of adultery .... [Regardless of whether he [was] actually guilty of adultery [this time].... ” The chancellor concluded that Andrew’s conduct in November 2008 was “misconduct of such a serious nature that it revive[d] and reinstate^] his prior adultery.” The chancellor also noted that the amount the parties agreed to for child support was below the statutory guideline amount; however, the chancellor did not make a specific ruling that the child-support obligation was insufficient.

¶ 9. Regarding the contested issues, the chancellor analyzed the factors for alimony in detail under Armstrong v. Armstrong, 618 So.2d 1278, 1280 (Miss.1993) and awarded Shannon $450 per month in rehabilitative alimony for forty-eight months. The chancellor took into account Andrew’s misconduct, which had caused the breakup of the marriage. The chancellor also found Shannon was entitled to a judgment for her attorney’s fees in the amount of $5,744.40, plus interest from the entry of the judgment.

¶ 10. A final judgment of divorce was entered in November 2009, granting the parties a divorce based on irreconcilable differences. After his post-trial motions were denied, Andrew timely appealed, raising several issues relating to the grant of an irreconcilable-differences divorce, rehabilitative alimony, and child support.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 11. The standard of review in domestic-relations cases is limited. In re Dissolution of Marriage of Wood, 35 So.3d 507, 512 (¶ 8) (Miss.2010). The findings of a chancellor will not be disturbed “when supported by substantial evidence unless the chancellor abused his discretion, was manifestly wrong, clearly erroneous or an erroneous legal standard was applied. Under the standard of review utilized to review a chancery court’s findings of fact, particularly in the areas of divorce, alimony and child support, [an appellate court] will not overturn the court on appeal unless its findings were manifestly wrong. For questions of law, our standard of review is de novo.” Id. (internal citations omitted).

ANALYSIS OF THE ISSUES

¶ 12. For judicial economy and clarity, we will combine several of Andrew’s issues in our discussion.

1. Divorce on the Ground of Irreconcilable Differences

¶ 13. Andrew argues that the chancellor should have granted him the opportunity to withdraw his consent to a divorce on the ground of irreconcilable differences because the chancellor, in effect, changed the terms of the consent divorce in his final judgment. Andrew maintains his agreement for a no-fault divorce was based on the premise that the chancery court would approve the $656 per month in child support, the parties’ distribution of the marital property, and would then consider alimony. He argues the chancellor changed the parties’ agreed-upon terms by finding the child-support obligation did not comply with the statutory guideline amount, and the deficient child-support obligation would be a factor to consider regarding alimony. He also claims the chancellor changed the irreconcilable-differences divorce to one of marital fault by making a finding of adultery in the analysis for alimony. Relatedly, Andrew raises a separate issue that he was deprived of due process of law in violation of the United States and Mississippi constitutions because he was not given notice that his agreement to an irreconcilable-differences divorce was not binding on the chancery court. Thus, he was unable to defend himself against a divorce based on adultery.

¶ 14. We find no merit to these arguments. We first note that Andrew never requested his consent to the divorce be withdrawn. Andrew is correct in noting that a divorce decree is quasi-contractual: the chancellor always has the discretion to modify the decree’s terms, and all such decrees are subject to the court’s approval. Varner v. Varner, 666 So.2d 493, 496-97 (Miss.1995) (citing Grier v. Grier, 616 So.2d 337, 340 (Miss.1993)). However, the chancellor did not modify any of the agreed-upon matters in the parties’ consent to divorce; the chancellor merely stated Andrew was at fault for the breakdown of the marriage in his analysis of the Armstrong factors for alimony. In doing so, the chancellor did not change the irreconcilable-differences divorce to one of fault.

¶ 15. In Driste v. Driste, 738 So.2d 763, 765-66 (¶¶ 8-9) (Miss.1999), the Mississippi Supreme Court determined a discussion of fault was proper in an Armstrong analysis, even if the divorce was based on irreconcilable differences. “[Ljimited testimony regarding all the Armstrong factors can be introduced even in an uncontested divorce. However, the chancellor should exercise discretion to restrict the evidence such that the determination of relative fault for purposes of awarding alimony does not become the equivalent of trying a contested divorce.” Id. at 766(¶ 9). Interestingly, in his appellate brief, Andrew acknowledges the Driste holding but does not attempt to distinguish it.

¶ 16. In this case, the terms of the parties’ consent to divorce were not altered by the chancery court. Andrew and Shannon entered into a consent divorce on the ground of irreconcilable differences, which covered all issues of property division, child support, and responsibility for other future expenses. The chancellor then determined the amount of alimony, taking into account the child-support obligation and the evidence of Andrew’s un-condoned adultery. We find no error in this regard. The divorce was granted based on irreconcilable differences, not the chancellor’s circumstantial finding of adultery. Basically, Andrew is arguing for a withdrawal of his consent to the divorce because he was ordered to pay rehabilitative alimony. However, the chancellor did not use the evidence of Andrew’s adultery in such a way to convert the proceedings from an uncontested divorce to a fault divorce.

2. Alimony

¶ 17. Andrew argues that Shannon’s award of rehabilitative alimony was in error. He claims the chancellor misapplied the Armstrong factors which resulted in an inequitable and unjustified award of álimo-ny — an award he basically views as a “fault penalty” for his alleged adultery. Additionally, he claims Shannon was awarded alimony to compensate for the agreed-upon child-support payments, which the chancellor found insufficient under the guidelines.

¶ 18. “ ‘Rehabilitative periodic alimony’ is an equitable mechanism which allows a party needing assistance to become self-supporting without becoming destitute in the interim.... [It] is not intended as an equalizer between the parties but is for the purpose of allowing the less able party to start anew.” Hubbard v. Hubbard, 656 So.2d 124, 130 (Miss.1995). When deciding whether to award alimony, the chancellor must consider the Armstrong factors. Armstrong, 618 So.2d at 1280. If the chancellor applies the correct legal standard, this Court cannot reverse the chancellor’s judgment unless the chancellor manifestly erred in his findings of fact and abused his discretion. Id.

¶ 19. In this case, the parties agreed that whether or not Andrew would pay alimony to Shannon would be a contested issue left to the chancellor to decide. At trial, Shannon requested rehabilitative alimony for ten years. The chancellor properly analyzed the Armstrong factors in determining whether alimony was appropriate, and he found that Andrew had a net monthly income after taxes of $4,057 per month, with expenses of $3,405. The chancellor noted the amount of child support agreed to by the parties was $155.58 less than the statutory guidelines; thus, Shannon would be shouldering most of the expenses for the two children. The chancellor found Shannon needed assistance to meet her household needs, even though the chancellor thought she had overstated her monthly expenses. Her net monthly income of $1,772, plus child support of $656, would total only $2,428. She claimed total expenses of $3,374, with the court finding a more realistic monthly expense total of $2,800. Andrew has the capacity to earn approximately $115,000 per year at Clarkco, although his current take-home pay is $50,000 per year. Shannon’s take-home pay is thus $2,285 per month less than Andrew’s. Her job at Howard Industries is also the highest paying job she has held. Additionally, the chancellor noted Shannon is being treated for varicose veins, which impacts her ability to perform her manufacturing job, where she stands a great deal of the day on concrete floors.

¶ 20. The chancellor also found Andrew had spent money on many extravagances, such as a fully loaded Cadillac Escalade, a four-wheeler, guns, hunting gear, and trips to Las Vegas, Nevada, and Florida, not to mention regular visits to local casinos. Shannon, on the other hand, spent most of her paycheck on the children and household expenses. Andrew’s only debt is his Cadillac Escalade, with a balance due of $24,938. Shannon is assuming the debt on the former marital residence, which has a balance due of $6,950. She also has a vehicle loan and student loan debt, for a post-divorce debt total of $14,878.

¶ 21. The chancellor found that the former marital residence was a non-liquid asset. “[Ojccupying the property rather than selling it is worth far more than the value of the equity to Shannon,” since it is not likely she could find a similar housing situation for the same money — Shannon’s mortgage payment was $218 per month. Also, the home might not fetch the full-appraised amount, and it might take a great deal of time to sell. Thus, the chancellor found the appraised value and projected equity of the residence would be minimally considered for purposes of alimony.

¶ 22. Regarding the Armstrong factor of fault, the chancellor stated: “Andrew has been guilty of misconduct that ultimately caused the breakup of the marriage.” This finding was supported by evidence in the record of Andrew’s flirtation with another woman in the form of text messages, numerous telephone calls, and the intervention in the couple’s late-night rendezvous in June 2009 by Shannon and her private investigator. The chancellor found Andrew’s behavior made him circumstantially guilty of adultery. The chancellor concluded that even though Shannon was completing her junior college education, with the lagging economy, it may be difficult for her to earn more money; thus, she was financially challenged and needed support for an interim period. The chancellor ruled that the substantial disparity of the parties’ income, coupled with Shannon’s deficit in income and expenses, even with the division of assets, justified an award of time-limited rehabilitative alimony of $450 per month for forty-eight consecutive months.

¶ 23. Andrew again takes issue with the finding of marital fault by the chancellor in his analysis of the Armstrong factors, but, as stated in the first issue, a finding of fault may be used to determine alimony. Driste, 738 So.2d at 765-66 (¶¶ 8-9). Additionally, we find no error with Andrew’s complaint of the chancellor calculating the child-support payment into his determination of alimony. When reviewing the reasonableness of an alimony award, an appellate court will “consider the totality of the chancellor’s awards upon the divorced parties, including the benefit to the payee spouse and the concomitant burden placed upon the payor spouse.” Brooks v. Brooks, 652 So.2d 1113, 1121 (Miss.1995). Moreover, the Mississippi Supreme Court has explained: “All property division, lump sum or periodic alimony payment, and mutual obligations for child support should be considered together .... to determine that they are equitable and fair.” Ferguson v. Ferguson, 639 So.2d 921, 929 (Miss.1994).

¶ 24. The chancellor thoroughly discussed each Armstrong factor in his opinion. The award of rehabilitative alimony was supported by substantial evidence in the record. The chancellor has substantial discretion in reaching a decision in matters of this nature to ensure the decision is “equitable and fair to both parties.” Seale v. Seale, 863 So.2d 996, 999 (¶ 14) (Miss Ct.App.2004). There is no indication in the record that the chancellor used the award of rehabilitative alimony to equalize the parties’ income; instead, the chancellor reasoned that the alimony award was to assist Shannon in starting anew. Accordingly, the chancellor did not abuse his discretion in awarding Shannon rehabilitative alimony.

3. Judicial Notice

¶ 25. Andrew claims that the chancellor took improper judicial notice by finding “the housing market was depressed,” but Andrew fails to relate it to any specific complaint he has regarding the chancellor’s judgment. We assume Andrew’s argument relates to the award of rehabilitative alimony, as the only place the chancellor made a comment about the housing market was during his Armstrong analysis, and there was no dispute over the award of the marital home. Andrew also complains that he could not object to this judicial notice because the chancellor did not tell Andrew that he was taking judicial notice.

¶ 26. Mississippi Rule of Evidence 201(b) explains: “A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Rule 201(c) explains: “A court may take judicial notice, whether requested or not.” M.R.E. 201(c).

¶ 27. In the parties’ consent to divorce, Andrew agreed that he would convey to Shannon an undivided interest in the marital home. Shannon received use of the marital home and agreed to pay the mortgage debt, which was $218 per month. At the time of trial, the debt on the marital residence was approximately $6,950. Regarding the contested issue of alimony in the Armstrong factor for the obligations and assets of the parties, the chancellor stated the following in his judgment:

On the face of it, Andrew is walking away from the divorce with little more than the proverbial shirt on his back. He gets $6,447 in assets, and Shannon gets more than ten times that amount. The asset division, however, is deceiving. More than 80% of Shannon’s share of the equitable division is the equity in the former marital residence. It must be considered a non-liquidable asset on several counts. First, occupying the property rather than selling it is worth far more than the value of the equity to Shannon because it is her home and, at a mere $218 per month, could not likely be replaced for the same money. In this court’s experience, few people in this part of the world have a four-bedroom habitable residence, with seven total rooms, on one acre of land, the payment for which is only $218 per month. Second, the appraisal itself (Exhibit 12) indicates that a sale would likely fetch only 85-90% of the appraised value, and realtor and lawyer’s fees would reduce that amount even further. Third, home equity is not like cash which is immediately accessible. As Exhibit 12 states, it would probably take more than six months to sell the property, and even then, lending restrictions have tightened the pool of possible purchasers. For Shannon to sell the property would result in a temporary bulge of cash, but that cash would most likely have to be re-invested in shelter that would cost more than the current residence and result in increased living expenses. No asset has a true fair market value until it is sold. As long as the residence remains a residence, its asset value remains conjectural.
Based on the foregoing, the court finds that, for purposes of considering an award of alimony, the appraised value and projected equity of the residence should be minimally considered in this particular case.

We assume this is the passage Andrew complains of, where the chancellor took improper “judicial notice of the housing market.” However, we find no such error. The appraisal of the marital home was submitted to the chancery court at trial. The record does not indicate that the chancellor took judicial notice of a depressed housing market. The comments in the above passage are references made by the chancellor of the appraisal, and they are accurate.

4. Child Support

¶ 28. Andrew raises two issues regarding child support. First, he argues the chancellor erred in approving the consent divorce which called for child support in an amount less than the guideline amount and in adjusting this deficiency by awarding alimony. Second, Andrew claims the child-support amount stated in the consent agreement was sufficient.

¶ 29. We note that “[t]he chancery court has the authority to modify the provisions of a child support agreement in a divorce action.” Woodfin v. Woodfin, 26 So.3d 389, 399 (¶ 59) (Miss.Ct.App.2010) (citing Barton v. Barton, 790 So.2d 169, 172 (¶ 10) (Miss.2001)). Additionally, Mississippi Code Annotated section 43-19-101(2) (Rev. 2009) requires that a deviation from the statutory child-support guidelines must be supported by specific findings of fact; however, such findings are not necessary when the child-support order is based upon the parties’ agreement. Id. at (¶ 62) (citing McDonald v. McDonald, 850 So.2d 1182, 1189 (¶ 24) (Miss.Ct.App.2002)). Finally, this Court has stated that the child-support guidelines are for guidance, and the chancellor is not required to follow them mechanically. Kilgore v. Fuller, 741 So.2d 351, 354 (¶ 10) (Miss.Ct.App.1999). The guidelines should shape a decision, allowing for the needs of the child and financial ability of the parent. Id.

¶ 30. The chancellor found that Andrew understated his income on his Rule 8.05 financial statement, and based on Andrew’s testimony, Andrew’s adjusted gross monthly income for computation of the child-support obligation was $4,057.88. Section 48-19-101(1) provides a child-support obligation of $811.58 per month, or twenty percent of $4,057.88. The amount of child support agreed upon by the parties was $656 per month, which is $155.58 per month less than the child-support guidelines section 48-19-101(1) provides. The chancellor stated: “There is nothing in the consent to support a finding that the statutory child-support guidelines are not applicable in this case. The court finds the fact that Andrew is paying less than guideline child support is a fact that the court should consider in its adjudication of the contested issues.”

¶ 31. The chancellor did not exceed his authority in approving the child-support amount below the statutory guidelines, nor does Shannon complain of the lesser amount. There was no need for the chancellor to provide specific findings of fact, as required by section 43-19-101(2), as to why the guidelines were deviated from, because the parties agreed to the child-support amount. As stated in Kil-gore, the guidelines do not need to be followed mechanically. Regardless, Andrew has no complaint about the child-support obligation being less than the statutory amount; rather, he complains it was used to justify an award of alimony. However, there are no specific findings that the chancellor awarded rehabilitative alimony to Shannon in order to compensate for a shortfall in child support; he merely explained that this fact would be considered in the contested issues. The chancellor also said at the hearing on the post-trial motion that all expenses and income were considered in his award of alimony, including child support. Further, the chancellor made detailed findings on the child-support issue, which was not required since the parties had agreed to the amount. We find no error in this regard.

¶ 32. Andrew also makes the same argument regarding child support as he did regarding the divorce and alimony: that the chancery court implicitly rejected the essence of the agreement of the parties by finding fault with Andrew’s adulterous behavior and awarding alimony. Andrew insists that the court did not accept the child-support amount, and since the court approved the consent to divorce, it should approve the child-support amount. Further, he claims if the child-support amount was inadequate, then the chancellor should have withdrawn his approval, instead of awarding alimony.

¶ 33. Again, we reiterate there is no indication the consented amount of child support was not accepted. It was. And there is no indication that the sole reason the chancellor awarded alimony to Shannon is because the child-support amount was inadequate; it was merely a fact that the court considered in regard to the totality of the parties’ financial circumstances, which is proper. See Brooks, 652 So.2d at 1121; Ferguson, 639 So.2d at 929.

¶ 34. Andrew makes two final complaints regarding the child support: the chancellor should have taken into consideration the court-ordered $200 per month he pays for the child born outside of his marriage in the adjusted gross income, and the chancellor should have taken into consideration the children’s health expenses.

¶ 35. According to section 43-19-101(3)(e), the guideline percentages are applied to the “adjusted gross income”; the court should have subtracted legally mandated deductions such as court-ordered child support, among other items, to arrive at this figure. It does not appear that the chancellor deducted this $200 payment for child support, which Andrew reported on his Rule 8.05 financial statement, from Andrew’s actual gross income of $5,817.61 in order to arrive at the statutory sum of $811.58. Andrew explains that if the $200 had been taken into account, the child-support guideline would have required $771.57 per month, which is less than the chancellor’s guideline amount, but higher than the agreed upon amount. However, because the chancellor accepted the agreed-upon figure of $656 for. child support, which is lower than both these other figures, it matters not whether the chancery court considered this $200 figure for Andrew’s adjusted gross income.

¶ 36. Andrew also argued that the chil-drens’ health insurance and related expenses, which he agreed to pay in the divorce consent, should have been considered when deciding the child-support obligation that was less than the guidelines. Again, because the chancellor accepted the parties’ child support figure of $656, this point is moot.

CONCLUSION

¶ 37. As the chancellor’s findings are supported by substantial evidence from the record, we affirm the chancery court’s judgment.

¶ 38. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CHANCERY COURT OF CLARKE COUNTY IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE APPELLANT.

LEE, C.J., IRVING AND GRIFFIS, P.JJ., ISHEE, ROBERTS, CARLTON, MAXWELL AND FAIR, JJ., CONCUR. RUSSELL, J„ CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY.

      . This last matter was not raised on appeal by Andrew; therefore, we do not address it.

      . Fault or misconduct is one of twelve Amt-strong factors. Armstrong, 618 So.2d at 1280.

      . The Driste court also stated that an analysis of fault is proper in an irreconcilable-differences divorce for property distribution as well. Driste, 738 So.2d at 768 (¶ 22).

      . The $3,405 figure for Andrew’s monthly expenses includes $200 for temporary alimony and $218 for the mortgage, both of which he was ordered to pay in the temporary judgment. Accordingly, the chancellor noted the final judgment will reduce his expenses by $418, thus yielding an excess of income over expenses of $1,070 per month for Andrew.

      . See Uniform Chancery Court Rule 8.05.

        . In his order, the chancellor only mentioned 2009 deductions totaling "$1,759.73 per month for withholding taxes, social security and Medicare.” No mention was made of another child-support obligation.