author: WALLER, Chief Justice,

text:
    Robert H. JACKSON v. STATE of Mississippi.
    No. 2008-CT-00074-SCT.
    Supreme Court of Mississippi.
    July 28, 2011.

      Robert H. Jackson, appellant, pro se. David McCarty, attorneys for appellant.
    Office of the Attorney General by John R. Henry, Jr., attorney for appellee.
   ON MOTION FOR REHEARING ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI

WALLER, Chief Justice,

for the Court:

¶ 1. The motion for rehearing filed by the State is granted. The previous opinion is withdrawn, and this opinion is substituted therefor.

¶ 2. Since his 1979 conviction for capital murder, Robert H. Jackson has filed multiple, unsuccessful motions and applications for post-conviction relief (PCR). The trial court dismissed Jackson’s most recent motion, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. We granted Jackson’s pro se petition for writ of certiorari. We conclude that the trial court erroneously dismissed Jackson’s PCR motion, so we reverse and remand.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 3. Robert H. Jackson was indicted for capital murder for killing Josephine Todd during the burglary of her home in Vicksburg, Mississippi, on June 4, 1979. Soon after his arrest, Jackson gave a statement to police, detailing the events surrounding the burglary. Jackson stated that he “had entered Mrs. Todd’s Apartment, tied her hands, placed a cloth over her mouth, looked through the drawers in her apartment, had found some money, took Mrs. Todd’s purse, removed [the] restraints from her hands and pulled [the] gag off [her] mouth and left through [the] front door of [the] apartment.” Mrs. Todd died from asphyxiation. The State indicted Jackson as a habitual offender. The indictment charged Jackson as follows:

The Grand Jurors of the State of Mississippi, elected, summoned, empaneled, sworn, and charged to inquire in and for the body of Warren County, State of Mississippi, at the term aforesaid, in the name and by the authority of the State of Mississippi, upon their oaths present that ROBERT H. JACKSON, late of the County aforesaid, on or before the 4th day of June, A.D., 1979, with force and arms, in the County aforesaid, and within the jurisdiction of this Court did felo-niously, wilfully, and of his malice aforethought, kill and murder Josephine Todd, a human being, with or without the design of the said Robert H. Jackson to effect the death of the said Josephine Todd, at a time when the said Robert H. Jackson was then engaged in the commission of the crime of Burglary of the dwelling house of the said Josephine Todd, contrary to the provisions of Section 97-3-19(2)(e) of the Mississippi Code of 1972, as amended. [CJontrary to the statute in such cases made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the State of Mississippi.

Jackson pleaded guilty to this charge, and he was sentenced as a habitual offender to life in prison without parole, pursuant to Mississippi Code Section 99-19-81 (1978).

¶4. Pursuant to Mississippi’s Uniform Post-Conviction Collateral Relief Act (UP-CCRA), Jackson filed a motion to vacate his conviction and sentence on April 21, 1986. See Miss.Code Ann. § 99-39-5(1) (Rev.2007). Jackson complained that his court-appointed attorneys had inadequately investigated the previous convictions on which the habitual-offender portion of the indictment was based, and that his guilty plea had been induced involuntarily because his attorneys had assured him he would, under a prearranged plea agreement, plead to the reduced charge of manslaughter. In the trial-court proceedings on Jackson’s 1986 motion for PCR, the State asserted the three-year statute of limitations under Mississippi Code Section 99-39-5(2). The trial court dismissed Jackson’s 1986 PCR motion without a hearing based on the procedural bar of the statute of limitations and “on the basis of its merit.”

¶ 5. On appeal, this Court held that the three-year limitation period of the UP-CCRA operates prospectively. Jackson v. State, 506 So.2d 994, 994-95 (Miss.1987) (“Jackson I”) (citing Odom v. State, 483 So.2d 343 (Miss.1986)). Therefore, we found that the trial court clearly was in error for applying the time bar to Jackson. We reversed the trial court’s dismissal of Jackson’s 1986 PCR motion and remanded the case for development of the facts of Jackson’s substantive claim, either through review of the transcript of the guilty plea, if sufficient, or through an evidentiary hearing.

¶ 6. Upon remand, the trial court issued an order on January 27, 1989, either dismissing or denying Jackson’s PCR motion. Jackson appealed that order to this Court, which affirmed without opinion on October 24, 1990. Jackson v. State, 568 So.2d 1212 (Miss.1990) (“Jackson II ”). Jackson filed another PCR motion in the trial court in 1993. The trial court either dismissed or denied this motion as well, issuing its order on February 26, 1993. Jackson appealed, and on December 7, 1995, this Court affirmed, once again without opinion. Jackson v. State, 665 So.2d 1356 (Miss.1995) (“Jackson III ”).

¶ 7. In 1997, this Court decided State v. Berryhill, 703 So.2d 250 (Miss.1997). We relied on two previous cases to hold that when a person is indicted for capital murder predicated on burglary, the indictment must state the underlying offense that comprised the burglary. Berryhill, 703 So.2d at 254-56. See Lambert v. State, 462 So.2d 308, 311 (Miss.1984); Moore v. State, 344 So.2d 731, 735 (Miss.1977).

¶ 8. On March 29, 1999, Jackson filed an application in this Court for leave to proceed in the trial court with a new PCR motion (No. 1999-M-00547). The basis of Jackson’s proposed PCR motion was that newly discovered evidence could raise a reasonable doubt as to whether Jackson had, in fact, caused Josephine Todd’s death. On August 6, 1999, a panel of this Court denied Jackson’s application, finding that “[a] prior application was denied by this Court in case no. 89-K[P]-00272.” So we held simply that “Jackson’s present motion is barred as a successive writ pursuant to Miss.Code Ann. § 99-39-27(9).”

¶ 9. On January 17, 2002, Jackson again sought leave of this Court to pursue post-conviction relief in the trial court (No. 2001-M-00864). In Jackson’s proposed PCR motion, attached to his application, Jackson argued for the first time that Ber-ryhill is an intervening decision of this Court which invalidates his indictment, or at least the capital portion thereof. Jackson also argued that his indictment was defective because it failed to include the phrase “without the authority of law,” a required element of capital murder. Without addressing the substantive merits of Jackson’s claims, a panel of this Court denied Jackson’s application on June 6, 2002, finding that “the petition [was] procedurally barred as a successive writ pursuant to Miss.Code Ann. § 99-39-27(9).”

¶ 10. On March 1, 2004, Jackson filed a document entitled “Petition for Extraordinary Circumstances Review,” which this Court treated as another application for permission to seek post-conviction relief in the trial court (No. 2003-M-01858). Jackson again argued that this Court should apply Berryhill and invalidate his indictment and that the indictment was otherwise defective for omitting the phrase “without the authority of law.” Jackson also argued that this Court unconstitutionally and unreasonably had applied the successive-writ procedural bar to his 1999 and 2002 applications. Once again, however, without addressing its merits, this Court denied Jackson’s application on July 19, 2004, finding it, “like others filed previously by Jackson, [to be] barred as a successive writ pursuant to Miss.Code Ann. § 99-39-27(9).”

¶ 11. Undeterred, Jackson filed the instant PCR motion in the circuit court on November 14, 2007. In this motion, Jackson again argued that his capital-murder indictment was constitutionally insufficient under Berryhill and because it omitted the phrase “without the authority of law.” Based on this Court’s dispositions of Jackson’s 2002 and 2004 applications, the circuit court dismissed Jackson’s 2007 PCR motion on December 4, 2007, finding it to be barred as a successive writ. Jackson appealed on January 7, 2008, and the case was assigned to the Court of Appeals.

¶ 12. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of Jackson’s latest PCR motion, explaining that “Jackson’s motion is procedurally barred as an impermissible subsequent attempt to obtain post-conviction relief, as Jackson has failed to show that it falls within any of the statutory exceptions to the successive-writ bar.” Jackson v. State, 67 So.3d 781, 782 (Miss.Ct.App. 2009). The Court of Appeals also held that “the circuit court was without jurisdiction to entertain Jackson’s motion absent leave of the supreme court, which Jackson did not obtain[,]” because this Court had “last exercised jurisdiction in the case.” Id. (citing Perry v. State, 759 So.2d 1269, 1270 (Miss.Ct.App.2000); Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-7 (Rev.2007)).

¶ 13. Jackson filed his petition for a writ of certiorari, arguing that this Court had jurisdiction to determine his PCR motion and that his motion was excepted from procedural bars. The State did not respond to Jackson’s petition. We granted the petition, and in our original opinion, we reversed Jackson’s capital-murder conviction. We held (1) that the trial court did have jurisdiction to consider Jackson’s 2007 PCR motion but that this Court could reach the merits of properly filed PCR motions that had been dismissed or denied; (2) that his motion was excepted from procedural bars; (3) that Berryhill voided the capital portion of Jackson’s indictment; and (4) that his indictment did not charge simple murder or manslaughter, since it omitted the words “without the authority of law.” Finding that the indictment charged no crime, we remanded without prejudice to the State’s right to proceed with a properly drawn indictment.

¶ 14. The State filed a motion for rehearing, arguing (1) that the trial court rather than this Court should consider the PCR motion; (2) that since Berryhill had not been applied retroactively, the case could not satisfy Jackson’s intervening-decision claim, and (3) that Jackson’s indictment was not defective for omitting the phrase “without the authority of law” or “unlawfully” because it included the word “feloniously.”

¶ 15. After further review, we find errors of law, and we withdraw our original opinion and substitute this opinion, reversing the Court of Appeals’ decision and the trial court’s dismissal and remanding this case to the trial court for further post-conviction-relief proceedings. We find that the Warren County Circuit Court should exercise initial jurisdiction over Jackson’s PCR motion.

DISCUSSION

¶ 16. A trial court’s dismissal of a motion for post-conviction relief will not be reversed absent a finding that the trial court’s decision was clearly erroneous. Brown v. State, 731 So.2d 595, 598 (Miss.1999). However, when issues of law are raised, the proper standard of review is de novo. Id.

I. Jurisdiction

¶ 17. Mississippi Code Section 99-39-5 provides that “[a]ny person sentenced by a court of record of the State of Mississippi ... may file a motion to vacate, set aside or correct the judgment or sentence [based on several applicable criteria].” Miss.Code Ann. § 99-39-5 (Rev. 2007) (emphasis added). Where there has been no direct appeal of his conviction or sentence, the prisoner must file this PCR motion, sometimes called a “PCR petition,” “as an original civil action in the trial court.” Miss.Code Ann. § 99-39-7 (Rev. 2007). But if the prisoner’s conviction and sentence were directly appealed, and either the conviction was affirmed or the appeal dismissed by this Court, then he must file an application in this Court for leave to proceed in the trial court and include the proposed PCR motion with his application. Miss.Code Ann. §§ 99-39-7 (Rev.2007) and 99-39-27 (Supp.2010).

¶ 18. Because Jackson pleaded guilty in 1979, a direct appeal of his conviction was not permitted. Miss.Code Ann. § 99-35-101 (Rev.2007). Because there has been no direct appeal of his conviction or sentence, Jackson must file his PCR motions in the trial court. Miss.Code Ann. § 99-39-7 (Rev.2007). See Martin v. State, 556 So.2d 357, 359 (Miss.1990) (citing McDonall v. State, 465 So.2d 1077 (Miss.1985)) (“In cases where the prisoner has entered a plea of guilty, the trial court has exclusive, original jurisdiction to hear and determine a petition for post-conviction relief.”). Jackson’s original, 1986 “motion to vacate” and his PCR filings in 1993 and 2007 were properly filed PCR motions. But Jackson incorrectly filed in this Court three applications for leave to proceed in the trial court (i.e., to get permission to file new PCR motions in the trial court), in 1999, 2002, and 2004. This Court denied all three applications, finding them to be impermissible successive writs under Section 99-39-27(9).

¶ 19. When we characterized our disposition of Jackson’s 1999 application as a denial, we were stating that the merits of the PCR motion had been reviewed and rejected or that his arguments were barred on res judicata or waiver grounds. See Miss.Code Ann. § 99-39-27(9) (Rev.2007). This was not the case. We did not make a “final determination going to the merits of the underlying conviction and sentence.” Martin, 556 So.2d at 359. Nonetheless, we had, in fact, “exercised jurisdiction” over Jackson’s PCR proceedings, and “[t]here is ... general language in our prior cases to the effect that the court to last exercise jurisdiction in the case has exclusive, original jurisdiction over the post-conviction petition.” Martin, 556 So.2d at 359 (citation omitted); McDonall, 465 So.2d at 1078. Based on these authorities, the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that, when we “denied” Jackson’s 1999 application, we assumed jurisdiction over Jackson’s PCR proceedings to the exclusion of the trial court. But the cases cited above presupposed that this Court had proper jurisdiction to exercise, which is not the case here.

¶ 20. Pursuant to Section 99-39-7 and Martin, this Court was without jurisdiction to consider Jackson’s 1999, 2002, and 2004 applications for leave to proceed in the trial court, because Jackson’s conviction and sentence were never directly appealed. Miss.Code Ann. § 99-39-7 (Rev. 2007); Martin, 556 So.2d at 358. The only way in which this Court properly could have considered Jackson’s PCR filings would have been if Jackson had first presented his PCR motion to the trial court, that court had denied relief, and Jackson had appealed that decision to this Court pursuant to Section 99-39-25. Miss.Code Ann. § 99-39-25 (Rev.2007); Martin, 556 So.2d at 358. Regarding Jackson’s misfiled applications, this had not happened, so this Court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction to entertain those applications, at first instance, or the merits of the PCR motions attached thereto.

¶ 21. Put simply, the fatal flaw in Jackson’s 1999, 2002, and 2004 applications was not that they were successive writs, but that they were filed in the wrong court. So we improperly exercised jurisdiction and denied Jackson’s applications. Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-7 (Rev.2007). We should have merely dismissed the applications without prejudice for being filed in the wrong court and directed Jackson to file his PCR motions in the trial court. Martin, 556 So.2d at 358 (“this post-conviction relief action initiated by Martin must be dismissed without prejudice as having been filed in the wrong court”). We routinely dismiss mistakenly filed applications, but such action by this Court does not strip the trial court of jurisdiction. Martin, 556 So.2d at 359.

¶ 22. Therefore, as this Court was without jurisdiction to entertain them, we vacate and set aside our denials of Jackson’s 1999, 2002, and 2004 applications. While Section 99-39-25 gives this Court jurisdiction to address Jackson’s dismissed 2007 PCR motion, the Warren County Circuit Court should exercise initial jurisdiction over Jackson’s PCR proceedings. Miss. Code Ann. §§ 99-39-25(1), 99-39-7 (Rev. 2007)

II. UPCCRA Successive-Writ Bar

¶23. Mississippi’s UPCCRA includes several procedural bars, but we limit our discussion to the successive-writ bar, the one addressed by the trial court and the Court of Appeals.

¶ 24. Based on this Court’s dispositions of Jackson’s 2002 and 2004 applications, the circuit court dismissed Jackson’s 2007 PCR motion, finding it to be barred as a successive writ pursuant to Section 99-39-23(6), and the Court of Appeals agreed. Jackson, 67 So.3d 781, at 782. See Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-23(6) (Rev.2007).

¶25. Section 99-39-23(6) provides the successive-writ bar for PCR motions. It states that “any order dismissing the petitioner’s motion or otherwise denying relief under this article is a final judgment and shall be conclusive until reversed. It shall be a bar to a second or successive motion under this article.” Miss.Code Ann. § 99-39-23(6) (Rev.2007).

¶ 26. Here, we have vacated our denials of Jackson’s 2002 and 2004 applications— the denials that prompted the trial court to apply the successive-writ bar. Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s dismissal of Jackson’s motion under the successive-writ bar. See Miss.Code Ann. § 99-39-23(6) (Rev.2007).

¶ 27. In sum, Jackson properly filed his 2007 PCR motion in the trial court under Sections 99-39-5 and 99-39-7, and he properly appealed the trial court’s dismissal of the motion, as a successive writ, to this Court under Section 99-39-25. We recognize that the trial court dismissed the motion as a successive writ based on our 2002 and 2004 denials of Jackson’s applications, and that the Court of Appeals interpreted our denials as rejections of Jackson’s arguments. But, having set aside our denials, we reverse the trial court’s dismissal and the Court of Appeals’ decision. Since the appellate record does not resolve the issues raised, we remand to the trial court for further post-conviction-relief proceedings.

CONCLUSION

¶ 28. As this Court was without jurisdiction to entertain them, we vacate and set aside our denials of Jackson’s 1999, 2002, and 2004 applications. Although this Court has jurisdiction to address Jackson’s dismissed 2007 PCR motion, the Warren County Circuit Court should exercise initial jurisdiction over Jackson’s PCR proceedings. We reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and the trial court’s dismissal and remand this case to the trial court for further post-conviction-relief proceedings.

¶ 29. REVERSED AND REMANDED.

CARLSON, P.J., RANDOLPH, LAMAR, KITCHENS, CHANDLER AND PIERCE, JJ., CONCUR. DICKINSON, P.J., CONCURS IN PART AND IN RESULT WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION. KING, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.

      . The capital-murder statute in effect in 1979 stated, in pertinent part, that "[t]he killing of a human being without the authority of law by any means or in any manner shall be capital murder ... [w]hen done with or without any design to effect death, by any person engaged in the commission of the crime of rape, burglary, kidnapping, arson or robbery, or in any attempt to commit such felonies[.]” Miss.Code Ann. § 97-3-19(2)(e) (1977).

      . Section 99-19-81 requires habitual offenders to "be sentenced to the maximum term of imprisonment prescribed for such felony, and such sentence shall not be reduced or suspended nor shall such person be eligible for parole or probation.” Miss.Code Ann. § 99-19-81 (Rev.2007) (emphasis added).

      . Jackson’s claim regarding the plea agreement was supported by a letter from his attorney recalling that the plea bargain was to be manslaughter, and an affidavit from two of Jackson’s family members who averred that they had understood from Jackson's attorneys that the charge would be reduced to manslaughter. No transcript of the guilty plea or waiver-of-rights form signed by Jackson appeared in the record before this Court in Jackson’s first post-conviction-relief appeal. Jackson v. State, 506 So.2d 994, 994-95 (Miss.1987) ("Jackson I ”).

      .The UPCCRA was enacted on April 17, 1984. So "[(Individuals convicted prior to April 17, 1984, ha[d] three (3) years from April 17, 1984, to file their petition for post conviction relief.” Odom v. State, 483 So.2d 343, 344 (Miss.1986).

      . The crime of burglary requires the breaking and entering of a dwelling of another with the intent to commit another crime therein. Miss. Code Ann. § 97-17-23 (Rev.2006).

      . Beginning after the denial of his 2002 application, and continuing after the denial of his 2004 application, Jackson filed several documents in this Court seeking certiorari, mandamus, ''discretionary review,” rehearing, and reconsideration of the denials. Jackson continued to raise his arguments concerning Ber-ryhill and the phrase "without the authority of law” in all of those filings. But this Court denied all of those motions without addressing their substantive merits.

      . The State asserted in its appellate brief that Jackson’s notice of appeal was untimely. Although Jackson has asserted his rights under the so-called "prison mailbox rule,” the record before us contains no evidence of the date when Jackson delivered his notice of appeal to prison officials. Nonetheless, "because procedures for criminal appeals apply to post-conviction relief proceedings, Miss.Code Ann. § 99-39-25(1); Williams v. State, 456 So.2d 1042, 1043 (Miss.1984) [superceded by rule as stated in Harris v. State, 826 So.2d 765, 767 (Miss.Ct.App.2002], [this] Court may suspend the rules and extend the time for taking an appeal in th[e]se proceedings.” Miss. R.App. P. 2(c) cmt. We hereby suspend the operation of the thirty-day appeal time under Rule 4(a) of the Mississippi Rules of Appellate Procedure, and hold that Jackson’s notice of appeal, filed thirty-four days after the trial court's entry of judgment, was timely.

      . "A final judgment entered under this article may be reviewed by the supreme court of Mississippi on appeal brought either by the prisoner or the state on such terms and conditions as are provided for in criminal cases.” Miss.Code Ann. § 99-39-25(1) (Rev.2007).

      . If a prisoner’s conviction and sentence were never directly appealed, then, pursuant to Sections 99-39-7 and 99-39-27, this Court is not permitted to entertain the prisoner’s PCR motion until it has been ruled upon by the circuit court and appealed to this Court under Section 99-39-25. Miss.Code Ann. §§ 99-39-7, 99-39-27, and 99-39-25 (Rev.2007); Martin, 556 So.2d at 358-59.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: RANDOLPH, Justice, WALLER, Chief Justice, KITCHENS, Justice,

license: Public Domain

text:
    Bobbi J. YOUNG and Lynda L. Carter, Next of Kin of Clarence S. Young, Deceased. v. Dr. Robert H. SMITH and Baptist Memorial Hospital-DeSoto, Inc.
    No. 2010-CA-00079-SCT.
    Supreme Court of Mississippi.
    Aug. 4, 2011.

      William Robert Bruce, attorney for appellants.
    David W. Upchurch, Joshua Shey Wise, Robert K. Upchurch, Tupelo, Janelle Marie Lowrey, Walter Alan Davis, Oxford, attorneys for appellees.
   RANDOLPH, Justice,

for the Court:

¶ 1. Bobbi J. Young and Lynda L. Carter, Next of Kin of Clarence S. Young, Deceased (‘Young”), appeal an Order of the Circuit Court of DeSoto County, Mississippi, which granted summary judgment in favor of Dr. Robert Smith and his employer, Baptist Memorial Hospital-DeSoto (“BMH-D”). The trial court certified the summary judgment for Smith and BMH-D as final for the purpose of appeal pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). Young argues that the circuit court abused its discretion in refusing to grant the “Motion to Withdraw Admissions” which was filed, without explanation or excuse, nearly seven-and-one-half years after said admissions were otherwise “conclusively established....” Miss. R. Civ. P. 36(b). This Court concludes that the circuit court’s ruling was well within its discretion under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 36. See Miss. R. Civ. P. 36. We further affirm the circuit court’s finding that no genuine issue of material fact remains regarding Young’s claims against Dr. Smith and BMH-D, as well as the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment as to Dr. Smith and BMH-D.

FACTS

¶ 2. On August 22, 2001, Young filed a “wrongful death, medical malpractice claim” against health-care providers, including Dr. Smith and BMH-D. Young I, 999 So.2d at 869-70. On October 11, 2001, Dr. Smith propounded “Requests for Admission” to Young, which included the following:

1. Please admit that with regard to the care and treatment provided to [Young] by [Dr. Smith] you have no qualified medical expert who is expected to testify at the trial of this case that [Dr. Smith] deviated from the applicable standard of care for an emergency room physician.
2. Please admit that you have no qualified medical expert who is expected to state an opinion at trial that any alleged deviation from the applicable standard of care on the part of [Dr. Smith] proximately caused or contributed to the death of [Young].

(Emphasis added.) Pursuant to Rule 36(a), a “written answer or objection” to these requests for admission was due “within thirty days after service of the request.” Miss. R. Civ. P. 36(a). But during this period, Young filed no “written answer[s] or objection[s,]” nor did Young request additional time to respond. Id. Rather, Young did not respond to the request. In December 2001, having received no “written answer[s] or objection[s],” Dr. Smith and BMH-D filed “Motions for Summary Judgment,” arguing that the requests were deemed admitted by operation of law. Id. (absent a timely “written answer or objection,” the “matter of which an admission is requested ... is admitted....”). Thus, they contended that Young’s admission that they did not have a “qualified medical expert” regarding Dr. Smith’s alleged conduct meant that no genuine issues of material fact remained as to Young’s claims against Dr. Smith and BMH-D.

¶ 3. On December 21, 2001, seventy-one days after service of the “Requests for Admission,” Young filed responses which denied the requested admissions; identified Dr. David E. Hansen as one of Young’s medical experts; and “filed a motion for summary judgment against the individual doctors[,]” with an attached affidavit from Dr. Hansen which “stated that the doctors had been negligent in their care of [Clarence] Young, and had they provided timely and proper care, it was probable that Young would have survived.” Young I, 999 So.2d at 370. Inexplicably, Young failed to file a motion to withdraw or amend the admissions which, by that point in time, were “conclusively established” by operation of law. Miss. R. Civ. P. 36(b) (“[a]ny matter admitted under this rule is conclusively established unless the court on motion permits withdrawal or amendment of the admission.”).

¶ 4. For several years thereafter, proceedings were delayed due to the insolvency of a liability insurance carrier for one of the defendants and the prior appeal to this Court. The prior appeal contested the grant of summary judgment. Young I, 999 So.2d at 368. On appeal, this Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. See id. at 373. This Court determined that “[b]y holding that [Young’s] supplemental expert designation violated the scheduling order, the trial court erroneously equated a discovery deadline with a deadline for supplementation of an expert opinion.” Id. at 372. This Court concluded that “[t]he trial court erred by refusing to consider Dr. Hansen’s supplemental affidavit in determining whether there was a genuine issue of material fact sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment.” Id.

¶ 5. In Young I, this Court chose not to address substantively the separate issue of “whether [Young’s] failure to respond to Dr. Smith’s requests for admissions warranted summary judgment in favor of Dr. Smith and his employer, BMH-D[,]” stating that because “the trial court has never ruled on this issue, we decline to address this assignment of error.” Id. at 371, 373. Following denial of the defendants’ motion for rehearing, this Court’s mandate was issued on February 17, 2009.

¶ 6. Upon remand, on February 19, 2009, BMH-D filed a “Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment” based upon Young’s failure to timely respond to the requests for admissions. On March 10, 2009, nearly seven-and-one-half years after the admissions were deemed admitted, Young filed a “Motion to Withdraw Admissions.” At the July 16, 2009, hearing on the “Renewed Motions for Summary Judgment,” Young explained the failure to provide timely responses to the October 2001 “Requests for Admission,” as follows, “[w]e simply didn’t have our expert opinion at the time that the Requests for Admissions were propounded.” To this point, counsel for BMH-D responded:

if that were the case, they could have moved for more time to respond; they could have responded as they were and then amended them when they got their expert opinions in, but they didn’t do that. They just simply didn’t respond. And then when they did respond, it took them years to even move to withdraw them....

Having offered no legitimate explanation or excuse to support the untimely motion to withdraw, Young leapfrogged to contesting the lack of prejudice to Dr. Smith and BMH-D. Counsel for Dr. Smith responded that the consequence of failing to comply with Rule 36 is an admission by operation of law, regardless of the defendants’ conduct.

¶ 7. After taking the matter under advisement for consideration, on September 9, 2009, the circuit court issued a five-page “Opinion.” The analysis began by quoting the pertinent portions of Rule 36. The learned circuit judge found, as follows:

Rule 36 is to be enforced according to its terns. Educational Placement Services v. Wilson, 487 So.2d 1316 (Miss.1986). When a party does not respond or object to requests for admissions within the time period allowed by this Rule and does not seek an extension of time for responding, a court does not abuse its discretion in striking untimely responses or refusing withdrawal of matters deemed admitted in untimely filed admissions. Sawyer v. Hannan, 556 So.2d 696 (Miss.1990).
If the plaintiff fails to communicate to the trial court a reason for the delay or a belief that they should have been allowed to delay their response, and the court can find no compelling circumstances to justify allowing an untimely reply to avoid admissions, the [cjourt does not abuse its discretion in not allowing the admissions to be withdrawn. Earwood v. Reeves, 798 So.2d 508, 514 (Miss.2001).
Requests are deemed admitted if the answers or objections are not served within 30 days of service. There appears to be no issue that [Young] did not file responses to the admissions within thirty days. The requests for admissions go to the heart of [Young’s] claims. [Young] asked to withdraw the admissions over seven years from when they were served. [Young] gave no explanation as to why they had not sought withdrawal of their responses which were deemed admitted thirty days after they were served until the Defendants filed their motions for summary judgment. The [cjourt also can find no compelling circumstances to justify allowing an untimely reply to avoid admissions. Therefore, the motion to withdraw the admissions will be denied.

(Emphasis added.) As to Young’s argument that Dr. Smith and BMH-D had waived their right to bring the “Renewed Motions for Summary Judgment,” the circuit court found:

[Rule] 36 provides that requests for admissions are deemed admitted by operation of law if a party does not respond within the required time. The party seeking the admissions are [sic] not required to take any affirmative action in this regard.... The [e]ourt does not find the cases regarding affirmative defenses being waived as persuasive or analogous. Also, [Rule] 56(b) provides that a motion for summary judgment can be made by the Defendant at any time. Therefore, the [c]ourt finds that the motions were timely filed and the arguments were not waived just because they were not asserted earlier.[] The [cjourt finds it noteworthy that the Supreme Court did not make any finding that the argument was waived when they declined to rule on the issue.

(Emphasis in original.) The circuit court ultimately concluded that the “Renewed Motions for Summary Judgment” filed by Dr. Smith and BMH-D “should be granted.”

¶ 8. Thereafter, the circuit court entered an “Order Granting Motions for Summary Judgment” and a “Final Judgment” in favor of Dr. Smith and BMH-D, dismissing Young’s claims against both with prejudice. From those rulings, Young filed timely “Notice of Appeal.”

ISSUES

¶ 9. This Court will consider:

(1) Whether the circuit court abused its discretion in denying Young’s “Motion to Withdraw Admissions.”
(2) Whether the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Dr. Smith and BMH-D.

ANALYSIS

I. Whether the circuit court abused its discretion in denying Young’s “Motion to Withdraw Admissions.”

¶ 10. This Court has stated that Rule 36 is “well-delineated” and “carries] harsh sanctions for failure to comply therewith.” Earwood, 798 So.2d at 515. It provides, in pertinent part, that:

(a) Request for Admission. A party may serve upon any other party a written request for the admission, for purposes of the pending action only, of the truth of any matters within the scope of Rule 26(b) set forth in the request that relate to statements or opinions of fact or of the application of law to fact, including the genuineness of any documents described in the request.
Each matter of which an admission is requested shall be separately set forth. The matter is admitted unless, within thirty days after service of the request, or within such shorter or longer time as the court may allow, the party to whom the request is directed serves upon the party requesting the admission a written answer or objection addressed to the matter, signed by the party or by his attorney, but, unless the court shortens the time, a defendant shall not be required to serve answers or objections before the expiration of forty-five days after service of the summons upon him.
(b) Effect of Admission. Any matter established under this rule is conclusively established unless the court on motion permits withdrawal or amendment of the admission. Subject to the provisions governing amendment of a pre-trial order, the court may permit withdrawal or amendment when the presentation of the merits of the action will be subserved thereby and the party who obtained the admission fails to satisfy the court that withdrawal or amendment will prejudice him in maintaining his action or defense on the merits.

Miss. R. Civ. P. 36 (emphasis added).

¶ 11. In cases before and after DeBlanc v. Standi, 814 So.2d 796 (Miss.2002), this Court has clearly stated that, in applying Rule 36, “discretion is vested in the trial judge with respect to whether he or she will take matters as admitted.” Scoggins v. Baptist Mem’l Hosp.-DeSoto, 967 So.2d 646, 648 (Miss.2007) (quoting Earwood, 798 So.2d at 514). See also DeBlanc, 814 So.2d at 801 (quoting Earwood, 798 So.2d at 516) (“[m]echanisms exist whereby a trial court may hold an untimely response does not constitute a deemed admission because the trial court has broad discretion in pretrial matters. However, because of trial court’s broad discretion in such matters, it certainly may also require that parties comply with the rules as stated.”) (emphasis added). In cases involving unexplained, untimely responses, the appellate courts of this state unanimously have emphasized that Rule 36 “is to be enforced according to its terms.” Educ. Placement Servs., 487 So.2d at 1318. Specifically, this Court has stated:

[w]e do not intend ... to suggest that any request for admissions to which a response, objection or motion for time has not been filed before the thirty-first day should be taken as irrevocably admitted. Necessary and practicable leniency, however, appear to have generated an air of benevolent gratuity about the administration of Rule 36. But, of course, there is no gratuity about it. Courts cannot give, or withhold at pleasure .... More than a year’s inaction on the part of the party to whom the request has been submitted must of ne cessity result in the matters being taken as admitted if the rule is to have any meaning of force at all. This is particularly so where, as in the case at bar, not one word of explanation or excuse appears either in the record or in his brief on appeal why Wilson could not have responded to the request.

Id. See also Langley v. Miles, 956 So.2d 970, 973 (Miss.Ct.App.2006) (“[o]n review, the court is likely to affirm the trial court’s enforcement of Rule 86 according to its terms if no justifiable excuse or explanation was offered for the default.”); Prime Rx, LLC v. McKendree, Inc., 917 So.2d 791, 795 (Miss.2005) (citing Earwood, 798 So.2d at 516) (“it would not be an abuse of the trial court’s discretion to require compliance [with Rule 36] when the defaulting party offered no good reason otherwise.”); DeBlanc, 814 So.2d at 801 (“we did not ... abandon the concept of enforcing [R]ule 36 in accordance with its terms as expressed in [Educational Placement Services] ... particularly when no explanation is offered for the default.”); Martin v. Simmons, 571 So.2d 254, 255 (Miss.1990) (affirming the trial court’s action of deeming requests for admission admitted where it found no justifiable excuse for the attorney’s failure to file a timely response); Sawyer, 556 So.2d at 698 (citing Dukes v. South Carolina Ins. Co., 770 F.2d 545 (5th Cir.1985)) (“the control of discovery is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court and discretion was not abused in striking [an] untimely response when [the plaintiff] had been evasive and dilatory throughout the litigation and offered no reason for failing to respond within the period provided by Rule 36.”).

¶ 12. Young unpersuasively submits that “[i]n considering a motion to withdraw admissions, trial courts in Mississippi are required to engage in the two-prong analysis set out in Rule 36(b).” (Emphasis added.) Young seeks to expand or amend the rule by asking this Court to declare it would be “an abuse of discretion per se for a trial court to deny a motion to withdraw requests for admission without engaging in the two-prong Rule 36(b) analysis.”

¶ 13. Dr. Smith and BMH-D respond that Young “filed an untimely Motion to Withdraw Admissions long after Dr. Smith had filed his Motion for Summary Judgment. Moreover, [Young] failed to demonstrate justifiable excuse in their seven (7) year delay in attempting to withdraw the admissions.” As such, they contend that the circuit judge “was within his discretion and properly denied withdrawal of the admissions .... ” They further note that the analysis in Rule 36(b) includes the permissive term “may,” as opposed to the mandatory term “shall,” such that the consideration, vel non, of such factors is within the circuit court’s discretion.

¶ 14. A mandatory, two-pronged test urged by the dissent is contrary to both the plain language of Rule 36(b) and prior rulings of this Court. In using the permissive term “may” rather than the mandatory term “shall,” Rule 36(b) does not create a mandatory, per se requirement that the lower court must apply before denying the withdrawal or amendment of a deemed admission. See DeBlanc, 814 So.2d at 799 (emphasizing the use of the term “may” in Rule 36(b)); Earwood, 798 So.2d at 515 (“[t]he permissive language of [Rule 36] respecting the trial court’s duties clearly provides that relief from the definite time periods is only available at the trial court’s discretion.”). In Earwood, this Court rejected arguments like those presented today, stating:

[notwithstanding the language of the rule, Earwood argues that, pursuant to M.R.C.P. 36, the court should have permitted withdrawal of the deemed admissions because the presentation of the case on the merits would be promoted and that permitting withdrawal would not result in undue prejudice or delay to Reeves in maintaining his action on the merits. Yet Earwood’s dilatory response had already delayed Reeves’s action. Earwood’s response was not forthcoming until almost ten months after the complaint, and only after Reeves filed a motion to deem requests admitted, to compel and for partial summary judgment. Therefore, the trial court’s reluctance to exercise its broad discretion in favor of Earwood is not illogical.
Here, the trial court found no compelling reason to allow disrespect of M.R.C.P. 36 regarding the set time for responding to requests for admissions; and we find no compelling reason to hold that such was an abuse of discretion. Earwood knew or should have known the severe consequences of failing to timely respond.

Earwood, 798 So.2d at 516 (emphasis in original). See also DeBlanc, 814 So.2d at 801 (quoting same). This position also is consistent with federal cases, which reflect that “[ejven when” the two factors set forth under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 36(b) “are established, a district court still has discretion to deny a request for leave to withdraw or amend an admission.” In re Carney, 258 F.3d 415, 419 (5th Cir.2001). Therefore, consistent with the presumptive conclusiveness accompanying the failure to comply with Rule 36(a), the permissive nature of Rule 36(b) (i.e., “may permit”), and the aforementioned discretion granted to trial courts in addressing motions to withdraw or amend, this Court concludes that a trial court “may,” but is not required to, consider the two-pronged test in denying a motion to withdraw or amend. Miss. R. Civ. P. 36(b). With that principle reaffirmed, this Court next considers whether the circuit court’s denial of Young’s “Motion to Withdraw Admissions” constituted an abuse of discretion.

¶ 15. The circuit court’s “Opinion” further reflects that the circuit court took into consideration all arguments presented, the applicable rule (Rule 36), and our established caselaw in rendering its decision. The circuit court began its analysis by emphasizing that Rule 36 should be “enforced according to its terms.” Educ. Placement Servs., 487 So.2d at 1318. The circuit court then found that Young had failed to file a timely response to the “Requests for Admissions” within thirty days after service thereof, as required by Rule 36(a); provided untimely responses only after a motion for summary judgment was filed; “gave no explanation” for waiting nearly seven-and-one-half years after the admissions had been deemed “conclusively established” to file the “Motion to Withdraw Admissions;” and failed to present any “compelling circumstances to justify allowing an untimely reply to avoid admissions.” Under the facts presented, that decision was hardly a Draconian one with which no reasonable jurist could agree. See Dawson v. U.S., 68 F.3d 886, 896 (5th Cir.1995) (quoting Lorentzen v. Anderson Pest Control, 64 F.3d 327, 330 (7th Cir.1995)) (“[generally, an abuse of discretion only occurs where no reasonable person could take the view adopted by the trial court”); Earwood, 798 So.2d at 517.

¶ 16. “The requests for admissions submitted to [Young] were a simple matter which could have been answered in a few minutes time[,]” or for which a “motion for enlargement of time” could have been filed. Sunbelt Royalty, Inc. v. Big-G Drilling Co., 592 So.2d 1011, 1012 (Miss.1992); Educ. Placement Servs., 487 So.2d at 1318. Yet Young simply failed to timely respond. “Rule 36 provides a specific consequence for a party’s failure to timely respond to a request for admission, the consequence being that those matters in the requests are deemed admitted.” Prime Rx, 917 So.2d at 797. See also Scoggins, 967 So.2d at 649 (“a diligent party will take great pains to ensure the requests have either been admitted or de nied, as they are automatically deemed admitted after thirty days”). Thus, those “[mjatters admitted by default under Rule 36(a) [were] established unless and until the trial court allow[ed] amendment or withdrawal by motion under Rule 36(b).” DeBlanc, 814 So.2d at 800. Without any excuse for that initial untimeliness, Young then proceeded to wait nearly seven-and-one-half years before filing the “Motion to Withdraw Admissions.” Under these circumstances of unexplained, untimely responses, coupled with an excessive delay before seeking leave to withdraw, the circuit court was well within its discretion in denying Young’s “Motion to Withdraw Admissions.” See Langley, 956 So.2d at 973; Prime Rx, 917 So.2d at 795; DeBlanc, 814 So.2d at 801; Earwood, 798 So.2d at 516; Martin, 571 So.2d at 255; Sawyer, 556 So.2d at 698; Educ. Placement Servs., 487 So.2d at 1318.

¶ 17. For certain, all courts, counsel, and litigants would rather see cases decided on the merits. But this aspirational goal carries with it a commensurate responsibility imposed upon all to abide by the Rules and the decisions of our courts, as opposed to seeking a benevolent decision from a trial judge. See DeBlanc, 814 So.2d at 801 (citing Earwood, 798 So.2d at 516) (“Rule 36 is to be enforced despite the fact that harsh consequences might result....”). But for Young’s conduct (or lack thereof), perhaps that goal could have been achieved in this case. In summation, we conclude that Young’s assertion of abuse of discretion must fail, as the record clearly reveals the circuit judge properly followed the applicable rule and our case-law interpreting same.

II. Whether the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Dr. Smith and BMH-D.

¶ 18. “The standard of review for a trial court’s grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment is de novo.” J.R. v. Malley, 62 So.3d 902, 905 (Miss.2011) (citations omitted). Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) provides, in pertinent part, that summary judgment “shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Miss. R. Civ. P. 56(c). “[W]hen a party, opposing summary judgment on a claim or defense as to which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial, fails to make a showing sufficient to establish an essential element of the claim or defense, then all other facts are immaterial, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Galloway v. Travelers Ins. Co., 515 So.2d 678, 684 (Miss.1987).

¶ 19. Young submits that Dr. Smith and BMH-D “waived” their “Renewed Motions for Summary Judgment” based upon the “failure to timely and reasonably pursue” a motion for summary judgment. Young further asserts that “[ejven without withdrawal of the 2001 admissions, a genuine issue as to deviations from the accepted standard of professional practice on the part of Defendants, and causation of the death of [Clarence Young] exists, and the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants.”

¶ 20. As to Young’s waiver argument, Dr. Smith and BMH-D maintain that Rule 36 is a “self-executing” “discovery device” that “does not require any action on the part [of] a Defendant for matters to be deemed admitted and conclusively established. Because such failures to respond result in a judicial admission, and not the creation of an ‘affirmative defense,’ ... waiver arguments are misplaced.” Regarding summary judgment, Dr. Smith and BMH-D respond that, “[p]ursuant to the requirements of Rule 86, the Plaintiffs’ admissions were deemed admitted by operation of law.” Because Young “made allegations of medical malpractice[,]” then “expert medical testimony was essential to their claims.... With these matters conclusively established,[] there are no genuine issues of material fact as to whether [Young] would be able to establish a viable claim for medical negligence.” See Hubbard v. Wansley, 954 So.2d 951, 956-57 (Miss.2007). In short, Dr. Smith and BMH-D contend that Young “admitted that they did not have a qualified medical expert to support their medical negligence claim” and “where a matter deemed admitted is an essential element of the claim presented, then summary judgment is properly granted on that claim.”

¶ 21. This Court rejects Young’s waiver argument based on the same reasoning and logic used by the circuit judge. See ¶ 7 supra. First, the admission exists by operation of law. See Miss. R. Civ. P. 36. An admission is not an affirmative defense. Rather, it establishes a factual matter for purposes of evaluating the elements of a party’s claim or defense. Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 56(b) provides that “[a] party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought may, at any time, move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor as to all or any part thereof.” Miss. R. Civ. P. 56(b) (emphasis added). As a motion for summary judgment can be made at any time, it is incongruous to argue the “Renewed Motions for Summary Judgment” were untimely.

¶ 22. This Court has stated that “[a] matter that is deemed admitted does not require further proof. Any admission that is not amended or withdrawn cannot be rebutted by contrary testimony or ignored by the court even if the party against whom it is directed offers more credible evidence.” DeBlanc, 814 So.2d at 801 (quoting 7 James W. Moore, et al., Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 36.03[2], at 36-15 (3d ed. 2001) (footnotes omitted)) (emphasis added). See also Prime Rx, 917 So.2d at 795 (quoting DeBlanc, 814 So.2d at 800) (when a matter is “conclusively established” under Rule 36, it may not be “offset by a conflicting answer to interrogatories.”); In re Carney, 258 F.3d at 420 (citing Dukes, 770 F.2d at 548-49) (“[sjince Rule 36 admissions, whether express or by default, are conclusive as to the matters admitted, they cannot be overcome at the summary judgment stage by contradictory affidavit testimony or other evidence in the summary judgment record.”). The effect of the subject admissions was that Young’s medical malpractice claims against Dr. Smith and BMH-D lacked any “qualified medical expert” to testify that Dr. Smith “deviated from the applicable standard of care for an emergency room physician” or that “any alleged deviation from the applicable standard of care” by Dr. Smith “proximately caused or contributed to” Clarence Young’s death. Thus, the essential elements of breach of duty and causation were absent. “The trial court had no duty to review any pleadings, deposition testimony, interrogatory answers, etc., to refute a matter conclusively established by defendants’ deemed admissions.... ” Prime Rx, 917 So.2d at 796. Based upon the deemed admissions, no genuine issues of material fact remain as to Young’s claims against Dr. Smith and BMH-D. Thus, the circuit court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of Dr. Smith and BMH-D.

CONCLUSION

¶ 23. In sum, this Court concludes that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying Young’s “Motion to Withdraw Admissions.” Given those admissions, no genuine issues of material fact remain as to Young’s claims against Dr. Smith and BMH-D. Therefore, this Court affirms the circuit court’s “Order Granting Motions for Summary Judgment” in favor of Dr. Smith and BMH-D.

¶ 24. AFFIRMED.

WALLER, C.J., CARLSON AND DICKINSON, P.JJ., CHANDLER, PIERCE AND KING, JJ., CONCUR. WALLER, C.J., SPECIALLY CONCURS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY DICKINSON, P.J., AND KING, J. KITCHENS, J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION. LAMAR, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.

WALLER, Chief Justice,

specially concurring.

¶ 25. I agree with the majority’s affir-mance of summary judgment in favor of Dr. Robert Smith and Baptist Memorial Hospital-DeSoto, Inc. I write separately, however, to emphasize the two-pronged test outlined in Rule 36(b) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure. In deciding to allow withdrawal or amendment of a deemed admission, the trial judge should consider whether withdrawal or amendment promotes the presentation of the underlying merits, and whether the opposing party has shown that the withdrawal or amendment would result in unfair prejudice to the party’s ability to maintain the case or defend against it. M.R.C.P 36(b). This Court has directed trial courts to carefully examine Rule 36(b) motions under this two-pronged test. DeBlanc v. Stancil, 814 So.2d 796, 802 (Miss.2002). This is the best practice, though not explicitly applied here.

DICKINSON, P.J., AND KING, J., JOIN THIS OPINION.

KITCHENS, Justice,

dissenting.

¶ 26. In DeBlanc v. Standi, 814 So.2d 796 (Miss.2002), this Court thoroughly examined our jurisprudence regarding Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 36 and held, unequivocally, that “[j]ust as a matter admitted is ‘conclusively established’ by the express terms of the Rule, the trial court is likewise directed to carefully examine a Rule 36(b) motion under the two-prong test there provided.” Id. at 802 (emphasis added). The majority’s holding that “a trial court ‘may’ but is not required to consider the two-pronged test in denying a motion to withdraw or amend,” directly contravenes this Court’s unequivocal holding in DeBlanc, 814 So.2d at 802 (Miss.2002). Because both prongs of Rule 36(b) weigh heavily in favor of the plaintiffs, and because the defendants clearly abandoned their reliance on the deemed admissions, the trial court abused its discretion in denying the plaintiffs’ motion to withdraw and subsequently granting summary judgment in favor of Dr. Smith and BMH-D. Inasmuch as I would reverse the grant of summary judgment and remand for a trial on the merits, I respectfully dissent.

¶ 27. While the trial court generally has broad discretion over pretrial discovery matters, matters conclusively established are not necessarily “irrevocably admitted.” Educ. Placement Servs. v. Wilson, 487 So.2d 1316, 1318 (Miss.1986). Rule 36 places a firm deadline on filing responses to requests for admission but is notably silent as to the timing of motions to withdraw deemed admissions. In evaluating motions to withdraw or amend deemed admissions, this Court has pronounced:

While Rule 36 is to be applied as written, it is not intended to be applied in Draconian fashion. If the Rule may sometimes seem harsh in its application, the harshness may be ameliorated by the trial court’s power to grant amendments or withdrawals of admissions in proper circumstances. The trial court’s ruling in this regard is subject to review for abuse of discretion. The purpose of the rule is to determine which facts are not in dispute. [7 James W. Moore, et al., Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 36.02[1] at 36-37) (3d ed. 2001) ]. It is not intended to be used as a vehicle to escape adjudication of the facts by means of artifice or happenstance. Just as a matter admitted is “conclusively established” by the express terms of the Rule, the trial court is likewise directed to carefully examine a Rule 36(b) motion under the two-prong test there provided.

DeBlanc, 814 So.2d at 801-802. Thus, while Rule 36 grants discretion to the trial court in considering a motion to withdraw or amend, “it is the policy of our system of judicial administration to favor disposition of cases on their merits.” Bell, 467 So.2d at 661 (citing Manning v. Lovett, 228 Miss. 191, 195, 87 So.2d 494, 496 (1956); S.W. Sec. Ins. Co. v. Treadway, 113 Miss. 189, 197, 74 So. 143, 145 (1917)).

¶ 28. The trial judge in the present case denied the plaintiffs’ motion to withdraw the deemed admissions because (1) the plaintiffs did not offer an explanation for the seven-year delay in seeking a withdrawal and because (2) there were “no compelling circumstances to justify allowing an untimely reply to avoid admissions.” Although the trial judge’s opinion quoted the language of Rule 36(b), it did not apply the two-pronged test of that rule, that is, whether “the presentation of the merits of the action will be subserved” and whether “the party who obtained the admission fails to satisfy the court that withdrawal or amendment will prejudice him in maintaining his action or defense on the merits.” M.R.C.P. 36(b). Instead, the trial court focused on the delay between the requests for admission and the motion for withdrawal, not on the effect his ruling would have on resolution of the case on its merits.

¶ 29. On appeal, the plaintiffs correctly argue that this delay, standing on its own, is not sufficient to justify the denial of a motion to withdraw deemed admissions, and that the trial court must apply the two-pronged test of Rule 36(b). As noted above, this Court clearly has held that, “Cflust as a matter admitted is ‘conclusively established’ by the express terms of the Rule, the trial court is likewise directed to carefully examine a Rule 36(b) motion under the two-prong test there provided.” DeBlanc, 814 So.2d at 802 (emphasis added). Thus, when a party files a motion to withdraw or amend deemed admissions, the trial court is obliged to apply the two-pronged test enunciated in Rule 36(b). The delay in seeking a withdrawal or amendment, and the reasons for the delay, are factors that must be considered in determining whether there was prejudice to the nonmoving party; but delay alone will not support denial of a motion to withdraw or amend. See In re Dissolution of Marriage of Leverock and Hamby, 23 So.3d 424 (Miss.2009) (although party gave no explanation for his untimely response to requests for admission, he could move to withdraw default admissions on remand). Cf. Scoggins v. Baptist Mem’l Hosp.-DeSoto, 967 So.2d 646, 649 (Miss.2007) (delay in responding to requests sufficient to deem requests admitted when dilatory party made no motion to withdraw or amend); Martin v. Simmons, 571 So.2d 254 (Miss.1990) (same).

¶ 30. With respect to the first prong of the test, i.e., whether “the presentation of the merits of the action will be subserved” by allowing the withdrawal, the parties do not dispute that a trial on the merits is foreclosed if the default admissions are allowed to stand. Dr. Smith had asked the plaintiffs to admit that they had engaged no medical expert to testify on their behalf. Without an expert, one cannot establish causation in a medical malpractice case. Hubbard v. Wansley, 954 So.2d 951, 957 (Miss.2007). Indeed, the trial court recognized that “[t]he requests for admissions go to the heart of the Plaintiffs’ claims.” Thus, the merits of the case will not be adjudicated if the issue continues to be deemed admitted.

¶ 31. With respect to the second prong, this Court has not squarely addressed what constitutes prejudice with respect to Rule 36(b) motions. However, cases interpreting the federal rules of civil procedure hold that, “[t]he reference to ‘prejudice’ in Rule 36(b) is to the prejudice stemming from reliance on the binding effect of the admission.” 8B Charles Alan Wright, et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 2264, at 387-95 (3d ed. 2010) (citations omitted). For example, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, construing Rule 36 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, has stated that “the prejudice contemplated by Rule 36(b) relates to special difficulties a party may face caused by a sudden need to obtain evidence upon withdrawal or amendment of an admission.” American Auto. Ass’n, Inc. v. AAA Legal Clinic of Jefferson Crooke, 930 F.2d 1117, 1120 (5th Cir.1991) (citing Brook Village N. Assocs. v. General Elec. Co., 686 F.2d 66, 70 (1st Cir.1982)). This understanding of prejudice, in this context, is not inconsistent with this Court’s ruling that prejudice, with respect to amendment of pleadings, results “where allowance of the amendment would burden the adverse party with more discovery, preparation, and expense, particularly where the adverse party would have little time to investigate and acquaint itself with the new matter.” TXG Intrastate Pipeline Co. v. Grossnickle, 716 So.2d 991, 1011 (Miss.1997) (citing Natural Mother v. Paternal Aunt, 583 So.2d 614, 617 (Miss.1991)).

¶ 32. It is plain that prejudice does not exist with respect to the defendants in this case; they cannot show that they relied on the default admissions either entirely or in part. The plaintiffs provided the defendants the identity of their expert and a summary of his expected testimony on December 21, 2001. Although Dr. Smith had filed a motion for summary judgment the day before, based on the plaintiffs’ failure to respond to requests for admission, Dr. Smith abandoned that motion and chose to proceed by fully engaging in the usual pretrial discovery. Both Dr. Smith and BMH-D participated in deposing Dr. Hansen, the plaintiffs’ expert, and both sought summary judgment based on Dr. Hansen’s deposition testimony. During that time, and through the ensuing years of active litigation of this case, Dr. Smith never sought to set his original summary judgment motion for hearing. That did not occur until March of 2009, when Dr. Smith “tagged along” in the hospital’s renewal of Dr. Smith’s dormant 2001 summary judgment motion. Notably, BMH-D did not raise the issue of the plaintiffs’ untimely response to Dr. Smith’s requests until the case was appealed to this Court on other grounds. Clearly, the defendants were not proceeding in reliance on the deemed admissions, but instead forsook them while actively engaging in the discovery process with respect to the plaintiffs’ medical expert. That the plaintiffs did not file a motion to withdraw the default admissions for seven years did nothing to affect defendants’ actions in defending this case. The seventy-one days between the day the requests were filed and the day they were answered is negligible when compared to the eight years that passed between the filing of the complaint and the latest motion for summary judgment.

¶ 33. The majority relies heavily on Earwood v. Reeves, 798 So.2d 508 (Miss.2001), and Educational Placement Services, 487 So.2d 1316, but both of those cases were decided before DeBlanc, 814 So.2d 796, and both are readily distinguishable. In Educational Placement Services, 487 So.2d at 1318, the defendant never responded to the requests for admission; the defendant “appear[ed] simply to have ignored the request.” In determining that the matters had been admitted, the Court reasoned that “[m]ore than a year’s inaction on the part of the party to whom the request has been submitted must of necessity result in the matters being taken as admitted if the rule is to have any meaning of force at all.” Id. at 1318. In the present case, the plaintiffs did respond to the requests for admission, albeit untimely. Moreover, the Court in Educational Placement Services, 487 So.2d at 1318 n. 1, noted that the subject matter of the requests related to issues of in personam jurisdiction and venue and that “those defenses are subject to waiver if not timely asserted.” (Citing M.R.C.P. 12(h)(1)). Thus, unlike the case before us, the deemed admissions in Educational Placement Services would not have foreclosed “the presentation of the merits of the action.” M.R.C.P. 36(b).

¶ 34. The opinion in Earwood, 798 So.2d 508, did not discuss the subject matter of the requests for admission; thus, it is not clear whether the deemed admissions would have prevented a decision on the merits. Instead, in affirming the trial court’s denial of the defendants’ motion to withdraw, the Court focused on the defendants’ ten-month delay in responding to the requests and that the defendants were an attorney and a law firm. Id. at 516-17. “This is not an instance where an attorney’s mistake prejudiced the defense of a client who knew nothing of the rules or requirements and would suffer because of his attorney’s inaction. The client was an attorney and his entire firm.” Id. at 517. In the present case, the plaintiffs responded in a significantly shorter time than ten months, and it is not alleged that the plaintiffs themselves have any legal training such that they would have been aware of the rules of civil procedure. Moreover, the plaintiff in Earwood timely pursued her motion to deem the requests for admission admitted; she received a ruling within four months of filing her motion. Dr. Smith and BMH-D waited years before seeking a ruling on Dr. Smith’s motion.

¶ 35. Finally, I note that “the purpose of requests for admissions is to narrow and define issues for trial. Properly used, requests for admissions serve the expedient purpose of eliminating the necessity of proving essentially undisputed and peripheral issues of fact.” Haley v. Harbin, 933 So.2d 261, 262-63 (Miss.2005) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Moreover, “[discovery methods, including but not limited to, interrogatories and requests for admissions, are not to be used as a ruse or stratagem to obfuscate the truth or to trick an opposing party into admitting a disputed fact.” Id. at 262 (internal citations omitted). Allowing the deemed admissions to stand clearly forecloses a decision on the merits and subverts the purpose of the rule.

¶ 36. The plain language of Rule 36(b) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a trial court may permit withdrawal or amendment, of admissions where to grant the motion would subserve the presentation of the merits of the case, and the party who obtained the admissions cannot show that withdrawal would prejudice his or her ability to present his or her position on the merits. Once a party has properly entered a motion to withdraw or amend admissions, the trial court should evaluate that motion according to the terms of the two-pronged test outlined in Rule 36(b). In the present case, the test was ignored. Because both prongs weigh heavily in favor of the plaintiffs, and because the defendants clearly did not rely on these deemed admissions while engaging in years of litigation, the trial court abused its discretion in denying the plaintiffs’ motion to withdraw. Accordingly, I would reverse summary judgment and allow the ease to proceed to an adjudication on the merits.

      . This Court previously has noted that "[t]he basis of the action against BMH-D was re-spondeat superior. Therefore, as the only employee of BMH-D in this case, summary judgment in favor of Smith would necessitate summary judgment in favor of BMH-D.” Young v. Meacham, 999 So.2d 368, 372 n. 2 (Miss.2008) ("Young I").

      . Dr. Smith and BMH-D are the only parties as to which Young advances this appeal. This decision does not implicate Young’s claims against four other health-care providers.

      . The underlying facts in this case were previously summarized by this Court. See Young I, 999 So.2d at 369-71. As such, we address only those facts pertinent to the present appeal.

      . Young did not present even an answer providing "lack of information or knowledge” as a basis for failing to admit or deny, which contended that a "reasonable inquiry” had been made and "the information known or readily obtainable ... [wa]s insufficient to enable [Young] to admit or deny.” Miss. R. Civ. P. 36(a).

      . On March 13, 2009, Dr. Smith filed a substantively similar “Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment.”

      . Additionally, counsel for BMH-D noted that Young was still shuffling experts at that time. Specifically, counsel for BMH-D stated that, on May 7, 2009, Young had filed a designation of a new nursing expert “to assert claims against [BMH-D,]” nearly four years after "[t]he deadline passed ... for [Young] to have their experts designated.” Counsel for BMH-D asserted that "Dr. Hansen's supplemental opinions ... were about [a separate defendant-physician], not about Dr. Smith[,]” such that those “supplemental opinions don't address the issue before the [c]ourt on this summary judgment motion with respect to Dr. Smith.”

      . The circuit court added that Dr. Smith and BMH-D "had no reason to bring forth their motion until this [c]ourt’s ruling on the previous motion was reversed."

      . In neither the record nor Young’s appellate brief does Young explain why no "lack of information or knowledge”-type response, objection, or motion for enlargement of time was interposed or filed. See Miss. R. Civ. P. 36(a); Educ. Placement Servs., 487 So.2d at 1318 (citing 8 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2259 (1970), and 1985 Pocket Part) ("[hjere the record reflects no response being filed by Wilson. No written objection to any of the requests for admissions has been interposed or filed. No motion for an enlargement of time within which to respond appears. In this context, the matters are taken as admitted for purposes of this action.”).

      . This should have been filed either before, or contemporaneously with, Young's untimely response.

      . Dr. Smith and BMH-D add that to hold otherwise "would require them to predict the future of [Young’s] failure to comply with the discovery rules.”

      . According to Dr. Smith and BMH-D, ”[a]s the motion to withdraw in this case was denied, ... [Young] w[as] not allowed to attempt to contradict the matters 'conclusively established.’ ”

      .This is true unless the motions were in violation of a local rule or a pretrial order. See Miss. R. Civ. P. 16.

      . Rule 36(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is almost identical to our Rüle 36(b):
      A matter admitted under this rule is conclusively established unless the court, on motion, permits the admission to be withdrawn or amended. Subject to Rule 16(e), the court may permit withdrawal or amendment if it would promote the presentation of the merits of the action and if the court is not persuaded that it would prejudice the requesting party in maintaining or defending the action on the merits. An admission under this rule is not an admission for any other purpose and cannot be used against the party in any other proceeding.


author:
RANDOLPH, Justice,
      KITCHENS, Justice,

text:
    Dot MERCHANT, As Administratrix of the Estate of Charles Ernie Harris, Sr., And On Behalf of All Wrongful Death Beneficiaries of Charles Ernie Harris, Sr. v. FOREST FAMILY PRACTICE CLINIC, P.A. and John P. Lee, M.D.
    No. 2009-CA-01622-SCT.
    Supreme Court of Mississippi.
    Aug. 11, 2011.

      Shane F. Langston, Jackson, Rebecca M. Langston, attorneys for appellant.
    Anastasia G. Jones, Mildred M. Morris, James A. Becker, Jr., Timothy Lee Sensing, Jackson, attorneys for appellees.
   RANDOLPH, Justice,

for the Court:

¶ 1. In August 2008, the Estate of Charles Ernie Harris, Sr. (“Estate”) filed a medical malpractice action against John P. Lee, M.D., and the Forest Family Practice Clinic (“Clinic”) in the Circuit Court of Scott County, Mississippi. Three days prior to trial, the Estate filed a “Motion to Transfer Venue” based upon Dr. Lee’s status in the community and his son’s position as the Scott County Sheriff. The circuit court denied the Estate’s “Motion to Transfer Venue.” In jury selection, the Estate subsequently exercised only seven of its ten peremptory challenges. Ultimately, the empaneled jury returned a verdict in favor of Dr. Lee and the Clinic.

¶ 2. Following the circuit court’s entry of “Final Judgment,” the Estate filed a “Motion to Investigate Juror Misconduct, to Set Aside or Void Jury Verdict, to Void or Set Aside Final Judgment, for New Trial, and to Change Venue.” Regarding juror misconduct, the Estate attached a juror affidavit which provided that, during deliberations, another juror had revealed prejudices and information which had not been disclosed in voir dire, and repeatedly had referred to a separate lawsuit which the circuit judge had instructed the jury to disregard. Following hearing, the circuit court denied the Estate’s post-trial motions. The Estate now appeals.

FACTS

¶ 3. The merits, vel non, of this case are not at issue on appeal, but this Court will briefly recount the undisputed facts. Harris was treated for gout of the left foot by Dr. Lee at the Clinic on multiple occasions between June 13, 2006, and June 30, 2006. On July 2, 2006, Harris was taken to the emergency room of Mississippi Baptist Medical Center and was diagnosed as septic. As a result of the sepsis, Harris’s left leg was amputated. On August 13, 2006, Harris died. On August 6, 2008, the Estate filed a complaint against the Clinic, Dr. Lee, and John Does 1-10, alleging, inter alia, medical negligence, vicarious liability, and wrongful death.

¶ 4. On Friday, May 29, 2009, three days before trial, the Estate filed a “Motion to Transfer Venue and for Continuance,” contending that it:

has good reason to believe, and does believe that, from the undue influence of [Dr. Lee] and his partners ... as well as the fact that Dr. Lee is the father of the Sheriff of Scott County, Mike Lee,[] that [the Estate] cannot obtain a fair and impartial trial in Scott County....

Regarding Dr. Lee and the Clinic, the Estate maintained that “a large majority of residents ... in Scott County will be either current or former patients of one of the three doctors at [the Clinic].” As to Sheriff Lee, the Estate asserted that “every potential juror will know Sheriff Lee and/or one of his deputies.... Also, the Sheriff’s deputies may be acting as bailiffs or [c]ourt security during the trial and thus the risk of imposing an unintentional influence may be present.” In addressing the Estate’s motion, the circuit judge stated that “this case has been on the docket for some time. You chose the venue in the filing of the suit.... The fact that [Dr. Lee] is a prominent doctor, you knew that [at] the time you filed the suit.” As to Sheriff Lee, the circuit judge found that his identity previously had been disclosed and his position was “an easy matter of discovery” which, “in and of itself, does not entitle you to have me sustain your motion for change of venue.” The circuit court denied the Estate’s “Motion to Transfer Venue.”

¶ 5. When jury selection began, the circuit judge noted that:

I issue[d] a summons for 185 jurors to begin with for a term of [c]ourt. The Clerk advised after I had [excused] peo-pie who were 65 and older and sick or whatever that we only had 39. So we summonsed [sic] 65 additional.... [W]hen we get a list of the jurors, I’m going to expand the peremptory challenges that you have because of the issue that you raised that Dr. Lee is a doctor of this county and that [Sheriff] Lee is the son of the doctor.

(Emphasis added.) Thereafter, the circuit court provided each party with ten peremptory challenges, based upon the “prominence of the parties in the case.” Further, before voir dire began, the circuit judge specifically instructed the venire that Dr. Lee was a party in the case, that Sheriff Lee was his son, and that neither fact should “affect your judgment in this case” or interfere with “[y]ou[r] ... oath ... that you will be fair and impartial on the evidence of the case.”

¶ 6. During voir dire, twenty-one members of the venire acknowledged that either they or their family members had been treated by Dr. Lee or other Clinic physicians, and/or that they had a personal relationship with Dr. Lee or Sheriff Lee. Four other members of the venire stated that they had relatives who either worked for, or had law-enforcement matters pending with, the Scott County Sheriff’s Department. Following voir dire, the Estate challenged numerous members of the veni-re “for cause.” The circuit court excused eight members of the venire “for cause.” The Estate then exercised seven of its ten peremptory challenges.

¶ 7. At trial, during cross-examination of the Estate’s medical expert, Dr. Steven Schwartz, counsel for Dr. Lee asked the following question, “[a]s far as your medical legal business picking up, can you tell me if you’ve been retained as an expert in the case where [counsel for the Estate] is suing Dr. Howard Clark just up the road?” (Emphasis added.) After the Estate’s objection was sustained, the circuit judge instructed the jury to disregard that question, and the jurors affirmatively responded that they would heed said instruction. The Estate moved for a mistrial, emphasizing that:

[w]e’ve already talked about the fact that there are only about five doctors in the whole county.... [I]f any of those jurors are friends of Dr. Clark or go see Dr. Clark, they may be prejudiced by that comment. There was no reason whatsoever for that question.... I know the [c]ourt gave an instruction for the jury to disregard it, but given everything else we’ve talked about with regard to the [Sjheriff and the doctors and the small communities, that ... justifies a mistrial.

The circuit judge denied the Estate’s motion, stating that “I instructed the jury to disregard the statement. All 13 stated they would follow my instructions, so I chose to believe that will be done.”

¶ 8. After the Estate rested, it renewed its motion for mistrial based upon the “cumulative effect” of the question counsel opposite posed to Dr. Schwartz, the presence of “Sheriff Lee’s deputies ... in the courtroom throughout the trial[,]” and an allegation that a deputy sheriff had spoken with Dr. Lee and had shaken his hand in “full view of the jury.” Regarding the question to Dr. Schwartz, the circuit judge reiterated that “I choose to believe that with an instruction such as I gave ... that [the jury] would follow the [cjourt’s instructions .... ” As to the conduct of the deputy sheriffs, the circuit judge stated that he had not observed them “being in the way of anyone or having familiarity with the” parties. The circuit court overruled the Estate’s renewed motion for mistrial.

¶ 9. Following deliberation, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Dr. Lee and the Clinic. A poll of the jury revealed nine jurors agreed, two disagreed, and one was undecided. On June 11, 2009, “Final Judgment” was entered by the circuit court.

¶ 10. On June 12, 2009, the Estate filed a “Motion to Investigate Juror Misconduct, to Set Aside or Void Jury Verdict, to Void or Set Aside Final Judgment, for New Trial, and to Change Venue.” Regarding juror misconduct, the Estate attached the affidavit of Juror Maria Lopez. That affidavit provided, in pertinent part, that during jury deliberations, Juror Clyde Low-den had stated, inter alia:

[tjhat he had been a patient of both Dr. Lee and Dr. Clark. That both were good doctors and that ive the [jjury could not “let those attorneys keep taking money from our doctors.” [Pace] and I reminded [Lowden] that the [c]ourt had instructed us to disregard the comment about a lawsuit against Dr. Clark. [Lowden] nonetheless continued to refer to that lawsuit in an attempt to persuade his fellow jurors to vote in favor of Dr. Lee.

(Emphasis added.) According to the Estate, Lowden prejudicially had failed to disclose in voir dire that he had been a patient of Dr. Lee. The Estate also contended that Lowden had “intentionally violated the [c]ourt’s clear and unambiguous charge and repeatedly referenced the lawsuit against Dr. Clark as a reason to rule in favor of Dr. Lee.” The Estate maintained that such is “precisely the type of ‘extraneous prejudicial information’ envisioned by” Mississippi Rule of Evidence 606(b).

¶ 11. On August 17, 2009, a hearing was held before the circuit court on the Estate’s post-trial motions. Regarding juror misconduct, the circuit judge examined Lopez’s affidavit, then stated:

[t]he question to me is the [c]ourt having instructed the juror to disregard that statement, was that then extraneous information that was brought into the jury room. If so, it would support the allegation of [Lopez] that there was extraneous information brought in if they chose somewhat to ignore the [c]ourt’s instruction.

The circuit judge then permitted examination of Lopez, during which she reiterated the statements from her affidavit, with limited additions and retractions. Following Lopez’s testimony, the circuit judge emphasized that the “ultimate issue” is “whether or not [Dr. Lee] in his diagnosis and treatment departed from the standard of care required of physicians of his standing.” Based thereon, the circuit judge determined that the statements made by Lowden were not “prejudicial to the outcome” as “jurors are permitted to bring some degree of personal knowledge and experience into the deliberation process without jeopardizing their verdict.”

¶ 12. On September 11, 2009, the circuit court entered an “Order” denying the Estate’s “Motion to Set Aside or Void Jury Verdict, to Void or Set Aside Final Judgment and for New Trial.” Based thereon, the circuit court also entered an “Order” denying the Estate’s “Renewed Motion to Transfer Venue” as moot. From those rulings, the Estate filed timely “Notice of Appeal.”

ISSUES

¶ 13. On appeal, the Estate presented the following issues, inter alia:

I. Whether the circuit court abused its discretion in denying the Estate’s “Motion to Transfer Venue.”
II. Whether the circuit court abused its discretion in denying several of the Estate’s requests to strike members of the venire “for cause.”
III. Whether the circuit court abused its discretion in denying the Estate’s motion for mistrial following counsel opposite’s reference to a lawsuit against Dr. Howard Clark, a sustained objection thereto, and a curative instruction.
IV.Whether the circuit court erred in denying the Estate’s motion for new trial based upon juror misconduct.

ANALYSIS

I. Whether the circuit court abused its discretion in denying the Estate’s “Motion to Transfer Venue.”
II. Whether the circuit court abused its discretion in denying several of the Estate’s requests to strike members of the venire “for cause.”
III. Whether the circuit court abused its discretion in denying the Estate’s motion for mistrial following counsel opposite’s reference to a lawsuit against Dr. Howard Clark, a sustained objection thereto, and a curative instruction.

¶ 14. This Court will address these issues collectively, as an abuse-of-discretion standard of review applies to each, individually. See Birkhead v. State, 57 So.3d 1223, 1237 (Miss.2011) (quoting Dora v. State, 986 So.2d 917, 921 (Miss.2008)) (“The standard of review for denial of a motion for mistrial is abuse of discretion.”); Crenshaw v. Roman, 942 So.2d 806, 809 (Miss.2006) (“An abuse of discretion standard of review is applied by this Court when reviewing the trial court’s denial of a motion to change venue.”); Miss. Transp. Comm’n v. Highland Dev., LLC, 836 So.2d 731, 738 (Miss.2002) (quoting Smith v. State, 802 So.2d 82, 86 (Miss.2001)) (“A trial court has wide discretion in determining whether to excuse prospective jurors, including those challenged for cause.”).

¶ 15. Mississippi Code Section 11-11-8(3) provides, in pertinent part, that:

any action against a licensed physician ... including any legal entity which may be liable for their acts or omissions, for malpractice, negligence, error, omission, mistake, breach of standard of care or the unauthorized rendering of professional services shall be brought only in the county in which the alleged act or omission occurred.

Miss.Code Ann. § 11-11-8(3) (Rev.2004). In this case, the circuit court denied the Estate’s “Motion to Transfer Venue” from that statutorily required forum, but also summoned additional jurors to expand the venire and granted six additional peremptory challenges to each side. Under these circumstances, this Court cannot conclude that the circuit court abused its discretion in denying the Estate’s “Motion to Transfer Venue.”

¶ 16. As to denying several of the Estate’s “for-cause” challenges, this Court concludes that the circuit court cannot be found to have abused its discretion because the Estate exercised only seven of its ten peremptory challenges. See Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v. Hawkins, 830 So.2d 1162, 1176 (Miss.2002) (quoting Scott v. Ball, 595 So.2d 848, 851 (Miss.1992)) (“This Court has ‘consistently held that the trial court may not be put in error for refusal to excuse jurors challenged for cause when the complaining party chooses not to exhaust his peremptory challenges.’ ”).

¶ 17. Regarding denial of the Estate’s motion for mistrial following the improper question by counsel opposite, the record reflects that the circuit judge sustained the Estate’s objection to the question, issued an instruction for the jury to disregard the question, and then received an affirmative response from the jury that his instruction would be heeded. “Absent unusual circumstances, where objection is sustained to improper questioning or testimony, and the jury is admonished to disregard the question or testimony, we will not find error.” Wright v. State, 540 So.2d 1, 4 (Miss.1989). As “[t]he jury is presumed to have followed the directions of the trial court[,]” this Court concludes that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant the motion for mistrial at that time. Walker v. State, 671 So.2d 581, 621 (Miss.1995).

¶ 18. Accordingly, this Court concludes that these issues are without merit.

IV. Whether the circuit court erred in denying the Estate’s motion for new trial based upon juror misconduct.

¶ 19. “Our judicial system is grounded toward providing a fair trial.” Hudson v. Taleff, 546 So.2d 359, 362 (Miss.1989). To that end, “Article 3, § 14 of the Mississippi Constitution guarantees due process of law, including a fair and impartial trial.” Brown v. Blackwood, 697 So.2d 763, 769 (Miss.1997) (citing Hudson, 546 So.2d at 363). Accordingly, “[t]he circuit court has an absolute duty ... to see that the jury selected to try any case is fair, impartial and competent.” Brown, 697 So.2d at 769 (emphasis added). In short, a jury verdict impermissibly influenced, without adherence to the evidence and in defiance of instructions of the trial court, cannot be sanctioned, as that verdict is the product of a trial that is neither fair nor impartial.

¶20. Mississippi Rule of Evidence 606(b) prohibits jurors from testifying to statements made during jury deliberations, subject to the exception “that a juror may testify on the question whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury’s attention or whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror.” Miss. R. Evid. 606(b) (emphasis added). See also Payton v. State, 897 So.2d 921, 954 (Miss.2003) (“jurors may testify about misconduct in their presence or about outside influences on the jury panel”). Based upon the record presented, the learned circuit judge fulfilled his duty in jury selection based upon the disclosures provided. However, unbeknownst to the circuit court during trial, the voir dire and jury-deliberation processes were flawed. Specifically, Lopez’s affidavit and subsequent testimony offered unrebutted evidence that Lowden “failed to truthfully answer questions during voir dire[,]” which implicated an “ ‘outside influence’ contemplated by Rule 606(b).” Mariner Health Care, Inc. v. Estate of Edwards, 964 So.2d 1138, 1146 (Miss.2007); Salter v. Watkins, 513 So.2d 569, 573 (Miss.1987). According to this Court:

[t]he standard of review for juror misconduct arising from a failure to respond to questions during voir dire is as follows:
[wjhere a prospective juror ... fails to respond to a question ... on voir dire, the [cjourt should determine whether the question was (1) relevant to the voir dire examination, (2) whether it was unambiguous, and (3) whether the juror had substantial knowledge of the information sought to be elicited. If all answers to the above questions are affirmative, then the court determines if prejudice ... in selecting the jury could be inferred from the juror’s failure to respond.

Mariner Health Care, 964 So.2d at 1146-47 (quoting Barker v. State, 463 So.2d 1080, 1083 (Miss.1985)) (emphasis added).

¶ 21. During voir dire, the circuit judge asked the venire, “[w]ith that type of case, a case where a doctor has been sued for malpractice, will that affect your judgment in this case?” The first inquiry posed by counsel for the Estate during voir dire was “[w]ould you raise your hand if any of you have had an occasion to be treated at the [Clinic] by Dr. Lee or any other doctors[?]” Counsel for the Estate later asked the venire, “would you raise your hand if you feel like ... you should not sit on this jury because of the knowledge of ... Dr. Lee or his [C]linic ..., that you feel like you shouldn’t sit on this jury because you can’t put aside that bias[?]” Finally, counsel for Dr. Lee asked the venire, “you will make your decision based on the actual evidence and the [j]udge’s instruction. Are you all aware of that?” During voir dire, the venire members (including Lowden) also responded affirmatively that they “still have an open mind and can receive the evidence and the law of this case and make a fair decision[,]” and that they will “listen to the evidence, listen to the [c]ourt, and ... follow the [c]ourt’s instructions, even if for some reason you disagree....” This Court finds the aforementioned questions were “unambiguous” and “relevant to the voir dire examination,” insofar as each sought to reveal potential juror bias. Mariner Health Care, 964 So.2d at 1146-47 (quoting Barker, 463 So.2d at 1083). Yet, according to the record presented, Lowden failed to respond affirmatively to any of these questions despite having “substantial knowledge of the information sought to be elicited[,]” such that he was under an “obligation to bring that information to the attention of the court.” Id.; Salter, 513 So.2d at 574. Lowden’s judgment was affected not only by the nature of the action, but also the participants to the proceeding, given his statement that Dr. Lee was a “good doctofr]_” Moreover, Lowden failed to respond honestly to voir dire queries and did not reveal until jury deliberations that “he had been a patient of ... Dr. Lee.... ” Additionally, Lowden’s repeated references to the separate lawsuit against Dr. Clark, another “good docto[r],” despite the circuit court’s clear and unequivocal instruction to disregard the lawsuit against Dr. Clark, reveals a decision guided by neither the evidence admitted nor the circuit court’s instructions of law.

¶ 22. Regarding prejudice, when:

a party shows that a juror withheld substantial information or misrepresented material facts, and where a full and complete response would have provided a valid basis for challenge for cause, the trial court must grant a new trial, and, failing that, we must reverse on appeal. We presume prejudice. Where, as a matter of common experience, a full and correct response would have provided the basis for a peremptory challenge, not rising to the dignity of a challenge for cause, our courts have greater discretion, although a discretion that should always be exercised against the backdrop of our duty to secure to each party trial before a fair and impartial jury.

T.K Stanley, Inc. v. Cason, 614 So.2d 942, 949 (Miss.1992) (citing Myers v. State, 565 So.2d 554, 558 (Miss.1990)) (emphasis added). Lowden’s failure to respond to the aforementioned questions amounted to withholding “substantial information” which “would have provided a valid basis for challenge for cause....” T.K. Stanley, 614 So.2d at 949 (citing Myers, 565 So.2d at 558). In fact, the Estate had challenged “for cause” all individuals who had been treated by Dr. Lee, and several of those individuals had been excused by the circuit court “for cause.” Furthermore, Lowden’s refusal to abide by the circuit court’s instruction to disregard the lawsuit against Dr. Clark resulted in the repeated, prejudicial injection of that subject during jury deliberation.

¶ 23. For these collective reasons, this Court concludes that the Estate’s right to a “fair, impartial and competent” jury was prejudicially compromised. Brown, 697 So.2d at 769. Lowden’s lack of candor during voir dire, and subsequent disclosures and opinions which surfaced only in jury deliberation, “resulted in fundamental unfairness” to the Estate. T.K. Stanley, 614 So.2d at 954. Accordingly, this Court reverses and remands for a new trial.

CONCLUSION

¶ 24. This Court affirms the Circuit Court of Scott County’s denial of the Estate’s “Motion to Transfer Venue,” its denial of several of the Estate’s “for-cause” challenges, and its denial of the Estate’s motion for mistrial based upon the improper question of counsel opposite. This Court reverses the circuit court’s denial of the Estate’s “Motion to Set Aside or Void Jury Verdict, to Void or Set Aside Final Judgment and for New Trial” as to juror misconduct, and remands for a new trial consistent with this opinion.

¶ 25. AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED.

WALLER, C.J., CARLSON AND DICKINSON, P.JJ., LAMAR AND PIERCE, JJ., CONCUR. KITCHENS, J., CONCURS IN PART AND DISSENTS IN PART WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY CHANDLER AND KING, JJ.

KITCHENS, Justice,

concurring in part and dissenting in part:

¶ 26. While I agree that the judgment should be reversed based on juror misconduct, I respectfully cannot join the majority opinion’s unnecessary analysis regarding the other three issues. Because the issue of juror misconduct is dispositive, the remaining issues are moot, and any discussion regarding them is advisory in nature. The proper disposition in this case is “reversed and remanded;” but because the majority affirms in part, I cannot fully concur with the result.

CHANDLER AND KING, JJ., JOIN THIS OPINION.

      . Dr. Lee is president of, and holds a one-third ownership interest in, the Clinic.

      . Each party was provided ten peremptory challenges (six more than usual), based upon the concerns raised in the Estate’s motion. See Miss. R. Civ. P. 47(c) (‘‘[i]n actions tried before a twelve-person jury, each side may exercise four peremptory challenges.... Where one or both sides are composed of multiple parties, the court may allow ... additional challenges....”).

      .According to the Estate, it learned that Sheriff Lee was Dr. Lee's son only on the evening of Wednesday, May 27, 2009, five days before trial.

      . As noted by counsel for Dr. Lee, in a December 2008 deposition, Dr. Lee stated that he had a son named Mike Lee.

      . At trial, the Estate renewed its "Motion to Transfer Venue.” In addressing that renewed motion, the circuit judge reiterated that it was not timely filed and further stated that "[i]t cannot successfully be argued that just because [Dr. Lee] is a doctor, that he enjoys such a position in this community that his position would be more persuasive.” According to the circuit judge, "there must be some evidence of that....” As to Sheriff Lee, the circuit judge stated that "I’ve witnessed in this very courtroom many times those defendants that he has brought into this courtroom were acquitted in a trial by jury.” Finally, according to the circuit judge, "when you all come into a ... rural county of [Mississippi], ... you must expect there will be familiarity with the people; that there will be knowledge of their backgrounds and ... histories[,]” and that "the duty would pass to [the Estate] to investigate the popularity of the Defendants. ...” As such, the circuit judge stated that determining that Sheriff Lee was Dr. Lee’s son only days before trial was "no one's fault but your [the Estate’s] own.”

      . During the "for-cause” challenges portion of jury selection, the circuit judge had stated, “[a]m I wrong in saying that there are only two clinics in Scott County[?] ... The only other clinic would be Dr. Howard Clark in Morton.”

      . In a post-trial motion, the Estate added that Dr. Clark’s deposition testimony from the improperly referenced case established that he:
      is a long-time prominent physician in Scott County and that [his] son is a prominent chancery judge ... in Scott County.... [He] has delivered over 4,500 babies in the Scott County area; he provides the only pediatric and internal medicine services in Scott County; and he has been the [physician] for the Morton High School for over 51 years....

      .The circuit court subsequently required the Estate "to file three separate motions as grounds for relief.” Thereafter, the Estate filed a separate "Motion to Investigate Juror Misconduct,” "Motion to Set Aside or Void Jury Verdict, to Void or Set Aside Final Judgment and for New Trial,” and "Renewed Motion to Transfer Venue.” These separate motions were substantively identical to the consolidated motion filed on June 12, 2009.

      . According to counsel for the Estate, "subsequent to the jury rendering its verdict, we walked outside the courthouse. [Lopez] and another juror, [Tina Pace], approached us and said they were sorry, that it wasn’t right.... We talked to [Lopez] subsequent to that ... and that's in her affidavit.” This Court notes that the jury returned its verdict on June 3, 2009, and Lopez's affidavit was taken on June 5, 2009, yet the issue of juror misconduct was not brought to the attention of either the circuit court or counsel opposite until the Estate's post-trial motion was filed on June 12, 2009. While this issue was not presented on cross-appeal by Dr. Lee and the Clinic, this Court advises that the better practice is for:
      the trial court and opposing counsel [to] be made aware of any potential juror misconduct when this evidence is manifested. Thus, if a juror approaches an attorney for one of the parties or the court itself, or if either subsequently learns such through alternative means, all parties involved should be made aware of the allegation as expeditiously as possible.

        Gladney v. Clarksdale Beverage Co., Inc., 625 So.2d 407, 418 (Miss.1993). In fact, we take this opportunity to remind the bench and bar of the entire "method to uniformly execute juror inquiry, under [Mississippi Rule of Evidence] 606(b)” outlined in Gladney. Id. at 418-19.

      . In their "Response” to the Estate's post-trial motions, Dr. Lee and the Clinic maintained that "a search of [the Clinic's] electronic patient records — which includes patient records for the previous eight years— indicates that [Lowden] has not been treated by any doctor at the Clinic during this time period.” The "Response” added that "Defendants cannot speak to what [Lowden] stated during jury deliberations as Defendants have not received the [c]ourt’s permission to contact any jurors and have not done so.”

      . According to Lopez, regarding the lawsuit against Dr. Clark, Lowden "just kept bringing it up.... [I]t was just a huge argument as to us telling him to disregard it when he just kept bringing it in.”

      . Additionally, Jury Instruction D-5 stated that "your verdict must be based solely upon the testimony, evidence and instructions of this [c]ourt.”