text:
    In re AMENDMENTS TO the FLORIDA SUPREME COURT APPROVED FAMILY LAW FORMS AND the FLORIDA FAMILY LAW RULES OF PROCEDURE FORMS.
    No. SC11-1314.
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    Sept. 28, 2011.

      Susan Proctor, Office of Court Improvement, Tallahassee, FL, for Petitioner.
   PER CURIAM.

This matter is before the Court for consideration of amendments to the Florida Supreme Court Approved Family Law Forms and the Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure Forms. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 2(a), Fla. Const.

Under Amendments to the Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure & Family Law Forms, 810 So.2d 1, 13-14 (Fla.2000), the Court internally reviews and maintains the Florida Supreme Court Approved Family Law Forms. Revisions to Florida Supreme Court Approved Family Law Forms have become necessary as a result of an amendment to Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.540, requiring all notices of court proceedings to contain the following statement in bold face, 14-point Times New Roman or Courier type:

If you are a person with a disability who needs any accommodation in order to participate in this proceeding, you are entitled, at no cost to you, to the provision of certain assistance. Please contact [identify applicable court personnel by name, address, and telephone number] at least 7 days before your scheduled court appearance, or immediately upon receiving this notification if the time before the scheduled appearance is less than 7 days; if you are hearing or voice impaired, call 711.

In re Amends. to Fla. Rule of Jud. Admin. 2.540, 41 So.3d 881, 883-84 (Fla.2010). The amendments to the Florida Supreme Court Approved Family Law Forms are meant to conform existing language in the forms to the specific language required by rule 2.540. We also on our own motion amend Florida Family Law Rule of Procedure form 12.920(c), Notice of Hearing Before General Magistrate, to this same end. Other minor and editorial amendments are also made to the forms.

Accordingly, the Florida Supreme Court Approved Family Law Forms are hereby amended as set forth in the appendix to this petition, fully engrossed and ready for use. The amendments shall become effective immediately upon release of this opinion. Because the amendments were not published for comment prior to adoption, interested persons shall have sixty days from the date of this opinion in which to file comments with the Court. By adoption of these forms, we express no opinion as to their correctness or applicability. The forms discussed herein may also be accessed and downloaded from the Florida State Courts website at www.flcourts.org/ gen_public/family/forms_rules/index.shtml.

It is so ordered.

CANADY, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, POLSTON, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur.

APPENDIX

INSTRUCTIONS FOR FLORIDA FAMILY LAW RULES OF PROCEDURE FORMS 12.920(a), MOTION FOR REFERRAL TO GENERAL MAGISTRATE, 12.920(b), ORDER OF REFERRAL TO GENERAL MAGISTRATE, and 12.920(c), NOTICE OF HEARING BEFORE GENERAL MAGISTRATE (09/11)

When should these forms be used?

A general magistrate is an attorney appointed by a judge to take testimony and recommend decisions on certain matters connected with a divorce. These recommendations are then reviewed by the judge and are generally approved unless contrary to the law or the facts of the case. The primary purposes of having general magistrates hear family law matters are to reduce the costs of litigation and to speed up cases. Either party may request that their case, or portions of their case, be heard by a general magistrate by filing Motion for Referral to General Magistrate, Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure Form 12.920(a). You must also prepare an Order of Referral to General Magistrate, Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure Form 12.920(b), to submit to the judge assigned to your ease.

Many times, the court, either on its own motion or under current administrative orders of the court, may refer your case to a general magistrate. Even in those instances, you may be required to prepare and submit an Order of Referral to General Magistrate, Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure Form 12.920(b), to the judge.

Once a general magistrate has been appointed to your case, the general magistrate will assign a time and place for a hearing as soon as reasonably possible after the referral is made. The general magistrate will give notice of that hearing to each of the parties directly or will direct a party or attorney in the case to file and serve a notice of hearing on the other party. If you are asked to send the notice of hearing, you will need to use the form entitled Notice of Hearing Before General Magistrate, Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure Form 12.920(c). Regardless of who prepares the notice of hearing, the moving party (the one who requested referral to the general magistrate) is required to have the notice properly served on the other party.

These forms should be typed or printed in black ink. After completing this form, you should file the original with the clerk of the circuit court in the county where your case is filed and keep a copy for your records.

What should I do next?

If you are filing a Motion for Referral to General Magistrate, Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure Form 12.920(a), you need to send or deliver your motion directly to the judge assigned to your case, along with an Order of Referral to General Magistrate, Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure Form 12.920(b), and an addressed, stamped envelope for each party in the case. The judge will then either grant or deny the motion, usually without a hearing.

If you are required to submit an Order of Referral to General Magistrate, Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure Form 12.920(b), to the judge assigned to your case, you will need to send or deliver the order directly to the judge, along with addressed, stamped envelopes for each party in the case.

The party who prepares any of these forms must file the original with the clerk of the circuit court. A copy of the motion must be mailed or hand delivered to any other party in your case.

Where can I look for more information?

Before proceeding, you should read General Information for Self-Represented Litigants found at the beginning of these forms. For further information, see rule 12.490, Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure.

Special notes ...

IMPORTANT: After the judge refers your case to a general magistrate, either party (including the party who was required to prepare and submit the Order of Referral) may object to the referral within 10 days of the date that the referral is made (if the Order of Referral is served by mail, the parties have an additional 5 days within which to object to the referral). Every litigant is entitled to have his or her case heard by a judge. However, before you decide to object to an Order of Referral to General Magistrate, you should consider the potential extra costs and time delays that may result from having a judge hear your case instead of a general magistrate. You may want to speak with an attorney in your area who can assist you in making a more informed decision regarding whether you should file an objection to an Order of Referral to General Magistrate.

Remember, a person who is NOT an attorney is called a nonlawyer. If a nonlawyer helps you fill out these forms, that person must give you a copy of Disclosure from Nonlawyer, Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure Form 12.900(a), before he or she helps you. A nonlawyer helping you fill out these forms also must put his or her name, address, and telephone number on the bottom of the last page of every form he or she helps you complete.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR FLORIDA SUPREME COURT APPROVED FAMILY LAW FORM 12.921, NOTICE OF HEARING (CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT HEARING OFFICERX09/11)

When should this form be used?

A child support enforcement hearing officer is an attorney who has been appointed by administrative order of the court to take testimony and recommend decisions in cases involving the establishment, enforcement, and/or modification of child support If your case only involves issues pertaining to child support, you cannot object to the referral of your case to a hearing officer.

Use this form anytime you have set a hearing before a child support enforcement hearing officer and have been instructed to send notice of the hearing to the other party. Before you fill out this form, you should coordinate a hearing time and date with the hearing officer and the other party. If the Department of Revenue is a party to the case, you may need to schedule your hearing time with the attorney for the Department of Revenue.

This form should be typed or printed in black ink. After completing this form, you should file the original with the clerk of the circuit court in the county where your case is filed and keep a copy for your records.

What should I do next?

A copy of this form must be mailed or hand delivered to the other party in your ease.

Where can I look for more information?

Before proceeding, you should read General Information for Self Represented Litigants found at the beginning of these forms. For further information, See Rule 12.941, Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure.

Special notes ...

An attorney who has been appointed by the court to serve as a child support enforcement hearing officer can also be appointed to serve as a general magistrate. If your case involves only child support issues, your case may properly be referred to a general magistrate acting as a child support enforcement hearing officer.

Remember, a person who is NOT an attorney is called a nonlawyer. If a nonlawyer helps you fill out these forms, that person must give you a copy of Disclosure from Nonlawyer, Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure Form 12.900(a), before he or she helps you. A nonlawyer helping you fill out these forms also must put his or her name, address, and telephone number on the bottom of the last page of every form he or she helps you complete.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR FLORIDA SUPREME COURT APPROVED FAMILY LAW FORM 12.923, NOTICE OF HEARING (GENERAL) (09/11)

When should this form be used?

Anytime you have set a hearing before a judge, you must send notice of the hearing to the other party. IMPORTANT: If your hearing has been set before a general magistrate, you should use Notice of Hearing Before General Magistrate, Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure Form 12.920(c). If your hearing has been set before a child support enforcement hearing officer, you should use Notice of Hearing (Child Support Hearing Officer), Florida Supreme Court Approved Family Law Form 12.921.

This form should be typed or printed in black ink. After completing this form, you should file the original with the clerk of the circuit court in the county where your case was filed and keep a copy for your records.

What should I do next?

A copy of this form must be mailed or hand delivered to the other party in your case. If a default has been entered, you must still send this form to the other party to notify the other party of the final hearing.

Where can I look for more information?

Before proceeding, you should read General Information for Self-Represented Litigants found at the beginning of these forms. For further information on serving notices of hearing, see rule 1.090(d), Florida Civil Rules of Procedure.

Special notes ...

To set a hearing date and time, you will usually have to make a good-faith effort to coordinate a mutually convenient date and time for you, the other parties in the case, and the judge, except in certain emergency situations. Some circuits may have additional procedural requirements that you must follow when you notify the court and other parties of your scheduled hearing. Therefore, before you complete this form, you should contact the clerk’s office, family law intake staff, or judicial assistant for information regarding the proper procedure to follow.

Remember, a person who is NOT an attorney is called a nonlawyer. If a nonlawyer helps you fill out these forms, that person must give you a copy of Disclosure from Nonlawyer, Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure Form 12.900(a), before he or she helps you. A nonlawyer helping you fill out these forms also must put his or her name, address, and telephone number on the bottom of the last page of every form he or she helps you complete.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR SUPREME COURT APPROVED FAMILY LAW FORMS 12.931(a), NOTICE OF PRODUCTION FROM NON-PARTY and 12.931(b), SUBPOENA FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS FROM NONPARTY (09/11)

When should these forms be used?

These forms should be used if you need copies of documents (for a purpose relating to your case) from a nonparty in your case. Both forms should be typed or printed in black ink.

Notice of Production from Nonparty, Florida Supreme Court Approved Family Law Form 12.931(a), is used to notify the other party in your case that in 10 days you are going to subpoena documents from a nonparty. Subpoena for Production of Documents from Nonparty, Florida Supreme Court Approved Family Law Form 12.931(b), is the actual subpoena directing the nonparty to produce specific documents. You must file the originals of these forms with the clerk of the circuit court. A copy of these forms must be mailed or hand delivered to any other party in your case.

What should I do next?

Ten days after you serve the Notice of Production from Nonparty, Florida Supreme Court Approved Family Law Form 12.931(a), on the other party in your case (15 days if service is by mail), you should ask the clerk of the court to sign the subpoena. You should contact the deputy sheriff or private process server and have the subpoena personally served on the person named in the subpoena.

Where can I look for more information?

Before proceeding, you should read General Information for Self-Represented Litigants found at the beginning of these forms. Because these papers must also comply with rule 12.280, Florida Family Law Rule of Procedure, and rules 1.280, 1.350, 1.351, and 1.410, Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, you also should read those rules.

Special notes ...

If the other party in your case objects in writing within 10 days (allow an additional 5 days if served by mail) of service of the Notice of Production from Nonparty, Florida Supreme Court Approved Family Law Form 12.931(a), you may not use this procedure to obtain documents from the nonparty unless and until the court orders otherwise.

The nonparty receiving the subpoena may charge you a reasonable fee for copies of the documents.

Remember, a person who is NOT an attorney is called a nonlawyer. If a nonlawyer helps you fill out these forms, that person must give you a copy of Disclosure from Nonlawyer, Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure Form 12.900(a), before he or she helps you. A nonlawyer helping you fill out these forms also must put his or her name, address, and telephone number on the bottom of the last page of every form he or she helps you complete.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR FLORIDA SUPREME COURT APPROVED FAMILY LAW FORM 12.961, NOTICE OF HEARING ON MOTION FOR CONTEMPT/ENFORCEMENT (09/11)

When should this form be used?

Use this form anytime you have set a hearing on a Motion for Contempt/Enforcement, Florida Supreme Court Approved Family Law Form 12.960, for a support matter under rule 12.615, Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure. Before you fill out this form, you should coordinate a hearing time and date with the judge or hearing officer and the other party. If the Department of Revenue is a party to the case, you may need to schedule your hearing time with the attorney for the Department of Revenue.

If your case is to be heard by a child support enforcement hearing officer, the following information applies: A child support enforcement hearing officer is an attorney who has been appointed by administrative order of the court to take testimony and recommend decisions in cases involving the establishment, enforcement, and/or modification of child support, and the enforcement of alimony in conjunction with an ongoing child support arrearage order. If your case only involves issues pertaining to child support, you cannot object to the referral of your case to a hearing officer. If your case is going to be heard by a general magistrate, you should use Notice of Hearing Before General Magistrate, Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure Form 12.920(c).

This form should be typed or printed in black ink. After completing this form, you should file the original with the clerk of the circuit court in the county where your case was filed and keep a copy for your records.

What should I do next?

A copy of this form must be personally served by a sheriff or private process server or mailed or hand delivered to any other party(ies) in your case. Please note that if notice is mailed, the court in certain circumstances may not consider mailing to be adequate notice. This is a technical area of the law; if you have any questions about it, you should consult a lawyer. For more information on personal service, see the instructions for Summons: Personal Service on an Individual, Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure Form 12.910(a).

Where can I look for more information?

Before proceeding, you should read General Information for Self-Represented Litigants found at the beginning of these forms. For further information, see rules 12.615 and 12.941, Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure.

Special notes

An attorney who has been appointed by the court to serve as a child support enforcement hearing officer can also be appointed to serve as a general magistrate. If your ease involves only child support issues, your case properly may be referred to a general magistrate acting as a child support enforcement hearing officer.

Remember, a person who is NOT an attorney is called a nonlawyer. If a nonlawyer helps you fill out these forms, that person must give you a copy of Disclosure from Nonlawyer, Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure Form 12.900(a), before he or she helps you. A nonlawyer helping you fill out these forms also must put his or her name, address, and telephone number on the bottom of the last page of every form he or she helps you complete.

      .The Florida Supreme Court Approved Family Law Forms amended are forms 12.921, Notice of Hearing (Child Support Enforcement Hearing Officer); 12.923, Notice of Hearing (General); 12.931(a), Notice of Production from Nonparty; 12.931(b), Subpoena for Production of Documents from Nonparty; 12.941(b), Temporary Injunction to Prevent Removal of Minor Child(ren) and/or Denial of Passport Services (ex parte); 12.941(e), Order to Pick-up Minor Child(ren); 12.944(b), Order for Testimony and Attendance of Minor Child(ren); and 12.961, Notice of Hearing on Motion for Contempt/Enforcement.

      . Minor editorial amendments are also made, on our own motion, to Florida Family Law Rule of Procedure forms 12.920(a) and (b).

      . An original and nine paper copies of all comments must be filed with the Court on or before November 28, 2011. A separate request for oral argument must be filed if the person filing the comment wishes to participate in oral argument, which may be scheduled in this case. Electronic copies of all comments also must be filed in accordance with the Court's administrative order in In re Mandatory Submission of Electronic Copies of Documents, Fla. Admin. Order No. AOSC04-84 (Sept. 13, 2004).


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: PER CURIAM.

license: Public Domain

text:
    Frank T. CAIAZZO d/b/a The Beatles Autographs, Appellant, v. AMERICAN ROYAL ARTS CORP., a foreign corporation, Appellee.
    No. 4D09-5152.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    June 1, 2011.

      Daniel J. Brams of Silver, Bass & Brams, P.A., West Palm Beach, for appellant.
    June Galkoski Hoffman of Fowler White Burnett P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for appel-lee.
   PER CURIAM.

I. Overview

After a great deal of judicial labor was focused on this case, but before this opinion was released, the Appellant filed a notice of voluntary dismissal. Because we believe that this case involves an issue of great public importance, we have decided not to dismiss this ease and instead to' release an opinion explaining our decision. We consider the issue presented in this case — the role the internet plays in a specific and general jurisdiction analysis — to be of great public importance because it involves a confusing area of the law that is mainly scattered across the federal courts and has not been addressed head-on by a Florida. court. Further, because of the ever-increasing role of technology and the internet in commerce, we believe that issues relating to jurisdiction and the internet will only increase over time. Therefore, we believe it is important to address this at the earliest opportunity to provide uniformity and guidance to Florida courts and would-be litigants.

We recognize that retaining jurisdiction over an appeal after it has been voluntarily dismissed is rare, but it has occurred under appropriate circumstances. See State v. Schopp, 653 So.2d 1016, 1018 (Fla.1995) (holding that an appellate court has the discretion not to dismiss an appeal after a notice of voluntary dismissal has been filed, which is “particularly true where ... the ease presents a question of public importance and substantial judicial labor has been expended .... ”); see, e.g., Bell v. U.S.B. Acquisition Co., 734 So.2d 403, 404 n. 1 (Fla.1999) (“As we have done in the past, we exercise our discretion to retain jurisdiction in this case because we consider this issue to be of great public importance.”); Brown v. McNeil, 22 So.3d 741, 742 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (declining to dismiss an appeal after a voluntary dismissal); Washington v. State, 982 So.2d 1207, 1208 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008) (“A reviewing court has discretion to retain jurisdiction and proceed with the appeal even where a notice of voluntary dismissal is timely filed.”); Hammerl v. State, 779 So.2d 410, 411 n. 1 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) (“A district court has the discretion when a timely notice of voluntary dismissal is filed to reject the appellant’s request to dismiss the appeal and to retain jurisdiction and proceed with the appeal.”).

This appeal arises from the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to dismiss based on alleged lack of personal jurisdiction.

The defendant below, Frank Caiazzo, operates a sole proprietorship known as “Beatles Autographs.” Caiazzo specializes in buying, selling, and authenticating Beatles memorabilia.

The plaintiff below, American Royal Arts Corp. (“ARA”), a seller of rock-n-roll memorabilia that has several galleries in the South Florida area, entered into an agreement with one of its customers to sell a Beatles Revolver album signed by all four members of the band for $14,900. The customer, in turn, sent a computerized scan of the album cover to an auction house, Cooper Owen, in England for an evaluation. The auction house then forwarded the scan to Caiazzo for his opinion. Caiazzo opined to Cooper Owen that the signatures on the album were forgeries from a southern California forgery ring. As a result, the customer informed ARA that he would not be purchasing the album.

This ultimately led to ARA’s suit against Caiazzo for (I) violation of Florida’s Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (“FDUTPA”), (II) defamation, and (III) unlawful restraint of trade under Florida’s unfair competition statute. Caiazzo filed a motion to dismiss the case alleging, among other issues, that the state of Florida did not have personal jurisdiction over ARA’s claims against him.

Judge Jeffrey Winikoff permitted limited discovery only as to the issue of jurisdiction. He also indicated that, following the limited discovery process, an evidentia-ry hearing would be necessary. Judge Jack Cox, Judge Winikoff s civil division successor, conducted the hearing after which he denied Caiazzo’s motion to dismiss, finding both specific and general personal jurisdiction over Caiazzo. The sole issue on this appeal is whether personal jurisdiction (specific, general, or both) exists' over Caiazzo.

II. A Background Review of Personal Jurisdiction in Florida

Because this case involves multiple jurisdictional issues, including both specific and general jurisdiction, constitutional due process constraints, and the role that the internet plays, a thorough review of jurisdictional jurisprudence is first in order.

In the seminal case of Venetian Salami Co. v. Parthenais, 554 So.2d 499, 502 (Fla.1989), the Florida Supreme Court set out a two-step process to determine if personal jurisdiction exists over a nonresident defendant. A court must first determine whether sufficient facts have been alleged to bring the action within the ambit of Florida’s long-arm statute. If the statute applies, the court must then determine whether there are sufficient “minimum contacts” on the part of the defendant to satisfy due process requirements.

Personal jurisdiction can exist in two forms: “specific,” in which the alleged activities or actions of the defendant are directly connected to the forum state, and “general,” in which the defendant’s connection with the forum state is so substantial that no specific or enumerated relationship between the alleged wrongful actions and the state is necessary.

A. The First Step: Within the Ambit of Florida’s Long-Arm Statute?

As the first step in a two-step process, it must initially be determined if sufficient facts exist to confer either specific jurisdiction or general jurisdiction pursuant to Florida’s long-arm statute.

Section 48.193, Florida Statutes, is Florida’s long-arm statute and addresses both specific and general jurisdiction. The long-arm statute “bestows broad jurisdiction on Florida courts.” Internet Solutions Corp. v. Marshall, 39 So.3d 1201, 1207 (Fla.2010) (citations omitted). Section 48.193(1), which addresses specific jurisdiction, states:

Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who personally or through an agent does any of the acts enumerated in this subsection thereby submits himself or herself ... to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state for any cause of action arising from the doing of any of the following acts.

§ 48.193(1), Fla. Stat. (2007). Following this language is an enumerated list of acts that allow Florida courts to exercise specific personal jurisdiction over a defendant. For purposes of this appeal, however, only two of the enumerated acts are relevant: “[ojperating, conducting, engaging in, or carrying on a business or business venture in this state or having an office or agency in this state,” and “[c]omitting a tortious act within this state.” § 48.193(l)(a) & (b), Fla. Stats., respectively.

Section 48.193(2), addresses general jurisdiction in Florida, and states:

A defendant who is engaged in substantial and not isolated activity within this state, whether such activity is wholly interstate, intrastate, or otherwise, is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state, whether or not the claim arises from that activity.

§ 48.193(2), Fla. Stat. (2007). This court and other district courts have held “substantial and not isolated” to mean “continuous and systematic general business contact” with Florida. See, e.g., Woods v. Nova Cos. Belize Ltd., 739 So.2d 617, 620 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999); Am. Overseas Marine Corp. v. Patterson, 632 So.2d 1124, 1128 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994). In the instant case, ARA alleged both specific and general jurisdiction over Caiazzo.

B. The Due Process Second Step

The second step, the due process analysis, is “controlled by United States Supreme Court precedent interpreting the Due Process Clause [of the United States Constitution] and imposes a more restrictive requirement” than the long-arm statute’s broad grant of jurisdiction. Internet Solutions, 39 So.3d at 1207 (quoting Wendt v. Horowitz, 822 So.2d 1252, 1257 (Fla.2002)). Additionally — and particularly germane to this appeal — the required due process analysis differs depending on whether it is (1) specific or (2) general jurisdiction being asserted.

Specific Jurisdiction Due Process

The United States Supreme Court, in a handful of leading cases, laid out the proper due process standard for cases involving specific jurisdiction. First, in the interest of preserving “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice” a state may exercise specific jurisdiction only over a defendant who has certain “minimum contacts” with the state. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945). This so-called “minimum contacts” rule is the “constitutional touchstone” for such jurisdiction. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985). The Court later clarified that the notion of minimum contacts encompasses only situations in which the defendant has “purposefully avail[ed] [himself or herself] of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.” Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253, 78 S.Ct. 1228, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958); see also Burger King, 471 U.S. at 474-75, 105 S.Ct. 2174; World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297, 100 S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980). Finally, the Court has stated that simply being able to foresee a product’s arrival in the forum state will never by itself establish minimum contacts over the seller of that product. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297, 100 S.Ct. 580. Instead, foreseeability is relevant only when “the defendant’s conduct and connection with the forum State are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.” Id, This is because an entity that purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state “has clear notice that it is subject to suit there, and can act to alleviate the risk of burdensome litigation by procuring insurance, passing the expected costs on to customers, or, if the risks are too great, severing its connection with the State.” Id.

General Jurisdiction Due Process

Unlike specific jurisdiction, the United States Supreme Court has rarely addressed the constitutional constraints on a court’s exercising general jurisdiction. In International Shoe, a specific jurisdiction case, the Court acknowledged that in some instances in which a corporation has enough significant contacts with the forum state, jurisdiction could exist over any act, even those unrelated to its activity within the state. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318, 66 S.Ct. 154 (“[T]here have been instances in which the continuous corporate operations within a state were thought so substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit against it on causes of action arising from dealings entirely distinct from those activities.”). Seven years later, in Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 72 S.Ct. 413, 96 L.Ed. 485 (1952), the United States Supreme Court tackled its stance pertaining to general jurisdiction. The Court avoided any hard line test and instead opted for a vague standard in which courts look to determine whether the activities of the defendant are “sufficiently substantial and of such a nature as to permit [the forum state] to entertain a cause of action against a foreign corporation, where the cause of action arose from activities entirely distinct from its activities in [that state].” Perkins, 342 U.S. at 447, 72 S.Ct. 413.

Once more, the United States Supreme Court refined this standard and addressed general jurisdiction in Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 104 S.Ct. 1868, 80 L.Ed.2d 404 (1984). The Court reiterated its holding in Perkins but added that “continuous and systematic general business contacts” are necessary to satisfy due process minimum contacts under general jurisdiction. Id. at 414-45. Accordingly, between International Shoe, Perkins, and Helicopteros, a showing of substantial, continuous, and systematic business contacts must be made to support general jurisdiction. Because substantial, continuous, and systematic business contacts is the standard for both subsection (2) of Florida’s long-arm statute and the due process requirement for general jurisdiction, a finding of substantial, continuous, and systematic business contacts will satisfy both the long-arm statute and the due process requirements of Helicopteros. See Garris v. Thomasville-Thomas Cnty. Humane Soc’y, Inc., 941 So.2d 540, 545 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (‘"When ... the question whether a Florida court has ‘general’ jurisdiction over the person of a nonresident defendant arises under section 48.193(2), these separate inquiries (long-arm statute and minimum contacts) merge.”); Woods, 739 So.2d at 620 (“Because section 48.193(2) requires [the] high threshold [of substantial, continuous, and systematic business contacts], if the defendant’s activities meet the requirements of section 48.193(2), minimum contacts is also satisfied.”); Kertesz v. Net Transactions, Ltd., 635 F.Supp.2d 1339, 1345 (S.D.Fla.2009) (“The ‘substantial and not isolated activity’ requirement of the long-arm statute has been recognized by Florida courts as the functional equivalent of the continuous and systematic contact requirement for general jurisdiction under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause.... ”).

Finally, the United States Supreme Court has added to its minimum contacts framework a “reasonableness” determination. Asahi Metal Indus. Co., v.Super. Ct. of Cal., Solano Cnty., 480 U.S. 102, 113, 107 S.Ct. 1026, 94 L.Ed.2d 92 (1987). According to the Court, an exercise of jurisdiction that is unreasonable would offend due process. To determine whether an exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable, “[a] court must consider the burden on the defendant, the interests of the forum State, and the plaintiffs interest in obtaining relief’ as well as “the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies; and the shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). While the concept of reasonableness originated in specific jurisdiction cases — because it goes to the core of due process — it is applicable to a minimum contacts analysis in both the specific and general jurisdiction context.

C. Along Comes the Internet

With the advent and ever-increasing use of the internet, both for business and personal use, what might otherwise be a straightforward jurisdictional analysis has unfortunately become frustratingly convoluted.

In 2011, no discussion of long-arm jurisdiction jurisprudence would be com-píete without a discussion on the internet’s effect on constitutional due process constraints including an analysis of the “passive” and “active” website distinction espoused in the seminal Zippo case arising out of Pennsylvania’s western district. Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F.Supp. 1119 (W.D.Pa.1997).

D. Zippo’s Spectrum of Interactivity

In Zippo, the court enunciated a sliding scale test for determining whether to assert jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant in the internet context. This sliding scale test looks to a website’s characteristics and places it somewhere along a spectrum of interactivity. On one end of the spectrum is a “passive” website in which “a defendant has simply posted information on an Internet Web site which is accessible to users in foreign jurisdictions.” Zippo, 952 F.Supp. at 1124. On the other end of the spectrum are “situations where a defendant clearly does business over the Internet.” Id. Finally, in the middle is the grey area where “a user can exchange information with the host computer,” which requires an examination of “the level of interactivity and commercial nature of the exchange of information that occurs on the Web site.” Id. While a clear majority of federal courts has adopted the Zippo analytical framework, Florida never has.

In Renaissance Health Publishing, LLC v. Resveratrol Partners, LLC, 982 So.2d 739, 742 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008), a specific jurisdiction case, this court, in its minimum contacts analysis, cited to Zippo, stating, “An interactive website which allows a defendant to enter into contracts to sell products to Florida residents, and which involves the knowing and repeated transmission of computer files over the [I]nternet, may support a finding of personal jurisdiction.” Id. (emphasis added) (alterations removed and internal quotation marks omitted). While this may seem like an adoption of the Zippo sliding scale, a close comparison of the two cases reveals that it is not. In Zippo, the website at issue occupied the end of the jurisdictional spectrum in which jurisdiction is proper without further analysis. In other words, according to Zippo, a website which “allows a defendant to enter into contracts to sell products to Florida residents” and involves “the knowing and repeated transmission of computer files over the internet” ipso facto leads to a finding of jurisdiction. This court, however, went on to look to the actual level of sales the defendant made to Florida residents and the nature of the alleged wrongful acts and their link to Florida to determine if minimum contacts existed. Therefore, the active/passive website distinction from Zippo was not central to this court’s holding and instead merely provided some analytical assistance. See also Westwind Limousine, Inc. v. Shorter, 932 So.2d 571, 575 n. 7 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006) (noting in a specific jurisdiction case, as dicta in a footnote, that posting a passive website by itself does not constitute soliciting business in Florida or transacting business in Florida because it does not demonstrate any effort on the part of the defendant to target Florida or purposefully avail itself of the benefits of Florida’s laws).

In Internet Solutions, 39 So.3d at 1203, the Florida Supreme Court addressed the type of internet activity which falls under the “tortious act” section of Florida’s long-arm statute. See § 48.193(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (2007). After reviewing this court’s analysis in Renaissance Health and the few federal district courts in Florida that have addressed this issue, the supreme court noted that “relevant case law reveals that courts interpreting Florida law in the context of the Web have applied differing approaches.” Internet Solutions, 39 So.3d at 1213. The supreme court declined to utilize an active/passive distinction and instead concluded:

By posting allegedly defamatory material on the Web about a Florida resident, the poster has directed the communication about a Florida resident to readers worldwide, including potential readers within Florida. When the posting is then accessed by a third party in Florida, the material has been “published” in Florida and the poster has communicated the material “into” Florida, thereby committing the tortious act of defamation within Florida.

Id. at 1215. Thus, the supreme court, when addressing the narrow question of what type of internet activity will fall under the tortious acts section of Florida’s broad long-arm statute, opted for a broad view of the internet and its reach into Florida. It should be noted, however, that the supreme court emphasized that its holding did not address minimum contacts. Id. at 1216.

No Florida court has actually adopted the Zippo factors and we are not inclined to do so either. As such, we take the opportunity to discuss some of the flaws inherent in a sliding scale analysis as advanced by Zippo.

E. Zippo’s Slippery Slope

While the internet’s qualities are certainly unique, it is essentially a medium for communication and interaction, much like the telephone and the mail. The United States Supreme Court created the minimum contacts test to determine if jurisdiction is constitutionally proper and no exception to this doctrine has been carved out for situations in which internet activity is part of the mix. In fact, the Supreme Court “long ago rejected the notion that personal jurisdiction might turn on ‘mechanical’ tests.” Burger King, 471 U.S. at 478, 105 S.Ct. 2174 (citation omitted). Additionally, the Supreme Court also specifically rejected “any talismanic jurisdictional formulas,” id. at 485, 105 S.Ct. 2174, which the Zippo test appears to be, and has made clear that “the facts of each case must always be weighed in determining whether personal jurisdiction would comport with fair play and substantial justice.” Id. at 486, 105 S.Ct. 2174 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

In addition to Zippo’s questionable fit with Supreme Court precedent, Zippo’s actual usefulness appears to be limited. As another court has noted, in an astute critique of the limitations of Zippo:

[A] court cannot determine whether personal jurisdiction is appropriate simply by deciding whether a website is “passive” or “interactive” (assuming that websites can be readily classified into one category or the other). Even a “passive” website may support a finding of jurisdiction if the defendant used its website intentionally to harm the plaintiff in the forum state. Similarly, an “interactive” or commercial website may not be sufficient to support jurisdiction if it is not aimed at residents in the forum state. Moreover, regardless how interactive a website is, it cannot form the basis for personal jurisdiction unless a nexus exists between the website and the cause of action [for specific jurisdiction] or unless the contacts through the website are so substantial that they may be considered “systematic and continuous” for the purpose of general jurisdiction. Thus, a rigid adherence to the Zippo test is likely to lead to erroneous results.

Hy Cite Corp. v. Badbusinessbureau.com, L.L.C., 297 F.Supp.2d 1154, 1160 (W.D.Wis.2004) (citations omitted). We believe that this characterization of Zippo’s limitation is correct.

Therefore, due to both the inappropriateness of permitting Zippo to replace traditional minimum contacts and Zippo’s practical limitations, we choose to continue to apply a traditional minimum contacts analysis in personal jurisdiction questions, whether or not the internet is involved. We note, however, that while we do not adopt the sliding scale from Zippo, determining whether a website is active or passive may be part of a minimum contacts determination. In other words, if a court, when dealing with a personal jurisdiction question, finds it helpful to categorize a website as “active” or “passive,” it may do so. But to be clear, “active” and “passive” are not talismanic jurisdictional terms; they do not provide a conclusive answer to the question of whether Florida has jurisdiction over a person.

We believe that this analytical framework which allows consideration of — but does not mandate adherence to—Zippo aligns with recent dicta from the Florida Supreme Court. See Internet Solutions, 39 So.3d at 1216 n. 11 (stating, in a specific jurisdiction case, that “the issues of whether [the defendant] targeted a Florida resident, whether [the defendant] purposefully directed her post at Florida, or whether [the defendant’s] website is ‘active’ or ‘passive’ could be properly considered in the due process analysis”).

III. The Instant Case

The trial court denied Caiazzo’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, finding (1) specific jurisdiction as to all three counts asserted against Caiazzo and (2) general jurisdiction over Caiazzo. The trial court’s order focused almost exclusively on general jurisdiction. While the trial court was correct in finding specific jurisdiction for each of the three counts, it erred in finding general jurisdiction over Caiazzo.

A trial court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is reviewed de novo. Renaissance Health, 982 So.2d at 741; Carib-USA Ship Lines Bahamas Ltd. v. Dorsett, 935 So.2d 1272, 1275 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006).

As previously stated, the Florida Supreme Court has articulated a two-step analysis to determine whether personal jurisdiction exists over a nonresident defendant. Venetian Salami, 554 So.2d at 502. First, the court must determine whether the complaint satisfies the requirements of Florida’s long-arm statute, section 48.193, Florida Statutes. Id. Second, if the long-arm statute applies, the court must then determine whether the complaint alleges sufficient minimum contacts to satisfy due process requirements. Id. Additionally, the supreme court has stated:

Initially, the plaintiff may seek to obtain jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant by pleading the basis for service in the language of the statute without pleading the supporting facts.A defendant wishing to contest the allegations of the complaint concerning jurisdiction or to raise a contention of minimum contacts must file affidavits in support of his [or her] position. The burden is then placed upon the plaintiff to prove by affidavit the basis upon which jurisdiction may be obtained.

Id.

Pursuant to Florida’s long-arm statute, a nonresident defendant may be subject to specific jurisdiction under section 48.193(1) where the defendant committed any of the acts enumerated in the subsection within Florida and the cause of action arose from the act. A nonresident defendant may be subject to general jurisdiction where he or she “engaged in substantial and not isolated activity within this state.” 48.193(2), Fla. Stat. (2007). “[C]ourts are required to strictly construe the long-arm statute.” Seabra v. Intl. Specialty Imports, Inc., 869 So.2d 732, 733 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004). Additionally, a court can exercise jurisdiction only if it is “reasonable.” See Asahi Metal, 480 U.S. at 113, 107 S.Ct. 1026.

A. Specific Jurisdiction

(Section 48.193(1))

In order to determine whether Florida has specific personal jurisdiction over Caiazzo, each of the three counts must be analyzed to determine whether the requirements of the long-arm statute have been satisfied.

Counts I and III, for violation of FDUTPA and unlawful restraint on trade respectively, both satisfy the requirements of the long-arm statute. Both counts are based on Caiazzo’s overall business practices within the state and not any isolated incident. These overall business practices were allegedly committed both while Caiazzo was a resident of Florida and while he was in New Jersey. The amended complaint states that “this action is based in part upon the unlawful actions of Caiazzo while he resided and transacted [his business] ... in Florida from November 2004 and December 2005.” While this jurisdictional allegation can fairly be described as “barebones,” both parties agree that Caiazzo resided in, and ran his business from, Florida from November 2004 to December 2005. This allegation falls clearly under section 48.193(l)(a), which states that Florida has jurisdiction over a person who “[o]perat[es], conduces], en-gagers] in, or carries] on a business or business venture in this state or ha[s] an office or agency in this state.” § 48.193(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (2007).

The second step of the jurisdictional analysis for these two counts looks for sufficient minimum contacts with Florida to satisfy due process requirements. The minimum contacts analysis in Renaissance Health is on point with the instant case’s minimum contacts analysis. 982 So.2d at 742. In Renaissance Health, the defendant business had posted allegedly defamatory statements on its website about a competitor business located in Florida. Id. After finding that the tortious acts subsection of the long-arm statute applied, this court performed a minimum contacts analysis, in which it found that the defendant’s sales to Florida through its website amounted to 2.4 of its overall sales and that its book sales to Florida totaled $2,101.83. Id. This court went on to-say,

Such commercial activity within Florida is sufficient to subject the defendants to jurisdiction here — where a defendant disparages a competitor’s products to enhance its own commercial sales in a state where the competitor has its corporate headquarters, the defendant could “reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.”

Id. (citations omitted).

According to the jurisdictional discovery from the instant case, Caiazzo’s website accounts for a majority of his sales. His overall sales delivered to Florida addresses from 2003-2007 were 4.35% of his total sales and amounted to approximately $100,000. Additionally, in counts I and III, Caiazzo is accused by ARA of making disparaging statements about ARA — headquartered in Florida — to enhance Caiazzo’s own commercial sales in Florida. These facts are similar enough to Renaissance Health to support a finding that Caiazzo has sufficient minimum contacts with Florida to satisfy the due process requirement of specific personal jurisdiction.

Finally, exercise of jurisdiction over Caiazzo is reasonable. The burden on Caiazzo is not particularly high in defending this case. While it may require some travel, that fact alone is not particularly unique. Additionally, Florida has a decided interest in the outcome of this case as ARA is headquartered and has multiple locations in Florida. As such, because the allegations against Caiazzo for violating FDUTPA and for unlawful restraint on trade satisfy the long-arm statute for specific personal jurisdiction and also satisfy the minimum contacts requirement, specific personal jurisdiction exists as to ARA’s FDUTPA and unlawful restraint on trade claims (counts I and III).

The trial court also has specific personal jurisdiction over count II, ARA’s defamation claim. A court has specific jurisdiction over a defendant where he or she “[c]ommit[s] a tortious act within this state.” § 48.193(l)(b), Fla. Stat. (2007). In order to commit a tortious act within this state, a defendants physical presence in Florida is not required. Wendt, 822 So.2d at 1260. “[T]elephonic, electronic, or written communications into Florida may form the basis for personal jurisdiction under section 48.193(l)(b) if the alleged cause of action arises from the communications .... ” Id.; see also Acquadro v. Bergeron, 851 So.2d 665 (Fla.2003); Becker v. Hooshmand, 841 So.2d 561 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003).

For its defamation claim, ARA alleges in its amended complaint that Perry Cox, a colleague of Caiazzo’s, sent an email to multiple people about ARA’s lawsuit against Caiazzo. Cox sent an email to friends and colleagues in the memorabilia business to raise funds for Caiazzo’s defense of this lawsuit. ARA’s amended complaint alleges that Cox is Caiazzo’s agent. Cox, however, submitted an affidavit in which he stated that he lives in Arizona and sent the email from Arizona. He also stated unequivocally that Caiazzo had nothing to do with the email, that he did not inform Caiazzo about the email, and that he did not give Caiazzo an opportunity to review the email before he sent it. This affidavit was not refuted by ARA either with countervailing affidavits or at the evidentiary hearing. As it is unclear how Caiazzo or Florida has anything to do with Cox’s email, the trial court does not have specific personal jurisdiction based on it.

However, ARA alleges additional facts to support a defamation claim: that Caiazzo directly or through agents made defamatory statements which were published and circulated in Florida, including telephone calls made directly to ARA’s employees in South Florida. These allegations are very barebones and probably come as close to being inadequate for jurisdiction as possible without actually crossing that line. That being the case, we are nonetheless compelled to find that the allegation is sufficient to state a claim for defamation in which the defamatory statements were published and circulated in Florida; therefore, this defamation allegation falls under Florida’s long-arm statute. Additionally, the minimum contacts analysis is essentially the same here as it was for counts I and III. Briefly, 4.35% of Caiazzo’s business originated in Florida, and the allegedly defamatory statements were targeted into Florida, at a competitor’s business headquartered in Florida, with the alleged purpose to damage that competitor’s reputation and business operations. Based upon these allegations, Caiazzo could reasonably anticipate being haled into a Florida court to defend himself. Additionally, for the same reasons previously articulated for counts I and III, exercise of jurisdiction over Caiazzo is reasonable.

B. General Jurisdiction

(Section 48.193(2))

While we find specific jurisdiction over all three counts, we write here to clarify how a general jurisdiction analysis differs from a specific jurisdiction analysis and to show how the trial court’s finding of general jurisdiction constituted error.

The amended complaint does not establish general jurisdiction over Caiazzo. Pursuant to Florida’s long-arm statute, a nonresident defendant may be subject to general jurisdiction where he “engaged in substantial and not isolated activity within this state” regardless of whether the claim arises from that activity. 48.193(2), Fla. Stat. (2007). This standard has been interpreted by Florida courts to require a “showing of ‘continuous and systematic general business contacts’ with the forum state.” Carib-USA, 935 So.2d at 1275 (quoting Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 416, 104 S.Ct. 1868); Seabra, 869 So.2d at 784. “The continuous and systematic general business contacts sufficient to confer general jurisdiction present a much higher threshold than those contacts necessary to support specific jurisdiction under section 48.193(1).” Trs. of Columbia Univ. v. Ocean World, S.A., 12 So.3d 788, 792 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (emphasis added) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). This is because “jurisdiction under section 48.193(2) does not require that a lawsuit’s cause of action arise from activity within Florida, or that there be any connection between the claim and the defendant’s Florida activities.” Id. Additionally,

Florida cases have found “continuous systematic business contacts” to confer general jurisdiction where a nonresident defendant’s activities are extensive and pervasive, in that a significant portion of the defendant’s business operations or revenue derived from established commercial relationships in the state. Such contacts have also been found where the defendant continuously solicits and procures substantial sales in Florida.

Id. at 793.

Finally, courts have found that a company’s level of business in Florida may be insufficient to constitute “continuous and systematic business activities” when only a de minimis percentage of the total sales is derived from its sales to Florida. See id. at 794 n. 2 (listing numerous cases in which general jurisdiction was not found when the percentage of sales in the forum state ranged from less than 1% to 12.9%). Of course, as we have already indicated, jurisdictional analysis does not turn on any talismanic formula or magic number, and instead requires a fact-specific inquiry into the details of the defendant’s contacts with the forum state. A large multinational corporate defendant might make less than 1% of its sales to Florida when compared to its massive global sales, but if that 1% constitutes millions of dollars of sales, thousands of transactions, or dozens of stores within Florida, obviously general jurisdiction has a high likelihood of being found. The converse is also true: a small business might make 15% of its total sales within Florida, but that might represent only a handful of actual transactions and only a few hundred dollars, which would be less likely to support a finding of general jurisdiction. Therefore, we emphasize that a “continuous and systematic business contacts” determination requires a holistic analysis of the defendant’s relationship with Florida.

The trial court found that Caiazzo’s website conferred Florida with general jurisdiction. ARA’s general jurisdiction allegations were based almost solely on Caiazzo’s website. The trial court based its finding of general jurisdiction on this court’s holding in Renaissance Health. However, Renaissance Health was a case involving specific jurisdiction and is therefore inapplicable to a general jurisdiction determination. See 982 So.2d at 741-43. The only mention of websites and personal jurisdiction in Renaissance was in the context of the due process-related minimum contacts analysis for specific jurisdiction. Id. at 742. As should be clear by now, minimum contacts for general jurisdiction is a much more demanding and necessarily different analysis than that required for specific jurisdiction.

Unfortunately, the law is severely underdeveloped and somewhat contradictory in the area of the internet and general jurisdiction. However, it should be noted and underscored that “[t]he mere existence of a website does not show that a defendant is directing its business activities towards every forum where the website is visible.” Trs. of Columbia Univ., 12 So.3d at 795 (quoting McBee v. Delica Co., 417 F.3d 107, 124 (1st Cir.2005)). To hold otherwise, as other courts have suggested, would essentially upend traditional notions of jurisdiction and “render any individual or entity that created ... a web site subject to personal jurisdiction” for virtually any matter. Dagesse v. Plant Hotel N.V., 113 F.Supp.2d 211, 221 (D.N.H.2000). One scholar has even warned that to find that internet activities alone bestow a court with general jurisdiction would be tantamount to establishing universal jurisdiction. Dennis T. Yokoyama, You Can’t Always Use the Zippo Code: The Fallacy of a Uniform Theory of Internet Personal Jurisdiction, 54 DePaul L. Rev. 1147, 1193 (2005). Additionally, “[t]he consensus among courts that have focused explicitly on the issue is that general jurisdiction cannot be founded solely on the existence of a defendant’s internet web site.” Dagesse, 113 F.Supp.2d at 221. See also, e.g., Revell v. Lidov, 317 F.3d 467, 471 (5th Cir.2002) (“Though the maintenance of a website is, in a sense, a continuous presence everywhere in the world, the cited contacts of [the defendant] with Texas are not in any way ‘substantial.’ ”); Hy Cite, 297 F.Supp.2d at 1161 (“Plaintiffs argument that general jurisdiction exists in this case [involving the defendant’s internet activities in the forum state] borders on the frivolous.”); Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865, 874 (6th Cir.2002) (“[T]he fact that [the defendant] maintains a website that is accessible to anyone over the Internet is insufficient to justify general jurisdiction.”). But see Gator.com Corp. v. L.L. Bean, Inc., 341 F.3d 1072, 1079-80 (9th Cir.2003) (finding that internet activities alone can lead to general jurisdiction), vacated as moot, 398 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir.2005).

Finally, this court, in our only case in which we have addressed general jurisdiction based, in part, on internet activity, found that the alleged activities did not rise to the level necessary to be considered “substantial.” Trs. of Columbia Univ., 12 So.3d at 795. Applying the traditional “substantial, continuous, and systematic” minimum contacts requirements for general jurisdiction to the instant case easily reveals that general jurisdiction does not exist.

A brief review of the pertinent facts concerning Caiazzo’s website discloses:

• The “vast majority” of Caiazzo’s business comes from his website.
• Caiazzo lists his services and merchandise on his website.
• There is no method for direct purchase of merchandise or services through Caiazzo’s website. Rather, interested persons must click on a link to send Caiazzo an email in which they can inquire about any aspect of Caiazzo’s business.
• From 2003 to 2007, 4.35% of Caiazzo’s total sales came from Florida. The actual amount is approximately $100,000 of sales to Florida out of approximately $2,300,000 of total sales.
• No evidence was presented that Caiaz-zo specifically targeted Florida residents with his website.

Given the very high requirement for general jurisdiction, it cannot be said that Caiazzo’s business contacts with Florida are substantial, continuous, or systematic. The 4.35 Florida sales figure appears to be de minimis. Caiazzo’s website is of insufficient caliber to correctly find general jurisdiction over him.

In sum, the trial court erred in finding that it had general jurisdiction over Caiaz-zo based on his website, which does not solicit business from Florida, does not target Florida, and only makes 4.35 of total sales to Florida, a de minimis amount. Caiazzo’s website does not have substantial, continuous, and systematic business contacts with Florida.

IV. Conclusion

The trial court’s order was ultimately correct in concluding that it had personal jurisdiction over Caiazzo for the three counts in ARA’s complaint. However, this jurisdiction is based only on specific jurisdiction and, contrary to the trial court’s order, not on general jurisdiction. As such, the trial court’s order denying Caiaz-zo’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is affirmed.

Affirmed.

HAZOURI, CIKLIN and LEVINE, JJ., concur.

      . Released in 1966, Revolver contains such ground-breaking Beatles songs as "Eleanor Rigby” and "Yellow Submarine.” Although the album was initially missing several tracks on its U.S. release, in 1987 the uncut version of Revolver was released on compact disc. The Beatles: Album Guide, Rolling Stone, http://www.rollingstone.com/music/artists/the-beatles/albumguide.

      . A long-arm statute is a statutory device by which a state obtains jurisdiction over certain causes of action involving parties or events (or both) outside that state. It is called a long-arm statute because it allows a state court to reach parties located outside the state and even possibly for events which occurred outside the state. In essence, it allows the state to reach its “long arm” outside the state.

      . See, e.g., 16 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 108.41 [3] (3d ed. 2005) ("Beyond Perkins and Helicópteros, the Supreme Court has offered little guidance on the issue of general jurisdiction-”).

      . Perhaps unwittingly, the Court, for the first time, began to interchangeably use the term "minimum contacts” to describe the due process requirements for both specific and general personal jurisdiction, even though the acts that will constitute "minimum contacts” differ significantly depending on which type of jurisdiction (specific or general) is being asserted. Using the same term to describe two very different analyses (purposeful availment versus substantial, continuous, and systematic business contacts) has led to some confusion. Nonetheless, it is the terminology used by the United States Supreme Court and we are therefore bound to its continued albeit confusing usage.

      . In Venetian Salami, the Florida Supreme Court held that Florida’s long-arm statute does not necessarily encompass constitutional due process requirements. Venetian Salami, 554 So.2d at 502 (Fla.1989). The supreme court stated:
      The mere proof of any one of the several circumstances enumerated in section 48.193 as the basis for obtaining jurisdiction of nonresidents does not automatically satisfy the due process requirement of minimum contacts. We do recognize, however, that implicit within several of the enumerated circumstances are sufficient facts which if proven, without more, would suffice to meet the requirements of International Shoe Co.

        Id. The due process requirements of International Shoe relate only to specific jurisdiction. Therefore, the supreme court’s statement that Florida's long-arm statute does not encompass due process requirements is limited to situations involving specific jurisdiction and not general jurisdiction.

      . While a reasonableness determination will rarely prevent a court from exercising general jurisdiction over a defendant, primarily because the general jurisdiction inquiry is so demanding, it is not unheard of. See, e.g., Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Robertson-Ceco Corp., 84 F.3d 560, 573 (2d Cir.1996) (declining to assert general jurisdiction, despite finding sufficient substantial, continuous, and systematic contacts, because it would be unreasonable, due primarily to the forum state’s not having any interest in the outcome of the case).

      . Because the issue of internet and jurisdiction is underdeveloped and widely scattered across the federal courts, we cite to federal cases whose analysis we believe is on point.

        . See Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. Step Two, S.A., 318 F.3d 446, 452-55 (3d Cir.2003); Gator.Com Corp. v. L.L. Bean Inc., 341 F.3d 1072, 1079 (9th Cir.2003), vacated as moot, 398 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir.2005); Lakin v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 348 F.3d 704, 711 (8th Cir.2003); Neogen Corp. v. Neo Gen Screening, Inc., 282 F.3d 883, 890 (6th Cir.2002); ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Serv. Consultants, Inc., 293 F.3d 707, 712-14 (4th Cir.2002); Gorman v. Ameritrade Holding Corp., 293 F.3d 506, 513 (D.C.Cir.2002); Mink v. AAAA Dev. LLC, 190 F.3d 333, 336-37 (5th Cir.1999); Soma Med. Int'l v.

        Standard Chartered Bank, 196 F.3d 1292, 1296-97 (10th Cir.1999).

      . We note that Zippo was a federal district court case out of Pennsylvania, the reasoning of which has never been adopted by either the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals or the United States Supreme Court.

      . While Florida courts have addressed the type of internet activity that falls under section 48.193(l)(a) (tortious acts), see Internet Solutions, 39 So.3d 1201, and the type of internet activity that will constitute minimum contacts for specific jurisdiction, see Renaissance Health, 982 So.2d 739, only one Florida case has addressed the issue of websites and general jurisdiction. See Trs. of Columbia Univ., 12 So.3d 788. Much of the case law on this issue, scant as it may be, is strewn primarily across the federal courts.

      . Note that our focus is not on whether Caiazzo’s website is “passive” or “active”; both of these terms only address hypothetical contacts. Instead we focus on Caiazzo's actual contacts to determine if they are "substantial, continuous, and systematic.” In Trustees of Columbia University v. Ocean World, S.A., this court addressed general jurisdiction based on internet activities and apparently did not feel it necessary to perform an active/passive determination either. 12 So.3d 788.


author: LEWIS, J.

text:
    DUVAL MOTORS COMPANY d/b/a Duval Ford, Appellant, v. Cassandra ROGERS and Alton Rogers, Appellees.
    No. 1D10-6607.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    June 21, 2011.
    Rehearing Denied Aug. 12, 2011.

      Kevin T. Smith of Law Offices of Boh-dan Neswiaeheny, Orange Park, for Appellant.
    Lynn Drysdale of Jacksonville Area Legal Aid, Inc., Jacksonville; Raymond G. Ingalsbe, Palm Beach Gardens, for Appel-lees.
   LEWIS, J.

Duval Motors Company d/b/a Duval Ford, Appellant, seeks review of an order denying its motion to compel arbitration of several claims filed by Cassandra and Alton Rogers, Appellees. Appellant contends that the parties have a valid agreement requiring arbitration of Appellees’ claims. For the reasons explained below, we disagree with Appellant and affirm the trial court’s decision.

On June 19, 2009, the parties signed multiple documents related to a vehicle purchase transaction. One of those documents is the Retail Installment Sales Contract (“RISC”). The RISC identifies Ap-pellees as the Buyer and Co-Buyer and Appellant as the Seller-Creditor. It then sets forth the following terms:

You, the Buyer (and Co-Buyer, if any), may buy the vehicle below for cash or on credit. By signing this contract, you choose to buy the vehicle on credit under the agreements on the front and back of this contract. You agree to pay the Seller — Creditor (sometimes “we” or “us” in this contract) the Amount Financed and Finance Charge in U.S. funds according to the payment schedule below.

The RISC identifies the vehicle being purchased and provides the financial terms of the purchase, including the down payment, the total sale price, the total amount financed, the annual percentage rate, the total finance charge, and a payment schedule. The RISC also contains a warning that state law does not provide a “cooling off’ period for the transaction and that Appellees are not entitled to cancel the contract simply because they change their minds. Additionally, the RISC provides that Appellant “may assign this contract.” Finally, and most importantly, the RISC contains the following merger clause:

HOW THIS CONTRACT CAN BE CHANGED. This contract contains the entire agreement between you and us relating to this contract. Any change to this contract must be in writing and we must sign it. No oral changes are binding.

The RISC does not contain an arbitration agreement.

The arbitration agreement appears in a separate document, the Retail Buyer’s Order (“RBO”), which was signed the same day. The RBO identifies the vehicle being purchased and lists the vehicle’s price and the fees associated with the purchase. Additionally, the RBO provides that “[t]he retail installment sales contract (“RISC”) to be entered between Dealer and Customer, unless otherwise indicated in writing by Dealer, shall be immediately assigned by Dealer to a bank / finance company (at face value or greater) which shall then be the creditor to whom Customer shall be obligated under the RISC.” It then states that the dealer has the right to terminate “this Order,” i.e. the RBO, if the dealer cannot obtain credit approval for the customer or if the dealer is unable to sell the RISC to a financial institution on terms of no less than face value. The RBO states that if the customer takes delivery of the vehicle before the dealer obtains financing approval, then delivery “serves as a convenience to Customer only and Customer does not have, nor will acquire, any rights or interests in the Vehicle by such delivery except Dealer’s permission to use it, which permission can be revoked, requiring the Vehicle’s immediate return to Dealer in the same condition as it existed when delivered to Customer.” Finally, the RBO purports to make financing approval a condition subsequent to the enforcement and validity of the RISC.

According to Appellees’ complaint, they took delivery of the vehicle after signing all the documents associated with the transaction. They alleged that two weeks after they took delivery, Appellant demanded an additional down payment of $5,000. According to the complaint, Appellant took the vehicle from Appellees’ possession after they refused this new demand. Appellees asserted seven causes of action arising out of these events. Instead of an answer, Appellant filed a motion to compel arbitration. The motion was based on the arbitration agreement in the RBO, which Appellant contends is part of the parties’ contract. Appellees argued, among other things, that the merger clause precluded consideration of the RBO. After reviewing the language of the documents at issue and considering the parties’ arguments, the trial court denied Appellant’s motion, concluding that no binding arbitration agreement existed with respect to the transaction at issue. Based on the merger clause, we agree with the trial court.

In determining whether to compel arbitration, a trial court is limited to three inquiries: “(1) whether a valid written agreement exists containing an arbitration clause, (2) whether an arbitrable issue exists, and (3) whether the right to arbitrate was waived.” Piercy v. School Bd. of Washington Cnty., Fla., 576 So.2d 806, 807 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). In the instant case, the trial court concluded that no valid agreement to arbitrate existed relating to the transaction at issue. This conclusion was based on construction of the parties’ contract. Therefore, it is subject to de novo review. Gainesville Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Weston, 857 So.2d 278, 283 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003).

Interpretation of a contract begins with its plain language. Taylor v. Taylor, 1 So.3d 348, 350 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009). As a general rule, evidence outside the contract language, which is known as parol evidence, may be considered only when the contract language contains a latent ambiguity. Wheeler v. Wheeler, Erwin & Fountain, P.A., 964 So.2d 745, 749 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007); Jenkins v. Eckerd Corp., 913 So.2d 43, 52-53 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005). Parol evidence includes “a verbal agreement or other extrinsic evidence where such agreement was made before or at the time of the instrument in question.” J.M. Montgomery Roofing Co. v. Fred Howland, Inc., 98 So.2d 484, 485 (Fla.1957). The parol evidence rule precludes consideration of such evidence “to contradict, vary, defeat, or modify a complete and unambiguous written instrument, or to change, add to, or subtract from it, or affect its construction.” Id. at 486 (citation omitted); see also Allett v. Hill, 422 So.2d 1047, 1050 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982) (finding error in “the admission of parol evidence to add a term to [a] written lease which, whether part of the preliminary negotiations or a separate subsequent condition, plainly violates ... the doctrine of merger and the parol evidence rule”).

The purpose of a merger clause is “to affirm the parties’ intent to have the parol evidence rule applied to their contracts.” Centennial Mortg., Inc. v. SG/SC, Ltd., 772 So.2d 564, 565 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) (quoting Outlaw v. McMichael, 397 So.2d 1009, 1011 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981)). Generally, a merger clause states “that the contract represents the parties’ complete and final agreement and supersedes all informal understandings and oral agreements relating to the subject matter of the contract.” Jenkins, 913 So.2d at 53 n. 1 (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary, 813 (7th ed. 1999)). This Court has explained the significance of a merger clause as follows:

Although the existence of a merger clause does not per se establish that the integration of the agreement is total, ... a merger clause is a highly persuasive statement that the parties intended the agreement to be totally integrated and generally works to prevent a party from introducing parol evidence to vary or contradict the written terms.

Id.

Appellant argues that the merger clause at issue exists only to establish that the contract cannot be modified orally and that “if it’s not in writing, it did not happen.” This interpretation is inconsistent with the plain language of the clause and the operation of the parol evidence rule, which excludes all evidence extrinsic to a fully integrated contract. See J.M. Montgomery Roofing, 98 So.2d at 485. The RISC’s merger clause does not specifically mention prior written agreements, but it explicitly provides that “this contract” is the “entire agreement” between the parties. As a result, it is immaterial whether any prior representations sought to be excluded are oral or written; anything that does not constitute part of “this contract” is not part of the parties’ agreement related to the contract. Thus, whether the RBO should be considered depends on whether it is part of “this contract” as that phrase is used in the merger clause.

Based on the language of the RISC itself, it is clear that “this contract” refers only to the RISC. By its title, “Retail Installment Sale Contract,” the RISC purports to represent the parties’ contract. More importantly, the RISC does not refer to any other document as part of the contract. As a result, the natural interpretation of the phrase “this contract,” as used in the merger clause, is the document on which the merger clause appears.

Moreover, even when the language of the RBO is considered, this conclusion is supported. The RBO does not refer to itself as a contract; instead, the RBO refers to itself as “this order” throughout the document. For example, the RBO contains a warning to the buyers not to sign until they have read and understood all the terms of “this order.” Thus, the two documents together reveal that “this contract” refers to the RISC, while “this order” refers to the RBO.

Appellant contends that this Court should not consider the RISC a fully integrated document because the RISC does not contain all the essential terms of the agreement. This argument appears to be based on the general principle that “if there has been no agreement as to essential terms, an enforceable contract does not exist.” Irby v. Mem’l Healthcare Grp., Inc., 901 So.2d 305, 306 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005) (citation omitted). By extension of this principle, it stands to reason that if a document does not contain all the essential terms of an agreement, it cannot be considered a fully integrated contract. See Jenkins, 913 So.2d at 53 (“For the parol evidence rule to apply, ‘the written agreement must appear on its face to express an agreement complete in all essential terms.’”) (quoting Gulf Atl. Towing Corp. v. Dickerson, Inc., 271 F.2d 542, 546 (5th Cir.1959)). Appellant claims that only the RBO contains important terms such as the price of the vehicle, the sales tax, the cost of a vehicle maintenance plan, a rebate to the buyers, and the amount of the down payment. To the contrary, the only item on Appellant’s list that is not included in the RISC is the “cost of a vehicle maintenance plan.” However, this item is not an essential term, as such a plan is not required to show that there was an agreement by the buyers to purchase the vehicle and an agreement by the seller to deliver the vehicle. The terms showing such an agreement indicate that there was consideration for the contract. Thus, the contract is complete without discussion of a maintenance plan.

Appellant also argues that case law requires this Court to interpret the term “this contract” as referring to all the documents signed contemporaneously with the RISC in conjunction with the sale of the vehicle. Appellant’s argument is based on the general principle recognized in Dodge City, Inc. v. Byrne, 698 So.2d 1033, 1035 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997), that “[w]hen the parties execute two or more documents concurrently, in the course of one transaction concerning the same subject matter, the documents must be read and construed together.” This principle also requires reconciliation, if possible, of all provisions of the documents that are contemporaneously executed. See id. The Dodge City case also concerned a vehicle purchase transaction and documents similar to the ones at issue in this case. See id. However, the Dodge City opinion does not indicate that the RISC or any other document executed in conjunction with the sale contained a merger clause (or that the parties made an issue of such a clause). See generally id. The parties have not cited any Florida case specifically analyzing whether this principle applies when a document containing a merger clause is executed contemporaneously with other documents.

We find two out-of-state cases persuasive on this point: Krueger v. Heartland Chevrolet, Inc., 289 S.W.3d 637 (Mo.Ct.App.2009); and Patton v. Jeff Wyler Eastgate, Inc., 608 F.Supp.2d 907 (S.D.Ohio 2007). Both jurisdictions follow the principle recognized in Dodge City, but both courts nevertheless required consideration of only the RISC in interpreting the parties’ rights and obligations related to a vehicle purchase transaction. Krueger, 289 S.W.3d at 640; Patton, 608 F.Supp.2d at 915-16.

In Knieger, in conjunction with the purchase of a vehicle, the buyers signed a Retail Buyer’s Order, an Arbitration Addendum to the Retail Buyer’s Order, and a Retail Installment Contract. 289 S.W.3d at 638. The Retail Installment Contract set forth the terms of the agreement based on a credit purchase of the vehicle and did not reference either the Retail Buyer’s Order or the Arbitration Addendum to the Retail Buyer’s Order. Id. The issue was whether the arbitration provision of the Retail Buyer’s Order and its addendum were binding. Id. The Krueger court held that the arbitration agreement was not binding based on the following merger clause in the Retail Installment Contract:

Oral agreements or commitments to loan money, extend credit or to forbear from enforcing repayment of a debt including promises to extend or renew such debt are not enforceable. To protect you (borrower(s)) and us (creditor) from misunderstanding or disappointment, any agreements we reach covering such matters are contained in this writing, which is the complete and exclusive statement of the agreement between us, except as we may later agree in writing to modify it.

Krueger, 289 S.W.3d at 639 (emphasis added in Krueger). Based on this language, the Krueger court held that the Retail Installment Contract was intended to supersede the Retail Buyer’s Order and that the Retail Installment Contract was “the only agreement controlling the sale and purchase of the vehicle.” Id. at 640. The Krueger court distinguished a case with similar facts based on the existence of the merger clause. Id.

In Patton, the terms of the retail installment sale contract were strikingly similar to those of the RISC in the instant case. See 608 F.Supp.2d at 908-09. The seller in Patton was identified as the “Creditor-Seller,” and the retail installment sale contract contained an agreement by the buyers to pay the Creditor-Seller the amount financed according to a payment schedule. Id. The merger clause in Patton was virtually identical to the merger clause at issue in the instant case. Id. at 909. The retail installment contract in Patton also contained the same warning about the lack of a “cooling off period” that the RISC in the instant case contains. Id. In Patton, the buyers also signed a separate “Purchase Spot Delivery Agreement,” indicating the buyers’ understanding that financing was not finalized and that the transaction would be complete upon assignment of the retail installment contract to a third party. Id. This agreement was similar to language contained within the RBO in the instant case. See id.

One of the issues before the Patton court was whether the spot delivery agreement rendered certain disclosures on the retail installment contract illusory. Id. at 913-15. This issue turned on whether the spot delivery agreement was part of the contract. See id. The Patton court concluded that the retail installment contract was a fully integrated contract. Id. at 915. To support this conclusion, the court noted that no language in the retail installment contract made it contingent on approval by or assignment to a third-party lender and that, by its terms, it obligated the buyers to make monthly installment payments to the seller. Id. The court further reasoned that certain provisions of the spot delivery agreement contradicted provisions of the retail installment contract. Id. In particular, the court concluded that the provision in the spot delivery agreement indicating that financing had not been finalized contradicted the terms of the installment contract that identified the seller as the “Creditor-Seller” and gave due dates for payments. Id. Further, the court noted that, although the retail installment contract indicated that the seller “may assign this contract,” it did not make the contract contingent on assignment, as the spot delivery agreement purported to do. Id. The court concluded that the language in the retail installment contract providing for financing on specific terms and payments at specific times would be rendered meaningless if the language in the spot delivery agreement permitting the seller to cancel the contract were in force. Id. These inconsistencies, along with the merger clause, the lack of incorporation by reference of the spot delivery agreement into the retail installment contract, and the purpose of the Truth In Lending Act, which was at issue in that case, led the Patton court to conclude that the general rule requiring consideration of all contemporaneously executed documents did not apply to the retail installment contract. Id. at 915-16.

As noted above, the documents at issue in this case are strikingly similar to those discussed in Patton. Because we agree with the Patton court’s reasoning, we hold that the RISC in the instant case is a fully integrated document, consistent with the plain language of the merger clause.

This conclusion does not end our inquiry because Appellant argues that, even if the RISC is a fully integrated contract, the RBO constitutes a valid change to it. This argument is based on the merger clause’s statement that “any change to this contract must be in writing and [the parties] must sign it.” We do not agree that the RBO constitutes a valid change to the RBO because nothing in the RBO indicates that it was intended as a modification of a pre-existing contract, and the parol evidence rule excludes evidence of other prior or contemporaneous agreements. Rather than indicating that it is a subsequent modification to the RISC, the RBO indicates that it was signed before the RISC, as it states, “The retail installment sales contract (“RISC”) to be entered between Dealer and Customer, unless otherwise indicated in writing by Dealer, shall be immediately assigned by Dealer to a bank/finance company ... which shall then be the creditor to whom Customer shall be obligated under the RISC.” (emphasis added). Because the RBO indicates on its face that it was signed before the RISC, it cannot be considered a “change” to the contract as that term is used in the merger clause; instead, the language in the RISC indicating that the RISC constitutes the entire agreement controls.

Notably, the RBO appears to incorporate the RISC by reference. See Jenkins, 913 So.2d at 51 (“A document may be incorporated by reference in a contract if the contract specifically describes the document and expresses the parties’ intent to be bound by its terms”) (citation omitted). This factor arguably distinguishes Patton, where neither document incorporated the other by reference. 608 F.Supp.2d at 909. However, this distinction is immaterial. As explained above, the terms of the RISC indicate that the RISC is the controlling instrument. Thus, the important inquiry is whether the RISC incorporates the RBO, not whether the RBO incorporates the RISC. The RISC does not mention the RBO. As a result, the RBO is irrelevant to the disputes arising out of the transaction at issue.

In sum, we affirm the trial court’s decision to deny Appellant’s motion to compel arbitration. This decision was correct because of the merger clause indicating that the RISC constitutes the entire agreement between the parties related to the contract governing the vehicle purchase. Accordingly, the order on appeal is AFFIRMED.

DAVIS, and WETHERELL, JJ„ Concur.

      . Appellant suggests that in ruling on a request for rehearing or reconsideration, the trial court abandoned its reliance on the merger clause as the basis for denying the motion. Whether the trial court abandoned its initial reasoning is irrelevant to the disposition of this appeal because, under the tipsy coachman doctrine, if the result the trial court reached was correct for any reason reflected in the record, then it is subject to affirmance. Dade Cnty. Sch. Bd. v. Radio Station WQBA, 731 So.2d 638, 644 (Fla.1999) ([I]f a trial court reaches the right result, but for the wrong reasons, it will be upheld if there is any basis which would support the judgment in the record.).

      . A latent ambiguity exists "where the language employed is clear and intelligible and suggests but a single meaning, but some extrinsic fact or extraneous evidence creates a necessity for interpretation or a choice among two or more possible meanings.” Barnwell v. Miami-Dade County Sch. Bd., 48 So.3d 144, 145-46 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (citation omitted).

      . The parol evidence rule is often characterized as excluding evidence of an oral agreement. See, e.g., Jenkins, 913 So.2d at 53; Sears v. James Talcott, Inc., 174 So.2d 776, 778 (Fla. 2d DCA 1965). However, as indicated by the use of the phrase "extrinsic evidence” in J.M. Montgomery Roofing, 98 So.2d at 485, the evidence excluded under the rule includes any evidence outside the instrument that is considered the fully integrated contract. See also Burgan v. Pines Co. of Ga., Ltd., 382 So.2d 1295, 1296 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980) (acknowledging that "the rule precludes evidence of understandings, parol or otherwise, which preceded a final integration of the parties’ contract”); Smith Eng'g & Constr. Co. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 199 So.2d 302, 305 (Fla. 1st DCA 1967) ("[W]hen a legal act is reduced into a single writing, all other utterances of the parties on that topic are legally immaterial for the purpose of determining what are the terms of their act.... No other language is admissible to show what they meant or intended ....”). (citation omitted).

      . Although the RISC does not independently state the price of the vehicle before tax, it states the total price and indicates that this price includes $1,223.48 in sales tax. It also indicates that Appellees received a "MANF Rebate” in the amount of $2,000 and that this amount was the total down payment.