author: CHANDLER, Justice,

text:
    Barrett B. DALY v. THE MISSISSIPPI BAR.
    No. 2010-BR-00716-SCT.
    Supreme Court of Mississippi.
    Jan. 20, 2011.

      Barrett B. Daly, Appellant, pro se.
    Adam B. Kilgore, Jackson, attorney for appellee.
   CHANDLER, Justice,

for the Court:

¶ 1. A complaint tribunal suspended Barrett B. Daly from the practice of law in Mississippi for three years. Daly petitions this Court for reinstatement to the practice of law pursuant to Rule 12 of the Rules of Discipline of the Mississippi State Bar. The Bar has filed a motion to dismiss the petition. The Court finds that Daly has proven by clear and convincing evidence that he has rehabilitated himself and is worthy of reinstatement to the practice of law. Therefore, we grant the petition for reinstatement conditional upon Daly’s taking and passing the Mississippi Bar Examination as ordered by the complaint tribunal.

FACTS

¶ 2. On March 5, 2007, a complaint tribunal appointed by this Court suspended Daly from the practice of law for a period of three years. See The Mississippi Bar v. Barrett B. Daly, cause no. 2005-B-2168. The suspension resulted from Daly’s omissions during his representation of a client and from his failure to fulfill certain requirements imposed on him in a prior disciplinary matter. Pursuant to Rule of Discipline 12, Daly now seeks reinstatement to the practice of law.

¶ 3. This matter began when attorney David K. Lukinovich filed an informal complaint against Daly that alleged violations of the Mississippi Rules of Professional Conduct concerning Daly’s handling of a probate matter. The Bar filed a formal complaint against Daly on November 22, 2005. When Daly failed to appear at his trial on September 15, 2006, the complaint tribunal set the matter for trial on January 26, 2006, and referred Daly to the Lawyers and Judges Assistance Program (LJAP) for evaluation of physical and mental impairment raised in his pleadings. On January 12, 2007, Daly signed a contract with the LJAP.

¶4. The trial occurred on January 26, 2007, with Daly present. After the trial, the complaint tribunal found the following. The Louisiana law firm of David K. Luki-novich had hired Daly for an ancillary Mississippi probate matter. Daly was supposed to transfer mineral rights from the estate of Joseph B. Storey, Sr., to individuals named in Storey’s will. Daly did prepare and file documents for the estate in chancery court. However, the tribunal found that the chancery court file contained no evidence that Daly had obtained proof of publication of the notice to creditors for the estate after the court had entered an order accepting the will for probate and had directed the clerk to issue letters testamentary. The tribunal further found that Daly had failed to communicate with the Lukinovich law firm concerning the estate after August 31, 2005. Consequently, the estate was forced to terminate Daly and hire substitute counsel to complete the probate case. The tribunal also found that Daly had failed to cooperate with his client and had made no effort to protect the interests of his client after the estate had terminated Daly’s representation. In his trial testimony, Daly maintained that the reasons for his omissions concerning the estate were that he had emotional problems, had family problems and had lost two homes and two offices in Hurricane Katrina, and, in particular, had allowed himself to become overburdened by his duties toward his primary client.

¶ 5. The complaint tribunal also considered Daly’s prior disciplinary action, which had resulted in a sixty-day suspension. One of the terms of suspension imposed on Daly had been to notify his current clients and all courts, agencies, and adverse parties in any proceeding in which he was involved of the suspension pursuant to Rule of Discipline 11(c). Daly was to file an affidavit with this Court attesting that he had made the required notifications. The complaint tribunal found that the affidavit which Daly had filed in this Court was false because, while Daly attested that he had made the required notifications, in fact he had not made the required notifications. The complaint tribunal found that Daly’s filing of the false affidavit was at least gross negligence. The complaint tribunal also noted that Daly had failed to respond to Lukinovich’s informal complaint, that he had knowingly failed to attend the investigative hearing, and that he had a history of noncompliance with the bar disciplinary process.

¶6. As a result of Daly’s actions, the complaint tribunal concluded that Daly should have discipline imposed on him in the form of a three-year suspension. The complaint tribunal required Daly, subsequent to the time of eligibility for reinstatement, to submit certificates from a psychiatrist and a medical doctor stating that he is mentally and physically able to practice law. The complaint tribunal stated that Daly’s choice of psychiatrist and medical doctor was subject to the approval of the LJAP. However, the complaint tribunal stated that it did not require Daly to remain under contract with the LJAP. The complaint tribunal required Daly to file an affidavit with this Court within thirty days stating he had notified all present clients of his suspension, as well as all courts, agencies, and adverse parties in any proceeding in which he was presently involved.

¶ 7. The complaint tribunal also required Daly, subsequent to the time of his eligibility for reinstatement, to take and pass the Mississippi Bar Exam (MBE) and the Mississippi Professional Responsibility Exam (MPRE). Daly has submitted proof that he has taken and passed the MPRE. He states that, although he applied to take the July 2010 MBE, the Mississippi Board of Bar Admissions would not allow him to sit for the exam without a reinstatement order from this Court. Daly requests that this Court either waive the requirement that he take and pass the MBE, or issue an order allowing him to take the MBE.

DISCUSSION

¶ 8. This Court has “exclusive and inherent jurisdiction of matters pertaining to attorney discipline [and] reinstatement. ...” M.R.D. 1(a). Under Rule 12 of the Rules of Discipline for the Bar, an attorney suspended for six months or longer must petition this Court for reinstatement. M.R.D. 12(a). We review petitions for reinstatement de novo. In re Prisock, 5 So.3d 319, 322 (Miss.2008) (quoting In Re Baldwin, 890 So.2d 56, 58 (Miss.2003)). On review, this Court sits as a trier of fact, and is not bound by substantial-evidence or manifest-error rules. Id. “In determining whether to grant reinstatement, ‘[t]he Court’s fundamental inquiry is whether [the attorney] has rehabilitated himself in conduct and character since the suspension was imposed.’ ” In re Asher, 987 So.2d 954, 958 (Miss.2008) (quoting In re Steele, 722 So.2d 662, 664 (Miss.1998)).

¶ 9. An attorney must meet five jurisdictional requirements before he or she may be reinstated under Rule 12. In Re Benson, 890 So.2d 888, 890 (Miss.2004). An attorney must:

(1) state the cause or causes for suspension or disbarment; (2) give the name and current address of all persons, parties, firms or legal entities who suffered pecuniary loss due to the improper conduct; (3) make full amends and restitution; (4) show that he has the necessary moral character for the practice of law; and (5) demonstrate the requisite legal education to be reinstated to the privilege of practicing law.

Id. “In cases of suspension pending satisfaction of conditions precedent, reinstatement shall not be permitted except upon proof that the conditions have been met.” M.R.D. 12.2. The attorney petitioning for reinstatement has the burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he has rehabilitated himself and possesses the requisite moral character to entitle him to reinstatement to the practice of law. Prisock, 5 So.3d at 322. Although the Bar’s support is not a jurisdictional requirement, this Court also considers the position of the Bar as to reinstatement in determining whether to grant or deny the petition. Benson, 890 So.2d at 890.

¶ 10. In the Bar’s motion to dismiss Daly’s petition, the Bar contends that Daly failed to meet two jurisdictional requirements and failed to satisfy the conditions precedent for reinstatement. After considering each jurisdictional requirement, followed by the conditions precedent, we find Daly has proven he has rehabilitated himself and possesses the requisite moral character for reinstatement to the practice of law.

A. Jurisdictional requirements

(1) State the cause or causes for suspension or disbarment.

¶ 11. Daly filed a petition followed by six supplemental and amended petitions. The Bar contends that Daly did not state the cause or causes for his suspension in the petition. It is true that Daly’s initial petition did not provide the meaningful detail about the cause or causes for his suspension that is required for reinstatement. The petition stated Daly was suspended by a complaint tribunal, that the matter arose from an informal complaint by Lukinovich regarding Daly’s handling of the Storey estate, and listed the Rules of Professional Responsibility which the complaint tribunal had found Daly to have violated.

¶ 12. This Court has held that the mere mention of the act for which the attorney was suspended is insufficient. Benson, 890 So.2d at 890. Rather, the attorney must provide a clear description of the improper conduct that led to the suspension. Id. The Court finds that, although the cause or causes for the suspension stated in the initial petition were insufficient, Daly’s Fifth Supplemental and Amended Petition for Reinstatement provided a clear description of the causes of his suspension for misconduct in the representation of the Storey estate. This description stated: (1) the documents which Daly had been hired to file; (2) that he had failed to complete the work for which he had been hired; (3) that the Estate had to hire another law firm to complete the work; (4) that Daly had made a false representation to the complaint tribunal and this Court by filing a false affidavit attesting that he had notified all clients, opposing counsel, courts and agencies that he was unable to practice law from June 16, 2004, through August 14, 2004; and (5) that, regarding the Estate:

(a) I failed to abide by the client’s decisions concerning the objectives of representation.
(b) I failed to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing the Estate of Storey.
(c) I failed to communicate with the Estate of Storey.
(d) I made a false statement of material fact to the Complaint Tribunal and this Court with respect to the affidavit I filed in cause number 2004-B-151.

Daly further stated: “I did not cooperate with the Bar concerning the informal Bar complaint filed by Mr. Lukonovich. I did not respond to the informal Bar complaint. I did not attend the investigatory hearing.”

¶ 13. The Court finds that, while Daly’s initial petition did not include a sufficient statement of the cause or causes of his suspension, Daly cured the problem with a supplemental and amended petition that provided a detailed summary of the causes of his suspension. This Court previously has considered the contents of supplemental petitions for reinstatement in determining whether the jurisdictional requirements were met. See In re Reinstatement of Hodges, 19 So.3d 656, 660-61 (Miss.2009). Therefore, we find that Daly has fulfilled this requirement.

(2) Give the name and current address of all persons, parties, firms or legal entities who suffered pecuniary loss due to the improper conduct.

¶ 14. The petition states that there was no suggestion of pecuniary loss in this case. At the hearing, the complaint tribunal found that no actual damages were suffered by Daly’s client. Indeed, nothing in the record indicates that any person, party, firm, or legal entity suffered pecuniary loss as a result of Daly’s improper conduct. Therefore, the Court finds that Daly has fulfilled this jurisdictional requirement.

(3) Make full amends and restitution.

¶ 15. The complaint tribunal required Daly to pay, if not already paid, $41.27 previously assessed by the Committee on Professional Responsibility within thirty days of the entry of the judgment. Further, the complaint tribunal ordered Daly to pay all costs and expenses associated with the litigation of the formal complaint, with the costs and expenses to be determined at a later date upon application of the Bar, and payable by Daly thirty days after the entry of the order for costs and expenses. In the petition, Daly states that he already has paid the $41.27 assessed by the Committee on Professional Responsibility. He attaches a bank account statement showing the check has cleared. Daly also states that, although the complaint tribunal has not entered an order of costs and expenses, he will pay the amount assessed within thirty days of the entry of the order. The Bar does not dispute that Daly’s petition has satisfied this requirement, and the Court finds that Daly’s petition meets this jurisdictional requirement.

(4) Show that he has the necessary moral character for the practice of law.

¶ 16. Daly submitted seven letters from attorneys recommending his reinstatement, including one letter from the complainant, Lukinovich. Each letter states that the writer personally knows that Daly has the moral character to practice law, and that Daly has learned not to take on projects that he does not have the time to fulfill. Daly also submitted his own affidavit, attesting that he regularly attends church with his family and assists at his son’s school. Daly states that he thinks of his past mistakes every day, truly regrets his mistakes, and is greatly sorry for his mistakes.

¶ 17. Daly bears the burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he is rehabilitated and possesses the requisite moral character to practice law. Prisock, 5 So.3d at 323-24. The Bar contends that Daly did not show that he possesses the necessary moral character to practice law. The Bar argues that Daly’s submission of six letters of recommendation “does not demonstrate a ringing endorsement” of Daly’s reinstatement. However, this Court does not require a minimum number of letters as a prerequisite to reinstatement. See Wong v. The Mississippi Bar, 5 So.3d 369, 372-74 (Miss.2008) (this Court conditionally granted Wong’s petition for reinstatement after finding that Wong was rehabilitated; the petition included three letters of recommendation). The Bar also points out that Daly has not performed any community service, and his own affidavit is the only proof of his attendance at church and assisting at his son’s school.

¶ 18. As evidence of moral unfitness, the Bar also points to Daly’s accusations against the LJAP in the misunderstanding over the termination of his LJAP contract. Daly explains this dispute in the petition, and he has attached associated documentation. On September 18, 2006, the complaint tribunal entered an order requiring Daly to enter into a contract with the LJAP. Daly signed a contract with the LJAP on January 12, 2007. But at the January 26, 2007 trial, the complaint tribunal relieved Daly of his LJAP contract. However, the complaint tribunal’s order failed to recite that Daly was relieved of his LJAP contract. Apparently, the LJAP was not notified that Daly had been relieved of his LJAP contract. Accordingly, on August 6, 2008, the LJAP sent Daly a letter stating that he was out of compliance with his LJAP contract.

¶ 19. Daly attempted to obtain the LJAP’s approval of his certifications from a medical doctor and a psychiatrist that he was medically and mentally able to practice law, as required by the order of the complaint tribunal as a prerequisite to his reinstatement. He submitted a letter from his treating psychiatrist, Dr. Alvin M. Rouchell of Ochsner Health System, certifying that he is mentally able to practice law, and a letter from his treating physician, Dr. Robert Miles, also of Ochsner, certifying that he is physically able to practice law. On April 2, 2010, he emailed a copy of the certifications and the physicians’ biographies to the director of the LJAP, Betty Daugherty. On April 20, 2010, Dr. Rouchell sent a letter to the LJAP that elaborated on his treatment of Daly and opined that Daly had no psychiatric impediments to practicing law. But on April 22, 2010, Daugherty sent a letter to Daly’s counsel denying the request for approval of his choice of psychiatrist and medical doctor. The fundamental reason for the denial was that Daugherty believed Daly to be out of compliance with his LJAP contract.

¶ 20. On April 26, 2010, Daly sent a seventeen-page response letter to the LJAP, and copied the staff of the LJAP, the committee members of the LJAP, all attorneys in the Office of General Counsel, and the Executive Director of the Mississippi Bar. In the letter, Daly took issue with Daugherty’s refusal to approve his choice of physicians. Daly complained that, on April 9, 2010, an attorney with the LJAP had e-mailed him an assurance that his physicians were qualified to treat Daly and to opine as to his fitness. Daly expressed frustration with the LJAP’s failure to acknowledge that he had been relieved of his LJAP contract, and with the fact that he was forced to purchase a trial transcript for $2,000 in order to prove that the tribunal had relieved him of the LJAP contract. Although the Bar cites Daly’s conduct in this matter as evidence of his unfitness, the record reflects that the LJAP misunderstood Daly’s status through no fault of Daly. Considering the entirety of Daly’s petition and attachments, we find that Daly’s expressions of frustration with the LJAP are no impediment to his reinstatement to the practice of law.

¶ 21. Daly has submitted seven letters of recommendation, including one from the same attorney who filed the informal complaint that culminated in his three-year suspension. Daly has sworn that he has attended church and volunteered at his child’s school. He has thoroughly acknowledged his misconduct and expressed remorse. We find that Daly’s petition meets the jurisdictional requirement of proving by clear and convincing evidence that Daly is rehabilitated and possesses the requisite moral character to practice law.

(5) Demonstrate the requisite legal education to be reinstated to the privilege of practicing law.

¶ 22. “[Attorneys who eventually wish to be reinstated have a responsibility to show a continuing commitment to staying informed and competent in the practice of law.” In re Benson, 890 So.2d at 891. In the petition, Daly stated that between January 8, 2007, and March 23, 2010, he completed 77.5 hours of continuing legal education. He stated that, since before January 26, 2007, he regularly has read new state and federal caselaw and statutes, and has kept abreast of developing patent law and tax law. In Daly’s Sixth Supplemental and Amended Petition for Reinstatement, he averred that he had attended an additional 7.5 hours of continuing legal education. Attachments to the petition and sixth supplemental petition documented his completion of continuing legal education in areas including estate planning and tax law. The Bar does not dispute that Daly has met this requirement. The Court finds that Daly has met this jurisdictional requirement.

B. Conditions precedent

¶ 23. Rule 12.2 states “[i]n cases of suspension pending satisfaction of conditions precedent, reinstatement shall not be permitted except upon proof that the conditions have been met.” The Bar contends that Daly has failed to comply with the condition precedent of filing affidavits in this Court within thirty days of his suspension stating he has notified all clients, courts, agencies and adverse parties of his suspension. In his petition, Daly admits he never filed the required affidavits. He points out that he testified under oath at the trial that he had no Mississippi clients and was not involved in any lawsuits in Mississippi. He states that the reason he did not file the required affidavits was that, because he had no Mississippi clients or cases, he was unable truthfully to swear that he had made the required notifications. The Court finds that, while it would have been preferable for Daly to have filed an affidavit attesting that he was not involved in any Mississippi cases, Daly’s failure to do so is not fatal to his petition for reinstatement.

¶ 24. The Bar also points out that Daly has failed to submit certifications from a psychiatrist and a medical doctor who have been approved by the LJAP stating he is mentally and physically able to practice law. As previously noted, Daly attached the required certifications from a psychiatrist and a medical doctor, but the LJAP did not approve his choices because the LJAP erroneously found that Daly was in breach of an LJAP contract. Daly has filed a “Motion to Deem Petitioner’s Choice of Psychiatrist and Medical Doctor Approved by the LJAP.” We observe that Daly’s psychiatrist, Dr. Rouchell, is the chairman of psychiatry at Ochsner Health System, and his physician, Dr. Miles, is also with Ochsner. Certainly, these physicians are well-qualified to opine on Daly’s mental and physical fitness to practice law. We grant Daly’s motion, and find that Daly has satisfied the requirement that he submit medical certifications on his mental and physical fitness to practice law.

¶ 25. Finally, we address the requirement that Daly take and pass the MBE. Daly avers that the Mississippi Board of Bar Admissions prevented him from sitting for the MBE without a reinstatement order from this Court. We note that, while taking the MPRE is an examination requirement of an attorney suspended for six months or longer, the Mississippi Rules of Discipline do not require such an attorney to take the MBE. See M.R.D. 12.5. Rather, the complaint tribunal imposed this additional requirement, which we deem appropriate in this case. Therefore, we order the Mississippi Board of Bar Admissions to allow Daly to sit for the MBE.

CONCLUSION

¶ 26. This Court holds that Daly’s petition meets the jurisdictional requirements for reinstatement to the practice of law. We find that Daly has demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that he has rehabilitated himself and possesses the requisite moral character to practice law. This Court holds that Daly’s petition for reinstatement to the practice of law should be granted on the condition that he take and pass the Mississippi Bar Examination.

¶ 27. PETITION OF BARRETT B. DALY FOR REINSTATEMENT TO THE PRACTICE OF LAW IN THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI IS CONDITIONALLY GRANTED.

WALLER, C.J., CARLSON AND GRAVES, P.JJ., DICKINSON, RANDOLPH, LAMAR, KITCHENS AND PIERCE, JJ„ CONCUR.

      . Daly has submitted documentation to the Bar that showed the notice to creditors actually had been published in the local newspaper.

      . Daly submitted a seventh letter after the Bar’s motion to dismiss.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: MICHAEL K. RANDOLPH, Justice,

license: Public Domain

text:
    THE MISSISSIPPI BAR, Appellant v. Paul S. MINOR, Appellee.
    No. 2007-BD-01653-SCT.
    Supreme Court of Mississippi.
    Feb. 11, 2011.
   ORDER

MICHAEL K. RANDOLPH, Justice,

for the Court.

¶ 1. These matters came before the Court en banc on the Motion for Disbarment filed by the Mississippi Bar and the response and motions filed by attorney Paul S. Minor (“Response to Motion for Disbarment and Motion for Permission to File or Submit Additional Information,” and “Supplement to Motion for Permission to File or Submit Additional Information.”)

¶ 2. The Bar filed a formal complaint against Minor based on his felony convictions in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi. By order handed down January 17, 2008, this Court granted the Bar’s subsequent Motion for Indefinite Suspension Pending Appeal, Striking from the Rolls, Suspending and Staying Proceedings. On December 11, 2009, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed Minor’s conviction for federal program bribery, but affirmed his convictions on all other counts. See U.S. v. Whitfield, 590 F.3d 325 (5th Cir.2009). On October 4, 2010, the United States Supreme Court denied Minor’s petition for writ of certiora-ri.

¶ 3. Thereafter, the Bar filed this Motion for Disbarment. The Bar asserts that Minor’s appeal has been concluded and asks this Court to disbar him pursuant to Rule 6 of the Mississippi Rules of Discipline. Minor then filed his “Response to Motion for Disbarment and Motion for Permission to File or Submit Additional Information,” and followed this response and motion, by filing a “Supplement to Motion for Permission to File or Submit Additional Information.” After due consideration, this Court finds that the Bar’s motion should be granted and Minor’s Motion for Permission to File or Submit Additional Information should be denied.

¶ 4. Minor’s argument regarding the ripeness of the Bar’s motion is without merit. Minor argues that the motion is premature pending his sentencing hearing and possible subsequent collateral attack upon his convictions. The United States Supreme Court denied Minor’s petition for writ of certiorari. Whitfield v. U.S., — U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 136, 178 L.Ed.2d 83 (2010). Upon that denial, “all appeals [had been] concluded without reversal.... ” M.R.D. 6(d). “[T]he Court shall forthwith enter an order of disbarment.” Id.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that:

1. Paul S. Minor is hereby permanently DISBARRED from the practice of law in the State of Mississippi.

2. This order shall constitute notice of permanent disbarment in this cause.

3. The Clerk of this Court shall forward certified copies of this order to Paul S. Minor and the Executive Director of the Mississippi Bar.

4. Paul S. Minor shall, within thirty days following entry of this order, notify clients and affected courts of his disbarment and comply with all other requirements applicable to disbarred attorneys pursuant to Rule 11 of the Mississippi Rules of Discipline.

5. Paul S. Minor shall, within forty-five days following entry of this order, file an affidavit with this Court stating that all of his clients have been notified of his disbarment and his consequent inability to practice law in Mississippi and that he has complied fully with all of the requirements set forth in Rule 11 of the Mississippi Rules of Discipline.

6. The Clerk of this Court shall immediately forward certified copies of this order to the Chancery Clerk and the Circuit Clerk of Harrison County and to the senior chancellor of the Chancery Court of Harrison County and the senior circuit judge of the Circuit Court of Harrison County, and the order shall be entered upon the minutes of those courts in accordance with Rule 8.6(iii) of the Mississippi Rules of Discipline.

7. The Clerk of this Court likewise shall immediately forward certified copies of this order to the Clerks of the United States District Courts for the Northern and Southern Districts of Mississippi, the Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, and the Clerk of the Supreme Court of the United States.

8. Minor’s Motion for Permission to File or Submit Additional Information is denied.

9. Costs of these proceedings are hereby assessed to Paul S. Minor.

SO ORDERED, this the 11th day of February, 2011.

KITCHENS, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.


author: JAMES E. GRAVES, JR., Presiding Justice

text:
    THE MISSISSIPPI BAR v. John H. WHITFIELD.
    No. 2007-BD-01655-SCT.
    Supreme Court of Mississippi.
    Feb. 14, 2011.
   ORDER

JAMES E. GRAVES, JR., Presiding Justice

for the Court.

¶ 1. This matter came before the Court en banc on the Motion for Disbarment filed by the Mississippi Bar. The Bar filed a formal complaint against attorney John H. Whitfield based on Whitfield’s felony convictions in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi. Whitfield did not file a response and waived service of process through counsel. By order filed January 17, 2008, this Court granted the Bar’s subsequent Motion for Indefinite Suspension Pending Appeal, Striking from Rolls, Suspending and Staying Proceedings. On December 11, 2009, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed Whitfield’s conviction for federal program bribery, but affirmed his conviction on all other counts. See U.S. v. Whitfield, 590 F.3d 325 (5th Cir.2009). On October 4, 2010, the United States Supreme Court denied Whitfield’s petition for writ of cer-tiorari.

¶ 2. Thereafter, the Bar filed this Motion for Disbarment. The Bar asserts that Whitfield’s appeal has been concluded and asks this Court to disbar him pursuant to Rule 6 of the Mississippi Rules of Discipline. After due consideration, this Court finds that the motion should be granted.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that:

1. John H. Whitfield is hereby permanently DISBARRED from the practice of law in the State of Mississippi.

2. This order shall constitute notice of permanent disbarment in this cause.

3. The Clerk of this Court shall forward certified copies of this order to John H. Whitfield and the Executive Director of the Mississippi Bar.

4. John H. Whitfield shall, within thirty days following entry of this order, notify clients and affected courts of his disbarment and comply with all other requirements applicable to disbarred attorneys pursuant to Rule 11 of the Mississippi Rules of Discipline.

5. John H. Whitfield shall, within forty-five days following entry of this order, file an affidavit with this Court stating that all of his clients have been notified of his disbarment and his consequent inability to practice law in Mississippi and that he has complied fully with all of the requirements set forth in Rule 11 of the Mississippi Rules of Discipline.

6. The Clerk of this Court shall immediately forward certified copies of this order to the Chancery Clerk and the Circuit Clerk of Harrison County and to the senior chancellor of the Chancery Court of Harrison County and the senior circuit judge of the Circuit Court of Harrison County, and the order shall be entered upon the minutes of those courts in accordance with Rule 8.6(iii) of the Mississippi Rules of Discipline.

7. The Clerk of this Court likewise shall immediately forward certified copies of this order to the Clerks of the United States District Courts for the Northern and Southern Districts of Mississippi, the Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, and the Clerk of the Supreme Court of the United States.

8. Costs of these proceedings are hereby assessed against John H. Whitfield.

SO ORDERED, this the 14th day of February, 2011.

KITCHENS, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.


author: JESS H. DICKINSON, Justice.

text:
    THE MISSISSIPPI BAR, Appellant v. Walter W. TEEL, Appellee.
    No. 2007-BD-01651-SCT.
    Supreme Court of Mississippi.
    Feb. 15, 2011.
   ORDER

JESS H. DICKINSON, Justice.

¶ 1. This matter came before the Court en banc on the Motion for Disbarment filed by the Mississippi Bar. The Bar filed a formal complaint against attorney Walter W. Teel based on Teel’s felony convictions in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi. Teel did not file a response and waived service of process through counsel. By order filed January 17, 2008, this Court granted the Bar’s subsequent Motion for Indefinite Suspension Pending Appeal, Striking from Rolls, Suspending and Staying Proceedings. On December 11, 2009, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed Teel’s conviction for federal program bribery, but affirmed his conviction on all other counts. On October 4, 2010, the United States Supreme Court denied Teel’s petition for writ of certiorari.

¶ 2. Thereafter, the Bar filed this Motion for Disbarment. The Bar asserts that Teel’s appeal has been concluded and asks this Court to disbar him pursuant to Rule 6 of the Mississippi Rules of Discipline. After due consideration, this Court finds that the motion should be granted.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that:

1. Walter W. Teel is hereby permanently DISBARRED from the practice of law in the State of Mississippi.

2. This order shall constitute notice of permanent disbarment in this cause.

3. The Clerk of this Court shall forward certified copies of this order to Walter W. Teel and the Executive Director of the Mississippi Bar.

4. Walter W. Teel shall, within thirty days following entry of this order, notify clients and affected courts of his disbarment and comply with all other requirements applicable to disbarred attorneys pursuant to Rule 11 of the Mississippi Rules of Discipline.

5. Walter W. Teel shall, within forty-five days following entry of this order, file an affidavit with this Court stating that all of his clients have been notified of his disbarment and his consequent inability to practice law in Mississippi and that he has complied fully with all of the requirements set forth in Rule 11 of the Mississippi Rules of Discipline.

6. The Clerk of this Court shall immediately forward certified copies of this order to the Chancery Clerk and the Circuit Clerk of Harrison County and to the senior chancellor of the Chancery Court of Harrison County and the senior circuit judge of the Circuit Court of Harrison County, and the order shall be entered upon the minutes of those courts in accordance with Rule 8.6(iii) of the Mississippi Rules of Discipline.

7. The Clerk of this Court likewise shall immediately forward certified copies of this order to the Clerks of the United States District Courts for the Northern and Southern Districts of Mississippi, the Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, and the Clerk of the Supreme Court of the United States.

8. Costs of these proceedings are hereby assessed against Walter W. Teel.

SO ORDERED.

KITCHENS, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.

      . See U.S. v. Whitfield, 590 F.3d 325 (5th Cir.2009).


author: LAMAR, Justice, WALLER, Chief Justice,

text:
    Azki SHAH v. THE MISSISSIPPI BAR.
    No. 2010-BR-00933-SCT.
    Supreme Court of Mississippi.
    May 12, 2011.

      Azki Shah, Appellant, pro se.
    Adam B. Kilgore, Jackson, attorney for appellee.
   LAMAR, Justice,

for the Court:

¶ 1. Azki Shah has been disbarred since June 23, 2005, and became eligible for reinstatement after April 19, 2010. Shah applied for reinstatement on June 9, 2010, after obtaining the requisite score on the Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination and complying with the various conditions imposed by this Court and under Mississippi Rule of Discipline 12. The Mississippi Bar opposes Shah’s reinstatement based on his “failure to satisfy the moral character component for reinstatement and his failure to accept and articulate full responsibility for his misconduct.” We disagree with the Bar’s position and grant Shah’s petition for reinstatement conditioned upon his passage of the complete Mississippi Bar Examination administered by the Mississippi Board of Bar Admissions. Miss. R. Discipline 12.5.

FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 2. On June 23, 2005, this Court disbarred Shah after he failed to perfect an appeal on behalf of Colon Yaughn, a criminal defendant. Shah v. Mississippi Bar, 919 So.2d 59, 61 (Miss.2005) (Shah I). Vaughn had paid Shah $3,750 to prosecute his appeal. Id. at 61-62. Shah had retained the payment, but never had filed Vaughn’s appeal. Id. at 64. Shah then had lied to Vaughn about the status of the appeal. Id. at 64, 66. This Court found Shah had violated Rules of Discipline 1.1 (duty of competence), 1.15 (duty of loyalty, including preserving the client’s property, maintaining confidentiality, and avoiding conflicts), 1.3 and 1.4 (duty of diligence), and 8.4 (duty of candor). Id. at 65. We disbarred Shah based on his pattern of misconduct; his failure to file Vaughn’s appeal and the serious deprivation that Vaughn had suffered as a result; his deception of Vaughn; and his deliberate evasiveness and lack of candor throughout the investigation process. Id. at 65-66.

¶ 3. Though already disbarred, Shah received additional sanctions on January 4, 2007. Shah v. Mississippi Bar, 962 So.2d 514, 519-20 (Miss.2007) (Shah II). The Court imposed a three-year suspension from the practice of law for misconduct that had occurred prior to Shah’s June 2005 disbarment. Id. In April 2002, Marcus Simmons had hired Shah to determine whether Simmons had valid title to certain real property. Id. at 519. Simmons had paid Shah an initial research fee, and later had paid Shah an additional amount to pursue the claim. Id. Shah first had informed Simmons that a court date had been set, but that Simmons’s presence was not required. Id. Shah later had told Simmons that a second court date had been set, and that Simmons needed to attend this particular hearing. Id. Simmons had arrived at the courthouse on said date, but had found no trace of Shah. Id. Simmons eventually had learned that Shah had never filed any case on his behalf. Id. This Court determined that Shah’s actions had violated Rules of Discipline 1.2(a) (duty regarding scope of representation), 1.3 and 1.4 (duty of diligence), 8.1(a) (duty in disciplinary matter not to make a knowingly false statement of material fact), 8.4(a) (duty not to violate or attempt to violate rules of professional conduct), and 8.4(c) (duty not to engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation). Id. at 522. Consequently, the Court suspended Shah from the practice of law for three years. Id. Since Shah already had been disbarred, the effect of this three-year suspension was simply to extend the time before Shah could petition this Court for reinstatement. In re Petition for Reinstatement of Shah, 987 So.2d 964, 966 (Miss.2008).

¶ 4. Since 2007, Shah has filed two petitions for reinstatement. His first petition was dismissed without prejudice as premature. Id. at 964, 966. The second petition was denied both as premature and because Shah had not passed the Multistate Professional Responsibility Exam. In re Petition of Shah for Reinstatement, 5 So.3d 352, 355 (Miss.2008). In denying his second petition, this Court instructed that Shah could not petition for reinstatement until April 19, 2010. Id. at 356. We instructed that any petition on or after that date must be preceded by proof of a passing score on the Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination. Id.

DISCUSSION

¶ 5. This Court reserves “ ‘exclusive and inherent jurisdiction’ ” over attorney-reinstatement cases. In re Petition for Reinstatement of Morrison, 819 So.2d 1181, 1183 (Miss.2001) (quoting In re Petition of Smith for Reinstatement, 758 So.2d 396, 397 (Miss.1999)). These matters are reviewed de novo on a ease-by-case basis. Id. The fundamental issue in a reinstatement case is the “attorney’s rehabilitation in conduct and character since the disbarment.” In re Petition of Benson for Reinstatement, 890 So.2d 888, 890 (Miss.2004). The petitioner must demonstrate this by meeting the jurisdictional requirements of Rule 12, which are: (1) stating the cause or causes for suspension or disbarment, (2) providing the names and current addresses of all persons, parties, firms, or legal entities who suffered pecuniary loss due to improper conduct, (3) making full amends and restitution, (4) showing requisite moral character for the practice of law, and (5) demonstrating the requisite legal education. Id. This Court also will consider the Bar’s position as to reinstatement. Id.

I. Cause for disbarment and suspension

¶ 6. Shah acknowledges that his actions in the Vaughn and Simmons matters were the bases for his disbarment and suspension. His initial petition summarily discussed the Vaughn case, but it did not address the Simmons matter. Shah filed an amendment to his petition in which he discussed the Simmons matter. While Shah did not provide details regarding the facts of these matters, we find his description sufficient. We also note that he discussed both cases more thoroughly in his deposition with the Bar, which was submitted in this matter. We find that Shah has satisfied this requirement.

II. Full amends and restitution to anyone suffering pecuniary loss

¶ 7. Shah maintains that Vaughn and Simmons are the only two individuals who suffered pecuniary loss as a result of his actions. In Shah I, this Court ordered Shah to pay restitution to Vaughn in the amount of $8,750. Shah I, 919 So.2d at 66. Shah has submitted photocopies of twenty-one cashier’s checks made out to Vaughn’s mother, Jimmie Nell Vaughn, totaling $3,750. And in Shah II, the evidence supported that Simmons had paid Shah an initial, $165 research fee and a second, $365 fee to pursue the claim. Shah II, 962 So.2d at 522, 524. Shah submitted proof that he had refunded Simmons $375 in October 2003 (prior to the disciplinary complaint being filed), and that he had forwarded Simmons an additional $165 in June 2010. We find that Shah has made full amends and restitution.

III. Rehabilitation and requisite moral character

¶ 8. Since his disbarment, Shah has worked as a cook at the local Sonic Drive-In. From January 2005 to July 2009, Shah worked part-time at Sonic and full-time at Planter’s Service and Sales, a fertilizer plant. Shah estimated that he had worked ninety hours a week between the two jobs. He also briefly tried his hand at soybean farming in 2006, but abandoned that venture because of the arduous work schedule between Sonic and Planter’s. Shah also mentioned that he once owned a beauty-supply store, but said that he had to close the store within the past ten years. It is not clear whether this store closed before or after Shah’s disbarment. Shah stated that he has not engaged in any law-related work since his disbarment and suspension. He did, however, represent himself in a civil suit against the Farmers Home Administration (FHA).

¶ 9. The Bar argues that Shah offers no civic, church, or charitable involvement in support of his reinstatement, other than alumni donations to his alma mater, Amherst College. It also argues that Shah’s petition does not include any personal letters in support of his reinstatement. Letters of support, while laudable and relevant, are not necessarily disposi-tive of moral character and are not required by Mississippi Rule of Discipline 12. We also note that the Bar has not submitted any letters in opposition to Shah’s reinstatement. As noted by the dissent, Shah attached a petition in support of reinstatement signed by fifty-three citizens in the Eleventh Circuit District.

¶ 10. Shah acknowledged being aware that this Court ascribes value to participation in civic, church, or charitable activities, when weighing the merits of a petition for reinstatement. But Shah asserts that his nearly ninety-hour-a-week work schedule, between two jobs, left him no time to participate in these activities.

¶ 11. The Bar and the dissent focus on Shah’s actions which led to his disbarment and Shah’s disagreement with a few of the Court’s specific findings in Shah I and Shah 11. Rather than focusing on Shah’s conduct since his disbarment, they rehash his prior misdeeds, for which he has been punished. Furthermore, Shah’s disagreement was in response to the Bar’s questions during a deposition in this matter. His disagreement with a specific finding of fact does not detract from his agreement with our findings as a whole. Nor should it prevent his reinstatement.

¶ 12. Additionally, as a prerequisite to seeking reinstatement, Shah was required to obtain a passing score on the Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination. In re Petition of Shah for Reinstatement, 5 So.3d at 356. Shah attached to his petition a document from the National Conference of Bar Examiners showing that he had scored a 90 on the Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination, well above the required score of 80. Miss. R. Discipline 12.5.

¶ 13. Shah accepted responsibility and expressed remorse for his actions throughout his petitions and deposition. Shah submits that he has learned a valuable lesson over the past six years: that he cannot overextend himself. He insists that his main problem was that he tried to handle too many cases at one time. Shah asserts that, if reinstated, he will employ strict guidelines in the number and type of cases he will handle in the future. Shah plans to reopen his solo practice and to focus on bankruptcy and criminal cases. We find Shah has shown sufficiently that he is rehabilitated and has the requisite moral character to practice law in this State.

IV. Requisite legal education for reinstatement

¶ 14. In addition to taking and passing the Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination, Shah’s petition also includes five statements from the Mississippi Commission on Continuing Legal Education. These statements show that from 2006 to 2008, Shah acquired 48.9 credit hours of continuing legal education in the areas of bankruptcy and criminal law. Additionally, Shah asserts that he regularly reads published decisions from this Court and the Court of Appeals. Further, the issue of Shah’s requisite legal education will be tested by his taking the complete Mississippi Bar Examination as required by Mississippi Rule of Discipline 12.5.

CONCLUSION

¶ 15. We find Shah has met each jurisdictional requirement and condition imposed by this Court, and that he should be reinstated to practice law in Mississippi conditioned upon his passage of the complete Mississippi Bar Examination administered by the Mississippi Board of Bar Admissions, as required by Mississippi Rule of Discipline 12.5.

¶ 16. PETITION OF AZKI SHAH FOR REINSTATEMENT TO THE PRACTICE OF LAW IN THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI IS GRANTED CONDITIONAL ON PASSAGE OF THE MISSISSIPPI BAR EXAMINATION.

CARLSON AND DICKINSON, P.JJ., KITCHENS, CHANDLER AND PIERCE JJ„ CONCUR. WALLER, C.J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY RANDOLPH, J. KING, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.

WALLER, Chief Justice,

Dissenting:

¶ 17. I disagree that Shah has met the requirements to warrant reinstatement. Aside from his own testimony, the only evidence offered to show Shah’s general reputation is a “Petition in Support of Petitioner’s Petition to be Readmitted to the Mississippi State Bar” signed by fifty-three individuals, only two of whom Shah knew personally. Furthermore, Shah has yet to accept full responsibility for his actions. Throughout the Bar’s deposition, Shah continued to dispute material facts surrounding the prior incidences of misconduct that eventually led to his disbar-xnent. For these reasons, I do not agree that Shah has met his burden of proving a rehabilitated character. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.

¶ 18. In determining character, the opinion of the public and of those intimately acquainted with the petitioner serves as the best evidence. Ex Parte Marshall, 165 Miss. 523, 147 So. 791, 796 (Miss.1933). Consequently, petitioners seeking reinstatement almost always include letters of support or recommendation from acquaintances, colleagues, employers, community and business leaders, and members of the Bar. The number of letters is often significant. E.g. In re Petition of Coleman, 949 So.2d 680, 682 (Miss.2006) (thirty-six letters of recommendation); In re McGuire, 912 So.2d 902, 905 (Miss.2005) (sixty-six letters of recommendation); In re Reinstatement of Holleman, 826 So.2d 1243, 1246 (Miss.2002) (sixty letters of recommendation); Matter of Reinstatement of Tucker, 656 So.2d 799, 802-03 (Miss.1995) (more than 100 letters in support). Though such letters are not required per se, they are helpful in assessing a petitioner’s fitness to practice law, if the letters are substantive and the sources are diverse. In re Shelton, 987 So.2d 898, 904 (Miss.2006).

¶ 19. Shah offers nothing comparable to a letter of support. He submits instead a “Petition in Support of Petitioner’s Petition to be Readmitted to the Mississippi State Bar.” This petition states that:

We the undersigned citizens of the 11th Circuit Judicial District, and the State of Mississippi wholeheartedly support Petitioner’s Petition to [b]e Readmitted to [t]he Mississippi State Bar due to his long-term efforts in making the legal profession accessable [sic] to those who could not afford it; Petitioner’s zealous advocacy; Petitioner’s dedication to the legal profession, and his clients, by signing our names to this Petition.

Fifty-three people signed the petition, none of whom were attorneys. Shah gathered these signatures back in 2007 by going door-to-door in various towns. He said that many of these individuals knew him “from the trials ... in Coahoma County and various places.” He added that he knew “a few” personally, but was unable to recall any such person until the Bar allowed him to refresh his memory by reviewing the petition. Even then, he named only two signatories whom he knew personally.

¶ 20. Shah’s “petition in support” fails to provide any meaningful, substantive information about Shah’s reputation and character. The signatories apparently had little or no knowledge about Shah apart from their brief, three-to-five minute encounter with him on the day that they signed the petition. The petition, therefore, is not helpful in determining Shah’s fitness to practice law.

¶ 21. The deficiency of having no letters of support, or anything comparable, is compounded by the fact that Shah continues to dispute material facts that were established in his prior disciplinary matters. This, in my view, indicates that he has not yet truly come to terms with and accepted full responsibility for his prior misconduct.

¶ 22. It is true that, at several points throughout his deposition, Shah said that he accepted responsibility for his actions and even expressed remorse. But he made other comments that raise doubts about those expressions. For example, Shah disputed the Bar’s characterization of his disciplinary history as “extensive.” “I wouldn’t label it as extensive,” said Shah, “I think it’s indicative probably of a pattern of not paying attention to detail.... ” But more significantly, Shah continued to contest certain material facts that were established in Shah II and Shah III.

¶ 23. With regard to Shah I, Shah insisted that he never had tried to deceive the lower court by implying in his motion for out-of-time appeal that another attorney, not Shah, had failed to timely file Vaughn’s appeal. The Complaint Tribunal, however, found that Shah had tried to deceive the lower court, and Shah did not contest that finding on appeal. Shah I, 919 So.2d at 62-63. Shah also disagreed that the $3,750 fee that he had charged Vaughn was unreasonable. Id. at 62. Shah said that the $3,750 fee compensated Shah for representing Vaughn on two separate matters: the appeal and Vaughn’s trial on an earlier, unrelated charge. But even if the $3,750 amount did represent a combined fee, as Shah suggests, the fee was still unreasonable, because the fact remains that Shah accepted full payment without performing at least some of the agreed-upon services. See id. at 62. Shah accepted payment to prosecute an appeal that he never filed; the fact that he would suggest that his fee in such instance was not unreasonable is especially troubling.

¶ 24. As for Shah III, Shah maintained that he never had informed Simmons of a court date that did not exist. This Court, however, concluded otherwise in Shah III. Shah II, 962 So.2d at 519-22.

¶ 25. Finally, Shah insisted that he always has tried to cooperate with the Bar. During his deposition, the Bar questioned Shah as to why he had filed only a brief, one-paragraph response to Simmons’s bar complaint against him, and why he had failed to attend the Bar’s investigatory hearing concerning Simmons’s bar complaint. Shah said he thought his response was “adequate enough,” given the little information he had about the case. And Shah said he chose not to attend the investigatory hearing because of a personal conflict between himself and Michael Martz, who had served as general counsel for the Bar at that time. A “personal conflict” with the Bar’s general counsel hardly justifies not attending an investigatory hearing. Moreover, Shah’s lack of cooperation with the Bar was not isolated to the Simmons matter. Shah I cited Shah’s “deliberate prevarication, lack of candor[,] and evasiveness” throughout disciplinary proceedings concerning the Vaughn matter, as well. Shah I, 919 So.2d at 66. It is clear that, contrary to his assertions, Shah has not always fully cooperated with the Bar.

¶ 26. Because Shah continues to dispute material, established facts concerning his prior misconduct, I cannot say that he has accepted full responsibility for his actions.

¶27. I applaud Shah for making full amends and restitution, exhibiting an exemplary work ethic, and obtaining a passing score on the Multistate Professional Responsibility Exam. But, for the reasons discussed above, I find his petition to be lacking. Thus, I respectfully dissent.

RANDOLPH, J„ JOINS THIS OPINION.

      . See id. at 65-66 for discussion of Shah’s complete disciplinary history.


author: JESS H. DICKINSON, Presiding Justice.

text:
    THE MISSISSIPPI BAR v. Joseph Patrick GAUTIER.
    No. 2010-BD-01332-SCT.
    Supreme Court of Mississippi.
    July 27, 2011.
   EN BANC ORDER

JESS H. DICKINSON, Presiding Justice.

¶ 1. This matter came before the Court en banc on the formal complaint the Mississippi Bar filed against attorney Joseph Patrick Gautier based upon his plea of guilty in the Circuit Court of Harrison County, Mississippi, to one count of possession of a controlled substance. Gautier was served with process but did not file a response.

¶ 2. On August 9, 2010, the Circuit Court of Harrison County, Mississippi, sentenced Gautier to serve a term of four years’ imprisonment (with credit for time served) followed by three years of reporting post-release supervision in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections, and to pay assessments and fines. On August 13, 2010, the Bar filed this formal complaint pursuant to Rule 6 of the Mississippi Rules of Discipline. Because Gautier has been adjudicated guilty of a felony, the Bar asks this Court to: Strike the name of Joseph Patrick Gautier from the rolls of the Mississippi Bar; immediately suspend Gautier from the practice of law in Mississippi pursuant to Rule 6(a) of the Mississippi Rules of Discipline; enter an order of disbarment pursuant to Rule 6(d) after the time for appeal from the judgment of conviction expires; and, upon entry of an order for disbarment, assess Gautier with the costs associated with this action.

¶ 8. After due consideration, this Court finds that the requested relief should be granted. Further, this Court takes judicial notice of the fact that no appeal has been filed. Therefore, we find that disbarment is proper at this time.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that.

1. Joseph Patrick Gautier is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law in the State of Mississippi.
2. This order shall constitute notice of disbarment in this cause.
3. The Clerk of this Court shall forward certified copies of this order to Joseph Patrick Gautier and the Executive Director of the Mississippi Bar.
4. Joseph Patrick Gautier shall, within thirty days following entry of this order, notify clients and affected courts of his disbarment, properly disburse all funds he may hold in trust, and comply with all other requirements applicable to disbarred attorneys pursuant to Rule 11 of the Rules of Discipline for the Mississippi Bar.
5. Joseph Patrick Gautier shall, within forty-five days following entry of this order, file an affidavit with this Court stating that all of his clients have been notified of his disbarment and his consequent inability to practice law in Mississippi and that he has complied fully with all of the requirements set forth in Mississippi Rule of Discipline 11, as well as the requirements of this order.
6. The Clerk of this Court shall immediately forward certified copies of this order to the chancery clerk and the circuit clerk of Harrison County and to the senior chancellor of the Chancery Court of Harrison County and to the senior circuit judge of the Circuit Court of Harrison County, and the order shall be entered upon the minutes of those courts in accordance with Rule 8.6(iii) of the Rules of Discipline.
7. The Clerk of this Court likewise shall immediately forward certified copies of this order to the Clerks of the United States District Courts for the Northern and Southern Districts of Mississippi, the Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, and the Clerk of the Supreme Court of the United States.
8. Costs of these proceedings are hereby assessed against Joseph Patrick Gautier.

¶ 4. SO ORDERED.


author: DAVID ANTHONY CHANDLER, Justice.

text:
    The MISSISSIPPI BAR, Appellant v. Wendel Shan THOMPSON, Appellee.
    No. 2011-BD-01185-SCT.
    Supreme Court of Mississippi.
    Jan. 5, 2012.
   ORDER OF DISBARMENT

DAVID ANTHONY CHANDLER, Justice.

¶ 1. This matter comes before the Court en banc on the “Motion to Accept Irrevocable Resignation and for Reimbursement of Costs and Expenses” filed by the Mississippi Bar. In the motion, the Bar requests that this Court accept the irrevocable resignation of Wendel Shan Thompson. Because all procedural prerequisites have been met, we order the disbarment of Wendel Shan Thompson.

¶ 2. On August 16, 2011, the Mississippi Bar filed a formal complaint against Wen-del Shan Thompson pursuant to Rule 6 of the Mississippi Rules of Discipline. Rule 6 provides, in pertinent part:

(a) Whenever any attorney subject to the disciplinary jurisdiction of the Court shall be convicted in any court of any state or in any federal court, or enter a plea of guilty or a plea of nolo contende-re therein, or tender a guilty plea pursuant to the provisions of Miss.Code Ann. § 99-15-26 (Supp.1993), or any similar provision in state or federal law therein of any felony (other than manslaughter) or of any misdemeanor involving fraud, dishonesty, misrepresentation, deceit, or willful failure to account for money or property of a client, a certified copy of the judgment of conviction or order accepting or acknowledging the offer or tender of a guilty plea pursuant to the provisions of Miss.Code Ann. § 99-15-26 (Supp.1993), or any similar provision in state or federal law shall be presented to the Court by Complaint Counsel and shall be conclusive evidence thereof. The Court shall then forthwith strike the name of the attorney and order his immediate suspension from the practice of law.
(d) When time for appeal from judgment or conviction provided above expires or all appeals have been concluded without reversal, Complaint Counsel shall certify that result to the Court, and the Court shall forthwith enter an order of disbarment.

M.R.D. 6. In the formal complaint, the Mississippi Bar stated that Wendel Shan Thompson had pleaded guilty to the felony crime of gratification of lust. The Mississippi Bar attached a certified copy of the order of conviction and sentence of Wendel Shan Thompson in the Circuit Court of Hinds County, First Judicial District, for the crime of gratification of lust on July 25, 2011. The Mississippi Bar requested the suspension of Wendel Shan Thompson from the practice of law and his disbarment after the time for taking an appeal had expired.

¶ 8. On September 19, 2011, the Mississippi Bar filed the instant Motion to Accept Irrevocable Resignation and for Reimbursement of Costs and Expenses. The Mississippi Bar attached a copy of the irrevocable resignation of Wendel Shan Thompson, dated September 17, 2011. In the irrevocable resignation, Wendel Shan Thompson acknowledged the instant matter as the sole pending disciplinary matter against him, provided the docket number of the matter, stated that he has no desire to defend the matter, and requested permission to irrevocably resign with prejudice from the Mississippi Bar.

¶ 4. “[T]his Court has exclusive and inherent jurisdiction regarding the discipline of attorneys as promulgated in the Rules of Discipline for the Mississippi State Bar.” In re Keenum, 63 So.3d 552, 552 (Miss.2011) (quoting In re Peters, 22 So.3d 266, 267 (Miss.2009)); M.R.D. 1(a). We apply de novo review to all attorney disciplinary matters. Keenum, 63 So.3d at 552 (quoting Peters, 22 So.3d at 267). Mississippi Rule of Discipline 10.5 provides:

Irrevocable Resignation — Contents and Effect. An attorney may tender an irrevocable resignation to either the Court or the Tribunal. Such a resignation shall acknowledge each and all disciplinary matters then pending, provide the docket number or numbers, state that the attorney does not desire to defend, and request permission to resign with prejudice from the Bar. Upon receipt of such a resignation, and any response that the Bar may elect to file, the disciplinary proceedings shall terminate and either the Court or the Tribunal shall enter its order accepting the resignation, revoking the attorney’s license, and barring forever thereafter the attorney’s right to seek reinstatement to the privilege of practicing law in this state. Such a resignation and order shall be considered disciplinary action, and the resignation shall be considered tantamount to the proof of guilt on the matter charged.

M.R.D. 10.5.

¶ 5. After due consideration, we find that Wendel Shan Thompson properly filed his Notice of Irrevocable Resignation in compliance with Mississippi Rule of Discipline 10.5, and that the Mississippi Bar is entitled to the relief it seeks. Based on the record before us, and consistent with the Rules of Discipline for the Mississippi Bar and our caselaw, this Court finds that Wendel Shan Thompson shall be disbarred permanently.

¶ 6. IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED as follows:

1. Wendel Shan Thompson is hereby permanently DISBARRED from the practice of law in the State of Mississippi.
2. This order shall constitute notice of permanent disbarment in this cause;
3. The Clerk of this Court shall forward an attested copy of this order to Wendel Shan Thompson and the Executive Director of the Mississippi Bar;
4. Wendel Shan Thompson shall, within ninety days following entry of this order, notify clients and affected courts of his disbarment, properly disburse all funds he may hold in trust, and comply with all other requirements applicable to disbarred attorneys pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Discipline 11;
5. Wendel Shan Thompson shall, within forty-five days following entry of this order, file an affidavit with this Court stating that all of his clients have been notified of his disbarment and his consequent inability to practice law in Mississippi, and that he has complied fully with all the requirements set forth in Mississippi Rule of Discipline 11, as well as the requirements of this order;
6. The Clerk of this Court shall immediately forward an attested copy of this order to the circuit court judges and chancellors in and for Hinds County, Mississippi, and the senior judge of each court shall enter this order upon the minutes of his or her respective court;
7. The Clerk of this Court likewise shall immediately forward an attested copy of this order to the Clerks for the United States District Courts for the Northern and Southern Districts of Mississippi, the Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, and the Clerk of the Supreme Court of the United States.
8. All outstanding disciplinary proceedings against Wendel Shan Thompson, including Cause No.2011-BD-01185, are hereby terminated; and
9. Costs of this proceeding are hereby assessed against Wendel Shan Thompson.

¶ 7. SO ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED this the 3rd day of January, 2012.


author: JAMES W. KITCHENS, Justice.

text:
    T. JACKSON LYONS & ASSOCIATES, P.A. v. PRECIOUS T. MARTIN, SR. & ASSOCIATES, PLLC.
    No. 2011-CA-00167-SCT.
    Supreme Court of Mississippi.
    Jan. 24, 2012.
   ORDER

JAMES W. KITCHENS, Justice.

¶ 1. This matter came before the Court on T. Jackson Lyons & Associates, P.A.’s (Lyons) “Motion to Compel Circuit Clerk to Transmit Complete Record and to Stay Briefing Schedule,” which was filed on April 26, 2011. Precious T. Martin, Sr. & Associates, PLLC (Martin), has not filed a response to the motion. Barbara Dunn, Circuit Clerk of Hinds County, Mississippi, has filed a response to the motion to compel.

¶ 2. Pursuant to orders of this Court and Rule 10 of the Mississippi Rules of Appellate Procedure, the Circuit Court of the First Judicial District of Hinds County, Mississippi, conducted a hearing with regard to whether the appellate record is complete. The circuit court also was ordered to determine whether the circuit clerk originally prepared the appellate record in accordance with the Mississippi Rules of Appellate Procedure, and if not, then the circuit court was to determine whether Lyons is entitled to attorney fees. The circuit court conducted a hearing on August 31, 2011, and found that the record, as supplemented, was complete for purposes of this appeal. The circuit court also found that the record, as originally prepared by the circuit clerk, was not prepared in accordance with the Mississippi Rules of Appellate Procedure. The circuit court found that the circuit clerk should bear the costs associated with supplementing the appellate record, but opined that the clerk’s failure to comply with the Mississippi Rules of Appellate Procedure was not the product of ill will or malice. The circuit court noted that employees in the circuit clerk’s office have not been adequately trained regarding the preparation of records for appeals, and went on to observe that “the cumulative result of the lack of training and lack of continuing education regarding rule compliance leads inevitably to the mishaps presently before the court.” The circuit court further found that Lyons had failed to prove that the circuit clerk’s errors had prejudiced that firm or caused it any damages.

¶ 3. By order entered on September 12, 2011, the parties and Dunn were given an opportunity to respond to the circuit court’s findings. Lyons filed “Appellant’s Response to Circuit Court’s Findings on Remand and Motion for Further Remedial Relief.” Lyons again requested that the circuit clerk be sanctioned for failure to fulfill her responsibilities. Neither Martin nor Circuit Clerk Dunn filed responses to the circuit court’s order or to Lyons’s latest motion.

¶ 4. Rule 10 of the Mississippi Rules of Appellate Procedure governs the content of the record on appeal and provides that “the record shall consist of designated papers and exhibits.” M.R.A.P. 10(a) (emphasis added). Rule 11 of the Mississippi Rules of Appellate Procedure establishes certain deadlines within which the clerk is to compile and transmit the appellate record and also requiring the clerk to retain a duplicate record in the trial court. M.R.A.P. 11(d) and (e). A trial court’s ruling sanctioning its clerk for failure to comply with Rules 10 and 11 of the Mississippi Rules of Appellate Procedure may be reviewed by this Court for an abuse of discretion. M.R.A.P. 2(b).

¶ 5. This Court’s case file, Lyons’s sworn motion to compel, the transcript of the circuit court hearing, and the circuit court’s findings of fact reveal that on January 4, 2011, Lyons filed a designation of the record with the circuit clerk. Various documents, including the briefs filed in the appeal from the county court to the circuit court, were specifically listed in the designation of the record. The circuit clerk failed timely to assemble the appellate record pursuant to Rule 11(d)(1) of the Mississippi Rules of Appellate Procedure, and the circuit clerk failed to seek an extension of that deadline. The circuit clerk did not notify the parties that the record was complete until March 2, 2011. On March 7, 2011, Lyons examined the documents that the circuit clerk offered as the appellate record. However, the circuit clerk incorrectly had provided the entire case file to Lyons, instead of the actual record that had been prepared for transmittal to the Supreme Court. M.R.A.P. 11(d) and 10(b). On March 9, 2011, the Lyons firm filed a Rule 10(b)(5) certificate certifying that it had examined the appellate record and that .the appellate record was complete. Once Lyons had filed its Rule 10(b)(5) certificate, the circuit clerk improperly excluded a number of documents from the appellate record, even though those documents had been properly designated. The circuit clerk failed timely to transmit the complete record to the Supreme Court pursuant to Rule 11(d)(2) of the Mississippi Rules of Appellate Procedure, and the circuit clerk did not seek an extension of the applicable deadline. The circuit clerk transmitted what she purported to be the appellate record, and it was marked filed by the Clerk of the Supreme Court on April 6, 2011.

¶ 6. On April 18, 2011, counsel for Lyons checked out the appellate record from the Clerk of the Supreme Court for use in preparing Appellant’s principal brief. Counsel discovered that the record docketed with this Court was not the same record he had inspected at the circuit clerk’s office. Several properly designated documents had not been included in the appellate record. Counsel for Lyons immediately communicated with the circuit clerk’s office, by telephone and by letter, informing that office that the complete appellate record, as designated and certified, had not been transmitted and requesting that the missing documents be transmitted to the Supreme Court immediately. Counsel also met with employees of the circuit clerk’s office in an effort to convince them to transmit the documents which had been improperly excluded from the appellate record. The circuit clerk’s office refused to transmit the documents, but offered instead to supplement the record using a procedure not consistent with the Mississippi Rules of Appellate Procedure. Counsel for Lyons was told that Lyons would have to pay the additional costs associated with this “supplementation.” Counsel for Lyons responded that if the complete record was not transmitted as soon as possible, he would be forced to file a motion with this Court to compel the transmission and that he would seek his reasonable attorney fees as a sanction. The employees of the circuit clerk’s office persisted in their refusal to transmit the documents. Counsel for Lyons waited several days to give the circuit clerk an opportunity to transmit the documents which had been improperly excluded. On April 26, 2011, finding that the documents had not been transmitted, Lyons filed its motion to compel the circuit clerk to transmit the complete, designated appellate record. In that motion Lyons also requested that the circuit clerk be ordered to pay Lyons an amount sufficient to compensate it for reasonable attorney fees incurred and made necessary by the circuit clerk’s failure to assemble and transmit the complete appellate record. Lyons noted that the circuit clerk’s refusal to correct that office’s errors caused unnecessary expense and delay.

¶ 7. At the hearing conducted in the circuit court, Loretta Wells, an employee in the circuit clerk’s office, testified that she is the only employee in that office who prepares records for appeals. She has not received any training regarding the proper assembly and transmittal of appellate records. The circuit clerk has no procedures in place to document, track, and meet deadlines. Wells acknowledged that she did not understand the difference between a brief filed in support of a motion and a brief filed in an appeal.

¶ 8. Wells also testified regarding the preparation of the record for this particular appeal and admitted that the deadlines were not met. It does not appear that she read the designation of the record or the Rule 10(b)(5) certificate when they were filed. She testified that counsel for Lyons met with employees of the clerk’s office on April 19, 2011, and that, when counsel left the circuit clerk’s office on the evening of April 19, she immediately prepared the “supplemental” record. She testified that the supplemental record was delivered to the Clerk of the Supreme Court on the morning of April 20, 2011, which was several days before Lyons filed the motion to compel.

¶ 9. Wells’s testimony regarding the date the supplemental record was transmitted to the Clerk of the Supreme Court is not supported by the records of this Court. This Court’s file reveals that Wells did not transmit the supplemental record until after the motion to compel was filed. This Court’s file contains a letter signed by Wells, dated April 26, 2011, in which she acknowledged that certain documents were omitted from the appellate record and to which are attached the documents as a “certified supplemental record.” No notification by the circuit clerk that a supplemental record was filed was provided to the parties. The letter and supplemental record were received and filed by the Clerk of the Supreme Court on April 28, 2011, eight days after Wells testified the record was delivered.

¶ 10. Had the omitted documents been transmitted by the circuit clerk on April 20, 2011, then Lyons’s motion to compel, and its request for sanctions, would have been unnecessary. Since the parties were not provided a copy of that letter, the parties and the circuit court had no way of knowing that Wells’s testimony was inaccurate. Given the apparent contradiction between Wells’s testimony and the record, the circuit court shall conduct an additional hearing to determine whether Wells falsely testified and, if so, take appropriate action.

¶ 11. The Court also finds that the circuit court abused its discretion in finding that Lyons was not damaged or prejudiced. Based on the pleadings, the testimony before the circuit court, and the circuit court’s findings, frequent systemic errors are occurring in the circuit clerk’s office. These errors are directly caused by the circuit clerk’s failure properly to train the employees in her office. The circuit clerk, not litigants, must bear the costs of these errors. Lyons has incurred unnecessary expense for its time and effort expended in attempting to persuade the clerk to transmit the designated appellate record. Had the clerk properly prepared the appellate record, as designated, Lyons would not have incurred any of these costs. Additionally, the circuit clerk’s errors delayed the filing of the complete appellate record in this matter and therefore, delayed this appeal. Clearly, Lyons was financially damaged.

¶ 12. The Court finds that Barbara Dunn, Circuit Clerk of Hinds County, Mississippi, shall be ordered to pay T. Jackson Lyons & Associates, P.A., an amount sufficient to compensate it for the reasonable attorney fees and related costs incurred as a result of the circuit clerk’s failure properly to transmit the appellate record. That amount shall include, but not necessarily be limited to, the preparation and filing of the “Motion to Compel Circuit Clerk to Transmit Complete Record and to Stay Briefing Schedule,” the “Appellant’s Motion to Lift Stay and to Re-Start the Briefing Schedule,” the time counsel and/or nonlawyer staff spent preparing for and appearing at the hearing of August 31, 2011, and the preparation and filing of the “Appellant’s Response to Circuit Court’s Findings on Remand and Motion for Further Remedial Relief.” Counsel for Lyons’s itemization of services was admitted into evidence during the circuit court hearing; however, none of the exhibits from that hearing was submitted to this Court. Therefore, this Court cannot calculate the amount of sanctions due. The Court remands this matter to the Honorable Tomie T. Green, Circuit Judge, for calculation, imposition, and collection of appropriate sanctions from the circuit clerk.

¶ IB. We further find that this case is yet another example of the recurring failures by Circuit Clerk Barbara Dunn to comply with the rules of the courts of Mississippi. The taxpayers of Hinds County, Mississippi, should not bear the costs of Dunn’s repeated errors. Therefore, the sanction shall be paid by Barbara Dunn personally and shall not be paid, in whole or in part, with public funds. See In Re Dunn, 84 So.3d 4 (Miss.2010); In Re Dunn, 84 So.3d 7 (Miss.2011). The account from which the sanction is paid shall contain only Barbara Dunn’s personal funds and shall not contain any public funds.

¶ 14. In its motions, Lyons also requests that the circuit clerk be ordered to pay sanctions to this Court and be required to produce a written plan of correction for the systemic faults revealed in the course of this appeal. We do not find that the circuit clerk should be ordered to pay sanctions to this Court, but we agree that the circuit clerk must immediately implement procedures to correct the numerous errors that are occurring in her office. Therefore, Barbara Dunn is hereby ordered immediately to provide appropriate and adequate training and education for all of the employees in the office of the Circuit Clerk of Hinds County, Mississippi. Section 9-1-29 of the Mississippi Code states that “[ejach court shall have control over all proceedings in the clerk’s office, and such control shall be exercised in a manner consistent with the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure.” Therefore, the Circuit Court for the First Judicial District of Hinds County, Mississippi, and the Circuit Court for the Second Judicial District of Hinds County, Mississippi, shall oversee the implementation of a training program in the circuit clerk’s office.

¶ 15. Accordingly, Lyons’s request for sanctions and remedial relief is granted on the basis set forth herein. Since the appellate record is now complete for purposes of the appeal, the motion to compel the circuit clerk to transmit the complete record is hereby dismissed as moot.

¶ 16. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that

1. The “Motion to Compel Circuit Clerk to Transmit Complete Record and to Stay Briefing Schedule” and the “Appellant’s Response to Circuit Court’s Findings on Remand and Motion for Further Remedial Relief’ filed by T. Jackson Lyons & Associates, P.A., are granted in part and dismissed as moot in part as discussed herein.
2. On or before March 20, 2012, Honorable Tomie T. Green, Circuit Judge for the First Judicial District of Hinds County, Mississippi, shall calculate and impose the sanctions against the circuit clerk for her failure to comply with Rules 10 and 11 of the Mississippi Rules of Appellate Procedure. This amount shall be paid by Dunn personally and shall not be paid from an account containing public funds.
3. Barbara Dunn immediately shall provide adequate training and education for all of the employees in the office of the Circuit Clerk of Hinds County, Mississippi, as provided herein.
4. The circuit court shall conduct an additional hearing to determine whether Wells falsely testified and, if so, take appropriate action.
5. The Clerk of this Court shall send copies of this order to Barbara Dunn, Circuit Clerk of Hinds County, as well as her employee, Loretta Wells.
6. The Clerk of this Court shall spread this order upon the minutes of the Court and shall forward a true certified copy hereof to West Publishing Company for publication as soon as practical in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter, Third Series (Mississippi Edition).

¶ 17. SO ORDERED.

WALLER, C.J., NOT PARTICIPATING.

      . By order entered on May 11, 2011, this Court stayed the briefing schedule. A supplemented record was filed and, by order entered on August 4, 2011, the stay was lifted and the briefing schedule reissued.

      . The circuit clerk's employee’s testimony is not completely clear, but suggests that duplicate copies of all documents contained in appellate records are not retained in the circuit clerk's office. Such practice violates Rule 11(e) of the Mississippi Rules of Appellate Procedure.

      . A copy of Wells's letter is attached to this order as Exhibit A.


author: RANDOLPH, Justice,

text:
    THE MISSISSIPPI BAR v. Robert E. CLARK.
    No. 2010-BD-00111-SCT.
    Supreme Court of Mississippi.
    Aug. 5, 2010.
    Adam B. Kilgore, Jackson, attorney for appellant.
    Robert E. Clark, Appellee, pro se.
   RANDOLPH, Justice,

for the Court:

¶ 1. The Mississippi Bar filed a formal complaint recommending disciplinary action against an attorney, Robert E. Clark, following the imposition by the Supreme Court of Louisiana of a two-year suspension from the practice of law in that state. See In re Clark, 25 So.3d 728, 735 (La.2009). Clark lives in Vidalia, Louisiana, a city across the river from Natchez, Mississippi. The formal complaint states that Clark was a member of the Mississippi Bar during the time of the conduct that led to the suspension. The complaint does not reference reciprocal discipline, nor recommend any particular punishment, but prays that Clark should pay the costs and expenses of this action. We order reciprocal discipline, consisting of a two-year suspension from the practice of law in Mississippi and an assessment against Clark for all costs and expenses.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 2. Clark, who was admitted to practice in Mississippi in 1974 and in Louisiana in 1983, admitted that he began using marijuana in 1994, but that it was “personal and limited to weekend use for medicinal purposes only” to relieve his glaucoma symptoms.

¶ 3. In January 2007, Dennis Roberts, a long-time friend and client of Clark, was arrested in Natchez for possession of cocaine. Clark, 25 So.3d at 729. Roberts agreed to attempt to obtain marijuana from his source, Clark. Roberts telephoned Clark, telling him that he needed some marijuana to “get a girl high and have sex.” Id. at 729, 731 n. 6. Clark admitted later that he had smoked marijuana on the night Roberts called. Id. at 732. Police officers followed Roberts to Clark’s house, where Clark gave Roberts a “small bag of marijuana. No money exchanged hands.” Id. at 729. Clark admitted later that he had known “it was wrong,” but that he did it because “Roberts was his best friend,” and that he did not need to be persuaded “to help his friend obtain possibly non-consensual sexual favors.” Id. at 731 n. 6.

¶ 4. Clark’s home was searched, and the following was found: more than seven “ounces of marijuana packaged in various amounts and stored in Ziploc bags[; a] variety of drug paraphernalia, some with residual amounts of cocaine and marijuana[;] a bottle containing ... Xanax[;] and a small amount of ... cocaine.” Id. at 730. Clark was arrested and tested positive for marijuana. Id. He was charged with possession of marijuana, cocaine, and drug paraphernalia; intent to distribute marijuana; and distribution of marijuana. Id. The prosecutor declined to prosecute after a judge excluded the evidence from the search. Id.

¶ 5. In March 2007, Clark reported his arrest to the Louisiana Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”). The ODC recommended an interim suspension, which was ordered in June 2007, and remained in force until January 2008. Id. Clark entered into a five-year contract with Louisiana’s Lawyer Assistance Program (“LAP”). Clark was charged with violating Rules 8.4(a) and 8.4(b) of the Rules of Professional Conduct (violating the rules by committing “a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects”). La. Rules of Prof 1 Conduct R. 8.4.

¶6. At a hearing, Clark argued that he had been entrapped and that the evidence from the search should not be admitted. The hearing committee ruled against both arguments, as suppression of evidence and entrapment have a limited place in disciplinary matters, and, because of his own admissions, Clark had not been prejudiced by the admission of the evidence. Clark, 25 So.3d at 731.

¶ 7. After review and recommendation by the committee, the disciplinary board “determined that [Clark had] intentionally violated duties owed to the public and the legal profession [and had] caused actual harm to the profession.” Id. at 733. The board found the following aggravating factors:

a pattern of misconduct (use of marijuana from 1994 to 2007), multiple offenses, substantial experience in the practice of law ... illegal conduct [, Clark’s] rationale for providing marijuana [and] the following mitigating factors: absence of a prior disciplinary record, full and free disclosure to the disciplinary board, and character and reputation.

Id. at 733. The board recommended that Clark be suspended for two years with credit for the time served on interim suspension and that Clark continue to comply with the LAP contract until its previously scheduled end in August 2012. . Id.

¶ 8. The Louisiana Supreme Court found the board’s recommendation to be appropriate. Id. at 734-35. One justice dissented to the severity of the discipline, citing Clark’s illness, exemplary LAP compliance, and the lack of any prior violations. Id. at 735-36 (Weimer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

¶ 9. In his answer to this Court, Clark admits all the allegations, except his unfitness to practice law, citing his LAP contract record. He asks this Court to dismiss the complaint, or to follow the dissenting opinion and order a lesser sanction. See id.

¶ 10. The Rules of Discipline for the Mississippi State Bar state:

When an attorney should be subjected to disciplinary sanctions in another jurisdiction, such sanction shall be grounds for disciplinary action in this state, and certification of such sanction by the appropriate authority of such jurisdiction to the Executive Director of the Bar or to the Court, shall be conclusive evidence of the guilt of the offense or unprofessional conduct on which said sanction was ordered, and it will not be necessary to prove the grounds for such offense in the disciplinary proceeding in this state. The sole issue to be determined in the disciplinary proceeding in this state shall be the extent of the final discipline to be imposed on the attorney, which may be less or more severe than the discipline imposed by the other jurisdiction.

Miss. State Bar Discipline R. 13.

¶ 11. The decree of the Supreme Court of Louisiana provides “conclusive evidence of the guilt of the offense.... ” Id. This Court need do no further fact-finding, as the sole issue is the extent of the discipline to be imposed. See Miss. Bar v. Ishee, 987 So.2d 909, 911 (Miss.2007). This Court applies nine criteria in assessing attorney sanctions. See Rogers v. Miss. Bar, 731 So.2d 1158, 1171 (Miss.1999). The Louisiana Supreme Court considered these criteria in its determination of the appropriate sanction. See Clark, 25 So.3d at 732-34. This Court defers to Louisiana’s findings, as it “takes the cold record of the foreign jurisdiction as conclusive .... ” Miss. Bar v. Drungole, 913 So.2d 963, 970 (Miss.2005). “[T]he sanction imposed in this State generally mirrors the sanction imposed in the sister state, absent extraordinary circumstances which compel, justify or support variance....” Ishee, 987 So.2d at 911.

¶ 12. There being no extraordinary circumstances, we impose reciprocal discipline, effective from the date of entry of this decision. Clark shall be suspended for two years from the practice of law in the State of Mississippi. At the end of the suspension, Clark may petition this Court to reinstate him. Miss. State Bar Discipline R. 12(a). All costs and expenses of this proceeding are taxed against Clark.

¶ 13. ROBERT E. CLARK IS HEREBY SUSPENDED FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW IN THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI FOR TWO (2) YEARS AND ASSESSED WITH COSTS AND EXPENSES.

WALLER, C.J., CARLSON AND GRAVES, P.JJ., DICKINSON, LAMAR, KITCHENS, CHANDLER AND PIERCE, JJ., CONCUR.

      . Id. at 731-732; State of Miss. Judiciary, Admin. Office of Courts, Bar Roll, httpj/www. mssc.state.ms.usfbanollfbanoll.html (last viewed July 28, 2010).


author: KITCHENS, Justice,

text:
    In re: Barbara DUNN, Hinds County Circuit Clerk.
    No. 2010-CS-00323-SCT.
    Supreme Court of Mississippi.
    Sept. 30, 2010.
    C.R. McRae, attorney for Dunn.
    Before CARLSON, P.J., DICKINSON and KITCHENS, JJ.
   KITCHENS, Justice,

for the Court:

¶ 1. Because it has appeared to this Court that the Office of the Circuit Clerk of Hinds County has not been in full compliance with Rule 77(d) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure in certain cases, a panel of this Court convened a hearing at which Hinds County Circuit Clerk Barbara Dunn was in attendance, with counsel. At the conclusion of that hearing, we took the matter under advisement for further consideration, and now issue our decision.

Facts

¶ 2. In February 2010, we granted petitions for interlocutory appeal in docket numbers 2009-IA-01939-SCT (Trustmark National Bank v. Meador) and 2009-IA-01940-SCT (Mississippi Baptist Health Systems, Inc. v. Meador). In our review of those petitions, we discovered that the Office of the Circuit Clerk of Hinds County had not fully complied with Rule 77(d) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides:

(d) Notice of Orders or Judgments. Immediately upon the entry of an order or judgment the clerk shall serve a notice of the entry in the manner provided for in Rule 5 upon each party who is not in default for failure to appear, and shall make a note in the docket of the service. Any party may in addition serve a notice of such entry in the manner provided in Rule 5 for the service of papers. Lack of notice of the entry by the clerk does not affect the time to appeal, nor relieve, nor authorize the court to relieve, a party for failure to appeal within the time allowed, except as permitted by the Mississippi Rules of Appellate Procedure.

¶ 3. The omissions by the clerk’s office were quite serious and potentially costly because they jeopardized the ability of several litigants to pursue interlocutory appeals.

¶ 4. In 2004, Carroll Brent Meador, M.D., had filed suit in the Circuit Court of the First Judicial District of Hinds County against several parties, including Trustmark National Bank and Mississippi Baptist Health Systems, Inc. In the civil action, Dr. Meador was represented by Attorney Michael S. Allred. Before answers were filed by the.respective defendants, the case was removed to federal court, but eventually was remanded to the Hinds County Circuit Court. While in federal court, the defendants filed answers to the complaint. Though the defendants’ attorneys were identified in the answers and other pleadings, which eventually made their way to the Hinds County Circuit Court, none of the defense attorneys formally entered their appearances in the state court.

¶ 5. In early 2008, following remand, various defendants filed motions for summary judgment and for dismissal, prompting Meador to file responsive pleadings. Some of the defendants filed additional pleadings related to the summary judgment motions. The presiding circuit court judge heard the motions in February 2009, then signed an order on July 2, 2009, in which he denied Trustmark’s motion for summary judgment and its motion to dismiss. On the same day, the circuit judge signed an order denying Baptist’s motion for summary judgment and its motion to dismiss.

¶ 6. Those orders were stamped “filed” on July 3, 2009, and they were recorded on the circuit court’s general docket the same day. The general docket contains an entry that on that date, July 3, 2009, copies of the orders were mailed by the circuit clerk to “Atty Michael S. Allred,” the attorney of record for the plaintiff, Meador. Conspicuous by its absence from the circuit court’s general docket is any indication that the circuit clerk’s office sent notice of the orders to any other party or lawyer.

Discussion

¶ 7. Rule 77(d) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure plainly requires that the circuit clerk serve notice of the entry of the orders upon all parties not in default. Circuit Clerk Dunn candidly has acknowledged to this Court that no such notice was issued in this case, other than to the plaintiffs lawyer. Although the responsibility for preparing and issuing the notices had been delegated to a subordinate, and it was she, and not Mrs. Dunn personally, who had overlooked sending the required notices to all of the active parties in the case, Mrs. Dunn clearly recognizes that responsibility for such failure ultimately lies with her and her alone.

¶ 8. The seriousness of this omission is such that this Court should not, and it will not, regard it as an innocuous clerical error. The notices required by Rule 77(d) are mandatory, and they are indispensable to the right of parties to receive timely information from our state trial courts concerning significant judicial actions in civil matters in litigation. The deadlines applicable to litigants’ right to appeal from judgments rendered by the courts are triggered by the dates on which those judgments and orders are entered. Meticulous adherence to Rule 77(d) by court clerks is essential to the protection and timely exercise of those rights. A court clerk’s failure to practice unerring care and absolute efficiency in timely issuing and docketing such notices can be disastrous to a party who, for want of notice of an adverse judgment, does not know that he or she needs to act with dispatch to appeal in an effort to protect some important right or interest.

¶ 9. We are fully aware that the Hinds County circuit clerk’s office serves a busy, multi-judge, civil and criminal court system in the state’s most populous county, and that the clerk has other demanding duties, including the registration of voters, the administration of elections, and the issuance of marriage licenses. However, this does not alter the fundamental principle that, no matter how heavy the workload, and regardless of how many thousands of cases must be processed by the circuit clerk and her staff, each litigant’s case is supremely important and must be handled with extraordinary attention to all applicable rules, statutes, and procedures. Court clerks are officers of the courts they serve, and as such, they and their staffs, not unlike judges and lawyers, must be ever mindful of the exceptionally high level of fidelity and care that is required of them.

Remedial Measures

¶ 10. To her credit, Circuit Clerk Dunn has freely acknowledged the failure of her office to comply fully in the referenced civil cases with the notice and docketing requirements of Rule 77(d), and she has unequivocally accepted personal responsibility for such failure. In addition, she has affirmatively expressed to this Court her intention to take whatever steps are necessary to ensure that parties and attorneys who hereafter are entitled to receive various kinds of notice from her office will be provided such in a timely and proper manner.

¶ 11. Yet, similar assurances have previously been given this Court by this official. In 2008, this Court sanctioned the Hinds County circuit clerk for failure to comply with Rules 77 and 79 of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure. The original amount of that sanction was $1,000; but, based on Mrs. Dunn’s written representation to the Supreme Court that she had promulgated and implemented new procedures to ensure compliance with the rules, the sanction was reduced to $100. However, the very next year, 2009, similar oversights, which this Court regards as egregious and potentially very dangerous, occurred in the same office.

¶ 12. Though we do not find Mrs. Dunn’s omissions to have been intentional, we do find that they constitute neglect of duty, the seriousness of which is compounded by the fact that strikingly similar mistakes in the same office recently have been addressed by this Court. Garland Sealing Tech., LLC v. Pittman, Case No. 2008-M-00177-SCT (May 1, 2008, order). The clerk, who again has been negligent in the supervision and oversight of her staff, is correct in her acceptance of personal responsibility for the failure of her office to notify all of the parties to the subject litigation — not just the plaintiffs lawyer— of the presiding judge’s denial of the motions for summary judgment and the motions to dismiss. Accordingly, it is she— the clerk — who must be sanctioned for such failure.

¶ 13. It is, therefore, ordered that on or before October 28, 2010, Hinds County Circuit Clerk Barbara Dunn shall pay unto the Clerk of this Court the sum of $5,000, from her personal funds, as sanctions for her failure to comply with Rule 77(d) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure, and she is hereby taxed with all costs of this proceeding. However, if on or before October 14, 2010, Barbara Dunn files with this Court a detailed statement explaining the practices and procedures she has implemented in her offices to ensure full compliance with said Rule 77(d), and all other rules and statutes requiring her to provide notice to litigants and/or their attorneys, the Court will consider reducing the sanction, if it finds the clerk’s remedial measures to be sufficient.

¶ 14. HINDS COUNTY CIRCUIT CLERK BARBARA DUNN IS SANCTIONED.

CARLSON AND GRAVES, P.JJ., DICKINSON, RANDOLPH, LAMAR, CHANDLER AND PIERCE, JJ., CONCUR. WALLER, C.J., NOT PARTICIPATING.

      . Mississippi practice did not then, and it does not now, require the filing of formal entries of appearance in such circumstances.

      . These pleadings, and others filed in Hinds County Circuit Court after remand, did identify the defense attorneys who had filed them. However, the circuit clerk did not record these attorneys’ names in the general docket. The clerk entered in the docket only the name of the plaintiff’s lawyer, which had appeared on the original complaints.

      . The present clerk held the same office at that time.

      . Said amount shall not be paid, in whole or in part, from public funds.

      . The Hinds County circuit clerk maintains offices in both the First and Second Judicial Districts of Hinds County, in Jackson and Raymond, respectively.