author: RANDOLPH, Justice, KING, JUSTICE,

text:
    SECRETARY OF STATE of the State of Mississippi and City of Ocean Springs, Mississippi v. Clyde H. GUNN, III, D. Neil Harris, Sr. and Vecie Michelle Harris.
    No. 2010-CA-00719-SCT.
    Supreme Court of Mississippi.
    Oct. 13, 2011.

      Rickey T. Moore Adam Stone Kaytie Michelle Pickett John B. Edwards, II, Attorneys for Appellants.
    John G. Corlew Virginia T. Munford, Attorneys for Appellees.
   RANDOLPH, Justice,

for the Court:

¶ 1. The Secretary of State of Mississippi (“State”) and the City of Ocean Springs (“Ocean Springs”) bring this appeal. The Hinds County Chancery Court enjoined the construction of a sidewalk along the beach, adjacent to the seawall, on property claimed by Gunn and Harris in Ocean Springs. This Court must determine whether the chancellor erred in granting the permanent injunction. The State and Ocean Springs assert that the chancellor erred in issuing the permanent injunction because: her finding of irreparable injury was not supported by substantial evidence; an adequate remedy at law was available; and she failed to rule on the merits of the underlying dispute regarding ownership of the land where the proposed sidewalk was to be located.

¶ 2. We find no error in the chancellor’s earlier determination that irreparable injury would result if she did not grant an injunction and that no adequate remedy at law was available. We conclude that the chancellor’s Order and Opinion is in fact a preliminary injunction, incorrectly styled as a permanent injunction. It is clear from its language that the chancellor sought to protect the interests of all parties until ownership of the property could be determined. We therefore remand this case to the Hinds County Chancery Court, vacate the permanent injunction, and leave the earlier-issued preliminary injunction in place.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 3. Clyde H. Gunn and D. Neil Harris, Sr., each own property in an area of Ocean Springs known as East Beach. A roadway, a seawall, and the beach run adjacent to the Gulf of Mexico (“Gulf’), separating home sites from the beach and Gulf. The beach runs from the edge of the seawall to the shoreline, or water’s edge. Tidelands — lands that are subject to the ebb and flow of the tides — span the area from the beach south into the Gulf. The State holds such tidelands in public trust. The mean high-water line marks the boundary between public-trust tidelands and private property.

¶ 4. In 2009, Ocean Springs received a federal grant to fund a beach-side public sidewalk project. On November 9, 2009, Ocean Springs applied for a permit from the Mississippi Department of Marine Resources (“Marine Resources”) to build the sidewalk.

¶ 5. On November 16, 2009, the State and Ocean Springs entered into a lease of public-trust tidelands, a narrow strip of beach known as East Beach, which the lease describes as located “seaward of the toe of the seawall.” The lease permits Ocean Springs to use the beach “for a free public walkway, access area, bicycle racks and other amenities which serve a higher public purpose of promoting the public access to and public use of tidelands and submerged lands.”

¶ 6. On January 11, 2010, Gunn and Harris filed a complaint against the State and Ocean Springs, challenging the validity of the lease. Gunn and Harris alleged that the State had acted contrary to its own statutory law, public policy, and the administrative rules and procedures, because the State had failed to obtain Gunn’s and Harris’s permission as property owners, or, at a minimum, as holders of littoral or riparian rights. Gunn and Harris requested that the chancellor enter a judgment declaring the lease void and enjoining the Secretary and Ocean Springs from any further action or proceeding under the lease.

¶ 7. On February 9, 2010, Marine Resources granted the permit for construction of the sidewalk, and construction was scheduled to begin in March 2010.

¶ 8. On March 24, 2010, the chancellor held a hearing on Gunn’s and Harris’s request for a preliminary injunction. The chancellor granted the preliminary injunction. The chancellor found that (1) the substantial likelihood of prevailing on the merits weighed equally in each party’s favor; (2) Gunn and Harris would likely suffer irreparable injury because the project was scheduled to be completed “within a matter of weeks[,]” before litigation of the merits; (3) the Secretary of State or Ocean Springs would likely not suffer irreparable injury; and (4) maintaining the area in its natural state would serve the public interest.

¶ 9. On April 8, 2010, the chancellor signed a “Judgment for Preliminary Injunction and Setting Security” granting the preliminary injunction “pending a hearing of this matter on the merits,” requiring Gunn and Harris “to forthwith post a security bond in the amount of $250,000[,]” and scheduling a hearing on the merits for a permanent injunction and declaratory relief for April 13 and 14, 2010. (Emphasis added.) Gunn and Harris posted the $250,000 bond the next day. The bond states that “should the Court find that its preliminary injunction was wrongfully granted, then this obligation be void; otherwise to remain in full force and effect.” (Emphasis added.) We find no evidence in the record that the Hinds County Chancery Court has held that the preliminary injunction was wrongfully granted, or that Gunn’s and Harris’s injunction bond has been cancelled.

¶ 10. On April 13 and 14, 2010, the chancellor held a hearing. On numerous occasions during the hearing, the chancellor expressed that the issue of property rights was not properly before the court and that a case to determine ownership was pending in Jackson County.

¶ 11. On April 23, 2010, the chancellor issued an Order and Opinion denying Gunn and Harris declaratory relief, but granting a permanent injunction. The chancellor again acknowledged the dispute over ownership of the leased land, but “refrain[ed] from drawing property lines or declaring fee simple ownership and other property ownership rights.... ” The chancellor balanced the required factors for granting an injunction, finding that: (1) “[ujntil a judgment of ownership rights is resolved then ... this Court[ ] ... must balance the Plaintiffs’ rights to free and quiet enjoyment of the real property now in their possession and the City of Ocean Springs[’j contention that the Subject Lease is valid. At present, [the substantial likelihood of prevailing on the merits] factor weighs equally to both parties[;j” (2) Gunn’s and Harris’s property interests “will be irreparably injured if the injunction is not granted” and “if the subject lease were allowed to continue^] ... the proposed pathway would be in place and construction complete before any other litigation could be resolved[;j” (3) she was “not persuaded that the Defendants will suffer harm [if the injunction is issued;]” and (4) “it is in the public’s interest to refrain from altering the natural habitat of the Subject Lease area until such time as the ownership of the Subject Lease area and relevant surrounding areas is established.” The chancellor concluded that, on balance, equity dictated that an injunction should be granted enjoining construction of the pathway “[ujntil there has been a final determination of property ownership.”

ISSUES

¶ 12. This Court will consider:

(1) Whether the trial court erred in granting a permanent injunction, because substantial evidence does not support a finding of irreparable injury;
(2) Whether the trial court committed legal error by granting a permanent injunction, because an adequate remedy at law is available; and
(3) Whether the trial court erroneously awarded a permanent injunction without ruling on the merits of the underlying action.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

¶ 13. This Court “will not disturb the factual findings of a chancellor when supported by substantial evidence unless ... the chancellor abused his discretion, was manifestly wrong, clearly erroneous or applied an erroneous legal standard.” A-1 Pallet Co. v. City of Jackson, 40 So.3d 563, 567 (Miss.2010) (citations omitted).

¶ 14. In determining the propriety of issuing an injunction, a chancellor must balance four factors: “(1) there exists a substantial likelihood that plaintiff will prevail on the merits; (2) the injunction is necessary to prevent irreparable harm; (3) the threatened harm to the applicant outweighs the harm the injunction might do to the respondents; and (4) entry of the injunction is consistent with the public interest.” Am. Legion Post # 134 v. Miss. Gaming Comm’n, 798 So.2d 445, 454 (Miss.2001).

(1) Whether the trial court erred in granting a permanent injunction, because substantial evidence does not support a finding of irreparable injury.

¶ 15. We cannot conclude that the chancellor erred in finding that Gunn and Harris would suffer irreparable injury if she did not issue an injunction. The chancellor found that habitat destruction and damage to real property would cause irreparable harm to Gunn and Harris, if ownership is resolved in their favor. However, the chancellor’s finding is couched in language that shows an intent to grant a temporary, not a permanent, injunction: “if the subject lease were allowed to continue^] then the reality of it is that the proposed pathway would be in place and construction complete before any other litigation could be resolved.” The chancellor expressed concern that the resolution of Gunn’s and Harris’s property rights could be rendered meaningless if she failed to issue an injunction to prevent construction of the pathway until their property rights were determined. Allowing construction of the pathway to proceed before ownership rights are determined could result in irreversible harm to Gunn and Harris, should it be determined that they own the land upon which the pathway is built. We find no evidence that the chancellor “abused [her] discretion, was manifestly wrong, clearly erroneous[,] or applied an erroneous legal standard” in finding that Gunn and Harris would be irreparably injured, particularly in light of the chancellor’s ruling to prevent construction before ownership of the property is determined. Thus, although we find no error in granting an injunction, the State’s contention that it was error to grant a permanent injunction has merit. “Permanent” means “[l]asting or meant to last indefinitely” or “[n]ot expected to change in status, condition, or place[.]” Webster’s II New College Dictionary 819 (2001). In contrast, “temporary” means “[l]asting, used, or enjoyed for a limited time[.]” Id. at 1135-36. Therefore, it was error to grant a permanent injunction.

(2) Whether the trial court committed legal error by granting a permanent injunction, because an adequate remedy at law is available.

¶ 16. Determining whether an adequate remedy at law is available is a part of determining whether “irreparable harm” will occur if an injunction does not issue. If an adequate remedy at law were available, Gunn and Harris would not be harmed irreparably in the absence of an injunction, because the very purpose of a remedy at law is to compensate for the harm the construction would cause. In other words, if an adequate remedy at law existed, the harm would be “reparable” rather than “irreparable.” The chancellor’s finding that Gunn and Harris would be harmed irreparably, therefore, contained a finding that there was no adequate remedy at law. As discussed above, we cannot find that the chancellor “abused [her] discretion, was manifestly wrong, clearly erroneous[,] or applied an erroneous legal standard” in finding that no adequate remedy at law was available, although it was error to grant a permanent injunction for the same reasons applied in ¶ 15 (supra).

(3) Whether the trial court erroneously awarded a permanent injunction without ruling on the merits of the underlying action.

¶ 17. The absence of a decision on the merits precludes a chancellor from granting a permanent injunction, but would not and did not preclude the continuance of the equitable relief granted via a preliminary injunction, until ownership of the property is determined. The chancellor erred in styling the disposition as a permanent injunction, because a court may issue a permanent injunction only after a “full hearing on the merits of the claim[.]” A-1 Pallet Co. v. City of Jackson, 40 So.3d 563, 569 (Miss.2010). However, a “court may issue a preliminary injunction even though plaintiffs right to relief still is uncertain.” Miss. R. Civ. P. 65(a) cmt. “[A] preliminary injunction ... is an injunction issued to protect the plaintiff from irreparable injury and to preserve the court’s power to render a meaningful decision on the merits.” Id. Here, the chancellor enjoined construction of the pathway “[u]ntil there has been a final determination of property oumership.” (Emphasis added.) Therefore, we find that the chancellor’s Order and Opinion in fact granted a preliminary injunction, albeit incorrectly styled as a permanent injunction.

¶ 18. The language of the chancellor’s Order and Opinion validates a decision to grant injunctive relief. The chancellor concluded her Order and Opinion by stating:

Until there has been a final determination of property ownership, this Court finds that the proposed pathway construction shall not be built without first knowing to whom the property belongs and to whom certain rights, privileges, and duties are given in relation to that property.
Therefore, the Plaintiffs should prevail on the permanent injunction until there is absolute certainty of the ownership rights of the parties.

The chancellor’s repeated use of the word “until” evidences a clear intention that an injunction be in place until a decision on the merits is reached — exemplifying the concept of a preliminary injunction. Thus, the injunction granted was conditional, and not a final, permanent resolution of the case. As such, only a preliminary injunction would lie.

¶ 19. The chancellor analyzed the necessary factors for granting an injunction. A court is required only to “balance the ... factors[,]” not to resolve all four factors in one party’s favor or the other, to achieve equity and grant an injunction. See A-1 Pallet Co., 40 So.3d at 569. The chancellor first found that Gunn’s and Harris’s property interests “will be irreparably injured if the injunction is not granted” and “if the subject lease were allowed to continue[,] ... the proposed pathway would be in place and construction complete before any other litigation could be resolved. This factor weighs in the Plaintiffs’ favor.” (Emphasis added.) Next, the chancellor stated that she was “not persuaded that the Defendants will suffer harm [if the injunction is issued]” and concluded that “[t]his factor does not weigh in the Defendants’ favor.” The chancellor then found that “it is in the public’s interest to refrain from altering the natural habitat of the Subject Lease area until such time as the ownership of the Subject Lease area and relevant surrounding areas is established. This factor weighs in the Plaintiffs’ favor.” (Emphasis added.) Finally, the chancellor addressed whether the plaintiff is likely to prevail on the merits and found that “[a]t present, this factor weighs equally to both parties.” The chancellor concluded, on balance after considering the factors, that equity dictated that an injunction should be granted enjoining construction of the pathway “[u]ntil there has been a final determination of property ownership.” (Emphasis added.) Given the uncertainty of the ownership of the property, we cannot conclude that the chancellor abused her discretion in granting an injunction, although she erred in styling it as a permanent injunction. See supra, ¶¶ 15-16.

CONCLUSION

¶ 20. We find that the injunction issued is essentially a reaffirmation of the earlier-granted preliminary injunction, improperly styled as a permanent injunction. We reverse the judgment granting a permanent injunction. We remand this case to the Hinds County Chancery Court with instruction to continue the preliminary injunction originally granted, which has not been appealed or cancelled. The chancellor may, within her discretion, (1) stay the action “until there is absolute certainty of the ownership rights of the parties” or (2) transfer the action to the Jackson County Chancery Court, if she concludes that “in the interest of justice[,]” transfer is in the best interests of all parties and will result in a more efficient resolution. See Miss. R. Civ. P. 82(e) (providing that “in the interest of justice[,]” a court may transfer a case that was filed in an appropriate venue to another court within the state “in which the action might have been properly filed”). In so doing, all rights of all parties will be protected, as justice and equity require.

¶ 21. REVERSED AND REMANDED.

WALLER, C.J., CARLSON AND DICKINSON, P.JJ., LAMAR, KITCHENS AND CHANDLER, JJ„ CONCUR. KING, J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION. PIERCE, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.

KING, JUSTICE,

dissenting:

¶ 22. With appropriate respect for the Majority, I am compelled to dissent from its ultimate resolution of this case. The Majority claims that the chancellor did not issue a permanent injunction, but in language less than artful, merely continued the preliminary injunction by improperly styling it as a permanent injunction. On that basis, the Majority holds that this case should be remanded with instructions to continue the preliminary injunction. It is my belief that the proper reading of the record is that (1) the chancellor held a hearing and granted a preliminary injunction; (2) the chancellor held a subsequent hearing on the merits of Gunn’s and Harris’s request for a permanent injunction; (3) the chancellor inferentially found that Gunn and Harris had failed to present sufficient evidence to establish their entitlement to a permanent injunction; and (4) the chancellor erred in granting a permanent injunction. Under this reading, the only proper action for this Court is to dissolve the permanent injunction.

¶ 23. Gunn and Harris requested that the chancellor preliminarily and permanently enjoin the Secretary of State and Ocean Springs from taking any action under what was claimed by the Secretary of State and the City of Ocean Springs to be a lease of public tidelands. Following a hearing, the chancellor granted the preliminary injunction on April 8, 2010, and scheduled a hearing on the request for a permanent injunction for April 13 and 14, 2010.

¶ 24. As the movants, Gunn and Harris were responsible for placing before the chancellor sufficient evidence of their entitlement to a permanent injunction. This Court has held that facts to warrant an injunction must be established by a preponderance of the evidence. State v. Myers, 244 Miss. 778, 782, 146 So.2d 334, 335 (1962) (citations omitted). Thus, Gunn and Harris were required to prove that the facts more likely than not supported their claim that the lease is invalid. Dill v. Southern Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co., 797 So.2d 858, 867 (¶ 27) (Miss.2001).

¶ 25. Following the presentation of evidence by the parties, the chancellor analyzed the evidence presented to her, and addressed the four-factor test which is applied to determine whether to grant a permanent injunction. Those four factors which are to be used in determining whether to issue a permanent injunction are: (1) a substantial likelihood that the plaintiff will prevail on the merits; (2) irreparable injury to the plaintiff; (3) the harm an injunction would cause the defendant; and (4) public interest. Punzo v. Jackson County, 861 So.2d 340, 350 (¶ 41) (Miss.2003) (citing Electronic Data Sys. Corp. v. Miss. Div. of Medicaid, 853 So.2d 1192, 1207-08 (¶ 49) (Miss.2003)).

¶ 26. The primary issue to be resolved in a consideration of the merits of the claims of Gunn and Harris is the ownership of the disputed property. In addressing that issue, the chancellor stated: “Evidence in this matter asserts that the Proposed Project may or may not be located within tideland. Further evidence contends that the Plaintiffs may or may not have littoral rights within the Proposed Project area.... At present, this factor weighs in equally to both parties.” Clearly, the chancellor considered this issue and determined that she lacked sufficient evidence to resolve it in favor of Gunn and Harris. The chancellor specifically held that the evidence of ownership did not preponderate in favor or either party. Because Gunn and Harris failed to meet their requisite burden of proof, they failed to establish any entitlement to relief. Thus, the chancellor erred in granting a permanent injunction.

¶ 27. The Majority holds that the injunction is mistakenly styled as permanent and is essentially a reaffirmation of the earlier-granted preliminary injunction. The Majority holds that this appeal should be remanded with an instruction to continue the preliminary injunction. I disagree. A preliminary injunction remains in place only until the completion of a trial on the merits. See Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 65; 11 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, Civil § 2947 (1973). The chancellor conducted a hearing on the merits and found that Gunn and Harris had failed to present sufficient evidence to establish their entitlement to a permanent injunction. I do not doubt that this Court may, by a mere majority vote, make any disposition of this case that it chooses. However, I am aware of no legal basis that allows this Court to ignore that the chancellor held a hearing on the merits and determined that Gunn and Harris had failed to establish that they were entitled to permanent injunctive relief. I would therefore hold that the chancellor erred in granting a permanent injunction, and the permanent injunction should be dissolved.

      . An ownership dispute is the subject of separate litigation in Jackson County.

      . The preliminary injunction was not appealed.

      . The location of Gunn’s and Harris's properties is more accurately described as being on the Mississippi Sound. See National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration — Gulf nautical charts, http://www.charts.noaa.gov/On LineViewer/GulfCoastViewerTable.shtml (last visited September 16, 2011).

      . Tidelands are "those lands which are daily covered and uncovered by water by the action of the tides, up to the mean line of the ordinary high tides.” Miss.Code Ann. § 29-15-1(h) (Rev.2010).

      . Miss.Code Ann. § 29-15-5 (Rev.2010) (“Tidelands and submerged lands are held by the state in trust for use of all the people.... Littoral and riparian property owners have common law and statutory rights under the Coastal Wetlands Protection Law which extend into the waters and beyond the low tide line, and the state’s responsibilities as trustee extends to such owners as well as to the other members of the public.”).

      . See Miss.Code Ann. § 29-15-3(2) (Rev. 2010) (declaring the Legislature’s aim "to resolve the uncertainty and disputes which have arisen as to the location of the boundary between the state’s public trust tidelands and the upland property and to confirm the mean high water boundary line-"). The mean high-water line is "the intersection of the tidal datum plane of mean high water with the shore.” Miss.Code Ann. § 29-15-l(d) (Rev. 2010). Mean high water is "the arithmetic mean of all the high waters occurring in a particular nineteen-year tidal epoch period; or for a shorter period of time after corrections are applied to the short term observations to reduce these values to the equivalent nineteen-year value.” Id. at (c).
      A mapping procedure determines the boundary between the state’s public-trust tidelands and the upland property. Miss.Code Ann. § 29-15-7 (Rev.2010). The Secretary of State submits a map to the chancery clerks of affected counties depicting "the boundary as the current mean high water line where shoreline is undeveloped and in developed areas or where there have been encroachments, such maps shall depict the boundary as the determinable mean high water line nearest the effective date of the Coastal Wetlands Protection Act." Id. After a sixty-day notice-and-comment period, the Secretary of State certifies adoption of the final map and records it with the appropriate chancery clerks. Id. Within 120 days of certifying the final map, the Secretary of State must identify and notify all property owners whose lands are subject to the public trust and are in violation of the public trust. Id. "[Ajfter three (3) years the boundary as set forth in the certified map shall become final unless the occupant has submitted a contrary claim to the office of the Secretary of State.” Id. Land owners "have six (6) months to negotiate and settle differences with the Secretary of State.” Id. "A boundary determination shall be final upon agreement of the Secretary of State and the owner and an instrument setting forth the boundary agreement shall be duly executed and recorded in the chancery court where the property is located. Any such boundary agreement shall be binding on the state and other parties thereto.” Id.

      . "Riparian” rights relate to land on "the bank of a river or stream-” Stewart v. Hoover, 815 So.2d 1157, 1163 (Miss.2002). "Littoral rights” are those "[rjights concerning properties abutting an ocean, sea or lake rather than a river or stream (riparian). Littoral rights are usually concerned with the use and enjoyment of the shore.” Id. (citation omitted). Gunn and Harris assert rights associated with property adjacent to the Gulf of Mexico; therefore, they claim littoral, not riparian, rights.

      . The Secretary of State raises a fourth issue: "Whether the trial court erred by excluding testimony and documents submitted by Willa Brantley.” The Willa Brantley evidence was related to the Mississippi Commission on Marine Resources’ decision to issue a permit for the pathway project, and presumably would support the argument that destruction of habitat is not sufficient to constitute "irreparable harm” under the chancellor's injunction analysis. We decline to address this issue in depth, because we find that, with or without the Willa Brantley evidence, the chancellor did not err in finding that Gunn and Harris would be irreparably harmed if an injunction did not issue. The chancellor found that Gunn and Harris would be harmed both by habitat destruction and by harm to their real property (should they be determined to own the property) if construction were to continue before their ownership rights were determined. Because the latter ground — harm to Gunn's and Harris’s real-property interests— provides sufficient justification for granting an injunction, the Willa Brantley evidence does not affect our consideration of the chancellor’s decision to grant the injunction.

      . We advise that Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 60(c) provides that, if the chancellor transfers this case to another court, the transfer will become effective ten days after she enters the order. For the transfer order to be reconsidered, the party seeking reconsideration must file a motion seeking reconsideration prior to the expiration of the ten-day period, with no exceptions. Miss. R. Civ. P. 60(c).


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: WALLER, Chief Justice,

license: Public Domain

text:
    Pamela Lynn LAWSON v. HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL, INC. f/k/a Allied Signal, Inc.
    No. 2010-CA-01924-SCT.
    Supreme Court of Mississippi.
    Oct. 20, 2011.
    Rehearing Denied Dec. 15, 2011.

      Edward A. Williamson, Christopher M. Posey, Philadelphia, attorneys for appellant.
    Joseph W. Gill, Edward J. Currie, Jackson, Randal R. Cangelosi, attorneys for appellee.
    Before WALLER, C.J., LAMAR and PIERCE, JJ.
   WALLER, Chief Justice,

for the Court:

¶ 1. Plaintiff Pamela Lynn Lawson appeals the trial court’s grants of summary judgment to the defendant, Honeywell International, Inc., on Lawson’s Mississippi Products Liability Act (“MPLA”) claim and her negligence claim arising from injuries Lawson sustained when her seatbelt buckle allegedly malfunctioned during an automobile accident. We affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment as to Lawson’s MPLA claim, as Honeywell is not the “manufacturer” of the buckle for purposes of liability under the MPLA. However, we reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment as to Lawson’s negligence claim, and remand for trial, as the MPLA does not preclude common-law claims of negligence against a nonmanufacturing and nonselling designer of a product.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 2. On July 81, 2005, Lawson lost control of her 1999 Jeep Cherokee while driving from Clara to Waynesboro, Mississippi. The vehicle veered off the highway and rolled over several times before coming to a stop. Lawson claims that, although she had her Gen-3 seat belt buckle correctly fastened at the time of the accident, a defective design in the buckle caused it to malfunction and disengage, resulting in her ejection from the vehicle. Lawson alleges she suffered severe injuries as a result. She filed this action against defendant Honeywell International, Inc., which she alleges originally designed the Gen-3 seat belt buckle before selling it to Chrysler in the mid-1990s. Lawson brought claims of strict liability under the MPLA, negligence, and negligence per se.

¶ 3. Honeywell denied designing the buckle and denies that the design was defective. Furthermore, Honeywell argued that the MPLA is the sole remedy for products liability actions in Mississippi, and that the MPLA does not provide for a cause of action against a product designer that neither manufactured nor sold the product at issue. Thus, Honeywell claimed, even if it did originally design the Gen-3 buckle, it still could not be held liable for Lawson’s injuries. The trial court agreed, holding that the MPLA is the exclusive remedy for products liability actions in Mississippi, and that the plain language of the MPLA does not allow design-defect claims against designers who neither manufacture nor sell the product.

¶ 4. Lawson filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the trial court denied. Accordingly, the trial judge entered final judgment and dismissed Honeywell from the lawsuit with prejudice. Subsequently, Lawson timely filed this appeal.

ISSUES

¶.5. In her appeal, Lawson asserts the following issues, which we will consider:

I. Whether the trial court erred in holding that Honeywell was not a “manufacturer” for purposes of the MPLA, and in therefore granting Honeywell’s motion for summary judgment as to Lawson’s MPLA claim.
II. Whether the trial court erred in holding that the MPLA is the exclusive remedy for products liability actions in Mississippi, and in therefore granting Honeywell’s motion for summary judgment as to Lawson’s common-law negligence claim.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 6. This Court reviews a trial court’s grant or denial of summary judgment de novo. One South, Inc., v. Hollowell, 963 So.2d 1156, 1160 (Miss.2007). Summary judgment shall be rendered when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file ... show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Miss. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The moving party bears the burden of showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists, whereas the nonmoving party is given the benefit of the doubt as to the existence of a material fact. Monsanto Co. v. Hall, 912 So.2d 134, 136 (Miss.2005). When considering a motion for summary judgment, evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Price v. Purdue Pharma Co., 920 So.2d 479, 483 (Miss.2006).

DISCUSSION

I. Whether Honeywell is a “manufacturer” under the MPLA.

¶ 7. The function of the Court is not to decide what a statute should provide, but to determine what it does provide. Russell v. State, 231 Miss. 176, 94 So.2d 916, 917 (1957). The Court must not broaden or restrict a legislative act. Barbour v. State ex rel. Hood, 974 So.2d 232, 240 (Miss.2008) (quoting Miss. Dep’t of Transp. v. Allred, 928 So.2d 152, 156 (Miss.2006)). The Court’s goal is to give effect to the intent of the Legislature. City of Natchez, Miss. v. Sullivan, 612 So.2d 1087, 1089 (Miss.1992). To determine legislative intent, the Court first looks to the language of the statute. Pinkton v. State, 481 So.2d 306, 309 (Miss.1985). If the words of a statute are clear and unambiguous, the Court applies the plain meaning of the statute and refrains from using principles of statutory construction. Clark v. State ex rel. Miss. State Med. Ass’n, 381 So.2d 1046, 1048 (Miss.1980); see also Gilmer v. State, 955 So.2d 829, 833 (Miss.2007).

¶ 8. The MPLA provides the exclusive remedy for strict-liability claims against a manufacturer or seller for damages caused by a product that has a design defect rendering it unreasonably dangerous. Miss.Code Ann. § 11-1-63 (Rev.2002). The MPLA states:

[I]n any action for damages caused by a product except for commercial damage to the product itself:
(a) The manufacturer or seller of the product shall not be liable if the claimant does not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that at the time the product left the control of the manufacturer or seller:

(i)... The product was designed in a defective manner ... and

(ii) The defective condition rendered the product unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer; and
(iii) The defective and unreasonably dangerous condition of the product proximately caused the damages for which recovery is sought.

Id. Lawson argues that the plain meaning of “manufacturer” shows that the Legislature intended for the MPLA to be applicable to product designers. According to Lawson, the definition of “manufacture” includes designing; thus, designers are “co-manufacturers.” However, a correct, plain-meaning analysis of the term “manufacturer” excludes a mere “designer” from falling under the statute.

¶ 9. Mississippi law mandates that “[a]ll words and phrases contained in the statutes are used according to their common and ordinary acceptation and meaning....” Miss.Code. Ann. § 1-3-65 (Rev. 2005); see also Lambert v. Ogden, 423 So.2d 1319, 1321 (Miss.1982) (“Where a popular word is used in a statute with no statutory definition, we follow the well established rule that popular words in a statute must be accepted in their popular sense....”). Since the MPLA provides no specific definition for “manufacturer,” its common or popular meaning must be applied. This Court frequently looks to dictionaries to ascertain the meaning of a word in its common or popular sense. See, e.g., Buffington v. Miss. State Tax Comm’n, 43 So.3d 450, 455 (Miss.2010) (using Black’s Law Dictionary and Random House Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary to define “disposes of’); Pegram v. Bailey, 708 So.2d 1307, 1314 (Miss.1997) (looking to Random House Webster’s Dictionary to find common meaning of “correspond”); Kerr-McGee Chem. Corp. v. Buelow, 670 So.2d 12, 17-20 (Miss.1995) (upholding use of Webster’s Third New International Dictionary to conclude that the popular meaning of “raw material” did not include electricity); Tower Loan of Miss., Inc. v. Miss. State Tax Comm’n, 662 So.2d 1077, 1083 (Miss.1995) (using Black’s Law Dictionary to define “book value”) Lambert v. Ogden 423 So.2d 1319, 1321-22 (Miss.1982) (using Webster’s Third New International Dictionary to define “truck”).

¶ 10. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “manufacturer” as “a person or entity engaged in producing or assembling new products.” Black’s Law Dictionary 984 (8th ed. 2004). The Random House Web-ster’s Unabridged Dictionary defines “manufacture” as “the making of goods or wares by manual labor or by machinery.” Random House Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary 1172 (2d ed. 1999). Conversely, “designer” is defined as “a person who devises or executes designs ... for works of art or machines.” Random House Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary 539 (2d ed. 1999). Based on these definitions, the common usage of the word “manufacturer” does not include “designer.” Accordingly, the plain meaning of a product “manufacturer” does not include a mere “designer” of a product.

¶ 11. Furthermore, this Court has defined what constitutes a “manufacturer” for strict products liability purposes. In Scordino v. Hopeman Bros., Inc., the Court found that the Restatement of Torts (Second) impliedly defined a manufacturer as “a person or company ‘who regularly and in the course of their principal business, create[s], assembles] and/or pre-pareds] goods for sale to the consuming public.” Scordino v. Hopeman Bros., Inc., 662 So.2d 640, 645 (Miss.1995) (quoting Olson v. Ulysses Irrigation Pipe Co., Inc., 649 F.Supp. 1511 (D.Kan.1986)) (emphasis original). The Court went on to hold that a manufacturer “produces goods as a principal part of its business and sells them either directly or for resale to the consuming public.” Scordino, 662 So.2d at 645 (emphasis original).

¶ 12. In so doing, the Court did not include mere designers in the definition of a “manufacturer” for purposes of strict liability. A designer of a good does not “produce” the good for direct sale or resale to the consuming public. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “produce” as “to bring into existence” or “to create.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1245 (8th ed. 2004). The Scordino Court’s definition implies that the manufacturer of a good is the person or company who brings the good into its tangible form — the point at which the good is ready for sale, or resale, to the consuming public. When a company merely creates the design of a product, but does not bring the product “into existence,” it is not functioning as a “manufacturer,” under this Court’s definition.

¶ 13. A mere designer of a product does not fall under the definition of a “manufacturer,” as that term is used in the MPLA. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to Honeywell with respect to Lawson’s statutory claim of design defect.

II. Whether the MPLA Precludes Common-Law Claims of Negligence Against a Nonmanufacturing Product Designer.

¶ 14. Honeywell argues that the MPLA abrogates all common-law claims of negligence for defective products, even those asserted against nonmanufacturers. To bolster this argument, Honeywell relies on the opening statement of the MPLA, which states: “[i]n any action for damages caused by a product....” Miss. Code. Ann. § 11-1-63 (Rev.2002). According to Honeywell, “any” means “every” and “all.” However, a reading of the statute in its entirety reveals the error in Honeywell’s argument.

¶ 15. In general, “a new statute will not be considered as reversing long-established principles of law and equity unless the legislative intention to do so clearly appears.” Thorp Commercial Corp. v. Miss. Road Supply Co., 348 So.2d 1016, 1018 (Miss.1977). This Court follows the long-standing maxim of statutory construction that “the Legislature’s intention must be determined by the total language of the statute and not from a segment considered apart from the remainder.... ” Manufab, Inc. v. Miss. State Tax Comm’n, 808 So.2d 947, 949 (Miss.2002) (quoting Brady v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 342 So.2d 295, 298 (Miss.1977)); see also L.W. v. McComb Separate Mun. School Dist., 754 So.2d 1136, 1140 (Miss.1990) (“[T]he legislative intent must be determined from the total language of the act and not from one section considered apart from the remainder.”). The Court looks to the whole of a statute to avoid adhering to one sentence or phrase of statute in a way that skews its true meaning. See Manufab, Inc., 808 So.2d at 949.

¶ 16. Interpreting the MPLA as a whole reveals that claims against non-manufacturing and nonselling designers are outside the scope of the statute. The MPLA addresses what plaintiffs must prove to hold “manufacturers” and “sellers” liable for damages caused by a product. Miss.Code Ann. § 11-1-63 (Rev. 2002). Because the statute applies only to manufacturers and sellers, a person or entity other than the manufacturer or seller — who negligently designs a product— may be held liable for common-law negligence or under any other available theory of liability. As discussed above, the “common and ordinary acceptation and meaning” of “manufacturer” does not include mere designers of a product. Read plainly, the MPLA does not address what a plaintiff must prove in an action against a product designer.

¶ 17. This Court “cannot ... add to the plain meaning of the statute or presume that the legislature failed to state something other than what was plainly stated.” His Way Homes, Inc. v. Miss. Gaming Comm’n, 733 So.2d 764, 769 (Miss.1999). The Legislature did not state that the MPLA applies to, or precludes, claims against designers of a product. Holding that the MPLA is applicable to such claims would constitute an improper addition to the statute, since designers plainly are omitted.

¶ 18. In its brief, Honeywell cites lowers v. BOC Group, Inc., a federal district-court case which held that the MPLA abrogated common-law negligence claims of product defect, Jowers v. BOC Group, Inc., 2009 WL 995613, at *4 (S.D.Miss. April 14, 2009) aff'd in part, vacated in part on other grounds, and remanded sub nom., Jowers v. Lincoln Elec. Co., 617 F.3d 346 (5th Cir.2010). The court in lowers held that the MPLA precluded common-law negligence claims against a manufacturer. Id. at *4. Neither lowers nor any other Mississippi case cited by Honeywell stands for the proposition that a negligence claim against a defendant who is not a “manufacturer” or “seller” is precluded by the MPLA.

¶ 19. We hold that the MPLA does not preclude common-law negligence claims against nonmanufacturing designers who do not fall under the purview of the statute. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to Honeywell with respect to Lawson’s common-law negligence claim.

CONCLUSION

¶ 20. The plain meaning of the MPLA and this Court’s previous definition of “manufacturer” for strict-liability purposes mandate a finding that a mere designer is not a manufacturer subject to liability under the MPLA. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to Honeywell as to Lawson’s statutory claim.

¶ 21. However, the MPLA does not preclude claims against defendants who are neither manufacturers nor sellers, as those terms are understood in the statute. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to Honeywell as to Lawson’s common-law negligence claim, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

¶ 22. AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED.

CARLSON AND DICKINSON, P.JJ., RANDOLPH, LAMAR, KITCHENS, CHANDLER, PIERCE AND KING, JJ„ CONCUR.

      . Lawson also named Key Safety Systems, Inc. and Chrysler, LLC, as defendants. Key Safety Systems currently manufactures and sells the Gen-3 buckle to Chrysler. However, Chrysler was severed from the lawsuit due to bankruptcy, and Key Safety settled with Lawson.

      . Miss. Code Ann. § 11-1-63 (Rev.2002).

      . Honeywell alleges that its corporate predecessor, AlliedSignal, Inc., had a safety restraint division that manufactured the seat buckle for Chrysler, but it sold this division two years before merging with Honeywell, Inc., to form Honeywell International.

      . In some instances, this Court has stated that, if a statute’s terms are unambiguous, the first rule of statutory construction is to apply a statute according to its plain meaning, known as the "plain meaning rule.” See, e.g., Bucket v. Chaney, 47 So.3d 148, 158 (Miss.2010); State ex rel. Hood v. Madison County ex rel. Madison County Bd. of Supervisors, 873 So.2d 85, 90 (Miss.2004). However, in most instances this Court has stated that applying a statute according to its unambiguous terms is not a rule of statutory construction, but is done before resorting to statutory construction. See, e.g., Corp. Mgmt., Inc. v. Greene County, 23 So.3d 454, 465 (Miss.2009); Kerr-McGee Chem. Corp. v. Buelow, 670 So.2d 12, 17 (Miss.1995); Pinkton v. State, 481 So.2d 306, 309 (Miss.1985). Regardless, whether "the plain meaning rule” is a rule of statutory construction, this Court always starts statutory interpretation by looking at the plain language of the statute.

      . The definition of “manufacture” must be used because Random House Webster's Unabridged Dictionary defines "manufacturer” merely as “a person, group, or company that manufactures.” Id. at 1172. Thus, the definition of "manufacture” controls the meaning of "manufacturer.”

      . Black’s Law Dictionary does not define "designer.”

      .Although the Court addressed the definition of a "manufacturer” under common-law strict liability and, therefore, the Restatement (Second) of Torts, there is no indication in either the MPLA or the caselaw since its adoption that the Legislature intended to abandon this definition. See Whelan v. Johnston, 192 Miss. 673, 6 So.2d 300, 303 (1942) ("[W]ords which have a clear and definite meaning at common law should be given that meaning when used in a statute, unless it is clear from the statute itself that they were used in a different sense....").


author: CHANDLER, Justice,

text:
    Steve KNOX, Michelle Byrom, Blayde Grayson, Benny Joe Stevens, Gerald Holland, Jan Michael Brawner, Rodney Gray, Jeffrey Havard, Richard Jordan, Thong Le, Willie Manning, William Mitchell, Stephen Powers, Larry Matthew Puckett, Gary Carl Simmons, and Alan Dale Walker v. STATE of Mississippi.
    No. 2010-CA-00814-SCT.
    Supreme Court of Mississippi.
    Dec. 1, 2011.

      James W. Craig, Brian F. McDonough, Gerald S. Hartman, attorneys for appellants.
    Office of the Attorney General by Harold Edward Pizzetta, III, Marvin L. White, Jr., attorneys for appellee.
    Before DICKINSON, P.J., CHANDLER and KING, JJ.
   CHANDLER, Justice,

for the Court:

¶ 1. On May 6, 2010, sixteen death-sentenced inmates, including Steve Knox, Michelle Byrom, Blayde Grayson, Benny Joe Stevens, Gerald Holland, Jan Michael Brawner, Rodney Gray, Jeffrey Havard, Richard Jordan, Thong Le, Willie Manning, William Mitchell, Stephen Powers, Larry Matthew Puckett, Gary Carl Simmons, and Alan Dale Walker (the inmates), filed a complaint in the Chancery Court for the First Judicial District of Hinds County. The essence of the inmates’ complaint was that, due to defects in both the statutory structure and the performance of the Mississippi Office of Capital Post-Conviction Counsel (MOCPCC), they were deprived of their right to obtain meaningful state post-conviction and federal habeas corpus review of their convictions and death sentences.

¶ 2. The inmates requested injunctive relief against the State of Mississippi due to alleged violations of their rights to competent, appointed, post-conviction counsel. In particular, the inmates requested that the chancery court enjoin the State from opposing the filing of a successive petition for post-conviction relief in each inmate’s case, from requesting execution dates for any of them, and from opposing a stay of execution in any case involving one of the inmates. The State moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. After a hearing, the chancery court found that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the complaint because the inmates’ “attack on the death sentences and post-conviction judicial reviews of [their] convictions” was cognizable under the Uniform Post-Conviction Collateral Relief Act (UPCCRA). The chancery court dismissed the complaint.

¶ 3. We affirm. The chancery court lacks jurisdiction over the inmates’ claims because those claims are embraced by the UPCCRA.

FACTS

I. The inmates’ claims

¶ 4. The inmates argue that the deficient performance of MOCPCC violated their right to the effective assistance of post-conviction counsel in their death-penalty cases. See Puckett v. State, 834 So.2d 676, 680 (Miss.2002); Jackson v. State, 732 So.2d 187, 190-91 (Miss.1999). Effective July 1, 2000, the Legislature created MOCPCC to provide appointed post-conviction counsel to death-row inmates. Miss.Code Ann. § 99-89-105 (Rev.2007). The governing legislation gave the Chief Justice of this Court the authority to appoint the director of MOCPCC, with the approval of a majority of justices voting, for a term of four years. Miss.Code Ann. § 99-39-103 (Rev.2007). The statutes gave the Chief Justice supervisory and termination authority over the director and required the director to submit monthly reports. Miss.Code Ann. § 99-39-103 (Rev.2007); Miss.Code Ann. § 99-39-115 (Rev.2007). However, the Legislature amended Section 99-39-103 effective March 16, 2009, to grant the Governor, with the advice and consent of the Senate, the power to appoint and remove the director. Miss.Code Ann. § 99-39-103 (Supp. 2011); see also §§ 99-39-107; 99-39-115 (Supp. 2011).

¶ 5. The inmates alleged that the Legislature’s grant of the power to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court to appoint, supervise, and remove the director of MOCPCC violated the separation-of-powers clause of the Mississippi Constitution. Miss. Const, art 1, § 2. They argued that the unconstitutional statutory structure of the office resulted in its provision of ineffective assistance of counsel. As redress for this harm, the inmates sought an opportunity to present new post-conviction claims through a properly-structured MOCPCC.

¶ 6. According to the inmates, the director had filed inadequate motions for post-conviction relief in their cases without conducting an adequate investigation into the guilt and sentencing phases of the trials and without raising all meritorious claims. The inmates alleged that MOCPCC’s omissions amounted to a failure to provide meaningful post-conviction representation, that the State had denied them due process of law, and that they had been denied meaningful access to the court system. They sought the following relief from the chancery court: (1) a declaration that their rights to competent and conscientious post-conviction counsel and to meaningful access to the court system have been violated; (2) a preliminary and permanent injunction requiring the State to provide competent and conscientious post-conviction counsel in subsequent proceedings; (3) a preliminary and permanent injunction requiring the State to permit them to file successive motions for post-conviction relief, and to have those motions decided on the merits; (4) a preliminary and permanent injunction enjoining the State from arguing their claims are procedurally barred, exhausted, or defaulted; (5) a declaration that MOCPCC had violated the separation-of-powers provisions of the Mississippi Constitution; (6) a preliminary and permanent injunction requiring that the executive appoint the director of MOCPCC; (7) a permanent injunction requiring MOCPCC to prepare semiannual reports for the next five years demonstrating it is providing competent counsel; (8) a permanent injunction providing for the appointment of an independent monitor to oversee the State’s actions in directing and administering the work of MOCPCC; (9) an award of attorney’s fees and costs; and (10) any further relief deemed just, equitable, and proper.

¶ 7. On May 8, 2010, the inmates filed a Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order, a Preliminary Injunction, and an Expedited Hearing on Plaintiffs Motion for a Preliminary Injunction Combined with a Trial on the Merits, along with a supporting memorandum of law. The inmates attached the affidavits of former directors C. Jackson Williams and Robert Ryan, attesting that MOCPCC had been overworked, understaffed, and underfunded. In his affidavit, Ryan stated that when he became the director, MOCPCC had twenty-seven cases. Ryan stated that he had not had time to file funding requests, conduct full investigations, or adequately research issues. The inmates also attached the supporting affidavits of other MOCPCC employees.

¶ 8. The State filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. According to the State, the claims raised by the inmates fell squarely within the UP-CCRA. Therefore, the State argued, the chancery court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction.

II. The chancery court’s ruling

¶ 9. The chancery court ruled that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the inmates’ claims. The chancery court noted that matters cognizable under the UP-CCRA should be decided under that statute, and that the inmates’ claims were, in reality, an attack on the post-conviction review of their convictions and death sentences under Mississippi Code Section 99-39-5. Miss.Code Ann. § 99-39-5 (Supp. 2011). Therefore, the chancery court held, the inmates’ claims could be litigated only under the terms of the UPCCRA. The chancery court recognized that, under the UPCCRA, when a conviction and sentence have been affirmed on direct appeal, a motion shall not be filed in the trial court without an order from the Supreme Court directing the filing of the motion. Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-7 (Supp. 2011). Because each inmate’s conviction and sentence had been reviewed on direct appeal, and no permission had been sought for filing a motion, the chancery court found that it lacked jurisdiction to consider any argument cognizable under the UPCCRA. For these reasons, the chancery court granted the State’s motion to dismiss and denied the inmates’ motion for a temporary restraining order and permanent injunction.

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of review

¶ 10. Subject-matter jurisdiction is a threshold inquiry that must be resolved before the court adjudicates the merits of a case. Schmidt v. Catholic Diocese of Biloxi, 18 So.3d 814, 821 (Miss.2009). This Court reviews de novo the dismissal of an action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Id. A facial attack on subject-matter jurisdiction is an argument that the court lacks jurisdiction as a matter of law, regardless of the determination of factual disputes. Roman Catholic Diocese v. Morrison, 905 So.2d 1213, 1220 (Miss.2005). When, as here, there is a facial attack on subject-matter jurisdiction, the allegations in the plaintiffs complaint are taken as true. Schmidt, 18 So.3d at 822. However, “[w]hen a plaintiffs allegations of jurisdiction are questioned, the plaintiff bears the burden to prove jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id. (citing Rosemound Sand & Gravel Co. v. Lambert Sand & Gravel Co., 469 F.2d 416, 418 (5th Cir.1972)).

II. Analysis

¶ 11. We hold that the chancery court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the inmates’ claims because those claims are properly asserted under the UPCCRA. While circuit courts are courts of general jurisdiction, with “original jurisdiction in all matters civil and criminal in this state not vested in another court,” chancery courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Lawrence County Sch. Dist. v. Brister, 823 So.2d 459, 460 (Miss.2001) (citing Miss. Const. art. 6, §§ 156, 159). The Mississippi Constitution states that the chancery court shall have jurisdiction over the following cases:

(a) All matters in equity;
(b) Divorce and alimony;
(c) Matters testamentary and of administration;
(d) Minors’ business;
(e) Cases of idiocy, lunacy, and persons of unsound mind;
(f) All cases of which the said court had jurisdiction under the laws in force when this Constitution is put in operation.

Miss. Const, art. 6, § 159. All cases brought in chancery court but under the exclusive jurisdiction of the circuit court must be transferred to the circuit court. Miss. Const, art. 6, § 162.

¶ 12. The chancery court’s power to grant injunctive relief rests upon the inadequacy of a remedy at law. A-1 Pallet Co. v. City of Jackson, 40 So.3d 563, 568 (Miss.2010). It is a cornerstone of equity jurisdiction that “equity follows the law,” and “courts of equity cannot modify or ignore an unambiguous statutory principle in an effort to shape relief.” In re Estate of Smith, 891 So.2d 811, 813 (Miss.2005) (citing In re Estate of Miller, 840 So.2d 703, 708 (Miss.2003)). The UP-CCRA contains an exclusivity provision. Miss.Code Ann. § 99-39-3 (Rev.2007). “The purpose [of the UPCCRA] is to revise, streamline and clarify the rules and statutes pertaining to post-conviction relief law and procedures, to resolve any conflicts therein and to provide the courts of this state with an exclusive and uniform procedure for the collateral review of convictions and sentences.” Id. A pleading cognizable under the UPCCRA will be treated as a motion for post-conviction relief that is subject to the procedural rules promulgated therein, regardless of how the plaintiff has denominated or characterized the pleading. Edmond v. Miss. Dep’t of Corrections, 783 So.2d 675, 677 (Miss.2001); Grubb v. State, 584 So.2d 786, 788 (Miss.1991). Claims cognizable under the UPCCRA are outside the equity jurisdiction of the chancery court. Miss.Code Ann. § 99-39-3 (Rev.2007); Miss. Const, art. 6, § 159. A motion for post-conviction relief must be filed in circuit court unless, as in the instant case, a conviction and sentence have been affirmed on direct appeal. Miss.Code Ann. § 99-39-7 (Supp. 2011). Then, a motion shall not be filed in the trial court without an order from the Supreme Court directing the filing of the motion. Id.

¶ 13. The inmates cite State v. Quitman County, 807 So.2d 401 (Miss.2001), in support of their assertion that the chancery court has jurisdiction. In Quitman County, the county sued the State in circuit court for declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing that statutes requiring the county to fund indigent defense were unconstitutional because they resulted in “chronic underfunding and systemic ineffective assistance of counsel in Quitman County.” Id. at 408. This Court stated that the crux of the county’s complaint was “the State’s failure to remedy the alleged systemic ineffective assistance of counsel.” Id. On appeal, the State argued that the county had failed to state a claim for which relief could be granted. Id. at 406. This Court held that “taking as true the well-pled allegations of the County’s complaint, such systemic constitutional deficiencies would entitle the County to relief.” Id. at 410.

¶ 14. Relying on Quitman County, the inmates argue that the chancery court had jurisdiction because they seek a remedy for systemic deficiencies in the State’s laws and practices related to the provision of post-conviction counsel for death-sentenced prisoners, and that these systemic deficiencies resulted in their receipt of ineffective assistance of counsel. We find that Quitman County is distinguishable from the instant case. As the State argues, in Quitman County, the county sought prospective relief from the legal burden of funding indigent defense. But the inmates’ complaint fundamentally seeks relief in the form of the ability to pursue fresh post-conviction proceedings with the assistance of competent counsel and no opposition from the State. An examination of the inmates’ prayer for relief reveals that, in fact, their claims are fully cognizable under the UPCCRA; therefore, they are outside the equity jurisdiction of the chancery court. See Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-3 (Rev.2007); Miss. Const, art. 6, § 159.

¶ 15. The UPCCRA promulgates specific procedures for the adjudication of ineffective-assistanee-of-counsel claims. Under the UPCCRA, when this Court already has affirmed or dismissed a petitioner’s direct appeal, the motion for post-conviction relief must be presented to a quorum of justices to determine whether to allow filing of the motion in the trial court. Miss.Code Ann. § 99-39-7 (Supp. 2011). When this Court is presented with an application to file a motion for post-conviction relief, the Court shall deny relief unless the claims are not procedurally barred and they make a substantial showing of the denial of a state or federal right. Miss.Code Ann. § 99-39-27 (Supp. 2011). Absent an applicable exception, a successive motion for post-conviction relief is procedurally barred. Miss.Code Ann. § 99-39-23(6) (Supp. 2011); Rowland v. State, 42 So.3d 503, 507 (Miss.2010). This Court, in its discretion, may order the Attorney General to respond, and the Court may not grant relief unless the Attorney General has been given at least five days to respond. Id.

¶ 16. The relief requested by the inmates would require the chancery court to interfere with these statutory procedures. The inmates seek a preliminary and permanent injunction requiring the State to permit them to file successive motions for post-conviction relief. They request an injunction preventing the State from raising its defenses that any claims raised in a successive pleading are procedurally barred, exhausted, or defaulted. This would require the chancery court to contravene the UPCCRA by determining what defenses could be raised in proceedings before this Court on an application to file a successive motion for post-conviction relief under Section 99-39-27. Such a determination is plainly outside the equity jurisdiction of the chancery court. Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-3 (Rev.2007); Estate of Smith, 891 So.2d at 813.

¶ 17. The inmates argue that the chancery court is empowered to decide whether their rights to the assistance of competent and conscientious counsel in their death-penalty, post-conviction proceedings and to meaningful access to the court system have been violated by the statutory structure and the actions and inactions of MOCPCC. But the remedy they seek based on a favorable determination of this claim is the filing of unopposed applications to file successive motions for post-conviction relief. The procedures for filing an application to file a successive motion for post-conviction relief are prescribed by the UPCCRA. Miss.Code Ann. § 99-39-27 (Supp. 2011).

¶ 18. Under Section 99-39-27, this Court is fully capable of considering the inmates’ claims in individual applications to file a motion for post-conviction relief. In fact, this Court already has considered individual applications to file successive motions for post-conviction relief filed by Earl Wesley Berry and Dale Leo Bishop. Berry v. State, 2008-DR-00717 (order entered May 5, 2008); Bishop v. State, 2008-DR-1122 (order entered July 9, 2008). Because the inmates’ claims plainly are cognizable under the UPCCRA, the chancery court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. Miss.Code Ann. § 99-89-3 (Rev. 2007). This Court is the only state court with jurisdiction over these claims. Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-27 (Supp. 2011).

CONCLUSION

¶ 19. The inmates’ claims are embraced by the UPCCRA; therefore, the chancery court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. We affirm.

¶ 20. AFFIRMED.

WALLER, C.J., CARLSON AND DICKINSON, P.JJ., RANDOLPH, LAMAR, KITCHENS, PIERCE AND KING, JJ., CONCUR.

      . Since the complaint was filed, appellants Gerald Holland, Rodney Gray, and Benny Joe Stevens have been executed pursuant to their sentences of death.

      . By statute, motions for post-conviction relief not filed in the Supreme Court are filed as an original civil action in the trial court, not in chancery court. Miss.Code Ann. § 99-39-7 (Supp. 2011).


author: RANDOLPH, Justice,

text:
    MISSISSIPPI COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE v. Leigh Ann DARBY.
    No. 2011-JP-01280-SCT.
    Supreme Court of Mississippi.
    Dec. 1, 2011.

      John B. Toney, Darlene D. Ballard, attorneys for appellant.
    Alan D. Lancaster, Grenada, attorney for appellee.
   RANDOLPH, Justice,

for the Court:

¶ 1. The Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance (“Commission”) filed a “Formal Complaint” charging Leigh Ann Darby, Youth Court Judge, Tate County, Mississippi, with violating various Canons of the Mississippi Code of Judicial Conduct and with “willful misconduct in office” and “conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice which brings the judicial office into disrepute[,]” actionable pursuant to Article 6, Section 177A of the Mississippi Constitution. Miss. Const, art. 6, § 177A. Ultimately, the Commission and Judge Darby filed an “Agreed Statement of Facts and Proposed Recommendation” which provided that Judge Darby had violated Canons 1, 2A, and 3B(2) of the Code of Judicial Conduct and had engaged in conduct actionable pursuant to Section 177A of the Mississippi Constitution, and recommended that she be publicly reprimanded, fined $500, and assessed costs of $100. The Commission unanimously agreed to “accept and adopt” that “Agreed Statement of Facts and Proposed Recommendation.” This Court now conducts its “mandated review of the Commission’s recommendation consistent with Miss. Const, art. 6, § 177A, Miss. Comm’n on Jud. Perf. R. 10, M.R.A.P. 16(a), and our case law.” Miss. Comm’n on Judicial Performance v. Sanford, 941 So.2d 209, 210 (Miss.2006).

FACTS

¶ 2. On August 13, 2009, T.J., the fifteen-year-old daughter of A.L.J. (“mother”), was arrested and charged with disturbing the peace. On August 14, 2009, following a detention hearing in the Youth Court of Tate County, Judge Darby issued a “Detention Order” which provided, inter alia, that T.J. was to be placed on “strict house arrest.” Thereafter, a formal petition was filed, and an adjudication hearing was conducted. During that hearing, issues regarding T.J.’s mental health were raised, her need for counseling and treatment was discussed, and Judge Darby learned that T.J. did not have medical insurance coverage. Judge Darby then verbally directed the mother to apply for Medicaid benefits on behalf of T.J.

¶ 3. On June 7, 2010, following a subsequent arrest of T.J., Judge Darby conducted another detention hearing. During that hearing, Judge Darby learned that T.J. still did not have medical insurance coverage, despite the fact that the mother’s employer offered health-care coverage. Judge Darby then “chastised” the mother for failing to have T.J. insured, verbally directed the mother to file for Medicaid, and verbally directed the mother to take T.J. to Parkwood Behavioral Health Systems (“Parkwood”) in Olive Branch, Mississippi, for evaluation and assessment.

¶ 4. On June 8, 2010, based solely upon Judge Darby’s verbal directions, the mother took T.J. to Parkwood for evaluation and assessment. While the Parkwood staff determined that T.J. would benefit from inpatient treatment, such treatment was not commenced, because T.J. was not insured. Thereafter, the mother applied for Medicaid on T.J.’s behalf, but was denied because she did not meet eligibility requirements. However, T.J. was approved for coverage under the Mississippi Children’s Health Insurance Program (“CHIP”).

¶ 5. On June 14, 2010, Judge Darby conducted a review hearing and learned that T.J. had been approved for CHIP coverage. Based thereon, Judge Darby verbally ordered the mother to schedule an appointment for T.J. at Communicare, a regional mental health-care facility, and to take T.J. back to Parkwood for a second evaluation and assessment.

¶ 6. On July 6, 2010, based solely upon Judge Darby’s verbal directions, the mother took T.J. to Communicare. On the morning of July 16, 2010, based solely upon Judge Darby’s verbal directions, the mother took T.J. to Parkwood for her second evaluation and assessment. There, the Parkwood staff informed the mother that CHIP would provide coverage for only a ten- to fifteen-day course of daily outpatient treatment from 8:00 a.m. until 3:00 p.m. The Parkwood staff further advised the mother that she would be required to sign a guaranty agreement, taking personal responsibility for any charges that CHIP refused to pay. Due to the transportation costs associated with the sixty-seven-mile round-trip commute from the mother’s home to Parkwood, and the adverse impact of that daily commute upon her employment, the mother concluded that it would not be financially possible for T.J. to participate in the Parkwood outpatient treatment program. The mother then called the Tate County Youth Services Counselor (“counselor”) and expressed these concerns. The counselor contacted Judge Darby and, following their conversation, informed the mother that if she refused to leave T.J. at Park-wood, then she would be held in contempt by Judge Darby and could be jailed. Despite that warning, T.J. and her mother left Parkwood that morning.

¶ 7. At 11:30 a.m., the counselor called the mother and instructed her to be in Judge Darby’s court for a 2:00 p.m. hearing. It is undisputed that (1) no pleadings had been filed which alleged that the mother was in contempt of court, (2) the mother was not provided written notice of the hearing, (3) the mother was not given a reasonable amount of time to prepare for the hearing, and (4) the mother was not afforded the opportunity to obtain counsel. At the conclusion of the hearing, of which there is no record, the mother was found in contempt of court for failing to admit T.J. for treatment at Parkwood. Judge Darby ordered the mother to report to the Tate County Jail at 3:00 p.m., to be taken into the custody of the Tate County Sheriff, and to be held there until further order of the court. Three days later, on July 19, 2010, the mother was released from custody after being brought back before Judge Darby.

¶ 8. On December 18, 2010, based upon the citizen complaint of the mother, the Commission filed a “Formal Complaint” against Judge Darby. The “Formal Complaint” provided that Judge Darby had violated various Canons of the Code of Judicial Conduct and engaged in conduct actionable pursuant to Section 177A of the Mississippi Constitution. Counsel for Judge Darby filed her “Answer to Formal Complaint.”

¶ 9. Subsequently, “in lieu of a hearing!!,]” the Commission and Judge Darby, through her counsel, filed an “Agreed Statement of Facts and Proposed Recommendation.” Judge Darby agreed that she had violated Canons l, 2A, and 3B(2) of the Code of Judicial Conduct “when she wrongly imposed sanctions against [the mother] for contempt of court without first affording her the due process rights required in a criminal contempt matter.” She farther agreed that such conduct was actionable pursuant to Section 177A of the Mississippi Constitution, “as said conduct constitutes misconduct in office and conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice which brings the judicial office into disrepute.” The jointly proposed recommendation to the Commission was a public reprimand, a $500 fine, and assessed costs of $100.

¶ 10. The Commission unanimously agreed to “accept and adopt the Agreed Statement of Facts and Proposed Recommendation and recommend to the Mississippi Supreme Court that [Judge Darby] be publicly reprimanded, fined $500.00 and assessed cost[s].” That recommendation was incorporated in the “Commission Findings of Fact and Recommendation,” which revealed that the Commission’s conclusion was based upon the evidence presented, Judge Darby’s history with the Commission, the mitigating factor of Judge Darby “acknowledging] her actions and ... cooperating] fully with the Commission in its investigation[,]” and the other factors delineated in Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance v. Gibson, 883 So.2d 1155 (Miss.2004), overruled in part by Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance v. Boone, 60 So.3d 172 (Miss.2011).

¶ 11. This matter has been presented to this Court, pursuant to Section 177A of the Mississippi Constitution and Rule 10A of the Rules of the Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance. See Miss. Const, art. 6, § 177A; Miss. Comm’n on Judicial Performance R. 10A.

ISSUES

¶ 12. This Court will consider:

(1) Whether Judge Darby’s conduct violated Canons 1, 2A, and 3B(2) of the Mississippi Code of Judicial Conduct and was actionable pursuant to Section 177A of the Mississippi Constitution.
(2) Whether Judge Darby should be publicly reprimanded, fined $500 pursuant to Section 177A of the Mississippi Constitution, and assessed costs of $100.

ANALYSIS

¶ 13. “Our state constitution states that this Court has authority to sanction a judge ‘[o]n recommendation of the commission on judicial performance....’ ... [I]n cases coming to us from the [Commission], the Court, in making a ‘final determination of the appropriate action to be taken in each case, ... conduces] an independent inquiry of the record’ .... ” Boone, 60 So.3d at 176 (quoting Miss. Const. art. 6, § 177A (1890); In re Anderson, 412 So.2d 743, 746 (Miss.1982)).

I. Whether Judge Darby’s conduct violated Canons 1, 2A, and 3B(2) of the Mississippi Code of Judicial Conduct and was actionable pursuant to Section 177A of the Mississippi Constitution.

¶ 14. In the “Agreed Statement of Facts and Proposed Recommendation,” Judge Darby acknowledges that, by “wrongly imposing] sanctions against [the mother] for contempt of court without first affording her the due process rights required in a criminal contempt matter[,]” she violated Canons 1, 2A, and 3B(2) of the Code of Judicial Conduct and engaged in conduct actionable pursuant to Section 177A of the Mississippi Constitution. This Court agrees.

¶ 15. According to Judge Darby, the power she exercised was one of criminal contempt. A finding of criminal contempt was based upon Jackson’s failure to admit T.J. to Parkwood. As that act occurred “in whole or in part ... outside the presence of the judge[,]” it was a form of “indirect” or “constructive” criminal contempt. Graves, 66 So.3d at 153. See also Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. McGill, 890 So.2d 859, 868 (Miss.2004) (quoting In re Williamson, 838 So.2d 226, 237 (Miss.2002)) (“constructive contempt involves actions which are committed outside the presence of the court.”). This Court has stated that a finding of “indirect” criminal contempt requires the existence of a valid, prior court order. See Graves, 66 So.3d at 153 (citing Premeaux v. Smith, 569 So.2d 681, 684 (Miss.1990)). The “Agreed Statement of Facts and Proposed Recommendation” acknowledges that, at the time of the contempt proceeding, “no written Order had been issued by [Judge Darby] memorializing the verbal directions given to” the mother at either the June 7, 2010, hearing or the June 14, 2010, review hearing. (Emphasis added.) Furthermore, the “Detention Order” and “Review Order” (both filed post-hearing on August 19, 2010) provided only, in pertinent part, that T.J. was “to be taken immediately to a mental/behavioral health center for assessment and evaluation[;]” that an “appointment for T.J. with Communicare shall be made as soon as possible[;]” and that once T.J. had health insurance coverage, “she shall return to Parkwood to complete the evaluation and assessment process.” Despite the absence of these written orders, the mother arguably complied with each of these directions.

¶ 16. Additionally, in cases of “indirect” criminal contempt, “defendants must be provided with procedural due process safeguards, including a specification of charges, notice, and a hearing.” Cooper Tire, 890 So.2d at 868 (quoting In re Williamson, 838 So.2d at 237). See also Graves, 66 So.3d at 154 (in cases of “indirect” criminal contempt, the accused con-temnor is “entitled to due-process notice and a hearing”); Miss. Comm’n on Judicial Performance v. Byers, 757 So.2d 961, 970 (Miss.2000) (quoting Purvis v. Purvis, 657 So.2d 794, 798 (Miss.1994)) (“procedural safeguards required for a charge of constructive contempt ... are: ‘... a specific charge, notice and a hearing’ ”). Judge Darby concedes that she “failed to provide [the mother] with due process or otherwise comply with the procedural safeguards outlined in [Cooper Tire ].”

¶ 17. Finally, “in cases of indirect or constructive criminal contempt, ‘where the trial judge has substantial personal involvement in the prosecution, the accused contemnor must be tried by another judge.’ ” Graves, 66 So.3d at 154 (quoting Cook v. State, 483 So.2d 371, 376 (Miss.1986)). See also Cooper Tire, 890 So.2d at 869 (“a person charged with constructive criminal contempt is afforded certain procedural safeguards. The citing judge must recuse himself from conducting the contempt proceedings involving the charges.”). As the “citing judge,” Judge Darby abused her contempt powers by failing to recuse herself from this “indirect” criminal contempt proceeding. Id.

¶ 18. The “misuse of the contempt power is prejudicial to the administration of justice....” Miss. Comm’n on Judicial Performance v. Sanders, 749 So.2d 1062, 1069 (Miss.1999). This Court previously has found that similar abuses of contempt powers violated Canons 1 and 2A of the Code of Judicial Conduct and were actionable pursuant to Section 177A of the Mississippi Constitution. See Miss. Comm’n on Judicial Performance v. Gunter, 797 So.2d 988, 990 (Miss.2001); Miss. Comm’n on Judicial Performance v. Willard, 788 So.2d 736, 743 (Miss.2001); Byers, 757 So.2d at 972; Sanders, 749 So.2d at 1070. As to Canon 3B(2), this Court concludes that Judge Darby’s conduct in the “indirect” criminal contempt proceeding plainly violated that Canon’s requirement of being “faithful to the law....”

¶ 19. As Judge Darby’s conduct violated Canons 1, 2A, and 3B(2) of the Code of Judicial Conduct and was actionable pursuant to Section 177A of the Mississippi Constitution, this Court next addresses “the appropriate sanctions to impose” upon Judge Darby. Sanford, 941 So.2d at 213.

II. Whether Judge Darby should be publicly reprimanded, fined $500 pursuant to Section 177A of the Mississippi Constitution, and assessed costs of $100.

¶ 20. Under Section 177A of the Mississippi Constitution, “[o]n recommendation of the commission on judicial performance, the supreme court may remove from office, suspend, fine or publicly censure or reprimand any justice or judge of this state-” Miss. Const. art. 6, § 177A. Fundamentally, the sanction(s) “ought [to] fit the offense” and there should be a “principled consistency with other like cases.” In re Bailey, 541 So.2d 1036, 1039 (Miss.1989). In examining the appropriateness of the sanction(s), the following factors should be considered:

(1) The length and character of the judge’s public service; (2) Whether there is any prior case law on point; (3) The magnitude of the offense and the harm suffered; (4) Whether the misconduct is an isolated event or evidences a pattern of conduct; (5) Whether moral turpitude was involved; and (6) The presence or absence of mitigating or aggravating circumstances.

Gibson, 883 So.2d at 1158.

(1) The length and character of the judge’s public service

¶ 21. Judge Darby was appointed to serve as Family Master/Youth Court Judge for the Third Chancery Court District in the fall of 2007. She hears all involuntary commitment actions, as well as youth-court matters, including the Tate County Juvenile Drug Court. She is a member and past board member of the Tate County Rotary Club. She serves as a trustee of the Senatobia Municipal School District endowment for education. She is a member of the Sardis Church of Christ.

(2) Whether there is any prior caselaw on point.

¶ 22. In the similar abuse-of-contempt-powers cases noted in ¶ 18 supra, comparable sanctions were imposed. See Gunter, 797 So.2d at 992 (public reprimand, $1,500 fine, and assessed costs of the proceeding, although other offenses were involved); Willard, 788 So.2d at 746 (removal from office and assessed costs of the proceeding, although numerous other offenses were involved); Byers, 757 So.2d at 973 (public reprimand, $1,500 fíne, and assessed costs of the proceeding, although other offenses were involved); Sanders, 749 So.2d at 1073 (public reprimand and assessed costs of the proceeding ($2,156.80)).

(3) The magnitude of the offense and the harm suffered

¶ 23. Judge Darby’s failure to adhere to proper procedure when exercising her contempt powers is serious, given the deprivation of liberty in this matter. Her actions caused a definite negative impact on the lives of the mother and her family.

(If) Whether the misconduct is an isolated event or evidences a pattern of conduct.

¶24. Judge Darby does not have any prior history with the Commission.

(5) Whether moral turpitude was involved.

¶ 25. According to the “Memorandum Brief in Support of Joint Motion for Approval of Recommendations Filed by the Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance,” Judge Darby “abused the judicial process by incarcerating an individual for indirect criminal contempt without providing her with the basic rights of due process thereby constituting moral turpitude.” This Court has stated that “moral turpitude” includes “actions which involve interference with the administration of justice, misrepresentation, fraud, deceit, bribery, extortion, or other such actions which bring the judiciary into disrepute.” Miss. Comm’n on Judicial Performance v. Osborne, 16 So.3d 16, 24 (Miss.2009) (“Osborne IV”) (citation omitted). Under that standard, this Court concludes that Judge Darby’s conduct did not rise to the level of moral turpitude. But the absence of moral turpitude does not alter this Court’s agreement with the recommended sanction. See ¶ 27 infra.

(6) The presence or absence of mitigating or aggravating circumstances

¶ 26. Judge Darby acknowledged her errors by entering into the “Agreed Statement of Facts and Proposed Recommendation,” without the necessity of a hearing, and cooperating with the Commission in its investigation.

Analysis

¶ 27. Taking into account the Gibson factors, most notably, the fact that Judge Darby has no prior history before the Commission, the comparable sanctions imposed in similar abuse-of-contempt-powers cases, and Judge Darby’s cooperation with the Commission and agreement with the recommended sanction, this Court concludes that the recommended sanction “fit[s] the offense” and is consistent “with other like cases.” In re Bailey, 541 So.2d at 1039. Accordingly, the appropriate sanction is for Judge Darby to be publicly reprimanded, fined $500, and assessed costs of $100.

CONCLUSION

¶ 28. After conducting an independent review of the record, this Court finds that Judge Darby’s conduct violated Canons 1, 2A, and 3B(2) of the Mississippi Code of Judicial Conduct and was actionable pursuant to Section 177A of the Mississippi Constitution. We order that Judge Darby be publicly reprimanded, fined $500, and assessed costs of $100.

¶ 29. TATE COUNTY YOUTH COURT JUDGE LEIGH ANN DARBY SHALL BE PUBLICLY REPRIMANDED, FINED $500, AND ASSESSED COSTS OF $100. THE PUBLIC REPRIMAND SHALL BE READ IN OPEN COURT BY THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE TATE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT ON THE FIRST DAY OF THE NEXT TERM OF THAT COURT IN WHICH A JURY VENIRE IS PRESENT AFTER THE ISSUANCE OF THIS COURT’S MANDATE, WITH JUDGE DARBY IN ATTENDANCE.

WALLER, C.J., CARLSON AND DICKINSON, P.JJ., KITCHENS, CHANDLER AND KING, JJ„ CONCUR. LAMAR AND PIERCE, JJ., NOT PARTICIPATING.

      . The “Facts” are largely taken from the "Agreed Statement of Facts” filed by the Commission and Judge Darby.

      . The “Agreed Statement of Facts” provided that the mother was employed as a janitor and that the subject employee health-care coverage had a $500 deductible.

      . No written orders from Judge Darby had been signed at the time. On August 19, 2010, a "Detention Order” dated June 7, 2010, but not signed until August 18, 2010, was filed. That order provided, in pertinent part, that T.J. was to be placed on "strict house arrest[,]” was to "be taken immediately to a mental/behavioral health center for assessment and evaluation^]” and that "[t]his cause shall be set for a review of this on June 14, 2010....”

      .No written orders from Judge Darby had been signed at the time. On August 19, 2010, a "Review Order” dated June 14, 2010, but not signed until August 18, 2010, was filed. That order provided, in pertinent part, that "[a]n appointment for [T.J.] with Communi-care shall be made as soon as possible!,]” and that "[o]nce [T.J.] is covered under some type of health insurance, she shall return to Park-wood to complete the evaluation and assessment process.”

      . Canon 1 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides, in pertinent part, that "[a] judge should participate in establishing, maintaining, and enforcing high standards of conduct, and shall personally observe those standards so that the integrity and independence of the judiciary will be preserved.”

      . Canon 2A of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides that "[a] judge shall respect and comply with the law and shall act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary."

      . Canon 3B(2) of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides that "[a] judge shall be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence in it. A judge shall not be swayed by partisan interests, public clamor, or fear of criticism.”

      . This Court recently distinguished the purposes of civil and criminal contempt, as follows:
      [jludges use the power of civil contempt to compel compliance with their instructions, admonitions, and previous orders; and they use the power of criminal contempt to punish inappropriate behavior, such as insulting remarks to the courts, or acts that demonstrate the accused "wilfully and deliberately ignored the order of the court.”

        Graves v. State, 66 So.3d 148, 151 (Miss.2011) (citations omitted).