author: WOODALL, Justice.

text:
    RIVERSTONE DEVELOPMENT CO., INC., and Southern Heritage, LLC v. Roy T. NELSON and Fieldstone Land Company, LLC.
    1101498.
    Supreme Court of Alabama.
    March 9, 2012.

      John F. DeBuys, Jr., and Devin C. Do-live of Burr & Forman, LLP, Birmingham, for appellants.
    Kenneth H. Looney, Scottsboro, for ap-pellees.
   WOODALL, Justice.

Riverstone Development Co., Inc. (“Riv-erstone”), and Southern Heritage, LLC (“Heritage”), appeal from a judgment dismissing, pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1), Ala. R. Civ. P., an action in which they had intervened as defendants. We reverse and remand.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

This dispute involves a number of individuals and entities who claim, or at various times have claimed, some right or title in one or more parcels of land lying along and north of County Road 88 in Jackson County. One such parcel is described as “Tract Number 10 of Jones’s Cove Estates, a subdivision located in Jackson County, Alabama” (“tract 10”). A second such parcel is known as the Pinnacle Cove Subdivision (“Pinnacle”), which lies north of, and contiguous to, tract 10.

The case began on December 12, 2005, when Roy T. Nelson filed a “complaint for specific performance” against Fieldstone Land Company, LLC (“Fieldstone”). The complaint averred that Nelson had been the high bidder for tract 10 at a public auction held on May 21, 2005, and sought a judgment ordering Fieldstone to “execute a deed to [Nelson] conveying the real property] to Nelson.” Fieldstone answered the complaint on January 17, 2006. (C., at 27.) The answer included a motion, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ. P., to dismiss the complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”

On January 28, 2007, Fieldstone executed a warranty deed to tract 10 in favor of Garner Properties, LLC (“Garner”). On December 16, 2008, Garner filed a motion to intervene in Nelson’s action “for purpose of joining [Fieldstone] in defending against [Nelson’s] claim” to tract 10. The trial court granted Garner’s motion on January 9, 2009, and, on January 28, 2009, Gamer filed its answer. (C., at 42.) In its answer, Garner asserted a counterclaim in the form of a request for a judgment declaring that it was “the sole owner of [tract 10] and that neither.the Plaintiff, Roy T. Nelson, nor [Fieldstone] ha[d] any right, claim or interest in any of such property.”

On December 29, 2009, Riverstone and Heritage moved to intervene in the action “to join [Fieldstone and Garner] in their defense against [Nelson’s] claim.” River-stone and Heritage alleged that they were the current and former owner, respectively, of Pinnacle. They averred that, before selling Pinnacle to Riverstone, Heritage had acquired from Fieldstone and Garner permission to construct a road across tract 10 as a means of ingress and egress to Pinnacle. They alleged that Nelson’s “assertion and publication of his alleged ‘right’ to acquire Tract 10 ha[d] defeated Riverstone’s ability to develop Tract 10 and [Pinnacle] as planned.” The trial court granted that motion on January 6, 2010, and, on January 12, 2010, Riverstone and Heritage filed an answer to the complaint. (C., at 48.)

On November 8, 2010, a motion styled “joint motion to dismiss by Plaintiff and Defendant” was filed. It was signed by Nelson and Stanley E. Stephens, as “managing member of [Fieldstone].” Two days later, Riverstone and Heritage filed a “motion for leave to file a counterclaim and opposition to ‘joint motion to dismiss.’” Riverstone and Heritage averred that, when Riverstone acquired Pinnacle, the road construction was in progress, and Riverstone contracted with a Guntersville realtor “to market and pre-sell lots in Pinnacle.” They alleged that Nelson subsequently asserted his rights in tract 10, thereby “creating] a cloud on the title of tract 10,” and caused the realtor “to terminate its efforts to market lots in [Pinnacle].” In their proposed counterclaim, Riverstone and Heritage asserted claims against Nelson alleging (1) intentional interference with business relations, (2) slander of title, and (3) abuse of process.

On April 8, 2011, the trial court entered a judgment, denying the motion of Heritage and Riverstone for leave to file counterclaims and dismissing the case. In so doing, the trial court stated, in pertinent part:

“The court has before it the ‘Joint Motion to Dismiss’ by [Nelson] and [Fieldstone], filed November 8, 2010, as well as the objection thereto filed by [Riverstone] and [Heritage]....
“On November 10, 2010, two days after the Joint Motion to Dismiss was filed, a Motion to File a Counterclaim as well as an opposition to the Joint Motion to dismiss was filed by [Riverstone] and [Heritage]. Ordinarily, the Motion to File a Counterclaim would be granted as a routine matter and, but for the previously filed Motion to Dismiss, it would be so in the instant case.
“Rule 41 of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure states in the pertinent part that:
“ ‘Rule 41. Dismissal of Actions
“ ‘(a) Voluntary Dismissal: Effect Thereof.
“‘(1) By Plaintiff; By Stipulation. Subject to the provisions of Rule 23(e), of Rule 66, and of any statute of this state, an action may be dismissed by the plaintiff without order of court (i) by filing a notice of dismissal at any time before service by the adverse party of an answer or of a motion for summary judgment, whichever first occurs, or (ii) by filing a stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who have appeared in the action. Unless otherwise stated in the notice of dismissal or stipulation, the dismissal is without prejudice, except that a notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication upon the merits when filed by a plaintiff who has once dismissed in any court of Alabama, or of the United States, or of any state, an action based on or including the same claim.’
“Had the Plaintiffs and Defendant’s November 8, 2010, motion been entitled a ‘Notice of Dismissal,’ rather than a ‘Motion to Dismiss,’ there would be nothing for this court to decide, inasmuch as the case would have been dismissed and closed at that point even without order of the court.
“However, parties may dismiss their own claims at any time for any reason, ‘before service by the adverse party of an answer or of a motion for summary judgment, whichever first occurs.’ In fact, it may sometimes be appropriate or even advantageous for a party to dismiss his, her or its own claim before an answer, motion for summary judgment or counter-claim is filed. The court, therefore, construes the November 8, 2010, ‘Joint Motion to Dismiss’ as what it actually and more properly was, a ‘Notice of Dismissal.’ It is clear that this was the intent of the parties signing that motion. It was filed before an answer, motion for summary judgment or counter-claim was filed. The court finds that the motion filed November 8, 2010, had the effect of dismissing the case and the court so rules.”

(Emphasis added.) Heritage and River-stone appealed, contending that the trial court erred in treating the “motion to dismiss” as a “notice of dismissal,” in light of the facts that it (1) was not filed before adverse parties filed their answers, and (2) was not “signed by all parties who have appeared in the action,” as required by Rule 41(a)(1), Ala. R. Civ. P.

II. Discussion

“The purpose of Rule 41(a) is to facilitate voluntary dismissals but to limit them to an early stage of the proceedings before issue is joined.” Rule 41 (Committee Comments on 1973 Adoption) (emphasis added). If the conditions of Rule 41(a)(1) are satisfied, dismissal is automatic, that is, “[n]o order of the court is required.... [and] the notice [of dismissal] terminates the action....” 9 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2363, at 439-41 (3d ed.2008) (footnotes omitted) (commenting on Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(a)(1)); see also Greene v. Town of Cedar Bluff, 965 So.2d 773, 777-79 (Ala.2007). Dismissal under Rule 41(a)(1) is a question of law and, therefore, is reviewable de novo. See Matthews v. Gaither, 902 F.2d 877, 879 (11th Cir.1990) (reviewing Rule 41, Fed.R.Civ.P.).

On the other hand, if the conditions of Rule 41(a)(1) are not met, “ ‘voluntary dismissal can only be upon court order [under Rule 41(a)(2) ] and the court is given broad powers to prevent harassment of or inconvenience to the defendant by an arbitrary dismissal at this advanced stage of the case.’” Milliken v. South Realty Co., 628 So.2d 928, 930 (Ala.Civ.App.1993) (quoting Committee Comments on 1973 Adoption of Rule 41). See Rule 41(a)(2) (“Except as provided in paragraph (1) of this subdivision of this rule, an action shall not be dismissed at the plaintiffs instance save upon order of the court and upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper”). In the event of a dismissal under Rule 41(a)(2), “[a] defendant is not entitled to reversal unless he can show that the trial court failed to exercise or abused its discretion, or exercised an unpermitted discretion.” Bevill v. Owen, 364 So.2d 1201, 1203 (Ala.1979).

There is no contention by anyone in this case that the court had before it a “stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who have appeared in the action” as required by Rule 41(a)(1). The trial court merely recast the “motion to dismiss” signed by Nelson and Stephens as a “notice of dismissal.” In so doing, the trial court inexplicably overlooked Fieldstone’s answer, which clearly appeared of record, not to mention the similarly appearing answers of Garner and Heritage and Riverstone, which were filed after those entities were expressly permitted to intervene and before the filing of the motion to .dismiss. In so doing, the trial court labored under the mistaken view that the requirements of Rule 41(a)(1) had been satisfied and that the court, therefore, had no discretion but to dismiss the action. In so doing, it erred. Thus, the judgment of dismissal is reversed, and the case is remanded.

III. Conclusion

Because the trial court erred in treating the motion to dismiss as a nondiscretion-ary dismissal under Rule 41(a)(1), the judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded for the trial court to exercise the discretion as is proper for consideration of a motion to dismiss under Rule 41(a)(2).

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

MALONE, C.J., and BOLIN, MURDOCK, and MAIN, JJ., concur.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    Ex parte AMERICAN FAMILY CARE, INC. (In re American Family Care, Inc. v. Anita Salters).
    1101505.
    Supreme Court of Alabama.
    March 9, 2012.
    Douglas J. Centeno of Benton & Cen-teno, LLP, Birmingham, for petitioner.
    Larry Ray Mann, Birmingham, for respondent.
   WOODALL, Justice.

American Family Care, Inc. (“AFC”), has petitioned this Court for a writ of mandamus directing the Jefferson Circuit Court to vacate its order staying the civil action filed by AFC against Anita Salters. We grant the petition and issue the writ.

AFC is an acute/urgent-care medical provider with offices in Alabama and Tennessee. It conducts centralized billing for its services from its claims-processing center (“the center”), located in its corporate office in Hoover, Alabama.

Salters is a former employee of AFC. When she was hired, she executed a confidentiality agreement and agreed not to remove AFC’s property from its offices. Salters was the director of the center from 2007 to June 2010, when her employment was terminated. As the director, she was responsible for handling billing issues and claim audits performed by insurance companies and governmental agencies. In some instances, Salters had the only copies of communications related to billing inquiries and claim audits.

In April 2011, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) executed a search warrant at AFC’s corporate office. The FBI removed mostly billing records. After the search warrant was executed, AFC determined that it was missing corporate records it would need to defend itself against any criminal charges that might be filed as a result of the FBI investigation. According to AFC, several of its employees reported that Salters had been seen removing files and records from the corporate offices shortly before she was fired. AFC made written demand upon Salters for the return of the records, but she did not respond.

On May 27, 2011, AFC sued Salters in the Jefferson Circuit Court, seeking the return of any business records of AFC’S that Salters might have. On June 23, 2011, Salters answered the complaint, denying that she had removed any AFC records from its offices.

On July 7, 2011, the trial court, sua sponte, entered an order staying AFC’s action “until further notice.” The trial court expressed no reason for entering the indefinite stay. On July 12, AFC filed a motion to vacate the stay, which the trial court heard on August 11. According to AFC, at the hearing, the trial court was unable to provide it with any reason for the entry of the stay. On August 12, 2011, the trial court denied the motion to vacate the stay, and AFC timely petitioned this Court for mandamus review.

“A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that is available when a trial court has exceeded its discretion.” Ex parte Antonucci, 917 So.2d 825, 830 (Ala.2005). AFC argues that the trial court exceeded its discretion in entering, on its own motion and without explanation, an indefinite stay of AFC’s action against Salters seeking the return of its corporate records. We agree.

In considering a stay, courts must always be mindful of “[t]he interest of the plaintiff in proceeding expeditiously with the civil litigation ... and the potential prejudice to the plaintiff of a delay in the progress of that litigation.” Ex parte Ebbers, 871 So.2d 776, 789 (Ala.2003). AFC’s interest in proceeding with its action against Salters is quite strong. Indeed, it has alleged that it “has a right to obtain its property back from Salters to protect itself in the federal investigation of [its] billing practices,” and it argues that it should not be required “to sit back and allow the federal investigation to proceed without the documentation that it needs to defend itself.” Petition, at 7. AFC’s arguments appear sound, and this Court has been provided with no argument or reasoning to the contrary.

It is well established that “[a] stay must not be ‘immoderate.’ ” Ortega Trujillo v. Conover & Co. Commc’ns, Inc., 221 F.3d 1262, 1264 (11th Cir.2000) (quoting CTI-Container Leasing Corp. v. Uiterwyk Corp., 685 F.2d 1284, 1288 (11th Cir.1982)). “In considering whether a stay is ‘immoderate,’ [appellate courts] examine both the scope of the stay (including its potential duration) and the reasons cited by the [trial] court for the stay.” Id. Clearly, the indefinite stay ordered by the trial court, with no stated justification for it, is immoderate and, consequently, beyond the scope of the trial court’s discretion.

For these reasons, we grant AFC’s petition and issue a writ of mandamus ordering the trial court to vacate its order staying AFC’s action against Salters.

PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.

MALONE, C.J., and BOLIN, MURDOCK, and MAIN, JJ., concur.

      . Salters has not opposed AFC’s petition for the writ of mandamus, and the trial court has chosen not to appear in this proceeding. See Rule 21(b), Ala. R.App. P.


author: PITTMAN, Judge.

text:
    T.C. v. C.E.
    2080763.
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    March 25, 2011.
    Stephen P. Johnson of Brackin, McGriff & Johnson, P.C., Foley, for appellant.
    Jennifer L. Evans of James B. Pittman, Jr., P.C., Daphne, for appellee.
   On Order of the Alabama Supreme Court and On Rehearing Ex Mero Motu

PITTMAN, Judge.

This court issued an opinion on December 11, 2009, reversing the Baldwin Juvenile Court’s judgment in favor of C.E. (“the mother”), and subsequently denied the mother’s application for a rehearing, prompting the mother to seek certiorari review. By an order dated July 6, 2010, the Alabama Supreme Court directed this court to “reconsider” our decision in this case in light of our decision in Ex parte T.C., 63 So.3d 627 (Ala.Civ.App.2010), to the effect that the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to hear a custody-modification action involving these same parties brought after this court’s December 11, 2009, decision. Ex parte C.E. (No. 1090624). We have placed this case on rehearing ex mero motu, and, upon reexamination of the facts and legal authorities as directed by the Supreme Court, we now withdraw our previous decision in this appeal and substitute the following therefor.

T.C. (“the father”), who is the primary custodial parent of A.C. and Tr.C. (“the children”), appeals from a judgment of the juvenile court sustaining the objection of the mother and denying leave to the father to relocate with the children to Vernon, New York. The record reflects that the juvenile court awarded primary physical custody of the children to the father in 2006. On November 25, 2008, the father sent the mother a letter by certified mail notifying her of his plan to relocate with the children to Vernon, New York, at the end of the 2008-2009 school year; that notice was in substantial compliance with the requirements of the Alabama Parent-Child Relationship Protection Act (“the Act”), Ala.Code 1975, § 30-3-160 et seq., concerning the form of such notices. See generally Ala.Code 1975, § 30-3-165. In particular, the notice stated that the mother had “thirty days from the date of [the] notice to object to the relocation by filing a proceeding with the Court or the relocation will be permitted.”

Although the mother, through her counsel, apparently sent a letter to the father on December 2, 2008, indicating that she objected to the proposed relocation, the record does not indicate that the mother initiated a civil action in the juvenile court objecting to the proposed relocation until February 9, 2009, more than 30 days after receipt of the notice. The father filed a motion to dismiss the mother’s action, asserting that the mother had not brought her action within 30 days of receipt of the notice of the planned relocation as required by Ala.Code 1975, § 30-3-169. The juvenile court, at the outset of trial on May 6, 2009, denied the father’s motion, stating: “I am not going to be that strict with a law that has had very little interpretation anywhere. I am not going to be that strict on the form stuff. I would rather deal [with] substance so I am going to deny your motion to dismiss.” After receiving testimony and documentary evidence, the juvenile court stated on the record that it would “deny the request for the move, because I just think it’s in the best interest for y’all to be in this place.” The juvenile court then entered a judgment denying leave to relocate, from which the father has timely appealed.

The father contends on appeal that the juvenile court erred in denying his motion to dismiss. We agree. Section 30-3-169, Ala.Code 1975, expressly states:

“The person entitled to determine the principal residence of a child may change the principal residence of a child after providing notice as provided herein unless a person entitled to notice files a proceeding seeking a temporary or permanent order to prevent the change of principal residence of a child within 30 days after receipt of such notice.”

(Emphasis added.)

The proposition that the Act requires a person entitled to notice of a proposed residential change to institute a civil action objecting to the change, as the father argues, rather than making a mere extrajudicial objection, as the mother argues, within 30 days of receipt of a proper notice of a proposed relocation is corroborated by examination of other provisions of the Act. For example, under the Act, all orders or judgments containing child-custody determinations must include the following provision:

“ ‘If you, as the non-relocating party, do not commence an action seeking a temporary or permanent order to prevent the change of principal residence of a child within 30 days after receipt of notice of the intent to change the principal residence of the child, the change of principal residence is authorized.’

Ala.Code 1975, § 30-3-166 (emphasis added). To like effect is § 30-3-169.1(a), which provides that “[a] person entitled to ... visitation with a child may commence a proceeding objecting to a proposed change of the principal residence of a child,” and § 30-3-169.1(c), which provides that such a proceeding

“must be filed within 30 days of receipt of notice of a proposed change of principal residence of a child, except that the court may extend or waive the time for commencing such action upon a showing of good cause, excusable neglect, or that the notice required by subsection (b) of Section 30-3-165 is defective or insufficient upon which to base an action under this article.”

(Emphasis added.)

Although the provisions of the Act addressing the content of the notice itself refer simply to the need for the notice to warn the nonrelocating person “that an objection to the relocation must be made within 30 days of receipt of the notice or the relocation will be permitted,” Ala.Code 1975, § 30-3-165(b)(8) (see also § 30-3-166), the above-quoted provisions of the Act indicate that, as a matter of substantive law, the legislature envisioned that only an “objection” in the form of a civil action would operate to potentially defeat a primary custodian’s right to change the principal residence of a child. Further, although the mother contends that the juvenile court implicitly concluded that “good cause” or “excusable neglect” warranted deeming the mother’s February 2009 action to have been timely filed, see § 30-3-169.1(c), the juvenile court’s ruling on the motion to dismiss, quoted above, negates the proposition that its ruling was based upon anything other than a desire to construe the Act with lenity. Further, and more importantly, the mother made no showing at trial regarding her conduct in response to the father’s notice tending to show that her failure to do anything other than authorize her attorney to send a letter to the father objecting to the proposed relocation within 30 days of receiving notice was a product of “excusable neglect” or amounted to “good cause” so as to warrant permitting her to maintain her February 2009 action against the father.

We recognize, as the mother insists, that Alabama law reflects a general policy that children will usually benefit from contact with both parents. See Ala.Code 1975, §§ 30-3-150 and 30-3-160. However, in the specific area of child relocation, the legislature has seen fit to confer upon a primary custodial parent the absolute right to relocate upon providing notice in conformity with the Act if no civil action objecting to the proposed relocation is initiated within 30 days of receipt of the notice. Thus, in this case, the mother’s substantive right to commence her action objecting to the proposed relocation had been extinguished at the time she brought it, and the juvenile court, in the absence of a showing of good cause or excusable neglect, had no authority to resurrect that right under the guise of not being strict as to mere matters of form.

The juvenile court’s judgment is reversed, and the cause is remanded with instructions to dismiss the mother’s action. The mother’s attorney-fee request is denied.

ON REHEARING EX MERO MOTU: OPINION OF DECEMBER 11, 2009, ■WITHDRAWN; OPINION SUBSTITUTED; REVERSED AND REMANDED. ■

THOMPSON, P.J., and BRYAN, THOMAS, and MOORE, JJ„ concur.

       Note from the reporter of decisions: On February 12, 2010, a petition for certiorari review was filed in the Alabama Supreme Court. On July 6, 2010, the Supreme Court issued an order instructing the Court of Civil Appeals to reconsider its decision in this case in light of its decision on Ex parte T.C., 63 So.3d 627 (Ala.Civ.App.2010), and placing the case on its administrative docket pending the Court of Civil Appeals’ review.

      . That letter, the mother claimed, amounted to a timely ''objection'' that sufficed under Ala.Code 1975, §§ 30-3-165(b)(8) and 30-3-166, to warrant the relief granted by the juvenile court. Further, that letter predated the January 1, 2009, effective date of Act No. 2008-277, Ala. Acts 2008, the principal jurisdictional authority upon which Ex parte T.C. relied. As we hold herein, assuming that that unfiled "objection” equated to a court filing triggering the juvenile court's jurisdiction under pre-2009 laws to consider the matter of the proposed relocation, it was nevertheless insufficient to preserve the mother’s substantive rights to object to the proposed move under Ala.Code 1975, § 30-3-160 et seq. If our assumption is wrong, and the adoption of Act No. 2008-277 did operate to divest the juvenile court of jurisdiction to hear the mother’s action seeking an order preventing the father’s contemplated relocation, then that fact would constitute all the more reason for this court to mandate, as we did in our opinion on original deliverance in this case, that the juvenile court dismiss the mother’s action.

      . We note that the notice actually given to the mother in this case referred specifically to the necessity of "filing a proceeding with the Court.”


author: MURDOCK, Justice.

text:
    Ex parte C.E. (In re T.C. v. C.E.).
    1090624.
    Supreme Court of Alabama.
    July 29, 2011.

      James B. Pittman, Jr., and Jennifer L. Evans of James B. Pittman, Jr., P.C., Daphne, for petitioner.
    Submitted on petitioner’s brief only.
   MURDOCK, Justice.

C.E. (“the mother”) petitions this Court for a writ of certiorari to review the Court of Civil Appeals’ judgment reversing a judgment entered in the mother’s favor by the Baldwin Juvenile Court. See T.C. v. C.E., 91 So.Sd 684 (Ala.Civ.App.2011). This case concerns a dispute between the mother and T.C. (“the father”) over the father’s proposed relocation of the parties’ two minor children, A.M.C. and T.R.C (“the relocation action”). Because we determine that the Baldwin Juvenile Court and the Court of Civil Appeals lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, we hereby suspend the provisions of Rule 39(g) and (h), Ala. R.App. P., and summarily grant the writ. We vacate the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals and remand the case with instructions.

According to the facts presented in the mother’s petition and those provided in T.C. v. C.E., the mother and the father, who were not married, and the children initially resided in the State of New York. In 2003, they left New York and traveled the country in a motor home for approximately one year. In October 2004, they settled in Baldwin County.

In August 2006, the Baldwin Juvenile Court awarded the father primary physical custody of the children, awarded the mother visitation, and awarded the parties joint legal custody of the children. The nature of the juvenile court proceeding that resulted in the August 2006 custody award to the father is not disclosed in the Court of Civil Appeals’ opinion in T.C. v. C.E. or in the mother’s petition.

In November 2008, the father sent the mother a letter by certified mail. The letter notified the mother of the father’s plan to relocate with the children to Vernon, New York, at the end of the 2008-2009 school year. The notice apparently was in substantial compliance with the requirements of the Alabama Parent-Child Relationship Protection Act, Ala. Code 1975, § 30-3-160 et seq. (“the Relationship Protection Act”). In December 2008, the mother, through her counsel, sent the father a letter indicating that she objected to the proposed relocation of the children to New York.

In February 2009, the mother filed a petition in the juvenile court requesting that it enter an order prohibiting the father from relocating the children. The father filed a motion to dismiss the mother’s petition as untimely filed. The juvenile court denied the father’s motion, and it granted the substantive relief requested by the mother in her petition.

The father appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals. On December 11, 2009, that court issued an opinion in which it concluded that the mother had waived her right to file an action opposing the proposed relocation because her petition in the juvenile court was not timely filed. In so doing, the Court of Civil Appeals treated the action as one that was within the subject-matter jurisdiction of the juvenile court. Accordingly, it proceeded to discuss the merits of the parties’ respective positions as to the meaning of various procedural requirements and other provisions of the Relationship Protection Act and as to what substantive rights might ensue to one party based on the other party’s failure to comply with the Relationship Protection Act as interpreted by that court. Based on this discussion, it reversed the judgment of the juvenile court; it also directed the juvenile court to dismiss the mother’s petition. See T.C. v. C.E., supra (withdrawing original opinion of December 11, 2009, on rehearing ex mero motu). The mother then filed the present petition for a writ of certiorari with this Court seeking a review of the Court of Civil Appeals’ decision in the relocation action.

A few days after the Court of Civil Appeals issued its decision in T.C. v. C.E., the mother filed an action in the Baldwin Juvenile Court seeking a modification of custody (“the modification action”). See Ex parte T.C., 63 So.3d 627 (Ala.Civ.App. 2010). The father filed a motion to dismiss the modification action. Thereafter, the juvenile court entered a “status quo” order directing that the children remain in Alabama pending a final hearing in the modification action.

The father then filed a petition for a writ of mandamus with the Court of Civil Appeals. In his petition, the father contended that the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to hear the modification action “because of [the Court of Civil Appeals’] opinion in [T.C. v. C.E.] and the pending certiorari proceedings in [this Court].” See Ex parte T.C., 63 So.3d at 630. The Court of Civil Appeals concluded, however, “that the mother’s modification action suffered] from a more fundamental jurisdictional defect.” Ex parte T.C., 63 So.3d at 630 (emphasis added). It concluded that the 2006 custody proceeding in which the father was awarded physical custody and the mother and the father were awarded joint legal custody had not involved an adjudication that A.M.C. and T.R.C. were dependent, delinquent, or in need of supervision. The Court of Civil Appeals further observed that juvenile courts no longer had subject-matter jurisdiction over custody proceedings filed after January 1, 2009, except in instances where the juvenile court had previously made an adjudication that the child was dependent, delinquent, or in need of supervision. See Ex parte T.C., 63 So.3d at 630; see also Ala.Code 1975, § 12-15-117. Accordingly, the Court of Civil Appeals correctly concluded that the juvenile court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction in the modification action. Based on this conclusion, the Court of Civil Appeals granted the father’s petition for a writ of mandamus, directed the juvenile court to vacate its “status quo” order, and ordered the juvenile court to dismiss the modification action. 63 So.3d at 631. The mother filed a petition for a writ of certiorari seeking our review of the Court of Civil Appeals’ decision in Ex parte T.C. This Court denied the mother’s petition, without an opinion. See Ex parte C.E. (No. 1091354, Sept. 10, 2010), 63 So.3d 627 (Ala.2010).

While considering the mother’s petition for certiorari review in the present case, i.e., the relocation action, and after reviewing the Court of Civil Appeals’ decision in the modification action, this Court became concerned that, as the Court of Civil Appeals had concluded in its opinion in the modification action, the juvenile court similarly lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to address the merits of the mother’s petition in the present case. Specifically, we were concerned that the juvenile court, and by extension the Court of Civil Appeals, lacked subject-matter jurisdiction in the present case to address what the Relationship Protection Act does or does not require procedurally (these requirements being nonjurisdictional in nature), whether the mother had correctly followed the procedural requirements under the Relationship Protection Act, and the nature of any substantive rights that might ensue to the father as a result of any unwaived or unexcused failures of the mother in this regard. See Jean v. Jean, 32 So.3d 1274, 1277 (Ala.2009) (repeating the well settled rules that a judgment entered without subject-matter jurisdiction is void and that a void judgment will not support an appeal). On July 6, 2010, this Court entered an order in this case requiring “that the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals reconsider the decision in T.C. v. C.E. ... in light of the decision in Ex parte T.C.”

In response to this Court’s order, the Court of Civil Appeals placed T.C. v. C.E. on rehearing ex mero motu, withdrew its December 11, 2009, opinion, and issued a new opinion. See T.C. v. C.E., 91 So.3d at 684-85. In the new opinion, however, the Court of Civil Appeals did not actually decide the issue of the juvenile court’s subject-matter jurisdiction or its subject-matter jurisdiction. Instead, it made an assumption that subject-matter jurisdiction existed and, upon the predicate of this assumption, proceeded to reissue an opinion addressing the procedural requirements under the Relationship Protection Act and the substantive rights relating thereto as referenced above. The Court of Civil Appeals’ only substantive reference to the issue of the jurisdiction of the juvenile court occurs in a footnote:

“[The mother claims that her December 2008] letter [to the father] amounted to a timely ‘objection’ that sufficed under Ala.Code 1975, §§ 30-3-165(b)(8) and 30-3-166, to warrant the relief granted by the juvenile court. Further, that letter predated the January 1, 2009, effective date of Act No. 2008-277, Ala. Acts 2008, the principal jurisdictional authority upon which Ex parte T.C. relied. As we hold herein, assuming that that un-filed ‘objection’ equated to a court filing triggering the juvenile court’s jurisdiction under pre-2009 laws to consider the matter of the proposed relocation, it was nevertheless insufficient to preserve the mother’s substantive rights to object to the proposed move under Ala.Code 1975, § 30-3-160 et seq. If our assumption is wrong, and the adoption of Act No. 2008-277 did operate to divest the juvenile couH of jurisdiction to hear the mother’s action seeking an order preventing the father’s contemplated relocation, then that fact would constitute all the more reason for this couH to mandate, as we did in our opinion on original deliverance in this case, that the juvenile couH dismiss the mother’s action.”

T.C. v. C.E., 91 So.3d at 685 n. 1 (some emphasis in original; some emphasis added).

As noted above, the mother in her petition for certiorari review asks this Court to reverse the Court of Civil Appeals’ judgment in T.C. v. C.E. Specifically, the mother makes a number or arguments as to how the Court of Civil Appeals erred in its analysis of the Relationship Protection Act and how that Act applies in this case. We pretermit discussion of the correctness of the Court of Civil Appeals’ analysis as to these issues, however. Consistent with the opinion issued by the Court of Civil Appeals in the modification action, Ex parte T.C., we conclude that the juvenile court’s decision the mother seeks to reinstate is void for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction; the Court of Civil Appeals likewise lacked jurisdiction and should have dismissed the father’s appeal.

In its opinion in the present case, the Court of Civil Appeals conceded that the assumption that the mother’s unfiled December 2008 letter equated to filing a petition with the juvenile court might be incorrect. Nonetheless, that court reasoned that, because the mother had not timely filed her objection to the relocation under the Relationship Protection Act, and because “dismissal” of the mother’s petition by the juvenile court would be the correct result whether the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction or whether the mother had failed to timely file her objection, a decision as to the jurisdictional issue was unnecessary. T.C. v. C.E., 91 So.3d at 685 n. 1. We conclude, however, that there was a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction that prevented the Court of Civil Appeals from addressing the procedural requirements and substantive rights associated with the Relationship Protection Act when it reissued its opinion following this Court’s July 16, 2010, order.

The Court of Civil Appeals reached the merits of the ease before it premised upon what, as noted, was its “assumption” that the “unfiled ‘objection’ ” — the mother’s December 2008 letter — “equated to a court filing triggering the juvenile court’s jurisdiction.” 91 So.3d at 685 n. -1. This premise for the discussion that ensued is contrary to the plain language of the Relationship Protection Act. Section 30-3-169, Ala.Code 1975, states:

“The person entitled to determine the principal residence of a child may change the principal residence of a child after providing notice as provided herein unless a person entitled to notice files a proceeding seeking a temporary or permanent order to prevent the change of principal residence of a child within 30 days after receipt of such notice.”

(Emphasis added.) See also Ala.Code 1975, § 30-3-169.1(a) (“A person entitled to custody of or visitation with a child may commence a proceeding objecting to a proposed change of the principal residence of a child and seek a temporary or permanent order to prevent the relocation.”). Section 30-3-169.1(c) also clearly contemplates a “filing” with the appropriate court.

“A proceeding filed under this section must be filed within 30 days of receipt of notice of a proposed change of principal residence of a child, except that the court may extend or waive the time for commencing such action upon a showing of good cause, excusable neglect, or that the notice required by subsection (b) of Section 30-3-165 is defective or insufficient upon which to base an action under this article.”

(Emphasis added.)

The premise upon which the Court of Civil Appeals proceeded to discuss the merits of the case before it also was contrary to the general principle that the filing of a pleading with the proper judicial officer is necessary to invoke a trial court’s jurisdiction.

“Unless the subject matter is presented to the court in some other mode sanctioned by law, a petition or complaint must be filed in the court where the judgment is sought in order to confer jurisdiction on the court to render the judgment....
“The filing of a pleading is complete once it is delivered to and received by the proper officer to be kept on the court files.”

61B Am.Jur.2d Pleading § 850 (2010) (emphasis added); see, e.g., Rule 3(a), Ala. R. Civ. P.; Rule 12(A), Ala. R. Juv. P.; see also Boyd v. Garrison, 246 Ala. 122, 126, 19 So.2d 385, 388 (1944) (“A court cannot of its own motion assume jurisdiction. It is necessary that some person shall in a legal way invoke its action.”).

Thus, the letter sent by the mother to the father in December 2008 clearly did not invoke the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. Any consideration by the juvenile court and, thereafter, by the Court of Civil Appeals, of the nonjurisdictional procedural requirements imposed by the Relationship Protection Act, and the consequences for parties’ substantive rights that might ensue from any unwaived or unexcused failure to meet those requirements, was appropriate only if the jurisdiction of the juvenile court was properly invoked at some subsequent juncture. Because of the above-noted changes to § 12-15-117 that became effective January 1, 2009, divesting the juvenile courts of subject-matter jurisdiction over custody proceedings except in those instances where the child has been adjudicated dependent, delinquent, or in need of supervision, subject-matter jurisdiction over the filing made by the mother in February 2009 resided in the circuit court, not the juvenile court. There being no other purported basis for the assertion of jurisdiction by the juvenile court over this case, that court, and in turn the Court of Civil Appeals, lacked jurisdiction over it. Accordingly, both courts exceeded their authority in addressing the merits of the issues raised by the parties, as referenced above. The appropriate course for the Court of Civil Appeals in this case was to vacate its judgment, which is void for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, and direct the juvenile court to do likewise.

Because of the lack of jurisdiction by both the juvenile court and the Court of Civil Appeals, we suspend the provisions of Rule 39(g) and (h), Ala. R.App. P., and grant the mother’s petition for the purpose of vacating the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals and remanding the case to that court; the Court of Civil Appeals is directed to dismiss the appeal and to direct the juvenile court to vacate its judgment and dismiss the case.

WRIT GRANTED; JUDGMENT VACATED AND CAUSE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.

COBB, C.J., and WOODALL, STUART, BOLIN, PARKER, SHAW, MAIN, and WISE, JJ., concur.

      . The children are referred to as "A.C." and "Tr.C.” in the Court of Civil Appeals’ opinion. See T.C. v. C.E. and Ex parte T.C., 63 So.3d 627 (Ala.Civ.App.2010).

      . The mother attributes the move from New York to “numerous problems ..., including drug use.” It appears that the “drug use” to which she was referring was by the father's brother, not the father or the mother.

      . Although it is not clear from the Court of Civil Appeals' opinion in Ex parte T.C., based upon a comment made by Presiding Judge Thompson in his special writing in that case, it appears that the 2006 custody proceeding was a paternity action. Ex parte T.C., 63 So.3d at 631 (“The changes in the retention law affect cases like paternity cases, in which issues of custody, visitation, and child support are routinely decided.” (Thompson, P.J., concurring in part and concurring in the result)).

      . See Ex parte Young, 13 So.3d 886 (Ala. 2007).


text:
    T.C. v. C.E.
    2080763.
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    March 23, 2012.
    Stephen P. Johnson of Brackin, McGriff & Johnson, P.C., Foley, for appellant.
    Jennifer L. Evans of James B. Pittman, Jr., P.C., Daphne, for appellee.
   After Remand from the Alabama Supreme Court

PITTMAN, Judge.

The prior judgment of this court, see T.C. v. C.E., 91 So.3d 684 (Ala.Civ.App. 2011), has been vacated on certiorari review. See Ex parte C.E., 91 So.3d 687 (Ala.2011). In compliance with Ex parte C.E., we hereby dismiss the appeal taken in this cause with instructions to the juvenile court to vacate its judgment and to dismiss the case.

APPEAL DISMISSED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

THOMPSON, P.J., and BRYAN, THOMAS, and MOORE, JJ., concur.


text:
    BROTHERHOOD’S RELIEF & COMPENSATION FUND v. Ryan V. RAFFERTY.
    2090113.
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    April 1, 2011.
    Rehearing Denied Dec. 9, 2011.
    Certiorari Denied April 6, 2012 Alabama Supreme Court 1110372.

      David R. Donaldson and Dawn Stith Evans of Donaldson & Guin, LLC, Birmingham, for appellant.
    Frank G. Alfano of Waldrep, Stewart & Kendrick, LLC, Birmingham, for appellee.
   PITTMAN, Judge.

An unincorporated association, the Brotherhood’s Relief & Compensation Fund (“the Fund”), appeals from a judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court, Bessemer Division, awarding a railroad worker, Ryan V. Rafferty (“the employee”), benefits allegedly due him as a result of an adverse disciplinary action taken against him by the Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railroad Company (“the employer”). Because we conclude that the Fund did not act arbitrarily in determining that the employee’s conduct constituted a willful or intentional violation of one of the employer’s rules within the scope of a provision of the Fund’s internal constitution barring the award of benefits for such violations, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand the cause with instructions.

The record reveals that the Fund maintains a society for beneficial and protective purposes that is open, conditioned upon acceptance of an application and payment of dues, to transportation workers who are affiliated with railroad brotherhoods or unions. The Fund is governed by a constitution that provides that moneys paid into the Fund are for the benefit of its members, and that document further specifies that a member may make a claim for benefits, among other reasons, when that member is “held out of service,” that is, “relieved by [the member’s] employer from the performance of ... usual duties.” However, the Fund’s constitution also specifies that the term “held out of service” does not include employer discipline “because of any willful or intentional violation or infraction of any order or orders, rule or rules, regulation or regulations, expressed or implied, of [the member’s] employer” (emphasis added).

In 2005, the employer had in force a rule providing that while on duty or on the employer’s property, with the exception of railroad police officers, “employees must not have firearms or other deadly weapons.” The employer also had in force a rule prohibiting dishonest and immoral conduct. On October 18, 2005, after conducting an investigation and holding a hearing concerning the circumstances under which a loaded pistol was found inside a case on one of the employer’s locomotives on October 7, 2005, the employer dismissed the employee from its employment on the stated basis that he had violated the employer’s firearm-possession and dishonesty rules.

The employee then presented a claim to the Fund for “held out of service” benefits, averring in his claim that he had, by accident, left a pistol in his bag on the employer’s locomotive. An official of the Fund, after studying the transcript of the disciplinary hearing, responded by letter to the employee’s claim and informed the employee that the claim could not be approved because of provisions of the Fund’s constitution barring benefit awards based upon acts constituting misrepresentation of facts to an employer or acts amounting to willful or intentional rule violations. Pursuant to pertinent review provisions of the Fund’s constitution, the employee appealed from that adverse decision to the Fund’s board of directors. In January 2006, the board, after reviewing the available information regarding the employee’s claim, upheld the official’s determination that the employee’s claim was not valid under the Fund’s constitution.

The Fund’s constitution specifies that a party aggrieved by a decision of its board of directors may “appeal to [c]ourt” and allege an abuse of discretion in making a decision if certain procedural deadlines are met; however, the Fund’s constitution also specifies that “no appeal shall lie” from a determination by the board that an offense is willful or intentional. It is undisputed that the employee initiated an action in the trial court in compliance with the procedural deadlines specified in the Fund’s constitution. In that action, the employee, alleging breach-of-contract claims, sought an award of benefits not only from the Fund, but also from a separate entity (Locomotive Engineers and Conductors Mutual Protective Association, Inc. (“LEMPA”)) as a result of his dismissal.

In the trial court, the Fund moved for a summary judgment; however, that motion was deemed untimely by the trial court and was not ruled upon. A bench trial on the employee’s claims was then held. At the conclusion of the trial, both defendants orally moved for judgments in their favor; however, the trial court declined to rule on those motions and instead directed “all parties to submit proposed orders.” The trial court entered a judgment in favor of the employee and against both defendants, ruling that each defendant owed benefits in the amount of $20,160. The Fund appealed from that judgment, asserting that the trial court’s judgment amounts to an erroneous interference with its internal operations and an impermissible substitution of the trial court’s interpretation of the phrase “willful or intentional violation” for the Fund’s own interpretation of that phrase.

The claim asserted by the employee was simply that the Fund had breached a contract by failing to pay benefits that he claimed were due under the Fund’s constitution. Under Alabama law, the constitution of a voluntary association such as the Fund is indeed deemed to be in the nature of a binding contract between the association and its members. E.g., Mackey v. Moss, 278 Ala. 55, 59, 175 So.2d 749, 752 (1965). However, whatever free hand the judiciary may otherwise have in interpreting a contract between two natural persons, the courts are enjoined by precedent not to “interfere with the internal operations of a voluntary organization” and not to “substitute their own construction of rules, regulations, bylaws, constitutions, or other formal agreements for that of the organization where the organization’s interpretations are not contrary to the law or public policy.” Wilson v. Spruell, 403 So.2d 214, 217 (Ala. 1981). Thus, a civil action by a member of a voluntary association making allegations as to claimed errors or omissions occurring in the association’s business conduct, therefore, must fall upon deaf ears “except in cases such as fraud, arbitrary ruling or lack of jurisdiction.” McNulty v. Higginbotham, 252 Ala. 218, 221, 40 So.2d 414, 416 (1949). McNulty further notes that a voluntary association such as the Fund has plenary power to interpret and administer its own rules and regulations, that the decision of such an association is to be presumed correct, and that courts may not interpret and apply rules and regulations in a manner reserved to the governing body of the association. Id.

A notable example of the application of the principles we have discussed is Brotherhood, of R.R. Trainmen v. Barnhill, 214 Ala. 565, 108 So. 456 (1926), upon which the Fund relied in the trial court and again cited in its principal appellate brief. In Barnhill, a member of a voluntary brotherhood of railroad workers prevailed at trial on a claim that the brotherhood had breached a contract to remit “strike benefits” allegedly payable from a protective fund to the member, who had continued to remain on strike after the board of directors of the brotherhood had voted to terminate a strike. The rules of the brotherhood provided that its board of trustees had the authority, in the event of disagreement between the brotherhood’s president and its general grievance committee, to decide whether to terminate a strike, and that in that event the board’s decision would be both binding and final. The judgment in favor of the member was reversed on the basis that it contravened the rules of the brotherhood:

“[T]he power through the provisions of the brotherhood law to make the decision of their own officials and tribunals conclusive in respect to the extraordinary protective fund and all its strike benefits under its law ... [is] conclusive on the members, no fraud being charged. These institutions, operating for their members or a reasonable classification thereof for reasons of policy and that of its welfare, may adopt laws for their government, to be administered by themselves to its members, and require for the general benefit the surrender of no right that an individual may not waive. And [a member] is bound by that authority and law only so long as [the member] chooses to recognize that authority. Any other rule would impair the usefulness of such institutions, and render the duly constituted tribunals of such order practically useless.”

214 Ala. at 572, 108 So. at 462 (citations omitted).

The trial court, in its judgment, opined that the Fund owed a duty to the employee not to be “arbitrary or capricious” in deciding whether the employee’s claim was valid and proceeded to conclude, based upon testimony of the Fund’s corporate representative to the effect that “weapons at work are not payable,” that the Fund’s decision was arbitrary because, that court stated, the employee’s intent was not actually considered. We cannot conclude that the record supports the trial court’s ultimate conclusion that the Fund acted arbitrarily.

At the time the Fund initially denied the employee’s claim, it had before it the transcript of the employer’s investigative hearing concerning the employee’s connection with the presence of the firearm on the locomotive. At that hearing, at which a union representative appeared on the employee’s behalf, the employer’s Birmingham terminal manager (who was also the employee’s supervisor) was questioned concerning the employee’s intention with respect to bringing a firearm on the employer’s property; the terminal manager testified, in two responses during that line of questioning, that the employee had originally mentioned that he had brought the pistol “to show somebody” and that the employee had surmised that the pistol had fallen out of the bag used to carry the pistol. Although another witness at the hearing, a special agent with the employer’s “resource protection solutions” unit, testified that the employee had stated that he had “forgotten” the presence of the pistol in his bag when he reported to work, that transcript indicates that the agent spoke with the employee only after the employee had spoken with the terminal manager.

When questioned at the hearing about the terminal manager’s testimony that the employee had stated that he had brought the pistol to work to display to coworkers, the employee testified that he had made that statement “in panic” after having been awakened from two hours of sleep by a coworker who had telephoned to report that the pistol had been found. Further, although the employee maintained that he had gone “target shooting” with a friend before his work shift so as to explain the presence of the pistol in his bag, the employee did not present any testimony from the pertinent friend to corroborate the employee’s account. Finally, the reference in the employer’s dismissal letter to the rule regarding misrepresentations indicates that the employer deemed one or more of the statements made by the employee regarding his intentions to have been untruthful.

Pursuant to the Fund’s constitution, the Fund’s review of an employee’s claim for benefits based upon allegedly having been “held out of service” includes not only any transcript of an employer’s investigation, but also the claim notice itself and “all matters submitted by the member for consideration.” However, the employee submitted no such additional material to the Fund. Thus, the record on which the Fund’s decision to deny benefits was made contained evidence indicating that the employee, contrary to his claims of inadvertence, had actually planned to bring a firearm onto the employer’s property in order to display it.

Even if it is true, as the employee suggests and as the trial court determined in its judgment, that deposition testimony of the Fund’s president proves that the Fund has a pattern and practice of not granting any “held out of service” claims involving possession of firearms at work, that fact alone would not support a conclusion that the Fund’s decision to deny the employee’s claim in this case is arbitrary. As was more recently noted in the context of attorney discipline, “ ‘[wjhere there is room for two opinions, [an] action is not arbitrary and capricious even though one may believe an erroneous conclusion has been reached.’ ” Alabama State Bar v. Hallett, 26 So.3d 1127, 1140 (Ala.2009) (quoting Heinmiller v. Department of Health, 127 Wash.2d 595, 609, 903 P.2d 433, 440 (1995)). The facts of the employee’s claim as presented to the board would, at least, leave enough room for reasonable people to form' conflicting opinions regarding the employee’s intent. Further, as we have noted, only the board of directors’ opinion regarding the employee’s intent is material because the Fund’s constitution renders final the board’s discretionary decision regarding whether an offense made the basis of an employment action giving rise to a “held out of service” benefits claim is willful or intentional.

For the reasons stated herein, we conclude that the trial court erred in substituting its judgment for that of the Fund’s board of directors with respect to the pay-ability of the employee’s benefits claim in contravention of Alabama precedents mandating deference to the board’s decision. That court’s judgment in favor of the employee on his breach-of-contract claim against the Fund is, therefore, necessarily erroneous. We reverse the judgment and remand the cause for the Jefferson Circuit Court to enter a judgment in favor of the Fund on the employee’s claim.

REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

THOMPSON, P.J., and THOMAS and MOORE, JJ., concur.

BRYAN, J., concurs in the result, without writing.

      . We note that under Rule 56(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., a motion for a summary judgment may be made by a defendant "at any time”; although Rule 16(b)(2), Ala. R. Civ. P., authorizes a trial court to limit the time in a particular case for the filing of motions, no such scheduling order appears in the record on appeal.

      . LEMPA satisfied the judgment as to its liability and has not appealed.

      .The Fund has abandoned on appeal any reliance upon the provision in its constitution barring benefits when a claim is based, in whole or in part, upon misrepresentation of facts to an employer; thus, we will not address that provision.

      . Although the Fund's constitution expressly states that any alleged abuse of discretion on the part of the Fund’s board of directors is to be "adjudged in accordance with the statutes and decision of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania” and that the mutual rights of the Fund and its members are to be determined under Pennsylvania law, neither the Fund nor the employee asserted, pursuant to Rule 44.1, Ala. R. Civ. P., the potential applicability of Pennsylvania law to their dispute; thus, like the trial court did, we will apply Alabama law. Brad’s Indus., Inc. v. Coast Bank, 429 So.2d 1001, 1003 (Ala. 1983).

      . The trial court determined that the Fund had simply concluded that benefits were not payable for the sole reason that the incident had involved a weapon. The record as a whole, however, does not support that determination; the record instead reflects that, in denying benefits to the employee, the Fund relied on its belief that the employee’s action in carrying the weapon onto work premises was willful. That the Fund may also have had other reasons for denying benefits to the employee (some of which, the Fund believed, were sufficient in and of themselves to justify its decision) does not permit the conclusion that the Fund did not also deem its decision to deny the employee’s claim to be proper in light of the submissions to the Fund tending to show that the employee’s action had been willful.

      . Our conclusion obviates consideration of other reasons cited by the Fund's corporate manager in his deposition testimony as arguably falling within the two provisions of the Fund’s constitution cited by the Fund as authority for denial of the employee’s claim. But see Central of Georgia R.R. v. Rush, 286 Ala. 333, 339, 239 So.2d 763, 768 (1970) (Harwood, J., dissenting) ("The employment of the plaintiff did not require his exposure to the risk of carrying a pistol in his shirt pocket, and the plaintiff’s personal act in carrying the pistol was external to the course of his employment.”).


author: BRYAN, Judge. MOORE, Judge,

text:
    Calvin LAMAR v. Peyton A. LANGFORD III.
    2100416.
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    July 29, 2011.
    Rehearing Denied Feb. 3, 2012.
    Certiorari Denied April 6, 2012 Alabama Supreme Court 1110598.
    Calvin Lamar, pro se.
    Submitted on appellant’s brief only.
   BRYAN, Judge.

AFFIRMED. NO OPINION.

See Rule 53(a)(1) and (a)(2)(F), Ala. RApp. P.; Galaxy Cable, Inc. v. Davis, 58 So.3d 93, 99 (Ala.2010); Reynolds v. Colonial Bank, 874 So.2d 497, 503 (Ala.2003); Clemons v. State, 29 So.3d 181, 185 (Ala. Civ.App.2009); and ArvinMeritor, Inc. v. Handley, 12 So.3d 669, 693 (Ala.Civ.App. 2007).

This case was transferred to this court by the supreme court, pursuant to § 12-2-7(6), Ala. Code 1975.

The appellant’s “motion for a default judgment” is denied.

THOMPSON, P.J., and PITTMAN and THOMAS, JJ., concur.

MOORE, J., concurs specially.

MOORE, Judge,

concurring specially.

Although I concur to affirm the trial court’s judgment, I write to address my concerns with the language of the remand order previously entered by the Alabama Supreme Court in a related appeal and its ramifications on the outcome of Calvin Lamar’s appeals. See Lamar v. Langford (No. 1090252* July 22, 2010).

In 2008, Lamar filed a complaint against Peyton A. Langford III, requesting that the Autauga Circuit Court enter a judgment establishing the boundary line between their two properties. Langford filed an answer and a counterclaim seeking damages based on Lamar’s alleged removal of a fence that Langford asserted had formed the proper boundary line between their properties. On June 17, 2009, the trial court entered a judgment establishing the boundary line at issue, but that judgment did not address the counterclaim filed by Langford. On July 16, 2009, Lamar and Langford both' filed “post-judgment” motions to have the judgment set aside or revised. The trial court amended the judgment on October 7, 2009, but it still did not adjudicate the counterclaim. Lamar nevertheless filed a notice of appeal of the judgment to our supreme court on November 9, 2009.

Upon preliminary review, the supreme court discovered that Langford’s counterclaim remained unadjudicated, and the supreme court remanded the action to the trial court. In its remand order (“the remand order”), issued on July 22, 2010, the supreme court stated, in pertinent part:

“If you [the trial court] elect to enter the Rule 54(b)[, Ala. R. Civ. P.,] order, or any other final judgment, a supplemental record reflecting such action should be prepared and forwarded to [t]his Court within fourteen (14) days from the date shown on this remand order. The judgment will be considered final as of the date the new order is entered.
“Failure to respond within fourteen (14) days will result in dismissal of the appeal as being from a non-final order.”

On remand, the trial court, on August 11, 2010, entered a judgment in favor of Lang-ford on the counterclaim, awarding Lang-ford $1,116.75. The trial-court clerk then prepared and submitted to the supreme court a supplemental record containing the new judgment on August 30, 2010.

Ordinarily, a litigant aggrieved by a final judgment has 30 days in which to file with the trial court a postjudgment motion seeking to correct any alleged errors contained in the judgment. See Rule 59, Ala. R. Civ. P. However, because the language of the remand order in the present case required the trial court to submit the judgment entered on remand to the supreme court within 14 days, Lamar had only a very limited opportunity to file any post-judgment motion.

Lamar, in fact, filed a postjudgment motion regarding the August 11, 2010, judgment, but he did not do so until September 9, 2010, well after the judgment had been submitted to the supreme court. By that time, the supreme court had not only accepted the supplemental record on appeal, but had transferred the appeal to this court. See ' § 12-2-7(6), Ala.Code 1975. This court would have held the appeal in abeyance pending the outcome of Lamar’s postjudgment motion had that post-judgment motion been filed before this court had taken jurisdiction of the appéal. Rule 4(a)(5), Ala. R.App. P. However, because the postjudgment motion was not filed until after the supplemental record had been submitted, this court proceeded to decide the appeal, affirming the trial court’s judgment without an opinion. See Lamar v. Langford (No. 2090191, October 1, 2010), 92 So.3d 186 (Ala.Civ.App.2010) (table).

The trial court subsequently purported to deny Lamar’s postjudgment motion as moot based on this court’s disposition of the prior appeal. Lamar now appeals from the purported denial of his post-judgment motion. We cannot, however, consider this appeal because the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the postjudgment motion. When Lamar filed his post-judgment motion on September 9, 2010, this court, by virtue of the language of the supreme court’s remand order in the prior appeal and the transfer of that appeal, held exclusive jurisdiction over the action, thereby depriving the trial court of jurisdiction. See Reynolds v. Colonial Bank, 874 So.2d 497, 503 (Ala.2003). Because the case was finally decided in the appellate courts, the trial court never regained jurisdiction.

The end result of this procedural quagmire is that the substance of the post-judgment motion Lamar filed on September 9, 2010, has never been considered by either the trial court or any appellate court: That result could have been avoided if Lamar had filed a motion to stay enforcement of the remand order with our supreme court so that he could pursue his postjudgment motion. See, e.g., Jones Express, Inc. v. Jackson, 86 So.3d 298, 302 (Ala.2010) (on remand from the supreme court, the appellant sought to stay the pending appeal so that the trial court could address the pending postjudgment motion, which had not been addressed in the supreme court’s remand order). However, Lamar, acting pro se, did not seek a stay, and, as a result, the trial court and this court were bound to follow the procedural course set in motion by the supreme court’s remand order. See Ex parte Edwards, 727 So.2d 792, 794 (Ala.1998) (quoting Ex parte Alabama Power Co., 431 So.2d 151, 155 (Ala.1983), quoting in turn 5 Am.Jur.2d Appeal and Error § 991 (1962)) (“ ‘ “It is the duty of the trial court, on remand, to comply strictly with the mandate of the appellate court....’” ”).

To avoid what I perceive to be an injustice, I urge the supreme court, and this court to the extent it utilizes similar language, to modify its standard remand order to account for postjudgment practice. Until such modifications are made, hopefully this writing will alert the members of the Bar to the potential pitfalls that accompany such orders.

      . The remand order actually required that the supplemental record be transmitted, and, by implication, that a final judgment be entered, no later than-August 5, 2010 — i.e., the 14th day following the date of the remand order, July 22, 2010. However, neither party asserted the untimeliness of the trial court's actions, and it appears that the supreme court chose to assume jurisdiction of the action, rather than dismiss it, despite the untimely entry of the judgment on remand and the untimely transfer of the supplemental record.

      . Lamar also filed a Rule 60(a), Ala. R. Civ. P., motion to correct entries in the trial court's case-action-summary sheet. On appeal, Lamar makes no argument as to any alleged error committed by the trial court in regard to that motion, so I do not address it. See Galaxy Cable, Inc. v. Davis, 58 So.3d 93, 99 (Ala.2010) ("Failure by an appellant to argue an issue in [his] brief waives that issue and precludes it from consideration on appeal.”).


text:
    Beverly WILMORE and Charles WILMORE v. Kendall WILMORE.
    2100101.
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    Aug. 19, 2011.
    Rehearing Denied March 23, 2012.

      Joan-Marie Dean, Huntsville, for appellants.
    Jay E. Stover of Stover, Stewart & Phillips, LLC, Gadsden, for appellee.
   PITTMAN, Judge.

Beverly Wilmore and Charles Wilmore (“the Wilmores”) appeal from a judgment entered against them in a declaratory-judgment action that also determined Charles Wilmore to be in contempt of court.

Bradley Wilmore (“the former husband”) and Kendall Wilmore (“the former wife”) were divorced in September 2005 by a judgment of the Etowah Circuit Court. According to certain provisions in that divorce judgment, the former wife was awarded all right, title, and interest in the marital residence; in addition, the former wife was to satisfy the note secured by a mortgage on the marital residence.

In December 2006, the former wife filed a declaratory-judgment action seeking a judicial determination as to the proper amount necessary to pay off the note secured by the mortgage on the former marital residence, which was held by the Wil-mores, the former husband’s parents. In October 2007, the former wife filed a separate action seeking an adjudication that the former husband was in contempt of court for having refused to pay any child support or alimony since the divorce judgment had been entered. That litigation ran parallel to the declaratory-judgment action until May 2009, when the trial court consolidated the two cases for the purpose of scheduling a hearing on all pending claims. Following numerous continuances, the trial court conducted an ore tenus proceeding on November 9, 2009. Present at that hearing were the former wife, the former husband’s father, and counsel for the parties; the former husband did not appear.

On December 7, 2009, the trial court entered a judgment determining that the former husband was in contempt of court. In addition, the trial court ordered the former husband’s father to produce certain documents relating to a family-farm trust and specific documents regarding the outstanding debt owed on the former marital residence; the trial court scheduled a final hearing in the declaratory-judgment action to be held in April 2010. Following additional continuances, the trial court rescheduled the final hearing for July 2, 2010. On June 30, the Wilmores filed a “notice of compliance” with the trial court; the next day, the Wilmores filed a motion to dismiss. Attached to that motion was a copy of an Indiana quitclaim deed by which the Wilmores attempted to convey the former marital residence to the former husband and the former wife jointly; that deed specifically noted that “[t]he resolution of all indebtedness due and owing grantors from granteefs] ... having been resolved by the [Indiana] Circuit [Court] ... and embodied in the judgment issued therein, all grantors’ interests in and to the subject ... property are hereby wholly released.” The trial court denied the Wil-mores’ motion to dismiss and conducted a final hearing on July 2, 2010.

At the outset of that hearing, at which neither of the Wilmores attended, the Wil-mores’ counsel unsuccessfully attempted to withdraw. Although the former husband had been ordered to attend, he was also absent from the proceeding; the former wife was the only party to attend the hearing. At the outset of the hearing, the trial judge noted on the record that the former husband’s father had been ordered to appear at trial and to produce certain financial documents to aid the court in resolving the financial issues presented in the declaratory-judgment action. The judge also stated on the record that the former husband’s father had failed to provide the requested documents or to appear in court for the trial on the merits. The trial judge then recited the following facts: that the former husband’s father had lied to the court during the previous hearing, that he had been warned by the court that his failure to produce the requested financial documents in a timely manner would subject him to contempt sanctions, and that in the motion to dismiss he had attempted to divest himself of a purported interest in the former marital residence that had already been awarded to the former wife in the 2005 divorce judgment.

The trial court proceeded to hear arguments from the parties’ counsel as to the proper disposition of the case in the absence of the former husband and the Wil-mores. Testimony was adduced from the former wife as well. At the conclusion of that proceeding, the trial court determined that the Wilmores had attempted to interfere with the disposition of the former marital residence, which had been awarded to the former wife in the 2005 divorce judgment. Specifically, the trial court determined that the former husband’s father had previously admitted to having prepared fraudulent documents, had not provided the requested financial documents to the court, and had failed to attend the final hearing on the merits. Based on those actions, the trial court determined that the former husband’s father was in contempt of court and sentenced him to be incarcerated for 105 days; in the alternative, the trial court ordered the former husband’s father, in order to purge himself of contempt, to appear before the trial court with the requested financial documents and to submit to a full examination regarding those documents. In. addition, based upon the quitclaim deed that was attached to the Wilmores’ motion to dismiss, the trial court instructed the county clerk “to execute a clerk’s deed granting sole ownership, rights, title and interest” in the former marital residence to the former wife. Moreover, the trial court reiterated that the former husband would remain in contempt of court until he was able to purge himself of that contempt by beginning to pay a portion of his child-support and alimony arrearage.

The Wilmores appealed, asserting that the former wife had failed to join the former husband as a party in the declaratory-judgment action despite his being, in their view, an indispensable party. In addition, the Wilmores assert that the trial court erred in failing to grant their motion to dismiss, in vesting sole title in the former marital residence in the former wife, and in determining that the former husband’s father was in contempt of court.

The Wilmores are correct that, under Alabama law, the duty to join necessary parties is ordinarily placed upon the plaintiff in an action. See Ex parte Izundu, 568 So.2d 771, 773 (Ala.1990); see also Walden v. ES Capital, LLC, 89 So.3d 90 (Ala.2011), and Hodge v. State, 643 So.2d 982 (Ala.Civ.App.1993). It is axiomatic that declaratory-judgment actions,are only binding on the parties to the action. See B.W.T. v. Haynes & Haynes, P.C., 20 So.3d 815, 821 (Ala.Civ.App.2009). Although there is no prescribed formula to be applied in determining whether a party is indispensable, see, e.g., Melton v. Harbor Pointe, LLC, 57 So.3d 695, 700 (Ala.2010), we do not agree with the Wilmores that the former husband was an indispensable party to the declaratory-judgment action.

The former wife sought an adjudication of the total amount she owed the Wilmores on the debt secured by the mortgage on the former marital residence. Although the trial court sought testimony from the former husband regarding what portion of the debt owed to the Wilmores had been retired during the marriage, that information was not produced, and the former husband’s presence was not necessary for the resolution of the pertinent issue: what amount was owed to the Wilmores at the time of the divorce. In fact, the 2005 divorce judgment specifically terminated the former husband’s interest in the former marital residence, awarding the property to the former wife subject to repayment of the remaining debt secured by the mortgage on that property. Thus, we conclude that the former husband does not meet the criterion of an indispensable party; that is, he is not a party whose interest in the controversy is “‘of such a nature that a final [judgment] cannot be made without either affecting that interest or leaving the controversy in such a condition that its final determination may be wholly inconsistent with equity and good conscience.’ ” J.R. McClenney & Son, Inc. v. Reimer, 435 So.2d 50, 52 (Ala.1983) (quoting 1 Champ Lyons, Alabama Practice, Rules of Civil Procedure at 389 (1973)). The trial court’s judgment is not erroneous on the basis that the former husband was not a party to the action.

The Wilmores also insist that the trial court erroneously failed to grant their motion to dismiss the declaratory-judgment action that was filed one day before the final hearing. The Wilmores posit that, because they asserted in that motion that they had relinquished all interest in the former marital residence, the trial court lost jurisdiction over the matter at that time. The problem with the Wil-mores’ position is two-fold. First, although it is true that the former wife sought a judgment declaring the amount of debt owed on the note held by the Wil-mores, the Wilmores’ motion to dismiss contained a photocopy of an unrecorded Indiana quitclaim deed purporting to convey the former marital residence to the former husband and the former wife. That document, in and of itself, did not divest the trial court of jurisdiction over the former marital residence, which had always been located in Alabama. Because the former marital residence was awarded to the former wife in the 2005 divorce judgment; because a trial court retains the power to enforce its judgments, see Patterson v. Patterson, 703 So.2d 372, 372 (Ala. Civ.App.1997), and Hall v. Hall, 485 So.2d 747, 749 (Ala.Civ.App.1986); and because the former wife’s declaratory-judgment action was initiated to enable her to comply with the terms of the divorce judgment, we conclude that the trial court could properly proceed to trial on the merits of the case.

Moreover, at the previous hearing, the trial court had instructed the Wilmores to provide certain financial records within a specified time or face the penalty of contempt sanctions. The Wilmores had never supplied the documents requested by the trial court; thus, the contempt issue remained pending at the time of the hearing. We conclude, therefore, that the trial court did not err in denying the Wilmores’ motion to dismiss.

The Wilmores next assert that the trial court erred in reforming the title to the former marital residence to reflect the former wife’s sole ownership of that property without any outstanding liens. They argue that the trial court could not ignore the terms of the sales document by which the former wife and the former husband had agreed to purchase the former marital residence with a note, secured by a mortgage, held by the Wilmores. Clearly, if the Wilmores divested themselves of all interest in the former marital residence, acknowledging complete satisfaction of the outstanding indebtedness associated with that property, then the Wilmores have no standing to challenge any action taken by the trial court regarding that property. A party lacks standing to invoke the power of the court in the absence of “a concrete stake in the outcome of the court’s decision.” Brown Mech. Contractors, Inc. v. Centennial Ins. Co., 431 So.2d 932, 937 (Ala.1983); see also Guyton v. Hunt, 61 So.3d 1085, 1091 (Ala.Civ.App.2010). Having presented the trial court with documentation that appears to resolve both the amount of indebtedness and the Wilmores’ interest regarding the former marital residence, we conclude that the Wilmores have conclusively demonstrated that they have no “stake in the outcome of the court’s decision.” Brown, 431 So.2d at 937. That portion of the Wilmores’ appeal is therefore dismissed for lack of standing.

Finally, the Wilmores challenge the trial court’s determination that the former husband’s father was in contempt of court for failing to comply with previous orders of that court. Alabama law concerning our standard of review in contempt cases is well settled.

“The issue whether to hold a party in contempt is solely within the discretion of the trial court, and a trial court’s contempt determination will not be reversed on appeal absent a showing that the trial court acted outside its discretion or that its judgment is not supported by the evidence. Brown v. Brown, 960 So.2d 712, 716 (Ala.Civ.App. 2006) (affirming a trial court’s decision not to hold a parent in contempt for failure to pay child support when the parent testified that he had deducted from his monthly child-support payment the amount he had expended to buy clothes for the children).”

Poh v. Poh, 64 So.3d 49, 61 (Ala.Civ.App. 2010). Moreover,

“Rule 70A, Ala. R. Civ. P., has governed contempt proceedings in civil actions since July 11, 1994. Rule 70A(a)(2)(D) defines ‘civil contempt’ as a ‘willful, continuing failure or refusal of any person to comply with a court’s lawful writ, subpoena, process, order, rule, or command that by its nature is still capable of being complied with.’ ”

Stamm v. Stamm, 922 So.2d 920, 924 (Ala. Civ.App.2004). To hold a party in contempt under either Rule 70A(a)(2)(C)(ii) (criminal contempt) or (D) (civil contempt), the trial court must find that the party willfully failed or refused to comply with a court order. T.L.D. v. C.G., 849 So.2d 200, 205 (Ala.Civ.App.2002).

The trial court in this case specifically determined that the former husband’s father had been warned that he would suffer contempt sanctions if he did not file the necessary financial documents with the court by a specific date. The record is clear that those documents were not filed with the court. In its judgment, the trial court noted that the former husband’s father “ha[d] actively and willfully ignored the orders of [that] court,” ordered him to be “incarcerated for a period of 5 days for each week that lapsed after the court’s extension [of time to file the requested documents],” and noted that a total of 20 weeks had passed, meriting incarceration for a total period of 100 days. In addition, the trial court determined that the former husband’s father was in contempt of court for refusing to appear at the final hearing on the merits, warranting an additional 5 days’ incarceration. However, the judgment also noted that the former husband’s father could purge himself of that contempt finding “by producing said documents and appearing personally before [the trial court and] subjecting himself to examination regarding said documents.”

The former husband’s father relies on one decision, Lowe v. Lowe, 561 So.2d 240 (Ala.Civ.App.1990), to support his contention that failing to provide the documents constitutes only one instance of contempt, not several. His reliance on that case is misplaced. This court reversed a 30-day sentence of incarceration for contempt in Lowe because this court was unable to determine which 6 specific occasions of disobedience were being punished by the maximum of 5 days’ incarceration. Lowe, 561 So.2d at 242. In the instant case, the trial court specifically determined that 20 weeks had elapsed since the deadline to produce the financial documents and multiplied that figure by 5, for a total contempt sanction of 100 days of incarceration. The instant case is more akin to Shonkwiler v. Kriska, 780 So.2d 703 (Ala.Civ.App.2000), wherein the basis of the trial court’s order of 30 days’ incarceration could be readily determined from the findings of fact contained in the judgment. Because the trial court determined that the former husband’s father had been in contempt of court for 20 weeks (the period between the date the documents were due and the date of trial), we conclude that the trial court could properly assess the maximum penalty of 5 days for each week of contempt pursuant to Rule 70A(a)(2)(C)(ii), Ala. R. Civ. P.

The former husband’s father also contends that he could not be held in contempt for failing to appear because his presence at trial was unnecessary for two reasons. First, he claims that, having divested himself of any interest in the former marital residence, he was no longer a viable party to the action. The problem with that argument is, as discussed previously, that the former husband’s father was on notice he would be held in contempt of court if he did not produce certain financial documents for the trial court’s review by a specific date before trial. Next, the former husband’s father asserts that his counsel served as his agent to handle any aspects of the case that might still pertain to him. He correctly notes that an attorney is generally regarded as “ ‘a special agent, limited in duty and authority to the vigilant prosecution or defense of the rights of the client.’ ” Williams v. North Alabama Court Reporting Serv., 833 So.2d 622, 626 (Ala.Civ.App. 2001) (quoting Robinson v. Murphy, 69 Ala. 543, 547 (1881)). However, as noted previously, trial courts have the power to punish for contempt in the interest of protecting and enforcing their judgments. See, e.g., Brickley v. Brickley, 586 So.2d 214 (Ala.Civ.App.1991). In Brickley, the father failed to appear in court, and evidence indicated that he had no intention of abiding by the trial court’s orders. Brick-ley, 586 So.2d at 215. Similarly, in this case, the trial court determined that the former husband’s father had lied to the court; that he had refused to produce documents the court deemed necessary to a proper disposition of the declaratory-judgment action; and, apparently, that he would not abide by the trial court’s orders or jurisdiction over the matter by failing to appear. We cannot conclude that the trial court erred in determining the former husband’s father to be in contempt of court even though his attorney was present at trial.

AFFIRMED IN PART; APPEAL DISMISSED IN PART.

THOMPSON, P.J., and THOMAS, J., concur.

BRYAN and MOORE, JJ., concur in the result, without writings.

      . The former husband appealed from that contempt judgment; this court affirmed the trial court's judgment without an opinion. See Wilmore v. Wilmore (No. 2090374, May 20, 2011), — So.3d - (Ala.Civ.App.2011) (table).

      . We note that in the divorce judgment the trial court divested the former husband of all interest in the former marital residence and ordered the wife to pay the outstanding debt on the note held by the Wilmores. Thus, -we conclude that the trial court could properly have disregarded the Wilmores' and the former husband's attempt to reallocate their interests in the former marital residence.