text:
    Jasheene WARD, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D10-5039.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    May 16, 2012.

      Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and James W. Mclntire, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Laura Fisher, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for ap-pellee.
   STEVENSON, J.

Appellant Jasheene Ward entered a negotiated, no contest plea to charges of trafficking in MDMA (count III) and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (count IV), reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress the drugs that formed the basis for the trafficking charge. The 31-year-old appellant was staying in a room at his mother’s house. Relying upon consent obtained from his mother, police searched the appellant’s bedroom and found the drugs in a box located in the bedroom closet. Appellant insists the evidence at the suppression hearing failed to establish that his mother had either the actual or apparent authority to consent to a search of the box found in the bedroom closet. We agree and reverse the conviction for count III.

Evidence at the suppression hearing established that, after appellant was arrested for another drug-related charge, police went to his residence. Appellant’s mother answered the door and told police that she was the owner of the home and that the appellant had been staying with her for about four months. Police testified the mother consented to a search of the premises after they informed her that they believed the appellant had drugs in his room resembling candy. Appellant’s mother told police she made the appellant’s bed, did his laundry and had “regular access” to his bedroom. In the defendant’s bedroom closet and behind a pair of jeans on an upper shelf, police found a box. Inside the box was a bag containing ecstasy pills. The closet had doors and contained adult men’s clothing.

“The Fourth Amendment prohibition against warrantless searches of an individual’s property does not apply when officers obtain consent either from the individual whose property is to be searched or from a third party who possesses ‘common authority’ over the premises.” Kelly v. State, 77 So.3d 818, 824 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (citing Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181, 110 S.Ct. 2793, 111 L.Ed.2d 148 (1990)). Common authority over the premises, however, “does not, in and of itself, ‘permit search of any personal property contained within the premises.’ ” King v. State, 79 So.3d 236, 238 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (quoting Kelly, 77 So.3d at 825). A third party cannot validly consent to a search of personal property belonging to another “ ‘unless there is evidence of both common authority over and mutual usage of the property.’” Id. Applying such principles, Florida’s appellate courts have held that a live-in girlfriend lacked the actual or apparent authority to consent to a search of a backpack in the garage, where she specifically identified the backpack as belonging to the defendant, see Kelly, 77 So.3d at 826; that the defendant’s wife lacked actual or apparent authority to consent to a search of a safe in the master bedroom closet, where she told police she did not have a key to the safe; see King, 79 So.3d at 239; and that the defendant’s mother lacked actual or apparent authority to consent to a search of a desk in the bedroom the defendant shared with his wife and son where police did not determine the mother “owned or used the desk or had regular access to its contents,” see State v. Miyasato, 805 So.2d 818, 821 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001).

Here, even assuming the mother’s “regular access” to the appellant’s room for purposes of laundry and making the bed were sufficient to substantiate the mother’s apparent authority to consent to a search of the appellant’s bedroom, such facts were insufficient to allow police to conclude the mother had actual or apparent authority to consent to a search of the box. The box was in a closet that contained only men’s clothing and was hidden away on an upper shelf and behind a pair of jeans. There was nothing in the information known to police to suggest any mutual usage of, or common control over, the box. The trial court thus erred in denying the motion to suppress. Appellant’s conviction for count III is, accordingly, reversed.

Reversed.

WARNER and GROSS, JJ., concur.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: PER CURIAM.

license: Public Domain

text:
    Pauline A. FERGUSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D10-5216.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    May 16, 2012.
    Benjamin S. Waxman of Robbins, Tun-key, Ross, Amsel, Raben & Waxman, P.A., Miami, for appellant.
    No appearance required for appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. Smith v. State, 85 So.3d 551 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012); Davis v. State, 69 So.3d 315 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011); Hernandez v. State, 61 So.3d 1144 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011), rev. granted, 81 So.3d 414 (Fla.2012); Barreneche v. State, 80 So.3d 455 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012); Barrios-Cruz v. State, 63 So.3d 868 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011); Castano v. State, 65 So.3d 546 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011).

MAY, C.J., WARNER and CIKLIN, JJ., concur.


author: GROSS, J.

text:
    Solomon O. LOPEZ, individually and as trustee, Robert Neil McDowell, Kingdom First Properties, LLC, Value Management Services, Inc., and Kent G. Davis, Appellants, v. UNITED CAPITAL FUND, LLC, Michael David Villa and WB5 Properties, LLC, Appellees.
    No. 4D11-3820.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    May 16, 2012.

      Martin B. Woods of Stearns Weaver Miller Weissler Alhadeff & Sitterson, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for appellants.
    Louis E. Lozeau, Jr. of Wright, Ponsoldt & Lozeau, Trial Attorneys, L.L.P., Stuart, for appellee, United Capital Fund, LLC.
    Raul Valles, Jr. of Rocke, McLean & Sbar, P.A., Tampa, for appellees, Michael David Villa and WB5 Properties, LLC.
   GROSS, J.

We affirm the trial court’s refusal to enforce certain forum selection clauses. The clauses are so overbroad and lacking in specificity that they fail to provide adequate indicia of the parties’ intent.

United Capital Fund, LLC, filed a multi-count complaint against various defendants who are the appellants in this case. The complaint was filed in Martin County, where United Capital was located. The causes of action arose from contracts that United Capital had entered into with the defendants. Each contract contained this provision:

EACH OF THE PARTIES HERETO WAIVES ITS RESPECTIVE RIGHTS TO A TRIAL BY JURY OF ANY CLAIM OR CAUSE OF ACTION BASED UPON OR ARISING OUT OF OR RELATED TO THIS AGREEMENT OR THE TRANSACTION CONTEMPLATED HEREBY OR THEREBY IN ANY ACTION, PROCEEDING OR OTHER LITIGATION OF ANY TYPE BROUGHT BY ANY PARTY AGAINST THE OTHER PARTY, WHETHER WITH RESPECT TO CONTRACT CLAIMS, TORT CLAIMS, OR OTHERWISE. EACH OF THE PARTIES HERETO AGREES THAT ANY SUCH CLAIM OR CAUSE OF ACTION SHALL BE TRIED BY A COURT TRIAL WITHOUT A JURY IN SELLER’S COUNTY AND STATE OF CHOICE. WITHOUT LIMITING THE FOREGOING, THE PARTIES FURTHER AGREE THAT THEIR RESPECTIVE RIGHT TO A TRIAL BY JURY IS WAIVED BY OPERATION OF THIS PARAGRAPH AS TO ANY ACTION, COUNTERCLAIM OR OTHER PROCEEDING WHICH SEEKS, IN WHOLE OR IN PART, TO CHALLENGE THE VALIDITY OR ENFORCEABILITY OF THIS AGREEMENT OR ANY PROVISION HEREOF OR THEREOF. BUYER AGREES THAT A LEGAL MEDIATION SHALL TAKE PLACE IN COUNTY AND STATE OF SELLER’S CHOICE BEFORE ANY COURT TRIAL. THIS WAIVER SHALL APPLY TO ANY SUBSEQUENT AMENDMENTS, SUPPLEMENTS OR MODIFICATIONS TO THIS AGREEMENT.

(Emphasis added).

All but one of the defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, or to transfer the case to the circuit court in Hillsborough County. The defendants pointed to the above forum selection clause, argued the clauses were valid and enforceable, and asserted they had chosen Hillsborough County as them forum. The trial court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss or transfer.

A trial court’s interpretation of a contractual forum selection clause is reviewed de novo. TECO Barge Line, Inc. v. Hagan, 15 So.3d 863, 865 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009); Bombardier Capital Inc. v. Progressive Mktg. Grp., Inc., 801 So.2d 131, 134 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001); Mgmt. Computer Controls, Inc. v. Charles Perry Constr., Inc., 743 So.2d 627, 630 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999). The polestar of interpretation is the intent of the parties, which is divined from the language of the contract if that language is clear and unambiguous. Bombardier Capital Inc., 801 So.2d at 134. The language of the forum selection clauses here at issue is clear and unambiguous.

“Forum selection clauses are presumptively valid and ‘should be enforced in the absence of a showing that enforcement would be unreasonable or unjust.’ ” Id. (quoting Manrique v. Fabbri, 493 So.2d 437, 440 (Fla.1986)) (footnote omitted) (other citations omitted). In Manrique, the Florida Supreme Court turned to an opinion of the United States Supreme Court to explain that such clauses “eliminate uncertainty as to the nature, location, and outlook of the forum in which parties ... might find themselves.” 493 So.2d at 439 (relying on M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 13-15, 92 S.Ct. 1907, 32 L.Ed.2d 513 (1972)). It is the total uncertainty of the forum selected by the clauses involved in this case that renders them unenforceable.

We agree with the analysis of Central Ohio Graphics v. Alco Capital Resource, Inc., 221 Ga.App. 434, 472 S.E.2d 2 (1996), where the Court of Appeals of Georgia held a similar forum selection clause unenforceable. There, Central entered into a leasing agreement for two copiers with Aleo. Id. at 3. The agreement contained a forum selection clause that provided that “Aleo Capital has the option of pursuing any action under this agreement in any court of competent jurisdiction and the customer [Central] consents to jurisdiction in the state of our choice.” Id. When Central unilaterally terminated the agreement over repeated difficulties with one of the copiers, Aleo sued Central in Georgia; within hours, Central sued Aleo in Ohio. Id. In the Georgia action, Central moved to dismiss, arguing that “the forum selection clause was too broad and vague to satisfy the requisites of due process.” Id. The trial court denied the motion, and Central appealed. Id.

The appellate court reversed. The court began its discussion by noting that, “[although we have enforced many forum selection clauses ...., including those designating more than one possible forum, never have we confronted one so broad and nonspecific.” Id. (citation omitted). The clause was unenforceable, it concluded, because “the forum selection clause provid[ed] no intimation of the forum contemplated,” so that “the clause fail[ed] to reflect a meeting of the minds sufficient to show the parties reached an agreement on the forum.” Id. at 4. Further, the clause’s “lack of specificity impugn[ed] a fundamental purpose of such clauses: to eliminate uncertainties by agreeing in advance on a forum acceptable to both parties.” Id. (citing M/S Bremen, 407 U.S. at 13, 92 S.Ct. 1907). It would be unreasonable to enforce a clause that, as written, “would permit Aleo to bring this action in any state in the country.” Id. “Because the forum selection clause at issue is over-broad and so lacking in specificity that it fails to provide any indicia of the parties’ intent,” the court held, “enforcing it would be unreasonable and unjust.” Id. (citation omitted).

Central Ohio Graphics is persuasive. As in Georgia, Florida law considers that forum selection clauses are presumptively valid and enforceable, unless enforcement would be unreasonable or unjust. Compare Central Ohio Graphics, 472 S.E.2d at 3, with Manrique, 493 So.2d at 440. Similarly, the law in both states recognizes that the main reason for forum selection clauses is to eliminate uncertainty as to the nature, location, and outlook of the forum in which parties might find themselves. Compare Central Ohio Graphics 472 S.E.2d at 4, with Manrique, 493 So.2d at 439.

In urging reversal of the trial court’s order, the defendants argue that the forum selection clauses’ failure to specify a particular forum did not render them so indefinite as to be unenforceable. They rely on Liberty Bank, F.S.B. v. Best Litho, Inc., 737 N.W.2d 312 (Iowa Ct.App.2007). However, that case does not control because it involves a floating forum selection clause which, unlike the indefinite clauses in this case, ties the forum selection to mutable and knowable facts.

Liberty Bank involved a dispute between renters of communications equipment and the assignee of the rental agreements between the renters and the original equipment company. See id. at 313. When the renters breached the agreements, the assignee brought suit in Iowa; none of the renters’ principal places of business were in Iowa. Id. at 313 & n. 1. The agreements contained the following provision:

APPLICABLE LAW: ... This agreement shall be governed by, construed and enforced in accordance with the laws of the State in which Renter’s principal offices are located or, if this Lease is assigned by Renter, the State in which the assignee’s principal offices are located ... and all legal actions relating to this Lease shall be venued exclusively in a state or federal court located within that State, such court to be chosen at Rentor or Renter’s assignee’s sole option ....

Id. at 314 (alterations in original). The renters answered and claimed lack of personal jurisdiction. The trial court rejected this argument. Id.

On appeal, the renters argued, among other things, that the forum selection clause that allowed suit in Iowa was unenforceable as unreasonable because it did not designate a particular forum. Id. The appellate court rejected this attack on the forum selection clause. It found that “the forum selection clause does designate the state of suit unequivocally: it is the state where the principal offices of NorVergence [original “Rentor”] are located or, if the contract has been assigned, the state where the principal offices of the assignee are located.” Id. at 316. Following the decisions of other state and federal courts, the court held that the clause was enforceable. See id. at 317.

The defendants’ reliance on Liberty Bank is misplaced. Liberty Bank’s clause is known as a “floating” forum selection clause. A floating forum selection clause is

a clause which, rather than designating a forum by immutable geographical place name, designates the exclusive forum for all litigation regarding the agreement which contains the clause by reference to mutable facts, namely, the location of the main office, headquarters, principal office, or principal place of business of one of the parties to the agreement, or that party’s assigns.

Dale Joseph Gilsinger, Enforceability of Floating Forum Selection Clauses, 39 A.L.R.6th 629, § 2 (2008). As noted by the Liberty Bank court, the weight of authority holds floating forum selection clauses enforceable. See, e.g., IFC Credit Corp. v. Aliano Bros. Gen. Contractors, Inc., 437 F.3d 606 (7th Cir.2006) (applying Illinois and federal law; holding that a floating forum selection clause was enforceable).

Floating forum selection clauses are distinct from the totally unspecific clauses in the instant case. The clauses here do not tie the selection of a forum to any mutable and identifiable fact, only to the whim of the defendants’ choice. Cf. Lyon Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Will H. Hall & Son Builders, Inc., No. Civ. 04-4383 ADM/AJB, 2005 WL 503371, *4 (D.Minn. Mar. 4, 2005) (“Although that state may indeed change upon assignment of the Lease, it does not give the lessor or assignee freedom to choose its forum. Rather, it must bring suit in its home state.”); IFC Credit Corp. v. Rieker Shoe Corp., 378 Ill.App.3d 77, 89, 317 Ill.Dec. 214, 881 N.E.2d 382 (“Despite this flexibility, the assignee cannot randomly select any forum within the United States, but must litigate any legal dispute in the state where its principal offices are located.”). Unlike floating forum selection clauses which eliminate forum uncertainty by providing criteria for determining the contemplated forum, the clauses in this case provided no such standards. Therefore, it cannot be said that there was a meeting of the minds on the location of a forum.

For these reasons, the trial court did not err in denying the defendants’ motions to dismiss or transfer.

Affirmed.

WARNER and STEVENSON, JJ., concur.

      . The defendants are correct that no Florida court has squarely addressed the issue of floating clauses. Still, in Bovis Homes, Inc. v. Chmielewski, 827 So.2d 1038 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002), the second district held that a trial court erred in concluding that a floating clause was ambiguous and, thus, unenforceable. The second district held that "[t]he plain language of the provision provides that venue for any action arising of the contract lies in the county or district where the principal place of business is located. The dispute in this case appears to be the location of Bovis Homes’ principal place of business.” Id. at 1039.

      . See also Preferred Capital, Inc. v. Assocs. in Urology, 453 F.3d 718 (6th Cir.2006) (applying Ohio and federal law); Lyon Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Will H. Hall & Son Builders, Inc., No. CIV. 04-4383 ADM/AJB, 2005 WL 503371 (D.Minn. Mar. 4, 2005) (applying federal law); Danka Funding, LLC v. Page, Scrantom, Sprouse, Tucker & Ford, PC, 21 F.Supp.2d 465 (D.N.J.1998) (applying New Jersey law); Edge Telecom, Inc. v. Sterling Bank, 143 P.3d 1155 (Colo.Ct.App.2006); OFC Capital v. Colonial Distribs., Inc., 285 Ga.App. 815, 648 S.E.2d 140 (2007); IFC Credit Corp. v. Rieker Shoe Corp., 378 Ill.App.3d 77, 317 Ill.Dec. 214, 881 N.E.2d 382 (Ill.App.Ct.2007); Sterling Nat’l Bank v. E. Shipping Worldwide, Inc., 35 A.D.3d 222, 826 N.Y.S.2d 235 (N.Y.App.Div.2006); Prof. Solutions Fin. Servs. v. Richard Yeager & Assocs., D.D. S., P.A., 722 S.E.2d 212 (N.C.Ct.App.2012) (unpublished opinion); Susquehanna Patriot Commercial Leasing Co., Inc. v. Holper Indus., Inc., 928 A.2d 278 (Pa.Super.Ct.2007); CMS Partners, Ltd. v. Plumrose USA, Inc., 101 S.W.3d 730 (Tex.Ct. App.2003). But see Preferred Capital, Inc. v. Power Eng'g Grp., Inc., 112 Ohio St.3d 429, 860 N.E.2d 741, 746 (2007) (holding that a floating forum selection clause is unenforceable "when one party to a contract containing a floating forum-selection clause possesses undisclosed information of its intent to assign its interest in the contract almost immediately to a company in a foreign jurisdiction”).


text:
    LASH & GOLDBERG LLP, Laurie Stern Torban, Esquire, and Martin B. Goldberg, Esquire, Appellants, v. Andrea CLARKE, Appellee.
    No. 4D11-4344.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    May 16, 2012.

      Rosemary Wilder of Marlow, Connell, Abrams, Adler, Newman & Lewis, Coral Gables, for appellants.
    David Steinfeld of Kramer, Sopko & Le-venstein, P.A., Stuart, for appellee.
   GROSS, J.

We reverse an order denying a motion to compel arbitration. The complaint’s allegations of concerted conduct between parties and non-parties to the arbitration agreement permit the non-parties to insist on arbitration under the agreement.

Andrea Clarke filed a multi-count complaint against Palm Beach Gardens Community Hospital, Inc., Tenet South Florida Regional Resource Pool, Tenet Healthcare Corporation, Tenet Healthcare-Florida, Inc., Terri Hughes, Lash & Goldberg, LLP, Laurie Stern Torban, and Martin B. Goldberg. The first four counts — fraud and deceit; negligent misrepresentation; defamation; and intentional infliction of emotional distress — were directed at all of the defendants. The last count, legal malpractice, was directed at Lash & Goldberg and its attorneys Torban and Goldberg. Central to all of the counts was the allegation that Clarke was falsely accused of causing a patient’s death, that all of the defendants knew that another nurse was responsible, and that they concealed this fact from Clarke.

The complaint contained allegations that the defendants acted together. In the fraud count, Clarke claimed that all of the defendants intentionally “engaged in a pattern of fraud and deceit” to conceal information about the patient’s death, and “conspired” to prevent her and her counsel from discovering that she was not responsible for the death. Clarke alleged that these actions “constituted a concerted effort to defraud” her.

The legal malpractice count against only the Lash & Goldberg defendants asserted that their representation of the other defendants, including the nurse whom Clarke believed to be responsible for the death, created conflicts of interest with their representation of Clarke and that they never disclosed those conflicts to her. She claimed that these attorneys knew she was blameless in the incident, but withheld the truth from her.

All defendants moved to compel arbitration based on an arbitration agreement that Clarke had signed as part of Tenet Healthcare Corporation’s employee package. The circuit court granted the motion as to the Tenet defendants and denied arbitration as to the Lash & Goldberg defendants.

We reverse the order denying arbitration. Even though the Lash & Goldberg defendants were not signatories or parties to the arbitration agreement, they may insist on arbitration because the complaint alleges that the defendants engaged in concerted conduct that harmed Clarke.

Generally, a non-signatory to an arbitration agreement cannot compel a signatory to submit to arbitration. See Roman v. Atl. Coast Constr. & Dev., Inc., 44 So.3d 222, 224 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010). One exception to the rule is that a non-signatory can compel arbitration when the signatory to the contract containing the arbitration clause alleges substantially interdependent and concerted misconduct by both the non-signatory and one or more of the signatories. See id.; Kolsky v. Jackson Square, LLC, 28 So.3d 965, 969 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010). This exception is based on the doctrine of equitable estoppel. See Armas v. Prudential Secs., Inc., 842 So.2d 210, 212 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003).

Although Clarke tries to spin the legal malpractice count as involving only her independent attorney-client relationship with the Lash & Goldberg defendants, her complaint generally ties those defendants to the others who were parties to the arbitration agreement. All of the counts in the complaint stem from the death of the patient and the defendants’ alleged efforts to conceal the truth and blame Clarke for the tragedy. Clarke alleged that, like the other defendants, the Lash & Goldberg defendants knew she was not responsible for the death, yet intentionally prevented her from discovering that fact. Thus, Clarke alleged concerted misconduct by non-signatories (the Lash & Goldberg defendants) and signatories (the Tenet defendants).

For these reasons, we reverse the order denying arbitration and remand to the circuit court to enter an order compelling arbitration with the Lash & Goldberg defendants.

WARNER and STEVENSON, JJ., concur.


text:
    Shirley A. VARNADO, Petitioner, v. The RAKUSIN LAW FIRM, Respondent.
    No. 4D11-2956.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    May 16, 2012.
    Shirley A. Varnado, Davie, pro se.
    Stephen Rakusin, The Rakusin Law Firm, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

The petition for second-tier review of the order of the circuit court sitting in its appellate capacity is granted. The court dismissed petitioner’s appeal of a county court judgment for failure to file a brief, without providing ten days’ notice as required before sanctions may be imposed. See Fla. RApp. P. 9.410. Respondent concedes that the court departed from the essential requirements of law. See Tucker v. Charles D. Franken, P.A., 62 So.3d 1207, 1208 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011). See also United Auto. Ins. Co. v. Total Rehab & Med. Ctr., 870 So.2d 866, 870 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004). This matter is remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with the foregoing cases.

WARNER, POLEN and TAYLOR, JJ., concur.


text:
    Quinten WALDEN, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 4D12-1537.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    May 16, 2012.
    Quinten Walden, Jasper, pro se.
    No appearance required for respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

Petition Denied. See Williams v. State, 40 So.3d 72 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (certifying questions of great public importance), review granted, 64 So.3d 1262 (Fla.2011).

POLEN, STEVENSON and LEVINE, JJ., concur.


text:
    Kevin SHEFFIELD, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D10-1495.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    May 16, 2012.
    Kevin Sheffield, Live Oak, pro se.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Don M. Rogers, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. See Capalbo v. State, 73 So.3d 838 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011).

STEVENSON, GROSS and LEVINE, JJ., concur.


text:
    Terry Walter KARR, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D11-2453.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    May 16, 2012.
    Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Emily Ross-Booker, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Richard Valuntas, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. See Maestas v. State, 76 So.3d 991 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011).

TAYLOR, CIKLIN and GERBER, JJ., concur.


text:
    Nelson ALVAREZ, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 3D12-510.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    May 16, 2012.
    Nelson Alvarez, in proper person.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, for appellee.
    Before SHEPHERD and CORTIÑAS, JJ., and SCHWARTZ, Senior Judge.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. See Little v. State, 77 So.3d 722, 722-23 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) (holding “section 89.13, as amended by section 893.101, Florida Statutes (2002), is constitutional,” and rejecting Shelton v. Secretary, Department of Corrections, 802 F.Supp.2d 1289, 1308 (M.D.Fla.2011), in which federal court held section 893.13, Florida Statutes (2004), “violates the due process clause and that the statute is unconstitutional on its face”); Ortega v. State, 76 So.3d 346 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011); see also State v. Adkins, 71 So.3d 184 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011), review granted, 71 So.3d 117 (Fla.2011).


author: SUAREZ, J.

text:
    Alberto MORALES, Appellant, v. PRESIDENTE SUPERMARKET NO. 17, INC., Appellee.
    No. 3D11-2318.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    May 16, 2012.
    McGuinness & Gonzalez and Lawrence J. McGuinness and Juliana Gonzalez, for appellant.
    Carmen Rodriguez, for appellee.
    Before SUAREZ and FERNANDEZ, JJ., and SCHWARTZ, Senior Judge.
   SUAREZ, J.

Affirmed. See Zwickel v. KLC, Inc., 464 So.2d 1280 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985); Am. Agro- nomics Corp. v. Varner, 413 So.2d 484 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982).


text:
    Jeffrey Wayne STREETER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. ID12-0330.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 16, 2012.
    Jeffrey Wayne Streeter, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED. See Flagg v. State, 74 So.3d 138 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011).

WOLF, LEWIS, and THOMAS, JJ., concur.


text:
    Michael D. JERNIGAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D12-0482.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 16, 2012.
    Michael D. Jernigan, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED. See Flagg v. State, 74 So.3d 138 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011).

BENTON, C.J., and CLARK and MAKAR, JJ., concur.


text:
    Rashae BRADLEY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1B12-0488.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 16, 2012.

      Rashae Bradley, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED. See Flagg v. State, 74 So.3d 138 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011).

WOLF, LEWIS, and THOMAS, JJ., concur.


text:
    Christopher WILLIS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D12-1039.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 16, 2012.
    Christopher Willis, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Christine Ann Guard, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED. See Flagg v. State, 74 So.3d 138 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011).

WOLF, LEWIS, and THOMAS, JJ., concur.


text:
    Anson MITCHELL, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D12-0692.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 16, 2012.
    Anson Mitchell, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED. See Flagg v. State, 74 So.3d 138 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011).

WOLF, LEWIS, and THOMAS, JJ., concur.


text:
    Angela LOCKE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D11-5705.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 16, 2012.

      Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and Steven L. Seliger, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

PADOVANO, ROWE, and RAY, JJ„ concur.


author: COHEN, J.

text:
    Jeffrey W. WELLS, Appellant, v. CIRCLE REDMONT, INC., Appellee.
    No. 5D11-3557.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    May 18, 2012.
    Alex Finch, Longwood, for Appellant.

      Allan P. Whitehead of Frese, Hansen, Anderson, Anderson, Heuston & Whitehead, P.A., Melbourne, for Appellee.
   COHEN, J.

Appellant, Jeffrey W. Wells (“Wells”), appeals from a final judgment in a breach of contract action, supplemental final judgment awarding attorney’s fees, and nonfi-nal order denying the release of personal property, each entered in favor of Circle Redmont, Inc. (“Redmont”). As to Wells’ claims concerning the final judgment and supplemental final judgment awarding attorney’s fees, we have contemporaneously affirmed without comment. As to the trial court’s nonfinal order denying the release of personal property and permitting the accumulation of storage fees, we reverse.

In 2005, Wells contracted with Redmont to engineer, fabricate, and install a skylight. The total cost of the project was $16,310, with a partial payment due and paid at signing. In January 2008, Red-mont completed the skylight, but Wells refused to tender the final payment for the skylight, which remained at Redmont’s facility. Redmont sued Wells for breach of contract, seeking the remaining $9,155 due per the contract, together with interest on the past due balance, storage and attorney’s fees. Before trial, Wells paid the principal balance, leaving the trial court to determine the remaining contract fees.

The final judgment, entered on June 4, 2010, awarded Redmont $8,982.31, which included interest and storage fees from January 4, 2008, to April 27, 2010. Red-mont was also awarded attorney’s fees to be determined at a later date. Regarding the storage fees, the judgment provides: “Storage charges will continue to accrue at the rate of $8.00 per day until payment is made and the completed skylight is removed from the [Redmont] premises.”

On June 10, 2010, Wells filed a motion to release the skylight, which was denied. The supplemental final judgment, awarding Redmont $23,733.32 in attorney’s fees plus statutory interest, was entered shortly thereafter.

On October 13, 2010, Wells posted a supersedeas bond by depositing cash with the clerk of the court in the amount of $39,280.32. This more than covered the interest, storage fees (from January 4, 2008 to April 27, 2010), and attorney’s fees awarded by the court, which totaled $32,781.63, and included a cushion of approximately $6,500.

Wells then filed a renewed motion to release the skylight. While the motion was pending, Wells encountered a problem with the sale of nonhomestead real property. At some point Redmont recorded the final judgment, which appeared as a cloud on title to property Wells was under contract to sell. This caused Wells to file an emergency motion pursuant to section 55.10, Florida Statutes (2010), to convert the supersedeas bond into a transfer bond, to which Redmont stipulated and the trial court granted. The order also directed Wells to pay additional moneys to the clerk in the amount equivalent to $8 per diem for interim storage fees that accrued to the date of the original supersedeas bond (April 28, 2010, to October 13, 2010), although moneys to cover these additional fees had already been deposited. The bond was converted and totaled $41,911.85.

On May 27, 2011, Wells filed an amended renewed motion to release the skylight, which the trial court denied. The trial court concluded that the bond posted did not constitute “payment” of the final judgment amount and thus did not extinguish Redmont’s possessory interest in the skylight. As a result, the skylight remained in Redmont’s possession, with storage fees accruing at $8 per day.

Typically, the trial court is given considerable latitude in controlling the circumstances under which proceedings may be stayed pending review. Cerrito v. Kovitch, 406 So.2d 125, 126 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981). “[T]he guiding principle in setting a supersedeas bond is to protect the party in whose favor judgment was entered by assuring its payment in the event the judgment is affirmed on appeal.” Pabian v. Pabian, 469 So.2d 189, 191 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985). “[T]he proper amount and conditions of the supersedeas bond are determined by the facts of the particular case.” Id.

A party seeking to stay execution of a final or nonfinal order on appeal must file a motion in the lower court, which may require the posting of a good and sufficient bond, i.e., a supersedeas or appeal bond. Fla. R.App. P. 9.310(a). If the party is seeking a stay from execution of solely a money judgment, no motion is necessary; the posting of a good and sufficient bond equal to the principal amount of the judgment plus twice the annual statutory interest rate will stay execution. Fla. R.App. P. 9.310(b)(1). A “good and sufficient bond” is either a bond with a principal and a surety or “cash deposited in the circuit court clerk’s office.” Fla. R.App. P. 9.310(c)(1) (emphasis added). The trial court has continuing jurisdiction to determine the sufficiency of a bond under the rule. Fla. R.App. P. 9.310(c)(1).

Here, the continuing circumstances governing the debt and release of the skylight in the final judgment were relatively straightforward. Redmont would retain the skylight and storage fees would accumulate until Wells paid the judgment amount, plus any additional storage fees.

At the time Wells filed the motion to release the skylight, no bond was posted and the judgment remained unpaid. In October, however, Wells posted a “good and sufficient” cash supersedeas bond by depositing a check with the clerk of the court in the amount of $39,280.32, which represented the judgment amount and statutory interest required under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.310, including amounts sufficient to cover any additional storage fees. At the same time, Wells apparently renewed his request for Redmont to release the skylight. Once the bond was posted and Wells sought possession of the skylight, he was entitled to its release and to relief from the accumulation of storage fees, which Redmont wrongfully opposed. Those storage fees ceased on October 13, 2010, the date the supersedeas bond was posted and Wells’ request to release the skylight was renewed.

AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; REMANDED.

EVANDER and JACOBUS, JJ., concur.

      . Wells appealed the final judgment and supplemental final judgment awarding attorney’s fees separately, in cases 5D10-3383 and 5D10-3546, respectively. This Court consolidated those cases on appeal.

      . The date on which the renewed motion to release the skylight was filed is not clear from the record.

      . The increase was due in large part to the additional interest and costs required by the statute governing transfer bonds.

      . A different trial judge presided over the amended renewed motion to release the skylight, and because the final judgments were on appeal at the time of the motion, this Court relinquished jurisdiction to allow the trial court to adjudicate the matter.


text:
    Norris B. HAWKINS, Petitioner, v. FLORIDA PAROLE COMMISSION, Respondent.
    No. 1D11-5661.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 18, 2012.
    Norris B. Hawkins, pro se, Petitioner.
    Sarah J. Rumph, General Counsel, and Anthony Andrews, Assistant General Counsel, Florida Parole Commission, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

Norris Hawkins seeks certiorari review of an order denying his petition for writ of mandamus. We grant the petition, quash the order denying mandamus relief, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

This is the second time Hawkins has sought certiorari review in this court concerning the Florida Parole Commission’s failure to set forth its reasons for its most recent decision declining to grant him parole. This court previously granted Hawkins’ petition for writ of certiorari and quashed the circuit court’s order denying mandamus relief in Hawkins v. Fla. Parole Comm’n, 65 So.3d 142 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011). This matter was remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with Alday v. Fla. Parole Comm’n, 58 So.3d 327 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011).

Upon remand, the circuit court reconsidered Hawkins’ petition, but again denied mandamus relief, finding that the “Florida Parole Commission adequately stated the reasons and record support for their negative findings and decision to continue suspension of Petitioner’s Presumptive Parole Release Date.” We disagree.

As it did before, the Florida Parole Commission has conceded error, correctly admitting that

“[a]lthough, as correctly observed by the lower court, the Commission did consider [four factors] in its latest Commission action and the Commission did provide the record it considered in said action, these factors were actually the reasons for setting Petitioner’s parole interview within five years instead of two years pursuant to Section 947.1745(6), Fla. Stat., not for the continued suspension pursuant to Section 947.18, Florida Statutes.”

The Commission thus suggests that it is appropriate for the lower tribunal to remand the matter to it so that it may set forth its reasons for denying parole. We agree.

Accordingly, the order denying Hawkins’ petition for writ of mandamus is QUASHED, and this matter is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion and with Alday, supra.

DAVIS, VAN NORTWICK, and PADOVANO, JJ., concur.

      . These factors were: (1), Hawkins' offense having involved the use of a deadly weapon; (2) the potential for Hawkins’ release to cause unreasonable risk to others; (3) an ”[e]scalat-ing or continuing persistent pattern of criminal conduct;” and (4) that Hawkins’ "offense was committed against a victim known to be particularly vulnerable such as elderly persons, physically or mentally handicapped persons or children.”


text:
    Gerald DOVE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D11-1842.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 18, 2012.
    Gerald Dove, pro se; Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and Joel Arnold, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

We affirm in all respects. We remand, however, for correction of a scrivener’s error in the Order on Violation of Probation. The written order reflects that Gerald Dove violated conditions four and eleven of probation, but the record demonstrates that the trial court found that Dove only violated condition four. The written order on remand should be corrected as indicated.

AFFIRMED and REMANDED.

PADOVANO, LEWIS, and WETHERELL, JJ., concur.


text:
    Jerry Neal PRATER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D11-6191.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 18, 2012.

      Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and Steven L. Seliger, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Therese A. Savona, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED. See Flagg v. State, 74 So.3d 138 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011).

LEWIS, CLARK, and MARSTILLER, JJ., concur.


text:
    Jerry Neal PRATER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D11-6192.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 18, 2012.
    Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and Steven L. Seliger, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Therese A. Savona, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED. See Flagg v. State, 74 So.3d 138 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011).

LEWIS, CLARK, and MARSTILLER, JJ., concur.


text:
    Jerry Neal PRATER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D11-6193.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 18, 2012.
    Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and Steven L. Seliger, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Therese A. Savona, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED. See Flagg v. State, 74 So.3d 138 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011).

LEWIS, CLARK, and MARSTILLER, JJ., concur.


text:
    Jerry Neal PRATER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D11-6194.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 18, 2012.
    Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and Steven L. Seliger, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Therese A. Savona, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED. See Flagg v. State, 74 So.3d 138 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011).

LEWIS, CLARK, and MARSTILLER, JJ., concur.


text:
    Elwood STALEY, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 1D12-1913.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 22, 2012.
    Elwood Staley, pro se, Petitioner.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

The petition for writ of mandamus is denied. See Munn v. Florida Parole Commn., 807 So.2d 733 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002).

BENTON, C.J., THOMAS and SWANSON, JJ., concur.


text:
    Joseph WYMAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D12-0762.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 22, 2012.
    Joseph Wyman, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

See Flagg v. State, 74 So.3d 138 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011).

AFFIRMED.

PADOVANO, ROWE, and RAY, JJ., concur.


text:
    Racheal SEGRETTO, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D11-6497.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 22, 2012.
    Racheal Segretto, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Therese A. Savona, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED. See Flagg v. State, 74 So.3d 138 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011).

LEWIS, CLARK, and MARSTILLER, JJ., concur.


text:
    Dale Lee LENOIR, Petitioner, v. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent.
    No. 1D11-6891.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    May 22, 2012.
    Dale Lee Lenoir, pro se, Petitioner.
    Jennifer Parker, General Counsel, and Barbara Debelius, Assistant General Counsel, Florida Department of Corrections, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

The petition for writ of mandamus is denied. See Munn v. Florida Parole Commn., 807 So.2d 733 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002).

BENTON, C.J., THOMAS and SWANSON, JJ., concur.


text:
    In re Robert Leslie GRAVES.
    No. 2012-OB-0744.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 1, 2012.
   ORDER

hln 2011, respondent pleaded guilty in the 19th Judicial District Court for the Parish of East Baton Rouge to illegal use of a firearm. In addition, the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) learned in the course of its investigation that respondent had practiced law while he was ineligible to do so, and that he had previously been charged with DWI and aggravated battery. Respondent now seeks to permanently resign from the practice of law in lieu of discipline. The ODC has concurred in respondent’s petition.

Having considered the Petition for Permanent Resignation from the Practice of Law filed by Robert Leslie Graves, Louisiana Bar Rpll number 28586, and the concurrence thereto filed by the ODC,

IT IS ORDERED that the request of Robert Leslie Graves for permanent resignation in lieu of discipline be and is hereby granted, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 20.1 and Rule 5.5 of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Robert Leslie Graves shall be permanently prohibited from practicing law in Louisiana or in any other jurisdiction in which he is admitted to the practice of law; shall be permanently prohibited from seeking readmission to the practice of law in this state or in any other jurisdiction in which he is admitted; and shall be permanently prohibited from seeking admission to the practice of law in any jurisdiction.

FOR THE COURT:

/s/ Jeannette Theriot Knoll Justice, Supreme Court of Louisiana


text:
    In re Arthur GILMORE, Jr.
    No. 2012-B-0852.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2012.
   ORDER

| Considering the Petition for Interim Suspension filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel,

IT IS ORDERED that Arthur Gilmore, Jr., Louisiana Bar Roll number 1059, be and he hereby is suspended from the practice of law on an interim basis pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 19. Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 26(E), this order is effective immediately.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that necessary disciplinary proceedings be instituted in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, §§ 11 and 19.

FOR THE COURT:

/§/ John L. Weimer Justice, Supreme Court of Louisiana


text:
    In re Debra L. CASSIBRY.
    No. 2012-B-0931.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2012.
   ORDER

| Considering the Petition for Interim Suspension for Threat of Harm filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel,

IT IS ORDERED that Debra L. Cassi-bry, Louisiana Bar Roll number 17029, be and she hereby is suspended from the practice of law on an interim basis pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 19.2. Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 26(E), this order is effective immediately-

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Office of Disciplinary Counsel may seek the appointment of a trustee(s) to protect the interests of respondent’s clients pursuant to the provisions of Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 27, if appropriate.

FOR THE COURT:

/s/ Marcus R. Clark Justice, Supreme Court of Louisiana


text:
    In re James M. BERNHARD, III.
    No. 2012-OB-0989.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2012.
   ORDER

|TThe Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) is investigating complaints alleging serious professional misconduct by respondent, including improper handling of client funds. Respondent now seeks to permanently resign from the practice of law in lieu of discipline. The ODC has concurred in respondent’s petition.

Having considered the Petition for Permanent Resignation from the Practice of Law filed by James M. Bernhard, III, Louisiana Bar Roll number 28495, and the concurrence thereto filed by the ODC,

IT IS ORDERED that the request of James M. Bernhard, III for permanent resignation in lieu of discipline be and is hereby granted, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 20.1 and Rule 5.5 of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that James M. Bernhard, III shall be permanently prohibited from practicing law in Louisiana or in any other jurisdiction in which he is admitted to the practice of law; shall be permanently prohibited from seeking readmission to the practice of law in this state or in any other jurisdiction in which he is admitted; and shall be permanently prohibited from seeking admission to the practice of law in any jurisdiction.

FOR THE COURT:

/s/ Marcus R. Clark Justice, Supreme Court of Louisiana


text:
    In re Craig T. BROUSSARD.
    No. 2012-B-0749.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 4, 2012.
   ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

PER CURIAM.

| following the institution of formal charges, respondent and the Office of Disciplinary Counsel submitted a joint petition for consent discipline in which respondent admitted that he violated the Rules of Professional Conduct by creating a false document which he provided to his client. Having reviewed the petition,

IT IS ORDERED that the Petition for Consent Discipline be accepted and that Craig T. Broussard, Louisiana Bar Roll number 26217, be suspended from the practice of law for a period of three years. It is further ordered that all but one year and one day of the' suspension shall be deferred, subject to the condition that any future misconduct may be grounds for making the deferred portion of the suspension executory or imposing additional discipline, as appropriate.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.

       Chief Justice Kimball not participating in the opinion.


author: PER CURIAM

text:
    In re Cindy M. WILLIAMS.
    No. 2012-B-0750.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 4, 2012.
   ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

PER CURIAM

hThe Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) commenced an investigation into allegations that respondent commingled client and personal funds. Prior to the filing of formal charges, respondent and the ODC submitted a joint petition for consent discipline, in which the parties stipulated that respondent has violated Rule 1.15 of the Rules of Professional Conduct. Having reviewed the petition,

IT IS ORDERED that the Petition for Consent Discipline be accepted and that Cindy M. Williams, Louisiana Bar Roll number 1070, be suspended from the practice of law for a period of six months, fully deferred, followed by a two-year period of supervised probation governed by the terms and conditions set forth in the Petition for Consent Discipline. The probationary period shall commence from the date respondent, the ODC, and the probation monitor execute a formal probation plan. Any failure of respondent to comply with the conditions of probation, or any misconduct during the probationary period, may be grounds for making the deferred suspension executory, or imposing additional discipline, as appropriate.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.

       Chief Justice Kimball not participating in the opinion.


text:
    Richard GUNTER, et ux. v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, et al.
    No. 2012-C-0562.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 4, 2012.
    Rehearing Denied June 15, 2012.
   PER CURIAM.

| ,We reverse the ruling of the court of appeal and reinstate the trial court’s judgment, granting St. Paul’s Motion for Summary Judgment, for the reasons assigned by Chief Judge Henry N. Brown in his dissent:

Finding no material issues of fact, the trial court granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs appealed. The submissions in support of the MSJ [“Motion for Summary Judgment”] without question prove a valid rejection of UMBI coverage. The sole basis of plaintiffs’ case is that the official minutes for the BPPJ [“Bossier Parish Police Jury”]for the years 1995 through 2007 do not show the passage of a specific resolution authorizing William Alti-mus, or any other legal representative, to negotiate terms of coverage or execute any documents for the purchase of automobile liability insurance with St. Paul on behalf of the BPPJ, including UM coverage. That is their case. Defendant even admits that there are no minutes or express written authorization for Altimus to execute the liability insurance documents on behalf of the police jury. Thus, there are no material issues of fact and this matter should be an up or down vote.
In Stewart v. Edwards, 34,435 (La. App.2d Cir.04/04/01), 784 So.2d 740, this court held that a corporate executive’s authority to reject UM coverage may be established explicitly or implicitly. Specifically, we found that the affidavit testimony of the executive officer acknowledging his signature on the rejection form and his authority to execute such a form was sufficient proof of his authorization. In the case sub judice, Altimus’s deposition, as well as the affidavit and deposition of the BPPJ’s president, stated that Altimus was authorized to reject UMBI coverage and sign the appropriate form. Plaintiffs | presented nothing to dispute this evidence.
It is clear that the BPPJ agreed to obtain insurance from St. Paul and renewed that policy yearly thereafter. The BPPJ met each year and approved the payment of the insurance bill. Alti-mus, who was both the administrator and an elected member of the police jury, signed the necessary documents each year, including the rejection of UMBI coverage.
La. R.S. 22:1295(1)(a)(ii), which governs the issuance of uninsured motorist coverage in Louisiana, provides, in part:
The form signed by the insured or his legal representative which initially rejects coverage, selects lower limits, or selects economic-only coverage shall remain valid for the life of the policy and shall not require the completion of a new selection form when a renewal, reinstatement, substitute, or amended policy is issued to the same named insured by the same insurer or any of its affiliates.... (Emphasis added).
* * *
Contrary to plaintiffs’ argument, the minutes of the BPPJ demonstrate that the police jury did agree to obtain insurance coverage from St. Paul, which in fact rejected UMBI coverage. Each year they reviewed the cost and paid the bill. Equally obvious' was that Altimus was authorized to execute the necessary documents.
A motion for summary judgment shall be granted if “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to material fact, and that mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” La. C.C.P. art. 966(B). Appellate courts review summary judgments de novo under the same criteria that govern the district court’s consideration of whether summary judgment is appropriate. NAB Natural Resources, L.L.C. v. Willamette Industries, Inc., 28,555 (La.App.2d Cir.08/21/96), 679 So.2d 477.

See Gunter v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 86 So.3d 716 (La.App. 2 Cir.2012).

KNOLL, J., dissents and would deny the writ.


text:
    Jay NAPOLITANO v. Steven GILL.
    No. 2012-CC-0206.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 4, 2012.
   PER CURIAM.

I,This matter arises from a dispute between attorneys over fees. After arbitration, the arbitrator awarded plaintiff 50% of the fees in the underlying litigation. Plaintiff then filed a proceeding in the district court to confirm the arbitration. After a contradictory hearing at which both attorneys appeared, the district court rendered judgment on November 19, 2010, confirming the arbitrator’s award. Defendant did not move for a new trial, nor did he file a motion and order for appeal. Three months later, on February 9, 2011, defendant filed a petition to annul the judgment of the arbitrator, alleging the arbitrator erred in prohibiting one of defendant’s witnesses from testifying during the arbitration, and erred in determining the amount of fees that should be divided. Plaintiff responded by filing an exception of no cause of action. The district court overruled the exception, and the court of appeal denied plaintiffs request for supervisory review. Plaintiff then sought review in this court.

In essence, defendant’s petition alleges the arbitration award should be annulled because the arbitrator failed to allow one of his witnesses to testify. Such a ground might arguably be a basis for vacating the award under La. R.S. 9:4210(0, which provides an award may be vacated “[wjhere the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy, or of any | pother misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced” [emphasis added]. However, La. R.S. 9:4213 provides such a motion must be filed within three months after the arbitrator’s award is filed or delivered. Defendant’s petition to annul was filed well outside of this time period.

As a result, defendant’s remedy would be limited to an action for nullity of the district court’s judgment on the basis of fraud or ill practices under La.Code Civ. P. art. 2001 et seq. Nothing in defendant’s petition for nullity alleges fraud or ill practices in connection with the district court’s judgment.

Accordingly, the writ is granted. The judgment of the district court is reversed, and plaintiffs exception of no cause of action is granted. Pursuant to La.Code Civ. P. art. 934, the case is remanded to district court to determine whether the objection may be removed by amendment of the petition, and if so, to set an appropriate delay for amendment.


text:
    Jane DOE v. SOUTHERN GYMS, L.L.C., et al.
    No. 2012-CC-0448.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 4, 2012.
    Rehearing Denied June 15, 2012.
   PER CURIAM.

| defendants filed a motion to transfer this action from Evangeline Parish to East Baton Rouge Parish based on forum non conveniens. The district court denied the motion. Relying on La.Code Civ. P. art. 123(A), the district court determined it could not transfer the action because plaintiff was domiciled in Evangeline Parish. Defendants sought supervisory review, which the court of appeal denied. Defendants now seek relief in this court.

La.Code Civ. P. art. 123(A) allows a district court to transfer a civil case to another district court where it might have been brought for the convenience of the parties and the witnesses. The article further provides, “no suit brought in the parish in which the plaintiff is domiciled, and in a court which is otherwise a court of competent jurisdiction and proper venue, shall be transferred to any other court pursuant to this Article.” The jurisprudence interpreting this article has held the plaintiffs domicile is determinated at the time the motion to transfer is filed. See Wallace v. Wallace, 25,366 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1/19/94), 631 So.2d 40, 42 (holding La.Code Civ. P. art. 123(A) “only prohibits a case transfer if the plaintiff is domiciled in the parish where suit was filed when the motion to change venue is made”).

In the instant case, defendants submitted plaintiffs deposition testimony, which establishes that at the time the motion was filed, she was residing in East Baton 1 ¡¡.Rouge Parish and intended to remain in that parish. Additionally, defendants produced evidence indicating East Baton Rouge Parish is a more convenient venue for the suit, as the incident in question took place in that parish, the majority of the witnesses reside in that parish and other lawsuits arising out of the same incident have been filed in that parish. Under these circumstances, we find the district court erred in failing to grant defendants’ motion to transfer.

Accordingly, the writ is granted. The judgment of the district court is reversed, and the motion to transfer based on forum non conveniens is granted. The case is remanded to the district court, which is instructed to transfer the proceeding to the 19th Judicial District Court for the Parish of East Baton Rouge.

WEIMER, J., would grant and docket.


text:
    GALLERY NINE-FORTY, LLC v. FIREMAN’S FUND INSURANCE CORPORATION.
    No. 2012-CC-0965.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 28, 2012.
   In re Continental Casualty Company;— Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. F, Nos. 06-8037, 09-5910; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2012-C-0439.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Carey GALLOWAY.
    No. 2012-KK-0719.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2012.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. F, No. 506-673; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-K-1726.

Denied.

GUIDRY, J., would grant.


text:
    Shannon Carter DIEZ v. Joshua Thomas DIEZ.
    No. 2012-CJ-0822.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 2, 2012.
   In re Diez, Joshua Thomas; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. K, No. 2008-14959; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011 CU 1569.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Travis MOORE.
    No. 2012-KD-0995.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 3, 2012.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. H, No. 502-817; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2012-K-0651.

Writ denied. In dismissing the jury after the state requested a stay following the granting of the defendant’s motion for mistrial, the trial court violated the mandatory provisions of La.C.Cr.P. art. 775.1. However, because we find the state is not prejudiced by the jury’s dismissal, and may re-try the defendant, we decline to order the jury re-seated.


text:
    Brenda WEATHERSPOON and Peggy Landry v. CHARTER HOME HEALTH, L.L.C., Bluecross Blueshield of Louisiana, Colonial Life and Accident Insurance Company, General Star Indemnity Company and United National Insurance Company.
    No. 2012-CC-0699.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 4, 2012.
   In re Landry, Peggy; Weatherspoon, Brenda et al.; — Plaintiffs); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. 0, No. 567,921; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 CW 0294.

Not considered. Not timely filed. See Supreme Court Rule X, Section 5(d).


text:
    Craig Steven ARABIE, et al. v. CITGO PETROLEUM CORPORATION, et al.
    No. 2010-C-2618.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 4, 2012.
   In re Citgo Petroleum Corporation et al.; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Calca-sieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 2007-2738; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 10-334.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Kenneth Wayne MONTGOMERY v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-1742.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 4, 2012.
   In re Montgomery, Kenneth Wayne;— Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 18150-08; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 10-1151.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Vincent Mark CASTILLO v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-1747.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 4, 2012.
   In re Castillo, Vincent Mark; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 95-105; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 11-KH-616.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2830 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Michael WALKER v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-1771.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 4, 2012.
   In re Walker, Michael; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 226570; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011 KW 0637.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; State v. Parker, 98-0256 (La.5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694; La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Derrick NELLON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-1803.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 4, 2012.
   In re Nellon, Derrick; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. J, No. 99-6870; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, Nos. 09-WR-569,10-KH-935.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Gale ELLIOT v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-1808.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 4, 2012.
   In re Elliot, Gale; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. H, No. 319-225; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-K-0922.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; State v. Parker, 98-0256 (La.5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Brett Robert CRIST v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-1809.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 4, 2012.
   In re Crist, Brett Robert; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 427-274; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011 KW 0822.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; State v. Parker, 98-0256 (La.5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694; La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Dennis R. WIGGINS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-1819.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 4, 2012.
   In re Wiggins, Dennis R.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. G, No. 319-077; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-K-0827.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; State v. Parker, 98-0256 (La.5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694; La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.


text:
    STATE ex rel. John E. JACKSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-1870.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 4, 2012.
   In re Jackson, John E.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Ouachita, 4th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 06-F21533; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 46,-781-KH.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Preston G. DEMOUCHETTE, Jr. v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-1871.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 4, 2012.
   In re Demouchette, Jr., Preston G.;— Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Acadia, 15th Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 31,861.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; State v. Parker, 98-0256 (La.5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Charles HARRIS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-1874.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 4, 2012.
   In re Harris, Charles; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Bienville, 2nd Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 39988; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 46,-619-KH.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Robert JACKSON, III v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-1895.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 4, 2012.
   In re Jackson III, Robert; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. 1, No. 200,991; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, Nos. 46,-736-KW, 46748-KW, 46791-KW.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Angelo A. GONZALEZ v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-1896.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 4, 2012.
   In re Gonzalez, Angelo A.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Winn, 8th Judicial District Court Div. 0, No. 40240; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 46,778-KH.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Derrick HOLT v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-1902.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 4, 2012.
   In re Holt, Derrick; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. O, No. 03-5674; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 11-KH-691.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Brande Loraine STOW a/k/a Brandé Stowe, v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-1904.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 4, 2012.
   In re Stow, Brande Loraine; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Bienville, 2nd Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 41243; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 46,-805-KH.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Sharon SYLVE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-1907.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 4, 2012.
   In re Sylve, Sharon; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 374851; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011 KW1039.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Devin HILLIARD v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-1919.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 4, 2012.
   In re Hilliard, Devin; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. B, No. 415-293; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-K-1101.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; State v. Parker, 98-0256 (La.5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694; La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172; State v. Cotton, 09-2397 (La.10/15/10), 45 So.3d 1030.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Joshua RILEY v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-1897.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 4, 2012.
   In re Riley, Joshua; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. L, No. 09-4979; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 11-KH-665.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Kenneth CORLEY v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-1921.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 4, 2012.
   In re Corley, Kenneth; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. B, No. 337-418; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-K-1017.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4(D).


text:
    STATE ex rel. Michael FRANCOIS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-1939.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 4, 2012.
   In re Francois, Michael; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Mary, 16th Judicial District Court Div. G, Nos. 2002-159321, 95-140603; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011 KW 1102.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; State v. Parker, 98-0256 (La.5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694; La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.

WEIMER, J., recused.


text:
    STATE ex rel. John E. MURPHY v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-1940.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 4, 2012.
   In re Murphy, John E.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. L, No. 08-3088; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 11-KH-739.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Gregory Don SEARLS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-1941.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 4, 2012.
   In re Searls, Gregory Don; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 07-6493; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 11-KH-761.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Darius R. PATTERSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-1945.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 4, 2012.
   In re Patterson, Darius R.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. L, No. 09-6180; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 11-KH-754.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Robert Lee JORDAN v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-1946.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 4, 2012.
   In re Jordan, Robert Lee; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Desoto, 42nd Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 07-CR-016550; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 46,799-KH.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Antonio DAVENPORT v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-1954.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 4, 2012.
   In re Davenport, Antonio; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 248,534; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 46,-777-KH.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Brian S. YOUNG v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-1959.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 4, 2012.
   In re Young, Brian S.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. L, No. 03-5199; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, Nos. 10-KH-684, 09-WR-738.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Alphonse HOGAN v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-1960.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 4, 2012.
   In re Hogan, Alphonse; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. C, No. 366-599; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-K-1058.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2380 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    Dax STRATTMAN v. LOUISIANA RISK REVIEW PANEL, Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections, et al.
    No. 2011-CI-1963.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 4, 2012.
   In re Strattman, Dax; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 576092; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 CA 0823.

Denied.


text:
    Alan L. DAWES v. Sid GAUTREAUX, Sheriff East Baton Rouge Sheriff Dept., et al.
    No. 2011-CI-1965.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 4, 2012.
   In re Dawes, Alan L.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. 1, No. 590,618; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011 CW 0480.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Eugene FRAZIER, Jr. v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-1982.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 4, 2012.
   In re Frazier Jr., Eugene; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Sabine, 11th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 49586; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 11-00763.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Justin TAYLOR v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-1985.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 4, 2012.
   In re Taylor, Justin; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. N, No. 02-3671; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 11-KH-785.

Denied. La.CCr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; State v. Parker, 98-0256 (La.5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694; La.CCr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Edmond STACKER v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-1986.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 4, 2012.
   In re Stacker, Edmond; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 01-6339; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 09-WR-518.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Luke LEMEUNIER v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-1987.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 4, 2012.
   In re Lemeunier, Luke; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. K, No. 03-2951; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 11-KH-731.

Denied. See State ex rel. Brown v. State, 03-2568 (La.3/26/04), 870 So.2d 976; State ex rel. Degreat v. State, 98-0690 (La.7/2/98), 724 So.2d 205; State ex rel. Fleury v. State, 93-2898 (La.10/13/95), 661 So.2d 488.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Steven Mark “Marc” ANDERSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-1988.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 4, 2012.
   In re Anderson, Steven Mark “Marc”;— Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 110556; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 10-01267.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Chadwick WRIGHT v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-1990.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 4, 2012.
   In re Wright, Chadwick; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Union, 3rd Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 89207; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 46,808-KH.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Kendrich THOMAS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-1996.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 4, 2012.
   In re Thomas, Kendrich; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. D, Nos. 462-419, 462-420; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-K-0964.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Christopher PENDLETON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-1997.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 4, 2012.
   In re Pendleton, Christopher; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. John, 40th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 94-445; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 08-WR-1137.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Shedrick GIVENS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-1999.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 4, 2012.
   In re Givens, Shedrick; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 95-2188; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, Nos. 08-WR-1236, 09-KH-1037,10-KH-103.

Denied. Result correct.


text:
    REIMBURSEMENT ASSURANCE CORPORATION v. STATE of Louisiana, through the DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HOSPITALS, Office of Public Health and Division of Administration, Office of Risk Management.
    No. 2011-CC-2697.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 4, 2012.
   In re Office of Public Health and Division of Administration, Office of Risk Management; State of Louisiana, through the Department of Health and Hospitals et al.; — Defendant(s); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 490396; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011 CW 1428.

Denied.

JOHNSON, VICTORY and CLARK, JJ., would grant.


text:
    ADVANCED ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTING, INC., v. LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, Quality Bark, L.L.C., S & R Management, L.L.C., Steven Earl White, and Richard L. Allen.
    No. 2012-CC-0039.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 4, 2012.
   In re Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 594548; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011 CW 1592.

Denied.

JOHNSON, VICTORY and CLARK, JJ., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Edward L. HARRIS.
    No. 2012-K-0100.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 4, 2012.
   In re Harris, Edward L.; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Ouachita, 4th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 09-F2122; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 46,721-KA.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Dean J. WILLIAMSON.
    No. 2012-K-0109.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 4, 2012.
   In re Williamson, Dean J.; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. James, 23rd Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 5123; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 10-KA-466.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana in the Interest of D.G.
    No. 2012-CK-0113.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 4, 2012.
   In re G., D.; — Other; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, Juvenile Court, No. 100,-291-A; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011 KW 2142.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Bruce Alvin ROBERTSON.
    No. 2012-KO-0116.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 4, 2012.
   In re Robertson, Bruce Alvin; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. N, No. 04-06-0211; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011 KA 1147.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Markeece T. MOSLEY.
    No. 2012-KO-0117.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 4, 2012.
   In re Mosley, Markeece T.; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 284,472; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 46,-756-KA.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Terrance J. JONES.
    No. 2012-KO-0125.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 4, 2012.
   In re Jones, Terrance J.; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. O, No. 97-7165; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 11-KA-87.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Randy Jerome WILSON.
    No. 2012-KO-0126.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 4, 2012.
   In re Wilson, Randy Jerome; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. 3, No. 251,407; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 46,708-KA.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Willie Carl JONES, Jr.
    No. 2012-K-0147.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 4, 2012.
   In re Jones Jr., Willie Carl; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Bossier, 26th Judicial District Court Div. D, Nos. 171,940, 171,-940A; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, Nos. 46,758-KA, 46,759-KA.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Bruce GILL.
    No. 2012-KO-0164.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 4, 2012.
   In re Gill, Bruce; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Webster, 26th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 82,122; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 46,784-KA.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Renee H. CRAPPS.
    No. 2012-K-0182.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 4, 2012.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 478,931; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011 KA 0966.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Julia Genelle EASILY.
    No. 2012-K-0198.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 4, 2012.
   In re Easily, Julia Genelle; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Sabine, 11th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 68823; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 11-687.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Raymond REARDON.
    No. 2012-K-0207.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 4, 2012.
   In re Reardon, Raymond; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 455,673; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011 KA 0800.

Denied.

KNOLL, J., concurs in the writ denial as only the result is correct.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Frank GEISLER.
    No. 2012-KP-0269.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 4, 2012.
   In re Geisler, Frank; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 05-02-0011; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011 KW 2029.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Vincent Mark CASTILLO v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-0356.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 4, 2012.
   In re Castillo, Vincent Mark; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 95-105; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 11-KH-936.

Denied. See State ex rel. Bernard v. Cr.D.C., 94-2247, p. 1 (La.4/28/95), 653 So.2d 1174, 1175; State ex rel. Fleury v. State, 93-2898 (La.10/13/95), 661 So.2d 488.


text:
    Patrick HESP and Kathleen Hastings v. Dirk VERTIGAN and Jilyana Cazaran.
    No. 2012-CC-0492.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 4, 2012.
   In re Cazaran, Jilyana; Vertigan, Dirk; — Defendant(s); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 517,584; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011 CW 1953.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant.


text:
    CITY OF GRETNA v. CARO PROPERTIES A, L.L.C.
    No. 2012-CC-0553.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 4, 2012.
   In re Caro Properties A, L.L.C.; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 681-498; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. ll-C-1037.

Denied.


text:
    Marilyn CLINE v. Mohammad CHEEMA d/b/a Belle Chasse Shell, Cheema Properties, LLC and M & S Oil Services, LLC.
    No. 2012-C-0666.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 4, 2012.
   In re Cheema Properties, LLC; M & S Oil Services, LLC; — Defendant(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Plaquemines, 25th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 57-340; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 2011-CA-1029.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant.


text:
    Thomas L. McGUIRE, III and E. Douglas Henriksen v. John J. KELLY.
    No. 2012-C-0685.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 4, 2012.
   In re Henriksen, E. Douglas; McGuire, Thomas L. et al.; — Plaintiff(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. M, No. 548,103; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 CA 0562.

Denied.


text:
    BRETON SOUND OYSTER COMPANY, L.L.C. v. STIEL INSURANCE COMPANY OF NEW ORLEANS, INC., et al.
    No. 2012-CC-0686.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 4, 2012.
   In re Delaune, Elson; Stiel Insurance Company of New Orleans, Inc.; Westport Insurance Corporation; — Defendant(s); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Plaquemines, 25th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 57 — 482; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-C-1744.

Denied.


text:
    PARISH OF JEFFERSON v. BANKERS INSURANCE COMPANY and Louis Marcotte, III.
    No. 2012-C-0691.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 4, 2012.
   In re Parish of Jefferson; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. 0, No. 616-439; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 11-CA-590.

Denied.


text:
    Veronica BOWMAN and Gregory Bowman v. The RIVERSIDE COURT CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION PHASE, II, INC., Essex Insurance Company, and Air Conditioning Ambulance Service, Inc.
    No. 2012-CC-0700.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 4, 2012.
   In re Air Conditioning Ambulance Service Inc.; Essex Insurance Company; Riverside Court Condominium Association Phase II Inc.; — Defendant(s); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. P, No. 678-619; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, Nos. ll-C-671, 11-C-718, ll-C-662.

Denied.


text:
    NEW ORLEANS PRIVATE PATROL SERVICE, INC. v. Tonja KUYKENDALL and Dawn Romero Watson, Administrator, Louisiana Department of Labor.
    No. 2012-C-0701.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 4, 2012.
   In re New Orleans Private Patrol Service Inc.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. K, No. 2005-1955; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-CA-1052.

Denied.


text:
    Thomas L. McGUIRE, III and E. Douglas Henriksen v. John J. KELLY.
    No. 2012-C-0702.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 4, 2012.
   In re Kelly, John J.; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. M, No. 548,103; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 CA 0562.

Denied.


text:
    SAFEGUARD STORAGE PROPERTIES, L.L.C., et al. v. DONAHUE FAVRET CONTRACTORS, INC., et al.
    No. 2012-CC-0706.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 4, 2012.
   In re Safeguard Storage Properties L.L.C. et al.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. H, No. 07-9359; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-C-1415.

Denied.


text:
    Almate GUIDRY v. DILLARD’S DEPARTMENT STORES, INC.
    No. 2012-CC-0709.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 4, 2012.
   In re Higbee Company; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Lafourche, 17th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 115668; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011 CW 1898.

Denied.


text:
    Pamala S. BERNHARD v. John D. BERNHARD.
    No. 2012-CC-0773.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 4, 2012.
   In re Woods, Pamala S.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, East Baton Rouge Family Court, No. 145,408; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011 CW 1101.

Denied.


text:
    John Rene GALLET v. Crystal Suire GALLET.
    No. 2012-CJ-0786.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 4, 2012.
   In re Gallet, John Rene; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Vermilion, 15th Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 80190-H; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 11-1416.

Denied.


text:
    Jade BOUDREAUX v. LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND CORRECTIONS.
    No. 2012-C-0239.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 4, 2012.
   In re Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections Office of Motor Vehicles; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, Office of Motor Vehicles, No. 2009-9231-PS; 19th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 587496; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011 CA 1087.

Granted.


text:
    Ellis HARGRAVE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-C-0341.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 4, 2012.
   In re Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review Office of Workers’ Compensation District 04, No. 06-04633; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 11-836.

Granted.


text:
    KATIE REALTY, LTD. d/b/a the Landry Building v. LOUISIANA CITIZENS PROPERTY INSURANCE CORPORATION.
    No. 2012-C-0588.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 4, 2012.
   In re Louisiana Citizens Property Insurance Corporation; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Terrebonne, 32nd Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 155,990; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011 CA 0949.

Granted.

WEIMER, J., recused.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Rodney JACK, et al.
    No. 2011-KK-2713.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 4, 2012.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Iberia, 16th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 117249-G; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW 11-00968.

Granted in part. The case is remanded to the district court for the sole purpose of granting relator an opportunity to amend the notice of pending forfeiture in order to remove the objection raised by defendants. See La. Code Civ. P. art. 932. In all other respects, the application is denied.


text:
    Dwayne HALEY v. Cheryl G. LEARY.
    No. 2012-OC-0795.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 4, 2012.
   In re Haley, Dwayne; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. J, No. 02-17470; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-CA-1144.

Application not considered. Not timely filed. See Supreme Court Rule X, Section 5.


text:
    Richard Raymus RONDENO v. The LAW OFFICE OF WILLIAM S. VINCENT JR., et al.
    No. 2012-CD-0905.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 4, 2012.
   In re Rondeno, Richard Raymus;— Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. H, No. 10-3214.

Transferred to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit for review and decision.


text:
    Averis Terrell MANCHESTER, Crystal D. Atkins and Heath H. Atkins v. Dedrick CONRAD, Circle J. Trucking, Inc., and Gemini Insurance Company. Shawn Jackson Individually, and on Behalf of his minor Children, Joshua Tackno, Cambrielle Tackno, and Shamara Porter and Danielle Kinchen, Individually v. Circle J. Trucking, Inc., Conrad Dedrick, and Gemini Insurance Company. John Ross v. Dedrick Conrad, Circle J. Trucking, Inc., and Gemini Insurance Company. Adam W. Vegas v. Circle J. Trucking, Inc., Conrad Dedrick, Gemini Insurance Company, and Alma Plantation, LLC. Jason White v. Dedrick Conrad, Circle J. Trucking, Alma Plantation, LLC, National Fire and Marine Insurance Company, Interstate Fire and Casualty Company, and Gemini Insurance Company.
    No. 2012-C-0567.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 4, 2012.
   In re National Fire & Marine Insurance Company; — Defendants; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Pointe Coupee, 18th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 41,640 C/W 41,700 C/W 41,963 C/W 42,175 C/W 42,187; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, Nos. 2011 CA 1249, 2011 CA 1248, 2011 CA 1250, 2011 CA 1251, 2011 CA 1252.

Denied.

VICTORY and CLARK, JJ., would grant.


text:
    Averis Terrell MANCHESTER, Crystal D. Atkins and Heath H. Atkins v. Dedrick CONRAD, Circle J. Trucking, Inc., and Gemini Insurance Company. Shawn Jackson Individually, and on Behalf of his Minor Children, Joshua Tackno, Cambrielle Tackno, and Shamara Porter and Danielle Kinchen, Individually v. Circle J. Trucking, Inc., Conrad Dedrick, and Gemini Insurance Company. John Ross v. Dedrick Conrad, Circle J. Trucking, Inc., and Gemini Insurance Company. Adam W. Vegas v. Circle J. Trucking, Inc., Conrad Dedrick, Gemini Insurance Company, and Alma Plantation, LLC. Jason White v. Dedrick Conrad, Circle J. Trucking, Alma Plantation, LLC, National Fire and Marine Insurance Company, Interstate Fire and Casualty Company, and Gemini Insurance Company.
    No. 2012-C-0568.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 4, 2012.
   In re Interstate Fire and Casualty Company; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Pointe Coupee, 18th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 41,640 C/W 41,700 C/W 41,963 C/W 42,175 C/W 42,187; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, Nos. 2011 CA 1249, 2011 CA 1248, 2011 CA 1252, 2011 CA 1251, 2011 CA 1250.

Denied.

VICTORY and CLARK, JJ., would grant.


text:
    Averis Terrell MANCHESTER, Crystal D. Atkins and Heath H. Atkins v. Dedrick CONRAD, Circle J. Trucking, Inc., and Gemini Insurance Company. Shawn Jackson Individually, and on Behalf of his Minor Children, Joshua Tackno, Cambrielle Tackno, and Shamara Porter and Danielle Kinchen, Individually v. Circle J. Trucking, Inc., Conrad Dedrick, and Gemini Insurance Company. John Ross v. Dedrick Conrad, Circle J. Trucking, Inc., and Gemini Insurance Company. Adam W. Vegas v. Circle J. Trucking, Inc., Conrad Dedrick, Gemini Insurance Company, and Alma Plantation, LLC. Jason White v. Dedrick Conrad, Circle J. Trucking, Alma Plantation, LLC, National Fire and Marine Insurance Company, Interstate Fire and Casualty Company, and Gemini Insurance Company.
    No. 2012-C-0584.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 4, 2012.
   In re Manchester, Averis Terrell;— Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Pointe Coupee, 18th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 41,640 C/W 41,700 C/W 41,963 C/W 42,175 C/W 42,187; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, Nos. 2011 CA 1248, 2011 CA 1252, 2011 CA 1251, 2011 CA 1250, 2011 CA 1249.

Denied.