author: LOLLEY, J.

text:
    STATE of Louisiana, Appellee v. James C. LEWIS, Jr., Appellant.
    No. 46,513-KA.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.
    Sept. 28, 2011.

      James C. Lewis, Jr., Pro Se.
    James E. Beal, Louisiana Appellate Project, Jonesboro, LA, for Appellant.
    Robert W. Levy, District Attorney, Clifford R. Strider, III, Michael S. Frederick, Assistant District Attorneys, for Appellee.
    Before WILLIAMS, DREW and LOLLEY, JJ.
   LOLLEY, J.

| jThis criminal appeal arises from the Third Judicial District Court, Parish of Lincoln, State of Louisiana. A jury found James C. Lewis guilty of second degree murder, a violation of La. R.S. 14:30.1. Thereafter, Lewis was sentenced to the mandatory term of life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. For the following reasons, Lewis’s conviction and sentence are affirmed.

Facts

On September 1, 2007, two young boys were en route to a fishing excursion when one of the boys saw what he thought was a body in the brush on the side of a road, less than one mile from the Louisiana state line, near Junction City, Arkansas. The next day, one of the boys told his father of their discovery, and the father went back to the area in an attempt to locate the body; however, he was unable to see it from the main road. After his son insisted that the body was there, the father went back and was able to see the body in the thick brush. He notified a Junction City police officer, and Precious “Petey” Story’s body was recovered. At the trial of James Lewis, the coroner would testify that the cause of her death was multiple gunshot wounds to the head and neck.

Lewis, who had been detained after a traffic violation in a Delta 88 bearing Pe-tey’s license plate, eventually made a statement to detectives alleging that his brother, Jamie Jackson, was responsible for shooting Petey. Lewis told police that he was afraid of his brother, and as a result he complied with his demands and did not attempt to help Petey after she was shot inside the house where he had been staying.

12Lewis, his brother Jamie Jackson, and Roger Phillips were eventually arrested for charges related to the murder of Petey. Lewis was indicted for second degree murder. A motion for change of venue was granted and the trial was moved from Union Parish to Lincoln Parish. Following a jury trial, the jury returned a verdict of guilty as charged. Thereafter, Lewis was sentenced to the mandatory sentence of life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. This appeal ensued.

Applicable Law

On appeal, Lewis raises the issue of sufficiency of the evidence for his conviction both pro se and with appeal counsel. In the appeal brief filed by his attorney, he argues specifically that the state failed to establish his responsibility for Petey’s death. Additionally, Lewis maintains that the state failed to establish that he had specific intent to kill the victim or that he actively desired her death. Pro se, Lewis contends that the state’s case against him consisted of only circumstantial evidence that he killed the victim for “the purpose of some form of a theft,” and that the verdict in this case was a “verdict of emotion,” unsupported by sufficient evidence. He further argues that the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he shot the victim; therefore, the only issue to resolve was whether or not he was a principal to the murder. Finally, Lewis also claims that the circumstantial evidence presented by the state does not rise to the level of excluding every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. We disagree.

13As stated in La. R.S. 14:30.1, in pertinent part:

A. Second degree murder is the killing of a human being:
(1) When the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm.
(2) When the offender is engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of aggravated rape, forcible rape, aggravated arson, aggravated burglary, aggravated kidnapping, second degree kidnapping, aggravated escape, assault by drive-by shooting, armed robbery, first degree robbery, second degree robbery, simple robbery, cruelty to juveniles, second degree cruelty to juveniles, or terrorism, even though he has no intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm.

The standard of appellate review for a sufficiency of the evidence claim is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); State v. Tate, 2001-1658 (La.05/20/03), 851 So.2d 921, cert. denied, 541 U.S. 905, 124 S.Ct. 1604, 158 L.Ed.2d 248 (2004). This standard, now legislatively embodied in La.C.Cr.P. art. 821, does not provide the appellate court with a vehicle to substitute its own appreciation of the evidence for that of the fact finder. State v. Pigford, 2005-0477 (La.02/22/06), 922 So.2d 517. The trier of fact is charged to make a credibility determination and may, within the bounds of rationality, accept or reject the testimony of any witness. State v. Casey, 99-0023 (La.01/26/00), 775 So.2d 1022, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 840, 121 S.Ct. 104, 148 L.Ed.2d 62 (2000). The reviewing court may impinge on that discretion only to the extent necessary to guarantee the fundamental due process of law. Id.

|4The appellate court does not assess the credibility of witnesses or reweigh evidence. State v. Smith, 94-3116 (La.10/16/95), 661 So.2d 442. A reviewing court accords great deference to a jury’s decision to accept or reject the testimony of a witness in whole or in part. State v. Eason, 43,788 (La.App.2d Cir.02/25/09), 3 So.3d 685, writ denied, 2009-0725 (La.12/11/09), 23 So.3d 913.

The Jackson standard is applicable in cases involving both direct and circumstantial evidence. An appellate court reviewing the sufficiency of evidence in such cases must resolve any conflict in the direct evidence by viewing that evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. When the direct evidence is thus viewed, the facts established by the direct evidence and inferred from the circumstances established by that evidence, must be sufficient for a rational trier of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant was guilty of every essential element of the crime. State v. Sutton, 436 So.2d 471 (La.1983); State v. Speed, 43,786 (La. App.2d Cir.01/14/09), 2 So.3d 582, unit denied, 2009-0372 (11/06/09), 21 So.3d 299.

In the absence of internal contradiction or irreconcilable conflict with physical evidence, one witness’s testimony, if believed by the trier of fact, is sufficient support for a requisite factual conclusion. State v. Gullette, 43,082 (La.App.2d Cir.02/13/08), 975 So.2d 753.

A person may be convicted of an offense even if he has not personally fired the fatal shot. State v. Hampton, 98-0331 (La.04/23/99) 750 So.2d 867, cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1007, 120 S.Ct. 504, 145 L.Ed.2d 390, (1999). 1/¡Regarding the law of principals, La. R.S. 14:24 provides:

All persons concerned in the commission of a crime, whether present or absent, and whether they directly commit the act constituting the offense, aid and abet in its commission, or directly or indirectly counsel or procure another to commit the crime, are principals.

Only those persons who knowingly participate in the planning or execution of a crime are principals. Mere presence at the scene is therefore not enough to “concern” an individual in the crime. Moreover, an individual may only be convicted as a principal for those crimes for which he personally has the requisite mental state. State v. Pierre, 631 So.2d 427 (La.1994). All persons concerned in the commission of an offense, either directly or indirectly, are principals in the crime and culpable according to the mental state they possess at the time of the offense. It is sufficient encouragement that the accomplice is standing by at the scene of the crime ready to give some aid if needed, although in such a case it is necessary that the principal actually be aware of the accomplice’s intention. State v. Anderson, 97-1301 (La.02/06/98), 707 So.2d 1223.

Specific intent is a state of mind and need not be proved as a fact; it may be inferred from the circumstances of the transaction and the actions of the defendant. State v. Graham, 420 So.2d 1126 (La.1982); State v. Taylor, 621 So.2d 141 (La.App.2d Cir.1993), writ denied, 93-2054 (La.02/11/94), 634 So.2d 371. Specific intent is that state of mind that exists when the circumstances indicate the offender actively desired the prescribed criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to act. La. R.S. 14:10(1); State v. Lindsey, 543 So.2d 886 (La.1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1074, 110 S.Ct. 1796, 108 L.Ed.2d 798 (1990); State v. McCray, 621 So.2d 94 (La.App.2d Cir.1993). The determination of whether the requisite intent is present in a criminal case is for the trier of fact. State v. Brown, 618 So.2d 629 (La.App.2d Cir.1993), writ denied, 624 So.2d 1222 (La.1993).

Discussion

As stated, on appeal Lewis challenges the sufficiency of the evidence used to convict him. The trial of James Lewis included physical evidence as well as the testimony of many witnesses to support his conviction.

Sondra Strahan

At the trial of the matter, Sondra Stra-han testified that she and her husband raised Petey from the time she was 22 months old until her death at the age of 18. Sondra testified that Petey worked at the IGA grocery store and drove a turquoise 4-door Grand Am. Strahan identified the state’s exhibits of photos of Pe-tey’s vehicle without its license plate and without the center console compact disc player. Sondra stated that the vehicle was recovered with the keys in the ignition and released to her by the sheriffs office. Pe-tey’s pit bull puppy, Chavez, was also recovered after her disappearance.

Sondra explained that she last saw Pe-tey on Thursday, August 30, 2007, when Petey came home after work sometime near 7:00 p.m. She described that Petey changed her clothes and asked to be awakened the next morning at 6:00 a.m., because she had to report to work at 7:00 a.m. 17According to Sondra, Petey left the house, carrying her dog, wearing a “Big Dog” T-shirt, khaki stretch pants, and blue Skechers tennis shoes. The next morning, on August 31, Strahan went to wake Petey, but she was not in her room. Petey was reported missing that Friday morning.

Jorman Snowden

Jorman Snowden, an assistant manager at the IGA, testified that he was on duty on August 30, 2007, the last time Petey worked at the store where she was a cashier. Petey worked that day from 2:00 to 7:00 p.m., and she received and cashed her weekly paycheck that day. Snowden recalled observing Lewis visiting Petey at the store on different occasions for several weeks prior to her disappearance. On August 30, during the course of Petey’s shift, Snowden saw Lewis come into the store and talk with her; in fact, images of Lewis entering and leaving the store around 5:25 p.m. were captured by the store’s video surveillance system. Still images of the video were entered into evidence. Lewis returned to the store later that evening around 7:00 p.m. Shortly thereafter, the victim ended her work shift and Snowden watched her as she got into her vehicle in the store parking lot. As Petey was driving away, Snowden saw her stop and pick up the defendant and his brother.

Jarkel Brown

Fifteen-year-old Jarkel Brown of Junction City, Arkansas, testified he and a friend, Robert Armstrong, were planning to go fishing on his grandfather’s property on September 1, 2007. As they were walking along a trail on that day, Jarkel saw a body in some bushes on the side of the trail. 1 sJarkeI told Robert about the body and the boys ran off, not telling anyone that day of their discovery because they were scared. The next day, Jarkel, his brother Jaron Brown, and Robert saw the body in the same place. The boys did not touch the body or go near it. Robert would later tell his father about the body.

Quentin Can’oll

Quentin Carroll, a resident of Junction City, Arkansas, testified that he was the father of Robert Armstrong. According to Carroll, Robert had been acting strangely, and as a result of a conversation with Robert, Carroll went out to the area near State Line Road on September 2, 2007. Initially, he did not see anything unusual, and he made three trips to the area before seeing a white blanket in the high weeds. After seeing this, Carroll made contact with Lloyd Falcon, a deputy police officer in Junction City, to report what his son had told him and what he had seen. Carroll testified that Officer Falcon was able to see the body from the vantage point of a side road.

Juan M. Reyes, Jr.

Juan M. Reyes, Jr., was accepted by the trial court as an expert in the field of crime scene investigations. Reyes stated his current assignment was as an instructor with the Arkansas Law Enforcement Training Academy. Reyes testified he was working as a senior investigator on September 2, 2007, when he was called out to investigate the discovery of a body, later identified as Petey, a few miles from the Louisiana state line in Union County, Arkansas, approximately 0.8 miles from the city limits of Junction |3City on East State Line Road. When Reyes arrived, other law enforcement officers were on the scene; however, none of them had approached the actual area where the body was located. Reyes found the body of a white female lying in the wild-growing weeds approximately four feet away from a gravel drive. There was no evidence that anyone had walked in the area near the body. Tire prints were found on the gravel driveway.

Reyes opined that Petey’s body had been tossed from the gravel driveway. The foliage near the driveway did not appear disturbed, and it prevented the body from being seen from the highway. There was no evidence that the body had been dragged through the gravel or surrounding grassy area. Petey’s arms were straight up over her head and her legs were bent at the knees with her feet nearly together forming “a diamond shape.” A bed ruffle was covering the victim’s upper body and a “Big Dog” T-shirt and bra were pulled up over her breasts. The lower portion of the victim’s body was nude with the exception of socks. Her underwear was found near her left arm. Reyes believed the bed ruffle and Petey’s underwear had been thrown over the body.

While the body had started decomposing and was covered with small insects including maggots, Reyes did not see any evidence that any larger animals had moved or fed on the body. Reyes was unsure how long Petey’s body had been in the area where it was found. He did not believe she had been killed in the location where she was found, and the lack of blood spatter or pooling was indicative of this fact. As the body was removed, the victim’s hands were covered with bags for preservation of any potential |inevidence. Reyes observed that Petey’s body had what appeared to be four “bullet wounds” to her head. All of the wounds appeared to be consistent with each other and made by a medium-to-small caliber bullet. Reyes was unable to determine if the wounds were entry or exit wounds.

Officer William⅛ Todd Gilbert

Officer William Todd Gilbert, the patrol unit commander of the Union Parish Sheriffs Department, testified that he was working in the narcotics division on August 30, 2007, when he was involved in the investigation of Petey’s disappearance. Officer Gilbert was responsible for collecting blood evidence at the house located at 217 John Louis Road, Spearsville, Louisiana, where Lewis had been living at the time. Officer Gilbert described that he worked the inside of the house while Off. Keith Blackmon collected evidence on the outside of the house. Approximately six bloodstains were found inside the house. Samples were collected from the stains using a standard procedure where a swab moistened with sterile water is used to remove a sample of the evidence. The swab would be allowed to dry before being sealed and forwarded for the appropriate testing.

Officer Eddie Horton

Officer Eddie Horton of the Bernice Police Department testified he was working on August 31, 2007, when he noticed a tan Oldsmobile Delta |n88 with a broken windshield traveling on the streets of Bernice. Officer Horton also noticed that the vehicle had a broken taillight and initially did not have a license plate. He decided he was going to make a traffic stop of the vehicle, but he “lost” the vehicle for a short period of time. As Off. Horton drove around looking for the vehicle, some citizens reported to him that a tan vehicle had run two stop signs, and Off. Horton continued his search through the area before deciding to stop in front of a local business to wait to see if the vehicle would pass. The vehicle went past Off. Horton, and he noticed that the vehicle now had a license plate, which was the same one for which a “be on the lookout” had been issued.

Officer Horton described that he engaged his emergency overhead lights and attempted to stop the vehicle. At that time, the vehicle pulled away from him and Off. Horton then activated his siren, attempting to stop the vehicle. The driver ran a stop sign before turning onto another street. At that point, the driver of the vehicle slowed the car down, jumped out, and ran toward a wooded area. As the driver ran, he looked back and Off. Horton recognized him as James Lewis. Although Off. Horton knew Lewis by sight, he had no significant interaction with him prior to that day. As Lewis ran away, the passenger (Roger Phillips) brought the vehicle to a complete stop, and Off. Horton removed him from the vehicle and searched him for officer safety. There was a small pit bull puppy on the back floorboard of the vehicle and several open quarts of beer inside.

Officer Horton called for backup officers and waited with the vehicle until they arrived. He left the vehicle for a short period of time when he 112went to an apartment complex where Lewis had been found. According to Off. Horton, Lewis gave the officers another name (“Heard”) and told the officers that he had been asleep in the apartment for at least two hours. However, Off. Horton knew this to be false, because he had witnessed Lewis running from the vehicle and he knew Lewis’s name prior to the attempted traffic stop.

Lavert Norman

Lavert Norman, a resident of Strong, Arkansas, testified that the defendant, whom he knew from middle school, arrived at his house early on the morning of August 31, 2007. According to Norman, Lewis was driving a greenish Grand Am, and Roger Phillips and Jamie Jackson were both with him. Norman described how Lewis asked him if he was interested in selling his vehicle, a Delta 88. Norman testified that he was a bit hesitant about selling the car, because he had recently purchased it and done some repair work on it. The Delta 88 did not have a license plate at that time. Lewis later asked Norman to trade the Delta 88 for Peters car, the Pontiac Grand Am. Norman agreed to the trade, stating that Lewis was the only one of the group involved in negotiating the trade of the vehicles.

According to Norman, while Lewis was negotiating the vehicle trade, he took the Delta 88 for a test drive with Norman riding as a passenger. They drove to Anthony Williams’s home with Phillips and Jackson following them in the Grand Am. Once they arrived at Williams’s home, Lewis attempted to sell speakers that were in the trunk of the Grand Am. Norman testified that he caught a glimpse of a piece of cloth that had some 11sblood on it when the trunk of the vehicle was opened. When Norman asked about it, Lewis responded, “I just killed the mother-f* * *er.” Norman thought the defendant was simply mouthing off.

Norman described how he stayed with the group for about five minutes before he left in the Delta 88 to go home. Lewis later returned and the trade took place. Norman testified that he wrote Lewis a bill of sale and gave him the title to the vehicle, and at trial Norman identified the documents found inside the Delta 88 as the items he transferred to Lewis as a result of the trade. Lewis did not require Norman provide a bill of sale for the Grand Am. Norman said Lewis removed the license plate from the Grand Am and attached it to the Delta 88 with a piece of speaker wiring. The puppy was also was transferred to the Delta 88.

Anthony Williams

Anthony Williams testified that he was living in Strong, Arkansas, on August 31, 2007, when Lewis arrived at his home at 9:00 a.m. driving Norman’s car, a Delta 88. Williams stated that he knew Lewis from school, but he had not seen him in years. According to Williams, another vehicle arrived, which Williams identified as a green Grand Am. As recalled by Williams, Jackson, who Williams knew as Lewis’s brother, was driving the Grand Am. Williams said he and the others, including Phillips, Norman, and “Rashad,” looked into the trunk of the Grand Am when Lewis indicated he had some speakers to sell. As related by Williams, all those individuals gathered around the trunk were engaged in several conversations simultaneously. When Lewis moved one of the speakers, Williams saw |14what he believed to be blood drop from the speaker or from a piece of cloth that was in the vehicle. Williams testified that Rashad purchased some of the speakers, planning to resell them. Lewis was the one who negotiated the sale of the speakers, and his brother, Jackson, stood by while the negotiations and transaction took place. Williams testified that he did not hear Lewis make any statements about killing anyone; however, once he saw the blood in the vehicle, he moved away from the car, leaving Lewis, Rashad and Norman there talking.

Roger Phillips

Roger Phillips, a resident of Strong, Arkansas, testified that the brothers, Lewis and Jackson, arrived at his home sometime in the early morning hours between 3:00 a.m. and 4:00 a.m. on August 31, 2007. Lewis told Phillips that he had just come from out of town and stopped to see Phillips because they had not seen each other in some time. According to Phillips, he knew Lewis from school and they “talked” and would hang out sometimes. Phillips stated that Lewis arrived driving a green Grand Am. Phillips asked Lewis to take him to the store to purchase cigarettes. Lewis, Jackson and Phillips went to the store in the vehicle with the pit bull riding in the back seat. Phillips testified that Lewis told him that the vehicle was his, which Phillips believed because Lewis had the keys to the vehicle.

Phillips described that the group returned from the store and sat at Phillips’s home listening to music. Sometime after daylight, they all left in the Grand Am and went cruising. Phillips recalled that they eventually got some alcohol to drink, and he drank to his limit, but was still able to speak |15and remember things that happened. The group continued their ride around the town and stopped at Norman’s house which was nearby, because they saw his Delta 88. The defendant and Norman had a conversation about the Delta 88. Lewis took the Delta 88 for a test drive with Norman. Phillips and Jackson got in the Grand Am with Jackson driving. At some point during the test drive, Phillips testified, Lewis stopped and attempted to sell the speakers out of the trunk of the Grand Am.

Later, when Phillips saw Norman in the Grand Am, Phillips believed that “they had done made some kind of deal.” Lewis asked Phillips to ride with him to get the title to the Grand Am on a “turnaround trip.” On their way to Bernice, Lewis was driving with Jackson in the front passenger seat. Phillips rode in the back of the vehicle with the dog. When they arrived in Bernice, they stopped for gas and Jackson was dropped off at some point. Approximately 20 minutes later, while “making a few blocks,” they saw a police ear, and Lewis drove around another vehicle and through a stop sign. Phillips testified that the police chased them; at this point Lewis stopped and put the license plate on the vehicle. According to Phillips, the police pulled them over, and Lewis ran from the vehicle, but Phillips stayed. The dog was still in the back seat of the vehicle when they were stopped; however, before they were stopped, Lewis told Phillips to throw the dog out of the car, saying that “she” got it for him. Phillips related that Lewis told him that “they” were saying he was the last one seen with “her” so he wanted to get rid of the dog. Further, Lewis told Phillips that “they” were saying the girl had been kidnapped and he had something to do with it.

| ifiShonwalkia Hall

Shonwalkia Hall testified she was in her friends Timothy Heard’s apartment when the defendant came in around 5:30 p.m. on August 31, 2007. Hall noticed that Lewis was a bit sweaty and acting nervously and fidgety, although Hall did not deem this behavior unusual. Hall heard Lewis ask Heard for a shirt and then ask if he could lie down in the bedroom. The defendant changed his shirt and lay down. Hall testified that approximately 30 minutes after the defendant arrived at the apartment, the police knocked on the door. Hall heard the police officers walk to the bedroom of the apartment and heard someone saying “wake up, wake up” before they walked back to the living room. Hall heard the defendant as he gave officers a fake name, and she related that shortly thereafter, Lewis was taken from the apartment. She recounted that the officers returned, asking if the defendant had changed his shirt in the apartment. Hall gave the officers the shirt Lewis was wearing when he arrived at the apartment earlier that day.

Sean Ramsey

Sean Ramsey, Lewis’s cousin, testified he was living in a house located near the house at 217 John Lewis Road where Lewis was living. Ramsey testified that he would see Lewis and/or Jackson at the house on different occasions. According to Ramsey, Lewis had visited Ramsey’s home on different occasions and Petey had been to the house at least twice prior to her death.

117On August 30, Ramsey saw Petey at the store where she worked in Bernice. Petey told Ramsey that Lewis had been in his house and had taken some items. Ramsey then noticed that Lewis was wearing one of his shirts. Ramsey went to his home and found items were missing. The items included clothing, a Jamaican cane, videotapes, a hot plate, .22 caliber Federal brand bullets, and an old single-bolt action .22 rifle. Ramsey went from his house to the house on John Lewis Road and looked around for his belongings. Ramsey found his clothes, his hot plate, the Jamaican cane, the videotapes, and the box of bullets. Some of the bullets were missing from the box. Ramsey did not find the rifle in the house, and he never recovered it.

Captain Barry Teague

Captain Barry Teague of the West Monroe Police Department testified that he worked as a trainer with the police department and was responsible for teaching officers techniques to move a person who was unconscious or deceased. Captain Teague stated that it was sometimes difficult to move a deceased or unconscious person because of the uneven distribution of the weight. Captain Teague noted that a “dummy” was generally used during training exercises to demonstrate the techniques for moving a person, and he brought a “dummy” to court to aid in a demonstration of how difficult it would be for an individual to move a body of the approximate height and weight of the victim. Captain Teague noted that it would be difficult for an individual, acting alone, to move a body of the victim’s size and stature from the trunk of a vehicle, although the taskjjgwould not be impossible. The jurors were given an opportunity to lift the “dummy” during Cpt. Teague’s demonstration.

Officer Keith Blackmon

Officer Keith Blackmon, an investigator with the Union Parish Sheriffs Office, testified that his initial involvement in the investigation of Petey’s disappearance was with the stop of the Delta 88 by Off. Horton. Officer Blackmon went to the scene where the vehicle had been stopped and stayed with the vehicle until it was relocated to the Union Parish Sheriffs Office storage yard. A search warrant was secured, and the vehicle was searched by Off. Blackmon and another officer, Todd Gilbert. They split the duties involved in searching the vehicle, with Off. Blackmon photographing the vehicle, obtaining some evidence from the vehicle, and processing items for latent prints. The license plate from Petey’s car that was attached to the Delta 88 was processed for latent prints by Off. Gilbert. Officer Blackmon took possession of some evidence removed from the Delta 88 by Off. Horton, including a handwritten bill of sale and other paperwork. Officer Gilbert also lifted several latent prints from the vehicle.

Officer Blackmon was later notified that Petey’s vehicle had been located in Arkansas. It was transported to the storage yard, at which time Off. Blackmon obtained a search warrant for the vehicle and conducted a search of it. A woman’s Skechers tennis shoe was found in the trunk of the vehicle. Blood was also found in the trunk. A swab sample was collected, as well as a piece of carpet from the trunk. Several drops of blood were also found on the vehicle, and swab samples were collected. One was from 119under the trunk lid. Another was found on the rear bumper, passenger side. Blood was also found on the lower side bumpers on both sides of the vehicle, as well as on the plastic molding (shoe plate) of the front passenger door. A strand of long light-colored hair was found under the trunk lid over the passenger side of the vehicle. All of this evidence was collected before Pe-tey’s body had been found.

Officer Blackmon further testified that following the search of the vehicles and the discovery of the evidence, foul play was suspected. Because Lewis had been in the Delta 88 and had Petey’s license plate, Off. Blackmon explained that a search warrant was obtained for the home at 217 John Lewis Road, and it was executed at approximately 8:00 a.m. on September 1. Officer Blackmon served as the supervisor of the crime scene unit during the time of the investigation. In the front yard of the house, a Skechers tennis shoe was located matching the one previously found in the truck of Petey’s vehicle. One spent .22 shell casing was found. Officer Blackmon noted that numerous blood samples were taken from the home and were tested; however, not all tested positive for blood or were able to be identified.

Sasha Story

Sasha Story, Petey’s older biological sister, also testified. According to Sasha, the victim was dating someone named Jamar-cus Underwood, and she was not dating Lewis. The last time Sasha spoke with Petey was about 10:00 p.m. on August 30. Sasha said she heard three other voices in the background when she spoke to Petey, and she recognized one of the voices |?,nto be Lewis, whom she knew from school and identified in court. Sasha believed Petey met Lewis about a month and a half before her disappearance. Petey would generally see the defendant when he called and wanted a ride. Sasha was not aware of her sister hanging out with Lewis prior to her death, nor was she aware that Petey had given Lewis any money during their friendship. In fact, Sasha believed that the victim only visited the defendant at his home on the night she disappeared, although Petey told Sasha that she would be staying the night with Lewis.

Dr. Frank Peretti

Dr. Frank Peretti, a forensic pathologist with the Arkansas State Crime Laboratory, testified as an expert in the field of forensic pathology. Dr. Peretti performed the autopsy on the victim. He related that when Petey’s body was received, it was maggot-infested and decomposing, and it was clad in a short-sleeved shirt and bra that were intertwined and pulled over her breasts, and “clean-appearing” socks. He described that clenched in Petey’s left hand was a piece of white fabric. He further noted that Petey had sustained four gunshot wounds to her head and neck area, including wounds to: the right side of her neck; her forehead between her eyes; a spot adjacent to her left eyebrow; and, the left side of her neck. There were no exit wounds and all of the bullets were found in Petey’s head. Because of the massive maggot infestation and decomposi-tional changes, Dr. Peretti was unable to determine the parameters of the wounds. As described by Dr. Peretti, the bullet that caused the wound to the middle of her forehead traveled into the brain; another bullet traveled into Petey’s left maxillary hi sinus through the cheekbone; and, still another wound to the left side of the neck was caused by a bullet traveling through the neck that lodged in the tongue. Dr. Peretti opined that the wound to the right side of the neck would not have caused instantaneous death and it was possible that Petey would have been able to walk after that injury alone. Each of the other wounds would have caused almost instantaneous death, or at the very least, very rapid death without medical intervention. Other injuries to the body included those associated with insect activity and a laceration to the back of Petey’s right hand. Additionally, Dr. Peretti noted a scrape to Petey’s left thigh.

During the autopsy, Dr. Peretti recovered evidence which he forwarded to the sheriffs department, including: fabric from Petey’s left hand; bullets and bullet fragments; fingernail cuttings and scrapings; scalp hair; oral, anal, and vaginal smears and slides; the blood for DNA; and, the clothing the victim was wearing. While Dr. Peretti completed a sexual assault kit on Petey, he could not see any signs of trauma to her body because of the massive maggot infestation. No semen or spermatozoa was detected in any of the swabs, and toxicology studies did not reveal any drugs in her system (although a small amount of alcohol was detected, it was related to the decomposition of the body). Finally, Dr. Peretti opined that the cause of Petey’s death was multiple gunshot wounds.

Edward Vollman

Edward Vollman, a forensic serologist (a person who examines physical evidence for the presence of body fluids, such a blood or semen), |?¿with the State Crime Laboratory of Arkansas was qualified by the trial court as an expert in his field. The blood swabs submitted for testing in connection with the case, presumptively testing positive for blood, were forwarded for further testing. Vollman confirmed the testimony of the detectives that not all samples collected for analysis tested positive for blood. He acknowledged that the testing of the swabs and items submitted provided varying results. Blood was found on the swabs from Petey’s car and the floor of the house on John Lewis Road. Blood was found on the socks belonging to Roger Phillips, but not on any of his other clothing items submitted for testing. No blood was found on any of Lewis’s items submitted for testing. Blood was found on Jamie Jackson’s shorts, blue jean shorts, and his underwear. Blood was also found on Jamie Jackson’s belt. Semen was found on a mattress pad and the blanket that covered Petey’s body when she was found. Blood was also found on khaki pants and a red pair of underwear found in the John Lewis Road residence.

Don McClanahan

Deputy Don McClanahan, a retired chief deputy of the Union Parish Sheriffs Office, testified that he assisted in the investigation of Petey’s disappearance. Deputy McClanahan conducted two recorded interviews with Lewis, on September 5 and 6. According to Dep. McClanahan, however, a few days prior to the recorded statements being given, Lewis was also interviewed and asked about Petey’s disappearance. At that time Lewis indicated that he knew Petey, but he did not have any idea where she was. Deputy McClanahan noted that prior to the beginning of the recorded | ^interviews, Lewis was advised of his Miranda rights and signed a waiver or explanation of rights. According to Dep. McClanahan, during the recorded interview, Lewis repeatedly claimed that he and Petey were using drugs on the night of her disappearance. Lewis informed Dep. McClanahan that his brother Jackson shot Petey because she owed him $150.00 for drugs. Deputy McClanahan testified that Lewis informed him that Jackson took Petey in her vehicle to get money to pay the debt, but when Jackson returned, Pe-tey was not with him. Lewis told Dep. McClanahan that he and Jackson smoked two “blunts” before leaving the house.

During Lewis’s interview, Dep. McCla-nahan also discussed with him a telephone voicemail message to Jamario Lewis, the defendant’s other brother. The call was made to Jamario’s phone at 12:08 a.m. on August 31. Lewis indicated to McClana-han that the voice on the recording was Jackson’s.

Jamario Lewis

Jamario Lewis, the defendant’s other brother, testified that he received a voice-mail message on August 31. He gave the cell phone to Detective Halley after “[t]hey kept harrassing me” about his cell phone number being the last one called from Petey’s cell phone. Jamario would later listen to the recording with detectives and then with Shawn Alford of the district attorney’s office. Jamario was asked to identify the voices on the recording, but he indicated that it was the job of the police to figure out who was on the recording. Again, after “they harassed me so much,” | g/l Jamario told the investigators what he heard on the recording and that he believed the voices belonged to his two brothers, Lewis and Jackson.

The recording (State Exhibit 74) was played in open court and Jamario testified that he heard Jackson’s voice as the primary person talking and Lewis’s voice in the background. Jamario testified that he did not remember telling anyone anything different prior to the trial. While the recording was played in open court, Jamario provided the following as what was being said:

Damn, dog. Sh* *, you heard me. Now doing this, boy dog. You know what I’m saying? I be on sh* * today. I’m a merk-ass n* * * * * dog. Quit playing dog. You know what I’m saying? Straight mother f* * * * * gangsta dog. You know what I’m talking about? Remember, I told you I had to have it. Got that rifle back there. Throwaway. Might be f* ⅜ *ing up. I can get a dub off of this one.

At trial, Jamario believed the person saying “quit playing, dog” was Lewis, and the rest of the tape was primarily Jackson talking. Jamario continuously denied previously saying that Lewis had been the voice doing the majority of the talking. When asked about the individual lines of the statement, Jamario testified that it was all Jackson, and the only statement made by Lewis was him saying “quit playing, dog.” When the recording was played for a third time, Jamario added that it sounded like the defendant saying “real n* * ⅜ ⅞ * sh* * ” in addition to “quit playing, dog” line. Jamario admitted to talking to assistant district attorney Shawn Alford previously and identifying Lewis as the primary speaker, but he claimed that the prosecutor was intentionally attempting to confuse him with the questioning | ^because he did not understand what she was asking. When asked what he was confused about, Jamario stated “[ajlmost everything you saying.” Jamario also testified that he was forced to give statements against his will because the police continued to harass him and he did not have any involvement in the situation.

Shawn Alford

Shawn Alford testified that she was a former assistant district attorney for the Third Judicial District and was the original ADA assigned to the prosecution of Lewis and Jackson, whose trial was set first. In preparation, Alford interviewed Jamario regarding the voicemail recording. Alford stated that she did not originally understand the voicemail recording and forwarded it to Louisiana Tech University where a linguist attempted to decipher the message. While that was somewhat successful, Alford still needed assistance from Jamario.

Alford stated that Jamario was very cooperative with her at that time. She believed the recording was accidental and it appeared that the two individuals were having a conversation and were unaware that it was being recorded. At that point in the investigation, Jamario told Alford that the most talking on the tape came from Lewis. Alford identified State Exhibits 75 and 76 as her handwritten and typed notes made while listening to the recording. Her notes showed she interpreted the statement to be:

Damn, dog. I been on this bar, dog. Know what I’m saying: I been on that sh* *. You heard me? I’m a merk-ass [african-american], dog. Quit playing dog. You know what I’m sayng? Straight mother-fing gangster, dog. Know what I’m talking about? This is real “N” sh* *. I told you I had to have it.

| ^Jamario told Alford that Lewis had made these statements. The statements Jamario attributed to Jackson at that time were, “[q]uit playing dog. I got that rifle back there.” The defendant replied it was a throwaway to which Jamie interjected “[y]ou fing bullshit, got to get a dub off this one.”

Several weeks after Jackson died, Jam-ario changed his interpretation of which brother was responsible for the statements. Alford testified that she believed Jamario realized it would be much easier to say Jackson, who had subsequently died, was responsible for killing Petey. Alford reminded him that he had previously given a different interpretation.

Weighing the Evidence

Considering the evidence presented during the trial, both direct and circumstantial, in the light most favorable to the state, it was clearly sufficient to convict Lewis of the charged offense. Through the testimony of its witnesses, the state was able to establish that Lewis and Petey were acquainted, and Lewis was one of the last people known to be with Petey after she left work on August 30. Petey informed her sister that she would be staying the night with Lewis. Petey did not return home the next morning, and she uncharacteristically had not called in or reported for work as scheduled. Lewis was found in possession of the license plate from Petey’s vehicle. Evidence showed he had traded Petey’s Grand Am for Norman’s Delta 88 several hours before he was arrested. Furthermore, when Lewis was stopped on August 31, in addition to the license plate, Lewis was also in possession of Petey’s pit bull puppy. Phillips, Lewis’s passenger at the time he was stopped, testified that Lewis had told him to 127get rid of the puppy after finding out that he was wanted in connection with Petey’s disappearance. Search warrants obtained for the Delta 88 produced a bill of sale and other documents connecting Lewis to Petey’s vehicle as a result of the trade/sale with Norman.

Petey’s body was later found with four gunshot wounds to her head and neck area. Although a murder weapon was never located, Sean Ramsey testified that a .22 rifle had been stolen from his house along with other items, which he later found at Lewis’s abode.

While blood was found in Lewis’s home and on Petey’s car, there was no direct connection of Lewis to the crime with the scientific evidence. Despite the fact that most of the DNA evidence did not provide a direct link to Lewis’s involvement in the murder, there was sufficient other evidence that proved the essential elements of second degree murder and his participation in the crime. Even if the state was not able to establish that Lewis was responsible for firing the fatal shots into Petey’s body, there was sufficient evidence presented by the state from which the trier of fact could have determined that Lewis was actively involved in the crime.

Additionally, the evidence showed that following Petey’s disappearance, Lewis took steps to dispose of her property that was in his possession. Contrary to Lewis’s assertions that Jackson was solely responsible for the victim’s death, the state presented evidence to establish that Lewis was actively involved in disposing of Pe-tey’s property after her death, although Lewis claimed to police that his brother coerced him, through perceived threats of violence, to participate in the actions. | ^However, the evidence showed that Lewis appeared to be in control of all transactions while Jackson merely waited on the sidelines. In fact, it was Lewis who held himself out to others to be the owner of Petey’s property. The defendant’s actions showed that he appeared to be intricately involved in the crime, and his intent or state of mind could be inferred from his actions.

Lewis’s participation in Petey’s murder was also proven by the statements he made following her disappearance, but pri- or to her body being found, on his brother’s voicemail. While Jamario testified that the defendant had not made the statements, but that Jackson was responsible, the state presented the testimony of the former assistant district attorney who had previously interviewed Jamario when he identified the voice on the message as being Lewis’s. The jury, presented with the conflicting evidence, could have reasonably concluded that Lewis made the statements and was bragging about his murderous actions. Additionally, even if Jamario was believed, the secondary voice (i.e., Lewis) displayed an awareness of the statements regarding the murder.

Faced with the facts and circumstances in evidence from which to draw an inference according to reason and common experience, the jury concluded that the recited facts and circumstances did not offer a reasonable hypothesis of innocence of the defendant. After reviewing the evidence presented at trial, in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that every reasonable hypothesis of innocence had been excluded. Jackson v. Virginia, supra; State v. Edwards, 400 So.2d 1370 (La.1981). So considering, the defendant’s arguments are without merit, and the conviction and sentence by the trial court were not in error.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the conviction and sentence of James C. Lewis are affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

      . The victim was related to Sondra by blood and marriage, and when the victim’s biological parents were unable to care for her, Sondra and her husband took the victim in and raised her as their own.

      . Gilbert’s testimony was taken in two parts as he was initially called to identify evidence he collected from Lewis’s home.

      . Officer Gilbert also testified that Jamie Jackson was at the house when the initial search warrant was served, but was not arrested at that time. He was later arrested and charged with the victim's murder.

      . The state received permission from the court to treat Jamario as a hostile witness and ask leading questions.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: MOORE, J. BROWN, Chief Judge,

license: Public Domain

text:
    Rudolph M. MORTON, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Raymond A. HICKS and Gary Loftin, Clerk of Court Caddo Parish, Louisiana, Defendants-Appellants.
    No. 46,991-CA.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.
    Sept. 28, 2011.

      John E. Settle, Jr., Bossier City, LA, for Defendant/Appellant, Raymond Hicks.
    Blanchard, Walker, O’Quin & Roberts, Shreveport, LA, by M. Thomas Arceneaux, Drew E. Smith, for Plaintiff/Appellee, Rudolph Morton.
    Booth, Lockard, Politz, LeSage, & Odom, Shreveport, LA, by Bennett L. Politz, for Defendant/Appellee, Gary Lof-tin.
    Before BROWN, STEWART, GASKINS, PEATROSS, DREW, MOORE and LOLLEY, JJ., En Banc.
   MOORE, J.

| jDr. Raymond Hicks appeals a judgment declaring him ineligible to run for the Louisiana House of Representatives, District 2. Finding no manifest error in the district court’s judgment, we affirm.

Factual Background

Dr. Hicks filed a notice of candidacy for House District 2 on September 6, 2011, giving his domicile address as 110 Holcomb Drive in Shreveport, which is located in District 2, and certifying that he met the other requirements for office. On September 15, Rudolph Morton filed this challenge, alleging that Dr. Hicks had not been domiciled at Holcomb Drive, or at any other address in District 2, for the year preceding his qualification. La. Const. Art. 3, § 4(A). The matter proceeded to a hearing in the First Judicial District Court on September 19.

At the hearing, Morton established that he was a registered voter and resident of House District 2; even though he believed that Dr. Hicks was currently living on Holcomb Drive, he felt that Dr. Hicks did not meet the one-year domicile requirement. Morton also offered into evidence the obituary for Dr. Hicks’s wife, Georgia, who died on October 3, 2010; a certified copy of Dr. Hicks’s notice of candidacy; a copy of a cash sale deed showing that Dr. and Mrs. Hicks bought a house on Willow Point Drive (not in House District 2) in 2002; and a copy of a cash donation from Mrs. Hicks to their daughter, Shannan Hicks, of the Holcomb Drive house in 2003.

^Angela Tuck, a secretary at plaintiffs counsel’s law firm, testified that she searched the conveyance records of Caddo Parish and could find no proof that Dr. Hicks had ever conveyed the Willow Point house to anybody. Julia McDonald, an employee of the Caddo Parish Assessor’s Office, testified that Dr. Hicks requested a homestead exemption for the Willow Point house in 2002 and maintained it constantly ever since; tax records for the Holcomb Street house showed the assessed owner was Shannan Hicks.

The Caddo Parish Registrar of Voters, Ernie Roberson, testified that in 1997, Dr. Hicks had registered to vote using the Holcomb Street address (District 2) as his residence; however, in 2001 he changed his residence address to the Willow Point address (House District 4), and did not make another change until January 28, 2011, when he again registered at the Holcomb Street address. Notably, on the change of address form, Dr. Hicks wrote “Nov. 2010” in the “Date Moved” field. Mr. Roberson also testified that based on his office’s records, Dr. Hicks had voted in nearly every election since 2002 in the precinct for the Willow Point address.

Finally, Willie Bradford Jr. testified that sometime during the previous year, on a warm day, he saw Dr. Hicks standing by his stalled car on the 1-220 bridge and gave Dr. Hicks a ride to his house on Willow Point Drive. The plaintiff then rested and Dr. Hicks did not move for involuntary dismissal.

|oDr. Hicks’s daughter, Shannan Hicks, testified that her mother donated the Holcomb Street house to her in 2003 and she lived there until September 2010, when she moved to Baton Rouge. She testified that her last day of employment in Shreveport was October 15, 2010, and her first day in Baton Rouge was October 28, 2010; she left Shreveport for career opportunities and decided not to maintain two households.

Shannan Hicks also testified that her mother suffered from sickle cell anemia and went into cardiac arrest on August 25, 2010; when the family learned that she would have to enter a nursing home, her father did not want to live in the large Willow Point house alone, and he decided to move back to the Holcomb Drive house. On August 30, she had her father sign a lease of the Holcomb Drive house for $1,038 a month, and testified that he had paid her rent every month. She maintained that Dr. Hicks had been sleeping at the Holcomb Drive house ever since August 2010, but admitted that his move back occurred gradually over several months. She also admitted that the utility bills remained in her name until mid-2011, but maintained that she paid them with her father’s money.

Dr. Hicks’s adult son, Michael, testified that he and his family had lived at the Willow Point house ever since “a little before our house sold, end of last year”; a deed showed that Michael’s former home sold in November 2010. He explained that before his mother’s final illness, his parents had planned to move back to Holcomb Drive, in part to downsize and in part to accommodate their youngest, autistic son, Jared, who lives with his parents and is still much more comfortable with the Holcomb Drive ^neighborhood. He testified that after his mother went into intensive care and later died, “they never went back to Willow Point,” and the family would not take Jared back there because it would upset him.

Dr. Hicks, a distinguished educator and former president of Grambling State University, testified that in the summer of 2010, when Shannan decided to move to Baton Rouge, the family held a meeting and decided that Dr. and Mrs. Hicks would move back to Holcomb Drive. Mrs. Hicks was taken to the hospital on August 22; on August 28, doctors informed Dr. Hicks that his wife would never be able to return home, as she required nursing care for the rest of her life. He explained:

I called the kids together because I had made my mind up that * * * Georgia and I dated two years in college and were married for 43 years, so. And when I got that news, I knew I couldn’t stay in that house [at Willow Point]. I wanted the kids to understand my position, * * * there’s no way that I could go back to that house if she was not going to come back there and I wanted them to understand that.

He maintained that after that date, he may have spent a night at Willow Point, “but for all practical purposes, we moved to Holcomb.”

Dr. Hicks also testified that he paid rent and utilities by writing checks into a joint account he held with Shannan, and she actually made the payments electronically. Bank records from August through December 2010 showed several deposits into the joint account which, according to Dr. Hicks and Shannan, were transfers to pay the rent and utilities. The bank records also showed withdrawals by Shannan to cover utility, insurance and mortgage payments; however, there were no payments for the precise amount of the rent, $1,038.

|sDr. Hicks admitted that he did not change the address on his driver’s license until May 2011, but stated that this, like changing the name on the utilities, was a low priority for him around the time of his wife’s sickness and death. He also explained that he wrote “Nov 2010” on the voter registration card because he was thinking of when they got the last of Shan-nan’s furniture out of the Holcomb Drive house. In point of fact, he maintained, Holcomb Drive became his permanent address and domicile on August 29, 2010. Finally, when Willie Bradford gave him a ride from 1-220, Dr. Hicks actually told him to drive to “Mike’s house” on Willow Point.

On rebuttal, Morton called Maxine Sar-py, who lives on Holcomb Drive and testified because of a subpoena. She stated that she was close to Dr. Hicks and his family, and looked on Shannan as a niece. Mrs. Sarpy recalled that shortly after Mrs. Hicks passed away (October 4) and Shan-nan had moved to New Orleans, she called to check on Shannan, who shared with her that Dr. Hicks would be moving into the house on Holcomb Drive and her brother Michael would be moving onto Willow Point. Mrs. Sarpy’s impression from this conversation was that the move had not yet taken place, but would take place in the future. She agreed this was consistent with the November 2010 date Dr. Hicks had placed on the change of voter registration card in January 2011. Dr. Hicks did not cross-examine Mrs. Sarpy; her testimony was not impeached by any other evidence.

| ⅜Action of the District Court

In written reasons for judgment, the district court found merit in plaintiffs argument that Dr. Hicks had not changed his domicile from Willow Point to Holcomb Drive. The court cited the property deeds, homestead exemption, voting and voter registration records, utility bills and driver’s license, finding that Morton made a prima facie case that Dr. Hicks did not change his domicile. As to whether Dr. Hicks rebutted this showing, the record “confirms absolutely this Court’s confidence in the credibility of the Defendant’s witnesses and truthfulness of their testimony.” However, the court found:

Weighing the documentary evidence presented by Plaintiff against the doeu-mentary and testimonial evidence offered by Defendant, this Court deems it difficult to find the totality of evidence offered by Defendant to be factually sufficient and conclusive that Defendant had established his domicile on Holcomb on or before September 6, 2010. Although Defendant has put forth his intention to [move] his domicile from Willow Point, regrettably Defendant experienced a serious family tragedy which interrupted and/or prevented him from accomplishing and completing a change of domicile in a timely manner to satisfy the election requirement. Defendant did not timely take certain actions to adequately complete a change of domicile. Executing the lease on August 30, 2010, and beginning to sleep at the Holcomb address during August, 2010, in this instant case simply appears not to [have] been enough.

In accordance with these findings, the court signed a judgment at 11:05 a.m. on September 21, 2011. This timely appeal by Dr. Hicks followed; the case was submitted to this court at 11:50 a.m. on September 27, 2011.

17Applicable Law

The qualifications for legislative candidacy in Louisiana are set forth in La. Const. Art. 8, § 4(A), which provides:

An elector who at the time of qualification as a candidate has attained the age of eighteen years, resided in the state for the preceding two years, and been actually domiciled for the preceding year in the legislative district from which he seeks election is eligible for membership in the legislature.

A candidate sets out his qualifications in the initial filing of notice of candidacy under La. R.S. 18:461. When the qualifications include a length of domicile requirement, the candidate shall meet that qualification notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary. La. R.S. 18:451. A candidate’s qualifications are subject to challenge. La. R.S. 18:1401 A.

In Landiak v. Richmond, 2005-0758 (La.3/24/05), 899 So.2d 535, the supreme court explained the general principles employed in deciding a challenge to qualification for candidacy:

Because election laws must be interpreted to give the electorate the widest possible choice of candidates, a person objecting to candidacy bears the burden of proving that the candidate is disqualified. See Becker v. Dean, 03-2493, p. 7 (La.9/18/03), 854 So.2d 864, 869; Russell v. Goldsby, 00-2595, p. 4 (La.9/22/00), 780 So.2d 1048, 1051; Dixon v. Hughes, 587 So.2d 679, 680 (La.1991); Messer v. London, 438 So.2d 546 (La.1983). It follows that, when a particular domicile is required for candidacy, the burden of showing lack of domicile rests on the party objecting to the candidacy. Becker, 03-2493 at 7, 854 So.2d at 869; Pattan v. Fields, 95-2375 (La.9/28/95), 661 So.2d 1320. Further, a court determining whether the person objecting to candidacy has carried his burden of proof must liberally construe the laws governing the conduct of elections “so as to promote rather than defeat candidacy.” Becker, 03-2493 at 7, 854 So.2d at 869; Russell, 00-2595 at 4, 780 So.2d at 1051; Dixon, 587 So.2d at 680. Any doubt concerning the qualifications of a candidate should be resolved in favor of | sallowing the candidate to run for public office. Becker, 03-2493 at 7, 854 So.2d at 869; Russell, 00-2595 at 4, 780 So.2d at 1051; Dixon, 587 So.2d at 680.

Although a plaintiff challenging a candidate’s qualifications bears the burden of proving that the candidate fails to meet the requirements, once the party bearing the burden of proof has established a pri-ma facie case, the burden then shifts to the opposing party to present sufficient evidence to overcome the other party’s prima facie case. Landiak, supra.

A person’s domicile is the place of his habitual residence. La. C.C. art. 38. A person may reside in several places but may not have more than one domicile. La. C.C. art. 39.

Of course, domicile may change. According to La. C.C. art. 44:

Domicile is maintained until acquisition of a new domicile. A natural person changes domicile when he moves his residence to another location with the intent to make that location his habitual residence.

La. C.C. art. 45 provides:

Proof of one’s intent to establish or change domicile depends on the circumstances. A sworn declaration of intent recorded in the parishes from which and to which he intends to move may be considered as evidence of intent.

As the court explained in Landiak:

When a party has not declared his intention in the manner prescribed by La. Civ.Code art. [45], proof of a person’s intention regarding domicile “shall depend upon circumstances.” La. Civ. Code art. 43. Thus, determination of a party’s intent to change his or her domicile must be based on the actual state of the facts, not simply on what the person declares them to be. Davis v. Glen Eagle Ship Management Corp., 97-0878, p. 2 (La.App. 4 Cir. 8/27/97), 700 So.2d 228, 230; Laborde v. Louisiana Insurance Guaranty Association, 95-1122, p. 5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/6/96), 670 So.2d 614, 617; Sheets v. Sheets, 612 So.2d 842, 844 (La.App. 1 Cir.1992). “The expressed intent of the party may be at variance with the Ipintent as evidenced by conduct.” LaBorde [Laborde], 95-1122 at 5, 670 So.2d at 617, quoting In re Kennedy, 357 So.2d 905, 909 (La.App. 2 Cir.1978). “Each case is unique and the courts attempt to arrive at the true intent, whether express or implied.” Id.

The court further explained what proof is required to show an intent to change domicile:

Every person has a domicile of origin that he retains until he acquires another. Davis, 97-0878 at 2, 700 So.2d 270 [at 230]; LaFleur v. Seaboard Fire & Marine Insurance Co., (La.App. 3 Cir.), writ refused,, 300 So.2d 185 (La.1974). Because the case law recognizes a legal presumption against change of domicile, a party seeking to show that domicile has been changed must overcome that presumption by presenting “positive and satisfactory proof of establishment of domicile as a matter of fact with the intention of remaining in the new place and of abandoning the former domicile.” Becker [v. Dean, 03-2493 (La.9/18/03) ] at 11, 854 So.2d at 871; Russell [v. Goldsby, 00-2595 (La.9/22/00), 780 So.2d 1048] at 5, 780 So.2d at 1051. Of course, because domicile and residence are two different legal concepts the facts could indicate that one has “abandoned the former domicile” in favor of a new domicile even if the person continues to have a place of residence at the former domicile.
The case law regarding domicile reveals that Louisiana courts commonly consider a number of different factors when trying to determine domicile in fact. Since domicile is generally defined as residence plus intent to remain, a party’s uncontroverted testimony regarding his intent may be sufficient to establish domicile, in the absence of any documentary or other objective evidence to the contrary. The same might be said when a person specifically declares his intent pursuant to La. Civ. Code art. 42. However, in the absence of a formal declaration, when documentary or other objective evidence casts doubt on a person’s statements regarding intent, it is incumbent on courts to weigh the evidence presented in order to determine domicile in fact. Otherwise, the legal concept of domicile is meaningless and every person would be considered legally domiciled wherever he says he is domiciled. Some of the types of documentary evidence commonly considered by courts to determine domicile in fact include such things as voter registration, homestead exemptions, vehicle registration records, driver’s license address, statements in notarial acts, and evidence that most of the person’s property is housed at that location. Obviously, the more of these items presented by |ina party opposing candidacy in a given case to show lack of domicile in the district, the more difficult it will be for the candidate to overcome the plaintiffs evidence.

(Footnotes omitted)

An appellate court reviews legal issues de novo but will not upset a trial court’s finding of fact unless that finding is manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong. Brewer v. J.B. Hunt Transport Inc., 2009-1408, p. 9 (La.3/16/10), 35 So.3d 230, 237. The district court’s factual findings regarding domicile are subject to manifest error review. Landiak v. Richmond, supra at 19, 899 So.2d at 548-549; Jones v. Brown, 35,803 (La.App. 2 Cir. 11/16/01), 799 So.2d 1278. In order to reverse a trial court’s determination of a fact, an appellate court must review the record in its entirety and (1) find that a reasonable factual basis does not exist for the finding, and (2) further determine that the record establishes that the fact finder is clearly wrong or manifestly erroneous. Bonin v. Ferrellgas, 2003-3024, p. 6-7 (La.7/2/04), 877 So.2d 89, 94-95; Stobart v. State, 617 So.2d 880, 882 (La.1993). Reasonable evaluations of credibility and reasonable inferences of fact should not be disturbed upon review where conflict exists in the testimony. Stobart v. State, supra. Moreover, appeal is from the judgment itself, not the reasons for judgment. La. C.C.P. arts. 1918, 2082, 2083; Wooley v. Lucksinger, 2009-0571 (La.4/1/11), 61 So.3d 507; Howard v. Willis-Knighton Med. Center, 40,634 (La.App. 2 Cir. 3/8/06), 924 So.2d 1245, writs denied, 2006-0850, -1064 (La.6/14/06), 929 So.2d 1268, 1271.

| nDiscussion

Dr. Hicks raises three assignments of error. First, the court erred in failing to consider the totality of the evidence, testimony and circumstances. Second, Dr. Hicks properly established his domicile in District 2 on August 29, 2010. Third, Morton failed to meet his burden of proof for challenging Dr. Hicks’s candidacy. We will consider these arguments together.

After a thorough review of this record and the exhibits, we conclude that the district court was not manifestly erroneous in finding that Dr. Hicks had not changed his domicile to the Holcomb Drive address in District 2 in time to qualify for this election.

This court is a court of review, and in the absence of proof of a legal error that interdicts the fact-finding process, our review of a factual determination such as this one is heavily constrained by the manifest error rule. Our application of that rule is informed in this case by the principle that the laws governing the conduct of elections should be liberally construed so as to promote rather than defeat candidacy. Nevertheless, this court will not find manifest error in a case where the trial court has chosen one permissible view of the evidence over another and where the record provides support for the trial court’s choice.

The trial court carefully weighed the evidence presented in order to determine Dr. Hicks’s domicile in fact. As the court in Landiak, supra, explained, such an exercise is necessary to give meaning to the concept of domicile; otherwise, every person would be considered legally domiciled wherever he says he is domiciled. Very nearly all the documentary evidence |12in this case supports the district court’s conclusion that, despite Dr. Hicks’s physical presence at Holcomb Drive starting in August 2010, he did not establish his domicile there until a later time. Of all the evidence, perhaps most significant is Dr. Hicks’s statement on his voter registration change of address — unaffected by any concern with qualification as a candidate— that he moved to Holcomb Drive in November 2010. That declaration is consistent with the testimony of Ms. Maxine Sarpy. Ms. Sarpy spoke with Shannan Hicks in the fall of 2010 after Georgia Hicks died in October, and Ms. Sarpy recalled that Shannan told her that her father “would be moving into the [Holcomb] house[.]”

Thus, despite Dr. Hicks’s physical presence in the Holcomb house, the evidence shows that he did not intend to make that address his “habitual residence” until sometime in the fall of 2010. This is not to discount the evidence to the contrary, and in particular the written lease executed by Dr. Hicks and his daughter or the payments made into their joint account by Dr. Hicks. Although this evidence tends to show that Dr. Hicks changed his domicile, it does not approach the level of undermining the trial court’s factual determination. It is not sufficient to warrant reversal.

The issue to be resolved by the reviewing court is not whether the trier of fact was right or wrong, but whether its conclusions were reasonable. If the factual findings are reasonable in light of the record reviewed in its entirety, the reviewing court may not reverse even though convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it would have weighed the evidence differently. Brewer v. J.B. Hunt Transport, supra.

11jtConclusion

Because we detect no manifest error in the trial court’s finding of fact that supports its judgment, the judgment disqualifying Dr. Hicks as a candidate for state representative is hereby affirmed at appellant’s cost.

AFFIRMED.

BROWN, C.J., dissents with written reasons.

DREW, J., dissents for the reasons assigned by Chief Judge BROWN.

LOLLEY, J., dissents for the reasons assigned by Chief Judge BROWN.

BROWN, Chief Judge,

dissents.

11What has been abandoned by the majority is the charge imposed by the supreme court in Landiak v. Richmond, 05-0758 (La.03/24/05), 899 So.2d 535, 541, that:

Because election laws must be interpreted to give the electorate the widest possible choice of candidates, a person objecting to candidacy bears the burden of proving that the candidate is disqualified. It follows that, when a particular domicile is required for candidacy, the burden of showing lack of domicile rests on the party objecting to the candidacy. Further, a court determining whether the person objecting to candidacy has carried his burden of proof must liberally construe the laws governing the conduct of elections “so as to promote rather than defeat candidacy.” Any doubt concerning the qualifications of a candidate should be resolved in favor of allowing the candidate to run for public office. Citations omitted.

In prior election challenges on residency, the issue has been whether the challenged candidate physically resided in a particular place. See Russell v. Goldsby, 00-2595 (La.09/22/00), 780 So.2d 1048, 1052:

We next look to the question of whether plaintiff proved Dr. Goldsby had not “actually resided” at the Division Street address for the year immediately preceding his qualification as a candidate for mayor. While this court has not previously interpreted the phrase “actually resided,” as used in La. R.S. 33:384, we have considered the phrase “actually domiciled,” as used in La. Const, art. Ill, § 4(A) in connection with the qualifications of candidates for the legislature. We concluded that the phrase “actually domiciled” required that the person seeking to hold legislative office must have a “real rather than fictitious domicile in the area represented.” Messer, 438 So.2d at 547; see also Herpin [v. Boudreaux], 98-306 at pp. 2-3 [ (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/5/98)], 709 So.2d [269] at 270-71 (citing Bradley v. Theus, 28,714 (La.App.2d Cir.02/20/96), 668 So.2d 1304, writ denied, 96-0469 (La.02/26/96), 668 So.2d 355). Because La. R.S. 33:384 uses the word “actually” in a virtually identical context (though referring to residence rather than domicile), the inquiry before us is whether plaintiff established that Dr. Goldsby’s Division Street residence is a fictitious residence rather than a real residence. |2The record establishes that Dr. Golds-by eats, naps, and entertains at the DMsion Street address. Moreover, Dr. Goldsby sleeps overnight at the Division Street house on occasion. He keeps changes of clothing and toiletry items at the Division Street house, claims a homestead exemption on this property, receives mail at the Division Street address, and uses this address on his driver’s license. All these factors show Dr. Goldsby has significant connections to the Division Street address, and that his residency at this address is real rather than fictitious.

In the case sub judice, the trial court stated in its written reasons for judgment: “This court now indicates and confirms absolutely this Court’s confidence in the credibility of the Defendant’s witnesses and truthfulness of their testimony.” (Bold emphasis by the trial court).

Everyone, including plaintiff and the trial and appellate judges, agree that Dr. Hicks physically moved to the Holcomb Drive address at the end of August 2010 and that he never went back to the Willow Point address. Everyone also agreed that in July, as well as in August, Dr. Hicks’ intent was to permanently move back to Holcomb Drive. He and his wife had lived at Holcomb Drive from 1997 until they purchased the Willow Point residence in 2002. The majority opinion is confusing. White it recognizes that Dr. Hicks actually occupied, resided, and lived at Holcomb Drive in August, it nonetheless concludes that somehow he was just in the process of moving, a “process” that he did not complete until November.

The burden of proving disqualification lies with the opponent of candidacy.

After hearing the witnesses testify, the district court specifically found that Dr. Hicks and his supporting witnesses were credible. In light of their testimony and documentary evidence, there was ample support to laprove both that Dr. Hicks actually lived at Holcomb Drive prior to September 6, 2010, and that Dr. Hicks intended to make that address his domicile. In fact, he gave the Willow Point residence to his son.

Dr. Hicks’ physical residence at the Holcomb house after August 29, 2010, is unchallenged by the plaintiff and accepted as truth by both the trial and appellate courts. He explained that he moved to that location to be closer to the hospital where his wife was being treated and because it was a better fit for his autistic son than the Willow Point location, where his son would be confused by the absence of his mother.

Dr. Hicks supplied sufficient evidence to overcome any prima facie case, if one was made, that he did not intend to make the Holcomb Drive home his domicile. Despite its specific and emphasized finding that the defendant was a credible witness, the trial court opted to disregard his testimony in favor of the various items of documentary evidence offered by plaintiffs. That documentary evidence, including utility bills, homestead exemption, drivers’ license and voter registration, was explained by Dr. Hicks as a consequence of the tragic illness and death of his wife during the time period in question. As he explained, these items were not a “big deal” when his wife was in intensive care. Likewise, Dr. Hicks explained that the “smoking gun,” the November 2010 move date that he listed on his voter registration card, was a product of his belief that his daughter’s abandonment of the home as her domicile meant that his move was complete at that time.

I/The trial court’s ruling was not plausible. Today’s majority opinion has attempted to make the incredible plausible.

      . Morton also alleged that Dr. Hicks failed to meet the qualifications regarding redistricting, La. Const. Art. 3, § 4(B), but the parties stipulated at trial that this provision did not apply to the case.

      . Although the time reference is unclear, this court assumes that the incident occurred in the summer of 2011; the fact that Dr. Hicks was still living on Willow Point in July or August 2010 would not be relevant to the suit.

      . The trial transcript mistakenly recites that Mrs. Sarpy was examined by Dr. Hicks’s counsel.


author: AMY, Judge.

text:
    SABINE RIVER AUTHORITY v. ALL TAXPAYERS, et al.
    No. 11-1139.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.
    Oct. 5, 2011.
    William Lee Schuette, Jr., Fred Lee Chevalier, Matthew W. Kern, Jones, Walker, Waechter, Poitevent, Carrére & De-negre, L.L.P., Baton Rouge, LA, for Plaintiff/Appellant, Sabine River Authority.
    Court composed of ULYSSES GENE THIBODEAUX, Chief Judge, JIMMIE C. PETERS and MARC T. AMY, Judges.
   AMY, Judge.

liThe Sabine River Authority (the “SRA”) seeks to commence a bond initiative to generate revenue. The SRA filed a motion for judgment seeking a judicial declaration that the bonds and the means by which they would be secured and paid were valid. No interested person challenged the bond resolution or the motion for judgment. The trial court denied the SRA’s motion, finding that although the SRA complied with the statute governing bond validation, the court had concerns about the funds to be used for the security of the bonds. The SRA filed this expedited appeal. For the following reasons, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for entry of a judgment consistent with this opinion.

Factual and Procedural Background

Pursuant to La.R.S. 38:2321, the SRA exists as a conservation and reclamation district comprised of the multi-parish territory lying within the watershed of the Sabine River and its tributary streams. It is “an agency and instrumentality of the state of Louisiana[.]” See La.R.S. 38:2324. The SRA is statutorily authorized to enter into contracts and agreements for the sale of waters over which it has jurisdiction. La.R.S. 38:2325. Further, the SRA is authorized to issue bonds in the carrying out of its corporate objectives. Id.

This matter stems from a May 26, 2011 resolution (the Bond Resolution), wherein the SRA authorized the issuance of Sabine River Authority Revenue Bonds (the Bonds) for the purpose of (1) financing repairs and improvements to the Sabine River Diversion System and associated equipment, (2) funding a reserve fund, and (3) paying costs related to the issuance of the Bonds. The SRA explains that the Bonds are to be secured by and are payable from the revenues received from contracts for the sale of water from the Sabine River Diversion Canal. Additional and subordinate security for the payment of the Bonds is to be provided from a Water Reservation and |2Sale Agreement (the Water Sale Agreement) to be executed by and between the SRA and Toledo Bend Partners, LP.

On July 21, 2011 and in accordance with La.R.S. 13:5123, the SRA filed a Motion for Judgment with the trial court seeking an Order designating that certain actions be taken in pursuit of the judicial validation of the Bonds. The SRA represented in the motion that, on June 1, 2011, it had published the Bond Resolution in the Sabine Index, a general circulation newspaper serving Sabine Parish, as required by La. Const, art. 6, § 35(B). The SRA stated in the motion that, although any interested person could challenge the issuance of municipal bonds by filing a motion for judgment within a thirty-day peremp-tive period, the “period expired on July 1, 2011 without any actions being taken to contest the legality of the Bonds, the revenues and the security pledges to the payment thereof or any other matters related to the Bonds.”

Pursuant to the filing, the district court ordered the publication of the motion for judgment and the accompanying court order as required by La.R.S. 13:5124. The |srecord indicates that the SRA complied with this order for publication by publishing the required text in the Sabine Index on July 27, 2011 and August 3, 2011. The record also included the evidence of the related notifications. The district court scheduled a hearing for August 16, 2011.

The SRA asserted, and the record indicates, that between the date the Bond Resolution was published and the date of the hearing, no challenges to the Bonds, the Bond Resolution, or the Water Sale Agreement were asserted, and no oppositions to the SRA’s motion for judgment were filed. At the August 16th hearing, no party appeared in opposition to the SRA’s motion. The SRA submitted its exhibits, including an affidavit of publication, into the record.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court took the matter under advisement. The trial court later denied the SRA’s motion, finding that although the |4SRA complied with La.R.S. 13:5121, et seq., the court had concerns regarding the revenue and security of the Bonds.

The SRA filed this appeal, asserting that: (1) the trial court erred in denying the SRA’s motion for judgment when no timely challenge had been asserted and (2) the trial court erred in denying the SRA’s motion for judgment based on its concerns regarding the adequacy of the Bonds’ security when no timely challenge had been asserted.

Discussion

Standard of Review

As this case poses a question of law, this court reviews the record de novo on appeal. An

[a]ppellate review of questions of law is simply to determine whether the trial court was legally correct or legally incorrect. If the trial court’s decision was based on its erroneous interpretation or application of the law, rather than a valid exercise of discretion, such incorrect decision is not entitled to deference by the reviewing court.

Citgo Petroleum Corp. v. Frantz, 03-88, p. 3-4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/4/03), 847 So.2d 734, 736 (citations omitted)(quoting Conagra Poultry Co. v. Collingsworth, 30,155 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/21/98), 705 So.2d 1280), unit denied, 03-1911 (La.10/31/03), 857 So.2d 484.

Bond Resolutions and Peremption

As extensively discussed by the supreme court in Denham Springs Econ. Dev. Dist. v. All Taxpayers, 05-2274 (La.10/17/06), 945 So.2d 665, Louisiana constitutional and statutory provisions provide an exclusive method to expedite all proceedings involving the validity of bonds. This framework recognizes the unique nature of municipal bonds and the importance of insuring their marketability. Id.

Louisiana Constitution Article 6, § 35(B) provides:

|fiEvery ordinance or resolution authorizing the issuance of bonds or other debt obligation by a political subdivision shall be published at least once in the official journal of the political subdivision or, if there is none, in a newspaper having general circulation therein. For thirty days after the date of publication, any person in interest may contest the legality of the ordinance or resolution and of any provision therein made for the security and payment of the bonds. After that time, no one shall have any cause of action to test the regularity, formality, legality, or effectiveness of the ordinance or resolution, and provisions thereof for any cause whatever. Thereafter, it shall be conclusively presumed that every legal requirement for the issuance of the bonds or other debt obligation, including all things pertaining to the election, if any, at which the bonds or other debt obligation were authorized, has been complied with. No court shall have authority to inquire into any of these matters after the thirty days.

Section 35(B) clearly creates a thirty-day peremptive period for contesting the legality of a bond resolution and any provisions made for the security and payment of the bonds. According to the above text, the peremptive period commences with publication of the bond resolution in the newspaper. During the thirty-day period, any person in interest may present to the court any concerns about the bond resolution. As the supreme court stated:

After the expiration of the thirty-day period, the right to contest is extinguished or perempted, and it is conclusively presumed all legal requirements for the issuance of the bonds have been satisfied and that the bonds, the legal documents providing for the bonds, and all security for the bonds are legal. Moreover, no court has authority to consider any challenge after the thirty-day peremptive period.

Denham Springs, 945 So.2d at 686.

Further, this constitutional provision governing the issuance of bond resolutions goes hand in hand with the statutory provisions governing bond validation.

Bond Validation Procedures

Louisiana Revised Statutes 13:5121, et seq., provides the exclusive manner by which any type of suit, action, or proceeding affecting the validity of government | (¡bonds can be properly asserted. See La. R.S. 13:5122; See also Smith v. Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 515 So.2d 632 (La.App. 1 Cir.), writ denied, 515 So.2d 1100 (La.1987). This procedure, discussed above, can be seen in the SRA’s actions in this case.

To validate the bonds, La.R.S. 13:5123 provides that the governmental unit may file a motion for judgment describing the bonds and the proceedings that occurred relative to their issuance and alleging that the bonds, when issued, will be valid and legal obligations of the issuing governmental unit. In such motion for judgment, the taxpayers, property owners, and citizens of the issuing governmental unit, including nonresidents owning property or subject to taxation therein, and all other persons interested in or affected in any way by the issuance of such bonds, shall be made parties defendant. Id.

Following the filing of the motion for judgment, the trial court shall enter an order requiring the publication of the motion twice in a general circulation newspaper in the district within a period of fifteen consecutive calendar days from the date of issuance of the order. La.R.S. 13:5125. The court shall also fix a time and place forjjhearing the proceeding, and that time and place shall be published with the motion for judgment. Id.

Thereafter, any party defendant may answer such motion for judgment within seven days after the second publication thereof, but not thereafter. La.R.S. 13:5126. Any property owner, taxpayer, citizen, or other person in interest may become a party to the proceedings by pleading to the motion within seven days after the second publication thereof, or thereafter by intervention upon leave of court. Id.

The SRA’s Bond Resolution and Validation Procedure

We find that Louisiana Constitution Article 6, § 35(B) and the peremptive period contained therein applies to the SRA’s Bond Resolution and is the appropriate inquiry in this case. It is undisputed that the SRA’s Bond Resolution was published on June 1, 2001 in the Sabine Index, a general circulation newspaper serving Sabine Parish. According to the constitutional language addressed above, any person of interest had thirty days from the publication to contest the legality of the Resolution and any provisions made for the security and payment of the Bonds. After that thirty-day period, the right to contest the Bond Resolution and the security provisions terminated, and a conclusive legal presumption of the validity of the bonds and the security provisions was established. Following that time period, the court had no authority to consider any challenges or to inquire into those matters.

The thirty-day publication period expired on July 1, 2011. The record indicates that, hearing no objections or concerns by any interested persons, the SRA began the process of bond validation by filing a motion for judgment on July 21, 2011. The | sSRA complied with the order of the district court and twice published the motion for judgment in the Sabine Index within the time periods articulated in La.R.S. 13:5125. No person objected to the motion for judgment or sought to intervene with the court either prior to the August 16th hearing or at the hearing itself.

Following the hearing, the trial court denied the SRA’s motion for judgment. In doing so, the court acknowledged that the SRA complied with La.R.S. 13:5121, but it listed concerns regarding the funds to be used as security for the Bonds. We find error in that judgment.

Contrary to the trial court’s inquiry, the trial court’s analysis should have started and ended with consideration of the SRA’s compliance with the provisions of La. Const, art. 6, § 35(B) and La.R.S. 13:5121, et seq. The Bond Resolution provided information notifying the public of the relevant provisions of the Water Sale Agreement and the other contracts the SRA sought to enter to secure the payment of the Bonds. The SRA published the Bond Resolution in a newspaper of general circulation in the area, and no interested persons objected during the thirty-day peremptive period. Thus, the right to challenge the provisions made for the security and payment of the bonds was per-empted. As noted in Denham Springs, 945 So.2d at 688, “[pjeremption is upheld even when it results in harsh consequences.”

Once the right to challenge the Bond Resolution extinguished, a conclusive legal presumption of the validity of the Bonds and the security provisions was established pursuant to La. Const, art. 6, § 35(B). It is clear that the trial court was presented with evidence that any challenge to the Bond Resolution was perempted. Further, all evidence presented indicated that the validation procedures outlined in La. R.S. 13:5121, et seq. were followed. In fact, the trial court found that the SRA complied with La.R.S. 13:5121, et seq. Thus, the trial court’s concerns regarding the | nfunding for the Bonds was irrelevant, and its denial of the SRA’s motion for judgment was erroneous. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand this matter to the trial court for entry of judgment validating the Bonds and the underlying security.

DECREE

For the above reasons, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand this case for entry of a judgment consistent with this opinion.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

      . Louisiana Revised Statutes. 13:5123 provides that:
      The governing body of any governmental unit proposing to issue or which is in the process of issuing bonds or has provided a new or different source of payment for outstanding bonds may bring at any time a proceeding in the district court having original jurisdiction over the matter, and in which such governmental unit is domiciled to establish the validity of such bonds, the legality of the election, if any, authorizing the issuance of such bonds, the validity of the action taken to provide a new source of security for outstanding bonds and all proceedings theretofore taken in connection with the authorization or issuance of such bonds and the validity of the tax, any lease or other means provided for the payment of such bonds, and the validity of all pledges of revenues and of all covenants and provisions which constitute a part of the contract between such governmental unit and the holders of such bonds. Such proceedings shall be brought by filing a motion for judgment describing such bonds and the proceedings had relative to the issuance thereof or the providing of a new or different source of payment therefor and alleging that such bonds when issued will be valid and legal obligations of the issuing governmental unit or that the action taken with respect to providing a new or different source of payment is valid and legal. In such motion for judgment the taxpayers, property owners and citizens of the issuing governmental units, including nonresidents owning property or subject to taxation therein, and all other persons interested in or affected in any way by the issuance of such bonds shall be made parties defendant.

      . With regard to publication of the motion for judgment and related notifications, La.R.S. 13:5124 provides:
      A. (1) All such parties shall be served by publishing the motion for judgment in a newspaper published in or having general circulation in such governmental unit in the manner hereinafter set forth. Upon the filing of the motion for judgment, the court shall enter an order requiring the publication of the motion two times within a period of fifteen consecutive calendar days from the date of the issuance of the order, specifying the dates for publication thereof with the first publication as hereinabove provided to be not later than eight days from and after the date of the issuance of the order, and at the same time fix a time and place for hearing the proceeding, which time and place shall be published with the motion for judgment. The date fixed for the hearing shall be at least ten days, but not more than thirteen days, after the second publication of such motion for judgment.
      (2) By publication of such motion for judgment, all taxpayers, property owners, and citizens of such governmental unit including nonresidents owning property or subject to taxation therein, and all other persons having or claiming any right, title, or interest in any property or funds to be affected in any way by the issuance of such bonds, or having or claiming to have any right or interest in the subject matter of such motion for judgment, shall be considered as parties defendant in such proceedings and as having been duly served, and the court shall have jurisdiction of them the same as if each of them were named individually as a party defendant in such motion for judgment and personally served with process.
      B. The party filing a motion for judgment shall also cause notification of said filing to be made upon the State Bond Commission and the attorney general by mailing a certified copy of the motion for judgment by registered or certified mail, with return receipt requested. No judgment can be rendered until the party filing a motion for judgment files in the record an affidavit of the individual who mailed the motion for judgment to the State Bond Commission and attorney general, showing that it was properly addressed, with sufficient postage affixed, and the date it was deposited in the United States mail, to which shall be attached the return receipt thereon.

      .In La.R.S. 13:5122, the legislature expressed that:
      All suits, actions and proceedings of whatever nature affecting the validity of bonds of any governmental unit, or the interest thereon, or the sale thereof, or the election, if any, authorizing the issuance of said bonds shall be brought only in accordance with the provisions of this Title. These provisions shall supersede all other acts and statutes on the subject and be controlling in all such cases notwithstanding the provisions of any other law or charter to the contrary; provided, however, nothing herein contained shall affect, change, alter or modify in any way any peremptive or prescriptive period for the contesting of bonds of governmental units or elections authorizing their issuance, established pursuant to the constitution and statutes of this state which shall continue to govern the time within which actions covered thereby may be filed. It is hereby declared that it is the intention of the legislature in enacting this law to provide a uniform, expeditious and equitable procedure with due regard for the public fisc and rights of persons in interest for the judicial determination of the validity of bonds and related proceedings where material and substantial questions with regard thereto are involved or a judicial determination of issues relating to bonds is necessary to insure the marketability of bonds in investment channels. It is not the intention of the legislature to require or to encourage the validation of all bonds by the judiciary.

      . The date fixed for hearing shall be at least ten days, but not more than thirteen days, after the second publication of such motion forjudgment. La.R.S. 13:5125.

      . We would note that the SRA also makes reference to La.R.S. 33:9038.4(L), a statute at issue in the case before the supreme court in Denham Springs, 945 So.2d 665. However, nothing in the record in this case indicates that the Bond Resolution at issue herein involves a sales tax increment financing plan. Thus, we do not consider the text of that statute.

      . Moreover, no party has sought to intervene in this appeal.