text:
    In re Willard J. BROWN, Sr.
    No. 2012-B-1254.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 14, 2012.
   ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

PER CURIAM.

b The instant disciplinary proceeding arises from a motion and rule to revoke probation filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) against respondent, Willard J. Brown, Sr., for his alleged failure to comply with the conditions of probation imposed in In re: Brown, 11-2247 (La.11/14/11), 74 So.3d 695 (“Brown I”).

UNDERLYING FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The record in Brown I demonstrated that respondent mishandled his client trust account by allowing the account to become overdrawn as the result of the assessment of bank service charges. Prior to the institution of formal charges, respondent and the ODC submitted a joint petition for consent discipline, proposing that respondent be suspended for six months, fully deferred, subject to his successful completion of a two-year period of supervised probation governed by the following conditions:

1. Respondent shall maintain his trust account in accordance with the Rules of Professional Conduct.
2. Respondent’s trust account shall be subject to quarterly review by a monitor approved by the ODC, at respondent’s expense, during the period of probation.
|23. Respondent shall attend the next available session of Trust Accounting School offered by the Louisiana State Bar Association’s Practice Assistance Counsel.
4. Any violations of these conditions or other misconduct during the probationary period shall be grounds to make the deferred suspension exec-utory and/or to impose additional discipline, as appropriate.
5. Respondent shall be assessed all costs and expenses associated with this matter.

On November 14, 2011, we accepted the petition for consent discipline in Brown I. Our order stated in pertinent part as follows:

IT IS ORDERED that the Petition for Consent Discipline be accepted and that Willard J. Brown, Sr., Louisiana Bar Roll number 23405, be suspended from the practice of law for a period of six months, fully deferred, followed by a two-year period of supervised probation governed by the terms and conditions set forth in the Petition for Consent Discipline. The probationary period shah commence from the date respondent, the ODC, and the probation monitor execute a formal probation plan. Any failure of respondent to comply with the conditions of probation, or any misconduct during the probationary period, may be grounds for making the deferred suspension executory, or imposing additional discipline, as appropriate. [Emphasis added.]

Following this ruling, respondent entered into a probation monitoring agreement providing that the period of probation commenced on February 28, 2012. The monitoring agreement also contained mandatory conditions which, among other things, required respondent to (1) promptly respond to all requests of the ODC; (2) maintain his client trust account in accordance with the Rules of Professional Conduct; (3) retain the services of an accountant approved by the ODC to perform quarterly reviews of his trust account in accordance with the ODC’s guidelines; and (4) direct his accountant to submit quarterly audit reports to the ODC.

| .¡DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

Motion and Rule to Revoke Probation

On April 26, 2012, the ODC filed a motion and rule to revoke respondent’s probation, alleging that he had failed to comply with the conditions of his probation in Brown I. First, the ODC alleged that despite multiple written requests, respondent had failed to provide the ODC with the name of the accountant whom he had retained to perform quarterly audits of his trust account. The ODC also noted that respondent had failed to submit his first quarterly audit report by the due date of April 20, 2012. Second, the ODC alleged that on January 30, 2012, a $4,654.50 check drawn on respondent’s trust account and payable to attorney Elizabeth Icamina was returned unpaid by respondent’s bank for “uncollected funds.” Ms. Icamina subsequently re-deposited the check and it cleared respondent’s account. By letter dated February 15, 2012, the ODC requested that, within ten days, respondent provide a written explanation of the circumstances relating to the returned check and submit copies of his trust account bank statements for the prior six months. Respondent did not submit a written response or the requested bank statements. Accordingly, the ODC prayed for revocation of respondent’s probation and the imposition of the previously deferred six-month suspension.

Respondent filed an answer to the motion and rule to revoke probation, essentially denying any misconduct. First, respondent denied that he refused to provide the ODC with the name of his accountant. Respondent stated that he was initially unable to obtain any information from the ODC regarding the trust account audits, and that it was not until the ODC filed the motion to revoke probation that he understood he needed to hire an accountant to perform the ^audits. Respondent then contacted a CPA, Curtis Click, to perform the trust account audits. However, Mr. Click did not understand what was being requested of him, and respondent suggested that he remains “unclear what will satisfy the audit of the Trust Account.” As to the unpaid check on his client trust account, respondent stated that he had , not refused to provide a response to the ODC’s inquiry regarding the check. Respondent represented that when he received the ODC’s letter of February 15, 2012, he contacted the ODC and spoke to Screening Counsel James Daly. Respondent informed Mr. Daly that the balance of the trust account was more than sufficient to cover the check when it was presented for payment, and in response, Mr. Daly requested that respondent obtain a letter from his bank explaining the situation. Respondent stated that he did contact his bank to request the letter, and that when he thereafter heard nothing further from the ODC, he “considered the matter resolved.”

Disciplinary Board, Recommendation

Following a hearing before a board panel, the board filed its report with this court, recommending that the ODC’s motion to revoke respondent’s probation be denied.

The board found that the conditions of respondent’s probation required him to retain an accountant to perform quarterly reviews of his trust account, which he was to provide to the ODC. Respondent testified that he understood this condition |fito mean that he should provide the ODC with the name of the person who manages his trust account. Respondent informed the ODC by letter dated April 3, 2012 that he was the only person who managed his trust account. However, the board noted that the probation monitoring agreement clearly states that respondent was to “retain the services of an accountant” to perform quarterly trust account audits. Respondent testified that he now understands that he is required to retain a separate accounting professional to audit his trust account during the period of his probation, and that he has already done so. Nevertheless, even giving respondent the benefit of the doubt that he misunderstood this condition of his probation, the board found the probation agreement is also clear that he is to provide the ODC with quarterly reviews of his trust account, which he admitted he did not do for the first quarter. Therefore, the board concluded that respondent failed to fulfill this condition of his probation.

Turning to the issue of the dishonored check, the board noted that on February 2, 2012, the ODC received notice that a $4,654.50 check drawn on respondent’s trust account was returned unpaid due to uncollected funds. The ODC alleges that this constitutes a violation of Rule 1.15(a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct (safekeeping property of clients or third persons). However, respondent introduced bank statements indicating that he had between $14,000 and $17,000 in his trust account at the time the check was returned by the bank. Therefore, the board found respondent did not violate Rule 1.15(a).

As to the issue of respondent’s failure to cooperate and/or respond to the ODC, the board noted respondent’s testimony that upon receiving notice of the returned check from the ODC, he contacted Screening Counsel James Daly to discuss the matter. Respondent further stated that he contacted his bank at Mr. Daly’s request and instructed a manager to send the ODC a letter acknowledging the bank’s error. The ODC’s staff auditor, who participates in the investigation of Intrust accounts, testified that she never received a letter from respondent’s bank, but that even if she had, the ODC would still require him to provide a written explanation of the situation with supporting documentation. Respondent was informed that he needed to provide this information to the ODC, and he admitted he did not do so. Therefore, the board found respondent failed to cooperate with the ODC pursuant to the conditions of his probation and pursuant to Rule 8.1(c) of the Rules of Professional Conduct (failure to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation).

Notwithstanding its finding that respondent has violated certain conditions of his probation, the board concluded that revocation of probation is not appropriate at this time. The board observed that respondent has only been on probation for three months. While he initially failed to cooperate with the ODC, respondent has demonstrated a willingness to do so in the future. Therefore, the board found that the interests of the disciplinary system will be better served by allowing respondent to continue on his supervised probation, instead of revoking his probation and having him serve a six-month suspension from the practice of law, during which he would not have the benefit of supervision by a probation monitor. The board cautioned respondent to fully comply with every condition outlined in his probation monitoring agreement and to promptly respond to all future requests for information from the ODC, and that if he fails to do so, the ODC may provoke another probation revocation proceeding.

Based on the above findings, the board recommended that the ODC’s motion to revoke respondent’s probation be denied.

^DISCUSSION

A review of the record reveals that respondent failed to timely provide the ODC with the name of the accountant who would be auditing his client trust account, and failed to submit the first quarterly audit report due on April 20, 2012. Respondent also failed to submit copies of his bank statements to the ODC in response to its February 15, 2012 request for an explanation of the returned check on his trust account. At the hearing in this matter, respondent explained that he did not fully understand his obligations relating to the trust account audits, and that he tried to contact the ODC for clarification, but was not able to speak with anyone who would respond to his questions. Respondent also testified that he believed the returned check issue had been fully addressed following his telephone conversation with the ODC’s screening counsel, James Daly.

In finding that respondent did violate some of the conditions of his probation, the disciplinary board appears to have largely rejected respondent’s explanations. Nevertheless, the board was persuaded not to recommend revocation in light of respondent’s assurance that he will be more cooperative in the future. In addition, the board believed that the disciplinary system and the public will be better served if respondent is allowed to remain on probation, under the supervision of a practice monitor, instead of being suspended.

We agree with these conclusions. Accordingly, we will accept the board’s recommendation and decline to revoke respondent’s probation at this time. However, we caution respondent that in the future we will expect from him nothing less than scrupulous adherence to the requirements of his probation.

DECREE

For the reasons assigned, the ODC’s motion to revoke respondent’s probation is denied.

       Chief Justice Kimball not participating in the opinion.

      . After Deputy Disciplinary Counsel Bernadine Johnson informed respondent that he was not in compliance with the conditions of his probation because he had • not provided her with the name of his "accounting professional,” respondent left several messages with the ODC asking to speak to Ms. Johnson regarding this matter. However, he did not actually speak with Ms. Johnson. Respondent then wrote a letter to Ms. Johnson stating, "I am the only person that handles my client's [sic] trust account, therefore, I am the accounting professional over my trust account.” Ms. Johnson acknowledged that she received this letter and that she did not follow up with respondent to let him know that he had to retain an accountant.

      . In support, respondent included a copy of the bank statements for his client trust account for a six-month period. The statements indicated that on January 30, 2012, the date Ms. Icamina presented the $4,654.50 check for payment, the balance of respondent’s trust account was $14,308.94.

      . The board’s report also discusses an issue raised for the first time at the revocation hearing regarding respondent’s failure to pay the costs of Brown I. The board determined that it would not make a finding of a probation violation on this issue because it was not raised in the ODC's motion and rule to revoke probation; however, the board directed respondent to address the unpaid costs in a timely manner.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: PER CURIAM.

license: Public Domain

text:
    In re Steven L. RUSHING.
    No. 2012-B-1172.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 14, 2012.

      . Of course, this holding should be limited to its facts, and should not be interpreted as providing support for the imposition of a suspension in excess of three years in a nonreciprocal disciplinary context. See In re: Bailey, 10-0426 (La.5/7/10), 41 So.3d 436.

   ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

PER CURIAM.

| ¶ Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 21, the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) has filed a petition seeking the imposition of reciprocal discipline against respondent, Steven L. Rushing, an attorney licensed to practice law in the States of Louisiana and Texas, based upon discipline imposed in two separate proceedings in Texas.

UNDERLYING FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In November 2000, Loyd Watts hired respondent to file a civil suit on his behalf. Respondent subsequently failed to file the suit and failed to communicate with Mr. Watts. When respondent did communicate with his client, he misrepresented to him that he was trying to get the case set for trial when it had not been filed in the first instance. In December 2010, Mr. Watts terminated respondent’s representation and requested the return of his file; however, respondent failed to comply with his client’s request. On March 12, 2012, respondent was suspended from the practice of law in Texas for four years based |?upon his misconduct in the Watts matter. Commission for Lawyer Discipline v. Rushing, No. 2011-2704-A on the docket of the 188th District Court of Gregg County, Texas.

Additional disciplinary proceedings were instituted against respondent arising out of his representation of Catherine Vick. In that matter, respondent was retained in 2002 to represent Ms. Vick in a medical malpractice case. Respondent filed suit on behalf of Ms. Vick in July 2003. Thereafter, he performed little or no work in the case and failed to properly communicate with his client. When respondent did communicate with Ms. Vick, he advised her that he was working on the case and that a settlement offer would soon be forthcoming. However, in 2009, Ms. Vick learned through another attorney that her suit had been abandoned and dismissed for want of prosecution in 2005. Respondent failed to comply with his client’s request to return her file. On May 10, 2012, respondent was suspended from the practice of law in Texas for six years, with three years of said suspension to be probated with conditions, based upon his misconduct in the Vick matter. Commission for Lawyer Discipline v. Rushing, No. 2010-2096-A on the docket of the 188th District Court of Gregg County, Texas.

After receiving notice of the Texas orders of discipline, the ODC filed a motion to initiate reciprocal discipline proceedings in Louisiana, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 21. Certified copies of the decisions and orders of the Texas court were attached to the motion. On June 4, 2012, this court rendered an order giving respondent thirty days to demonstrate why the imposition of identical discipline in this state would be unwarranted. Respondent failed to file any response in this court.

IsDISCUSSION

The standard for imposition of discipline on a reciprocal basis is set forth in Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 21(D). That rule provides:

Discipline to be Imposed. Upon the expiration of thirty days from service of the notice pursuant to the provisions of paragraph B, this court shall impose the identical discipline ... unless disciplinary counsel or the lawyer demonstrates, or this court finds that it clearly appears upon the face of the record from which the discipline is predicated, that:
(1) The procedure was so lacking in notice or opportunity to be heard as to constitute a deprivation of due process; or
(2) Based on the record created by the jurisdiction that imposed the discipline, there was such infirmity of proof establishing the misconduct as to give rise to the clear conviction that the court could not, consistent with its duty, accept as final the conclusion on that subject; or
(3) The imposition of the same discipline by the court would result in grave injustice or be offensive to the public policy of the jurisdiction; or
(4) The misconduct established warrants substantially different discipline in this state; ...
If this court determines that any of those elements exists, this court shall enter such other order as it deems appropriate. The burden is on the party seeking different discipline in this jurisdiction to demonstrate that the imposition of the same discipline is not appropriate.

In the instant case, more than thirty days have passed since the date respondent was served with notice of the ODC’s motion to initiate reciprocal disciplinary proceedings. Respondent has not filed any objections in this court alleging any jurisdictional infirmities or lack of due process in the Texas proceedings, nor do we discern any such defects from our review of the record. Accordingly, we find the requirements of Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 21(D)(1) and (2) are satisfied.

The sole remaining inquiry under Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 21(D)(3) and (4) is whether the imposition of the same discipline imposed by Texas would result |4in grave injustice or be offensive to the public policy of Louisiana, or whether the misconduct at issue would warrant substantially different discipline in Louisiana.

In addressing these factors, we note that respondent faced two separate disciplinary proceedings in Texas, both based upon very similar misconduct which occurred in the same time frame. Respondent neglected the legal matters of two clients, failed to communicate with his clients, made misrepresentations to the clients concerning the status of their case, and failed to return the clients’ files to them upon request or upon termination of the representation. For his misconduct in the Watts and Vick matters, respondent has been suspended from the practice of law in Texas for four years and six years, respectively, with three years of the six-year suspension deferred subject to probation.

We believe the sanction imposed in Texas is harsh, however, we cannot say that reciprocal discipline should not be imposed. In reaching this conclusion, we point out that reciprocal disciplinary matters involve unique considerations. Our jurisprudence recognizes that “only under extraordinary circumstances should there be a significant variance from the sanction imposed by the other jurisdiction.” In re: Aulston, 05-1546, p. 6 (La.1/13/06), 918 So.2d 461, 464. [Emphasis added.] A common theme of our reciprocal disciplinary cases is deference to the decisions made by the sister state with which we share authority over the respondent. See In re: Kanwal, 09-2192, p. 3 (La.12/18/09), 24 So.3d 189,191 (“we find it appropriate to defer to the determination made by Colorado, with which we share authority over respondent”); see also In re: Zdravkovich, 831 A.2d 964, 968-69 (D.C.2003) (“there is merit in according deference, for its own sake, to the actions of other jurisdictions with respect to the attorneys over whom we share supervisory authority”).

| a Under these circumstances, we believe it is appropriate to defer to the Texas judgments imposing discipline upon respondent. Accordingly, we will impose reciprocal discipline in the form of a four-year suspension and a six-year suspension, with three years deferred, even though Louisiana has no exact equivalent.

DECREE

Considering the Petition to Initiate Reciprocal Discipline Proceedings filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel and the record filed herein, it is ordered that respondent, Steven L. Rushing, Louisiana Bar Roll number 19767, be suspended from the practice of law for a period of four years, beginning on November 15, 2012 and ending on November 14, 2016. It is further ordered that beginning on November 15, 2016, respondent shall be suspended from the practice of law for a period of six years. Three years of the six-year suspension shall be deferred, subject to the terms of probation set forth by the court in Commission for Lawyer Discipline v. Rushing, No. 2010-2096-A on the docket of the 188th District Court of Gregg County, Texas. Any violation of the terms of probation may result in the deferred portion of the suspension becoming executory, or the imposition of different discipline, as appropriate.

       Chief Justice Kimball not participating in the opinion.

      . Respondent was admitted to the practice of law in Louisiana in 1989, but he has been ineligible to practice since September 9, 2009 for failure to pay his bar dues and the disciplinary assessment. Respondent is also ineligible for failure to comply with the mandatory continuing legal education requirements and for failure to file a trust account disclosure form.
      On November 18, 2011, we imposed reciprocal discipline upon respondent in the form of a twenty-four month suspension from the practice of law, with twelve months deferred, based upon discipline imposed in Texas. In re: Rushing, 11-1995 (La. 11/18/11), 74 So.3d 708.

      . The court’s order specified that respondent's suspension would begin on November 15, 2012 and end on November 14, 2016.

      . The court’s order specified that respondent’s active suspension would begin on November 15, 2016 and continue to November 14, 2019, and that his probated suspension would begin on November 15, 2019 and continue to November 14, 2022.

      . Louisiana does not have any procedural equivalent to either the four- or six-year suspension imposed in Texas. To the contrary, Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10(A)(2) does not permit a suspension in excess of three years.


text:
    In re Michael K. LeBLANC.
    No. 2012-B-1487.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 14, 2012.
   ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

PER CURIAM.

|-i The Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) commenced an investigation into allegations that respondent neglected legal matters, failed to communicate with his clients, and failed to promptly refund unearned fees. Respondent initially did not cooperate with the ODC in its investigation of the complaints filed against him. Prior to the institution of formal charges, respondent and the ODC submitted a joint petition for consent discipline. Having reviewed the petition,

IT IS ORDERED that the Petition for Consent Discipline be accepted and that Michael K. LeBlanc, Louisiana Bar Roll number 27834, be suspended from the practice of law for a period of three years, retroactive to July 29, 2008, the date of his interim suspension.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.

       Chief Justice Kimball not participating in the opinion.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana. v. David BROWN.
    No. 2012-OK-2006.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 14, 2012.
   PER CURIAM.

| (Writ granted in part. Although defendant was found guilty of first degree murder on October 27, 2011, and sentenced to death on November 16, 2011, the state’s application indicates that the district court suspended action on defendant’s notice of appeal and designation of the record pending consideration of defendant’s motion for new trial. Although “a case shall be ap-pealable to the supreme court if ... the defendant has been convicted of a capital offense and a penalty of death [has] actually [been] imposed,” La. Const, art. V, § 5(D), this Court’s appellate jurisdiction has not yet attached. La.C.Cr.P. art. 916 (“The jurisdiction of the trial court is divested and that of the appellate court attaches upon the entering of the order of appeal.”). The state therefore properly invoked the supervisory jurisdiction of the court of appeal “over cases which arise within its circuit.” La. Const, art. V, § 10(A). The application is therefore granted for the sole purpose of transferring it for consideration of the merits to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit.


text:
    In re Michael T. BELL.
    No. 2012-B-1689.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 19, 2012.
   ORDER

h Considering the Petition for Interim Suspension for Threat of Harm filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel,

IT IS ORDERED that Michael T. Bell, Louisiana Bar Roll number 27740, be and he hereby is suspended from the practice of law on an interim basis pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 19.2. Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 26(E), this order is effective immediately.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Office of Disciplinary Counsel may seek the appointment of a trustee(s) to protect the interests of respondent’s clients pursuant to the provisions of Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 27, if appropriate.

FOR THE COURT:

/s/ Marcus R. Clark Justice, Supreme Court of Louisiana


text:
    In re Woody Marvin DUNN.
    No. 2012-B-1312.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 21, 2012.
   ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

PER CURIAM.

liThis disciplinary matter arises from formal charges filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) against respondent, Woody Marvin Dunn, an attorney licensed to practice law in Louisiana, but currently ineligible to practice.

FORMAL CHARGES

Count I

Respondent represented the plaintiffs in a personal injury matter. On July 12, 2004, he filed a lawsuit in the 20th Judicial District Court for the Parish of East Feli-ciana, captioned Gloria M. Sanders, Tom Sanders, Dominique Wright, and Jeremy Wright versus Dana J. Brasseaux and Joseph D. Brasseaux and GEICO Insurance Company. On February 10, 2005, respondent settled the matter for a total of $16,600. Because Mrs. Sanders had passed away by this time, respondent informed GEICO’s attorney, John Castille, II, that he would prepare the succession documents necessary to have Mr. Sanders named as the administrator of his late wife’s succession. Mr. Castille delivered to respondent the following:

1. Receipt and Release forms;
2. Joint motion and order of final dismissal;
|23. A check payable to the clerk of court for the filing of the dismissal;
4. A check for $5,200 payable to Tom Sanders, as succession representative for the succession of Gloria Sanders, and respondent;
5. A check for $5,700 payable to Jeremy Wright and respondent; and
6. A check for $5,700 payable to Dominique Wright and respondent.

Respondent and his clients endorsed the settlement checks, and they were negotiated on February 11, 2005. The proceeds of the checks were deposited into respondent’s bank account, which was not identified or registered as a trust account.

After several unsuccessful attempts to contact respondent to obtain the executed releases, Mr. Castille learned that respondent had not opened Mrs. Sanders’ succession and had not filed a motion to dismiss the lawsuit. Respondent also failed to retain the settlement funds in his trust account pending receipt of a judgment of possession, and he did not have Mr. Sanders duly appointed as the succession representative to receive Mrs. Sanders’ settlement funds.

Thereafter, Mr. Castille filed a motion to enforce the settlement, which was set for hearing in August 2005. Although respondent was served with the motion, he did not appear for the hearing. The court dismissed the lawsuit with prejudice. .

Soon thereafter, Mr. Castille filed a disciplinary complaint against respondent. The ODC mailed notice of the complaint to respondent’s primary registration address; however, the notice was returned marked “moved, left no address.” The ODC contacted respondent via telephone and then hand-delivered notice of the complaint to him. Nevertheless, respondent failed to submit a written response, necessitating the issuance of a subpoena to obtain his sworn statement, which he provided on January 11, 2006.

|<¡The ODC alleged that respondent’s conduct violated the following provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 1.1(a) (failure to provide competent representation to a client), 1.3 (failure to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client), 1.15(a)(g) (safekeeping property of clients or third persons), 3.2 (failure to make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation), 3.4(c) (knowing disobedience of an obligation under the rules of a tribunal), 8.1(c) (failure to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation), 8.4(a) (violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct), and 8.4(d) (engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice). Additionally, the ODC alleged that respondent’s conduct violated Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 8(C) (failure to update registration address with the Louisiana State Bar Association).

Count II

Respondent has been ineligible to practice law since September 29, 2007 due to his failure to comply with mandatory continuing legal education requirements. He is also ineligible for failure to pay his bar dues and the disciplinary assessment. Additionally, respondent was ineligible to practice law from October 31, 2005 until May 24, 2006 due to his failure to pay bar dues and the disciplinary assessment for 2005-2006.

In July 2005, Ava and Lloyd Turner hired respondent to defend them against a debt collection lawsuit. Respondent charged and collected a $300 fee to begin the representation. On August 5, 2005, respondent filed an answer on the Turners’ behalf, denying some allegations of the plaintiffs petition and averring that the matter had prescribed. However, he thereafter failed to cooperate in the discovery process and failed to respond to a request for admission of facts. Accordingly, |4those issues were statutorily deemed admitted. In July 2007, judgment was rendered against respondent’s clients in the amount of $5,797.88, and in March 2008, Ms. Turner’s wages were garnished.

On March 24, 2008, respondent executed a promissory note in favor of the Turners for the amount of the judgment against them, agreeing to pay them $850 per month. Respondent did not inform the Turners that they had a right to consult independent counsel prior to accepting the promissory note. Respondent has made no payments on the note.

In April 2008, the Turners filed a disciplinary complaint against respondent. The ODC mailed notice of the complaint to respondent at his primary and secondary registration addresses. One notice was delivered, and one was returned unclaimed. Respondent failed to answer the complaint despite receiving two telephone calls from the ODC regarding same, necessitating the issuance of a subpoena to obtain his sworn statement, which he provided on October 14, 2008.

The ODC alleged that respondent’s conduct violated the following provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 1.1(b) (failure to comply with MCLE requirements), 1.1(c) (failure to pay bar dues and the disciplinary assessment), 1.3, 1.4 (failure to communicate with a client), 1.8(a)(h) (conflict of interest), 5.5(a) (engaging in the unauthorized practice of law), 8.1(c), and 8.4(a).

DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

In July 2010, the ODC filed formal charges against respondent. Respondent failed to answer the formal charges. Accordingly, the factual allegations contained therein were deemed admitted and proven by clear and convincing evidence | ¡¡pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 11(E)(3). No formal hearing was held, but the parties were given an opportunity to file with the hearing committee written arguments and documentary evidence on the issue of sanctions. Respondent filed nothing for the hearing committee’s consideration.

Hearing Committee Report

After considering the ODC’s deemed admitted submission, the hearing committee determined that the factual allegations of the formal charges have been deemed admitted and proven by clear and convincing evidence. After also determining that the documentary evidence in the record supports the allegations of misconduct, the committee concluded respondent violated the Rules of Professional Conduct as charged. Specifically, the committee found that, in the Castille matter, respondent failed to properly and promptly complete the settlement, failed to properly safeguard his clients’ settlement funds, and failed to expedite resolution of the lawsuit. In the Turner matter, respondent provided legal services to the Turners when he was ineligible to practice law, and he engaged in a prohibited business transaction with the Turners.

The committee then determined that respondent negligently, if not knowingly and willfully, violated duties owed to his clients, the legal system, and the legal profession. His misconduct directly damaged or inconvenienced his clients. His misconduct also reflects a disregard for both the interests of his clients and the rights, obligations, and responsibilities attendant to the practice of law. Furthermore, respondent has not made restitution to the Turners for the damage his incompetence caused them, nor has he reimbursed GEICO for the costs and expenses it incurred because of his failure to complete the settlement in the Castille matter. After considering the ABA’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, the committee determined that the baseline sanction is suspension.

|fiIn aggravation, the committee found prior disciplinary offenses, a pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses, bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by intentionally failing to comply with the rules or orders of the disciplinary agency, refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the conduct, substantial experience in the practice of law (admitted 1984), and indifference to making restitution. Additionally, the committee noted that respondent has been ineligible to practice law since 2007 due to his failure to comply with bar membership requirements. The committee found no mitigating factors present.

Under these circumstances, the committee recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for three years, followed by two years of probation with specified conditions. The committee further recommended that half of the suspension may be deferred if respondent meets certain additional conditions within a specified time frame.

Neither respondent nor the ODC filed an objection to the hearing committee’s report and recommendation. Disciplinary Board Recommendation

After acknowledging that the factual allegations of the formal charges have been deemed admitted, the disciplinary board determined that the hearing committee’s factual findings are supported by the factual allegations of the formal charges and the evidence submitted in support of those allegations. The board then determined that the committee correctly applied the Rules of Professional Conduct.

]7The board further determined that respondent knowingly violated duties owed to his clients, the legal system, and the legal profession. Respondent’s misconduct caused harm to GEICO and the Turners. After considering the ABA’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, the board determined that suspension and disbarment are potential baseline sanctions for respondent’s misconduct.

In aggravation, the board found prior disciplinary offenses, a pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses, bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by intentionally failing to comply with rules or orders of the disciplinary agency, substantial experience in the practice of law, and indifference to making restitution. In mitigation, the board found only the remoteness of the prior offenses. The board also noted that, while the record contains reference to respondent’s health problems, there is insufficient evidence in the record of said health problems to determine whether they should be considered in mitigation.

After also considering this court’s prior jurisprudence addressing similar misconduct, the board recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for three years and be ordered to make restitution to the Turners.

Neither respondent nor the ODC filed an objection to the disciplinary board’s recommendation.

DISCUSSION

Bar disciplinary matters fall within the original jurisdiction of this court. La. Const, art. V, § 5(B). Consequently, we act as triers of fact and conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether the alleged misconduct has been proven by clear and convincing evidence. In re: Banks, 09-1212 (La.10/2/09), 18 So.3d 57.

In cases in which the lawyer does not answer the formal charges, the factual allegations of those charges are deemed admitted. Supreme Court Rule XIX, § |S11(E)(3). Thus, the ODC bears no additional burden to prove the factual allegations contained in the formal charges after those charges have been deemed admitted. However, the language of § 11(E)(3) does not encompass legal conclusions that flow from the factual allegations. If the legal conclusion the ODC seeks to prove (i.e., a violation of a specific rule) is not readily apparent from the deemed admitted facts, additional evidence may need to be submitted in order to prove the legal conclusions that flow from the admitted factual allegations. In re: Donnan, 01-3058 (La.1/10/03), 838 So.2d 715.

The record in this deemed admitted matter supports a finding that respondent failed to properly complete the settlement in the Castille matter, practiced law while ineligible to do so, neglected the Turners’ legal matter, and settled a potential legal malpractice claim with the Turners without informing them to seek the advice of independent counsel. Respondent also failed to respond to the complaints filed against him, necessitating the issuance of two subpoenas to obtain his sworn statements. Based on these facts, respondent has violated the Rules of Professional Conduct as alleged in the formal charges.

Having found evidence of professional misconduct, we now turn to a determination of the appropriate sanction for respondent’s actions. In determining a sanction, we are mindful that disciplinary proceedings are designed to maintain high standards of conduct, protect the public, preserve the integrity of the profession, and deter future misconduct. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Reis, 513 So.2d 1173 (La.1987).

The record supports a finding that respondent knowingly violated duties owed to his clients, the legal system, and the legal profession. His misconduct caused actual harm to GEICO and the Turners. The baseline sanction for this type of misconduct is suspension.

19The following aggravating factors are present: prior disciplinary offenses, a pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses, bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by intentionally failing to comply with the rules or orders of the disciplinary agency, substantial experience in the practice of law, and indifference to making restitution. We agree with the board that the only mitigating factor supported by the evidence is the remoteness of respondent’s prior disciplinary offenses.

In light of the numerous aggravating factors present, the harm caused by respondent’s misconduct, and the fact that respondent has failed to comply with the bar membership requirements since 2007, we will adopt the disciplinary board’s recommendation and suspend respondent from the practice of law for three years. We will also order respondent to make restitution to the Turners.

DECREE

Upon review of the findings and recommendations of the hearing committee and disciplinary board, and considering the record, it is ordered that Woody Marvin Dunn, Louisiana Bar Roll number 8390, be and he hereby is suspended from the practice of law for three years. It is further ordered that respondent shall make restitution to Ava and Lloyd Turner. All costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.

       Chief Justice Kimball not participating in the opinion.

      . Since the latter part of 2007, respondent has been ineligible to practice law due to his failure to pay bar dues and the disciplinary assessment, fulfill mandatory continuing legal education requirements, and file the trust account disclosure statement.

      . During his sworn statement, respondent provided documentary evidence that he filed an affidavit of small succession with the Louisiana Department of Revenue. He did not file the succession in the district court because he did not think he needed to do so. He also acknowledged receiving all of the settlement documents from Mr. Castille. However, he claimed that, before he was able to return them to Mr. Castille and file the motion to dismiss with the court, he “took sick.”

      . During his sworn statement, respondent claimed that, after the answer was filed, Mr. Turner instructed him not to do anything else on the case because he and his wife were moving to Georgia where Mr. Turner believed they would be judgment proof. Respondent informed Mr. Turner that was not true, but Mr. Turner still instructed him to take no further action in the case. Respondent asserted that he failed to confirm Mr. Turner's instructions in writing because he had been sick at that time and was going to the doctor two or three times a week.

      . In July 1995, respondent was admonished for failing to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation. In June 1998, this court suspended respondent for six months, fully deferred, subject to one year of probation with conditions, for neglecting a legal matter and settling the resulting malpractice claim directly with the client without advising the client to seek the advice of independent counsel. In re: Dunn, 98-0535 (La.6/5/98), 713 So.2d 461. Finally, in August 2002, respondent was admonished for engaging in the practice of law while ineligible to do so.

      . Respondent subsequently filed a motion to recall the deemed admitted order and sought a remand of the matter for a hearing, asserting that he suffers from health problems. Respondent did not submit any documentary evidence in support of his motion. The disciplinary board denied the motion.


text:
    In re Christopher SUBA.
    No. 2012-OB-1478.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 21, 2012.
   ON APPLICATION FOR READMISSION

PER CURIAM.

11 This proceeding arises out of an application for readmission filed by petitioner, Christopher Suba, an attorney whose conditional admission to the practice of law in Louisiana was revoked in 2004.

UNDERLYING FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Petitioner disclosed three alcohol-related arrests on his application to take the July 2003 Louisiana bar examination. Thereafter, we conditionally admitted him to the practice of law, subject to a two-year period of probation, during which he was required to comply with the terms of his contract with the Lawyers Assistance Program (“LAP”). In re: Suba, 03-2795 (La.10/9/03), 856 So.2d 1202. On October 14, 2004, we revoked petitioner’s conditional admission after he violated the terms of his LAP contract by using cocaine, drinking alcohol, and missing Alcoholics Anonymous meetings, among other things. In re: Suba, 04-1766 (La.10/14/04), 884 So.2d 559.

Petitioner subsequently filed an application for readmission with the disciplinary board, alleging he has complied with the readmission criteria set forth in Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 24(E). The Office of Disciplinary Counsel took no position regarding the application for readmission. Accordingly, the matter was referred for a formal hearing before a hearing committee.

| ¡.Following the hearing, the hearing committee recommended that petitioner be readmitted to the practice of law, with the following conditions:

1. Petitioner must refrain from all use of alcohol and illegal drugs and refrain from abusing prescription and non-prescription medication;
2. Petitioner must enter into a LAP contract to extend the life of his present LAP contractual obligations for a period of five years, commencing from the date his readmission is approved by the court. Additionally, the terms of the LAP contract shall include all of the usual and customary provisions as they pertain to monitoring for the use/abuse of alcohol and illegal drugs;
3. Petitioner shall be subject to random alcohol and drug testing by LAP at his cost and expense during the above period;
4. Petitioner shall continue his treatment with Dr. Paul Dammers (or another health care professional acceptable to LAP) and provide LAP with Dr. Dammers’ reports as requested;
5. Petitioner shall be on probation for a period of three years from the date his readmission is approved by the court and he shall be monitored by the ODC under terms discretionary with his probation monitor;
6. Any violation of the terms or conditions of this readmission shall result in a motion to revoke petitioner’s readmission with an expedited hearing to be conducted by the disciplinary board in a summary fashion as directed by the board; and
7. Petitioner shall pay all costs of these proceedings.

Neither petitioner nor the ODC filed an objection to the hearing committee’s recommendation.

After considering the record in its entirety, we will adopt the committee’s recommendation and readmit petitioner to the practice of law. As found by the | ¡¡committee, the record provides clear and convincing evidence of petitioner’s compliance with the readmission criteria. In particular, the record supports the finding that petitioner has not practiced law or engaged in additional misconduct since his conditional admission was revoked. He has kept informed about recent developments in the law and has acknowledged the wrongfulness and seriousness of the conduct that led to the revocation of his conditional admission. Most significantly, petitioner has shown that he has been alcohol and drug free for more than one year and is likely to remain so given his dedicated adherence to his LAP contract. Under these circumstances, we find petitioner has shown that he possesses the requisite competence, honesty, and integrity to be readmitted to the practice of law. Accordingly, we will readmit petitioner to the practice of law, subject to a five-year period of probation to coincide with a newly-executed five-year LAP contract. In all other respects, petitioner’s readmission shall be subject to the conditions recommended by the hearing committee.

DECREE

Upon review of the recommendation of the hearing committee, and considering the record, it is ordered that Christopher Suba, Louisiana Bar Roll number 28832, be immediately readmitted to the practice of law in Louisiana, subject to the conditions set forth in this opinion. All costs of these proceedings are assessed against petitioner.


author: PER CURIAM. JOHNSON, Justice,

text:
    Deanna MOREAU, Individually and on Behalf of her Minor Son, Michael Moreau, Jr. v. MOREAU’S MATERIAL YARD, LLC, et al.
    No. 2012-CC-1096.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 21, 2012.
   PER CURIAM.

| plaintiff filed suit against her husband’s employer, alleging its failure to adhere to proper safety procedures which resulted in his death. Defendant moved for summary judgment, alleging plaintiffs exclusive remedy was in workers’ compensation, as she was unable to show an intentional act on its part. The district court denied summary judgment, and the court of appeal denied supervisory writs. This application followed.

To recover in tort against defendant under La.R.S. 28:1032(B), plaintiff must prove decedent’s injury resulted from an “intentional act.” In Bazley v. Tortorich, 397 So.2d 475 (La.1981), we explained an intentional act requires the actor to either (1) consciously desire the physical result of his act, whatever the likelihood of that result happening from his conduct; or (2) know that the result is substantially certain to follow from his conduct, whatever his desire may be as to that result. In the instant case, plaintiff does not allege defendant consciously desired to cause harm to decedent. Rather, she asserts decedent’s injuries were substantially certain to follow from defendant’s conduct.

In Reeves v. Structural Preservation Systems, 98-1795 at pp. 9-10 (La.3/12/99), 731 So.2d 208, 213, we discussed the “substantial certainty” requirement as follows:

| ¡¿Believing that someone may, or even probably will, eventually get hurt if a workplace practice is continued does not rise to the level of an intentional act, but instead falls within the range of negligent acts that are covered by workers’ compensation.
* * *
“ ‘Substantially certain to follow’ requires more than a reasonable probability that an injury will occur and ‘certain’ has been defined to mean ‘inevitable’ or ‘incapable of failing’ ” Jasmin v. HNV Cent. Riverfront Corp., supra [642 So.2d 311] at 312 [La.App. 4 Cir.1994]. “[A]n employer’s mere knowledge that a machine is dangerous and that its use creates a high probability that someone will eventually be injured is not sufficient to meet the ‘substantial certainty’ requirement.” Armstead v. Schwegmann Giant Super Markets, Inc., 618 So.2d 1140, 1142 (La.App. 4 Cir.1993), writ denied, 629 So.2d 347 (La.1993). “Further, mere knowledge and appreciation of a risk does not constitute intent, nor does reckless or wanton conduct by an employer constitute intentional wrongdoing.” Id. (citing Tapia v. Schwegmann Giant Supermarkets, Inc., 590 So.2d 806, 807-808 (La.App. 4 Cir.1991)).

In the instant case, plaintiff alleges defendant required decedent to work under unsafe conditions, and failed to provide necessary safety equipment. Accepting plaintiffs allegations as true, we do not find the accident was substantially certain to occur. As we explained in Simoneaux v. Excel Group, LLC, 06-1050 at p. 3 (La.9/1/06), 936 So.2d 1246, 1248, an employer’s actions in providing poor working conditions “may have been negligent or even grossly negligent, but they were not intentional.”

Accordingly, the writ is granted. The judgment of the district court is reversed, and summary judgment is granted in favor of defendant.

JOHNSON, J„ dissents.

JOHNSON, Justice,

dissents, and would deny Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment.


text:
    Phil WILLIAMS v. The NEW ORLEANS ERNEST N. MORIAL CONVENTION CENTER.
    No. 2012-CC-1201.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 21, 2012.
   PER CURIAM.

| iPlaintiff, Phil Williams, was a carpenter formerly employed by Freeman Decorating. Plaintiff was involved in a scuffle with his supervisor while they were working at the New Orleans Ernest N. Morial Convention Center (“Convention Center”). As a result, Freeman Decorating terminated plaintiff, and the Convention Center, through its Director of Public Safety, Joseph Hebert, alerted staff to deny plaintiff further entry to Convention Center premises by posting plaintiffs photograph and name at various security/aecess points.

Thereafter, plaintiff filed this action against the Convention Center, alleging his character was defamed by the posting of his photograph and name at various entry and security points on the premises. In response, the Convention Center filed a motion to strike pursuant to La.Code Civ. P. art. 971.

The district court denied the motion, and the court of appeal, after a remand for briefing and argument by this court, denied the writ. This application followed.

In support of its motion, the Convention Center attached an affidavit from Mr. Hebert, who averred he posted plaintiffs photograph “in the reasonable belief that Plaintiff presented a security risk to the Convention Center and to the many people coursing through the building.” We find this affidavit is sufficient to establish the Convention Center’s decision to post the photograph was subject to a qualified | aprivilege. Once the privilege is established, it becomes incumbent on the plaintiff to come forward with rebuttal evidence establishing the privilege was abused through malice or lack of good faith. Kennedy v. Sheriff of East Baton Rouge, 05-1418 (La.7/10/06), 935 So.2d 669. Plaintiff produced no evidence indicating the Convention Center acted with malice or in bad faith. As a result, plaintiff failed to establish a probability of success on his claim for purposes of La. Code Civ. P. art. 971. Accordingly, the writ is granted. The judgment of the district court is reversed, and judgment is entered in favor of the Convention Center, dismissing plaintiffs suit with prejudice.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Haskell D. WALL v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-0591.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 12, 2012.
   In re Wall, Haskell D.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Franklin, 5th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 2010-166F; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 47,-211-KH.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Derrick FRUGA v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-0606.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 12, 2012.
   In re Fruga, Derrick; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. C, No. 429-997; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2012-K-0121.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Richard BROWN, III v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-0607.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 12, 2012.
   In re Brown III, Richard; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. I, No. 407-740; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-K-0294.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; State v. Parker, 98-0256 (La.5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694; La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Field CALHOUN v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-0625.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 12, 2012.
   In re Calhoun, Field; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. 3, No. 136,984; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 47,-213-KH.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Ernest Ray WILSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-0626.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 12, 2012.
   In re Wilson, Ernest Ray; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. 3, No. 225,045; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 47,-214-KH.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Stevon ARCHIE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-0627.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 12, 2012.
   In re Archie, Stevon; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of East Feliciana, 20th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 00-CR-1102; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011 KW 2179.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Ernest SAM.
    No. 2012-K-0631.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 12, 2012.
   In re Sam, Ernest; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, Div. K, No. 09-4488; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. ll-KA-469. _

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Eddie J. ARMANT v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-0633.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 12, 2012.
   In re Armant, Eddie J.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. James, 23rd Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 2584; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 11-KH-1170.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Larry BANNISTER v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-0645.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 12, 2012.
   In re Bannister, Larry; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. M, No. 93-5104; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 12-KH-64.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Tremayne SIMMS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-0651.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 12, 2012.
   In re Simms, Tremayne; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 07-07-0394; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011 KW 2076.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Allen DAVENPORT v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-0652.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 12, 2012.
   In re Davenport, Allen; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 07-7235; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 12-KH-134.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of ex rel. Dennis D. THOMAS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-0653.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 12, 2012.
   In re Thomas, Dennis D.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedíal Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. 4, No. 248,138; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 47,-209-KH.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of ex rel. Raymond MATOS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-0654.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 12, 2012.
   In re Matos, Raymond; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 418693-4; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011 KW 2099.

Denied. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying relief as a matter of La.C.Cr.P. art 930.4(C).


text:
    STATE ex rel. Christopher O’NEAL v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-0661.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 12, 2012.
   In re O’Neal, Christopher; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. 3, No. 251,395; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 47,-191-KH.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Steven CAMPBELL v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-0662.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 12, 2012.
   In re Campbell, Steven; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 05-578; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 12-KH-104.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Jose M. Lima CASTRO v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-0663.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 12, 2012.
   In re Castro, Jose M. Lima; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedíal Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. P, No. 05-4125; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 12-KH-211.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Harold Joe BLACK v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-0665.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 12, 2012.
   In re Black, Harold Joe; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. 5, No. 194,296; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 47,-194-KH.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172; See also State v. Cotton, 09-2397 (La.10/15/10), 45 So.3d 1030; La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4(D).


text:
    Vernon J. TATUM, Jr. v. ORLEANS PARISH SCHOOL BOARD.
    No. 2012-CC-0668.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 12, 2012.
   In re Tatum Jr., Vernon J.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. K, No. 96-2775; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-CA-1051.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Freggie D. MACK v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-0670.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 12, 2012.
   In re Mack, Freggie D.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Ouachita, 4th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 09-F1570; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 47260-KH.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 9B0.B; State ex rel Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Earl CRUM v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-0681.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 12, 2012.
   In re Crum, Earl; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. G, Nos. 01-95-0741, 01-95-0742; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011 KW 2122.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; State v. Parker, 98-0256 (La.5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694; La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.

WEIMER, J., recused.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Elijah L. HAWTHORNE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-0713.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 12, 2012.
   In re Hawthorne, Elijah L.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Tangipahoa, 21st Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 601117; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, Nos. 2011 KW 2108, 2011 KW 1453.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Marcus Lamont DOTIE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-0717.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 12, 2012.
   In re Dotie, Marcus Lamont; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. 3, No. 260,858; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 47,-229-KH.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Harry Lee WILLIAMS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-0723.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 12, 2012.
   In re Williams, Harry Lee; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. James, 28rd Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 08-M-000545; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. ll-KH-352.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Reginald WALLER v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-0732.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 12, 2012.
   In re Waller, Reginald; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. K, No. 03-03-0193; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011 KW 2288.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; State v. Parker, 98-0256 (La.5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694; La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4(D).


text:
    STATE ex rel. John ROWELL v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-0733.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 12, 2012.
   In re Rowell, John; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. P, No. 97-566; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. ll-KH-1179.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. John PRIEST v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-0737.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 12, 2012.
   In re Priest, John; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Livingston, 21st Judicial District Court Div. G, Nos. 016299, 016300; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011 KW 2191.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Otho GUY, III v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-0738.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 12, 2012.
   In re Guy III, Otho; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. C, No. 415-567; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2012-K-0168.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; State v. Parker, 98-0256 (La.5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694; La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Vincent Mark CASTILLO v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-0753.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 12, 2012.
   In re Castillo, Vincent Mark; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. E, Nos. 12-270,12-344; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 12-K-212.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Sugar Ray LEWIS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-0755.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 12, 2012.
   In re Lewis, Sugar Ray; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. F, No. 372-469; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2012-K-0321.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; State v. Parker, 98-0256 (La. 5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694; La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Russell ALEXANDER v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-0757.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 12, 2012.
   In re Alexander, Russell; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Mary, 16th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 2003-161240.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; State v. Parker, 98-0256 (La.5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694; La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Simpson WRIGHT v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-0760.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 12, 2012.
   In re Wright, Simpson; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 03-1124; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 12-KH-168.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172; see also State v. Cotton, 09-2397 (La.10/15/10), 45 So.3d 1030; State v. Parker, 98-0256 (La.5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Eddie J. ARMANT v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-0768.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 12, 2012.
   In re Armant, Eddie J.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. James, 23rd Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 2584; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, Nos. 11-KH-1170,12-KH-13.

Denied.


text:
    Kevin B. LORIO v. TECHE FEDERAL SAVINGS BANK, et al.
    No. 2012-C-0802.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 12, 2012.
   In re Lorio, Kevin B.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 2000-0214-C; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 11-1218.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Darren L. JARVIS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-0818.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 12, 2012.
   In re Jarvis, Darren L.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 265848; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011 KW 2416.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2380 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; State v. Parker, 98-0256 (La.5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694; La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172; State v. Cotton, 09-2397 (La.10/15/10), 45 So.3d 1030.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Michael BROWN v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-0819.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 12, 2012.
   In re Brown, Michael; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 97-365; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 12-KH-155.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; State v. Parker, 98-0256 (La.5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694; La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172. State v. Cotton, 09-2397 (La.10/15/10), 45 So.3d 1030; La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4(D).


text:
    STATE ex rel. Norris MOTEN v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-0857.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 12, 2012.
   In re Moten, Norris; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. B, No. 320-387; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2012-K-0426.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189. Cf. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4(D).


text:
    STATE ex rel. Jonathan HARDING v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-0878.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 12, 2012.
   In re Harding, Jonathan; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 09-3742; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 12-KH-121.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172; see also State v. Cotton, 09-2397 (La.10/15/10), 45 So.3d 1030. State v. G.T., Jr., (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/15/11), 71 So.3d 394, 399-401.


text:
    Dana RUSHING and Tammy Lemons Rushing v. Donald Ray GLOVER, Laura Kathryn Cox Glover and Beusa Energy, Inc.
    No. 2012-C-1071.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 12, 2012.
   In re Rushing, Dana E. et ah; Rushing, Tammy Lemons; — Plaintiff(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Desoto, 42nd Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 69464; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 46,980-CA.

Denied.


text:
    Ryan BRODNAX v. Jeff FOSTER and Zachary Nolan.
    No. 2012-C-1074.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 12, 2012.
   In re Brodnax, Ryan; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Morehouse, 4th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 2009-190; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 47,079-CA.

Denied.


text:
    Alvin CARTHON v. JOHNSON CONTROLS, INC. and Underwriters Safety & Claims.
    No. 2012-C-1076.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 12, 2012.
   In re Carthon, Alvin; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review Office of Workers’ Compensation District 1, No. 1009732; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 47,037-CA.

Denied.


text:
    Crystal JOHNSON v. CHRISTUS HEALTH CENTRAL LOUISIANA.
    No. 2012-CC-1078.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 12, 2012.
   In re Christus Health Central Louisiana D/B/A Chi-istus St. Frances Cabrini Hospital; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Rap-ides, Alexandria City Court, No. 115,803; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW12-00001.

Denied.


text:
    Julius B. ELLERBE, et al. v. OUACHITA PARISH POLICE JURY.
    No. 2012-C-1080.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 12, 2012.
   In re Ellerbe, Julius B. et al.; Hairell, Nolan B.; — Plaintiffs); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Ouachita, 4th Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 07-0460; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 47,022-CA.

Denied.


text:
    Patrick D. BREEDEN v. Mary Weber, Wife of/and Oliver S. CRUMES, Sr., Cuna Mutual Group and Safeco Lloyds Insurance Company.
    No. 2012-C-1091.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 12, 2012.
   In re Breeden, Patrick D.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. C, No. 2010-5638; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-CA-1098.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Evidio PALACIO.
    No. 2012-KK-1093.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 12, 2012.
   In re Palacio, Evidio; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. L, No. 11-532; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 12-K-270.

Denied.


text:
    Lourdes BURKE v. LAFAYETTE INSURANCE COMPANY, Eagan Insurance Agency, Inc. and ABC Insurance Company. Lourdes M. Burke v. Lafayette Insurance Company, Eagan Insurance Agency, Inc. and ABC Insurance Company.
    No. 2012-C-1104.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 12, 2012.
   In re Lafayette Insurance Company;— Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certio-rari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. C, No. 2006-11932; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, Nos. 2011-CA-0775, 2011-CA-0785.

Denied.


text:
    Maureen SONGER v. AUTOMOBILE CLUB INTER-INSURANCE EXCHANGE d/b/a AAA Insurance Company, and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company.
    No. 2012-CC-1111.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 12, 2012.
   In re Automobile Club Inter-Insurance Exchange d/b/a AAA Insurance Company; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of East Carroll, 6th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 21,353; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 47,426-CW.

Denied.


text:
    John Y. PEARCE and Julia E. Reed v. ANTON, LTD. and Anton G. Heine.
    No. 2012-CC-1112.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 12, 2012.
   In re Anton, Ltd. et al.; Heine, Anton G.; — Defendant(s); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 655201; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 12-C-248.

Denied.


text:
    Sean Christopher PATRICK v. Patricia Robinson Clayton PATRICK. Patricia Robinson Clayton Patrick v. Sean Christopher Patrick.
    No. 2012-CC-1193.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 14, 2012.
   In re Patrick, Sean Christopher; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Tangipahoa, 21st Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 2010-0000959 C/W 0000971; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011 CW 1141 C/W 2011 CW 1142.

Denied.


text:
    Sean Christopher PATRICK v. Patricia Robinson Clayton PATRICK. Patricia Robinson Clayton Patrick v. Sean Christopher Patrick.
    No. 2012-CC-1194.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 14, 2012.
   In re Patrick, Sean Christopher; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Tangipahoa, 21st Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 2010-0000959 C/W 2010-0000971; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011 CW 1141 C/W 2011 CW 1142.

Denied.


text:
    Robert REEDS, et al. v. BP AMERICAN PRODUCTION COMPANY, et al.
    No. 2012-CC-1195.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 14, 2012.
   In re Gulfport Energy Corporation;— Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Cameron, 88th Judicial District Court Div. O, No. 10-18714; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW 12-00035.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Erik TRACZYK.
    No. 2012-KD-2032.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 17, 2012.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. I, No. 473-300; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2012-K-1354.

Writ granted. The trial court’s September 7, 2012 ruling pursuant to La.Code Crim. Proc. art. 719, ordering the state to produce the documents and information reviewed by the mental health experts in preparation of their reports, is reversed.

JOHNSON, KNOLL and WEIMER, JJ., would deny.


text:
    Japhet P. OGDEN, Alton J. Crowden, and Wendell M. Pierre v. James A. GRAY, II, and Arthur Morrell, in his Official Capacity as Clerk of the Criminal Court for the City of New Orleans.
    No. 2012-C-2041.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 17, 2012.
   In re Crowden, Alton J.; Ogden, Japhet P. et al.; Pierre, Wendell M.; — Plaintiff(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. J, No. 2012-8318; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2012-CA-1314.

Denied.


text:
    Michael RILEY, et al. v. Robin KEEGAN, et al.
    No. 2012-CC-1108.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 21, 2012.
   In re Forbes, Patrick; Louisiana Recovery Authority; Office of Community Development; — Defendant(s); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. C, No. 10-08715; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2012-C-0184.

Granted. Considering the unique circumstances of this case, it is ordered the motion to recuse be granted. The case is remanded to the district court for reallotment.


text:
    In re Appeal of the Decision of the DISCIPLINARY BOARD NO. 11-PDB-110.
    No. 2012-OB-1047.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 21, 2012.
   In re Davis, Legregory; — Plaintiff; Applying For Appeal of the Decision of the Disciplinary Board Office of Disciplinary Board, No. ll-PDB-110.

Leave to appeal denied.


text:
    In re Appeal of the DISCIPLINARY BOARD NO. 11-PDB-118.
    No. 2012-OB-1073.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 21, 2012.
   In re Whitehead, Michael V.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Appeal of the Decision of the Disciplinary Board Office of Disciplinary Board, No. ll-PDB-118.

Leave to appeal denied


text:
    Appeal of the Decision of the DISCIPLINARY BOARD NO. 11-PDB-115.
    No. 2012-OB-1081.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 21, 2012.
   In re Andrews, Mark E.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Appeal of the Decision of the Disciplinary Board Office of Disciplinary Board, No. 11-PDB-115.

Leave to appeal denied.


text:
    In re Appeal of Decision of the DISCIPLINARY BOARD NO. 12-PDB-002.
    No. 2012-OB-1258.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 21, 2012.
   In re Reed, Marie; — Plaintiff; Applying For Appeal of Decision of the Disciplinary Board Office of the Disciplinary Board, No. 12-PDB-002.

Leave to appeal denied.


text:
    In re Appeal of the Decision of the DISCIPLINARY BOARD NO. 12-PDB-001.
    No. 2012-OB-1276.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 21, 2012.
   In re Cage, Percy; — Plaintiff; Applying For Appeal of the Decision of the Disciplinary Board Office of Disciplinary Board, No. 12-PDB-001.

Leave to appeal denied.


text:
    Appeal of the Decision of the DISCIPLINARY BOARD NO. 11-PDB-120.
    No. 2012-OB-1355.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 21, 2012.
   In re Larson, Meria E.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Appeal of the Decision of the Disciplinary Board Office of Disciplinary Board, No. ll-PDB-120.

Leave to appeal denied.


text:
    In re Appeal of the Decision of the DISCIPLINARY BOARD NO. 12-PDB-009.
    No. 2012-OB-1401.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 21, 2012.
   In re Richard, Lloyd; — Plaintiff; Applying For Appeal of the Decision of the Disciplinary Board Office of Disciplinary Board, No. 12-PDB-009.

Leave to appeal denied.


text:
    Appeal of the Decision of the DISCIPLINARY BOARD NO. 11-PDB-122.
    No. 2012-OB-1402.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 21, 2012.
   In re Arterburn, Karen A.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Appeal of the Decision of the Disciplinary Board Office of Disciplinary Board, No. ll-PDB-122.

Leave to appeal denied.


text:
    In re Appeal of the Decision of the DISCIPLINARY BOARD NO. 11-PDB-107.
    No. 2012-OB-1419.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 21, 2012.
   In re Fuller, Clara; — Plaintiff; Applying For Appeal of the Decision of the Disciplinary Board Office of Disciplinary Board, No. ll-PDB-107.

Leave to appeal denied.


text:
    In re Appeal of Decision of the DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL NO. 2012-ADMIN-0635.
    No. 2012-OB-1269.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 21, 2012.
   In re Daniels, Patricia G.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Appeal of Decision of the Disciplinary Counsel Office of Disciplinary Counsel, No. 2012-ADMIN-0635.

Granted for the sole purpose of transferring the matter to the Office of the Disciplinary Counsel for review by the Chief Disciplinary Counsel. See Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 11(A).


text:
    In re Jason B. ROCHON.
    No. 2012-OB-1617.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 21, 2012.
   In re Disciplinary Counsel; — Other; Applying For Findings and Recommendations (Readmission) Office of Disciplinary Board, No. ll-DB-080.

Readmission denied. Petitioner may not reapply for readmission until at least three years have passed from the date of this judgment. Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 24(1).

JOHNSON, J., would conditionally grant readmission.


text:
    Charles H. THIBODEAUX v. CLECO CORPORATION.
    No. 2012-CC-1197.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 21, 2012.
   In re Thibodeaux, Charles H.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs City Court of Slidell, No. 2006-02196; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011 CW 2397.

Not considered. Not timely filed. See Supreme Court Rule X, § 5.


text:
    Sharon MILLER, Roy Miller, Jr. and Catisha Chism v. M & L INDUSTRIES, LLC, Warren Johnson, K & B Machine Works, LLC, Cargotec Solutions LLC and/or Kalmar Industries USA LLC and/or Cargotec USA, Inc., ABC Insurance Company and DEF Insurance Company.
    No. 2012-CC-1795.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 21, 2012.
   In re Chism, Catisha; Miller Jr., Roy; Miller, Sharon et al.; — Plaintiffs); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Terrebonne, 32nd Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 159,310; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No.2011 CW 1726.

Not considered. Not timely filed. See Supreme Court Rule X, § 5.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Kia STEWART.
    No. 2011-K-1718.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 21, 2012.
   In re Stewart, Kia; — Defendant; Applying for Reconsideration of this Court’s action dated May 18, 2012, and from Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. J, No. 464-435; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2010-KA-0298.

Denied.

GUIDRY, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Gregory Jean LOUIS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-2028.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 21, 2012.
   In re Louis, Gregory Jean; — Plaintiff; Applying for Reconsideration of this Court’s action dated May 18, 2012, and from Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. J, No. 66602; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 10-01188.

Reconsideration denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Duncan E. HICKS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-2554.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 21, 2012.
   In re Hicks, Duncan E.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Reconsideration of this Court’s action dated July 27, 2012, and from Parish of Ouachita, 4th Judicial District Court Div. H. No. 97F1621; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 46,933-KH.

Reconsideration denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Willie POGUE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-2813.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 21, 2012.
   In re Pogue, Willie; Applying for Reconsideration of this Court’s action dated July 27, 2012, and from Parish of W. Baton Rouge, 18th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 991610; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011 KW 1785.

Reconsideration denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Angel PEDROSO v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-0008.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 21, 2012.
   In re Pedroso, Angel; — Plaintiff; Applying for Reconsideration of this Court’s action dated July 27, 2012, and from Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 86-2410; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, Nos. 10-KH-136, 08-WR-966.

Reconsideration denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Manuel ORTIZ.
    No. 2011-KP-2799.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 21, 2012.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 92-6496.

Granted.

GUIDRY, J., recused.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Giovanni BROWN.
    No. 2012-KP-0872.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 21, 2012.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 99-8001; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 12-KH-93.

Granted.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Robert L. NORWOOD v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-0216.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 21, 2012.
   In re Norwood, Robert L.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Motion to Enforce this Court’s Order dated January 31, 2011; Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court, Div. D, No. 279-452.

Denied. Moot. The District Court has acted.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Antoine DEAN.
    No. 2012-KK-2003.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 21, 2012.
   In re Dean, Antoine; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. F, No. 510-754; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2012-K-0992.

Stay denied; writ denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Sean T. MONROE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-1587.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 21, 2012.
   In re Monroe, Sean T.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. 0, No. 99-947; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, Nos. 09-WR-543, 09-KH-608, 09-KH-681.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Gary L. COPP.
    No. 2011-KP-1480.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 21, 2012.
   In re Copp, Gary L.; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 412974; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011 KW 0038.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Raymond GREEN v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-2165.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 21, 2012.
   In re Green, Raymond; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Rapides, 9th Judicial District Court Div. B, Nos. 272,179, 273,842; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 11-00118.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Wendell WESLEY v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-2311.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 21, 2012.
   In re Wesley, Wendell; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Iberville, 18th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 266-07; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 KA 2066.

Denied.

JOHNSON, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Clarence MOTT, Jr. v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-2630.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 21, 2012.
   In re Mott Jr., Clarence; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 08-07-0409; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011 KW 0676.

Denied.

GUIDRY, J., would grant to transfer to court of appeal.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Derrick LEE v. Burl CAIN, Warden.
    No. 2011-OK-2683.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 21, 2012.
   In re Lee, Derrick; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 6-03-655.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. John N. LUTTRULL v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-2738.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 21, 2012.
   In re Luttrull, John H.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Concordia, 7th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 09-1020; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 10-1153.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Eric MAXWELL.
    No. 2012-K-0226.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 21, 2012.
   In re Maxwell, Eric; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. C, No. 472-378; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-KA-0564.

Denied.

WEIMER, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Emmett MESSICK v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-0357.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 21, 2012.
   IN RE: Messick, Emmett; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. B, No. 314-691; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No.2011K-1765.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Rendrick R. DUKE.
    No. 2012-K-0373.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 21, 2012.
   In re Duke, Rendrick R.; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Natchitoches, 10th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. C16430-1; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, Nos. 11-688,11-688.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. David Wayne GIBSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-0383.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 21, 2012.
   In re Gibson, David Wayne; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Charles, 29th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 88-166; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 11-KH-1169.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Adam FRANK v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-0446.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 21, 2012.
   In re Frank, Adam; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Landry, 27th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 03-K-0233; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 11-00935.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Leslie YOUNG v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-0542.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 21, 2012.
   In re Young, Leslie; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 02-87-0665; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011 KW 2178.

Denied.


text:
    Henry CARTER v. James LeBLANC, Secretary, Department of Corrections and N. Burl Cain, Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary.
    No. 2012-CI-0543.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 21, 2012.
   In re Carter, Henry; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 573,789; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011 CA1020.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana in the Interest of J.W.B.
    No. 2012-CK-0595.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 21, 2012.
   In re B., J.W.; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, Juvenile Court for the Parish of East Baton Rouge, No. 2011 JU 00084; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011 KJ 1850.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Emile DELANUEVILLE.
    No. 2012-K-0630.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 21, 2012.
   In re Delanueville, Emile; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. John, 40th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 08-91; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 11-KA-879.

Denied.

VICTORY and WEIMER, JJ., would grant.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Richard LAY v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-0646.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 21, 2012.
   In re Lay, Richard; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 383759; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011 KW 2408.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.

WEIMER, J., recused.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Richard LAY v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-0647.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 21, 2012.
   In re Lay, Richard; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 605156; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011 CW 2000.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.

WEIMER, J., recused.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Curtis F. WILLIAMS.
    No. 2012-K-0708.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 21, 2012.
   IN RE: Williams, Curtis F.; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. B, No. 494-001; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No.2011KA-0414.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Ronald ANDERSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-0739.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 21, 2012.
   In re Anderson, Ronald; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. K, No. 464-431; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2010-KA-1589.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Richard LAY v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-0754.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 21, 2012.
   In re Lay, Richard; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. J, No. 11-CR5-112033; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011 KW 2409.

Denied.

WEIMER, J., recused.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Harold J. OZENNE.
    No. 2012-KO-0756.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 21, 2012.
   In re Ozenne, Harold J.; — Other; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. D, Nos. 125838, 129663; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, Nos. 11-725, 11-1312.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Crystal REED v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-0827.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 21, 2012.
   In re Reed, Crystal; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. John, 40th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 06-339; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 11-KH-977.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Arthur MORRIS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-0850.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 21, 2012.
   In re Morris, Arthur; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Charles, 29th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 03-60; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 12-KH-97.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Earton SMITH v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-0861.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 21, 2012.
   In re Smith, Earton; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Bossier, 26th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 168,438; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 47,-263-KH.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Vincent Mark CASTILLO v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-0863.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 21, 2012.
   In re Castillo, Vincent Mark; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court, Nos. F1808683, F1808684, F1808685, F1859335, F1859969, F1870547; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 12-K-288.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Randy C. MARSHALL v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-0891.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 21, 2012.
   In re Marshall, Randy C.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 242,976; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 47,-232-KH.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Anthony KINCHEN v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-0897.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 21, 2012.
   In re Kinchen, Anthony; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. K, No. 710084; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011 KA 2023.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Ricky KING v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-0918.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 21, 2012.
   In re King, Ricky; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. H, No. 415-236; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2012-K-0331.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; La.C.Cr.P. art. 351; La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.4(D).


text:
    Joel WILLEBY, Individually and as Natural Tutor of His Minor Daughter, Dawn Willeby v. JE MERIT CONSTRUCTORS, INC., Trent Thibodaux, Willie B. Hurst, James Scott Bissette, Paul Gentile, Darryl Robinson, David Rumfola, and Randy P. Farriel.
    No. 2012-C-0923.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 21, 2012.
   In re Exxon Mobil Corporation; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Helena, 21st Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 17,937; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011 CA 0166.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Benjamin WRIGHT, Jr. v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-0924.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 21, 2012.
   In re Wright Jr., Benjamin; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Webster, 26th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 69,946; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 47,-256-KH.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Terrell ANDERSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-0928.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 21, 2012.
   In re Anderson, Terrell; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. H, No. 475-297; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2012-K-318.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Leroy P. JOHNSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-0934.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 21, 2012.
   In re Johnson, Leroy P.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Tangipahoa, 21st Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 99840; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011 KW 2410.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. David A. JONES v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-0842.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 21, 2012.
   In re Jones, David A.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. J, No. 95550; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 10 01429-KH.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Timothy ROBERTSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-0815.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 21, 2012.
   In re Robertson, Timothy; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 05-01-0148; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 KW 0287.

Denied.