author: LEE, P.J.,

text:
    Scott FAVRE and Jefferson Parker, Appellants v. HANCOCK COUNTY BOARD OF SUPERVISORS and Jourdan River Estates, LLC, Appellees.
    No. 2009-CA-00764-COA.
    Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
    Jan. 25, 2011.

      Robert B. Wiygul, attorney for appellants.
    Ronald J. Artigues Jr., Patrick W. Kirby, Henry Laird, Gulfport, Samuel Trent Favre, attorneys for appellees.
    Before LEE, P.J., IRVING and GRIFFIS, JJ.
   LEE, P.J.,

for the Court:

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 1. Jourdan River Estates (Jourdan River) owns two-hundred-and-sixty-nine acres in Kiln, Mississippi, which is located in Hancock County. The property in question is accessed by way of Nicola Road, which is located north of Interstate 10 directly off of Highway 603. There is another entrance to the Jourdan River property off of Crump Road, which is also directly off of Highway 603. In early 2007, Jourdan River submitted a proposal to the Hancock County Planning and Zoning Commission (the Commission) requesting rezoning of the property from A-l General Agricultural to a Waterfront Special Use District. Jourdan River planned to develop a 1,000-unit condominium complex and a 130-slip marina. The Commission approved Jourdan River’s request, but two local property owners, Scott Favre and Jefferson Parker (collectively Parker), appealed this decision to the Hancock County Board of Supervisors (the Board). The Board then denied Jourdan River’s request.

¶ 2. In early 2008, Jourdan River resubmitted its plans to the Commission for approval. The new plans, which did not call for rezoning, reduced the number of condominium units from 1,000 to 472, and it changed the marina to a yacht club. The yacht club included construction of a three-to-five-acre yacht basin. Under A-1, condominiums require planning commission approval, but a yacht club is considered a “permitted use by right.” After a hearing on the matter, the Commission unanimously approved Jourdan River’s proposal. Parker appealed to the Board. The Board conducted a hearing; then it took the matter under advisement in order to review the record. The Board approved the plan, subject to several conditions, the most significant that the Hancock County Engineer approve the plans for the road providing ingress and egress for the development.

¶ 3. Parker subsequently filed a bill of exceptions in the Hancock County Circuit Court. The circuit court affirmed the Board’s decision. Parker now appeals, asserting four issues that we have reordered as follows: (1) the Board erred by failing to articulate specific findings; (2) the Board erred in approving a yacht club as a “permitted use by right;” (3) the record does not contain substantial evidence to support the Board’s decision; and (4) the Board erred by declining to make findings regarding access to the property where a finding of adequate access is specifically required by the zoning ordinance.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 4. “Unlike decisions to zone or re-zone, which are legislative in nature, decisions on requests for special exceptions are adjudicative, and a reviewing court thus subjects such decisions to the same standard as is applied to administrative agency adjudicative decisions.” Hearne v. City of Brookhaven, 822 So.2d 999, 1002 (¶ 9) (Miss.Ct.App.2002). This Court will not disturb an administrative agency’s findings “unless the agency’s order 1) is not supported by substantial evidence, 2) is arbitrary or capricious, 3) is beyond the scope or power granted to the agency, or 4) violates one’s constitutional rights.” Johnson v. Miss. Employment Sec. Comm’n, 767 So.2d 1088, 1090 (¶ 7) (Miss.Ct.App.2000) (citing Sprouse v. Miss. Employment Sec. Comm’n, 639 So.2d 901, 902 (Miss.1994)).

DISCUSSION

I. SPECIFIC FINDINGS

¶ 5. Parker argues that this Court should reverse and remand this case for the Board to make specific findings supporting its decision. However, in Barnes v. Board of Supervisors, DeSoto County, 553 So.2d 508, 511 (Miss.1989), the Mississippi Supreme Court found that although the Board should have made specific findings of fact, the evidence in the record supported the Board’s decision. The supreme court stated that “granting the conditional use permit and imposing conditions upon the granting of that permit, [was] tantamount to a finding of fact by the DeSoto County Board of Supervisors ....” Id. The absence of findings does not necessarily warrant reversal. Caver v. Jackson County Bd. of Supervisors, 947 So.2d 351, 353 (¶ 8) (Miss.Ct.App.2007). We must review the record to determine whether the Board’s decision was supported by substantial evidence. Id. at 354 (¶ 8). Based upon our review, we find that this issue is without merit.

II. YACHT CLUB

¶ 6. Parker argues that Jourdan River’s 2008 application simply relabeled the marina as a yacht club/yacht basin in order to meet the zoning requirements under A-l. According to the local zoning ordinances, a marina is defined as “a boat basin, harbor or dock, with facilities for berthing and servicing boats, including bait and fishing tackle shop and eating establishments.” Neither yacht club nor yacht basin is defined in the zoning ordinance. The Commission commented that a yacht club would include a basin to dock boats and access to and from this area. Jourdan River contends that the yacht club is private and will not permit fueling or repair services on the premises.

¶ 7. Parker focuses on the fact that the plans submitted by Jourdan River in 2008 included references to a marina as well as the original drawing of the proposed marina from the 2007 rezoning application. The record is clear that Jourdan River decided to submit the original plans in an effort to save money since the yacht club would be located in the same spot as the marina.

¶ 8. “[T]he best interpretation of what the wording in the ordinance means is the manner in which it is interpreted and applied by the enacting and enforcement authorities.” Faircloth v. Lyles, 592 So.2d 941, 945 (Miss.1991). From the record, it is clear that the Commission and the Board concluded that a yacht club includes a basin to dock boats and access to and from this area. This issue is without merit.

III. SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE

IV. ADEQUATE ACCESS

¶ 9. Parker next contends that the Board’s decision to grant the conditional-use permit for the condominiums was not supported by substantial evidence. Specifically, Parker argues that Jourdan River failed to prove that the project would have sewer and water service and that there was adequate access to the area.

¶ 10. In regard to conditional-use permits, Hancock County Zoning Ordinance 411.01-02 provides as follows:

The uses listed in the chart are permitted upon approval of location and the site plane thereof by the planning commission as being appropriate with regard to transportation and access, water supply, waste disposal, fire and police protection, and other public facilities, as not causing undue traffic congestion or creating a traffic hazard and as being in harmony with the orderly and appropriate development of the district in which the use is located.

Additionally, Section 905.03 of the zoning ordinance enumerates several factors that “shall be established where applicable as necessary” in order not to cause an adverse effect on “other properties in the neighborhood.”

¶ 11. According to testimony presented by Jourdan River at the time of the hearing before the Board, the property already had a water line running toward it. The record contains a letter submitted by Jour-dan River from Southern Regional Waste-water Management District indicating its willingness to treat wastewater from the development. There is also a letter from the Hancock County Water and Sewer District indicating that it would service the development’s sewage needs. However, on the day of the hearing before the Board, Parker presented another letter, dated the day of the hearing, which stated that the Hancock County Water and Sewer District no longer had the capacity to handle the sewage needs of the development. The letter stated that the development was outside the District’s area. Jourdan River asserts that this letter was not authorized.

¶ 12. Shortly after the hearing, Jourdan River submitted two letters to the Board, one from the Hancock County Utility Authority that demonstrated it would provide wastewater treatment services to the development, and one from the Kiln Water and Fire Protection District that indicated its approval. The letter from Kiln Water noted that the city of Kiln did not have adequate water service in the area of the development but anticipated it in the near future. According to testimony at the time of the hearing, a sewer treatment plant in Kiln was under construction. Alternatively, Jourdan River presented testimony that it was prepared to construct and operate a decentralized system for water, sewer collection, and sewer treatment.

¶ 13. Although sewer and water service is only one of the factors to consider when approving a conditional-use permit, we find that there was substantial evidence in the record to support the Board’s decision.

¶ 14. In regard to the access issue, Parker contends that the Board did not make the required findings regarding access to the development. In its decision, the Board approved the conditional-use permit with certain restrictions:

1. That the developer submit plans and specifications for the construction of a road to provide ingress/egress for this development that will adequately handle the volume of traffic to the fully proposed development (includes all phases) as determined and approved by the County Engineer; and
2. That the developer post a Performance Bond for the benefit of the County to insure the construction of said road for ingress/egress, and the amount of said bond shall be based upon the anticipated cost of construction of said road as determined by the County Engineer; and
3. Must be in full compliance with all regulations and requirements that may be imposed by the Hancock County Utility Authority; and
4. That Crump Road not be used for ingress or egress to the development except for emergency vehicles and emergency purposes.

Parker’s sole argument is that because the Board failed to make specific findings regarding access to the development, the Board’s decision violated the zoning ordinance and is arbitrary and capricious. Parker contends that the Board should have denied the conditional-use permit rather than issuing the permit subject to the submission of additional information. In Barnes, the Board granted the conditional-use permit with certain restrictions, similar to the situation in the present case. Barnes, 553 So.2d at 511. As previously stated, we will not automatically reverse the Board for granting the conditional-use permit subject to certain restrictions. See Caver, 947 So.2d at 353 (¶ 8).

¶ 15. The deed to Jourdan River’s property includes an easement for access, which ends at the terminus of Nicola Road. According to a survey commissioned by the Hancock County Engineer, Hancock County had been maintaining Nicola Road up to the point where Jourdan River’s easement begins. Neel-Schaffer Engineering performed a traffic analysis of the area that included diagrams of Nicola Road showing sufficient width to expand the road. This analysis demonstrated that Nicola Road was the safest and most effective means of ingress and egress to the property. We find that the Board’s decision to grant the conditional-use permit subject to certain restrictions is tantamount to a finding of fact that all questions were answered and found in favor of Jour-dan River. This issue is without merit.

¶ 16. The circuit court was correct in affirming the Board’s decision; therefore, we affirm the court’s judgment.

¶ 17. THE JUDGMENT OF THE HANCOCK COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE APPELLANTS.

KING, C.J., MYERS, P.J., IRVING, GRIFFIS, BARNES, ISHEE, ROBERTS, CARLTON AND MAXWELL, JJ., CONCUR.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: KING, C.J.,

license: Public Domain

text:
    Justin WALTON, Appellant v. John WALTON and Kenneth Walton, Appellees.
    No. 2009-CA-01615-COA.
    Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
    Jan. 25, 2011.

      John Preston Scanlon, Jerry L. Mills, Ridgeland, attorneys for appellant.
    John Denver Fike, attorney for appel-lees.
    Before KING, C.J., BARNES and CARLTON, JJ.
   KING, C.J.,

for the Court:

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 1. On May 21, 2009, Justin Walton sued his uncles, John Walton and Kenneth Walton, and argued that he should have inherited land in 1992 from his grandfather’s estate, which was conveyed by deed to John and Kenneth in 1989. The chancellor dismissed the case for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, as barred by the doctrine of res judicata, and as time-barred. Justin was ordered to pay $1,000 in sanctions to John and Kenneth for filing a frivolous lawsuit. Aggrieved, Justin timely filed this appeal, raising the following issues: whether the trial court erred by finding that his claim was barred by the doctrine of res judicata, and whether the trial court erred by finding that his claim was time-barred. Finding no error, we affirm.

I. Estate Proceedings

¶ 2. Edward and Jacqueline Walton had three sons: George, John, and Kenneth. George, Justin’s father, died in 1984, predeceasing his parents. On December 12, 1989, Edward and Jacqueline conveyed their interest in six parcels of land to John and Kenneth as tenants in common, reserving a life estate for themselves.

¶ 3. Edward died intestate on August 6, 1990. Thereafter, the estate was opened for probate. The petition for appointment of administrators named Jacqueline, John, and Kenneth as the sole heirs at law. The record shows that on April 4, 1991, Justin, who was twelve years old at the time, was given notice of the estate proceedings; and his mother, Mary Lou Boles, was given notice as well.

¶ 4. Boles, on behalf of Justin, filed a response to John and Kenneth’s petition for a final accounting, to discharge administrators, and to close the estate. In the response, Boles stated that she was without sufficient information to admit or deny the allegations contained in the petition and requested that the chancellor refuse to approve the closing of the estate. On January 27, 1992, Boles’s attorney filed a motion to withdraw as counsel, stating that he had repeatedly tried to contact Boles regarding the disposition of her case and that she had failed to respond to him. The chancellor granted the motion to withdraw and gave Boles thirty days to employ new counsel or to notify the chancellor if she wished to proceed without counsel. Boles failed to notify the chancellor of her intention to employ new counsel or to proceed pro se.

¶ 5. On June 23, 1992, the chancellor entered his judgment distributing the widow’s allowance, discharging the administrators, and closing the estate. In the order, the chancellor noted that Justin was an hem at law and that Boles did not pursue her petition before the court. The chancellor determined that the only asset of the estate was a 1986 Chevrolet truck, which was given to Jacqueline as her widow’s allowance, and that there were no other assets in the estate to distribute. Therefore, the estate was closed.

II. Justin’s Lawsuit

¶ 6. On May 21, 2009, Justin filed a complaint in the Hinds County Chancery Court against John and Kenneth to set aside the 1989 deed. Justin argued that: he was entitled to inherit one-third of the property; his grandparents intended to give him his share; and after the estate proceedings, his uncles made representations to him that he would receive a share of the property. Justin also argued that John and Kenneth misrepresented the value of Edward’s estate during the probate of the estate, and his uncles exerted undue influence over his grandparents to obtain their real property.

¶ 7. John and Kenneth filed a motion to dismiss and a motion for sanctions. The chancellor found that Justin’s claim stemmed from the probate of his grandfather’s estate. The chancellor also found that Justin, through his mother, made an appearance in that action, and he failed to raise the 1989 deed at that time. The chancellor found that Justin’s 2009 complaint was merely an attempt to reopen Edward’s estate, and the claim was barred by the two-year statute of limitations. In addition, the chancellor found that Justin could not prove any set of facts in support of his claim of undue influence. Thus, the chancellor granted the motion to dismiss on the grounds of failure to state a claim, res judicata, and as being time-barred. The chancellor also granted John and Kenneth’s motion for sanctions and awarded them $1,000 collectively as the cost of reasonable attorney’s fees. Aggrieved, Justin timely filed this appeal.

ANALYSIS

I. Failure to State a Claim

¶ 8. Justin did not raise this issue on appeal. However, the chancellor primarily dismissed Justin’s lawsuit for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). This Court reviews a lower court’s grant or denial of a motion to dismiss using a de novo standard of review. Rose v. Tullos, 994 So.2d 734, 737 (¶ 11) (Miss.2008). The 12(b)(6) motion tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Id. A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is reviewed on the face of the pleadings alone. Chalk v. Bertholf, 980 So.2d 290, 293 (¶ 4) (Miss.Ct.App.2007). In determining whether to dismiss a lawsuit for failure to state a claim, “[t]he allegations in the complaint must be taken as true, and there must be no set of facts that would allow the plaintiff to prevail.” Rose, 994 So.2d at 737 (¶ 11).

¶ 9. In his complaint, Justin charged that John and Kenneth had fraudulently obtained his grandparents’ real property by exerting undue influence over them. In his order, the chancellor stated that he took all of the allegations in the complaint as true. However, the chancellor found no merit in Justin’s assertions that John and Kenneth engaged in fraud and ruled that Justin could not prove any set of facts in support of his claim.

¶ 10. The law is clear that allegations of fraud “shall be stated with particularity.” Estate of Hudson v. Hudson, 962 So.2d 90, 93 (¶ 16) (Miss.Ct.App.2007) (citing M.R.C.P. 9(b)). “A complaint will be dismissed when a party fails to sufficiently plead allegations of fraud.” Id. (citing State Indus. v. Hodges, 919 So.2d 943, 946 (¶ 5) (Miss.2006)).

¶ 11. Justin pleaded a fraudulent conveyance in general terms; he failed to state with particularity what made the conveyance fraudulent. Because Justin failed to plead his claim of fraudulent conveyance with particularity, we find that the chancellor did not err by dismissing the lawsuit. This issue is meritless.

II. Statute of Limitations

¶ 12. “The lower court’s grant of a motion to dismiss based upon the statute of limitations presents a question of law to which this Court applies de novo review.” Anderson v. R & D Foods, Inc., 913 So.2d 394, 397 (¶ 7) (Miss.Ct.App.2005).

¶ 13. First, Justin maintains that he was not properly noticed in the estate proceeding; thus, he was not a party. However, the record shows the contrary. Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d)(2)(A) provides that service upon a minor shall be made as follows:

[B]y delivering a copy of the summons and complaint to any one of the following: the infant’s mother, father, legal guardian (of either the person or the estate), or the person having care of such infant or with whom he lives, and if the infant be 12 years of age or older, by delivering a copy of the summons and complaint to both the infant and the appropriate person as designated above.

The chancery court’s docket shows that a summons was issued to both Justin and his mother, giving them notice of the probate of Edward’s estate, and that the summonses were returned. Thus, Justin’s argument fails.

¶ 14. Next, Justin argues that the chancellor erred by finding that his claim is time-barred pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated section 91-7-309 (Rev. 2004). Justin contends that the statute of limitations was tolled based on the doctrine of fraudulent concealment and by the minor’s savings provision under Mississippi Code Annotated section 15-1-7 (Rev. 2003). Conversely, John and Kenneth argue that the doctrine of fraudulent concealment and the minor’s savings provision are not applicable in this case, and Justin’s claim was time-barred.

¶ 15. The chancellor found that Justin’s 2009 lawsuit was an attempt to reopen Edward’s estate. Section 91-7-309 provides a two-year statute of limitations for such claims. Justin contends that the chancellor applied the wrong statute of limitations and, instead, should have used the statute of limitations under section 15-1-7 for an action to recover land. In pertinent part, section 15-1-7 provides a ten-year statute of limitations in actions to recover land; the minor savings provision allows a minor to file suit within ten years after he has attained majority.

¶ 16. However, we agree with the chancellor that this is not an action to recover land. The Mississippi Supreme Court stated that “in all the cases applying [section] 15-1-7, the contested issue always concerns ownership or possession of the property in question, such as adverse possession, a suit to remove a cloud on title, or confirmation of mineral rights.” O’Neal Steel, Inc. v. Millette, 797 So.2d 869, 873 (¶ 11) (Miss.2001); see also McWilliams v. McWilliams, 970 So.2d 200, 203 n. 1 (¶ 7) (Miss.Ct.App.2007) (citing O’Neal, 797 So.2d at 873 (¶ 11)). In McWilliams, this Court found that the appellant’s claim to set aside a warranty deed was not an action to recover land as contemplated by section 15-1-7; thus, the ten-year statute of limitations did not apply. Id. at (¶¶ 7-8). Instead, the Court found that a three-year statute of limitations applied in an action to set aside a deed based on fraud. Id. at (¶ 8).

¶ 17. Justin argued that: John and Kenneth fraudulently represented to the chancellor the amount of assets in Edward’s estate; that John and Kenneth exerted undue influence over his grandparents to obtain their property; that the property should have passed through Edward’s estate; and Justin was entitled to inherit one-third of the property. Justin’s arguments are an attempt to attack and falsify the final accounting of Edward’s estate. As a result, we find that the chancellor did not err by finding that Justin’s claim was an attempt to reopen Edward’s estate. Regardless, if this Court applies the two-year statute of limitations under section 91-7-309 or the three-year statute of limitations as found in McWilliams, Justin’s claim is still time-barred. The statute of limitations began running against Justin on November 26, 1999, his twenty-first birthday. Justin did not file this lawsuit until May 21, 2009, well outside of the statute of limitations.

¶ 18. Justin argues that the statute of limitations was tolled by John and Kenneth’s fraudulent concealment of the 1989 deed. However, an alleged fraudulent concealment does not toll the statute of limitations for matters of public record. O’Neal Steel, Inc., 797 So.2d at 875 (¶ 22). “[W]here the alleged fraudulent conveyance is recorded, the circumstances are public and the means of finding out the character of the transaction is available. Consequently, the running of the statute of limitations is not prevented.” Id. (citation omitted).

¶ 19. Also, there is evidence that Justin should have known that he had a cause of action. Justin argues that he did not realize he had a cause of action until 2007 when a great-uncle told him that he was entitled to one-third of his grandparents’ land. But in Justin’s complaint, he stated that:

[I]t was the intention of Justin’s grandparents Jacqueline and Edward Lee Walton for Justin to take per stirpes the share that would have otherwise gone to Justin’s father George Walton. Justin’s grandfather Edward Lee had personally and repeatedly expressed as much to Justin verbally.

Thus, by Justin’s own admission, he knew before his grandfather’s death that Edward owned land and that Edward had expressed an intent that Justin inherit this land. The fact that no land was distributed in Edward’s estate to Justin put Justin on notice that he had a cause of action. Justin also stated that he began spending time with his uncles in 1995 or 1996, and he learned that his grandfather had owned substantial property.

¶20. Based on the foregoing, we find that there was no fraudulent concealment to toll the statute of limitations. Because of the Court’s ruling on the previous two issues, we decline to address Justin’s issues regarding res judicata.

III. Sanctions

¶ 21. In a cursory manner, Justin argues that the chancellor erred by imposing sanctions against him. Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b) provides, in pertinent part, that:

If any party files a motion or pleading which, in the opinion of the court, is frivolous or is filed for the purpose of harassment or delay, the court may order such a party, or his attorney, or both, to pay to the opposing party or parties the reasonable expenses incurred by such other parties and by their attorneys, including reasonable attorneys’ fees.

We review a chancellor’s award of sanctions for an abuse of discretion. Hodges v. Lucas, 904 So.2d 1098, 1102 (¶ 14) (Miss.Ct.App.2004).

¶ 22. The chancellor granted John and Kenneth’s joint motion for sanctions, finding that Justin “instituted a second frivolous lawsuit.” In the first lawsuit that was dismissed for failure to state a claim, Justin sued John and Kenneth and requested the chancellor to set aside a 1997 deed, which conveyed Kenneth and Jacqueline’s interest in one tract of land to John. This tract of land was also one of the six tracts of land that was conveyed to John and Kenneth in the 1989 deed. As previously mentioned, Justin failed to plead his claim of fraudulent conveyance with particularity; thus, there was no way that he could prove the claim, making the claim frivo-

lous. As a result, we find no abuse in discretion in the chancellor’s decision to impose sanctions against Justin. See, e.g., Foster v. Ross, 804 So.2d 1018, 1025 (¶ 23) (Miss.2002) (finding that an uncle was entitled to an award of attorney’s fees where his nephew filed a groundless claim against him alleging that the uncle had obtained certificates of deposits from the testator through undue influence).

¶ 23. Upon granting the motion for sanctions, the chancellor ordered John and Kenneth to submit proof of the reasonable expenses they had incurred defending this action. In the chancellor’s final judgment, he ruled that: “John Walton and Kenneth Walton are collectively awarded a judgment of one-thousand dollars ($1,000) against Justin Walton as the cost of reasonable attorney[’]s fees in this action.” (Emphasis added). However, the Court notes that there is no evidence in the record that John and Kenneth submitted proof of their expenses to the chancellor.

¶ 24. ‘While the [lower] court may find a case appropriate for the award of attorney’s fees, the actual award of attorney’s fees is still dependent upon specific proof.” Romney v. Barbetta, 881 So.2d 958, 962 (¶ 20) (Miss.Ct.App.2004) (citing A & F Properties, LLC v. Lake Caroline, Inc., 775 So.2d 1276, 1283 (¶ 22) (Miss.Ct.App.2000)). However, based upon the pleadings and documents contained in the record, it is more probable than not that John and Kenneth spent more than $1,000 in defending this action. Justin filed his complaint on May 21, 2009. Thereafter, John and Kenneth filed their answer to Justin’s complaint. John and Kenneth filed a motion to dismiss and a motion for sanctions. Justin filed a response to those motions. In addition to those pleadings, John and Kenneth filed numerous exhibits to accompany their motions, which included pleadings from the probate of Edward’s estate and documents concerning the 1989 warranty deed. John and Kenneth’s attorney also had to prepare for and attend court proceedings regarding this matter.

¶ 25. Accordingly, we find that the award of $1,000 in attorney’s fees is reasonable, and the absence of specific proof is harmless error in this case. Thus, we affirm the award of $1,000 in sanctions, which is to be shared by John and Kenneth. This issue lacks merit.

¶ 26. THE JUDGMENT OF THE HINDS COUNTY CHANCERY COURT IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE APPELLANT.

LEE, P.J., IRVING, GRIFFIS, BARNES, ISHEE, ROBERTS, CARLTON AND MAXWELL, JJ„ CONCUR. MYERS, P.J., NOT PARTICIPATING.


author: LYONS, Justice.

text:
    Ex parte Gilnita JONES et al. (In re Angela S. Levert, as personal representative of the estate of M.S., deceased v. Tyshelle Wilson et al.). Ex parte Tyshelle Wilson (In re Angela S. Levert, as personal representative of the estate of M.S., deceased v. Tyshelle Wilson et al.).
    1090762 and 1090781.
    Supreme Court of Alabama.
    June 25, 2010.

      Sharon E. Ficquette, gen. counsel, and Felicia M. Brooks, staff atty., Department of Human Resources, for petitioners Gilni-ta Jones, Elizabeth Walter, Cynthia Pate Henderson, and Tracy Eubanks.
    James S. Lloyd and J. Rick Wallis of Lloyd, Gray <& Whitehead, P.C., Birmingham, for petitioner Tyshelle Wilson.
    G. Courtney French and Michael D. Pet-way of Fuston, Petway & French, LLP, Birmingham, for respondent.
   LYONS, Justice.

In case no. 1090762, Gilnita Jones, Cynthia Pate Henderson, Elizabeth Katie Walter, and Tracy Eubanks petition this Court for a writ of mandamus directing the Jefferson Circuit Court to enter a summary judgment in their favor on the basis of State-agent immunity in a wrongful-death action brought against them by Angela S. Levert, as personal representative of the estate of M.S. In case no. 1090781, Ty-shelle Wilson petitions this Court for a writ of mandamus directing the Jefferson Circuit Court to enter a summary judgment in her favor on the basis of State-agent immunity in the same wrongful-death action. We grant the petition as to Jones, Henderson, and Walter; we deny the petition as to Eubanks (case no. 1090762). We deny the petition as to Wilson (case no. 1090781).

I. Facts and Procedural History

At the time of the events underlying this wrongful-death action, Wilson was a social worker with the Jefferson County Department of Human Resources (“DHR”). Among Wilson’s duties at that time was to act periodically as an on-call DHR worker charged with responding to telephone calls made to DHR after normal business hours. On October 5, 2007, Wilson was the scheduled on-call worker responsible for investigating a call received by DHR alleging child abuse or neglect against a minor child, M.S., who was at that time approximately 23 months old. Levert, the child’s grandmother, telephoned DHR at approximately 9:30 p.m. Jones, another DHR worker, was assigned to “shadow” Wilson while Wilson investigated Levert’s allegations. According to DHR, a shadow assignment is a training exercise for a worker before that worker assumes responsibility as an on-call worker. Jones testified that as a shadow worker she had no input into investigating a call. Before going to M.S.’s home, Jones spoke with Levert on the telephone. Wilson and Jones stated that Jones returned Levert’s initial telephone call because Wilson was busy with another call involving a teenager received on the same evening. Levert described bruising on M.S.’s face and reported that a day-care worker who saw M.S. regularly reported to her that he had been walking with a limp. Levert reported to Jones that M.S.’s mother, L.S. (“the mother”), told her that she intended to take M.S. to the doctor, but Levert said that she did not believe that he had been taken to the doctor.

Wilson spoke with the on-call supervisor for the evening, Deborah Key, who advised her to go to the house and confirm that M.S. had been taken to the doctor. Wilson and Jones then went to the house, where they found M.S. in the care of the mother’s boyfriend, Nakia McConico. M.S. was asleep on the couch; there were bruises on his forehead and around his eye. Wilson and Jones then traveled to the mother’s place of employment to verify that M.S. had been seen by a doctor. The mother told Wilson and Jones that M.S. had fallen off his bicycle, that he had been taken to the hospital where he had seen a doctor on October 4 (the preceding day), and that the paperwork generated by the hospital visit was at the house. Wilson and the mother then returned to the mother’s house, where the medical paperwork was located and given to Wilson. Jones did not accompany Wilson on her second visit to M.S.’s house. Wilson took the paperwork and returned to her office. Wilson telephoned Key, the on-call supervisor for the evening, and reported to her the information she had gathered, including the fact that the hospital physician who saw M.S. indicated that his injuries were consistent with a fall from a bicycle. Wilson advised Key that the investigation had been completed, that she was preparing a written report of the investigation, and that she would place the report, together with the hospital-discharge paperwork and the doctor’s report, in the DHR intake supervisor’s mailbox. Eubanks was the intake supervisor at that time. Wilson says that she prepared written reports of both the investigation of M.S.’s case and the investigation of the call involving the teenager, and that she placed both reports in Eubanks’s box during the early morning hours of October 6 before the DHR office opened at 7:30 a.m. DHR intake logs and building logs show Wilson’s arrival and departure from the building. However, Eubanks testified that she never saw Wilson’s report on M.S.

Wilson thereafter had no further involvement in M.S.’s case. She did not hear anything further about M.S. until she was informed on October 21, 2007, that he had died on that date. It is undisputed that Wilson’s report should have triggered assignment of the call to an intake worker to obtain more detailed facts surrounding Levert’s call to DHR and, thereafter, assignment of the case to a child-abuse-and-neglect (“CA/N”) worker to investigate more fully Levert’s allegations of the alleged abuse. It is also undisputed that no intake worker or CA/N worker was assigned to M.S.’s case immediately after Wilson’s initial contact with the family as the on-call worker. After M.S.’s death, Eubanks assigned Henderson, an intake worker in Jefferson County, to undertake the intake process concerning M.S.’s case and assigned Walter, a CA/N worker in Jefferson County, to undertake the CA/N investigation.

On May 30, 2008, Levert sued Wilson, Jones, Henderson, Walter, Eubanks, and numerous other DHR workers. Levert sued each DHR worker in her individual capacity, alleging that she had negligently failed to perform her mandatory duties in accordance with DHR’s rules and regulations, as well as the laws of the State. The complaint also alleged that each DHR worker had acted willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, in bad faith, beyond her authority, or under a mistaken interpretation of the law, proximately causing M.S.’s death. Expert testimony indicates that M.S. died from injuries inflicted during the evening of October 20-21 and not from any injuries relating to the October 4 incident investigated by Wilson and Jones. McConico has been arrested and charged with capital murder in connection with M.S.’s death.

Levert contended in the trial court that Wilson and Jones neither completed an investigatory report nor turned it in to Eubanks, who has stated that she “did not see [the report].” Levert also contended that Eubanks failed to make a timely assignment of an intake worker and a CA/N worker to M.S.’s case and that Henderson and Walter, who were assigned to the case after M.S.’s death, failed to complete timely investigations. Levert further contends that any investigation DHR conducted would have, or should have, uncovered the facts that McConico, who was reported to be a drug user and drug dealer who had also been previously charged with child abuse, was alone with M.S. for 12 or more hours a day and that both the mother and McConico were addicted to cocaine, heroin, marijuana, ecstacy, and other drugs.

Wilson, Jones, Henderson, Walter, and Eubanks all filed motions for a summary judgment arguing that they were immune from liability on the basis of State-agent immunity. Levert contended that, by their willful deviations from DHR policy, Wilson, Jones, Henderson, Walter, and Eubanks waived any State-agent immunity they may have otherwise had. On January 26, 2010, the trial court denied their motions for a summary judgment, and they petitioned for writs of mandamus.

II. Standard of Review

“This Court has stated:
“ ‘ “While the general rule is that the denial of a motion for summary judgment is not reviewable, the exception is that the denial of a motion grounded on a claim of immunity is reviewable by petition for writ of mandamus. Ex parte Purvis, 689 So.2d 794 (Ala.1996)....
“ ‘ “Summary judgment is appropriate only when ‘there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.’ Rule 56(c)(3), Ala. R. Civ. P., Young v. La Quinta Inns, Inc., 682 So.2d 402 (Ala.1996). A court considering a motion for summary judgment will view the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, Hurst v. Alabama Power Co., 675 So.2d 397 (Ala. 1996), Fuqua v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 591 So.2d 486 (Ala.1991); will accord the nonmoving party all reasonable favorable inferences from the evidence, Fuqua, supra, Aldridge v. Valley Steel Constr., Inc., 603 So.2d 981 (Ala.1992); and will resolve all reasonable doubts against the moving party, Hurst, supra, Ex parte Brislin, 719 So.2d 185 (Ala.1998).
“ ‘ “An appellate court reviewing a ruling on a motion for summary judgment will, de novo, apply these same standards applicable in the trial court. Fuqua, supra, Brislin, supra. Likewise, the appellate court will consider only that factual material available of record to the trial court for its consideration in deciding the motion. Dynasty Corp. v. Alpha Resins Corp., 577 So.2d 1278 (Ala.1991), Boland v. Fort Rucker Nat’l Bank, 599 So.2d 595 (Ala.1992), Rowe v. Isbell, 599 So.2d 35 (Ala.1992).” ’
“Ex parte Turner, 840 So.2d 132, 135 (Ala.2002) (quoting Ex parte Rizk, 791 So.2d 911, 912-13 (Ala.2000)). A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy available only when the petitioner can demonstrate: ‘ “(1) a clear legal right to the order sought; (2) an imperative duty upon the respondent to perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so; (3) the lack of another adequate remedy; and (4) the properly invoked jurisdiction of the court.” ’ Ex parte Nall, 879 So.2d 541, 543 (Ala.2003) (quoting Ex parte BOC Group, Inc., 823 So.2d 1270, 1272 (Ala.2001)).”

Ex parte Yancey, 8 So.3d 299, 303-04 (Ala.2008).

III. Analysis

“In Ex parte Cranman, 792 So.2d 392 (Ala.2000), a plurality of this Court restated the test for determining when a State employee is entitled to State-agent immunity:
“ ‘A State agent shall be immune from civil liability in his or her personal capacity when the conduct made the basis of the claim against the agent is based upon the agent’s
“ ‘(1) formulating plans, policies, or designs; or
“ ‘(2) exercising his or her judgment in the administration of a department or agency of government, including, but not limited to, examples such as:
“ ‘(a) making administrative adjudications;
“ ‘(b) allocating resources;
“ ‘(c) negotiating contracts;
“ ‘(d) hiring, firing, transferring, assigning, or supervising personnel; or
“ ‘(3) discharging duties imposed on a department or agency by statute, rule, or regulation, insofar as the statute, rule, or regulation prescribes the manner for performing the duties and the State agent performs the duties in that manner; or
“ ‘(4) exercising judgment in the enforcement of the criminal laws of the State, including, but not limited to, law-enforcement officers’ arresting or attempting to arrest persons; or “‘(5) exercising judgment in the discharge of duties imposed by statute, rule, or regulation in releasing prisoners, counseling or releasing persons of unsound mind, or educating students.
“ ‘Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the foregoing statement of the rule, a State agent shall not be immune from civil liability in his or her personal capacity
“ ‘(1) when the Constitution or laws of the United States, or the Constitution of this State, or laws, rules, or regulations of this State enacted or promulgated for the purpose of regulating the activities of a governmental agency require otherwise; or
“ ‘(2) when the State agent acts willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, in bad faith, beyond his or her authority, or under a mistaken interpretation of the law.’
792 So.2d at 405. Although Cranman was a plurality decision, the restatement of law as it pertains to State-agent immunity set forth in Cranman was subsequently adopted by this Court in Ex parte Rizk, 791 So.2d 911 (Ala.2000), and Ex parte Butts, 775 So.2d 173 (Ala.2000).
“Additionally, this Court has stated:
“ ‘This Court has established a “burden-shifting” process when a party raises the defense of State-agent immunity. Giambrone v. Douglas, 874 So.2d 1046, 1052 (Ala.2003). In order to claim State-agent immunity, a State agent bears the burden of demonstrating that the plaintiffs claims arise from a function that would entitle the State agent to immunity. Giambrone, 874 So.2d at 1052; Ex parte Wood, 852 So.2d 705, 709 (Ala.2002). If the State agent makes such a showing, the burden then shifts to the plaintiff to show that the State agent acted willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, in bad faith, or beyond his or her authority. Giambrone, 874 So.2d at 1052; Wood, 852 So.2d at 709; Ex parte Davis, 721 So.2d 685, 689 (Ala.1998). “A State agent acts beyond authority and is therefore not immune when he or she ‘fail[s] to discharge duties pursuant to detailed rules or regulations, such as those stated on a checklist.’ ” Giambrone, 874 So.2d at 1052 (quoting Ex parte Butts, 775 So.2d 173, 178 (Ala.2000)).’
“Ex parte Estate of Reynolds, 946 So.2d 450, 452 (Ala.2006).”

Ex parte Yancey, 8 So.3d at 304-05.

A. Case No. 1090762

1. Gilnita Jones

Jones argues that as a “shadow worker” she was assigned to assist Wilson on the calls Wilson received during her on-call assignment and to observe the on-call process but that she had no other responsibilities. Levert argues that as an employee of DHR Jones was considered a child-welfare staff worker just as Wilson was and that she had the same duty as did Wilson to turn in her on-call reports before 7:30 a.m. on the next business day. The trial court found that Levert presented substantial evidence that Jones had responsibilities beyond merely observing Wilson and that she also had a duty to turn in an on-call report. Because the trial court found that a factual dispute existed involving whether Jones had any involvement with the report and whether the report was properly submitted, it concluded that Jones was not entitled to a summary judgment on the basis of State-agent immunity. We disagree.

Jones and various DHR supervisory personnel all testified that a “shadow worker” was assigned to observe another worker performing a certain task as a type of training exercise and that a shadow worker did not have the same responsibilities as did the worker who was being observed. The only testimony Levert produced to indicate that Jones had a duty to turn in the same report as did Wilson was Wilson’s statement that she thought Jones would have had the same duties she did and the statement by Levert’s expert witness, a former DHR employee, that any child-welfare staff worker had a duty to follow all DHR policy, including the policy that all on-call reports were to be turned in before the beginning of the next business day. This testimony ignores the fact that Jones shadowed Wilson only as far as Wilson’s interview with the mother at her workplace. Both Jones and Wilson testified that at that point Wilson told Jones she could go home and that Jones neither accompanied Wilson and the mother back to the mother’s house to retrieve the hospital records nor accompanied Wilson back to the DHR office to prepare and to turn in the on-call report. Wilson undertook the preparation of the on-call report by herself; Jones did not assist in its preparation or undertake to turn the report in to Eubanks. Jones clearly had no involvement in the point of dispute in this case— whether a report of the on-call investigation of M.S. was turned in to the supervisor who would have been responsible for assigning other workers to further investigate the incident upon receipt of the report. By that time, Wilson had terminated Jones’s association with the investigation.

Jones demonstrated that Levert’s claims arise from a function that would entitle her to State-agent immunity, i.e., “(3) discharging duties imposed on a department or agency by statute, rule, or regulation, insofar as the statute, rule, or regulation prescribes the manner for performing the duties and the State agent performs the duties in that manner....” Ex parte Cranman, 792 So.2d 392, 405 (Ala.2000). Levert failed to prove that Jones acted willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, in bad faith, or beyond her authority so as not to be entitled to State-agent immunity. We conclude that no genuine issue of material fact exists as to Jones’s entitlement to State-agent immunity; therefore, her petition for a writ of mandamus is due to be granted.

2. Cynthia Pate Henderson and Elizabeth Katie Walter

Both Henderson and Walter testified that they were not aware of the anything relating to M.S.’s case until they were assigned to investigate it as the intake worker and the CA/N worker, respectively, following M.S.’s death. They both argue that they were complete strangers to the events made the basis of Levert’s complaint and that their involvement with the case after M.S.’s death cannot be a basis for any liability arising from any failure to properly investigate the case after Levert’s initial call to DHR. Levert argues that because Henderson and Walter were employees of DHR, each of them was considered a child-welfare staff worker who had the duty to respond to reports of suspected child abuse in accordance with DHR policy. The trial court found that Levert presented substantial evidence that if Wilson’s report had been properly submitted, then Henderson and Walter should have known about M.S. before his death and that each of them had a duty to act on M.S.’s case pursuant to the deadlines established by DHR policy. Because the trial court found that whether Henderson and Walter received Wilson’s report and whether each knew about M.S. before his death were questions of fact to be decided by a jury, it concluded that Henderson and Walter were not entitled to State-agent immunity. We disagree.

Eubanks contends that because she never saw Wilson’s report she cannot be held responsible for failing to assign an intake worker and a CA/N worker to investigate Levert’s allegations of abuse before M.S.’s death. Consequently, it is undisputed that she made no such assignment before M.S.’s death. Henderson testified that Eubanks assigned her to complete the intake process on M.S. after he had died and that she had never heard of M.S. before that time. Henderson further testified that Eubanks gave her notes that she was told had been written by Wilson and that Eubanks instructed her to enter those notes into her intake report. Henderson said she did as instructed, although she had not seen the notes before M.S.’s death and she never saw the report Wilson said she turned in to Eubanks.

Walter testified that Eubanks assigned her to complete the CA/N investigation on M.S. after he had died and that she had never heard of M.S. before that time. Walter also testified that Eubanks gave her notes that she was told had been written by Wilson and that Eubanks instructed her to enter those notes into her CA/N investigation report. Like Henderson, Walter said she did as she had been instructed, although she had not seen the notes before M.S.’s death and she never saw the report Wilson said she turned in to Eubanks.

The only testimony Levert produced to indicate that Henderson or Walter had a duty to M.S. before his death was the statements by Levert’s expert witness that any child-welfare staff worker had a duty to follow all DHR policy, including the policy that intake and CA/N reports were to be completed within a specified period. This testimony assumed that Wilson’s report had been properly turned in and acted upon and ignores the factual dispute that surrounds that report; it also assumes that assignments to Henderson and Walter preceded M.S.’s death, contrary to the undisputed evidence. Both Henderson and Walter testified that they had no knowledge about M.S. or the report of alleged abuse until after M.S.’s death, when they were assigned to be workers on his case. Clearly, Henderson and Walter were both complete strangers to any investigation of M.S. before his death.

Both Henderson and Walter demonstrated that Levert’s claims arise from a function that would entitle each of them to State-agent immunity, i.e., “(3) discharging duties imposed on a department or agency by statute, rule, or regulation, insofar as the statute, rule, or regulation prescribes the manner for performing the duties and the State agent performs the duties in that manner.... ” Cranman, 792 So.2d at 405. Levert failed to prove that either Henderson or Walter acted willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, in bad faith, or beyond her authority so as not to be entitled to State-agent immunity. We conclude that no genuine issue of material fact exists as to Henderson’s or Walter’s entitlement to State-agent immunity; therefore, their petitions for a writ of mandamus are due to be granted.

3. Tracy Eubanks

As previously noted, Eubanks insists that she never saw Wilson’s on-call report; therefore, she argues, she cannot be held responsible for failing to assign an intake worker and a CA/N worker before M.S.’s death to investigate Levert’s allegations of abuse. Eubanks does not contend that Wilson did not turn in the report, only that she never saw it. Levert argues that Eubanks mishandled the assignments she was obligated to make upon receipt of the report and also argues that, as a supervisory employee of DHR, Eubanks was also considered to be a child-welfare staff worker who had the responsibility to assure that investigatory reports were completed within the periods specified by DHR policy. The trial court found that Levert presented substantial evidence that Eubanks had the supervisory responsibility of assigning workers to M.S.’s case upon the proper receipt of an on-call report and also that Eubanks had the same duties as any other child-welfare staff worker to follow DHR policy. As with Henderson and Walter, Eubanks’s duty to follow DHR policy assumed that Wilson properly turned in her report and that Eubanks received it. Because the trial court found a factual dispute involving whether the report was properly submitted and/or received, it concluded that Eubanks was not entitled to a summary judgment based on State-agent immunity. We agree.

Wilson adamantly insists that she turned in her on-call report concerning her initial investigation of Levert’s report of alleged abuse of M.S.; Eubanks just as adamantly insists that she never saw the report. This discrepancy clearly presents a genuine issue of material fact. Wilson testified that she placed her report on the teenager whose case she investigated and her report on the investigation of M.S. in Eubanks’s inbox before she left the DHR office shortly before 2:00 a.m. on October 5. She stated that she clipped the two reports together before she placed them into the box. Wilson said she knew that the teenager’s case had been properly further investigated based upon her initial report and that she did not understand why Eubanks had not received her report on M.S. as well. If the jury believes Wilson and disbelieves Eubanks, the jury could conclude that Wilson did turn in the report and that Eubanks misplaced or mishandled it after Wilson turned it in. Fui’thermore, both Henderson and Walter testified that Eubanks instructed them to enter notes from Wilson into the reports they were completing after M.S.’s death. From that testimony, the jury could conclude that Eubanks had not only Wilson’s notes before M.S.’s death, but also Wilson’s report. Such factual disputes cannot be resolved at the summary-judgment stage of the proceedings.

Eubanks demonstrated that Levert’s claims arise from a function that would entitle her to State-agent immunity, i.e.,

“(2) exercising ... her judgment in the administration of a department or agency of government, including ... examples such as:
“(d) ..., assigning, or supervising personnel; or
“(3) discharging duties imposed on a department or agency by statute, rule, or regulation, insofar as the statute, rule, or regulation prescribes the manner for performing the duties and the State agent performs the duties in that manner....”

Cranman, 792 So.2d at 405. Levert, however, produced testimony that, if believed, would prove that Eubanks acted willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, in bad faith, or beyond her authority in failing to properly act on Wilson’s report, thus satisfying her burden of proof under Giambrone v. Douglas, 874 So.2d 1046, 1052 (Ala.2003). We conclude that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Eubanks is entitled to State-agent immunity; therefore, her petition for a writ of mandamus is due to be denied.

B. Case No. 1090781 — Tyshelle Wilson

Wilson maintains that she placed her report of her on-call investigation of Levert’s allegations concerning M.S. in Eubanks’s box in her office where such reports were to be placed; therefore, she argues, she cannot be held responsible for the failure of other DHR workers to investigate Levert’s report of the alleged abuse of her grandson before M.S.’s death. Wilson consistently testified that she prepared and turned in the report during the early morning hours after she had visited the mother’s house and had obtained the copies of the records relating to M.S.’s hospital visit and that her responsibility ended there. She stated that if Eubanks did not see the report, she does not know what happened to it. Levert argues that Wilson had a duty to turn in her on-call report before 7:30 a.m. on the business day next following the completion of the report. Because the trial court found a factual dispute involving whether the report had been properly submitted, it concluded that Wilson was not entitled to State-agent immunity. We agree.

As previously discussed, Wilson adamantly testified that she turned in her on-call report concerning her initial investigation of Levert’s report of alleged abuse of M.S.; Eubanks just as adamantly testified that she never saw the report. This discrepancy clearly presents a genuine issue of material fact. If the jury believes Wilson’s testimony that she turned in the report on M.S. with her report on the teenager whose case she also handled while on call on the night of October 5, 2007, and disbelieves Eubanks, the jury could conclude that Wilson turned in the report and that Eubanks was responsible for the failure to further investigate that followed. Likewise, as previously noted, testimony from Henderson and Walter indicating that Eubanks instructed them to enter Wilson’s notes into their reports after M.S.’s death supports an inference that Wilson had turned in the report and that Eubanks misplaced or mishandled it. However, if the jury believes Eubanks’s testimony that she never saw Wilson’s report and, thus, 'never had any reason to know that further investigation into Le-vert’s allegations was necessary, the jury could conclude that Wilson’s failure to turn in her report or her mishandling of the report in the process of turning it in resulted in the failure to further investigate Levert’s allegations of abuse. We reiterate that such factual disputes cannot be resolved at the summary-judgment stage of the proceedings.

Wilson demonstrated that Levert’s claims arise from a function that would entitle her to State-agent immunity, i.e., “(3) discharging duties imposed on a department or agency by statute, rule, or regulation, insofar as the statute, rule, or regulation prescribes the manner for performing the duties and the State agent performs the duties in that manner....” Cranman, 792 So.2d at 405. Levert, however, produced testimony that, if believed, would prove that Wilson acted willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, in bad faith, or beyond her authority in failing to properly turn in her report, thus satisfying her burden of proof under Giambrone, 874 So.2d at 1052. We conclude that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to Wilson’s entitlement to State-agent immunity; therefore, her petition for a writ of mandamus is due to be denied.

IV. Conclusion

In case no. 1090762, we conclude that Jones, Henderson, and Walter are entitled to State-agent immunity, and we grant the petition as to them; we deny the petition as to Eubanks’s claim that she is entitled to State-agent immunity. In case no. 1090781, we deny the petition as to Wilson’s claim that she is entitled to State-agent immunity.

1090762 — PETITION GRANTED AS TO JONES, HENDERSON, AND WALTER AND DENIED AS TO EUBANKS; WRIT ISSUED.

1090781 — PETITION DENIED.

COBB, C.J., and STUART, BOLIN, and MURDOCK, JJ., concur.

      . The other DHR workers Levert sued were Janice King, Toni Dollar, Angela Lacy McClintock, Catherine Denard, Terry Beasley, Renecia Swoopes, and Deborah Key. The trial court entered summary judgments in their favor; Levert has not appealed from those judgments.