source: Caselaw Access Project

author: PER CURIAM.

license: Public Domain

text:
    Antonio JOHNSON, Petitioner, v. Katherine Fernandez RUNDLE, etc., Respondent. Antonio Johnson, Petitioner, v. Edwin G. Buss, etc., Respondent.
    Nos. SC10-35, SC10-207.
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    Jan. 6, 2011.
    Rehearing Denied April 20, 2011.
    Antonio Johnson, Lake City, FL, for Petitioner.
    Honorable Katherine Fernandez Run-dle, State Attorney, Eleventh Judicial Circuit, Miami, FL, and Honorable Edwin G. Buss, The Department of Corrections, Tallahassee, FL, for Respondents.
   PER CURIAM.

Antonio Johnson, an inmate in state custody, filed two pro se petitions seeking extraordinary relief from the Court, both challenging the lawfulness of Johnson’s 1998 conviction for armed robbery and resulting life sentence entered by the Circuit Court of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit, in and for Miami-Dade County, Florida, in Case No. F97-32329. The cases were consolidated and the petitions denied on April 22, 2010. Johnson v. Rundle, 36 So.3d 84 (Fla.2010) (table). The Court retained jurisdiction for purposes of sanctioning based upon Johnson’s repeated filing of frivolous actions attacking his judgment in case number F97-32329. Accordingly, the Court directed Johnson to show cause why he should not be barred from filing further pleadings or other papers pertaining to his 1998 judgment, unless such filings are signed by a member of The Florida Bar in good standing. We now sanction Johnson.

For several years, Johnson has unsuccessfully sought relief from this Court. Undaunted, Johnson filed a petition for writ of quo warranto (Case No. SC10-35) on January 1, 2010, and a petition for writ of habeas corpus (Case No. SC10-207) on February 2, 2010. Specifically, since 2004, Johnson has initiated a total of sixteen proceedings in this Court seeking extraordinary relief pertaining to his conviction and sentence entered by the Eleventh Circuit in Case No. F97-32329. See Johnson v. Rundle, No. SC09-2150 (Fla. Feb. 10, 2010) (petition for quo warranto transferred to circuit court) (unpublished); Johnson v. McNeil, 17 So.3d 292 (Fla.2009) (habeas corpus petition dismissed) (table); Johnson v. State, 13 So.3d 1056 (Fla.2009) (mandamus petition dismissed) (table); Johnson v. McNeil, No. SC09-53 (Fla. Mar. 12, 2009) (petition for writ of quo warranto transferred to circuit court) (unpublished); Johnson v. State, No. SC08-1156 (Fla. July 24, 2008) (petition for writ of habeas corpus transferred to circuit court for consideration as rule 3.850 or 3.800(a) motion) (unpublished); Johnson v. State, 985 So.2d 1091 (Fla.2008) (all writs petition dismissed) (table); Johnson v. McDonough, No. SC07-2228 (Fla. Jan. 23, 2008) (petition for writ of mandamus transferred) (unpublished); Johnson v. Florida Dept. of Corrections, No. SC07-2269 (Fla. Dec. 26, 2007) (transfer of petition for writ of mandamus for consideration in pending case) (unpublished); Johnson v. McDonough, 969 So.2d 1013 (Fla.2007) (habeas corpus petition dismissed) (table); Johnson v. McDonough, 966 So.2d 967 (Fla.2007) (mandamus petition dismissed) (table); Johnson v. State, 962 So.2d 337 (Fla.2007) (petition for writ of quo warranto denied) (table); Johnson v. Bateman, No. SC07-1018 (Fla. Jun. 26, 2007) (petition for writ of quo warranto treated as notice of appeal and transferred to the First District Court of Appeal) (unpublished); Johnson v. State, 939 So.2d 1059 (Fla.2006) (all writs petition denied) (table); Johnson v. State, 881 So.2d 1112 (Fla.2004) (petition for writ of habeas corpus dismissed) (table).

This Court has the “inherent judicial authority to sanction an abusive litigant.” Sibley v. Fla. Judicial Qualifications Comm’n, 973 So.2d 425 (Fla.2006). In response to the Court’s order, rather than show cause why he should not be sanctioned for his abusive filings, Johnson continues to assert that his filings were not abusive, were meritorious, and that this Court is the proper forum for him to continually seek redress of the many injustices he claims have been thrust upon him. Johnson also asks that the Court review his “meritorious pleadings” appended to the response, and that the petition for writ of habeas corpus in Case No. SC10-207 be reconsidered by the Court as one seeking mandamus. Thus, Johnson’s response to the show cause order highlights the necessity of the sanction we now impose.

Johnson also claims that this Court has never considered the difficulties a barring order might impose on a pro se litigant. To the contrary, this Court has long maintained that such orders “should not be construed as a diminution of our support for the principle of free access to the courts.” Attwood v. Singletary, 661 So.2d 1216, 1217 (Fla.1995). Sanctioning abusive litigants by prohibiting pro se pleadings and requiring all prospective filings with the Court be signed by a member of The Florida Bar in good standing furthers the right of access. The sanction does so by providing the Court the opportunity to devote “finite resources to the consideration of legitimate claims of persons who have not abused the process.” Id.; see also Pettway v. McNeil, 987 So.2d 20, 22 (Fla.2008) (“One justification for such a sanction lies in the protection of the rights of others to have the Court conduct timely reviews of their legitimate filings”).

As we have concluded in similar cases, under the facts of this case, “[t]here is a strong inference that unless he is stopped, [Johnson] will continue filing nonmeritorious requests for relief in this Court,” Pettway, 987 So.2d at 22, regarding his conviction and sentence in State v. Johnson, Case No. F97-32329. See Lanier v. State, 982 So.2d 626, 627-28 (Fla.2008); Tate v. McNeil, 983 So.2d 502, 504 (Fla.2008); Jackson v. Florida Dept. of Corrections, 790 So.2d 398, 401-2 (Fla.2001). Accordingly, we hereby direct the Clerk of this Court to accept no further pleadings or other requests for relief relating to case number 97-32329 from Johnson for filing unless submitted and signed by a lawyer in good standing as a member of The Florida Bar.

Furthermore, since we have in this opinion found that Johnson has repeatedly initiated frivolous proceedings, we direct the Clerk of this Court, pursuant to section 944.279(1); Florida Statutes (2010), to forward a certified copy of this opinion to the Department of Corrections institution where Johnson is incarcerated.

It is so ordered.

CANADY, C.J., and-PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, POLSTON, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur.

      . We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(8), Fla. Const.; art. V, § 3(b)(9), Fla. Const.


author: CANADY, C.J., LEWIS, J.,

text:
    Ronald MOREL, Petitioner(s) v. George H. SHELDON, etc., Respondent(s). Stephen Morel, Petitioner(s) v. Michael Joseph Satz, State Attorney, etc., Respondent(s).
    Nos. SC10-2293, SC11-105.
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    Jan. 21, 2011.
   This Court has before it the Second District Court of Appeal’s Certification of Order Requiring Immediate Resolution by this Court in Case No. 2D09-2096, In re Commitment of Morel, — So.3d -, 2010 WL 4861507 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010), regarding allegations that Ronald Morel has been in pretrial detention for eight years as a result of unresolved Jimmy Ryce Act civil commitment proceedings. Morel’s appeal to the Second District resulted from the denial of habeas corpus relief challenging the legality of his custody wherein he alleged that he has been unable to receive treatment, which would enable him to seek release. Morel also filed separate petitions in this Court challenging recent actions taken in his civil commitment proceeding in Broward County, Florida. We consolidate our review of the Second District’s certification and Morel’s separately filed petitions in this Court for the purpose of this order of relinquishment.

The Second District’s decision points out that it lacks territorial jurisdiction over all aspects of the legality of Morel’s pretrial detention, which in part stems from (1) alleged action or inaction in Broward County within the Fourth District and (2) alleged action or inaction regarding Morel’s treatment in a facility in DeSoto County, Florida, .within the Second District. Moreover, in regard to the Second District case, the Department of Children and Families (DCF) took the position that “it has no statutory or constitutional duty to provide treatment to a detainee whose status is ‘awaiting the commitment trial.’” Morel, — So.3d at -. The Second District stated the following in certifying the case to this Court:

This case is an extreme example, but from our anecdotal experience, it is not unique. The statute contemplates that detainees will receive a speedy trial and then will receive annual reviews. § 394.918, Fla. Stat. (1999-2010). Once the right to the thirty-day trial' is waived, however, these proceedings often seem to take many years. The fact that the detainee is being held sometimes hundreds of miles from the trial forum does not facilitate timely resolution of these cases. If the Department is not providing treatment during this delay, a pretrial detainee may not actually hold the keys to the cell in which he is civilly detained.
If we were convinced that both this court and the circuit court had the power to provide a remedy under habeas corpus, we would order the circuit court to issue the writ of habeas corpus returnable before itself to require the Department to show cause why Mr. Morel should not be released. However, without a hearing involving the circuit court in Broward County, we do not envision how this matter could be fairly resolved for all parties.
The supreme court is the only court that clearly has territorial jurisdiction over all aspects of this case.

Id. at -. After the issuance of the Second District’s decision, the circuit court in Broward County apparently set the civil commitment case for trial but later granted a continuance and advised counsel for Morel to set a status conference for a date in February 2011. Morel filed an emergency petition in this Court requesting a stay of those proceedings so that the issues raised by the Second District’s decision could first be resolved.

We have determined that these matters (i.e., the failure to receive treatment as a pretrial detainee and the failure to have held a civil commitment hearing for eight years) are interrelatecl and present serious questions as to the functioning of our system for civil commitments and the legality of Morel’s continued detention.

In order to obtain a complete answer, it is necessary for DCF, the Attorney General’s Office, the Office of the State Attorney for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, and the lawyers representing Morel, together with Ronald Morel himself, to participate in a hearing to be held before one fact-finder. We conclude that the most appropriate foruni to hear these interrelated matters would be the Circuit Court of the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County, Florida, which is assigned to Morel’s civil commitment proceeding. Accordingly, we enter the following order:

1. The civil commitment trial before Judge Eileen M. O’Connor as Case No. CACE-02-007799 is temporarily stayed pending resolution of the fact-finding to be conducted on the issues relating to Morel’s pretrial detention.

2. The Court relinquishes jurisdiction of this matter to the Circuit Court of the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County, Florida, for a period not to exceed sixty days and orders that DCF, the Attorney General, the State Attorney for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, the lawyers representing Morel, and Ronald Morel appear before the circuit court in Broward County at a time to be determined for a hearing to resolve all of the facts surrounding the eight-year delay in the civil commitment proceedings and the failure of Morel to receive treatment, including, but not limited to:

a. Whether Morel’s allegations in his petition regarding the inability to receive treatment because of his pretrial detainee status are accurate and to obtain details regarding the issues surrounding treatment (or lack thereof) for pretrial detainees awaiting civil commitment trials;

b. Whether Morel’s allegations in his petition regarding the waiting list to obtain treatment, even if eligible for treatment, are accurate and, if not, explain;

c. Whether Morel’s commitment is illegal or unlawful because of the inordinate amount of time (eight years) since his release from his prison sentence; and

- d. The reason why the trial in this case has not taken place for eight years and whether Morel has had counsel throughout that time, and if not, the reasons for lack of counsel.

The court shall enter a written order as to these issues. Upon issuance of the trial court’s order, the trial court clerk shall immediately transmit a copy of the order to this Court.

The relinquishment period is for no longer than sixty days. At the end of the relinquishment period, jurisdiction will be returned to this Court. Any extension of time shall be based only upon a timely motion filed in this Court demonstrating good cause and representing the positions of the opposing party and the trial court.

The court reporters shall have ten days after completion of the above proceedings in which to file any transcripts with the trial court clerk, and the trial court clerk shall have ten days after receipt of the transcripts in which to file a record of the entire relinquishment proceeding with this Court. Under this Court’s Administrative Order In Re: Mandatory Submission of Electronic Copies of Documents, AOSC04-84, dated September 18, 2004, the court reporters are directed to transmit a copy of any transcripts, in addition to paper copies, in an electronic format as required by the provisions of that order. The electronic version for this Court shall be submitted to the following e-mail address: e-file@flcourts.org.

It is so ordered.

PARIENTE, QUINCE, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur.

CANADY, C.J., dissents with an opinion.

LEWIS, J., dissents with an opinion, in which POLSTON, J., concurs.

CANADY, C.J.,

dissenting.

I dissent. I would deny review of Morel’s appeal from the denial of his habeas corpus petition challenging the conditions of his confinement. In his habeas petition, Morel alleged that the Department of Children and Families (DCF) refuses to provide sex-offender treatment to individuals who are detained pursuant to the Jimmy Ryce Act but not committed. Morel asserted that due to DCF’s policy of not treating pretrial detainees, he has been unable to receive treatment, which may have enabled him to seek release. Morel also raised several challenges to the adequacy of the treatment program offered by DCF to individuals committed pursuant to the Jimmy Ryce Act. There is no impediment to the full adjudication of these claims in the Second District.

I likewise dissent from the majority’s decision to consider Morel’s pro se petition for prohibition regarding his civil commitment proceeding in the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit. Morel is represented by counsel in that proceeding. Accordingly, his pro se filing is unauthorized. See Johnson v. State, 974 So.2d 363, 364-65 (Fla.2008).

LEWIS, J.,

dissenting.

I dissent. I agree with a relinquishment and temporary stay of the civil commitment proceedings until the court and parties are prepared to proceed to a full hearing to determine the pending issues. I dissent because I would, allow the circuit court trial judge to whom this case is assigned to decide and resolve all factual issues that are pending and ready to be adjudicated without limitation.

POLSTON, J., concurs.


author: LABARGA, J. CANADY, C.J.,

text:
    Andrew KRAUSE, et al., Petitioners, v. TEXTRON FINANCIAL CORPORATION, Respondent.
    No. SC09-881.
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    Feb. 3, 2011.

      William A. Donovan, Naples, FL, for Petitioners.
    Paul A. Avron and Jordi Guso of Berger Singerman, P.A., Miami, FL, for Respondent.
   LABARGA, J.

In the case before us, Andrew Krause and David Bautsch (“Petitioners”) seek review of the decision of the Second District Court of Appeal in Krause v. Textron Financial Corp., 10 So.3d 208 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009), on the ground that it expressly and directly conflicts with the decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal in Scarfo v. Ginsberg, 817 So.2d 919 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.

The issue presented for our determination is whether the federal supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) (2006), tolls a state statute of limitations after a state law claim is dismissed on the basis that the bankruptcy court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. As we explain below, we conclude that the applicable state statute of limitations in this case was tolled pursuant to section 1367(d) of the federal supplemental jurisdiction statute. Based on our reasoning below, we quash the decision of the Second District in Krause to the extent that it is inconsistent with this opinion, and approve the Fourth District’s decision in Scarfo to the extent that it is consistent with our analysis and holding.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The Second District described the facts underlying its decision in Krause as follows:

Appellants purchased separate memberships in the Twin Eagles Golf and Country Club in 1997. The membership fee paid by each was $52,000. The terms of the Twin Eagles’ membership agreement provided that if a member resigned his or her membership, Twin Eagles would sell that membership to a third party and the resigning member would be entitled to ninety percent of the resale price.
In July 1998, Textron provided financing to Twin Eagles and its affiliates. As collateral for the loan, .Textron received a security interest in Twin Eagles’ assets, including the club’s.previously unsold new memberships. Pursuant to the financing agreement between Textron and Twin Eagles, only one out of every three memberships sold by Twin Eagles could be a resale of a resigned membership.
In the spring of 1999, Appellants resigned as members of Twin Eagles and returned their memberships for resale. By the terms of their membership agreements, Appellants were entitled to ninety percent of the proceeds generated by the resale of their memberships as a reimbursement from Twin Eagles. However, upon resale of Appellants’ memberships, Twin Eagles paid all of the proceeds to Textron in partial satisfaction of its loan obligation, thereby denying Appellants the payments to which they were entitled. Within months of these resales, Twin Eagles filed for relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Florida.
Appellants filed an adversary proceeding in the bankruptcy case, alleging that Twin Eagles had improperly paid all of the proceeds from the resale of their resigned memberships to Textron prior to its filing of the petition for relief in the bankruptcy court. In count one, Appellants sought declaratory relief against Twin Eagles, and in count two, they asked for the imposition of a constructive trust against any of the remaining proceeds realized from the resale of golf memberships or, in the alternative, “in Textron’s secured claim to the extent the membership sale proceeds [were] used by [Twin Eagles] or encumbered with [Twin Eagles’] permission by Textron’s secured claim.”
On August 15, 2000, the bankruptcy court entered an order confirming the Chapter 11 plan filed by Twin Eagles. The bankruptcy court also determined that Textron had a valid claim against Twin Eagles for an amount in excess of $17 million and that the claim had been fully satisfied by the proceeds of the sale of Twin Eagles’ assets pursuant to the bankruptcy plan. The order further concluded that Textron did not have any further claims against Twin Eagles or its affiliates.
In 2002, Textron moved for summary judgment as to count two of Appellants’ complaint. The bankruptcy court granted the motion, and Appellants attempted to appeal; however, since count one remained pending, the appeal was dismissed. Accordingly, on May 16, 2005, Appellants voluntarily dismissed with prejudice the remaining count of their complaint against Twin Eagles and pursued their appeal of the summary judgment of count two against Textron.

Krause, 10 So.3d at 209-10.

The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, in its appellate capacity, directed the bankruptcy court to vacate .its summary judgment entered in favor of Textron and dismiss the adversary proceeding as to Textron after determining that the bankruptcy court should have dismissed the constructive trust claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Less than one month later, Petitioners filed suit against Textron in the Circuit Court for the Twentieth Judicial Circuit in and- for Collier County, Florida, seeking declaratory relief and the imposition of a constructive trust on the funds that Tex-tron allegedly received from Twin Eagles. Petitioners’ amended complaint contained two counts. In count one, Petitioners sought the imposition of a constructive trust, and in count two, they sought a judgment against Textron on the theory of unjust enrichment. Textron moved to dismiss the amended complaint, arguing that claims were time barred by the limitations period set forth in section 95.11(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2005). Petitioners contended in the trial court that the statute of limitations was tolled by the federal tolling provision contained in section 1367(d) and that their claims were therefore timely. The trial court concluded, however, that the claims were filed outside of the state statute of limitations and that the federal tolling provision did not apply. The Second District affirmed the lower court’s decision on appeal, holding that section 1367(d) did not apply to toll Petitioners’ constructive trust claim in state court because the federal district court had previously determined that the bankruptcy court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the constructive trust claim. See Krause, 10 So.3d at 209-12.

Petitioners then sought review in this Court, alleging express and direct conflict with the Fourth District’s decision in Scarfo v. Ginsberg, 817 So.2d 919 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002). In Scarfo, the federal district court dismissed the plaintiffs federal claim for lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 920. Because of the disposition of the federal claim, the federal court dismissed the plaintiffs state law claims without prejudice to refiling them in state court. Id. When the plaintiff brought her claims in state court less than a month after the dismissal, the defendants moved for summary judgment, alleging that the claims were barred by the statute of limitations. Id. The trial court granted the motion, and the plaintiff appealed. Id. The defendants in Scarfo contended that because the plaintiffs federal claim was dismissed for lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction, the tolling provision in section 1367(d) was inapplicable. Id. On appeal, the Fourth District concluded in Scarfo that the dismissal of the plaintiffs federal claim for lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction did not bar the application of section 1367(d) to toll the plaintiffs state law claims. Thus, the district court reversed, holding that section 1367(d) applied to toll the state law claims during the pendency of the federal action. Id. at 921. For reasons explained below, we agree with the Fourth District’s decision in Scar-fo on this issue.

ANALYSIS

Petitioners contend that the federal tolling provision of section 1367(d) applies to toll the state statute of limitations in the instant case where the federal court determined that the bankruptcy court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over their state law claim against Textron. They allege that the decision of the Second District not to apply the federal tolling provision in the instant case expressly and directly conflicts with the decision of the Fourth District in Scarfo, which held that the federal tolling provision applied despite the lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction over a federal claim. Textron contends that Scarfo is distinguishable and that the tolling provision does not apply in the instant case. The conflict issue before this Court is whether the tolling provision of the federal statute on supplemental jurisdiction tolls the applicable state limitations period after the state law claim was dismissed for lack of the bankruptcy court’s subject matter jurisdiction.

Because this case presents an issue of statutory interpretation, our review is de novo. See Larimore v. State, 2 So.3d 101, 106 (Fla.2008). “It is well settled that legislative intent is the polestar that guides a court’s statutory construction analysis.” Knowles v. Beverly Enterprises-Fla., Inc., 898 So.2d 1, 5 (Fla.2004). To discern legislative intent, we first look to the statute’s plain language. See Borden v. E.-European Ins. Co., 921 So.2d 587, 595 (Fla.2006). “When the statute is clear and unambiguous, ‘there is no occasion for resorting to the rules of statutory interpretation and construction; the statute must be given its plain and obvious meaning.”’ Saleeby v. Rocky Elson Constr., Inc., 3 So.3d 1078, 1082 (Fla.2009) (quoting Holly v. Auld, 450 So.2d 217, 219 (Fla.1984)). “Further, we are “without power to construe an unambiguous statute in a way which would extend, modify, or limit, its express terms or its reasonable and.obvious implications.’” Velez v. Miami-Dade County Police Dep’t, 934 So.2d 1162, 1164-65 (Fla.2006) (quoting McLaughlin v. State, 721 So.2d 1170, 1172 (Fla.1998)). Accordingly, we begin our analysis with the language of section 1367, the federal statute at issue here, to determine if any of its provisions prohibit application of the tolling provision to state law claims dismissed for lack of federal jurisdiction.

The federal supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367, provides that a federal district court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over certain claims, and it governs when the court may do so. The statute provides in'pertinent part:

§ 1367. Supplemental Jurisdiction
(a)Except as provided in subsections (b)and (c) or as expressly provided otherwise by Federal statute, in any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction thát they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution. Such supplemental jurisdiction shall include claims that involve the joinder or intervention of additional parties.
(c)The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if—
(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue -of State law, •
(2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which, the district court has original jurisdiction,
(3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction, or
(4) in exceptional circumstances, there are' other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction.
(d) The period of limitations for any claim asserted under subsection (a), and for any other claim in the same action that is voluntarily dismissed at the same time as or after the dismissal of the claim under subsection (a), shall be tolled while the claim is pending and for a period of 30 days after it is dismissed unless State law provides for a longer tolling period.

28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2006).

The plain text of the federal statute does not, by its terms, bar the application of the tolling provision where a claim is dismissed for lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction. Rather, the savings protection of section 1367(d) applies “for any claim asserted under subsection (a).” The plain and unambiguous language of section 1367(d) thus permits the application of the tolling provision to claims commenced in federal court but later dismissed for lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction.

Our precedent concerning statutory interpretation also supports the Fourth District’s interpretation of section 1367(d) in Scarfo, where the court concluded that the dismissal of a federal claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction did not bar the application of section 1367(d) to toll the state limitations period for claims refiled in state court. The Fourth District noted that “[sjection 1367(d) exactly fits the facts and circumstances of this case,” reasoning that the fact that the dismissal of the plaintiffs federal claim was based on jurisdictional grounds “does not change the text of section 1367.” Id. at 921. We find that the same reasoning applies to state law claims dismissed for lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction. We thus conclude that the fact that Petitioners’ constructive trust claim was dismissed for lack of the bankruptcy court’s subject matter jurisdiction does not preclude the applicability of the federal tolling provision in this case.

Textron also contends that the Petitioners’ constructive trust claim is not subject to the tolling provision of subsection (d), asserting that subsection (d) only applies to those supplemental claims asserted under section 1367(a) and dismissed by the federal district court under, one of the four circumstances set forth in subsection (c) of the federal supplemental jurisdiction statute. Textron further contends that the constructive trust claim was not dismissed under the criteria set forth in subsection (c) because there was never a decision by the bankruptcy court or the federal district court not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claim. We disagree with Textron’s contentions.

We note that a similar narrow reading of section 1367(d) was rejected by the First District Court of Appeal in Blinn v. Florida Department of Transportation, 781 So.2d 1103 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000). There, the district court considered whether section 1367(d) tolls a state limitations period when the federal action was terminated by the plaintiffs voluntary dismissal of the case in federal court with the intention' of refiling the same claims against the same parties in state court. Id. at 1104. Based on the text of the supplemental jurisdiction statute, the First District concluded that the tolling provision was not limited to “dismissals predicated on a federal court’s decision to decline supplemental jurisdiction, pursuant to the criteria set forth in section 1367(c)(1)-(4).” Id. at. 1108. The court reasoned that “[a] policy of this nature would force a plaintiff to litigate the supplemental jurisdiction question in order to gain the savings protection of section 1367(d),” and consequently held that the tolling provision was applicable. Id.

We agree with the reasoning of the First District in Blinn. Moreover, the district court’s holding in Blinn is consistent with the plain language of the supplemental jurisdiction statute, which was also the focus of the Fourth District’s analysis in Scarfo. We agree with this analysis and hold that the text of subsection (d) does not limit the applicability of the tolling provision solely to instances where the federal court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction under the circumstances set forth in subsection (c) of the statute. In so holding, we recognize, as stated above, that we are “without power to construe an unambiguous statute in a way which would extend, modify, or limit, its express terms or its reasonable and obvious implications.” McLaughlin, 721 So.2d at 1172 (quoting Holly v. Auld, 450 So.2d 217, 219 (Fla.1984)).

We note that the tolling provision serves to prevent the limitations period from expiring while a plaintiff unsuccessfully pursues state claims in federal court in conjunction with federal claims. As we have explained above, the plain language of section 1367 leads us to conclude that the dismissal of a claim in federal court or, as here, in a bankruptcy court which is a unit of the federal district court, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, does not bar the applicability of the federal tolling provision in the subsequent state court action.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, we quash the decision of the Second District in Krause v. Textron Financial Corp., 10 So.3d 208 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009), to the extent that it is inconsistent with our decision, and we approve the decision of the Fourth District in Scarfo v. Ginsberg, 817 So.2d 919 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002). We remand to the Second District for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, POLSTON, and PERRY, JJ., concur.

CANADY, C.J., dissents with an opinion.

CANADY, C.J.,

dissenting.

Because I conclude that there is no express and direct conflict warranting the exercise of our jurisdiction under article V, section 8(b)(3), Florida Constitution, I dissent.

The holding in the Second District Court of Appeal’s decision in Krause v. Textron Financial Corp., 10 So.3d 208, 212 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009),,was as follows: - “Because this [constructive trust] claim against Textron was not ‘related to’ the claim against Twin Eagles, it is not entitled to the federal court’s supplemental jurisdiction and the tolling provision found in 28 -U.S.C. § 1367(d) does not apply.” The decision in Krause thus turned on whether the state claim at issue fell within the scope of the section 1367(a) provision for supplemental jurisdiction over “claims that are so related to claims in the action within [a district court’s] original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy.”

In Scarfo v. Ginsberg, 817 So.2d 919, 920 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002), however, the court addressed an argument by the defendant that the “plaintiffs federal claim was dismissed for lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction and therefore the tolling provision in section 1367(d) is inapplicable.” The Scarfo court rejected this argument and held that the tolling provision applied. The Scarfo decision makes no mention of any argument that the state law claim at issue was not related to the federal law claim. Instead, Scarfo assumes—without expressly deciding—that the state law claims were related to the federal claims.

The question at issue in Scarfo—that is, the impact on the operation of the tolling provision of the lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs federal claim—was not a question at issue in Krause. Indeed, the Krause court specifically recognized that the “complaint in the bankruptcy case did allege a claim cognizable in bankruptcy court.” 10 So.3d at 211.

In sum, the application of the “related to” requirement of section 1867(a) was dis-positive in Krause but was not at issue in Scarfo. There is thus no express and direct conflict between Krause and Scarfo.

Express and direct conflict is similarly lacking with respect to Blinn v. Florida Department of Transportation, 781 So.2d 1103, 1104-05 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000), a decision which turned on whether the tolling provision of section 1367(d) is operative where “the plaintiff voluntarily dismisses the case” or is instead limited to circumstances where “a federal district court dismisses a claim after declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.” The Blinn court held that the tolling provision applied even though the federal case had been voluntarily dismissed. Id. at 1108. Once again, unlike Krause, there was no issue in Blinn concerning whether the state claims were related to the federal claims as required by section 1367(a). And, although the federal claim in Krause had been voluntarily dismissed, that circumstance was not relied on as a basis for the decision of the Second District in Krause rejecting application of the tolling provision.

Since there is no basis for the exercise of jurisdiction, this case should be dismissed.

      N. 1] This was confirmed by deposition testimony taken during the discovery phase of the adversary proceeding. The trial court's order granting Textron’s motion to dismiss made a finding that at the time of the filing of the complaint in bankruptcy court, Appellants did not know which entity had possession of the resale proceeds; however, the complaint alleged that "upon information and belief,” Twin Eagles had transferred the funds to Textron prior to the commencement of the. Chapter 11 proceedings.

      . Textron also asserted that the Petitioners could not establish the elements of their constructive trust claim. The trial court did not address this ground because it found that the claim was time barred. Textron raises a similar claim before this Cpurt; however, we decline to reach this issue.

      . The trial court concluded further that it could not rely on the doctrine of equitable estoppel to preclude dismissal in the action.

      .The Second District also held that because Petitioners’ claim for unjust enrichment was not part of the bankruptcy complaint, section 1367(d) did not apply to that claim. Id. at 212. We do not disturb the district court’s holding with respect to the unjust enrichment claim.

      . Textron contends that the decision in Scarfo is distinguishable from the instant case, asserting that unlike Scarfo, the bankruptcy court never had original jurisdiction over Petitioners' claims. However, the federal district court's order suggests otherwise, noting that the effect of its ruling that the bankruptcy court should dismiss for lack of jurisdiction over the constructive trust claim "is not that the bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction from the inception.” In re Section 20 Land Group LTD., Case No. 205CV317FTM29DNF (M.D. Fla. order dated Jan. 12, 2006) (Steele, J.).


author: PER CURIAM. PARIENTE, J., CANADY, C.J.,

text:
    Juan PANTOJA, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. SC08-1879.
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    March 3, 2011.

      Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and Kathleen Stover, Assistant Public Defender, Second Judicial Circuit, Tallahassee, FL, for Petitioner.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Trisha Meggs Pate, Bureau Chief, and Christine Ann Guard, Assistant Attorneys General, Tallahassee, FL, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

This case is before the Court for review of the decision of the First District Court of Appeal in Pantoja v. State, 990 So.2d 626 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008). The district court certified that its decision is in direct conflict with the decision of the Second District Court of Appeal in Jaggers v. State, 536 So.2d 321 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.

FACTS

On April 20, 2006, Juan Pantoja was sentenced to life imprisonment after a jury convicted him of sexual battery on a child under twelve years of age by a defendant less than eighteen years of age and lewd or-lascivious molestation by a defendant eighteen years of age or older. This case involves the following facts:

Juan Pantoja, Appellant, challenges his conviction and sentence for sexual battery and lewd or lascivious molestation. He raises two issues on appeal, and we affirm as to both issues.. Only one of the issues, whether the trial court erred in excluding evidence that the victim recanted a prior accusation of molestation against another person, merits discussion. We hold that the trial court properly excluded this evidence under the well-settled rule that a witness’ credibility may not be attacked by proof that she committed specific acts of misconduct that did not end in a criminal conviction. We find the instant case factually indistinguishable from Jaggers v. State, 536 So.2d 321 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988), where the Second District reached a contrary holding. Accordingly, in affirming the trial court, we certify conflict with the Second District’s opinion in Jaggers.
Before Appellant’s trial, the State filed a motion in limine, requesting that the defense be prohibited from asking questions concerning an allegation that the victim’s uncle, T.D., had inappropriately touched her. Appellant argued that he should be permitted .to present evidence that the victim had accused T.D. of molesting her and later admitted the accusation was false. He proffered the testimony of the victim’s grandmother and aunt, who were also T.D.’s mother and sister, respectively. Both of these witnesses stated that the victim told them she had lied about T.D. because she was mád at him, although they gave different reasons for the victim’s alleged anger at T.D. Appellant’s counsel also cross-examined the victim outside the presence of the jury; During that cross-examination, the victim testified that T.D. had sexually abused her. She denied having recanted her previous statements about the incident. Appellant’s counsel then attempted to impeach the victim with the following statement from her deposition: “I told my aunt [C.M.D.] once about Juan touching me, but I guess she might have gotten mad at my uncle and said that he did it to Nanna because my nanna will believe anything.” Finally, Appellant proffered the testimony of Mary Van Tassel, a Headstart counselor who had worked closely with the victim’s family. In proffer, Van Tassel testified that, after observing a change in the victim’s behavior, she asked the victim if Appellant and T.D. had touched her inappropriately. Van Tassel then testified that the victim “said very quietly with her head down ... and looking away, ‘No,’ ... And she had tears in her eyes and ... she stopped talking.” Van Tassel further testified the victim denied that T.D. touched her in a sexual way. The trial court ruled that the defense could not cross-examine the victim about her allegations against T.D. or solicit extrinsic evidence on the subject.
Although Appellant was not permitted to impeach the victim with her allegedly false prior report of molestation, he did present to the jury several other grounds for discrediting her testimony. In cross-examination, Appellant’s attorney questioned the victim regarding perceived inconsistencies between her out-of-court statements and her trial testimony, as well as between her direct testimony and her testimony on cross. Additionally, Appellant’s attorney asked the victim if she had told Mary Van Tassel that Appellant had not molested her. The victim denied having made such a statement to Van Tassel. Appellant later called Van Tassel as a witness, and she testified that when she asked the victim if Appellant had touched her, the victim “said no ma’am, and she dropped her head and looked away.”

Pantoja v. State, 990 So.2d 626, 628-29 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (footnotes omitted).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

As a, general rule, “[a] trial judge’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion.” Blanco v. State, 452 So.2d 520, 523 (Fla.1984). “However, a court’s discretion is limited by the evidence code and applicable case law. A court’s erroneous interpretation of these authorities is subject to de. novo review.” McCray v. State, 919 So.2d 647, 649 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006). “The standard of review applicable to a trial court decision based on a finding of fact is whether the decision is supported by competent substantial evidence.” Teffeteller v. Dugger, 734 So.2d 1009, 1017 (Fla.1999) (quoting Phillip J. Padovano, Florida Appellate Practice § 9.6, at 155 (2d ed.1997)).

ANALYSIS

To begin, Pantoja argues that the victim’s prior accusation against her uncle should have been admitted under section 90.610, Florida Statutes (2002), because there is a false reporting exception to section 90.610’s criminal conviction requirement. We disagree. Section 90.610 provides:

(1) A party may attack the credibility of any witness, including an accused, by evidence that the witness has been convicted of a crime if the crime was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of 1 year under the law under which the witness was convicted, or if the crime involved dishonesty or a false statement regardless of the punishment, with the following exceptions:
(a) Evidence of any such conviction is inadmissible in a civil trial if it is so remote in time as to have no bearing on the present character of the witness.
(b) Evidence of juvenile adjudications are inadmissible under this subsection.
(2) The pendency of an appeal or the granting of a pardon relating to such crime does not render evidence of the conviction from which the appeal was taken or for which the pardon was granted inadmissible. Evidence of the pendency of the appeal is admissible.
(3) Nothing in this section affects the admissibility of evidence under s. 90.404 or s. 90.608.

§ 90.610, Fla. Stat. (2002). “[T]he Legislature adopted the express wording of section 90.610, Florida Statutes, in an effort to bar all character impeachment based on prior misconduct that did not involve a criminal conviction. The plain language of section 90.610, Florida Statutes, authorizes impeachment with only prior convictions .... ” Roebuck v. State, 953 So.2d 40, 43 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007). “[W]hen the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no occasion for resorting to the rules of statutory interpretation and construction; the statute must be given its plain and obvious meaning.” Holly v. Auld, 450 So.2d 217, 219 (Fla.1984) (quoting A.R. Douglass, Inc. v. McRainey, 102 Fla. 1141, 137 So. 157, 159 (1931)).

The Florida Legislature’s intent regarding section 90.610 is clear. While Federal Rule of Evidence 608(b) permits character impeachment through prior misconduct without a criminal conviction requirement, Florida’s Legislature adopted our evidence code without this language. See Roebuck, 953 So.2d at 43. Professor Charles Eh-rhardt distinguished section 90.610 from Federal Rule of Evidence 608(b):

Occasionally decisions ignore the limitation and permit impeachment with prior acts of misconduct of a witness when they involve prior false accusations of a crime by the witness.
The drafters of the Code specifically intended not to adopt provision similar to Federal Rule 608(b) because it did not reflect the existing Florida law and because they felt the possibility for abuse of this type of evidence was great.

Charles W. Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence § 610.8 (2010 ed.).

We agree with the First District’s determination that section 90.610 does not permit an exception to the conviction requirement for prior false accusations. We have held that “evidence of particular acts of ethical misconduct cannot be introduced to impeach the credibility of a witness. The only proper inquiry into a witness’s character for impeachment purposes goes to the witness’s reputation for truth and veracity.” Fernandez v. State, 730 So.2d 277, 282 (Fla.1999). In so holding, we have explained, “Allowing this testimony would violate sections 90.608, 90.609, and 90.610, Florida Statutes (1998), which prohibit impeachment by reference to specific bad acts other than convictions for felonies or misdemeanors involving dishonesty.” Fernandez, 730 So.2d at 282-83. In accordance with this, we have repeatedly interpreted section 90.610 to permit impeachment of a witness’s credibility only by felony conviction or by a conviction involving a crime of dishonesty or false statement. See id.; Farinas v. State, 569 So.2d 425, 429 (Fla.1990); Jackson v. State, 545 So.2d 260, 264 (Fla.1989); Hitchcock v. State, 413 So.2d 741, 744 (Fla.1982); Fulton v. State, 335 So.2d 280, 284 (Fla.1976). Accordingly, we approve the First District’s decision in Pantoja, holding that section 90.610 does not permit impeachment of a witness with evidence of a prior accusation that did not result in a criminal conviction.

Pantoja further argues that the victim’s prior false accusation is admissible under section 90.608(2), Florida Statutes (2002), to prove bias or motive to lie. We disagree. Section 90.608(2) provides, “Any party, including the party calling the witness, may attack the credibility of a witness by: ... (2) Showing that the witness is biased.” Although the facts of Jaggers did support the use of false reporting evidence to establish bias or motive pursuant to section 90.608(2), that provision is not applicable in the instant case. Unlike Jaggers, the prior accusation in Pantoja involved the victim’s uncle, not Pantoja. Although both of the victim’s prior accusations were sexual in nature, the degree of the alleged abuse varied greatly. The victim had previously accused her uncle of inappropriately touching her over her clothing, whereas the victim’s accusation against Pantoja involved physical and oral sexual acts that were performed under the clothes or without clothing. Pantoja claims the evidence of the victim’s prior accusation should have been admitted to show that she fabricated the charges against Pantoja because her family was upset that Pantoja had recently been bailed out of jail on an unrelated charge. However, the proffered evidence did not establish a motive for the victim to lie about the abuse. The proffered evidence merely showed that the victim previously accused her uncle of inappropriately touching her at one time and that no one believed her or acted on her allegation. An investigation into the allegation against her uncle was never conducted and her uncle was never punished for the alleged conduct. It does not logically follow that the victim would have motive to lie about sexual abuse because her prior allegation went unacknowledged.

Next, Pantoja argues that the victim’s prior accusation should have been admitted under section 90.405(2), Florida Statutes (2002). We disagree. Section 90.405(2) provides, ‘When character or a trait of character of a person is an essential element of a charge, claim, or defense, proof may be made of specific instances of that person’s conduct.” Here, the victim’s character was not an essential element of the defense or charge. It is a rare occurrence that character is an essential element of a claim! or defense. “Were this court to expand the narrow application of section 90.405(2)’s character at issue provision to all cases in which the veracity of a witness is pertinent to the proceedings, section 90.610’s confinement of impeachment evidence to only prior convictions would be rendered ‘meaningless.” Roebuck, 953 So.2d at 44.

Likewise, Pantoja contends that evidence of a prior accusation is admissible under section 90.405(2) as a specific instance of conduct to show that the victim was inclined to lie about sexual abuse. We disagree. The First District rejected this argument and explained:

There is some support for this argument [that a prior false accusation is admissible under section 90.405(2) to show the victim was inclined to lie about sexual abuse] in Jaggers. See 536 So.2d at 327. However, we disagree with the Second District’s application of this section, as we explained in Roebuck, 953 So.2d at 43-44. The victim’s character was not an essential element of a charge, claim, or defense in the instant case. Appellant argues that the victim’s character was critical to the defense because its position was that she was lying. If Appellant’s argument were accurate, then the victim’s character would be an essential element of the defense in almost every case. In fact, we rejected a similar argument in Roebuck, explaining, “Cases in which character is actually at issue are ‘relatively rare’ and do not impede on the traditional rule that specific incidents of misconduct are generally not admissible to prove character.” 953 So.2d at 43-44 (citation omitted).

Pantoja, 990 So.2d at 630-31. Moreover, the First District declined to adopt the Second District’s holding in Jaggers “that evidence that a witness has falsely accused a person of sexual abuse must be admitted when the defendant is being tried for a crime of sexual abuse and ‘there is no independent evidence of the abuse and the defendant’s sole defense is either fabrication or mistake on the part of the alleged victims.’” Pantoja, 990 So.2d at 630 (quoting Jaggers, 536 So.2d at 327). In Pantoja, the First District reasoned:

The Second District reached this holding after concluding that such evidence is “relevant to the possible bias, prejudice, motive, intent or corruptness” of the witness. Id. Evidence that is relevant to a witness’ bias is admissible under section 90.608(2). Prejudice, motive to testify, and intent in testifying are all ways of showing the witness’ bias, and, thus, are also proper grounds for impeachment under section 90.608(2). However, there is no provision in the Evidence Code allowing general evidence of “corruptness” as a means of impeaching a witness. The only such admissible evidence is evidence of a prior conviction under section 90.610 or evidence that the witness has a poor reputation for truthfulness under section 90.609. Accordingly, we cannot agree with the Second District that a witness’ prior false accusation of sexual abuse against a person other than the defendant always constitutes grounds for impeachment.

Pantoja, 990 So.2d at 630.

Finally, Pantoja contends that his right to confront the -witness, as set forth in article I, section 16(a) of the Florida Constitution and the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution, was violated. We disagree. The First District correctly determined that Pantoja’s right to confront the witness had not been violated and explained:

In applying Roebuck to the instant case, we have considered whether Appellant’s rights to due process and confrontation of witnesses require a different result. Our decision is governed by the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974), and its progeny. The Davis Court held that the denial of the right to effective cross-examination is a violation of the Confrontation Clause and that when a state law would deny a defendant that right, the state law must yield. 415 U.S. at 318-19, 94 S.Ct. 1105. In reaching this holding, the Davis Court distinguished between general attacks on credibility and more particular attacks. Id. at 316-17, 94 S.Ct. 1105. The Davis Court explained that when “the cross-examiner intends to afford the jury a basis to infer that the witness’ character is such that he would be less likely than the average trustworthy citizen to be truthful in this testimony,” general credibility is at issue. Id. at 316, 94 S.Ct. 1105. An example of this type of credibility attack is the introduction of evidence of a prior crime. Id. In contrast, a particular credibility attack “is effected by means of cross-examination directed toward revealing possible biases, prejudices, or ulterior motives of the witness as they may relate directly to issues or personalities in the case at hand.” Id. State laws that limit a defendant’s right to launch a general credibility attack against a witness do not violate the Confrontation Clause, while state laws that limit a defendant’s right to launch a particular credibility attack are constitutionally infirm. See id.
Several federal courts of appeals have concluded that there is no constitutional error in prohibiting cross-examination of a witness regarding an alleged false, accusation against someone other than the defendant. See, e.g., Boggs v. Collins, 226 F.3d 728, 739 (6th Cir.2000) (concluding that a defendant who was convicted of rape was not constitutionally entitled to cross-examine the victim regarding an alleged prior false accusation of rape against another person, as his sole basis for such cross-examination was to show that if she lied once, she would do it again); Hogan v. Hanks, 97 F.3d 189, 192 (7th Cir.1996) (upholding a state court’s decision, to disallow questioning of a rape victim regarding two alleged prior false accusations where state law required evidence that the pri- or reports were “demonstrably false” before permitting such questioning); see also State v. Raines, 118 S.W.3d 205, 213 (Mo.Ct.App.2003) (noting that the majority of the federal appellate courts that have addressed the issue have found no violation of the Confrontation Clause where a-trial court has prevented cross-examination for the sole purpose of showing that a witness has a “tendency to lie, based on a pattern of past lies”). Applying Davis, the Seventh Circuit held that impeachment with evidence of a prior false report constitutes a general credibility attack for which there is no constitutional entitlement.
Boggs, 226 F.3d at 739. The following language from Boggs is instructive:
No matter how central an accuser’s credibility is to a case — indeed, her credibility will almost always be the cornerstone of a rape or sexual assault case ... — the Constitution does not require that a defendant be given the opportunity to wage a general attack on credibility by pointing to individual instances of past conduct.... Under Davis and its progeny, the Sixth Amendment only compels cross-examination if that examination aims to reveal the motive, bias or prejudice of a witness/aceuser.
Id. at 740. The Sixth Circuit, in Hogan, noted that the Supreme Court had never held “or even suggested” that a prohibition against using specific acts of misconduct to impeach a witness posed constitutional problems. 97 F.3d at 191.

Pantoja, 990 So.2d at 631-32. Accordingly, it is clear that Pantoja’s confrontation claim lacks merit. Federal courts have upheld exclusion of prior false accusation evidence against Sixth Amendment challenges because the evidence was properly excluded under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. See United States v. Kenyon, 481 F.3d 1054, 1064 (8th Cir.2007); United States v. Tail, 459 F.3d 854, 860 (8th Cir.2006); Hughes v. Raines, 641 F.2d 790, 793 (9th Cir.1981). But see Redmond v. Kingston, 240 F.3d 590, 591-92 (7th Cir.2001); United States v. Stamper, 766 F.Supp. 1396, 1398 (W.D.N.C.1991). “Evidence alleging that the accuser made false prior accusations may be excluded if the evidence has minimal probative value.” Tail, 459 F.3d at 860. According to section 90.403, Florida Statutes (2002), “[relevant evidence is inadmissible if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, misleading the jury, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” The trial court’s exclusion of the victim’s prior accusation does not result in a confrontation violation for several reasons. First, the victim’s prior accusation was against her uncle, not Pantoja. Second, the victim’s accusation against her uncle involved a one-time incident involving “over-the-clothes” groping, whereas her accusation in the instant case involves “under-the-clothes” sexual acts that occurred on multiple occasions. Third, the victim testified that she did not recant her prior accusation against her uncle. Finally, cross-examination regarding the victim’s prior accusation would not have explained her knowledge of sex to the jury and might have caused the jury to infer that she had a propensity to lie about sexual abuse. Section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2002), expressly prohibits the use of “[sjimilar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts ... when the evidence is relevant solely to prove bad character or propensity.”

Accordingly, we approve the First District’s decision in Pantoja and disapprove the Second District’s decision in Jaggers to the extent that it is inconsistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

POLSTON, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur.

PARIENTE, J., concurs in result with an opinion.

LEWIS, J., concurs in result.

CANADY, C.J., dissents with an opinion, in which QUINCE, J., concurs.

PARIENTE, J.,

concurring in result.

I concur with the majority that there is no false reporting exception under the Florida Evidence Code. In a particular case, however, the evidence might be admissible under section 90.608(2) to show the witness is biased or under section 90.404(2)(a). I also agree with the First District that there may be circumstances where the failure to allow cross-examination of a witness about prior false accusations may constitute a constitutional infirmity. As Judge Lewis stated in his opinion below:

We agree that the evidence may be highly probative of the victim’s general credibility. At the same time, we recognize that the type of evidence Appellant sought to introduce is prohibited under current state law, and we are bound to apply that law, absent a constitutional infirmity. We adhere to our previously stated position that under the facts of another case, the circumstances surrounding the prior false accusation may be so similar to the circumstances surrounding the accusation in the defendant’s case that due process would require cross-examination regarding the prior incident. We are not presented with such a case today. Appellant’s proffered evidence, taken in the light most favorable to him, showed only that the victim previously falsely accused someone of sexual molestation when she was angry. The evidence Appellant adduced in the proffer and at trial did not reveal that the victim’s accusation against Appellant was made under substantially the same circumstances as her prior accusation.

Pantoja, 990 So.2d at 632. I conclude that no reversible error occurred under the circumstances of this case.

CANADY, C.J.,

dissenting.

Because I conclude that the evidence at issue was admissible to show the bias of the witness who accused the defendant, I would quash the decision of the First District Court of Appeal.

Section 90.608, Florida Statutes (2006), provides that “the credibility of a witness” may be attacked by “[s]howing that the witness is biased.” Bias means “[a]n inclination, a propensity, a predisposition.” 1 Shorter Oxford English Dictionary 229 (6th ed. 2007). A witness’s credibility, therefore, may be attacked by evidence which shows an inclination or propensity of the'witnéss that is relevant to the subject or substance of the witness’s testimony. Here, the evidence that the witness had previously made false accusations that her uncle sexually molested her tended to show such a bias — namely, an inclination to make false accusations of sexual molestation — that was relevant to her accusation against her stepfather, the defendant.

I find the majority’s attempt to distinguish Jaggers v. State, 536 So.2d 321 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988), unpersuasive. The First District correctly recognized that the decision now on review was in conflict with Jaggers. The Jaggers court focused on the relevance of the witness’s “inclin[ation] to lie about sexual incidents and charge people with those acts without justification.” Id. at 327. The majority suggests that — unlike the prior accusation at issue here — the prior false accusation at issue in Jaggers was made.against the defendant. This is simply incorrect. See id. at 326-27.

Pantoja’s conviction should be set aside, and he should be afforded a new trial in which he is permitted to introduce the proper impeachment evidence that was excluded.

QUINCE, J., concurs.

      . Pantoja was thirty-six years old when he committed the offense. . In the information, Pantoja was charged in Count I for sexual battery on a child under twelve years of age by a defendant eighteen years of age or older, and in Count II for lewd or lascivious molestation. However, on March 29, 2006, the jury found Pantoja guilty of the lesser included offense of sexual battery on a child under twelve years of age by a defendant less than eighteen years of age.


text:
    THE FLORIDA BAR, Complainant, v. Jaime ROBERTO, Respondent.
    No. SC09-1929.
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    March 3, 2011.

      John K. Harkness, Jr., Executive Director, Kenneth Lawrence Marvin, Staff Counsel, The Florida Bar, Tallahassee, FL, and Keshara Darcel David, Bar Counsel, The Florida Bar, Orlando, FL, for Complainant.
    Jaime Roberto, pro se, Orlando, FL, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

We have for review a referee’s report recommending that Respondent Jaime Roberto be found guilty of professional misconduct and placed on probation for a period of one year. The Florida Bar petitions the Court for review of the report, taking issue with the referee’s failure to find . Roberto in violation of Rule Regulating the Florida Bar 4-1.7(a) (Representing Adverse Interests), as well as the referee’s recommended sanction. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 15, Fla. Const.

The disciplinary case against Jaime Roberto arises from alleged ethical violations that occurred during his representation of two female clients in their criminal cases. The referee found that in the course of his representation of these clients, with whom he admits having sexual relations, Roberto impermissibly provided financial assistance outside the scope of.litigation, in violation of Rule Regulating the Florida Bar 4-1.8(e) (Financial Assistance to Client), and improperly used a client to solicit additional business, in violation of Rule Regulating the Florida Bar 4-7.4(a) (Solicitation). Based on the record before us, we agree with The Florida Bar that, in addition to the violations found by the referee, Roberto’s conduct also violated Rule Regulating the Florida Bar 4-1.7(a), prohibiting an attorney from engaging in a conflict of interest. We further conclude that the sanction of a one-year probationary period recommended by the referee is too lenient. Instead, we impose a one-year rehabilitative suspension.

BACKGROUND

The Florida Bar filed a disciplinary complaint against Respondent Roberto, alleging that he violated several of the Rúles Regulating the Florida Bar (Bar Rules). A referee was appointed. After holding a hearing in the case, the referee has submitted her report for the Court’s review, in which she makes the following findings and recommendations.

Roberto graduated from law school and was admitted to The Florida Bar in October 2006. In January and February 2008, while working as a solo practitioner, Roberto undertook representation of two female clients in two separate and unrelated criminal matters. Roberto has admitted, and the referee found, that he engaged in sexual relations with both of these women during the course of the representation. The facts presented demonstrate that Roberto never entered into a written fee agreement with either client, and he never received any monetary fees from them.

Roberto has also admitted that he provided both clients with financial assistance on several occasions. As to one client, Roberto helped her to obtain a business-purpose driver’s license and paid the fee associated with the license. Later, when that client was serving her criminal sentence in the county jail, Roberto made at least two deposits into her commissary account, totaling around $130. With respect to the second client, Roberto gave her $250 to buy clothes, groceries, and other personal goods. During a period of time when this client was also held in the county jail, Roberto deposited approximately $60 into her commissary account. In both cases, the financial assistance was not associated with the costs of litigation or in any way connected with the criminal case.

Finally, the referee found that Roberto asked one of these female clients to refer prospective criminal clients to him for representation. In fact, Roberto admitted that he purchased a cellular phone for her to use in referring clients. There is no evidence that Roberto actually received any legal fees from the arrangement or that he shared . any legal fees with the client for her referrals.

The Bar argued before the referee that Roberto engaged in the sexual relationship in exchange for his legal services. However, the referee rejected this assertion. With respect to both clients, the referee found that the Bar failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the sexual relationship was in exchange for legal services • or that it exploited the attorney-client relationship.

Given the conduct described above, the referee specifically noted as follows:

It is the opinion of this referee that an attorney should not have a sexual relationship with a current client and recommends that The Florida Bar review the applicable rules " and consider such changes. Pursuant to the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar, respondent’s conduct during his representation ... did create a conflict of interest. Conduct such as that engaged in by respondent, taints how the legal profession is viewed by members of the public and by people who seek the professional services of an attorney....

The referee ultimately found that Roberto’s misconduct violated Bar Rules 4-1.8(e) (Financial Assistance to a Client) and 4.7.4(a) (Solicitation).

The referee’s report indicates that she considered the following factors in mitigation: (1) Roberto has no prior disciplinary record; (2) he did not act with a dishonest or selfish motive; (3) he made full and free disclosure to the disciplinary board and exhibited a cooperative attitude during the disciplinary proceedings; and finally, (4) he is inexperienced in the practice of law. The referee did not find any aggravating factors in this case.

Accordingly, based on her recommendations as to guilt and the several mitigating circumstances, the referee recommended that Roberto serve one year of probation; that he participate in Law Office Management Assistance Service (LOMAS) and comply with the program’s recommendations; that he complete an ethics course; and that he be ordered to pay the Bar’s costs, totaling $4,402.27.

The Bar has filed a petition seeking review of the referee’s report. As neither party has challenged the referee’s factual findings, we approve them without further comment. However, as discussed below, the Bar challenges the recommendations as to guilt and discipline.

ANALYSIS

The Bar first challenges the referee’s recommendation that Roberto’s misconduct in this case does not amount to a violation of rule 4-1.7(a), regarding conflicts of interest. In reviewing a referee’s recommendations as to guilt, the Court has consistently stated that the referee’s factual findings must be sufficient under the applicable rules to support the recommendations as to guilt. See Fla. Bar v. Scott, 39 So.3d 309, 315-16 (Fla.), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 581, 178 L.Ed.2d 415 (2010); Fla. Bar v. Shoureas, 913 So.2d 554, 557-58 (Fla.2005). Here, the Bar argues that the referee erred in failing to recommend that Roberto be found guilty of violating rule 4-1.7(a). We agree.

Rule 4-1.7, in general, prohibits attorneys from representing a client or clients if the representation creates a conflict of interest. In relevant part, the rule provides that a lawyer shall not represent a client if there is a substantial risk the representation will be “materially limited” by the lawyer’s own personal interests. See R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-1.7(a)(2). The comment to this rule explains that loyalty and independent judgment are essential elements in the lawyer’s relationship with a client. Id. cmt. This loyalty may be impaired when a lawyer cannot consider, recommend, or carry out an appropriate course of action on behalf of his or her client because of the lawyer’s other interests.

As noted in the excerpt from the referee’s report cited above, the referee expressly found that Roberto’s sexual relationship with his clients created a conflict of interest. Nonetheless, the referee did not find Roberto in violation of rule 4-1.7(a). We conclude that the referee’s recommendation on this point is not supported. Indeed, the referee’s findings of fact, and Roberto’s own admissions, establish that his conduct created a conflict of interest.

The record is clear that Roberto engaged, in sexual relations with these clients during the time he represented them. Moreover, the referee’s factual findings in this case support the conclusion that Roberto’s sexual relationship with his clients impaired the exercise of his professional judgment, which in turn led to additional unethical conduct. While Roberto did not trade legal services for sexual favors, his conduct undoubtedly gave the appearance of impropriety. Roberto never entered into a written fee agreement with either client, he never received any monetary fees from either client, and he repeatedly met both women at their homes or in restaurants to discuss their cases, rather than in a professional office setting. Roberto also provided the clients with prohibited financial assistance in violation of rule 4 — 1.8(e), in that he used his personal funds to pay their bills, gave them money to buy clothes and other personal items, and made deposits to their commissary accounts in jail. Although this financial assistance may have been given, at least partially, from a misguided sense of philanthropy, we conclude that Roberto’s behavior demonstrates that his involvement in sexual relationships with his clients clouded his professional judgment, creating a conflict of interest that ultimately led to additional ethical violations.

Accordingly, we disapprove the referee’s recommendation that Roberto’s conduct did not amount to a violation 'of rule 4-1.7(a). We approve the referee’s other recommendations as to guilt without comment.

The Bar next challenges the referee’s recommended sanction, a one-year period of probation. In reviewing a referee’s recommended discipline, this Court’s scope of review is broader than that afforded to the referee’s findings of fact because, ultimately, it is our responsibility to order the appropriate sanction. See Fla. Bar v. Anderson, 538 So.2d 852, 854 (Fla.1989); see also art. V, § 15, Fla. Const. Generally speaking, this Court will not second-guess the referee’s recommended discipline as long as it has a reasonable basis in existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions. See Fla. Bar v. Temmer, 753 So.2d 555, 558 (Fla.1999).

In challenging the referee’s recommended sanction, the Bar first argues that the referee’s factual findings demonstrate a pattern of misconduct, which should be considered as an aggravating factor under Florida Standard for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions 9.22(c). We agree. This Court has held, “Like other factual findings, a referee’s findings of mitigation and aggravation carry a presumption of correctness and will be upheld unless clearly erroneous or without support in the record. A referee’s failure to find that an aggravating factor or mitigating factor applies is due the same deference.” Fla. Bar v. Germain, 957 So.2d 613, 621 (Fla.2007) (citation omitted). Here, the record clearly establishes that Roberto engaged in a sexual relationship with two current clients; in each case, the sexual nature of the relationship created a conflict of interest between Roberto’s own interests and those of his client. Additionally, in both relationships, Roberto has admitted that he provided his clients with financial assistance, namely money for their personal expenses. Given these undisputed facts, we agree with the Bar that Roberto’s improper behavior with clients demonstrates a pattern of misconduct and that the referee should have considered the pattern as an aggravating factor pursuant to Standard 9.22(c).

The Bar also argues that, considering the seriousness of Roberto’s misconduct and the aggravating and mitigating factors in this case, the appropriate sanction is a one-year suspension. In determining a proper sanction, the Court must take into account the three purposes of lawyer discipline:

First, the judgment must be fair to society, both in terms of protecting the public from unethical conduct and at the same time not denying the public the services of a qualified lawyer as a result of undue harshness in imposing penalty. Second, the judgment must be fair to the respondent, being sufficient to punish a breach of ethics and at the same time encourage reformation and rehabilitation. Third, the judgment must be severe enough to deter others who might be prone or tempted to become involved in like violations.

Fla. Bar v. Barrett, 897 So.2d 1269, 1275-76 (Fla.2005) (quoting Fla. Bar v. Lord, 433 So.2d 983, 986 (Fla.1983)); see also Fla. Bar v. Cohen, 919 So.2d 384, 388 (Fla.2005); Fla. Bar v. Spear, 887 So.2d 1242, 1246 (Fla.2004).

In this case, any sanction less than a suspension that requires Respondent to prove rehabilitation would not be consistent with the seriousness of the rule violations found in this case. Although the referee found that Roberto was an inexperienced lawyer, he should have known that it was improper to use his client to solicit business from other potential clients, even buying her a cell phone to assist with this impermissible scheme. Similarly, Roberto’s inexperience does not excuse the breach of ethics in providing financial assistance to clients outside of the scope of litigation. The ethical prohibition on this type of activity could not be more clear. See R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-1.8.

Although Roberto was an inexperienced lawyer, the totality of his conduct shows that as a result of the sexual relationship with these clients, he violated multiple rules. While the referee did not find that he traded legal services for sex, and the Bar has not appealed that specific finding, the circumstances of the representation, including the fact of the sexual relationships, created an appearance of impropriety. One might ask why there was no fee agreement and why Roberto never even attempted to collect a fee from these clients, choosing instead to provide them with financial assistance.

Simply put, this is not a case that merits only probation. The Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions applicable to Roberto’s misconduct suggest that a period of suspension is appropriate. See Fla. Stds. Imposing Law. Sanes. 4.32 (“Suspension is appropriate when a lawyer knows of a conflict of interest and does not fully disclose to a client the possible effect of that conflict, and causes injury or potential injury to a client.”); Fla. Stds. Imposing Law. Sanes. 7.2 (“Suspension is appropriate when a lawyer knowingly engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional and causes injury or potential injury to a client, the public, or the legal system.”).

Moreover, this Court has consistently imposed rehabilitative suspensions for violations of the ethical rules similar to those found in this case. See, e.g., Fla. Bar v. Rue, 643 So.2d 1080 (Fla.1994) (imposing a ninety-one day suspension for misconduct involving, among other violations, improper financial assistance to clients and improper business transactions with clients, where the lawyer advanced money to clients for their living expenses, costs not associated with the underlying litigation); Fla. Bar v. Stafford, 542 So.2d 1321 (Fla.1989) (imposing a six-month suspension for ethical violations including improper solicitation of clients). We have also considered Florida Bar v. Bryant, 813 So.2d 38 (Fla.2002), in which we imposed a one-year suspension for violations of rule 4-8.4(i), which explicitly prohibits impermissible sexual relationships with current clients. While we recognize that the referee did not find violations of rule 4-8.4(i), we view the sum total of Respondent’s conduct in this case to be of equivalent severity.

In sum, considering the aggravating and mitigating factors discussed above, coupled with the Standards and case law cited herein, we disapprove the referee’s recommended discipline of probation for one year and instead impose a rehabilitative suspension of one year.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, Jaime Roberto is hereby suspended from the practice of law for one year. The suspension will be effective thirty days from the filing of this opinion so that Roberto can close out his practice and protect the interests of existing clients. If Roberto notifies this Court in writing that he is no longer practicing and does not need the thirty days to protect existing clients, this Court will enter an order making the suspension effective immediately. Roberto shall fully comply with Rule Regulating the Florida Bar 3-5.1(g). Further, Roberto shall accept no new business from the date this opinion is filed until he is reinstated.

Judgment is entered for The Florida Bar, 651 East Jefferson Street, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2300, for recovery of costs from Jaime Roberto in the amount of $4,402.27, for which sum let execution issue.

It is so ordered.

CANADY, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, POLSTON, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur.

      . The referee found that Roberto’s conduct did not amount to a violation of rule 4-8.4(i), stating that a lawyer shall not engage in a sexual relationship with a client that exploits or adversely affects the interests of the client or the lawyer-client relationship. The Bar does not challenge this finding, and accordingly we do not address it except to note that subsequent to the conduct in this case, rule 4-8.4(i) was amended to include the following presumption: “If the sexual conduct commenced after the lawyer-client relationship was formed it shall be presumed that the sexual conduct exploits or adversely affects the interests of the client or the lawyer-client relationship.” In re Amendments to the Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar, 24 So.3d 63, 145 (Fla.2009).

      . Bar rule 4-1.8(e) provides that a lawyer shall not provide financial assistance to a client in connection with pending or .contemplated litigation, except that: ‘‘(1) a lawyer may advance court costs and expenses of litigation, the repayment of which may be contingent on the outcome of the matter; and (2) a lawyer representing an indigent client may pay court costs and expenses of litigation on behalf of the client.” Roberto does not challenge the referee’s determination that his conduct in this case was a violation of rule 4-1.8.