text:
    Robert Ernest CAMILLI, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 5D10-552.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Sept. 23, 2011.
    James S. Purdy, Public Defender, and Rose M. Levering, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee and Ann M. Phillips, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Ap-pellee.
   PER CURIAM.

In this appeal of his upward departure sentence, Robert Ernest Camilli argues, and the State concedes, that the fifteen-year sentence imposed for his violation of probation is unsupported because the trial court utilized improper factors. We accept the State’s proper concession and agree.

Camilli was originally convicted in 1996 for his 1994 offense of lewd and lascivious act committed in the presence of a minor. Camilli was placed on probation, which he subsequently violated. Upon resentenc-ing, it was determined that the 1994 guidelines applied. After revoking Camilli’s probation, the trial court imposed a fifteen-year upward departure sentence based on two factors-an escalating pattern of conduct that took place during his probation and enticing a minor to participate. Because the first factor did not exist at the time of Camilli’s original sentence, it cannot be used as a basis for a departure sentence imposed upon a violation of probation. See Lambert v. State, 545 So.2d 838, 842 (Fla.1989). The remaining ground is likewise invalid because, as the State concedes, the original offense did not involve the victim’s participation.

We reverse Camilli’s departure sentence and remand to the trial court for resen-tencing.

REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

ORFINGER, C.J., GRIFFIN and LAWSON, JJ., concur.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: PER CURIAM.

license: Public Domain

text:
    Robert Irvin HECKMAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 5D10-2162.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Sept. 23, 2011.
    Dane K. Chase, of O’Brien Bower, P.A., Tampa, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Carmen F. Corrente, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Robert Irvin Heckman appeals the trial court’s order revoking his probation. We reverse.

A violation of probation that triggers revocation must be willful and substantial, and must be supported by the greater weight of the evidence. Robinson v. State, 907 So.2d 1284, 1286 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005). We conclude, in light of the circumstances, that the alleged violation was not substantial. Heckman promptly informed his probation officer of his actions with no objection. Although the probation officer’s view of Heckman’s actions is not determinative, it does support Heckman’s contention that his violation was not willful or substantial. See Benedict v. State, 774 So.2d 940 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001).

We, therefore, reverse the order revoking Heckman’s probation, and remand this matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

ORFINGER, C.J., GRIFFIN and COHEN, JJ., concur.


author: TORPY, J.

text:
    Jose R. BENENATI and Sandra Benenati, Appellants, v. CHASE HOME FINANCE, LLC, ETC., et al., Appellees.
    No. 5D10-2884.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Sept. 23, 2011.
    F. Scott Fistel, Gwen L. Kellman and Laura L. Brogan of Fistel Law Firm, P.A., Coral Springs, Hal Uhrig and Jad M. Brewer of Foreclosure Defense Group, Maitland, for Appellants.
    Jeffery M. Gano of Florida Default Law Group, P.L., Tampa, for Appellees.
   ON MOTIONS TO WITHDRAW

TORPY, J.

In this over one-year-old appeal from an attempted collateral attack on a foreclosure judgment entered in 2008, counsel for Appellants seek to withdraw. Hal Uhrig, Esquire, and Jad M. Brewer, Esquire (whose firm filed the initial brief under signature of Jad M. Brewer, Esquire), have attempted to withdraw by filing a “Notice of Withdrawal of Appearance as Local Co-Counsel.” The so-called “notice” fails to state the reasons for withdrawal and fails to request court permission to withdraw as required by Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.440(b). The motion to withdraw filed by F. Scott Fistel, Esquire, states only that “irreconcilable differences have arisen” and seeks an indefinite extension of time for Appellants to obtain new counsel. There is also no indication that it was served on Appellant Jose R. Benenati, in violation of rule 9.440(b).

We deny withdrawal for failure to comply with the rule. We also disapprove the stated reason for withdrawal by Attorney Fistel given the vague nature of the request, the fact that briefing has been closed for many months, and that no oral argument was requested. Because a disposition on the merits is imminent, no further requests to withdraw will be considered.

MOTIONS DENIED.

LAWSON and EVANDER, JJ., concur.


text:
    Willie HARMON, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 1D11-4315.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Sept. 23, 2011.
    Willie Harmon, pro se, Petitioner.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent. .
   PER CURIAM.

DISMISSED. See Fla. R.App. P. 9.141(d)(5).

THOMAS, WETHERELL, and SWANSON, JJ., concur.


text:
    George WALKER, Petitioner, v. STATE of florida, Respondent.
    No. 1D11-4769.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Sept. 23, 2011.
    George Walker, pro se, Petitioner.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

The petition alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is denied on the merits.

THOMAS, WETHERELL, and SWANSON, JJ., concur.


text:
    Karl Alan SCHOENWALDER, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 5D11-2650.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Sept. 28, 2011.

      Robert Wesley, Public Defender Ninth Judicial Circuit and Joanna G. Snow, Assistant Public Defender, Orlando for Petitioner.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee and Megan Saillant, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

Karl Alan Schoenwalder (Petitioner) filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging the trial court’s imposition of a ninety-day sentence for Petitioner’s direct criminal contempt. Petitioner argues that his actions did not rise to the level of a criminal contempt and that he is being illegally detained because of a denial of due process under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.830. We agree in part.

Petitioner’s conduct clearly constituted a direct criminal contempt of the court. A review of the audio recording of the hearing held below reveals that Petitioner utilized his arraignment on criminal charges to advance his personal agenda and to usurp the objective of the proceedings. Upon being castigated by the trial court for this behavior, Petitioner continued to interrupt the court and to regale all present with his beliefs regarding testimony, oaths, affirmations and appearance for his arraignment.

While we agree with the trial court that Petitioner’s unacceptable behavior constituted a criminal contempt of the court, we must grant Petitioner’s request for relief based on the inadequacy of the contempt hearing. Before being adjudicated guilty of his contemptible behavior, Petitioner was entitled to “the opportunity to present evidence of excusing or mitigating circumstances.” Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.830. Petitioner did not receive this opportunity. Beyond a perfunctory request whether there was just cause not to hold Petitioner in contempt, the trial court did not provide Petitioner with the opportunity to present evidence of excusing or mitigating circumstances. A trial court’s failure to afford a defendant this opportunity constitutes fundamental error. See Garrett v. State, 876 So.2d 24 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004).

In light of the trial court’s omission, the petition for habeas corpus relief is granted to the extent that the trial court shall hold a proper proceeding as mandated by the rule and allow Petitioner the opportunity to present evidence excusing or mitigating the circumstances of his behavior.

PETITION GRANTED and REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

SAWAYA, MONACO and EVANDER, JJ., concur.

      . A subsequent hearing was held on August 9, 2011, upon the defense’s motion for superse-deas bond and to argue that contempt was improper. At that proceeding, the court simply stated that a review of the contempt proceeding would be conducted; it did not afford Petitioner an opportunity to present excusing or mitigating circumstances with regard to the contempt.


author: HAZOURI, J.

text:
    LaShawn P. HARRIS, Appellant, v. Feaster Bernard HAMPTON, Appellee.
    No. 4D11-966.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    Oct. 5, 2011.
    Jason H. Haber of Jason H. Haber, P.A., Plantation, for appellant.
    No appearance for appellee.
   HAZOURI, J.

LaShawn P. Harris (“Mother”) appeals from a non-final order of contempt entered after a final order in a post-dissolution of marriage case. The contempt order mandated that Mother enroll her minor child, B.H., in Flamingo Road Christian Academy. Mother argues that the trial court erred in entering the contempt order because it failed to make an affirmative finding as to Mother’s ability to comply, and the underlying order was not explicit. We agree and reverse.

Mother was married to Feaster Bernard Hampton (“Father”) and the couple had one minor son, B.H. Subsequently, the parties filed for divorce and their marriage was dissolved in Michigan pursuant to a Consent Judgment of Divorce. The Consent Judgment of Divorce did not mandate that B.H. attend a particular school.

The parties then separately moved to Florida. In Broward County, Mother petitioned the trial court to recognize and enforce the Michigan judgment. Father then petitioned the trial court for modification of the final judgment, seeking to be designated the primary residential parent, or, alternatively, for equal time sharing with Mother. The parties went to mediation and resolved Father’s modification petition. On November 13, 2006, the trial court entered an agreed order approving the mediation settlement agreement. Like the original dissolution judgment, the mediation settlement agreement did not contain a requirement that B.H. enroll at a particular school.

Subsequently, each party moved for contempt and enforcement of the mediation settlement agreement for reasons unrelated to B.H.’s schooling. Following a hearing on January 25, 2007, the court deferred ruling on the parties’ motions for contempt, yet found that “[t]he parties agree to place the minor child at Flamingo Road Christian [Academy] and shall pay all required expense beyond the basic tuition by pro[-]rata share (uniforms only & books & registration fee).” The order did not require that a specific party enroll B.H., nor did it specify which party should pay tuition.

Thereafter, Father filed an amended second motion for contempt and enforcement of final judgment. Father contested that Mother had “failed to enroll the child in Flamingo Road Christian [Academy] as ordered by this court on January 25, 2007.” The court then entered an “Agreed Amended Order Granting Former Husband’s Second Amended Motion for Contempt and Enforcement of Final Judgment and Order Denying Former Wife’s Motion to Modify the Court’s Order Dated January 25, 2007.” The court found that Mother “failed to register the child as previously ordered by this court and ... shall forthwith comply with the provisions of this Court’s Order dated January 25, 2007, and shall immediately register and enroll the parties!’] minor child at Flamingo Road Christian [Academy] for the next school session beginning January 2007.”

On March 26, 2010, Father moved once again for contempt and enforcement, contending that “[d]espite repeated requests, the Mother has willfully failed to honor the court order and failed to enroll the minor child in Flamingo Road Christian Academy.” Ultimately, the trial court granted Father’s motion for contempt and enforcement, finding

La[S]hawn P. Harris [is] in contempt of court. She is ordered to enroll [B.H.], D.O.B. 12-1-03 at Flamingo Road Christian Academy within 15 days of the date of this order. Failure to register the child as ordered shall result in the mother, La[S]hawn P. Harris[,] sentenced to 10 days in the Broward County jail. La[S]hawn P. Harris is ordered to pay attorney[’]s [fees] to Feaster Bernard Hampton in the amount of $1,878.75 within 15 days of this order.

Mother appealed.

“A judgment of contempt comes to the appellate court clothed with a presumption of correctness and will not be overturned unless a clear showing is made that the trial court either abused its discretion or departed so substantially from the essential requirements of law as to have committed fundamental error.” De-Mello v. Buckman, 914 So.2d 1090, 1093 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (citing Northstar Invs. & Dev., Inc. v. Pobaco, Inc., 691 So.2d 565, 565 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997)). “However, this court, in a specially concurring opinion, stated that ‘[a] judge cannot base contempt upon noncompliance with something an order does not say.’ ” Id. (citing Keitel v. Keitel, 716 So.2d 842, 845 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)). “Under such circumstances, the standard of review is legal error, not abuse of discretion.” Id. (citation omitted).

“Florida courts also require that in order to find an individual in contempt, the trial court must find that the contem-nor had the ability to comply with the previous court order.” Dep’t of Children & Families v. R.H., 819 So.2d 858, 862 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002) (footnote omitted). “[T]rial courts should make an express finding of ability to comply before imposing sanctions.” Fla. Coast Bank of Pompano Beach v. Mayes, 433 So.2d 1033,1036 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983); see State, Dep’t of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v. Maxwell, 667 So.2d 980, 980-81 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (reversing an order of contempt because the trial court failed to make an express finding that HRS had the ability to comply with the court’s directives).

In the instant case, the trial court failed to make an affirmative finding in its contempt order that Mother had the ability to comply with its directive. The underlying order required Mother to enroll B.H. at Flamingo Road Christian Academy within fifteen days. However, the trial court failed to make an express finding of Mother’s ability to pay the Flamingo Road Christian Academy’s tuition and fees. Accordingly, the trial court erred in issuing the contempt order without an affirmative finding as to Mother’s ability to comply.

The January 25, 2007 order declared that “[t]he parties agree to place the minor child at Flamingo Road Christian School and shall pay all required expense beyond the basic tuition by pro[-]rata share (uniforms only & books & registration fee).” The order does not require that a specific party enroll B.H., nor does it specify which party should pay tuition, or how to divide tuition costs.

Despite the lack of explicitness, in the agreed November 14, 2007 order, the trial court mandated that Mother “immediately register and enroll the parties[’] minor child at Flamingo Road Christian [Academy] for the next school session beginning January 2007.” Again, the order does not specify how B.H.’s tuition would be paid. While directing Mother to enroll B.H. may imply that she is responsible for paying tuition, “implied or inherent provisions of a final judgment cannot serve as a basis for an order of contempt.” Keitel, 716 So.2d at 844 (citations omitted).

Thus, although the trial court’s agreed amended order directs Mother to enroll B.H. at Flamingo Road Christian Academy, the trial court’s contempt order fails to make an express finding of Mother’s ability to comply with this directive. Accordingly, we reverse the order granting Father’s motion for contempt and enforcement and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Reversed and Remanded.

TAYLOR and LEVINE, JJ., concur.


author: DAMOORGIAN, J.

text:
    K.I., the Mother, Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, Appellee.
    No. 4D11-298.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    Oct. 5, 2011.

      Philip J. Massa, Regional Counsel, and J. Patrick Reynolds, Assistant Regional Counsel, Office of Criminal Conflict and Civil Regional Counsel, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Carolyn Schwarz, Assistant Attorney General, Fort Lauderdale, for appellee.
   DAMOORGIAN, J.

Appellant, K.I. (“the mother”), timely appeals a final order transferring jurisdiction from Florida to Virginia for purposes of determining the placement of K.I.’s minor daughter, V.D. (“the child”), in a dependency case. The mother raises several issues relating to whether the circuit court abused its discretion in its determination that the State of Virginia was the proper forum to address modification of the placement of the child.

Our decision is expressly governed by the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (“UCCJEA”), sections 61.501-542, Florida Statutes (2010). The UCCJEA was enacted in part to “[ajvoid jurisdictional competition and conflict with courts of other states in matters of child custody....” § 61.502(1), Fla. Stat. (2010). The court that has initial child custody jurisdiction to decide child placement under the UCCJEA is “the home state of the child on the date of the commencement of the proceeding.” § 61.514(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (2010). However, the court of another state may exercise temporary jurisdiction in an emergency situation to protect a child even though the court with initial custody jurisdiction has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction. Steckler v. Steckler, 921 So.2d 740, 743 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006). Both Florida and Virginia have adopted versions of the UCCJEA and both versions include a temporary emergency jurisdiction provision. See § 61.517, Fla. Stat. (2010); Va.Code Ann. § 20-146.15 (2010). We affirm on all but one issue.

Proceedings regarding the dependency of the child began in 2001 in Broward County, Florida. The child originally lived in Florida with her mother. The child was later adjudicated dependent and the Department of Children and Families (“DCF”) placed the child in the custody of her father in Pennsylvania. The father eventually moved to Virginia with the child. The mother was granted visitation. In 2003, the Florida trial court entered an order granting DCF’s motion to terminate protective supervision of the child and authorized custody to remain with her father. The court expressly retained jurisdiction over the cause. In 2010, the father was arrested for alleged child abuse in Virginia, and the child was placed in the care of the paternal aunt in Virginia.

In response to the father’s arrest, the mother filed an emergency motion in the Florida trial court seeking to reopen the dependency case in order to have the child returned to Florida and placed in her custody. DCF filed a corresponding motion arising out of the allegations concerning the father. In response to the motions, the Florida court entered a temporary emergency order requiring the return of the child. Thereafter, the Virginia court conducted a hearing to register and enforce the Florida temporary court order. Present at the hearing were child advocates from ChildNet, who were assigned the responsibility of returning the child to Florida, as well as the child, the guardian ad litem, and several representatives from the Virginia Department of Human Services. The mother was not present at this hearing. She stated that she was not notified of the hearing in Virginia and the record does not indicate otherwise. The Florida trial judge participated in the hearing via telephone.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the Virginia court found that it was in the best interest of the child to stay in Virginia, where she had been living for the past ten years with her aunt, who was willing to keep the child. The Virginia court denied the motion to register and enforce the Florida trial court order. Upon consideration of the proceedings before the Virginia court, the Florida trial judge concluded that it was in the best interest of the child that Virginia take jurisdiction over this cause.

Thereafter, the Florida trial court held a hearing in Broward County and entered an order terminating Florida’s jurisdiction of the matter based in part on the findings made during the hearing in Virginia. The mother was present at this hearing. This appeal of the final order terminating jurisdiction followed.

The mother first argues that the only proper forum for proceedings regarding the modification of the child’s placement is Florida, where jurisdiction was expressly retained. We disagree.

The Virginia trial court was authorized to exercise emergency jurisdiction under Virginia’s temporary emergency jurisdiction provision. Although Florida had initial custody jurisdiction, the child was allegedly abused by the father while she was in Virginia, which gave Virginia temporary jurisdiction to protect the child given the emergency situation. Accordingly, the trial court in Virginia was authorized to modify Florida’s custody determination for the best interest of the child given the emergency situation. See § 61.517, Fla. Stat. (2010); Ya.Code Ann. § 20-146.15 (2010).

The mother next argues that the trial court improperly transferred jurisdiction to Virginia on the grounds that Virginia was the more convenient forum. DCF counters that the trial court properly exercised its discretion under the UCCJEA. We review the trial court’s order and its determination that Virginia was the more convenient forum for abuse of discretion. Steckler, 921 So.2d at 744.

The UCCJEA provides that a court with jurisdiction over a custody cause may decline to exercise that jurisdiction if the court “determines that it is an inconvenient forum under the circumstances and that a court of another state is a more appropriate forum.” § 61.520(1), Fla. Stat. (2010). The transfer of a case from one jurisdiction to another on the ground of inconvenient forum may be raised in a motion from either party, the court, or the request of another court; provided the court follows the statutory procedures and considerations. See § 61.520(1), (2)(a)-(h).

The Florida trial court considered facts obtained during the Virginia hearing and the January 12, 2011 hearing in Broward County, including the fact that the child had been living in Virginia for approximately ten years and would be a witness in the father’s criminal proceeding, the alleged abuse occurred in Virginia, the relative willing to care for the child resided in Virginia, and the Virginia court already issued a preliminary protective order for the child. After noting these findings from the Virginia court, the trial court concluded that it was in the best interest of the child to be in the custody of her paternal aunt in Virginia. What is clear from the record is that the trial court considered all of the relevant information and properly applied the statutory factors enumerated under the UCCJEA. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in terminating jurisdiction over the child in Florida and transferring the case to Virginia.

Lastly, the mother argues that the trial court erred by denying her the opportunity to be heard in the Virginia proceedings regarding the modification of the Florida placement order of the child. It is undisputed that the mother did not receive notice of the hearing conducted by the Virginia court. On this point, DCF concedes error and we agree. “Where a court’s decision on whether to allow a sister state to exercise jurisdiction is ‘based, in whole or in part, upon conversations the judge has with the judge of a sister state, then the court must allow the parties to be present during the conversation and set forth specific findings regarding the basis for concluding that jurisdiction in a sister state is appropriate.’ ” Poliandro v. Springer, 899 So.2d 441, 444 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (quoting McDaniel v. Burton, 748 So.2d 1072, 1076 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (emphasis in original)); see also § 61.511(2), Fla. Stat. (2010) (“The court shall allow the parties to participate in the communication. If the parties elect to participate in the communication, they must be given the opportunity to present facts and legal arguments before a decision on jurisdiction is made.”).

Based upon the foregoing, we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. After due notice to all appropriate parties, including the mother, the father, and the Virginia court, the trial court should then rule on whether retaining jurisdiction in Florida is proper based on its factual findings.

Affirmed in part; Reversed in part and Remanded.

CIKLIN and LEVINE, JJ., concur.

      . Section 61.517(4), Florida Statutes provides, in pertinent part:
      A court of this state which is exercising jurisdiction under ss. 61.514-61.516, upon being informed that a child custody proceeding has been commenced in, or a child custody determination has been made by, a court of another state under a statute similar to this section shall immediately communicate with the court of that state to resolve the emergency, protect the safety of the parties and the child, and determine a period for the duration of the temporary order.
      § 61.517(4), Fla. Stat. (2010).

      . Virginia's emergency provision provides in pertinent part:
      A court of this Commonwealth has temporary emergency jurisdiction if the child is present in this Commonwealth and ... if it is necessary in an emergency to protect the child because the child ... is subjected to mistreatment or abuse....
      § 20-146.15(A), Va.Code Ann. (2010). Florida’s equivalent utilizes almost identical language. See § 61.517(1), Fla. Stat. (2010).

      . See Florida Rule of Juvenile Procedure 8.205(c), providing that "[i]f it should appear at any time that an action is pending in another state, the court may transfer jurisdiction over the action to a more convenient forum state...."

      . Section 61.520(2), Florida Statutes, provides the following factors to be considered by the trial court in determining whether another state is a more appropriate forum:
      (a) Whether domestic violence has occurred and is likely to continue in the future and which state could best protect the parties and the child; (b) The length of time the child has resided outside this state; (c) The distance between the court in this state and the court in the state that would assume jurisdiction; (d) The relative financial circumstances of the parties; (e) Any agreement of the parties as to which state should assume jurisdiction; (f) The nature and location of the evidence required to resolve the pending litigation, including testimony of the child; (g) The ability of the court of each state to decide the issue expeditiously and the procedures necessary to present the evidence; and (h) The familiarity of the court of each state with the facts and issues in the pending litigation.
      § 61.520(2)(a)-(h), Fla. Stat. (2010).


author: POLEN, J.

text:
    A.S.F., a child, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D10-1873.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    Oct. 5, 2011.

      Philip J. Massa, Regional Counsel, and Louis G. Carres, Special Assistant Conflict Counsel, Office of Criminal Conflict and Civil Regional Counsel, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Melanie Dale Surber, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
   POLEN, J.

Juvenile appellant, A.S.F., appeals the judgment of conviction and sentence of the trial court. A.S.F. was found guilty of aggravated battery and strong arm robbery, was adjudicated delinquent, and was placed in a high-risk residential facility. A.S.F. moved for judgment of dismissal because he was not definitively identified so as to warrant a conviction. We hold that the State failed to meet its burden of showing proof beyond a reasonable doubt that A.S.F. was guilty and reverse the denial of A.S.F.’s judgment of dismissal.

Victim, Rubin Roblero Santico (“Santi-co”), testified that on the date of the incident he was living at home with his mother and siblings. Santico left his home to go over to the next street to pick up money being loaned to his mother. On his way home, Santico stopped at the store to purchase beer. While at the store, he ran into his friend and two other boys he knew from school, all of whom joined him back at his home to drink the beer. At Santi-co’s home, the group sat and drank beer in the backyard. Within an hour, Santieo’s friend left while the two individuals, one of whom was A.S.F., remained at the house. An older male, unknown to Santico but friendly with the other two, arrived at the home. Santico sat in front of A.S.F. and talked to him while the other younger male was to Santico’s left. Santico did not recall any hostile conversations and simply remembered discussing school with the two younger males. While Santico was still talking to A.S.F., the other younger male and the older male were speaking in a foreign language, believed to be Guatemalan. As Santico continued speaking to A.S.F., he was grabbed by the neck from behind and hit on the head. At that time, Santico’s wallet, phone, and a gold chain were taken from him. Santico realized there was blood coming from his head. He felt a knife in that spot, removed it, put the knife in his pocket, and fainted.

Santico’s mother, Celia Santico Perez (“Perez”), was in the front of the house playing with her daughters while her son and the other boys were in the backyard. Her youngest child came to her and told her Santico had been hit. At that point, Perez saw two of the males jumping the backyard fence while the third ran through the front of the house. Perez identified A.S.F. as the one who ran out the front door. Perez did not see who attacked her son, but she blamed the two males who were at her home earlier because they had opened the gate to allow the older male inside.

Officer Knodle arrived on the scene and found Santico sitting at a table, holding his profusely bleeding head. The stab wound was at the top of the left side of Santico’s head and the assault weapon was in one of his pockets. Officer Flynn, a detective who went to the Santico-Perez home with Officer Knodle, was given A.S.F.’s and his co-defendant’s addresses. Flynn went to A.S.F.’s home and spoke with him. During that conversation, A.S.F. told Flynn that he was at Santico’s home drinking, but had left before anyone else because he was tired. He further stated that he was unaware that anything had happened. Upon making contact with the co-defendant, Flynn was advised that an unknown male showed up and got into an argument with A.S.F. At that time, the co-defendant alleged that Santico went inside and got knives, brought them outside, and told the co-defendant not to get involved in the fight between the other two. He stated that once the argument was over, everybody left Santico alone and unharmed in his backyard.

A.S.F. was arrested and charged by juvenile affidavit, along with his co-defendant, with aggravated battery and strong arm robbery. A.S.F. moved for judgment of dismissal because the varying facts resulted in no definitive identification to warrant a conviction. The court denied the motion for dismissal and both defendants were found guilty by the trial court because it found the case was proven circumstantially, satisfactorily. The court adjudicated A.S.F. delinquent based on the offenses and placed him in a high risk residential facility with conditional release. A special public defender fee of $800 was orally pronounced at trial, but the written order provided the fee was $400 instead. A.S.F. appealed the denial of his motion for dismissal and the inconsistent order of fees by the court.

“The standard of review for judgment of dismissal is the same standard we apply to review a judgment of acquittal. The denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal is reviewed de novo.” R.H. v. State, 56 So.3d 156, 157 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011) (citing J.P. v. State, 855 So.2d 1262, 1264 n. 1 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)). The court views the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, but if the evidence does not support a conviction, the motion is granted. Id. If the State is able to prove that each element of the crime existed, the motion is denied. Id.

Here, A.S.F. contended that the facts of the case failed to provide inferences that he was an involved or knowing participant of the crime.

To secure a conviction on an aider and abettor theory, the state must establish (1) that the defendant helped the person who actually committed the crime by doing or saying something that caused, encouraged, incited or otherwise assisted that person to commit the crime; and (2) that the defendant intended to participate in the crime.

Wyatt v. State, 755 So.2d 671, 673 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). To convict someone as a principal, “the defendant must have intended that the crimes be committed and have done some act to assist another in committing the crimes.” Garda v. State, 899 So.2d 447, 449 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005). To prove these elements, circumstantial evidence may be presented, but that evidence must satisfy the requisite standard of proof addressed above. See T.S. v. State, 675 So.2d 196, 198 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996).

The First District Court of Appeal supports the position that, even if A.S.F. had knowledge that an attack was imminent, it does not render him guilty of aiding and abetting. C.P.P. v. State, 479 So.2d 858, 859 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). In C.P.P., the court provided that merely knowing an offense is being committed is not equal to participating in the crime “with the requisite criminal intent.” Id. Furthermore, being present at a scene and fleeing from the scene when an offense is committed also does not sufficiently establish participation. Id. (citing J.W. v. State, 467 So.2d 796, 797 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)). Without additional evidence to eliminate the hypothesis of innocence, the trial court’s conviction must be reversed. See id.

The undisputed facts of this case show that A.S.F. was present in Santico’s backyard and drinking beer with Santico and two other males at the time Santico was attacked. Santico could not say who attacked him. Perez witnessed A.S.F. run out the front of the house while the other two escaped over the backyard fence. In its brief, the State concluded that A.S.F. must be involved because Perez found her son’s wallet on the other side of the fence after the attack. However, the transcripts from the hearing in this case contrarily provided that the co-defendant and the older male were the only ones who jumped over the fence while A.S.F. ran through the front door.

The state presented no evidence that A.S.F. had any participation in the attack and merely showed that he might have, at some point, been aware that an attack was going to occur. Absent from the evidence is any proof that A.S.F. and his co-defendant might have realized the older male’s intentions, but, in accordance with the First District’s ruling in C.P.P., that realization or mere knowledge would not even be enough to establish the requisite criminal intent.

Because the State failed to meet its burden of showing that the evidence was inconsistent with A.S.F.’s reasonable hypothesis of innocence, that he was merely present and did not participate in the crime, we reverse the denial of A.S.F.’s motion for judgment of dismissal. Since the charges will be dismissed, no special public defender fee may be imposed on remand.

Reversed and Remanded.

WARNER, J., and EHRLICH, MERRILEE, Associate Judge, concur.


text:
    Andrea S. STEFFENS, as surviving spouse of decedent, and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Steffens, Appellant, v. Denise EVANS, as parent and natural guardian of S.S. and A.S., minors, Appellee.
    No. 4D10-2467.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    Oct. 5, 2011.
    Mark R. Manceri of Mark R. Manceri, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for appellant.
    Andrew K. Fein of Minerley Fein, P.A., Boca Raton, for appellee.
   HAZOURI, J.

Andrea S. Steffens appeals the May 4, 2010 order determining beneficiaries in the estate of her husband, the decedent, Jeffrey E. Steffens. The petition was filed by Denise Evans, Jeffrey’s former wife, in her capacity as parent and natural guardian of S.S. and A.S., Jeffrey’s minor children. The order determined that Andrea waived all of her beneficial rights under Jeffrey’s last will and testament. On appeal, Andrea raises three issues: (1) the probate court erred in ruling that she waived her rights as a beneficiary under the will by executing the Post-Nuptial Agreement; (2) the probate court erred in refusing to allow her to present evidence; and (3) the probate court erred in failing to follow the procedures for adversary proceedings under the probate rules. We affirm, finding her issues to be without merit, and write only to address Andrea’s first challenge.

On January 4, 2002, Jeffrey executed his last will and testament. At the time he executed his will, Jeffrey was married to Andrea, and he named her as a substantial beneficiary. The parties then contemplated separating, and on June 6, 2007, entered into a Posh-Nuptial Agreement. Andrea and Jeffrey remained married upon his death on January 9, 2009.

Under the provisions of the Posh-Nuptial Agreement, both parties agreed to waive the following rights:

Each party freely and voluntarily irrevocably waives all rights in the earnings, property and estate of the other as well as any right to alimony, support or any other monetary relief in the event of a dissolution of marriage or death, except as specifically provided herein.
4. WAIVER OF RIGHTS AGAINST SEPARATE PROPERTY.
4.1 Except as is otherwise specifically provided in this Agreement, each party waives, relinquishes and releases all right, title and interest in and to any and all of the other party’s separate property (See Section 5) to which each party may otherwise be entitled as the spouse of the other party, widow or widower, heir at law, next of kin or distributee, upon or by virtue of a termination of the marriage of the parties by death, divorce, dissolution of marriage, annulment or otherwise, including, but not by way of limitation:
4.1.1 Such rights as dower or curtesy, and statutory or other allowances to a spouse of a decedent;
4.1.2 Distribution by way of intestacy, special equity, division of property, inheritance, equitable distribution, and descent and distribution;
4.1.3 Preference of appointment as personal representative, guardian or curator of the estate of the other;
4.1.4 Rights of election to share in the estate of the other;
4.1.5 The rights of a surviving spouse to homestead; exempt property and family allowance, or any or all of the foregoing. As to “homestead real estate”, in Florida if a party is a permanent resident of Florida and owns and resides in a residence in Florida, then and in such event that residence will be considered a “homestead” under Florida law. During the owning party’s lifetime, if the owning party desires to convey the homestead the joinder of his or her spouse is required in any such convey-anee. Therefore, the non-owning party agrees to execute any instrument of conveyance at the owning party’s request. At the owning party’s death, if he or she is survived by a spouse, the surviving spouse is entitled to a life estate in any such homestead. The parties hereto acknowledge that they fully understand the rights he and she would have in the homestead under Florida law and waive those rights by this Agreement and specifically this Section 4.1.5.
4.2 The waiver contained herein is to be broadly construed pursuant to Section 732.702, Florida Statutes.

Following Jeffrey’s death, on January 27, 2009, Andrea filed a petition for administration. The probate court then entered an order admitting the will to probate and appointing Andrea the personal representative. On February 4, 2010, Denise filed a petition to determine beneficiaries, contending that section four of the Post-Nuptial Agreement contained a broad, reciprocal waiver in which Andrea waived all rights to Jeffrey’s separate property and estate. The probate court agreed and entered an order determining that “[t]he application of Paragraph 4.1 of the Post-Nuptial Agreement and Florida Statutes Section 732.702 creates a waiver of all of the Surviving Spouse’s rights under the Decedent’s will.” Andrea appealed.

“Generally, interpretation of a document, such as a written contract, is a question of law rather than of fact.” Port-A-Weld, Inc. v. Padula & Wadsworth Constr., Inc., 984 So.2d 564, 568 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (citing Peacock Constr. Co. v. Modem Air Conditioning, Inc., 353 So.2d 840, 842 (Fla.1977)). “[P]ure questions of law ... are reviewed de novo.” Sumner Group, Inc. v. M.C. Distributee, Inc., 949 So.2d 1205, 1206 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (citing Knight v. Winn, 910 So.2d 310, 312 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005)).

In the instant case, the probate court did not err in determining that Andrea waived her right to be a beneficiary under the will by executing the Post-Nuptial Agreement. Section 732.702(1), Florida Statutes (2007), states that

The rights of a surviving spouse to an elective share, intestate share, preter-mitted share, homestead, exempt property, family allowance, and preference in appointment as personal representative of an intestate estate or any of those rights, may be waived, wholly or partly, before or after marriage, by a written contract, agreement, or waiver, signed by the waiving party in the presence of two subscribing witnesses.... Unless the waiver provides to the contrary, a waiver of “all rights, or equivalent language, in the property or estate of a present or prospective spouse, or a complete property settlement entered into after, or in anticipation of, separation, dissolution of marriage, or divorce, is a waiver of all rights to elective share, intestate share, pretermitted share, homestead, exempt property, family allowance, and preference in appointment as personal representative of an intestate estate, by the waiving party in the property of the other and a renunciation by the waiving party of all benefits that would otherwise pass to the waiving party from the other by intestate succession or by the provisions of any will executed before the written contract, agreement, or waiver.

§ 732.702(1), Fla. Stat. (2007) (emphasis added). Tracking the language in section 732.702(1), the Post-Nuptial Agreement refers to the parties waiving “all rights” several times:

Each party freely and voluntarily irrevocably waives all rights in the earnings, property and estate of the other as well as any right to alimony, support or any other monetary relief in the event of a dissolution of marriage or death, except as specifically provided herein.
4.1 Except as is otherwise specifically provided in this Agreement, each party waives, relinquishes and releases all right, title and interest in and to any and all of the other party’s separate property (See Section 5) to which each party may otherwise be entitled as the spouse of the other party, widow or widower, heir at law, next of kin or distributee, upon or by virtue of a termination of the marriage of the parties by death, divorce, dissolution of marriage, annulment or otherwise....
4.2 The waiver contained herein is to be broadly construed pursuant to Section 732.702, Florida Statutes.

(emphasis added.) Accordingly, as Jeffrey’s 2002 will was executed before the parties’ 2007 Post-Nuptial Agreement, the Post-Nuptial Agreement waived any benefits that would have passed to Andrea under the 2002 will.

The Third District reached a similar result in Hulsh v. Hulsh, 431 So.2d 658 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983). In Hulsh, the court examined whether the language of a post-will antenuptial agreement between the decedent and the widow was effective to waive the widow’s right to take under the will. Hulsh, 431 So.2d at 660. Three days before the parties’ marriage, they agreed to

expressly waive all rights which they might otherwise have or claim under the laws of the State of Florida, or any other jurisdiction, to the property of the other, including any such rights which might be claimed under the laws of dower, courtesy [sic], or the elective share of a spouse, or in any other manner by operation of law, and each hereby releases all marital property rights, including but not limited to homestead rights under the laws of the State of Florida or any other jurisdiction.

Id. at 661. Ultimately, relying on section 732.702(1), the court determined that it had “no difficulty in deciding that the language of the antenuptial agreement was sufficient to waive Marcella’s rights to take under the provisions of Sheldon Hulsh’s will.” Id. at 662 (footnote omitted). Similarly, we find that the language of the Post-Nuptial Agreement waived Andrea’s rights to take under the provisions of Jeffrey’s will.

Lastly, while Andrea cites section six of the Post-Nuptial Agreement as reserving her right to receive property under Jeffrey’s will, this is incorrect. Section six states:

Notwithstanding the terms of this Agreement, either party shall have the right to voluntarily transfer or convey to the other party any property or interest therein, whether Separate Property or other property, which may be lawfully conveyed or transferred during his or her lifetime, or by will or otherwise upon death. Neither party intends by this Agreement to limit or restrict in any way the right and power of the other to receive any such voluntary transfer or conveyance. Such gifts shall not constitute an amendment to or other change in this Agreement, regardless of the extent or frequency of such gifts. Any gifts given by one party to the other hereafter shall constitute the receiving party’s separate property.

(emphasis added.) Thus, section six unambiguously refers to transfers of property after the 2007 Post-Nuptial Agreement and would not reserve Andrea’s beneficiary rights under the 2002 will.

Therefore, the trial court did not err in ruling that Andrea waived her right as a beneficiary under Jeffrey’s will in the Post>-Nuptial Agreement. Accordingly, we affirm the order determining beneficiaries.

Affirmed.

TAYLOR and LEVINE, JJ., concur.


text:
    George C. GRIMSLEY, Appellant, v. MOODY, JONES, INGINO & MOREHEAD, P.A., and General Motors Acceptance Corporation, a/k/a GMAC, Appellees.
    No. 4D10-4544.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    Oct. 5, 2011.

      George C. Grimsley, West Palm Beach, pro se.
    Michael J. Ingino of Moody, Jones, Ingi-no & Morehead, P.A., Plantation, for ap-pellees.
   HAZOURI, J.

George C. Grimsley (“Grimsley”) appeals the trial court’s grant of summary final judgment in favor of General Motors Acceptance Corporation (“GMAC”). We affirm the summary final judgment and remand back to the trial court to correct a scrivener’s error.

Grimsley filed an amended complaint against Moody, Jones, Ingino & Morehead, P.A. (“Moody”) and GMAC, alleging negligence and violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. GMAC filed a counter-claim against Grimsley, seeking $5689.15 in damages for Grimsley’s default on a motor lease agreement. GMAC then moved for summary final judgment and Grimsley filed a response.

Ultimately, the trial court entered summary final judgment in favor of GMAC. The trial court included a handwritten note at the bottom of the typed order granting summary final judgment which stated that “[t]he court considered the opposition filed by A [defendant] as well as payments. As a matter of law, there are issues of a material fact.”

“The standard of review of an order granting summary judgment is de novo.” Bender v. CareGivers of Am., Inc., 42 So.3d 893, 894 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (quoting Mobley v. Gilbert E. Hirschberg, P.A., 915 So.2d 217, 218 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005)). ‘When a defendant moves for summary judgment, the court is not called upon to determine whether the plaintiff can actually prove his cause of action.” Id. at 894 (quoting Winston Park, Ltd. v. City of Coconut Creek, 872 So.2d 415, 418 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) (citations omitted)). Rather, the court’s role is to determine whether the record conclusively shows that the moving party proved a negative, that is, “the nonexistence of a genuine issue of a material fact.” Id. (citation omitted).

In the instant case, the trial court did not err in granting summary final judgment in GMAC’s favor. Grims-ley does not dispute that he surrendered the subject vehicle prior to the lease’s termination date and that a resulting balance was due and owing to GMAC. Rather, Grimsley argues the existence of issues of material fact which are not material to GMAC’s claim for damages. “Issues of nonmaterial facts are irrelevant to the summary judgment determination.” Cont’l Concrete, Inc. v. Lakes at La Paz III Ltd. P’ship, 758 So.2d 1214, 1217 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (citing Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510(c)). While the trial court included a handwritten note at the bottom of its typed order granting summary final judgment stating “[a]s a matter of law, there are issues of a material fact,” it appears that the trial court omitted an important word, intending to write there are no issues of a material fact.

Accordingly, we affirm the summary final judgment and remand to the trial court with directions that the scrivener’s error be corrected with an amended summary final judgment nunc pro tunc to October 6, 2010.

Affirmed and Remanded.

TAYLOR and LEVINE, JJ., concur.


text:
    Dennis STURGEON, Appellant, v. C & L BUS COMPANY, Appellee.
    No. 4D10-3766.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    Oct. 5, 2011.
    Stewart Lee Karlin of the Karlin Law Group, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for appellant.
    John J. Shahady of Yoss LLP, Fort Lauderdale, for appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. See Curbelo v. Ullman, 571 So.2d 443 (Fla.1990); Harrison v. La Placida Cmty. Ass’n, Inc., 665 So.2d 1138 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996).

MAY, C.J., STEVENSON and CIKLIN, JJ., concur.


text:
    STATE of Florida, Petitioner, v. Subi TITUS, Respondent.
    No. 4D11-2702.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    Oct. 5, 2011.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Georgina Jimenez-Orosa, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for petitioner.
    Thomas P. O’Connell of Thomas P. O’Connell, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

The State seeks certiorari relief following the trial court’s June 23, 2011 order granting defendant Subi Titus’s motion to disclose the identity of a confidential informant. Titus did not file an affidavit until July 27, 2011 — one month after the order issued. The trial court never considered sworn allegations. We, therefore, find that the trial court departed from the essential requirements of the law when it granted disclosure without having sworn allegations of a legally cognizable defense before it. State v. Carter, 29 So.3d 1217, 1219 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010). We make no determination of Titus’s entrapment defense, on the merits, as doing so would be premature.

We quash the trial court’s order mandating disclosure of the confidential informant’s identity. The court may make new findings based upon sworn allegations in which to determine whether the defendant has met his “burden of showing that disclosure of the Cl’s identity is necessary to a specific and available defense .... ” State v. Rivas, 25 So.3d 647, 651 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010). If so, the court should then, “conduct an in camera hearing to determine if the Cl has anything relevant and helpful to say before ordering disclosure of the Cl’s identity.” Id.

Petition granted.

MAY, C.J., POLEN and CONNER, JJ., concur.


author: WEIMER, Justice. VICTORY, J., CLARK, J., VICTORY, J., WEIMER, Justice,

text:
    Mitchell S. GLASGOW, Et Al. v. PAR MINERALS CORPORATION, Et Al.
    No. 2010-C-2011.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 10, 2011.
    Dissenting and Concurring Opinions on Denial of Rehearing July 14, 2011.
    Broussard & Hart, LLC, Randall Earl Hart, Lake Charles, LA, for Applicant.
    Lebas Law Offices, APLC, Gordon Van Greig, Mayer, Smith & Roberts, LLP, Steven Eric Soileau, Shreveport, LA, for Respondent.
   WEIMER, Justice.

| We granted certiorari in this case to determine whether a lawsuit against a worker’s statutory employer can interrupt prescription against an alleged third-party tortfeasor. Answering that inquiry in the affirmative, we find that the lower courts erred in sustaining the alleged third-party tortfeasor’s exception of prescription. Accordingly, we reverse the decisions of both lower courts and remand this matter to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This case arises from a fire at an oil well site which left Mitchell Glasgow severely burned. The oil well accident occurred on September 27, 2007.

At the time, Mr. Glasgow was directly employed by Therral Story Well Service (TSWS). Mineral owners had contracted with another company, PAR Minerals, Inc., to produce oil and gas. In turn, PAR Minerals contracted with Mr. Glasgow’s direct employer, TSWS, to drill a well. PAR Minerals also contracted with Pipe Services Unlimited, Inc. to complete the well.

|aMr. Glasgow filed a tort suit against PAR Minerals and its insurer on September 4, 2008. According to Mr. Glasgow’s original petition, during drilling operations, the well penetrated into formations that were pressurized with hydrocarbons. Mr. Glasgow was circulating water through the well while awaiting heavier drilling mud to be pumped into the well to control the hydrocarbon pressure. Mr. Glasgow’s direct supervisor, a TSWS employee, told Mr. Glasgow to stand away from the well because the pressure was dangerous. But, PAR Minerals’ “on-site supervisor ... countermanded that order, and told Petitioner GLASGOW to get on his station at the pump, and to abandon his station only after shutting the pump off should the gas escape the well. Petitioner followed Defendant PAR’S orders.” Then, “after only a few more minutes, hydrocarbon gas from down-hole escaped from the water tank sufficiently so that it ignited as Petitioner was attempting to shut off the pump. The ignited hydrocarbon gas cloud set Petitioner MITCHELL GLASGOW on fire.”

On September 10, 2008, less than one year after the well accident, service of process of the lawsuit was made on PAR Minerals. During discovery, Mr. Glasgow learned that the person he believed was “PAR’S on-site supervisor” was actually an independent contractor employed by the contractor’s own corporation, Pipe Services, Inc. On May 4, 2009, Mr. Glasgow named Pipe Services as a defendant in a supplemental and amended petition.

At the time Pipe Services was named as a defendant, Mr. Glasgow was receiving workers’ compensation benefits from his direct employer, TSWS.

On June 17, 2009, PAR Minerals filed a motion for summary judgment. PAR Minerals alleged that it was Mr. Glasgow’s “statutory employer” under LSA-R.S. |¾23:1061. Because a statutory employer is immune from tort liability, argued PAR Minerals, it should be dismissed from Mr. Glasgow’s tort lawsuit.

The district court granted PAR Minerals’ motion, and dismissed PAR Minerals from the lawsuit. Though there are no extensive reasons in the record, the district court apparently agreed (and the parties do not now dispute) that PAR Minerals was Mr. Glasgow’s statutory employer.

Shortly after the district court granted PAR Minerals’ motion for summary judgment, Pipe Services filed an exception of prescription. In its exception, Pipe Services cited the fact that the district court found PAR Minerals to be “the statutory employer of Mitchell Glasgow, and [to be] immune from tort liability.” Citing also the fact that Pipe Services was not named as a defendant until more than a year after the accident, Pipe Services argued that based on PAR Minerals being “immune from tort liability,” that “[t]here was no timely suit against a joint tortfeasor to interrupt prescription and plaintiffs’ claims have thus prescribed.” In other words, because Mr. Glasgow named Pipe Services as a defendant more than one year from his accident, the general prescriptive period of one year now rendered Mr. Glasgow’s claims against Pipe Services untimely. Prescription could not be interrupted for Mr. Glasgow’s claim against Pipe Services under the principle that timely suit against one tortfeasor (here PAR Minerals) interrupts prescription against another tortfeasor (here Pipe Services), given that the district court had ruled that PAR Minerals was immune from a suit in tort.

The district court agreed, ruling that Mr. Glasgow’s claim against Pipe Services was prescribed. Mr. Glasgow appealed.

14A majority of a panel of the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, affirmed the judgment of the district court. Glasgow v. PAR Minerals Corp., 2010-64 (La.App. B Cir. 7/28/10), 43 So.3d 1093. The majority held that Mr. Glasgow’s petition was prescribed on its face; that prescription was not interrupted as to Pipe Services because Pipe Services was not solidarily liable with PAR Minerals as “[n]o workers’ compensation action was ever brought against PAR.” Glasgow, 2010-64 at 4, 7, 43 So.2d at 1096, 1097-1098. The majority further held that “because PAR was immune from liability based in tort, no soli-dary liability existed between Pipe Services and PAR.” Id., 2010-64 at 7, 43 So.3d at 1098.

One member of the appellate court panel dissented. Judge Pickett observed that Mr. Glasgow’s “Motion and Order for De-volutive Appeal” identified a ruling signed on December 28, 2009, as the basis for the appeal. That ruling was a venue ruling, Judge Pickett noted, but the ruling on prescription was a different ruling altogether and was signed on December 7, 2009. Judge Pickett would have dismissed the appeal because the motion did not identify the prescription judgment that Mr. Glasgow briefed as being in error. Glasgow, 2010-64 at 1, 43 So.3d at 1098 (Pickett, J. dissenting).

We granted certiorari to address Mr. Glasgow’s contention that because he filed suit against a solidary obligor and effected service within the prescriptive period against that obligor, prescription was thus interrupted against another solidary obli-gor, and his lawsuit should not have been dismissed as untimely.

|,LAW AND DISCUSSION

A lawsuit for personal injury is subject to a one-year period of liberative prescription, following the date of accident, pursuant to LSA-C.C. art. 3492. According to Mr. Glasgow’s petition, the accident that gave rise to Mr. Glasgow’s injuries occurred on September 27, 2007. By a supplemental and amending petition, Mr. Glasgow named Pipe Services as a defendant on May 4, 2009, more than one year later. As a result, the supplemental and amending petition on its face revealed that prescription had run, and it was Mr. Glasgow’s burden to demonstrate why his claim had not prescribed. Denoux v. Vessel Management Services, Inc., 07-2143, p. 5 (La.5/21/08), 983 So.2d 84, 88; Lima v. Schmidt, 595 So.2d 624, 628 (La.1992).

The jurisprudence recognizes three theories upon which a plaintiff may rely to establish that prescription has not run: suspension, interruption, and renunciation. Lima, 595 So.2d at 628. In this case, Mr. Glasgow relies upon the theory of interruption to argue that his claim is not prescribed.

Mr. Glasgow’s theory of interruption is based upon two provisions of the Civil Code. The first, LSA-C.C. art. 3462, in pertinent part, provides:

If action is commenced in an incompetent court, or in an improper venue, prescription is interrupted only as to a defendant served by process within the prescriptive period.

Indisputably, the latter part of Article 3462 is met here because Mr. Glasgow filed suit against and effected service upon PAR Minerals within the one-year prescriptive period. The parties are not, however, in apparent agreement on the initial |^threshold excerpted above, i.e., the commencement of a lawsuit “in an incompetent court.” This case calls upon us to determine whether commencing a tort lawsuit against a party that is immune from tort liability satisfies this threshold. Guided by civilian methodology, we find this threshold met.

Civilian methodology and the Louisiana Civil Code instruct that the sources of law are legislation and custom, and that legislation is the superior source of law. LSA-C.C. arts. 1, 3. Legislation, which is defined as the solemn expression of legislative will, LSA-C.C. art. 2, is to be interpreted according to the rules set forth in the Civil Code. Chief among those rules is the admonition in LSA-C.C. art. 9 that “[w]hen a law is clear and unambiguous and its application does not lead to absurd consequences, the law shall be applied as written and no further interpretation may be made in search of the intent of the legislature.” Additionally, LSA-C.C. art. 11 instructs that “[t]he words of a law must be given their generally prevailing meaning.”

In our analysis of the meaning of the term “an incompetent court,” we initially note that the term is cast in the negative and the term is not defined in the Civil Code or in the Code of Civil Procedure. The opposite term, cast in the positive, i.e. “competent court,” is defined in the Code of Civil Procedure: “ ‘Competent court’, or ‘court of competent jurisdiction’, means a court which has jurisdiction over the subject matter of, and is the proper venue for, the action or proceeding.” LSA-C.C.P. art. 5251. By inference, an “incompetent court” certainly means a court lacking subject matter jurisdiction, because LSA-C.C.P. art. 5251 lists subject matter jurisdiction among the requirements for being competent. But because this meaning is supplied by inference, and because the Civil Code itself does not define either a competent court or an incompetent court, the term we are called upon here to apply 17(“incompetent court”) may have a broader meaning than simply referring to a court lacking subject matter jurisdiction.

We leave the full breadth of the term “incompetent court” for determination another day. For this case, it is sufficient for us to observe as a “generally prevailing meaning” called for by LSA-C.C. art. 11 that the district court would not have been competent to render a tort judgment against a party that is immune from tort. The legislature has removed the possibility of a tort remedy against statutory employers. See LSA-R.S. 23:1032(A) (“compensation under this Chapter, shall be exclusive of all other rights, remedies and claims for damages”). As a matter of plain meaning, “incompetent” is defined as “not qualified to act in a particular capacity.” New OxfoRD American Dictionary 880 (3rd ed.2010). Our state constitution also underscores that a district court would be incompetent to render the only remedy available from a statutory employer, because only the Office of Workers’ Compensation is qualified in the first instance to award the exclusive remedy of worker’s compensation benefits. See La. Const, art. V, § 16(A).

By commencing a tort lawsuit against and effectuating service upon PAR Minerals within the prescriptive period of one year, Mr. Glasgow thereby successfully interrupted prescription as to PAR Minerals even though PAR Minerals ultimately proved to be immune to a tort claim. But interrupting prescription as to PAR Minerals does not render timely the claim against Pipe Services, a claim which was added more than one year after Mr. Glasgow’s accident, unless the law makes the interruption effective as to Pipe Services also.

Mr. Glasgow, therefore, turns a second time to the Civil Code, and argues that the Civil Code’s treatment of solidary obligors transfers the interruption of | ¡^prescription effective for his claim against PAR Minerals directly to his claim against Pipe Services. We agree.

In pertinent part, LSA-C.C. art. 1799 provides: “The interruption of prescription against one solidary obligor is effective against all solidary obligors.” The Civil Code restates this provision in LSA-C.C. art. 3503: ‘When prescription is interrupted against a solidary obligor, the interruption is effective against all solidary obli-gors.” This court has already interpreted LSA-C.C. arts. 1799 and 3503 to apply to the situation when a first party sued is liable for workers’ compensation benefits (and is immune from tort liability), but a party later sued is allegedly liable in tort. See Williams v. Sewerage & Water Bd. of New Orleans, 611 So.2d 1383 (La.1993).

In Williams, this court explained that obligors are solidary when “each ... is ‘obliged to the same thing.’ ” Williams, 611 So.2d at 1387, quoting Hoefly v. Government Employees Insurance Co., 418 So.2d 575, 576 (La.1982). A defendant obligated for workers’ compensation benefits because the defendant is an employer is a solidary obligor along with an alleged tort-feasor: “In a worker’s compensation claim where the employee does not suffer a fatal injury, some elements of compensation damages are the same as those which may be recovered as tort damages, i.e. lost wages and medical expenses.” Williams, 611 So.2d at 1387. Even though workers’ compensation and tort remedies have different legislative sources, that does not alter the solidary relationship between a defendant with employer status and a defendant that is an alleged tortfeasor. “ ‘It is the coextensiveness of the obligations for the same debt, and not the source of liability, that determines the | nsolidarity of the obligation.’ Thus, to the extent that the worker’s compensation death benefits and the wrongful death and survival provisions overlap, [the employer] and [alleged tortfeasor] are obligated to the same thing even though the obligations arise from different sources.” Williams, 611 So.2d at 1388, quoting Narcise v. Illinois Central Gulf Railroad Co., 427 So.2d 1192, 1195 (La.1983).

Pipe Services argues that this case is distinguishable from Williams such that no solidary relationship can exist between Pipe Services and PAR Minerals. Pipe Services emphasizes that workers’ compensation benefits have been voluntarily provided by Mr. Glasgow’s direct employer, TSWS, and that there has been no lawsuit against PAR Minerals for workers’ compensation benefits. Pipe Services argues that the fact that benefits have been paid voluntarily and the fact there has been no lawsuit for compensation benefits render Williams inapplicable under this pronouncement: “we hold a suit timely filed against the employer for workers’ compensation interrupted the prescription as to the subsequent claim against the third party tort-feasor for damages.” Williams, 611 So.2d at 1390.

The language just quoted reflected the facts and procedural posture before us in Williams, as there was a lawsuit for workers’ compensation benefits. Notwithstanding, Pipe Services’ argument would have us ignore the reasoning of Williams, which bears repeating here because it applies with greater force in this case than when we first said it: “It is the coexten-siveness of the obligations for the same debt, and not the source of liability, that determines the solidarity of the obligation.” Williams, 611 So.2d at 1388, quoting Narcise v. Illinois Central Gulf Railroad Co., 427 So.2d 1192, 1195 (La.1983) (emphasis added).

This reasoning now applies with greater force because the year after this court, in Narcise, ruled that the source of liability was immaterial for establishing solidary liability, the legislature promoted that ruling to an article of the Civil Code: “An obligation may be solidary though it derives from a different source for each obli-gor.” LSA-C.C. art. 1797 (1984 La. Acts No. 331, § 1). See also LSA-C.C. art. 1797, cmt. (a) “This Article is new. It restates a principle developed by the Louisiana jurisprudence.” Therefore, whether the source of the obligation was voluntary or not, the fact that an obligation existed to provide workers’ compensation benefits meant that for purposes of prescription, the alleged tortfeasor and the employer were solidary obligors.

Pipe Services also argues that Williams should be overruled, because an amendment to La. Const, art. V, § 16(A), effective after the events in Williams, now provides for workers’ compensation claims to be brought, not in a district court (as was the case in Williams), but in the Office of Workers’ Compensation. In brief, Pipe Services further argues: “There are no workers’ compensation ‘lawsuits’ .... The workers’ compensation ‘claim’, a.k.a. the 1008, is filed at an administrative office and not a courthouse. This court should reconsider the opinion of Ad Hoc Justice Shortess in Williams v. Sewerage & Water Board of New Orleans. It no_|_ylonger is viable in light of the fact the workers’ compensation claims are not filed in court. Williams should be overruled.”

We find this argument also relies on distinguishing “the source of the obligation” as a rationale to thwart solidary liability. Though Pipe Services does not explain why it should matter here, Pipe Services’s argument suggests that there is some inherent difference between an obligation arising from adjudication by a district court, and an obligation arising from adjudication by an administrative agency. Aside from observing a lack of support for this argument, we find Pipe Services’ argument to be inconsistent with the law of solidary liability. See LSA-C.C. art. 1797 (“An obligation may be solidary though it derives from a different source for each obligor.”). Given that Article 1797 has been retained in the Civil Code, Pipe Services fails to persuade that the legislature intended to change the nature of solidary liability when the legislature proposed and the voters amended La. Const, art. V, § 16(A) to allow workers’ compensation claims to be brought before an administrative agency instead of a court.

Contrary to Pipe Services’ argument, it is also of no moment that Mr. Glasgow’s petition enumerates tort damages rather than workers’ compensation benefits. “Louisiana has chosen a system of fact pleading.... Therefore, it is not necessary for a plaintiff to plead the theory of his case in the petition.” Wright v. Louisiana Power & Light, 2006-1181, p. 15 (La.3/9/07), 951 So.2d 1058, 1069, citing LSA-C.C.P. art. 854, cmt. (a); Montalvo v. Sondes, 93-2813, p. 6 (La.5/23/94), 637 So.2d 127, 131; and Kizer v. Lilly, 471 So.2d 716, 719 (La.1985).

We decline, therefore, to overrule Williams v. Sewerage & Water Bd. of New Orleans, 611 So.2d 1383 (La.1993). However, from the wellworn course Williams has traveled in the jurisprudence, three panels of the courts of appeal have deviated by distinguishing Williams in a manner inconsistent with our holding here.

In Keller v. McLeod, 2003-267 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/11/04) 866 So.2d 388, plaintiff sued a statutory employer in tort but “did not file an action for workers’ compensation benefits against [the statutory employer] and therefore [plaintiff] has no other remedies against [the statutory employer];” consequently, the court found no solidary liability and no interruption of prescription. In Williams v. Holiday Inn Worldwide, 2002-0762 p. 3 (La.App. 4 Cir. 5/15/02), 816 So.2d 998, 1001, plaintiff filed a tort suit against a statutory employer. Similar to the court in Keller, the court in Holiday Inn Worldwide reasoned that because there was no compensation lawsuit, there was no solidary relationship with an alleged tortfeasor and no interruption of prescription. Id., 2002-0762 p. 8, 816 So.2d at 1001. The court similarly found no interruption of prescription in Layman v. City of New Orleans, 1998-0705, p. 3 (La.App. 4 Cir. 12/9/98) 753 So.2d 254, 256, because plaintiff “sued only for negligence damages. He did not sue for worker’s compensation benefits.”

In our review of these three cases, we find that the courts imposed pleading requirements which are inconsistent with Louisiana’s rules of pleading, or otherwise failed to recognize a solidary relationship by drawing a distinction between liability derived from workers’ compensation and liability derived from tort. The rulings of these courts are, therefore, contrary to LSA-C.C. art. 1797 (“An obligation may be solidary though it derives from a different source for each obligor.”). We overrule them here. Indeed, as in Williams itself, civilian methodology and the Civil Code again compel us to reject the proposition “that parties cannot be solidarily liable unless their liability is based upon the same cause of action” and we likewise affirm the principle that for purposes of prescription, parties “are solidarily liable to the | isextent that they share coextensive liability to repair certain elements of the same damage.” Williams, 611 So.2d at 1389.

CONCLUSION

The Civil Code provides a two-part formula for interrupting prescription in this situation: 1) a timely lawsuit (and service, if in an incompetent court; see LSA-C.C. art. 3462); and 2) a solidary relationship between a party sued within the prescriptive period and a party not sued within the prescriptive period (see LSA-C.C. art. 1799 or art. 3503). The procedural posture here is comparable to that in Williams v. Sewerage & Water Bd. of New Orleans, 611 So.2d 1383 (La.1993), except that in Williams, the suit in district court was for workers’ compensation and the suit was brought against a direct employer rather, than a statutory employer. The procedural distinctions here are without a difference, because LSA-C.C. art. 1797 provides that the source of the solidary relationship is immaterial. For this reason, to the extent Keller v. McLeod, 2003-267 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/11/04), 866 So.2d 388; Williams v. Holiday Inn Worldwide, 2002-0762 (La.App. 4 Cir. 5/15/02), 816 So.2d 998; and Layman v. City of New Orleans, 1998-0705 (La.App. 4 Cir. 12/9/98), 753 So.2d 254, are inconsistent with the conclusion that a timely lawsuit (and service, if in an incompetent court) against a principal or statutory employer interrupts prescription as to a third-party alleged tortfeasor, those cases are overruled. In the instant case, we find both parts of the formula provided by the Civil Code for interrupting prescription have been met; the lower courts erred in sustaining the alleged third-party tortfeasor’s exception of prescription. Accordingly, we reverse the decisions of both lower courts and remand this matter to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

VICTORY, J., dissents and assigns reasons.

GUIDRY, J., dissents and assigns reasons.

CLARK, J., dissents for reasons assigned by Justice VICTORY.

VICTORY, J.,

dissenting.

|,I dissent from the majority’s holding that the timely filing of a tort suit against a party that is later dismissed as the plaintiffs statutory employer interrupts prescription against an alleged third party tortfeasor. It is well-established that a suit that is timely filed against a defendant who is not liable does not interrupt prescription against other defendants who were sued too late. Vicknair v. Hibernia Building Corp., 479 So.2d 904 (La.1985). Here, the party that was timely sued is not liable in tort because it was the plaintiffs statutory employer; thus, the timely filed suit against it does not interrupt prescription as to the defendant who was sued too late.

Further, I strongly disagree that the holding of Williams v. Sewerage & Water Bd. of New Orleans, 611 So.2d 1383 (La. 1993) applies to interrupt prescription as to the late-filed defendant. In Williams, the plaintiff timely filed a workers compensation suit, and the Court held this interrupted prescription as to a subsequent claim against a third party for tort damages. First, Williams is distinguishable because here there was no timely filed workers’ compensation case against the employer, there was only a tort suit which was dismissed. Secondly, I disagree with the holding of Williams because it was based on faulty reasoning. The Court in Williams relied on Hoefly v. Government Employees Insurance Co., 418 So.2d 575 (La.1982) to hold that the workers’ compensation lawsuit interrupted suit on the tort claim because the defendants were solidarity liable. However, Hoefly actually held that solidarity exists where (1) each defendant is obligated to the same thing; (2) each obligor is liable for the whole performance; and (3) payment by one soli-dary obligor exonerates the other obligor as to the creditor. It is beyond cavil that payment of workers’ compensation benefits by the employer would not exonerate the tortfeasor as to the payment of tort damages to the plaintiff.

Finally, in my view Williams is not viable anymore because workers’ compensation claims are no longer filed in the district court, but are instead administrative proceedings filed at an Office of Workers’ Compensation. These proceedings are not a matter of public record and notice of the claim is not given to anyone except the defendant employer. Thus, the third party tortfeasor would have no notice of the timely filed workers’ compensation claim.

For the above reasons, I respectfully dissent.

GUIDRY, Justice dissents with reasons.

Lin my view, Williams v. Sewerage & Water Board of New Orleans, 611 So.2d 1383 (La.1993) is not controlling. In Williams, the plaintiff filed both tort and worker’s compensation claims against the timely sued defendant. Following the addition of other solidarily liable defendants after the one year prescriptive period had run, and the dismissal of the original tort claims, the worker’s compensation claim against at least one of the original defendants continued. In this case, after PAR Minerals was dismissed from the tort suit, the plaintiff did not file a worker’s compensation claim. Suit against the timely sued defendant did not continue and, consequently, the interruption of prescription is considered never to have occurred. La. C.C. art. 3463. Accordingly, I would affirm the court of appeal decision.

CLARK, J.,

dissenting.

hi dissent for the reasons assigned by Justice Victory.

Application for rehearing denied.

VICTORY, J.,

dissenting from the denial of rehearing.

hi dissent from the denial of rehearing for the same reasons stated in my original dissent — mainly, the employer and third party tortfeasor are not solidary obligors because they are not each liable for the whole performance. La. C.C. art. 1794 (“An obligation is solidary for the obligors when each obligor is liable for the whole performance”). Williams v. Sewerage & Water Bd. of New Orleans, 611 So.2d 1383 (La.1993) was wrong to hold otherwise, but at least in Williams a workers’ compensation suit was filed against the employer for which the employer was liable. This case extends the error of Williams by holding that prescription will be interrupted by the filing of a suit for which the timely sued defendant is not even liable, much less solidarily liable. It is this clearly erroneous aspect of the majority opinion that I write separately about today.

After being injured in a workplace well explosion on September 27, 2007, plaintiff filed a tort suit in the district court against PAR Minerals, and served it within the one year prescriptive period. On May 4, 2009, after that one-year period had elapsed, plaintiff filed a supplemental and amending petition against Pipe |2Services, claiming Pipe Services was actually the employer of the person plaintiff alleged was responsible for the accident. A month later, PAR Minerals filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing it was plaintiffs statutory employer and therefore should be dismissed from the suit because it was immune from tort liability. The court granted PAR Mineral’s motion for summary judgment, and dismissed it from the lawsuit. Thereafter, the district court granted Pipe Service’s exception of prescription, finding prescription was not interrupted because there was no timely filed suit against a joint tortfeasor or soli-dary obligor as PAR Minerals was dismissed from the suit. The court of appeal affirmed.

Even though the timely sued defendant was dismissed, a majority of this Court now finds that prescription was interrupted as to Pipe Services because a suit was timely filed and served upon PAR Minerals within the prescriptive period in an incompetent court under La. C.C. art. 3462. However, suit was filed in a court of competent jurisdiction and proper venue; it just was filed against a party who was not liable because it had a meritorious defense. This Court has long held that a timely filed suit against one defendant does not interrupt prescription against a non-timely sued defendant claimed to be solidarily liable if the timely sued defendant is dismissed from the lawsuit because it is not liable. See e.g., Renfroe v. State ex rel. Dept. of Transp. and Development, 01-1646 (La.2/26/02), 809 So.2d 947, 950; Etienne v. National Auto Ins. Co., 99-2610 (La.4/25/00), 759 So.2d 51; Miller v. 708 So.2d 418; Rizer v. American Sur. and Fidelity Ins. Co., 95-1200 (La.3/8/96), 669 So.2d 387; Younger v. Marshall Industries, Inc., 618 So.2d 866, 869 (La.1993); Picone v. Lyons, 601 So.2d 1375 (La.1992); Spott v. Otis Elevator Co., 601 So.2d 1355 (La.1992); Pearson v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 281 So.2d 724, 726 (La.1973). The reason for this is that the party dismissed is not obligated at all to pay the damages sought in the lawsuit; therefore, he cannot possibly be solidarity obligated with the late-filed defendant. See La. C.C. art. 1794 (in order for an obligation to be solidary, each obligor must be “liable for the whole performance”); Renfroe, supra (“a suit timely filed against one defendant does not interrupt prescription as against other defendants not timely sued, where the timely sued defendant is ultimately found not liable to plaintiffs, since no joint or solidary obligation would exist”). Even when the timely sued defendant is found not liable after a trial on the merits, the non-timely sued defendant may re-urge his exception of prescription at that time. Younger, supra at 869; Frank L. Maraist, Louisiana Civil Laiv Treatise: Vol. 1, Civil Procedure, § 6.7, p. 177, n. 90 (2nd Ed.2008). This Court has often remanded cases with the caveat that if the timely served defendant is ultimately dismissed because it is found to be not liable, the late served defendant can re-urge his exception of prescription at that time. See e.g., McDaniels v. Allison, supra. Here, PAR Minerals was found to be immune from liability on summary judgment and was dismissed; therefore, the trial court Rivers, 98-1086 (La.6/5/98), 720 So.2d 673; McDaniels v. Allison, 97-2572 (La.4/9/98), correctly granted Pipe Services’ exception of prescription.

Instead of addressing the above line of cases, the majority talks about “fact pleading” in this matter it labeled a “tort suit,” Op. at pp. 766, 769, stating it is of “no enumerates tort damages rather than workers’ compensation benefits,” because “it is not necessary for the plaintiff to plead the theory of his case in the petition.” Op. at 771. Apparently it does this in an attempt to say that this tort suit should also be construed as a workers’ compensation suit so that it falls under Williams. However, even if this argument were correct, the plaintiff must plead all theories of his case against a defendant before that defendant is dismissed with prejudice from the lawsuit. Once that happens, that defendant can no longer be liable to the plaintiff on any cause of action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the litigation. See La. R.S. 13:4231 (A valid and final judgment in favor of the defendant is conclusive between the same parties and all causes of action existing at the time of the final judgment arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the litigation are extinguished and the judgment bars a subsequent action on those causes of action). |4moment that Mr. Glasgow’s petition

PAR Minerals was dismissed from this tort suit because its statutory defense gave it immunity from any tort liability, therefore, it should not be classified as solidarity liable merely for the purpose of interrupting prescription. For these reasons, as well as the reasons expressed in my previous dissent, I dissent from the denial of rehearing in this case.

WEIMER, Justice,

concurring in the denial of rehearing.

_JjThe dissent to the denial of the rehearing overlooks the procedural posture of this case, and would erase the effects of timely service compelled by the Civil Code.

The majority opinion undertook an analysis of LSA-C.C. art. 8462 because Article 3462 accurately accounts for the procedural posture of the case in which suit was brought seeking tort relief against a party that can only be liable in the workers’ compensation system and the suit was served within the prescriptive period. From the standpoint the district court could not render a judgment regarding workers’ compensation benefits, the district court was an incompetent court.

But in suggesting that LSA-C.C. art. 8462 has no application here, this latest dissent raises a point that only underscores the correctness of the majority opinion. Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the dissent is correct, that the district court is not a court that would be incompetent under LSA-C.C. art. 3462, the result would be exactly the same: prescription would be interrupted as to Pipe Services by timely joining suit against PAR Minerals. For the following reasons, the Louisiana Civil Code compels this result.

First, and undeniably, it must be noted that suit against PAR Minerals was brought within the prescriptive period. Then, assuming as the dissent does that LSAjC.C.2 art. 3462 has no application, the solidary relationship between PAR Minerals and the later-added defendant, Pipe Services, still cannot be ignored. The Civil Code provides that a timely suit against one solidary obligor interrupts prescription as to other solidary obligors. See LSA-C.C. art. 1799 or 3503. Thus, when suit is timely brought in a competent court, there is no requirement for suit to be served within the prescriptive period or joined against other solidary obligors within the prescriptive period.

This solidary relationship is the key to analyzing this case. As noted in the majority opinion, longstanding jurisprudence from this court holds that a party liable in worker’s compensation is solidarity liable with a party liable in tort:

“It is the coextensiveness of the obligations for the same debt, and not the source of liability, that determines the solidarity of the obligation.”
Thus, to the extent that the worker’s compensation death benefits and the wrongful death and survival provisions overlap, [the employer] and [alleged tortfeasor] are obligated to the same thing even though the obligations arise from different sources. [Citation omitted.]

Op. at 770, quoting Williams v. Sewerage & Water Bd. of New Orleans, 611 So.2d 1383, 1388 (La.1993), quoting Narcise v. Illinois Central Gulf Railroad Co., 427 So.2d 1192, 1195 (La.1983).

In their application for rehearing, Respondents urge that this court overrule Williams/Narcise. But Respondents do not address why the principle of jurisprudence constante should now be ignored for this court to overrule Williams/Narcise. “Once jurisprudence constante has been established, we should be ‘extremely reluctant to change our position.’ Borel v. Young, 07-419 (La.7/1/08), 989 So.2d 42, 65. The policy behind this rule is simple, as the public should be able to expect a certain amount of stability and predictability from the decisions of this Court. Id.” Hogg v. Chevron USA, Inc., 09-2632, 39-2635, p. 14 (La.7/6/10), 45 So.3d 991, 1014.

Even more important than this court adhering to jurisprudence constante, the rationale in Williams/Narcise has been codified by the legislature, and is therefore no longer for this court to change:

This reasoning now applies with greater force because the year after this court, in Narcise, ruled that the source of liability was immaterial for establishing solidary liability, the legislature promoted that ruling to an article of the Civil Code: “An obligation may be soli-dary though it derives from a different source for each obligor.” LSA-C.C. art. 1797 (1984 La. Acts No. 381, § 1). See also LSA-C.C. art. 1797, cmt. (a) “This Article is new. It restates a principle developed by the Louisiana jurisprudence.”

Op. at 770.

A review of the rehearing application shows that Respondents do not mention LSA-C.C. art. 1797. Thus, Respondents have failed to show why a party liable in tort and a party liable in workers’ compensation for the same accident, is not a situation of coextensive, solidary liability contemplated by LSA-C.C. art. 1797.

Furthermore, Respondents do not mention LSA-C.C. art. 1794, which is relied on in the dissent to revisit Williams/Narcise. The dissent’s reliance on Article 1794 is similarly misplaced. As this court has recently ruled, Article 1794 formed the basis for solidary liability between a workers’ compensation carrier and an uninsured motorist carrier. See Cutsinger v. Redfern, 08-2607, pp. 7-9 (La.5/22/09), 12 So.3d 945, 950-51. Applying Article 1794, this court explained that both “the uninsured motorist carrier and the workers’ compensation insurer are obliged to the same thing, [and] may each be compelled [to pay] for the whole of their common liability....” Id., 08-2607 at 9-10, 12 So.3d at 952. Here, the same principle of solidary liability applies. Under Article 1794, a tortfeasor and employer are solidarity liable from the | ¿standpoint that both the tortfeasor and employer are liable for the medical expenses and for wage replacement. The liability from that perspective is coextensive and, in the words of Article 1794, “each obligor is liable for the whole performance.” Succinctly stated, the tortfeasor is liable for the whole amount for which the employer is liable. Thus, the dissent is simply in error when suggesting the suit was against a “defendant [which] is not even liable.” Op. on reh’g, dissent at 774. The suit was undis-putedly brought against one liable in workers’ compensation as a statutory employer. The now codified principle that coextensive liability is solidary liability compels the conclusion that prescription was interrupted as to Pipe Services by timely joining suit against PAR Minerals. Whether that suit was in a competent or incompetent court, the result remains the same. In the end, neither the arguments raised by Respondents nor by the dissenting opinion justify a rehearing of this matter.

      . The district court ruled from the bench on October 7, 2009, and a written judgment was signed later on October 19, 2009.

      . Because the result Judge Pickett would have reached, i.e. dismissal of appeal, was substantially the same as the ruling of the majority, i.e. affirming the district court's dismissal, Judge Pickett’s reasons would perhaps better be characterized as a concurrence.

      . Pipe Services has argued for dismissal of this matter based upon Mr. Glasgow placing the wrong date for the judgment he intended to appeal in his "Motion and Order for Devol-utive Appeal.” We find this argument to have been amply addressed by the majority of the court of appeal panel, which cited long held principles for rejecting it. See, e.g., Kirkeby-Natus Corp. v. Campbell, 250 La. 868, 199 So.2d 904, 905 (1967) ("appeals are favored by the courts; ... they should be dismissed only for substantial causes; and ... unless the grounds urged for dismissal are free from doubt appeals will be maintained.”). Although Mr. Glasgow used the date of another judgment in the same case, he indicated later within the body of the motion that he was appealing the "ruling, which granted defendant’s, Pipe Services Unlimited’s, exception of prescription.” Both parties later filed briefs in the Court of Appeal on the issue of prescription. Therefore, like the Court of Appeal, we decline to dismiss this matter for what appears to be only a typographical mistake prejudicing no one.

      . The fountainhead of tort liability is LSA-C.C. art. 2315; workers’ compensation liability is established by the Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Act, LSA-R.S. 23:1021, et seq.

        . At the time, suits for workers’ compensation benefits were commenced in the first instance in district courts. This changed with the amendment of La. Const, art. V, § 16(A) to allow for workers’ compensation cases to be filed with the Office of Workers' Compensation. See 1990 La. Acts No. 1098, § 1, approved Oct. 6, 1990, eff. Nov. 8, 1990.

      . On this point, Pipe Services’ reliance upon Gary v. Camden Fire Ins. Co., 96-0055 (La.7/2/96) 676 So.2d 553 ("voluntary payments are insufficient to toll prescription under Article 3462”) is misplaced. The Civil Code provides a two-part formula for interrupting prescription in this situation: a soli-dary relationship (LSA-C.C. art. 1799 or art. 3503); and a lawsuit against one of the soli-dary obligors (LSA-C.C. art. 3462). In Camden, one part of this formula was missing because there was no timely lawsuit against one of the solidary obligors, only an acknowledgment to pay workers' compensation benefits. See Camden, 96-0055 pp. 3-4; 676 So.2d at 555-556. Here, as recounted in the earlier analysis under LSA-C.C. art. 3462, there was a timely lawsuit against one of the solidary obligors.

      . The majority relies on La.C.C. art. 1797 to support its finding of a solidary obligation here, but that reliance is misplaced. Even though the obligation may be solidary if it derives from a different source for each obli-gor, the requirements of La.C.C. art. 1794 must still be met.

      . As argued by Pipe Services in its application for rehearing at page 3, footnote 2, suit against PAR Minerals was not filed in an "incompetent court.” The majority opinion recognizes that a "competent court” is "a court which has jurisdiction over the subject matter of, and is the proper venue for, the action or proceeding,” but finds the district court to be incompetent because it "would not have been competent to render a tort judgment against a party that is immune from tort,” and "would be incompetent to render the only remedy available from a statutory employer [workers' compensation benefits].” Op. at 769. However, no one was asking for workers’ compensation benefits in this tort suit, and clearly, a district court is the court of proper subject matter jurisdiction for a tort suit. The fact that it could not render a tort judgment against PAR Minerals because PAR Minerals had a meritorious statutory employer defense does not mean the court is incompetent, it just means the defendant is not liable in tort. In addition, if it were an incompetent court, prescription would only be interrupted "as to a defendant served with process within the prescriptive period,” i.e., PAR Minerals, not Pipe Services. La.C.C. art. 3462.

      . Although the wage replacement owed by the employer may be limited, the result under Article 1794 is unchanged. As this court recently explained, “we determined that the uninsured motorist carrier and the employer and/or its workers’ compensation insurer share a common liability that is not subject to a plea of division.... Thus, each obligor is bound for the whole as to each element of damage that is coextensive." Cutsinger, 2008-2607 at 9, 12 So.3d at 951, citing Bellard v. American Central Ins. Co., 07-1335, p. 14 (La.4/18/08), 980 So.2d 654, 665-66.