author: GUIDRY, Justice. JOHNSON, Justice,

text:
    LOUISIANA FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, East Baton Rouge Federation of Teachers, Jefferson Federation of Teachers Vernon L. Bolden, Venice Gunner-Holiday, Teri Ann Johnson & Rachel Rasbery v. STATE of Louisiana & the Board of Elementary & Secondary Education.
    No. 2011-CA-2226.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 2, 2012.

      James D. Caldwell, Attorney General, Angelique Duhon Freel, Assistant Attorney General, for Appellant.
    Rittenberg, Samuel & Phillips, LLC, Charles Mayer Samuel, III, William Edward Rittenberg, New Orleans, LA, for Appellee.
   GUIDRY, Justice.

b This case is before us on direct appeal from a judgment of the trial court declaring Act 749 of the 2010 Legislative Session unconstitutional. Because we find the constitutional challenge is premature and presents no justiciable controversy, we reverse the ruling of the trial court.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

During its 2010 Regular Session, the Louisiana Legislature enacted Act 749 (“the Act”), comprising La.Rev.Stat. 17:4041 through 17:4049, known as the “Red Tape Reduction and Local Empowerment Waiver Program.” The Act authorizes the Board of Secondary and Elementary Education (“BESE”) to grant waivers exempting school districts and individual schools from complying with a number of statutes provided for in Title 17, the Education Code. Under the Act, a | ¡waiver cannot be presented to BESE “unless a majority of the classroom teachers employed in the school, voting by secret ballot, vote in favor of inclusion of such school in the waiver request.” La.Rev.Stat. 17:4043(A). At this point, no waiver has been granted under the Act, or even requested.

The Louisiana Federation of Teachers and others (collectively “LFT”) filed a petition for declaratory judgment against the State of Louisiana (“State”) and BESE, seeking a judgment declaring Act 749 unconstitutional. In particular, LFT sought to enjoin defendants from applying and enforcing La.Rev.Stat. 17:4041(7), et seq., which authorizes BESE to grant waivers as follows:

(7) “Waiver” means a waiver granted pursuant to and in accordance with this Chapter which exempts the recipient district from any provision of this Title or from any rule, regulation, or policy of the board that is applicable to public schools and to public school officers and employees....

LFT subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment asserting the Act was unconstitutional on numerous grounds. The State and BESE opposed the motion, arguing the constitutional challenge was premature, LFT could not show the irreparable harm required to obtain injunctive relief, and Act 749 was not unconstitutional.

The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment in favor of LFT and declared Act 749 amounted to an unconstitutional delegation of authority. The trial court found Act 749 to be unconstitutional “to the extent that it delegated to |aBESE authority to grant waivers to governing authorities, as set forth in La.Rev.Stat. 17:4041 et seq., exempting any recipient district from any provision of Title 17 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes of 1950 that is applicable to public school[s] and to public school officers and employees.”

The State and BESE directly appealed to this court pursuant to La. Const. Art. V, § 5.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

This matter arises out of a petition for declaratory judgment filed by LFT seeking to have Act 749 declared unconstitutional. La.Code Civ. Proc. art. 1872 designates who can bring a declaratory judgment action by providing that a “person ... whose rights, status, or other legal relations are affected by statute ... may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the ... statute ... and obtain a declaration of rights, status, or other legal relations thereunder.”

The State argues that LFT’s constitutional challenge is premature and presents no justiciable controversy. Pursuant to the subject statute, before a school district can apply for a waiver, the request must necessarily be approved by a majority of teachers, voting by secret ballot. Even then, BESE would not be \¿required to issue a waiver, as the statute only provides that BESE “may ... issue a waiver.” La.Rev.Stat. 17:4042. (Emphasis added). At this point, no school district has applied to BESE for a waiver; thus,, according to the State, LFT is essentially seeking an advisory opinion. Further, the State contends the constitutional question is hypothetical or abstract because it is based on a contingency (i.e., a request for a waiver), which may not arise.

The jurisprudence of this court is well settled that, courts will not render advisory opinions. First Nat'l Bank of Picayune v. Pearl River Fabricators, Inc., 06-2195, p. 7 (La.11/16/07), 971 So.2d 302, 307. Cases submitted for adjudication must be justiciable, ripe for decision, and not brought prematurely. Prator v. Caddo Parish, 04-794, p. 5 (La.12/1/04), 888 So.2d 812, 815. For the reasons set forth below, we find that LFT’s action seeking to have Act 749 declared unconstitutional because it delegates legislative authority to BESE presents no justiciable controversy.

This court has previously discussed “justiciable controversy” relative to declaratory judgment actions. In Abbott v. Parker, we explained:

|SA “justiciable controversy” connotes, in the present sense, an existing actual and substantial dispute, as distinguished from one that is merely hypothetical or abstract, and a dispute which involves the legal relations of the parties who have real adverse interests, and upon which the judgment of the court may effectively operate through a decree of conclusive character. Further, the plaintiff should have a legally protecta-ble and tangible interest at stake, and the dispute presented should be of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.

259 La. 279, 249 So.2d 908, 918 (1971); see also, Prator, pp. 5-7, 888 So.2d at 815-817. A court must refuse to entertain an action for a declaration of rights if the issue presented is academic, theoretical, or based on a contingency which may or may not arise. American Waste & Pollution Control Co. v. St. Martin Parish Police Jury, 627 So.2d 158, 162 (La.1993). Further, a case is not ripe for review unless it raises more than a generalized, speculative fear of unconstitutional action. State v. Rochon, p. 7, 11-0009 (La.10/25/11), 75 So.3d 876, 882.

In addition to our jurisprudence, the United States Supreme Court has provided further guidance on the justiciability of an action and has held a court may review a statute prior to enforcement if: (1) the issues are fit for judicial decision; and (2) the parties will suffer hardship if the court withholds consideration. See Nat’l Park Hospitality Ass’n v. Dep’t of Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 808, 123 S.Ct. 2026, 155 L.Ed.2d 1017 (2003) (citing Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 18 L.Ed.2d 681 (1967)). In the case before us, no waivers have yet been sought, much less granted; thus, LFT cannot point to any particularized harm directly resulting from a waiver.

A “hardship” occurs where the law produces “adverse effects of a strictly legal kind.” Nat’l Park Hospitality Ass’n, 538 U.S. at 809, 123 S.Ct. 2026. The Supreme Court has found a hardship exists where a law affects a party’s “primary conduct” and is “ ‘felt immediately by those subject to it in conducting their day-to-day affairs.’ ” | Jd.; Reno v. Catholic Soc. Servs. Inc., 509 U.S. 43, 58, 113 S.Ct. 2485, 125 L.Ed.2d 38 (1993) (quoting Toilet Goods Ass’n, Inc. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158, 164, 87 S.Ct. 1520, 18 L.Ed.2d 697 (1967)).

In the instant case, the subject statute does not create a hardship for LFT requiring pre-enforcement review. If a claim depends on “contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all,” then it is not ripe for adjudication. Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296, 300, 118 S.Ct. 1257, 140 L.Ed.2d 406 (1998) (quoting Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co., 473 U.S. 568, 580-581, 105 S.Ct. 3325, 87 L.Ed.2d 409 (1985)). Currently, no waivers have been applied for or granted under the subject statute. Prior to submitting a waiver request, a majority of school teachers, voting by secret ballot, must approve the waiver. La.Rev.Stat. 17:4043. Thereafter, the statute allows, but does not mandate, BESE to grant the waiver. La.Rev. Stat. 17:4042. Thus, enforcement of the law is far from certain. Cf Texas, 523 U.S. at 300-01, 118 S.Ct. 1257 (question of whether appointing a magistrate to oversee school districts required preclearance under the Voting Rights Act was not ripe as no magistrate had been appointed and would only be appointed as a last resort).

LFT is not “required to engage in, or to refrain from, any conduct, unless and until” a group of teachers approves, by majority vote, a waiver request and BESE grants that request. Id. at 301, 118 S.Ct. 1257. As such, the statute does not have an immediate impact on LFT members’ day-to-day conduct and “no irremediably adverse consequences [would flow] from requiring a later challenge” if and when a waiver is granted under the subject statute. Reno, 509 U.S. at 58, 113 S.Ct. 2485. Accordingly, this is not a case where LFT must face the immediate dilemma of complying with a law or risking penalties or where enforcement of the law is certain.

^Furthermore, this court’s jurisprudence has recognized that, when asked to declare legislation unconstitutional, a court must examine whether the legislation is permissive or mandatory. American Waste & Pollution Control Co., 627 So.2d at 162-163 (La.1993), citing Stoddard v. City of New Orleans, 246 La. 417, 165 So.2d 9, 11 (1964). Mandatory legislation requires a governmental agency to act while permissive legislation allows an agency to act. See Id. (providing an example of permissive zoning legislation). This court has explained that, when legislation is permissive and a governmental agency has not implemented or threatened to implement the legislation, there is no justicia-ble controversy, and courts must refrain from deciding the constitutionality of the legislation. See American Waste & Pollution Control Co., 627 So.2d at 163.

In the instant case, Act 749 is permissive because it allows, but does not require, BESE to issue waivers. La.Rev. Stat. 17:4042 states that BESE “may ... issue a waiver.” (Emphasis added). Similarly, nothing requires a governing authority to request a waiver. See La.Rev.Stat. 17:4043(A) (“A governing authority may request a waiver.”). (Emphasis added). In addition, a governing authority cannot request a waiver “unless a majority of the classroom teachers employed in the school, voting by secret ballot, vote in favor of inclusion of such school in the waiver request.” Id.

A permissive statute must be rendered operative or threatened to be rendered operative prior to being challenged. American Waste & Pollution Control Co., 627 So.2d at 163. As explained above, Act 749 is a permissive statute. No school district has applied to BESE for a waiver under the Act and as a result, BESE has yet to implement a waiver under that Act. Therefore, it follows that LFT’s lawsuit 1 ^contesting the constitutionality of Act 749 is premature.

CONCLUSION

The instant ease presents no justiciable controversy currently amenable to resolution by this court. LFT has failed to demonstrate any real hardship requiring pre-enforcement review of the statute. It is not certain that a waiver will be requested or granted under the statute, and LFT will not be harmed by declining review of the statute at this point in time. Therefore, we reverse the decision of the trial court declaring La.Rev.Stat. 17:4041, et. seq. unconstitutional.

REVERSED.

JOHNSON, Justice, dissents and assigns reasons.

JOHNSON, Justice,

dissents and assigns reasons.

hi disagree with the majority’s finding that the constitutional challenge is premature and presents no justiciable controversy. Therefore, I must respectfully dissent.

This Court has recognized that the issue of when a controversy is justiciable as opposed to an advisory opinion is a difficult one. Prator v. Caddo Parish, 04-0794 (La.12/1/04), 888 So.2d 812, 816; Louisiana Independent Auto Dealers Assn. v. State, 295 So.2d 796, 798 (La.1974). The nature of LFT’s suit is one for declaratory judgment. In Louisiana Independent Auto Dealers Assn., this Court looked to Professor Borchard’s treatise on declaratory judgments for guidance in setting forth standards for determining when a controversy is “justiciable:”

It is sufficient if a dispute or controversy as to legal rights is shown, which, in the court’s opinion, requires judicial determination — that is, in which the court is convinced that by adjudication a useful purpose will be served. The requisites of justiciability must be present. Not only must the plaintiff prove his tangible interest in obtaining a judgment, but the action must be adversary in character, that is, there Lmust be a controversy between the plaintiff and a defendant, subject to the court’s jurisdiction, having an interest in opposing his claim. Unless the parties have such conflicting interests, the case is likely to be characterized as one for an advisory opinion, and the controversy as academic, a mere difference of opinion or disagreement not involving their legal relations, and hence not justiciable.
Actions or opinions are denominated “advisory,” when there is an insufficient interest in the plaintiff or defendant to justify judicial determination, where the judgment sought would not constitute specific relief to a litigant or affect legal relations or where, by inadequacy of parties defendant, the judgment could not be sufficiently conclusive.

295 So.2d at 798-99 (citing Borchard, Declaratory Judgments (2d Ed.1941)). This Court has further recognized that "[t]he difference between an abstract question and a controversy contemplated by the Declaratory Judgment Act is necessarily one of degree and it would be difficult, if it would be possible, to fashion a precise test for determining in every case whether there is such a controversy.” Pmtor, 888 So.2d at 816 (internal citations removed).

Based on my review of relevant jurisprudence, I find LFT’s declaratory judgment action sufficiently meets the requirements of a “justiciable controversy.” I recognize that no waivers have yet been granted by BESE, thus LFT cannot point to any particularized harm directly resulting from a waiver. However, in my view, the harm relevant to this Court’s consideration is the unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority. It is the structure of the waiver system itself that is alleged to be unconstitutional. Here, there is an actual and substantial dispute over the constitutionality of the delegation of authority given to BESE by the Act. The alleged improper delegation of authority has already occurred in the drafting of the Act. Because this is a facial challenge to the constitutionality of the text of the Act itself, I find it irrelevant that the Act has not yet been applied, or that LFT cannot point to a specific harm caused by the granting of a waiver. If the establishment of the waiver |,«¡system (i.e. the text of the Act itself) impermissibly delegates legislative authority to BESE, no further injury should be required for the Act to fail a facial challenge. There is no action BESE can take in implementing the Act that changes the issue of whether this delegation of authority, on its face, is unconstitutional. In my mind, the fact that no waiver has yet been granted does not deprive the dispute of sufficient immediacy and reality, so as to bar a declaratory judgment on the basis of lack of a justiciable controversy.

For this same reason, I do not agree that the necessity of a request for a waiver operates as a contingency which may not arise, thus making the issue hypothetical and premature. The constitutional attack is based on a formal defect in the Act. The alleged unconstitutionality is presented as a facial challenge to the text and structure of the Act itself. The Act as written either does, or does not, improperly delegate legislative authority to BESE. A waiver application, and subsequent application of the Act, should not be a prerequisite to determining whether the statute, on its face, is unconstitutional.

Declaratory judgments serve a useful purpose and provide the practical effect of terminating the controversy giving rise to the proceeding. The issue here concerns genuine rights between the State and LFT, and a declaratory judgment provides concrete relief by terminating the controversy if the Act is found unconstitutional. Moreover, the issue is purely legal, and its resolution is not dependent upon the presentation of involved factual evidence, or further development of the record. Thus, waiting until a waiver is granted would not advance this Court’s ease and ability to address the issue of improper delegation of legislative authority.

In sum, this Court was asked to declare whether the Act is unconstitutional on its face because the Act itself delegates legislative authority to BESE. The issue is not |4a dispute of a hypothetical or abstract nature. The controversy is definite and affects the legal relations of parties that have adverse legal interests. The controversy is real and substantial, and is distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical set of facts. The issue is purely legal, and ripe for decision now. In my view, to require LFT to wait until the Act is applied before a facial challenge can be made based on the text of the Act itself defeats the purpose of declaratory judgments.

In reviewing the merits of the constitutional challenge, I would find Act 749 of 2010, comprising La. R.S. 17:4041 through 17:4049, to be unconstitutional on its face. I agree with the trial court’s finding that Act 749 unconstitutionally delegates legislative authority to BESE.

The Louisiana Constitution divides the powers of government into three separate branches: legislative, executive and judicial. La. Const, art. II, § 1. Our constitution further provides that no branch may exercise power belonging to another. La. Const, art. II, § 2. The legislative power of the State rests exclusively in the Legislature. La. Const, art. Ill, § 1; La. Const, art. II, § 1; State v. Alfonso, 99-1546 (La.11/23/99), 753 So.2d 156, 160. Thus, it is axiomatic that the legislature is vested with the sole law-making power of the State. See, e.g., State v. Dick, 06-2223 (La.1/26/07), 951 So.2d 124, 133.

Because of the constitutional separation of powers, delegation of legislative power is generally prohibited. State v. Miller, 03-0206 (La.10/21/03), 857 So.2d 423, 427. However, as an exception to this rule, this Court has recognized that the legislative branch has the authority to delegate to administrative boards and agencies of the State the power to ascertain and determine the facts upon which the laws are to be applied and enforced. See, City of Alexandria v. Alexandria Fire Fighters Ass’n, 1,220 La. 754, 758, 57 So.2d 673, 674 (La.1952); State v. Guidry, 142 La. 422, 76 So. 843 (1917). This Court has noted that “delegation of certain administrative functions is necessary because of the vast amount of governmental functions that are vested in the legislative branch, which cannot possibly enact and re-enact detailed laws to cover every situation during rapidly changing times.” State v. Alfonso, 99-1546 (La.11/23/99), 753 So.2d 156, 160.

To determine whether a particular delegation of legislative authority is unconstitutional, this Court established the following rule in Schwegmann Brothers Giant Super Markets v. McCrory, Commissioner of Agriculture, 237 La. 768, 788, 112 So.2d 606, 613 (1959):

So long as the regulation or action of the official or board authorized by statute does not in effect determine what the law shall be, or involve the exercise of primary and independent discretion, but only determines within prescribed limits some fact upon which the law by its own terms operates, such regulation is administrative and not legislative in its nature.

This rule requires courts to distinguish between “delegations of purely legislative authority, which necessarily violate the separation of powers, and delegations of ministerial or administrative authority, which do not.” State v. All Pro Paint & Body Shop, Inc., 93-1316 (La.7/5/94), 639 So.2d 707, 711. Guided by these principles, this Court has developed a three-part test to ascertain whether a statute unconstitutionally delegates legislative authority. Id. at 712. A delegation of authority to an administrative agency is constitutionally valid if the statute: 1) contains a clear expression of legislative policy; 2) prescribes sufficient standards to guide the agency in the execution of that policy; and 3) is accompanied by adequate procedural safeguards to protect against abuse of discretion by the agency. Id.; State v. Barthelemy, 545 So.2d 531, 534 (La.1989); Adams v. State, 458 So.2d 1295, 1298 (La.1984); State v. Union Tank Car, 439 So.2d 377, 381 (La.1983). This test serves | fitwo functions vital to preserving the separation of powers required by the Constitution:

First, it insures that the fundamental policy decisions in our society will be made not by an appointed official but by the body immediately responsible to the people. Second, it prevents judicial review from becoming merely an exercise at large by providing the courts with some measure against which to judge the official action that has been challenged.

All Pro Paint, 639 So.2d at 712. Moreover, this Court has explained the importance and necessity of each part of the test:

Application of the Schwegmann three-prong test ensures the elected members of the Louisiana Legislature retain all legislative power by insisting that they, not their delegates in the executive branch, make the difficult policy choices for which they are accountable to the public through the democratic process. Furthermore, by insisting that the enabling statute prescribe not only the legislative policy to be enforced by the agency but also sufficient standards to guide or “canalize” the agency’s execution of the legislative will, the test ensures the statute delegates only administrative or ministerial authority and guards against delegations of unbridled legislative discretion and the danger of “delegation running riot.” Additionally, because even delegations of administrative or ministerial authority require agencies to exercise some discretion in executing the legislative will, the requirement of adequate procedural safeguards ensures the agency exercises that discretion in accordance with the policy and standards prescribed in the enabling statute and consistent with democratic values served by public participation and judicial review.

Id. at 712-13.

Application of the three-prong test set forth in Schwegmann and All Pro Paint compels me to conclude that Act 749 fails to establish a constitutionally valid delegation of power to BESE. Examining the first prong of the test, I find Act 749 does contain a sufficient expression of legislative policy. La. R.S. 17:4042 states that BESE may grant a waiver application “with the goal of improving quality of instruction and student academic achievement. ...” The State and BESE assert that Act 749 provides flexibility and autonomy for purposes of achieving that stated goal. 17Further, they assert the Act gives BESE an opportunity to level the playing field between local school districts and charter schools, which enjoy greater autonomy than traditional public schools. This stated goal is further reflected in La. R.S. 17:4043, which provides that waiver applicants must describe how the proposed waiver will increase the quality of instruction for students, improve the academic achievement of students, and improve teaching effectiveness within schools. Thus, I find the Act sets forth a defined statement of legislative policy sufficient to satisfy the first prong of the test.

Although I find the Act meets the first prong of the test, it is clear the standards accompanying this declaration of legislative intent do not provide adequate guidelines for BESE in determining whether to grant a waiver, and thus the Act fails to satisfy the second prong of the test. This analysis is simplified because the Act contains absolutely no standards to guide BESE in carrying out the waiver process set forth by the legislature. While § 4043 sets forth particular information that must be included by a school governing authority in its waiver application, there are no corresponding standards or criteria provided to guide BESE in applying, weighing, or processing this information as part of the waiver process.

In testing the constitutional sufficiency of the standards prescribed in the Act, regard must be given to the purpose and scope of the Act, the subject matters covered therein, the duties prescribed, and the broad or narrow powers granted. All Pro Paint, 639 So.2d at 716. Here, the extent of the power granted to BESE is broad and great. The statute, as written, vests BESE with unbridled discretion to exempt a school district from almost any provision in the Education Code. Contrary to this Court’s pronouncements in Schweg-mann, the Act gives BESE power to exercise primary and independent discretion in granting or denying waivers. The legislature has essentially ^delegated to BESE the power to determine what law will apply in a particular school district, rather than delegating to BESE the power to determine whether a school district meets standards set by the legislature for the waiver. Because the legislature has failed to devise a scheme which provides intelligible standards sufficient to guide BESE in the waiver process, the Act runs afoul of the principles set forth in Schwegmann and All Pro Paint. When the delegated authority to an administrative agency is unfettered, its exercise becomes legislative in nature, and contravenes the constitutional mandate of separation of powers.

I also find Act 749 fails to meet the third prong of the test, which requires the delegation of authority be accompanied by adequate procedural safeguards to protect against abuse of discretion by BESE. As this Court recognized in All Pro Paint, delegations of power require agencies to exercise some discretion in executing the legislative will. 639 So.2d at 713. Thus, requiring procedural safeguards ensures that the agency exercises that discretion in accordance with the policy and standards prescribed in the enabling statute. Id. The only provisions of the Act that can reasonably be construed as procedural safeguards are the requirement that BESE submit a yearly report to the Senate Committee on Education and the House Committee on Education, and the provision limiting waivers to a four-year period. La. R.S. 17:4046(B); La. R.S. 17:4045(A). The annual report would include a summary of waivers granted and BESE’s statement as to whether such waivers increased the quality of instruction to students and improved the academic achievement of students. La. R.S. 17:4046(B). However, because there are no standards in the Act itself, it is impossible for this report, submitted long after the waiver is granted, to ensure that BESE has exercised its discretion in accordance with standards set forth by the legislature. Nothing in the Act details standards as to whether a waiver should be 19granted initially. Thus, nothing in the Act safeguards against abuse by BESE in granting waivers. And, while waivers are only granted for a maximum four-year term, the Act also allows BESE to extend these waivers. La. R.S. 17:4045(C).

For these reasons, I would find the statutory provisions of Act 749 impermissibly delegate legislative authority to BESE, giving BESE unfettered discretion to determine which waivers to grant based solely on BESE’s opinion, without any legislative guidance as to how that opinion is to be formed or what guidelines should be used in considering waiver applications. This conclusion reinforces the policies underlying Schwegmann and All Pro Paint by insisting that the legislature, not BESE, make the actual decision as to whether provisions of the Education Code should apply to all public schools. Moreover, such a holding would ensure that members of the legislature “retain all legislative power by insisting that they, not their delegates in the executive branch, make the difficult policy choices for which they are accountable to the public through the democratic process.” See, All Pro Paint, 689 So.2d at 712. I find the Act, as written, fails in these principles by creating a wholesale surrender of this legislative responsibility to BESE.

This Court has recognized that to successfully challenge a legislative act as unconstitutional on its face, the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid. State v. Powdrill, 95-2307 (La.l1/25/96), 684 So.2d 350, 357; see also, City of New Orleans v. Louisiana Assessors’ Retirement and Relief Fund, 05-2548 (La.10/1/07), 986 So.2d 1, 19. Here, because I find the text and structure of the Act itself impermissibly delegates legislative authority to BESE, I also find there are necessarily no circumstances under which application of the Act can operate constitutionally. Thus, I would find the Act unconstitutional on its face.

      .La. Const, art. V, § 5(D) provides, in pertinent part: a case shall be appealable to the supreme court if (1) a law or ordinance has been declared unconstitutional.

      . Act 749 was originally enacted as La.Rev. Stat. 17:4031, et seq., and was later redesig-nated as La.Rev.Stat. 17:4041, et seq.

      . The Petition for Declaratory Judgment was filed by Louisiana Federation of Teachers, East Baton Rouge Federation of Teachers, Jefferson Federation of Teachers, Vernon L. Bolden, Venice Gunner-Holiday, Teri Ann Johnson, and Rachel Rasbery.

      . LFT argued Act 749 was unconstitutional in the following respects:
      (1) It improperly delegates legislative authority to BESE in violation of La. Const, art. II, § 1 and § 2;
      (2) It is a prohibited local or special law in violation of La. Const, art. Ill, § 12; further, LFT complained the State enacted Act 749 without publication of a Notice of Intent as required under La. Const, art. Ill, § 13;
      (3) It violates constitutional requirements of due process and equal protection; and
      (4)It allows BESE to suspend a law in violation of La. Const, art. Ill, § 20.

      . La.Rev.Stat. 17:4043, "Requests for waivers," provides in part:
      A. A governing authority may request a waiver for any school, any combination of schools, or all schools under his district's jurisdiction. However, a governing authority shall not request a waiver for any school unless a majority of the classroom teachers employed in the school, voting by secret ballot, vote in favor of inclusion of such school in the waiver request. (Emphasis added).
      B. A governing authority requesting a waiver shall submit to the board a written waiver request that does all of the following:

        (1) Identifies the specific laws, rules, regulations, and policies from which waiver is sought.
      (2) Identifies the school or schools that will be covered by the waiver.
      (3) Describes the policies and procedures that will be instituted as a substitute for the waived provisions.
      (4) Describes how the proposed waiver will accomplish all of the following:
      (a) Increase the quality of instruction for students.
      (b) Improve the academic achievement of students.
      (c) Improve teaching effectiveness within schools.
      (5)Describes, for each school year, specific, measurable educational goals and the methods to be used annually to measure progress in meeting such goals.

      . La.Rev.Stat. 17:4042, entitled "Authority of the board to grant waivers,” states:
      Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the board may, upon receipt of a waiver application from a governing authority as set forth in this Chapter and with the goal of improving quality of instruction and student academic achievement, issue a waiver to any district. (Emphasis added).

      . Reno, 509 U.S. at 57, 113 S.Ct. 2485; see also, Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 152-53, 87 S.Ct. 1507 (plaintiffs action challenging a regulation that required manufacturers to change their labels and advertisements or face sanctions was ripe for review).

      . See Louisiana Associated General Contractors, Inc. v. State, Division of Admin., Office of State Purchasing, 95-2105 (La.3/8/96), 669 So.2d 1185, 1195 (for an example of mandatory legislation).

      . See also, Minutes, House Committee on Education, 2010 Reg. Sess., May 6, 2010, at 6.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: CLARK, Justice. KIMBALL, Chief Justice, WEIMER, J.,

license: Public Domain

text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Joshua Dion WILLIAMS.
    No. 2011-KA-0958.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 2, 2012.

      James D. Caldwell, Attorney General, Kurt L. Wall, Robert C. Abendroth, Assistant Attorneys General, Hillar Clement Moore, III, District Attorney, Jeanne Guil-lory Rougeau, William Kyle Morris, Assistant District Attorneys, for Appellant.
    Leo J. Berggreen, Baton Rouge, LA, The Hillman Law Firm, APLC, Bertha Moseley Hillman, for Appellee.
   CLARK, Justice.

hWe granted this writ application in order to determine whether the trial court erred in granting defendant’s motion to quash his indictment. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the ruling of the trial court.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On June 1, 2009, officers were dispatched to a reported shooting at 300 N. 26th street in Baton Rouge. They found the victim, Ramon House, lying on the sidewalk, shot in the chest and ankle. Mr. House died of blood loss at the hospital shortly afterward. An eyewitness reported that defendant Joshua Dion Williams, age 19, and defendant’s friend, a juvenile, both shot the victim during a dispute over narcotics. On August 26, 2009, a grand jury in East Baton Rouge Parish indicted defendant for second degree murder. On February 5, 2010, defendant filed a motion to quash the indictment, in which he contended that La.C.Cr.P. art. 404(B), which provides that the judicial administrator of the 19th JDC shall perform the function of jury commission in East Baton Rouge Parish, is a special or local law prohibited by La. Const, art. Ill, § 12.

|2On April 20, 2010, the trial court held a hearing on defendant’s motion to quash. At that hearing, defendant argued that La.C.Cr.P. art. 404(B) was amended in 1975 to create a special rule that operates only in East Baton Rouge Parish in violation of the constitutional prohibition against special or local laws. In support, defendant referred the trial court to State v. Slay, 370 So.2d 508 (La.1979), which defendant characterized as holding that an enactment is suspect as a local law if its operation is limited to certain parishes unless the limitation results from a reasonable classification, such as population. Defendant argued that because a prosecution must be instituted with a constitutionally valid grand jury indictment, his indictment should be quashed.

In response, the State alleged that defendant had not given notice of this constitutional challenge to the Attorney General, and the State further argued that this Court had rejected a similar claim in State v. Mercadel, 03-3015 (La.5/25/04), 874 So.2d 829, finding that the defendant in that case lacked standing. According to the State, whether a judicial administrator performs the function of jury commission does not affect the defendant. The State further argued that “the real distinction between public or general laws and local or special laws is that the former affects the community as a whole, whether throughout the state or one of its subdivisions, and the latter affects private persons, private property, private or local interests.” R. at 500. Because the provision at issue affects the community of East Baton Rouge Parish as a whole, the State contended, it is not a special or local law.

Defendant then argued that standing is conferred by La.C.Cr.P. art. 533, | ..¡which provides special grounds for a motion to quash a grand jury indictment, and that Mercadel is distinguishable on the basis that it did not involve the claim that a more recent amendment established a prohibited special or local law by effectively repealing the prior general provision. At the close of the hearing, the trial court took the matter under advisement.

On April 29, 2010, the trial court granted defendant’s motion to quash. The trial court prefaced the ruling by disclaiming that the issue to be decided was one of constitutionality:

The issue which the court is called upon to decide is not a review of the constitutionality of the statute. The statute is not sought to be declared unconstitutional. It is not a motion that’s before the court to declare the statute unconstitutional, which would involve a different procedure. Notice is required to the Attorney General and other proceedings would be held, but that is not the motion that is before the court.

R. at 510. The trial court then found that defendant had standing to complain that La.C.Cr.P. art. 404(B) was a special or local law prohibited by the constitution because the Code of Criminal Procedure provides a means to obtain relief by quashal. R. at 511-12. The trial court proceeded to consider whether Article 404(B) is a prohibited special or local law. The trial court found that this article operates only in East Baton Rouge Parish, that there is no indication that this restriction was based on population or other reasonable classifying characteristic, and no possibility that its reach would extend to other regions. R. at 512-14. Therefore, the trial court concluded that the Article is a special or local law within the meaning of the prohibition contained in the constitution and further that the indictment would be quashed:

|4I believe, based upon my knowledge as written, that the statute does not meet the requisite general law of Louisiana, and I must conclude that it is local and it is special. So based upon my analysis, officers, I do grant relief.

R. at 515. In response to the State’s request for clarification, the trial court reiterated that he was simply ordering the indictment quashed without finding that La.C.Cr.P. art. 404(B) is in violation of the state constitution:

And I did not address the constitutionality of this issue; that, even though the assertion may have been that it was perhaps unconstitutional, the mechanism that [defense counsel] has utilized here does not seek relief to declare the issue of constitutionality or non constitutionality. I have simply used [Article 538 of] the Code of Criminal Procedure method which gives him standing to assert an illegal proceeding.
So, no. The answer is no. I have not entered any declaration of the constitutionality of the statute.
I did not deny or grant relief on that. I have not commented one way or the other whether this statute is constitutional or not, and I’m not granting relief on that basis. I’m granting relief under the Code of Criminal Procedure. That’s my ruling.

R. at 517-18.

The State appealed the trial court’s ruling to the First Circuit Court of Appeal. In its brief, the State argued that: (1) the trial court abused its discretion in granting the motion to quash, in which the sole claim was that La.C.Cr.P. art. 404(B) is a special or local law prohibited by the Louisiana Constitution, while refusing to declare the article unconstitutional; (2) defendant lacked standing to challenge the article as a prohibited special or local law because he suffered no injury by application of the article, citing Mercadel; and (3) the article was not a prohibited special or local law because all citizens of Louisiana are interested in the jury commission and any citizen who moves into East Baton Rouge Parish will be affected equally by the article (citing State v. Dalon, 35 La. Ann. 1141 (1883)).

1 ¿Defendant moved to dismiss the appeal. In his motion to dismiss, defendant argued that the trial court’s ruling, notwithstanding the trial court’s statements to the contrary, can only be construed as quashing the indictment because Article 404(B) is a special or local law prohibited by the constitution. Therefore, defendant argued that this Court has exclusive appellate jurisdiction pursuant to La. Const, art. V, § 5(D). In response, the State argued that the trial court explicitly refused to consider the constitutional question. The State thus contended that the court of appeal had jurisdiction to find that the district court abused its discretion in quashing the indictment.

The court of appeal transferred the appeal to this Court. State v. Williams, 10-1385 (La.App. 1 Cir. 2/11/11), 2011 WL 2178753 (unpub’d). The panel reproduced the trial court’s reasons before finding that, despite the trial court’s disclaimer, the trial court’s ruling in its entirety shows that the court granted the motion to quash on the basis that Article 404(B) is a special or local law prohibited by the state constitution:

In his appeal brief, the defendant claims the district court’s ruling could only have been based on the constitutionality of the statute, because that was the sole claim asserted in the motion to quash. We agree. Considering the single claim raised by the defendant in his motion to quash, and the district court’s ruling in its entirety (which includes a discussion of the constitutionality of the statute), we find that the court clearly granted the motion to quash on the basis that the East Baton Rouge Parish grand jury procedure set forth in Article 404(B) is unconstitutional local and special legislation. Although the district court claimed to have been granting relief under the Code of Criminal Procedure, the record on appeal simply does not support this conclusion.

Williams, 10-1335 at 6. Therefore, the panel found that this Court has exclusive appellate jurisdiction:

Article V, § 5(D)(1) of the Louisiana Constitution grants appellate jurisdiction to the Louisiana Supreme Court in cases in |fiwhich a law has been declared unconstitutional. Although the district court stated it was not ruling on the issue of constitutionality, since the court specifically declared Article 404(B) to be a violation of the Louisiana Constitution’s prohibition against local and special legislation, the court’s ruling effectively declared the statute unconstitutional. Therefore, the Louisiana Supreme Court has exclusive appellate jurisdiction in this matter.

Williams, 10-1335 at 6-7.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

As an initial matter, the State contends that the trial court erred in granting the motion to quash while refusing to declare that the article violates the state constitution. The State contends that the only basis for quashal presented in defendant’s motion is that La.C.Cr.P. art. 404(B) is a special or local law prohibited by La. Const, art. Ill, § 12. Defendant agrees that the only ground for quashing the indictment is the unconstitutionality of Article 404(B) and argues that the result of the trial court’s ruling is correct. The court of appeal construed the trial court’s ruling as a determination of the article’s constitutionality, despite the trial court’s statement to the contrary. Therefore, the court of appeal determined that this Court has sole appellate jurisdiction pursuant to La. Const, art. V, § 5(D). This Court, therefore, must address the question of jurisdiction first. See, e.g., Anisman v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 232 La. 514, 94 So.2d 650, 652 (1957) (“This Court, ex pro-prio motu, must determine whether it has appellate jurisdiction.”).

Under La. Const, art. V, § 5(D), a case is appealable to this Court if a law or ordinance has been declared unconstitutional. “[W]here the jurisdiction of this court is dependent solely on the claim that a law has been declared unconstitutional, it must affirmatively and clearly appear that the judgment of the lower court was based wholly on the unconstitutionality of the law.” State v. Clement, 178 La. 93, 95, 150 So. 842, 842 (1933). Here, the trial court repeatedly stated that the court was not declaring La.C.Cr.P. art. 404(B) unconstitutional. However, the only ground for quashing the indictment asserted by defendant was 17that the article is unconstitutional; the only ground argued at the hearing was that the article is unconstitutional; and the only basis given for quashing the indictment by the trial judge was “based on my analysis ... I do grant relief,” which analysis considered only whether the article was a special or local law prohibited by the constitution. The trial court appeared to draw a procedural distinction between declaring the article unconstitutional and granting a motion to quash based on the underlying unconstitutionality of the article. Thus, the trial court quashed the indictment for reasons pertaining to the constitutionality of the article despite declining to declare the article unconstitutional.

Although this Court has on several occasions considered the extent of its appellate jurisdiction in light of the precise contours of trial court rulings, see, e.g., State v. Fleming, 01-2799, pp. 4-5 (La.6/21/02), 820 So.2d 467, 470 (finding that the trial court erred in declaring La.C.Cr.P. art. 413(C) unconstitutional as a local or special law after quashing the indictments because the article was applied in a discriminatory manner, and therefore transferring the matter to the court of appeal), the trial court’s deliberate distinction here presents us with an unusual problem.

We were presented with the inverse situation in Twin Parish Port Commission v. Berry Bros., Inc., 94-2594 (La.2/20/95), 650 So.2d 748, after the Port Commission unsuccessfully sought to enjoin Berry Brothers from constructing a natural gas storage facility on the basis that the proposed construction would violate a commission ordinance. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Berry Brothers, finding that the ordinance was unconstitutional. However, this Court reviewed the record and found that the trial court had in fact ruled in favor of defendants because the ordinance was improperly enacted after failure to comply with statutory public hearing and notification requirements. “Without a substantive declaration of unconstitutionality,” we concluded that this Court had no appellate jurisdiction under La. Const, art. V, § 5(D). Twin Parish Port ^Commission, 94-2594 at 3, 650 So.2d at 749. In contrast, the record in the present case contains reasons that can fairly be characterized as “a substantive declaration of unconstitutionality,” despite the trial court’s contradictory disclaimers. There was no alternative statutory theory alleged or argued by the parties. Cf. State v. Hatton, 07-2377, pp. 18-19 (La.7/1/08), 985 So.2d 709, 721-22 (finding that the trial court erred in granting a motion to quash on constitutional grounds other than those properly asserted by the movant). Furthermore, the question whether the article is a prohibited special or local law was central to the trial court’s analysis. Compare Blocker v. City of New Orleans, 218 La. 669, 670, 50 So.2d 643 (1951) (characterizing the trial court’s discussion of constitutionality as “merely obiter”), with St. Charles Gaming Co., Inc. v. River Boat Gaming Com’n, 94-2697, p. 1 (La.11/10/94), 645 So.2d 208, 209 (per curiam) (finding that “the trial court declared a parish zoning ordinance unconstitutional in its written reasons for judgment [and that] declaration appears to be the basis for the trial court’s preliminary injunction judgment and therefore cannot be considered as dictum”).

However, in the civil realm, this Court has recently declined to consider a trial court’s reasons when the ruling itself makes no declaration of unconstitutionality on the basis that “it is well-settled law that the trial court’s oral or written reasons form no part of the judgment.” Burmaster v. Plaquemines Parish Government, 07-1311, pp. 1-2 (La.8/31/07), 963 So.2d 378, 379 (per curiam). Thus, the Court in Burmaster found that “[bjecause there is no Isdeclaration of unconstitutionality in the district court’s judgment, there is no basis for the exercise of this court’s appellate jurisdiction.” Burmaster, 07-1311 at 2, 963 So.2d at 379. Similarly, in Carmena v. East Baton Rouge Parish Sheriff’s Office, 06-2680, p. 2 (La.2/2/07), 947 So.2d 715, 716 (per curiam), this Court found that “[bjecause there is no declaration of unconstitutionality in the district court’s judgment, there is no basis for the exercise of this court’s appellate jurisdiction.” The State in Carmena sought to invoke this Court’s appellate jurisdiction on the ground that the trial court had declared certain executive orders to be unconstitutional. This Court, however, reviewed the trial court’s judgment and found that it indicated that “the court merely granted defendants’ exception of prescription [and nothing] in the judgment declares a law or ordinance unconstitutional [although] the district court’s reasons for judgment discuss the constitutionality of the governor’s executive orders.” Carmena, 06-2680 at 2, 947 So.2d at 716. In Meaux v. Galtier, 07-2474, p. 1 (La.1/25/08), 972 So.2d 1137, 1137 (per curiam), the Court reiterated that “[although the district court’s reasons for judgment discuss the constitutionality of La. Civ.Code art. 191, it is well-settled law that the trial court’s oral or written reasons form no part of the judgment.” Therefore, the Court in Meaux found that “the appeal is not properly |10before this court.” Meaux, 07-2474 at 1, 972 So.2d at 1137. Finally, in Greater New Orleans Expressway Com’n v. Olivier, 02-2795 (La.11/18/03), 860 So.2d 22, this Court found that it lacked appellate jurisdiction over the Greater New Orleans Expressway Commission’s appeal of the denial of its request for writ of mandamus to compel two judges to collect an additional five dollar fine on any person found guilty of a motor vehicle offense committed on the Huey P. Long Bridge or Lake Pontchartrain Causeway. Defendants contended that the additional fine was unconstitutional and the district court agreed in written reasons for judgment. However, the judgment itself simply denied the petition for writ of mandamus. This Court found that “[bjecause the district court’s judgment did not declare La. R.S. 32:57(G) unconstitutional, we do not have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to the provisions of La. Const, art. V, § 5(D).” Greater New Orleans Expressway Com’n, 02-2795 at 4, 860 So.2d at 24.

The disjunction between the reasons and the judgment is greater in the present case than in those discussed above. In the reasons for judgment in Burmaster and Carmena, remarks regarding constitutionality were minimal. In contrast, in the present case, the trial court considered the constitutional question at great length. Further, the constitutionality of La.C.Cr.P. art. 404(B) was the sole ground for quashal raised by defendant, and the only substantive ground discussed by the trial court. Finally, the judgments in Meaux and Greater New Orleans Expressway Commission were written judgments, which failed to declare the statutes at issue unconstitutional, whereas, here, the trial judge gave an oral ruling from the bench, directly after his discussion of whether the article was a local or special law in violation of the constitution, stating:

I believe, based upon my knowledge as written, that the statute does not meet the requisite general law of Louisiana, and I must |, conclude that it is local and it is special. So based upon my analysis, officers, I do grant relief.

R. at 515. Based upon the above language, it is readily apparent that, despite the trial judge’s protestations to the contrary, he granted the motion to quash the indictment because he found that Article 404(B) is a local or special law, i.e., unconstitutional.

Therefore, we distinguish the above cases on those grounds. Because, unlike Burmaster and Carmena, the record in this case contains reasons that can fairly be characterized as a substantive declaration of unconstitutionality, the case falls within our appellate jurisdiction.

Having determined that the matter is properly before this Court, the remaining questions to be resolved are whether defendant has standing to challenge the constitutionality of the Article and, if so, whether the Article is in fact a prohibited local or special law. The State argues that defendant lacks standing to challenge the constitutionality of La.C.Cr.P. art. 404(B) because he suffered no harm as a result of this provision. The State relies on Merca-del, in which this Court found that an indicted defendant lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality of several enactments relative to grand jury proceedings in Orleans Parish because he failed to show that their application had a serious effect on his rights. In the present case, the State argues that defendant’s rights are likewise unaffected by the appointment of the judicial administrator to perform the role of jury commission.

Defendant argues that, by enacting La. C.Cr.P. art. 404(B), the legislature changed a general law by partial repeal into a special or local law prohibited by La. Const, art. 3, § 12 because it applies only to proceedings in criminal courts in East Baton Rouge. Defendant acknowledges Mercadel, but distinguishes it by asserting that the specific argument in the present case, i.e., that the amendment acted as a 112partial repeal of the prior general law, was not before the Court in Mercadel. Defendant argues that La.C.Cr.P. art. 533(1), which provides that a motion to quash may be based on the illegality of the manner of selection of the general venire, grand jury venire, or grand jury, confers standing and a mechanism by which the constitutionality of Article 404(B) can be challenged. Defendant contends that the article is a local or special law within the meaning of the constitution because it regulates the practice of the courts in one political subdivision only and defendant disputes the state’s assertion that the general public’s interest in the broad subject matter of a law is sufficient to render it a general law.

The Attorney General filed an amicus brief in support of the State. The amicus argues that the issue in the present case is identical to that previously addressed in Mercadel, which the amicus contends defendant fails to distinguish adequately. Because this Court determined in Merca-del that the method used to appoint a jury commission does not alone cause injury to a criminal defendant, the present defendant, who suffered no injury, lacks standing to challenge the provision that governs the appointment of the jury commission in East Baton Rouge Parish. The amicus also argues that the provision is not a local or special law because the jury commission in East Baton Rouge Parish plays an integral role in the administration of criminal justice in that parish and the administration of criminal justice is a subject of general interest statewide. The amicus compares the present article to statutes authorizing gaming operations in specific localities, which the amicus contends are not local or special laws because gaming is a statewide concern.

Statutes are presumed to be constitutional and the party challenging the validity of a statute generally has the burden of proving unconstitutionality. State v. Granger, 2007-2285, p. 6 (La.5/21/08), 982 So.2d 779, 787. As this Court has [ ^previously stated on many occasions, a court should avoid constitutional questions whenever the case can be disposed of on non-constitutional grounds. E.g., State v. Citizen, 2004-1841, p. 10 (La.4/1/05), 898 So.2d 325, 334. Further, a threshold issue that must be decided by a court before it may consider a constitutional challenge to a legal provision is whether the person challenging the provision has standing to do so. Greater New Orleans Expressway Comm’n v. Olivier, 2004-2147, p. 4 (La.1/19/05), 892 So.2d 570, 573. In order to have standing to challenge the constitutionality of a legal provision, the person bringing the challenge must have rights in controversy. Ring v. State, DOTD, 2002-1367, p. 7 (La.1/14/03), 835 So.2d 423, 428. More specifically, “[a] person can challenge the constitutionality of a statute only if the statute seriously affects his or her rights.” Mercadel, p. 9, 874 So.2d at 834.

In Mercadel, the state appealed directly to this Court after the trial court quashed the defendant’s indictment for first degree murder. By way of background, prior to deciding Mercadel, in State v. Dilosa, 02-2222 (La.6/27/03), 848 So.2d 546, this Court had struck down La.C.Cr.P. arts. 412, 413(C), 414(C), part of art. 413(B), and R.S. 15:114 (governing the drawing and impaneling of grand jurors in Orleans Parish before amendment in 2001) as local laws prohibited by La. Const, art. Ill, § 12(A)(3) because the state failed to provide “any viable geographic or demographic necessity which would justify the existence of the unique grand jury procedures in Orleans Parish mandated by the statutes.” See Dilosa, 02-2222 at 5, 848 So.2d at 550. By the time Mercadel was indicted, the bulk of these enactments had been amended with a few exceptions such as R.S. 15:114. Mercadel, then, sought to quash his indictment contending that the vestigial provisions, as well as other enactments related to the administration of criminal justice in Orleans Parish that were not challenged in Dilosa, were prohibited local laws. The trial judge found that defendant suffered no prejudice as 114a result of any of the provisions, but, nonetheless, granted the motion to quash to encourage this Court to clarify matters. This Court declined the trial court’s invitation and, instead, found that Mercadel lacked standing to challenge the enactments because he suffered no harm from their operation, stating:

Finding that the defendant has no standing to challenge the laws because he has failed to establish that application of the subject criminal code articles and statutes had a serious effect on his rights, we reverse the district court judgment declaring the code articles and statutes unconstitutional and quashing the defendant’s indictment.

Mercadel, 08-3015 at 2, 874 So.2d at 831. The Court further stated:

In this case, the district court specifically found that the defendant had not suffered any real harm as a result of any of the subject criminal code articles and statutes challenged. Thus, the district court implicitly found that the defendant had failed to show that the code articles and statutes he has challenged seriously affected his rights, as required, in order for a person to have standing to bring a constitutional challenge. Once the district judge found that the defendant lacked standing to challenge the subject criminal code articles and statutes, it should have denied defendant’s motions to quash, rather than granting the motions for the purpose of inviting this court to “speak” to the constitutionality of the challenged provisions. We decline that invitation, and vacate the district court judgment declaring the subject criminal code articles and statutes unconstitutional and granting the motions to quash.

Mercadel, 03-3015 at 8, 874 So.2d at 834.

Here, defendant, like the defendant in Mercadel, has neither alleged nor proved that the subject Article had any serious effect on his rights, without which he lacks standing to challenge the constitutionality of the Article. Defendant has failed to show, or allege, that the circumstances of his indictment would have been any different had the grand jury selection process been conducted by a jury commission, rather than by the judicial administrator. Further, defendant’s counsel at oral argument was unable to articulate a single effect on defendant’s rights due to the grand jury selection process having been conducted by the judicial administrator rather than a jury commission.

Defendant argues, instead, that La. C.Cr.P. art. 533 provides standing. The | ^Article reads in pertinent part:

A motion to quash an indictment by a grand jury may also be based on one or more of the following grounds:
(1) The manner of selection of the general venire, the grand jury venire, or the grand jury was illegal.

La.C.Cr.P. art. 533.

Here, the manner of selection of the grand jury was not “illegal.” In fact, the selection process comported exactly with La.C.Cr.P. art. 404(B), which is presumed to be constitutional. Defendant’s complaint, then, is not that the manner of selection of the grand jury was illegal in that it violated Article 404(B), it is that Article 404(B), itself, is unconstitutional. As stated above, a person can challenge the constitutionality of a statute only if the statute seriously affects his rights, and, here, the defendant has not made, or attempted to make, any showing that the Article does so.

Because defendant has not proved that the application of the article in question has “seriously affected” his rights, he lacks standing to challenge the constitutionality of the Article, and the trial court erred in reaching the question of constitutionality.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, we reverse the trial court’s granting of defendant’s motion to quash his indictment, and remand to that court for further proceedings in accordance with this decision.

KIMBALL, Chief Justice, dissents and assigns reasons.

WEIMER, Justice, concurs and assigns reasons.

KIMBALL, Chief Justice,

dissents and assigns reasons.

hi respectfully dissent from the majority opinion because I believe this court lacks appellate jurisdiction in this matter. Louisiana Constitution article V, § 5(D) provides, in pertinent part, that “[A] case shall be appealable to the supreme court if (1) a law or ordinance has been declared unconstitutional....” In the instant case, the district court’s oral ruling from the bench simply granted the defendant’s Motion to Quash. Nothing in the official criminal court minutes declares a law or ordinance unconstitutional. Although the transcript from the hearing on the motion to quash shows the district court judge discussed the constitutionality of Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 404(B), it is well settled law that the trial court’s oral or written reasons form no part of the judgment. Appeals are taken from the judgment, not the written reasons for judgment. See La. C.C.P. arts. 2082, 2088; Greater New Orleans Expressway Comm’n, 02-2795 at 3, 860 So.2d Rat 24 (citations omitted). Because there is no declaration of unconstitutionality in the district court’s judgment, there is no basis for the exercise of this court’s appellate jurisdiction. Burmaster, 07-1311 at 2, 963 So.2d at 379; Carmena, 06-2680 at 2, 947 So.2d at 716; Greater New Orleans Expressway Comm’n, 02-2795 at 4, 860 So.2d at 24; see Meaux, 07-2474 at 1, 972 So.2d at 1137. Thus, I would dismiss the appeal and remand the case to the district court for further proceedings.

The majority opinion attempts to distinguish Burmaster and Carmena by asserting the remarks regarding constitutionality in those cases “were minimal.” Op. p. 777. Both cases, however, merely state, “[although the district court’s reasons for judgment discuss the constitutionality of the [act at issue], it is well-settled law that the trial court’s oral or written reasons form no part of the judgment.” Burmas-ter, 07-1311 at 1, 963 So.2d at 379; Carme- na, 06-2680 at 1, 947 So.2d at 716. The majority opinion also tries to distinguish Meaux and Greater New Orleans Expressway Comm’n because those cases involved written judgments that failed to declare the statutes at issue unconstitutional, and this case involves an oral ruling from the bench after a discussion of whether article 404(B) was a local or special law. Op. pp. 777-78. The majority opinion, however, fails to address how an oral ruling issued after a discussion of the constitutionality of article 404(B) is distinguishable from a written judgment issued after a discussion of the constitutionality of a statute in its written or oral reasons for judgment. In the present case, like Burmaster, Carme-na, Greater New Orleans Expressway Comm’n, and Meaux, the oral ruling from the bench does not declare article 404(B) unconstitutional. The criminal court minutes merely state, “[t]he Court GRANTED the defense motion to Quash Indictment.” Thus, there is no declaration of unconstitutionality.

The particular facts of this case, namely the district court judge’s repeated refusals to make a declaration of unconstitutionality, further show there was no ^declaration of unconstitutionality for this court to review. In the above eases, the district court “discussed” the constitutionality of the provisions at issue, with the district court in Greater New Orleans Expressway Comm’n declaring a statute unconstitutional in its written reasons for judgment. Greater New Orleans Expressway Comm’n, 02-2795 at 3, 860 So.2d at 23. In contrast, as the majority opinion points out, the district court judge specifically stated the issue before the court was not a review of the constitutionality of the statute, as the statute was not sought to be declared unconstitutional. Op. pp. 772-73. When the state sought clarification of the district court’s ruling, the district court again stated it did not address the constitutionality of article 404(B), it had “not entered any declaration of the constitutionality of the statute,” and it had “not commented one way or the other whether the statute is constitutional or not.” Instead, the district court granted relief under the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure. Op. p. 773. Thus, the district court’s discussion of constitutionality in this case appears to warrant the same result reached in Carmena, Burmaster, Greater New Orleans Expressway Comm’n, and Meaux, wherein this court concluded it did not have appellate jurisdiction and rémanded the case to the district court.

For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.

WEIMER, J.,

concurring.

| jWhile I agree with the result in this case, I write separately to express my views as to why La.C.Cr.P. art. 533 does not confer standing upon the defendant to challenge the constitutionality of La. C.Cr.P. art. 404(B).

Central to the defendant’s standing argument is whether La.C.Cr.P. art. 404(B) impacts “[t]he manner of selection of the general venire, the grand jury venire, or the grand jury.” La.C.Cr.P. art. 533(1). However, a review of the defendant’s complaint reveals that his attack on La.C.Cr.P. art. 404(B) is aimed, not at the “manner of selection” of the general venire, but at who is tasked with making the selection. The defendant complains that La.C.Cr.P. art. 404(B), which provides that the function of the jury commission in East Baton Rouge Parish be performed by the judicial administrator of the Nineteenth Judicial District Court, is a prohibited special or local law. Ultimately, then, the defendant’s complaint is not with the manner in which selection of the jury venire is made, but with who makes that selection. The alleged infirmity in La.C.Cr.P. art. 404(B) does not affect the manner or procedures for selecting jury venires, only the person or entity performing the selection. Therefore, no standing to bring this complaint is conferred on the defendant under the express provisions of La.C.Cr.P. art. 533.

|2The wording of La.C.Cr.P. art. 533 is clear and unambiguous. It speaks solely to the illegality of the “manner of selection” of the general venire, the grand jury venire, or the grand jury. In Louisiana, it is presumed that every word, sentence or provision in a law was intended to serve some useful purpose, that some effect is to be given to each such provision, and that no unnecessary words or provisions were employed. Sultana Corporation v. Jewelers Mutual Insurance Company, 03-0360, p. 9 (La.12/3/03), 860 So.2d 1112, 1119. In this case, there has been no showing by defendant that the manner of selection of the jury venire in East Baton Rouge Parish, ie., the methodology used, differs from that in any other parish. In the absence of such a showing, there is no standing conferred under La.C.Cr.P. art. 533.

      . In his motion to quash, defendant argued that Article 404(B) runs afoul of the constitutional prohibition in two ways. First, defendant argued that the article constituted a special or local law regulating the practice of a court, which is prohibited by La. Const, art. Ill, § 12(A)(3). Second, defendant argued that the article, when amended, effectuated a partial repeal of the prior existing general law, which is prohibited by La. Const, art. Ill, § 12(B).

      . In Slay, three co-defendants who were charged with fishing with improperly sized nets unsuccessfully sought to quash the charging instruments on the basis that R.S. 56:322 violated the constitutional prohibition against local or special laws. In reversing the convictions on appeal, this Court found that the enactment provided no justification for regulating mesh size differently depending on location and that the rationale for the classification proposed by amicus Department of Wildlife and Fisheries was not reasonable.

      . Throughout the hearing, defendant also argued that any ruling favorable to him should have only limited and prospective effect. He thus also distinguished Mercadel with the allegation that defense counsel in Mercadel had tried to "empty the jails in Orleans Parish.” R. at 502. The State, however, disputed that the remedy would apply only to defendant and contended that the natural effect of ruling in defendant’s favor would be that "every case indicted in East Baton Rouge Parish since the drafting of this article would, then, come under question.” R. at 503.

      . The defendant in Dalon, who was convicted of arson in Orleans Parish, contended on appeal that the enactment which established the Criminal District Court for the Parish of Orleans was a special or local law prohibited by Articles 46 and 48 of the Louisiana Constitution then in force. Relying on earlier jurisprudence, the Dalon court rejected that claim as "perfectly preposterous, and so hollow that it cannot stand criticism” largely because of the necessity of having a criminal court in Orleans Parish.

        .Burmaster is a brief per curiam in which it was noted that, although the state invoked the appellate jurisdiction of this Court pursuant to La. Const, art. V, § 5(D), a review of the trial court’s judgment "indicates the court merely denied defendant's exception of no cause of action ... [and nothing] in the judgment declares a law or ordinance unconstitutional ... [although] the district court's oral reasons for judgment discuss the constitutionality of [the enactment].” Burmaster, 07-1311 at 1, 963 So.2d at 378-79. Plaintiffs in Burmaster, who were residents of Plaque-mines Parish whose properties were flooded during hurricanes Katrina and Rita, filed suit against the parish government for negligent failure to maintain the levees. The parish responded with an exception of no cause of action based on a legislative enactment precluding any party from having a cause of action against a public entity for damages arising from those two hurricanes. Plaintiffs in opposing the exception contended that this enactment unconstitutionally divested them of property rights in violation of La. Const, art. I, § 9. The trial court's ruling stated simply that the exception was denied. In oral reasons for judgment, the court stated further that "the act was unconstitutional.”

      . Plaintiffs Sandy Carmena and her family sued the sheriff's department and its deputies over their actions in a dispute between neighbors over a dog. Defendants, anticipating that plaintiffs would rely on executive orders that suspended prescriptive periods after hurricanes Katrina and Rita, argued that the governor exceeded her authority in issuing those orders. The trial court's ruling sustained defendant's exception of prescription. In written reasons, the trial court commented that the executive orders were "unconstitutional and without legal effect.”

      . The plaintiff in Meaux sought to establish paternity in 2003 after the child’s birth in 1997. The custodial grandparents filed an exception of prescription based on a 2004 amendment establishing two-year prescriptive period for paternity actions. The trial court found that the custodial grandparents could not rely on the amendment because it had been declared unconstitutional in another court proceeding and therefore dismissed the exception of prescription.

      . Furthermore, by law, the only ground available to the judge for granting the motion to quash was the one asserted by the defendant — that the article is unconstitutional. La. C.Cr.P. art. 536.

      . See La. C.C.P. art. 1918; see also Meaux v. Galtier, 07-2474, p. 1 (La.1/25/08), 972 So.2d 1137, 1137; Burmaster v. Plaquemines Parish Government, 07-1311, p. 1 (La.8/31/07), 963 So.2d 378, 379; Carmena v. East Baton Rouge Parish Sheriff’s Office, 06-2680, p. 1 (La.2/2/07), 947 So.2d 715, 716; Haynes v. United Parcel Service, 05-2378, p. 7, n. 4 (La.7/6/06), 933 So.2d 765; Greater New Orleans Expressway Comm’n v. Olivier, 02-2795, p. 3 (La.11/18/03), 860 So.2d 22, 24 (Knoll, and Weimer, JJ., dissenting for reasons; Victory, J., dissenting for reasons assigned by Knoll and Weimer, JJ.).