author: WEIMER, Justice. TRAYLOR, Justice, KNOLL, Justice,

text:
    Elaine FRUGE v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF the LOUISIANA STATE EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT SYSTEM.
    No. 2008-CA-1270.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 2, 2008.
    Rehearing Denied Feb. 13, 2009.

      Roedel, Parson, Koch, Blanche, Balhoff & McCollister, C. Kevin Hayes, Carlton Jones, III, Baton Rouge, for appellant.
    Lockwood & Rome, Thomas McCabe Lockwood, Baton Rouge, for appellee.
    Mary Florence Quaid, Baton Rouge, Jerry Glen Jones, Jerry J. Guillot, Yolanda Johnson Dixon, Baton Rouge, and Alfred William Speer, II, for amicus curiae, Legislature of Louisiana.
    Bradley Charles Myers and Donna Van-dever Yelverton, Baton Rouge, amicus curiae, for Louisiana Municipal Association.
    George R. Trelles, for amicus curiae, AFSCME AFL-CIO Louisiana Public Employees Council 17.
   WEIMER, Justice.

| tThis declaratory judgment action challenges the validity of 2002 1st Ex.Sess. La. Acts No. 165 (“Act 165”), which amended LSA-R.S. 11:416 and added LSA-R.S. 11:416.1, provisions of the Louisiana State Employees’ Retirement System. The case is before us on direct appeal from a judgment declaring Act 165 unconstitutional on grounds that it was enacted in violation of La. Const, art. X, § 29(C), which requires that notice of any proposal to effect a change in any provisions of the public retirement system be published in the official state journal at least thirty days prior to introduction of the bill in the legislature.

After reviewing the record, the Act, and the constitutional provisions at issue, we find, contrary to the district court, that Act 165 does not suffer from a constitutional infirmity. The publication requirements of La. Const, art. X, § 29(C) apply only to bills introduced in regular sessions of the legislature and do not apply to bills introduced in an extraordinary session. Because Act 165 was introduced and enacted during the 2002 First Extraordinary Session, the Act was not subject to the |-¿publication requirements of La. Const, art. X, § 29(C). The judgment of the district court declaring Act 165 unconstitutional is therefore reversed.

BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Prior to June 30, 2001, LSA-R.S. 11:416 offered retirees of the Louisiana State Employees’ Retirement System (“LASERS”) who chose to return to state employment certain options with respect to their benefits. During its 2001 Regular Session, the Louisiana legislature passed 2001 La. Acts No. 455 (“Act 455”), which became effective June 30, 2001. Act 455 amended LSA-R.S. 11:416 in several respects.

On March 19, 2002, Governor M.J. “Mike” Foster, Jr. issued Proclamation Number 11 MJF 2002, calling for an extraordinary session of the legislature to convene, beginning on March 25, 2002, for the purpose of legislating on certain specifically enumerated objects. Item 23 of the Proclamation listed as one of the enumerated objects: “To amend and reenact R.S. 11:416 relative to the Louisiana State Employees Retirement System to provide for the reemployment of retirees; and to otherwise provide relative thereto.”

On March 26, 2002, House Bill 130 (“HB-130”) of the 2002 First Extraordinary Session was introduced in the Louisiana House of Representatives. The stated purpose of the bill was “[t]o amend and reenact R.S. 11:416, relative to the Louisiana State Employees Re&ement System; to provide for the reemployment of retirees; to provide for the benefits paid to such retirees; to provide relative to accrual of credit for service; to provide for employer contributions; to provide an option for regaining membership in the system; to provide for reporting; to provide penalties for failure to report; to provide for retirees reemployed pursuant to Act No. 455 of the 2001 Regular Session of the Legislature and for employees who retired prior to the Ineffective date of such Act; and to provide for related matters.” The bill was passed by the legislature and enacted as Act 165 of the 2002 First Extraordinary Session. It became effective May 9, 2002, when Governor Foster failed to sign it within the delays allowed by law.

For the purposes of the instant matter, it is sufficient to note Act 165 changed provisions of Act 455. In addition, Act 165 enacted LSA-R.S. 11:416.1, which applies specifically to those retirees who retired and were rehired during the ten-month period Act 455 was in effect.

On March 5, 2007, this declaratory judgment action was instituted against the Board of Trustees of LASERS. The plaintiff, Elaine Fruge, is an employee of the Department of Corrections who retired on July 19, 2002, two months after the passage of Act 165, and who, as a result, was unable to avail herself of the benefits provided under LSA-R.S. 11:416 prior to its amendment and re-enactment by Act 165. Ms. Fruge’s petition alleges that HB-130 (the bill which later became Act 165) was a proposal to effect a change in existing laws relating to the retirement system for public employees within the meaning of La. Const, art. X, § 29(C), and as such was subject to that constitutional provision’s requirement that notice to introduce the proposal be published, without cost to the state, in the official state journal on two separate days, the last day being at least thirty days prior to introduction of the bill in the legislature. Ms. Fruge’s petition avers that notice of an intention to introduce HB-130 was never published in any official state journal, and thus no thirty day delay occurred between publication of the notice and introduction of the bill on March 26, 2002. In addition, Ms. Fruge alleges that the legislation does not contain a recital that the publication requirements of La. Const, art. X, § 29(C) were met, all as required by the constitution. Accordingly, Ms. Fruge sought a declaratory judgment declaring |4Act 165 of the 2002 First Extraordinary Session unconstitutional. In addition, she sought a judgment declaring her immediate eligibility for the benefits provided under LSA-R.S. 11:416 prior to its amendment and reenactment by Act 165.

Following the district court’s overruling of a peremptory exception of no cause of action filed by LASERS, Ms. Fruge filed a motion for - summary judgment in which she argued that Act 165 was enacted without complying with the notice and publication requirements of La. Const, art. X, § 29(C), and that the Act is therefore unconstitutional, null, void, and unenforceable. LASERS responded by filing a cross-motion for summary judgment, not disputing Ms. Fruge’s contention of noncompliance with the provisions of La. Const, art. X, § 29(C), but asserting that those provisions do not apply to legislation such as HB-130 (the bill which later became Act 165), introduced during extraordinary sessions of the legislature.

After a hearing on March 24, 2008, the district court denied the motion for summary judgment filed by LASERS, and granted Ms. Fruge’s motion for summary judgment, declaring Act 165 of the 2002 First Extraordinary Session unconstitutional on grounds that it was enacted without complying with the notice, publication, and recital requirements of La. Const, art. X, § 29(C). Consistent with its findings, the district court signed a written judgment, dated May 14, 2008, in which it declared Act 165 of the 2002 First Extraordinary Session unconstitutional, null, void, and unenforceable, and decreed Ms. Fruge to be immediately eligible for the retire/rehire benefits provided under LSA-R.S. 11:416, as the statute existed prior to its amendment and re-enactment by Act 165.

| fjLASERS suspensively appealed the district court judgment to this court, which has jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to La. Const, art. Y, § 5(D).

LAW AND ANALYSIS

Principles of Review for Constitutionality

This court reviews judgments declaring a statute unconstitutional de novo. State v. All Property and Casualty Insurance Camers Authorized, and Licensed to do Business in State, 06-2030, p. 6 (La 8/25/06), 937 So.2d 313, 319; Louisiana Municipal Association v. State, 04-0227, p. 45 (La.1/19/05), 893 So.2d 809, 842. In conjunction with this review, certain principles apply. As a general rule, statutes are presumed to be constitutional; therefore, the party challenging the validity of a statute has the burden of proving its unconstitutionality. State v. Citizen, 04-1841, p. 11 (La.4/1/05), 898 So.2d 325, 334; Louisiana Municipal Association, 04-0227 at 45; 893 So.2d at 842; Board of Commissioners of North Lafourche Conservation, Levee and Drainage District v. Board of Commissioners of Atchafalaya Basin Levee District, 95-1353, pp. 3-4 (La.1/16/96), 666 So.2d 636, 639. Because the provisions of the Louisiana Constitution are not grants of power but instead are limitations on the otherwise plenary power of the people, exercised through the legislature, the legislature may enact any legislation that the constitution does not prohibit. Louisiana Municipal Association, 04-0227 at 45, 893 So.2d at 842-843; Polk v. Edwards, 626 So.2d 1128, 1132 (La.1993); Board of Commissioners of Orleans Levee District v. Department of Natural Resources, 496 So.2d 281, 286 (La.1986). As a result, a party challenging the constitutionality of a statute must point to a particular provision of the constitution that would prohibit | fithe enactment of the statute, and must demonstrate clearly and convincingly that it was the constitutional aim of that provision to deny the legislature the power to enact the statute in question. World Trade Center Taxing District v. All Taxpayers, Property Owners, 05-0374, p. 12 (La.6/29/05), 908 So.2d 623, 632; Caddo-Shreveport Sales and Use Tax Commission v. Office of Motor Vehicles Department of Public Safety and Corrections of the State, 97-2233, pp. 5-6 (La.4/14/98), 710 So.2d 776, 779; Polk, 626 So.2d at 1132. Finally, because it is presumed that the legislature acts within its constitutional authority in enacting legislation, this court must construe a statute so as to preserve its constitutionality when it is reasonable to do so. State v. Fleury, 01-0871, p. 5 (La.10/16/01), 799 So.2d 468, 472; Moore v. Roemer, 567 So.2d 75, 78 (La.1990).

Constitutionality of Act 165

For purposes of the present challenge, the parties do not dispute that the notice, publication, and recital requirements of La. Const, art. X, § 29(C) were not satisfied prior to the introduction of HB-130 during the 2002 First Extraordinary Session and that the only notice provided of the intent to introduce HB-130 was that contained in Proclamation No. 11 MJF 2002 calling for the extraordinary session. Given this admission, the issue presented for this court’s resolution is whether the requirements of La. Const, art. X, § 29(C) apply to legislation, such as Act 165, enacted during extraordinary sessions of the legislature.

17Resolution of this issue hinges upon the interpretation and interplay of the following provisions of the Louisiana constitution:

La. Const, art. X, § 29(C) Retirement Systems; Change; Notice. No proposal to effect any change in existing laws or constitutional provisions relating to any retirement system for public employees shall be introduced in the legislature unless notice of intention to introduce the proposal has been published, without cost to the state, in the official state journal on two separate days. The last day of publication shall be at least thirty days before introduction of the bill. The notice shall state the substance of the contemplated law or proposal, and the bill shall contain a recital that the notice has been given.
La. Const, art. Ill, § 2. Sessions
(B) Extraordinary Session. The legislature may be convened at other times by the governor and shall be convened by the presiding officers of both houses upon written petition of a majority of the elected members of each house. The form of the petition shall be provided by law. At least five days prior to convening the legislature in extraordinary session, the governor or the presiding officers, as the case may be, shall issue a proclamation stating the objects of the session, the date on which it shall convene, and the number of days for which it is convened. The power to legislate shall be limited, under penalty of nullity, to the objects specifically enumerated in the proclamation. The session shall be limited to the number of days stated therein, which shall not exceed thirty calendar days.
(C) Emergency Session. The governor may convene the legislature in extraordinary session without prior notice or proclamation in the event of public emergency caused by epidemic, enemy attack, or public catastrophe.

Interpretation of these constitutional provisions is governed by well-settled rules of constitutional construction. As we have repeatedly explained, the starting point in the interpretation of constitutional provisions is the language of the constitution itself. Malone v. Shyne, 06-2190, p. 7 (La.9/13/06), 937 So.2d 343, 349; Ocean Energy, Inc. v. Plaquemines Parish Government, 04-0066, pp. 6-7 (La.7/6/04), 880 So.2d 1, 7. When a constitutional provision is clear and unambiguous, and its application does not lead to absurd consequences, its language |smust be given effect. Malone, 06-2190 at 7, 937 So.2d at 349; Ocean Energy, 04-0066 at 7, 880 So.2d at 7. Unequivocal constitutional provisions are not subject to judicial construction and should be applied by giving words their generally understood meaning. Malone, 06-2190 at 7, 937 So.2d at 349; Ocean Energy, 04-0066 at 7, 880 So.2d at 7.

While constitutional provisions should be construed so as to give effect to the purpose indicated by a fair interpretation of the language used, in the event of conflict or inconsistency, constitutional provisions should be construed, where possible, to allow each provision to stand and be given effect. Perschall v. State, 96-0322, p. 21-22 (La.7/1/97), 697 So.2d 240, 255. If one constitutional provision addresses a subject in general terms, and another addresses the same subject in more detailed terms, the two should be harmonized if possible, but if there is any conflict, the latter must prevail. Malone, 06-2190 at 7, 937 So.2d at 349; Ocean Energy, 04-0066 at 7, 880 So.2d at 7; Perschall, 96-0322 at 22, 697 So.2d at 255. Nevertheless, where the language of a constitutional provision makes its aim evident and unequivocal, courts need not consider the historical basis for the provision and may not, by separately considering related constitutional provisions, arrive at a construction that detracts from the effectiveness or manifest meaning and purpose of the related provisions. Malone, 06-2190 at 7, 937 So.2d at 349; Perschall, 96-0322 at 22; 697 So.2d at 256.

The wording of La. Const, art. X, § 29(C) is clear, unambiguous, and admits of no exceptions. It states, in pertinent part: “No proposal to effect any change in existing laws ... relating to any retirement system for public employees shall be introduced in the legislature unless notice of intention to introduce the proposal has been published ... in the official state journal on two separate days. The last day l^of publication shall be at least thirty days before introduction of the bill.” (Emphasis added.)

However, Act 165, an act effecting a change in existing laws relating to the public retirement system, was enacted during an extraordinary session of the legislature, and the constitution contains its own specific notice provisions for legislation introduced during extraordinary sessions. In equally clear and unambiguous terms, La. Const, art. Ill, § 2(B) states, in pertinent part: “The legislature may be convened at other times by the governor .... At least five days prior to convening the legislature in extraordinary session, the governor ... shall issue a proclamation stating the objects of the session, the date on which it shall convene, and the number of days for which it is convened. The power to legislate shall be limited, under penalty of nullity, to the objects specifically enumerated in the proclamation. The session shall be limited to the number of days stated therein, which shall not exceed thirty calendar days.” (Emphasis added.)

The enactment of Act 165 places in conflict the five day notice requirement for legislation introduced during extraordinary sessions, La. Const, art. Ill, § 2(B), and the longer, thirty day notice required for legislation relating to the retirement system for public employees, La. Const, art. X, § 29(C). Ms. Fruge argues, and the district court apparently concluded, that the thirty day notice requirement for public retirement system legislation can be reconciled with the five day notice requirement for legislation introduced during extraordinary sessions by recognizing that La. Const, art. Ill, § 2(B) requires that the governor issue the call for an extraordinary session “[a]t least five days prior to convening,” and that, as a result, if legislation regarding a public retirement plan is to be included in a call for an extraordinary session, that call must specify a commencement date at least thirty-days hence, |inthereby satisfying the thirty day notice and publication requirements of La. Const, art. X, § 29(C).

LASERS counters by pointing out that such a literal application of La. Const, art. X, § 29(C) produces the absurd consequence of preventing, for all practical purposes, consideration of public retirement system legislation at extraordinary sessions, which are typically called on short notice and have a constitutionally limited duration (no more than 30 calendar days, the minimum time allowed by La. Const, art. X, § 29(C) between publication of notice and introduction of a bill). It absolutely prohibits the legislature from considering such matters in times of public emergency caused by epidemic, enemy attack, or public catastrophe, occasions on which La. Const, art. Ill, § 2(C) authorizes the governor to convene the legislature in extraordinary session without any prior notice or proclamation. And, as a result, it interferes with and constrains the otherwise plenary power of the governor to convene an extraordinary session to address such issues.

Although we agree with Ms. Fruge that the language of La. Const, art. X, § 29(C) is clear and unambiguous, its conflict with La. Const, art. Ill, § 2(B) presents a circumstance in which the full and unqualified exercise of its notice and publication provisions leads to the absurd consequence of detracting from and limiting the more spe-eifie provisions of the constitution addressing the notice requirements for extraordinary sessions, and the plenary power of the governor and legislature to |nconvene such extraordinary sessions. Louisiana Constitution art. Ill, § 2(B) is a clear and specific provision, with which the more general provision found in La. Const, art. X, § 29(C) conflicts. Therefore, it is our responsibility to attempt to harmonize the constitutional provisions placed in conflict by Act 165.

In doing so, we do not work on a clean slate. The essentially identical issue was initially presented to this court almost a century ago, in State ex rel. Sewerage & Water Board of New Orleans v. Michel, 127 La. 685, 53 So. 926 (1910). There, the Sewerage and Water Board of the City of New Orleans, along with certain taxpayers, sought a writ of mandamus to compel the Secretary of State to register and promulgate Senate Bill No. 1 of the Second Extra Session of the 1910 General Assembly. The Secretary of State refused to register and promulgate the bill, averring that it did not comply with the public notice requirements of Article 50 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1898, which provided:

No local or special law shall be passed on any subject not enumerated in Article 48 of this Constitution, unless notice of the intention to apply therefor shall have been published, without cost to the State, in the locality where the matter or thing to be affected may be situated, which notice shall state the substance of the contemplated law, and shall be published at least thirty days prior to the introduction into the General Assembly of such bill, and in the same manner provided by law for the advertisement of judicial sales. The evidence of such notice having been published, shall be exhibited in the General Assembly before such act shall be passed, and every such act shall contain a recital that such notice has been given.

This court disagreed with the Secretary of State, holding that the thirty-day notice provision does not apply to legislation introduced during extraordinary sessions, explaining:

_Jj2[I]t is evident that the power thus conferred on the Governor to convene the General Assembly [in extraordinary session], in order that it may legislate on matters of urgent necessity, and on the General Assembly so to legislate, is independent of the restriction imposed by article 50 of the Constitution, since the necessity for immediate legislation which would justify the convening of the General Assembly in extraordinary session could not be expected to yield to the requirement that notice of the intention so to legislate should be published for 30 days, without expense to the state. [Emphasis added.]

Michel, 127 La. at 690-691, 53 So. at 928. The holding of Michel was subsequently reaffirmed by this court. See, Williams v. Guerre, 182 La. 745, 768, 162 So. 609, 616 (1935) (“Assuming that Act No. 27 of 1934 (3d Ex.Sess.) was a local or special law ... under the decision of [Michel ], which seems to be the only case on point, [S]ection 6 of [Article 4 [of the Constitution of 1921, the corollary of Article 50 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1898] would not be applicable.”); State ex rel Porterie v. Smith, 184 La. 263, 290, 166 So. 72, 81 (1935) (“Under the authority of State ex rel. Sewerage & Water Board [of New Orleans] v. Michel, 127 La. 685, 53 So. 926, even if Act 22 were a local or special law, [S]ection 6 of [A]rticle 4 of the Constitution [of 1921] would not be applicable, since the act was passed at a Special or Extraordinary Session. The correctness of the Michel Case has never been challenged or disputed.”).

This court visited the issue again in State v. Cusimano, 187 La. 269, 174 So. 352 (1937). In Cusimano, the State sued the defendant for the balance due on a liquor license tax authorized by Act No. 24 of the Third Extra Session of 1935. The defendant refused to pay the license tax, claiming it to be unconstitutional for, among other reasons, the failure to comply with the notice and publication requirements for enacting local or special laws embodied in [S]ection 6 of [A]rtiele 4 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1921. This court again disagreed, holding that the thirty-day notice | ^requirement was not applicable to legislation introduced during an extraordinary session:

The power conferred on the Governor by the constitutional provision to convene the Legislature to legislate on designated subjects, and on the Legislature so to legislate, presupposes an urgent necessity for prompt action, and the exercise of such power is not controlled by the constitutional requirement that previous notice of the intention to enact permitted local or special laws shall be published for 30 days.

Cusimano, 187 La. at 275, 174 So. at 354-355, citing Michel,

Admittedly, Michel and its progeny were decided under prior constitutions and involved the predecessor to La. Const, art. Ill, § 13, the constitutional provision which requires that notice of the intention to introduce a bill enacting a local or special law be published in the official journal of the locality where the matter to be affected is situated at least thirty days prior to the introduction of the bill in the legislature. However, the fact that a different constitutional provision is involved here (one affecting public retirement systems as opposed to one enacting local or special laws) does not dictate a different analysis or result. 20 Lamonioa & Jones, Louisiana Civil Law Treatise: Legislative Law and Procedure, § 2.12 at 34 (“The same exception to notice that appears to apply to local or special bills in special sessions should also apply to retirement bills,... .”).

|14In fact, Ms. Fruge does not contend that our analysis of the notice provisions of La. Const, art. Ill, § 13 cannot be extended by analogy to the substantially similar notice requirements of La. Const, art. X, § 29(C); rather she argues that substantive changes in the 1974 Louisiana Constitution have largely invalidated the underlying rationale of Michel and its progeny, rendering suspect the continued viability of their holdings. According to Ms. Fruge, the Louisiana Constitutions of 1898 and 1921 did not make a distinction between extraordinary legislative sessions necessitated by public emergency and those convened by the governor for other purposes. This lack of distinction made it reasonable for this court, in Michel and Cusimano, to characterize extraordinary sessions as legislative sessions involving “matters of urgent necessity” and as presupposing “an urgent necessity for prompt action,” because, according to Ms. Fruge, the express language of La. Const, art. LXXV (1898) and La. Const, art. V, § 14 (1921) tied the convening of extraordinary sessions to emergency conditions. The 1974 Constitution, by contrast, does not tie extraordinary sessions to public emergency, but distinguishes between extraordinary sessions convened by the governor as a matter of executive prerogative, La. Const, art. Ill, § 2(B) (1974), and those convened in the event of public emergency, La. Const, art. Ill, § 2(C) (1974). This difference, Ms. Fruge asserts, compels a different analysis.

| ^However, in neither Michel nor any of the cases which followed it, did the challenged legislation involve matters of public emergency or arise out of an extraordinary session called under emergency circumstances. And, even a cursory examination of the language of our prior constitutions reveals' that no substantive change was wrought by the 1974 Constitution.

Article LXXV of the Louisiana Constitution of 1898 provided:

He [the governor] shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed, and he may, on extraordinary occasions, convene the General Assembly at the seat of government, or, if that should have become dangerous from an enemy or from an epidemic, at a different place. The power to legislate shall be limited to the objects specially enumerated in the proclamation convening such extraordinary session; therein the Governor shall also limit the time such session may continue; provided, it shall not exceed thirty days. Any legislative action had after the time so limited, or as to objects not enumerated in said proclamation, shall be null and void.

Contrary to Ms. Fruge’s allegations, the governor’s authority to convene an extraordinary session was not limited to a public emergency, but to a time frame, which could not exceed thirty days, and to the objects specially enumerated in the proclamation convening the extraordinary session. The provisions of Article V, § 14 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1921 continue this limitation, which again is not tied to a public emergency, although under the 1921 Constitution, a distinction is drawn between extraordinary sessions called on the governor’s own initiative and extraordinary sessions called in the event of a public emergency, the latter being exempt from the notice and proclamation requirements of the former:

He [the governor] shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed, and may, on extraordinary occasions, convene the Legislature at the seat of government, or, if that should have become dangerous from an enemy, or epidemic, at a different place. It shall become his duty to convene the Legislature in extraordinary session whenever petitioned to do so by two-thirds of the members elected to each house....
| ifiThe power to legislate, under the penalty of nullity, shall be limited to the objects specially enumerated in the proclamation of the Governor, ... convening such extraordinary session, and the session shall be limited to the time named therein, which shall never exceed thirty days.
Whenever the Governor on his own initiative desires to convene the Legislature in extraordinary session in addition to the requirements hereinabove set forth the Governor shall be required in his proclamation to fix the date of the commencement of said extraordinary session and shall have given five days notice in writing to each member of the Legislature that he will call said extraordinary session on the date fixed in the proclamation and which date shall be not less than five days subsequent to the date on which said notice to said Legislators was mailed, except on such occasions as epidemics, attacks by the enemy, or public catastrophe. [Emphasis added.]

La. Const, art. V, § 14 (1921).

The 1974 Constitution, at Article III, simplifies but maintains much of the language of the 1921 Constitution. It basically divides what was one paragraph in the 1921 Constitution into two: section 2(B) which involves extraordinary sessions called on the governor’s own initiative and requiring five days notice, in the form of a proclamation, of the objects to be considered at said session; and section 2(C) which involves extraordinary sessions called in the event of public emergency, which require no prior notice or proclamation. The reason for breaking the provision into two paragraphs was explained by one of the delegates to the 1973 Constitutional Convention:

As I understand it, ... in the original section, in the original draft of the legislative department there was no requirement of a five day notice. Therefore, this would have been unnecessary. When the five day notice was inserted and placed in them report, they overlooked the emergency situation and the purpose of this is merely to take care of emergencies as they are taken care of in the present constitution.

117Records of the Louisiana Constitutional Convention of 1973: Convention Transcripts, Vol. V, 17th Days Proceedings— July 19,1973, p. 312.

Clearly, in drafting the provisions of La. Const, art. Ill, § 2(B) and (C), the redactors intended no change in the constitution from prior law. The 1921 Constitution distinguished between extraordinary sessions necessitated by public emergency and those convened by the governor for other purposes, and that distinction was preserved and carried forth, in much the same manner, in the 1974 Constitution. As a result, and contrary to Ms. Fruge’s contention, it is clear that the underlying rationale of Michel and its progeny remains valid.

Even were such not the case, however, and we were considering this matter for the first time, we would find ourselves constrained by our rules of interpretation to accord the words of La. Const, art. Ill, § 2(B) their generally understood meaning. Malone, 06-2190 at 7, 937 So.2d at 349; Ocean Energy, 04-0066 at 7, 880 So.2d at 7. The word “extraordinary” is defined as “going beyond what is usual, regular, or customary.” Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary, 11th ed. (2003) at p. 444. According to the generally understood meaning of the word, then, an extraordinary session is one which calls for action that cannot be taken in regular course. Indeed, the shortened time period permitted for an extraordinary session (no more than thirty calendar days) presupposes a necessity for “prompt action,” and the limited scope of the session (only those objects enumerated in the proclamation) presupposes matters of “urgent necessity” which cannot be addressed in a regular session. This |isis precisely what this court recognized in Michel. The reasoning of that decision remains as relevant today as when it was first put forth.

Any other interpretation of the interplay of these constitutional provisions ignores the fundamental distinction between regular and extraordinary sessions of the legislature. Regular sessions commence on a regular date, fixed by law, and there is a deadline for pre-filing bills to be introduced in either house. La. Const, art. Ill, § 2(A). Extraordinary sessions, on the other hand, are spontaneously called. In place of a deadline for pre-filing bills, there is a requirement that notice, in the form of a proclamation stating the objects of the session, be provided at least five days in advance of the session. La. Const, art. Ill, § 2(B). The requirement of at least five days notice serves the same function as the thirty-day advertisement requirement of La. Const, art. X, § 29(C); it simply shortens the advance notice required to make it consistent with the shortened periods and agendas that apply to extraordinary sessions.

Further, and consistent with another of our well-settled rules of interpretation, we presume that the legislature was aware of the interpretation that had been given to the constitutional provisions by the jurisprudence. State, Department of Public Safety and Corrections, Office of State Police, Riverboat Gaming Division v. Louisiana Riverboat Gaming Commission and Horseshoe Entertainment, 94-1872, 94-1914, p. 17 (La.5/22/95), 655 So.2d 292, 301 n. 10 (reciting the rule that those who enact laws are presumed to act deliberately and with full knowledge of existing laws on the same subject, with awareness of court cases and well-established principles of construction, and with knowledge of the effect of their acts and a purpose in view). Yet, a review of the transcripts of the Constitutional Convention of 1973, reveals that, as a general proposition, in enacting La. Const, art. X, § 29(C), 11}1the redactors intended no change in the law. After a reading of the proposed provision, it was explained:

Mr. Chairman, members of the convention, this section has to do with intent to change the retirement system and the procedure which you should follow in making the changes. The proposed constitution says that “you must advertise twice in the Official Journal on two separate days, the last day which would be thirty days prior to the introduction of this bill.” It retains the requirement that “such notice states the substance of the contemplated law or proposal contained in the notice that shall be given.” The constitution today provides that “any change in the constitution must be advertised on three successive days, thirty days prior to the regular session.” This just changes it to twice, thirty days prior to the introduction of bills for intent to change the retirement system. It’s a very simple thing and it is contained in the present constitution.

Records of the Louisiana Constitutional Convention of 1973: Convention Transcripts, Vol. IX, 92nd Days Proceedings— December 5, 1973, p. 2592. Indeed, the changes that were effected in the language of this particular provision were explained as necessary “to make it coincide with the legislature session, I believe it was, where you have to give notice of publication for passage of local and special laws.” Id. And, at the time this explanation was advanced, the jurisprudence clearly held, by virtue of Michel and its progeny, that the notice and advertisement requirements for passage of local and special laws were not applicable to legislation introduced during extraordinary sessions of the legislature.

In the final analysis, our review of the provisions of the 1974 Constitution reveals that, as a general proposition, the redactors intended no change in the law concerning extraordinary sessions and the notice requirements connected therewith. The rule that the notice requirements for extraordinary sessions are stand-alone provisions, exempt from the notice and advertising requirements for local and special laws, and by analogy, for laws affecting the public retirement system, has been a part of our law over several, constitutional revisions, and remains so today.

|anFor ninety-eight years, this court has followed and endorsed the Michel analysis. State v. Cusimano, 187 La. 269, 174 So. 352 (1937); State ex rel. Porterie v. Smith, 184 La. 263, 166 So. 72 (1935); Williams v. Guerre, 182 La. 745, 162 So. 609 (1935). Numerous statutes have been enacted at extraordinary sessions in reliance on the assurance that the governor is constitutionally empowered to call extraordinary sessions and that in doing so, he is bound only by the limitations and notice requirements set forth in the constitutional provision addressing extraordinary sessions.

Although we are bound by the words of the statutes and the constitution, as we have noted, once this court has ruled on an issue, we should be extremely reluctant to change our position, as both the legislature and society should be able to rely on the finality of our pronouncements. Stability and predictability in the law demand such a result. Borel v. Young, 07-0419, p. 21 (La.11/27/07), 989 So.2d 42, 65 (on reh’g). The cases from this court, spanning ninety-eight years, endorsing the Michel interpretation of the notice provisions of extraordinary sessions as standalone provisions, are of considerable persuasive authority, which in the absence of a definitive change, should be respected by this court.

In challenging the constitutionality of Act 165, Ms. Fruge has the heavy burden of demonstrating, clearly and convincingly, that it was the constitutional aim of La. Const, art. X, § 29(C) to deny the legislature the power to consider and enact Act 165 at an extraordinary session, convened pursuant to the directives of La. Const, art. Ill, |21§ 2(B). For the reasons expressed above, we find that Ms. Fruge has failed in her burden of proof. Even Ms. Fruge acknowledges in brief that it would produce an absurd result to hold that La. Const, art. X, § 29(C) should apply to extraordinary sessions called in instances of public emergency; otherwise changes to the public retirement system could not be effected in times of public catastrophe, such as a financial collapse. However, she fails to explain how the language of La. Const, art. X, § 29(C) that she interprets as admitting of no exception, would justify an exception for extraordinary sessions called in times of public emergency, but not for extraordinary sessions called for any other reason. The notice and publication requirements of La. Const, art. X, § 29(C) can only be reconciled and harmonized with the separate notice requirements of La. Const, art. Ill, § 2(B) by holding, as this court has done with respect to the notice and publication requirements of La. Const, art. Ill, § 13, that La. Const, art. Ill, § 2(B) is a standalone provision, and that La. Const, art. X, § 29(C) does not apply to legislation enacted in extraordinary sessions of the legislature.

| -¿.¿CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, we reverse the judgment of the district court granting Ms. Fruge’s motion for summary-judgment, declaring Act No. 165 of the 2002 First Extraordinary Session unconstitutional, null, void, and unenforceable, and declaring Ms. Fruge immediately eligible for the retire/rehire benefits provided under LSA-R. S. 11:416 as it existed prior to its amendment and reenactment under Act 165 of the 2002 First Extraordinary Session. Finding that there are no disputed issues of material fact, and that LASERS is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, we hereby gvant summary judgment in favor of LASERS,

JOHNSON, J, dissents.

TRAYLOR and KNOLL, JJ., dissent and assign reasons.

REVERSED AND RENDERED.

TRAYLOR, Justice,

dissenting.

hi respectfully dissent. The majority opinion finds that the notice and publication requirements of La. Const, art. 10, Section 29(C) can only be reconciled and harmonized with the separate notice requirements of La. Const, art. 3, Section 2(B) by holding that La. Const, art. 3, Section 2(B) is a stand-alone provision, and that La. Const, art. 10, Section 29(C) does not apply to legislation enacted in extraordinary sessions of the legislature. However, the wording of La. const, art. 10, Section 29(C) is clear, unambiguous, and admits of no exceptions. It states, in pertinent part: “No proposal to effect any change in existing laws ... relating to any retirement system for public employees shall be introduced in the legislature unless notice of intention to introduce the proposal has been published ... in the official state journal on two separate days. The last day of publication shall be at least thirty days before introduction of the bill.” The notice, publication and recital requirements contained in La. Const, art. 10, Section 29(C) represent protections promulgated by the delegates of the Louisiana Constitutional Convention of 1973 to and in favor of the members of public retirement systems, for the purpose of restricting changes to public retirement systems without sufficient notice to the citizens who are members of these systems.

I agree that the governor’s authority to convene an extraordinary session is not [2Iimited to a public emergency. However, it is generally accepted that an extraordinary session is one which calls for action that cannot be taken in regular course and presupposes matters of urgent necessity which cannot be addressed in a regular session; it is not designed for consideration of matters so as to avoid constitutional notice requirements. The subject matter of Act 165 of the 2002 First Extraordinary Session did not require prompt action. Further, the clear, unambiguous language of La. const, art. 10, Section 29(C) requires thirty days notice before consideration of any proposal relating to public retirement systems, even in an extraordinary session.

KNOLL, Justice,

dissenting.

11With all due respect, I disagree with the majority. I find the majority opinion’s analysis is fatally flawed because there is no conflict between La. Const. Art. X, § 29(C) and La. Const. Art. Ill, § 2(B).

According to the general rule, articles of the constitution are to be construed and interpreted using the same canons of interpretation applicable to statutes and written instruments. State v. Expunged Record (No.) 249,044, 03-1940, p. 4 (La.7/2/04), 881 So.2d 104, 107; Barnett v. Develle, 289 So.2d 129, 146 (La.1974). Thus, under the well-established rules of statutory construction, any interpretation of constitutional provisions begins with the language of the constitution itself. Record, 03-1940 at p. 4, 881 So.2d at 107; Ocean Energy, Inc. v. Plaquemines Parish Government, 04-0066, pp. 6-7 (La.7/6/04), 880 So.2d 1, 7. When the provision is clear and unambiguous and its application does not lead to absurd consequences, its language must be given effect and its provisions must be construed so as to give effect to the purpose indicated by a fair interpretation of the language used. Cajun Elec. Power Co-op., Inc. v. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Com’n, 544 So.2d 362, 363 (La.1989) (on rehearing); Perschall v. State, 96-0322, p. 21-22 (La.7/1/97), 697 So.2d 240, 255. Where the language of a constitutional provision makes its aim evident and unequivocal, courts may not arrive at a construction that detracts from the | ¿effectiveness or distorts the manifest meaning and purpose of the related provisions by separately considering related constitutional provisions and likewise need not consider the historical basis for the provision. Perschall, 96-0322 at p. 22, 697 So.2d at 256; Barnett, 289 So.2d at 146. Moreover, where it is possible, courts have a duty to adopt a construction of the relevant provision which harmonizes and reconciles it with other provisions dealing with the same subject matter. See La. Civ.Code art. 13.

La. Const. Art. X, § 29(C) provides:

No proposal to effect any change in existing laws or constitutional provisions relating to any retirement system for public employees shall be introduced in the legislature unless notice of intention to introduce the proposal has been published, without cost to the state, in the official state journal on two separate days. The last day of publication shall be at least thirty days before introduction of the bill. The notice shall state the substance of the contemplated law or proposal, and the bill shall contain a recital that the notice has been given. La. Const. Art. Ill, § 2 provides, in

relevant part:

(B) Extraordinary Session. The legislature may be convened at other times by the governor and shall be convened by the presiding officers of both houses upon written petition of a majority of the elected members of each house. The form of the petition shall be provided by law. At least five days prior to convening the legislature in extraordinary session, the governor or the presiding officers, as the case may be, shall issue a proclamation stating the objects of the session, the date on which it shall convene, and the number of days for which it is convened. The power to legislate shall be limited, under penalty of nullity, to the object specifically enumerated in the proclamation. The session shall be limited to the number of days stated therein, which shall not exceed thirty calendar days.

According to the majority, the enactment of Act 165 places in conflict the five-day notice requirement for legislation introduced during extraordinary sessions under La. Const. Art. Ill, § 2(B) and the longer thirty-day notice required for legislation relating to the retirement systems for public employees under La. Const. Art. X, § 29(C). However, this premise as well as the conclusions based upon it, are flawed because by the plain language of the provisions no such conflict exists.

|;iThe language of La. Const. Art. X, § 29(C), as noted by the majority, is clear, unambiguous, and admits no exceptions to its requirement that no proposal to effect any change in existing law relating to any retirement system for public employees shall be introduced unless notice of intention to introduce the proposal has been published at least thirty days before introduction of the bill. Likewise, the wording of La. Const. Art. Ill, § 2(B) is clear, unambiguous, but admits no exemption to the publication requirements of La. Const. Ait. X, § 29(C), merely providing that the governor or presiding officers shall issue a proclamation stating the objects of the extraordinary session at least five days prior to convening the Legislature in extraordinary session. Clearly, nothing in La. Const. Art. Ill, § 2(B) impedes or prevents compliance with the thirty-day notice requirement of La. Const. Art. X, § 29(C) in extraordinary sessions as long as the objects of the session are proclaimed by the governor or presiding officers at least five days prior to convening the Legislature in extraordinary session. As the plaintiff so aptly explained in her brief, if the governor or a majority of elected members should determine that an extraordinary session is necessary, and if legislation regarding a public retirement plan was to be included on the agenda, the call for the session need only specify a commencement date not less than thirty-days hence, thus allowing for the notice and publication requirements of La. Const. Art. X, § 29(C). Such a construction neither detracts from the effectiveness nor distorts the manifest meaning and purpose of the relevant constitutional provisions, but rather allows both provisions to stand and be given effect.

LBecause there is no conflict between the relevant constitutional provisions, the majority need not have engaged in an analysis to harmonize the two provisions, and thus, its reliance on State ex rel. Sewerage & Water Board of New Orleans v. Michel, 127 La. 685, 53 So. 926 (1910) and its progeny in this endeavor was unnecessary. Such reliance on this jurisprudence was also misplaced. As the majority readily admits, these cases were decided under prior constitutions and involved the predecessor to La. Const. Art. Ill, § 13, governing notice and publication of the intention to introduce a bill enacting a local or special law.

Simply put, the problem in the instant case is not that the enactment of Act 165 places constitutional provisions in conflict, but that the Legislature failed to comply with the constitutional publication requirements in its effort to effect a change in existing laws relating to the Louisiana State Employees’ Retirement System. As there is no evidence introduced to establish that the Legislature complied with the notice, publication, and recital requirements provided for in La. Const. Art. X, § 29(C) in its enactment of Act 165 and the parties do not dispute that said requirements were not satisfied, I find the district court did not err in declaring said act unconstitutional, null, void, and unenforceable, and I would affirm its judgment.

      . La. Const, art. V, § 5(D) provides this court with appellate jurisdiction when "a law or ordinance has been declared unconstitutional.”

      . Ms. Fruge does not contest the validity of the proclamation calling for the extraordinary session, nor does she challenge whether Act 165 (originating as HB-130) falls within the scope of that proclamation. Neither does she assail the constitutionality of the Act on any grounds other than the alleged violation of La. Const, art. X, § 29(C), the constitutionality of the substantive provisions of Act 165 having been previously upheld by this court in Smith v. Board of Trustees of Louisiana State Employees’ Retirement System, 02-2161 (La.6/27/03), 851 So.2d 1100.

      . In support of its position, LASERS points to 20 Lamonica & Jones, Louisiana Civil Law Treatise: Legislative Law and Procedure, § 2.11 at 33 (2004), wherein the authors note: "Special sessions cannot exceed 30 calendar days in length, and the session ‘call’ can be issued anytime up to five days before the start of the special session. Requiring advertising of legislation already included in the call, with the mandatory [thirty-day] time periods between publication of notice and introduction, could easily create an absurd result' — the prohibition of any introduction, let alone consideration, of the legislation during the special session." (Footnote omitted.)

      . We have previously recognized that the governor is authorized and empowered by the constitution to call extraordinary sessions of the legislature, and that he is the sole judge as to whether or not the occasion for his call exists, and his decision in this respect is not subject to question by the courts. Williams v. Guerre, 182 La. 745, 767, 162 So. 609, 615-616 (1935).

      .In fact, a comparison of the provisions of La. Const, art. Ill, § 13 and art. X, § 29(C) reveals no basis for differentiating the two, the publication requirements being nearly identical.
      As regards local and special laws, La. Const, art. Ill, § 13 provides:
      No local or special law shall be enacted unless notice of the intent to introduce a bill to enact such a law has been published on two separate days, without cost to the state, in the official journal of the locality where the matter to be affected is situated. The last day of publication shall be at least thirty days prior to introduction of the bill. The notice shall state the substance of the contemplated law, and every such bill shall recite that notice has been given.
      As regards laws affecting the public retirement system, La. Const, art. X, § 29(C) provides:
      No proposal to effect any change in existing laws or constitutional provisions relating to any retirement system for public employees shall be introduced in the legislature unless notice of intention to introduce the proposal has been published, without cost to the state, in the official state journal on two separate days. The last day of publication shall be at least thirty days before introduction of the bill. The notice shall state the substance of the contemplated law or proposal, and the bill shall contain a recital that the notice has been given.

      . Michel, 127 La. at 690, 53 So. at 928.

      . Cusimano, 187 La. at 275, 174 So. at 354-355.

      . The only truly substantive distinction between the 1921 and 1974 Constitutions lies in the fact that under the 1974 Constitution, an extraordinary session may be convened upon petition of a simple majority of the elected member of each house, as opposed to the two-thirds majority required under the 1921 Constitution.

      .In fact, although the heading of La. Const, art. Ill, § 2(C) uses the word “emergency,” the body of the provision defines an “emergency session” as a species of extraordinary session — an "extraordinary session without prior notice or proclamation in the event of public emergency” — thereby continuing the distinction articulated in the 1921 Constitution.

      . Cusimano, 187 La. at 275, 174 So. at 354-355.

      . Michel, 127 La. at 690, 53 So. at 928.

      . In fact, it appears that Act 165 was itself enacted in reliance on Michel and Cusimano. The Minutes, House Committee on Retirement, 2002 First Extraordinary Session, April 2, 2002, p. 15, reflect that objections were raised to consideration of all items in the governor's call affecting the public retirement system on grounds that La. Const, art. X, § 29(C)’s publication requirements were not satisfied. The objections were met with the statement that Cusimano is the controlling law, and under Cusimano, the notice requirements of La. Const, art. X, § 29(C) do not apply to extraordinary sessions.

      . Another long-standing rule of statutory construction is that when the legislature changes the wording of a statute, it is presumed to have intended a change in the law. SWAT 24 Shreveport Bossier, Inc. v. Bond, 00-1695, p. 17 (La.6/29/01), 808 So.2d 294, 305. Given this rule, it might be argued that when in enacting La. ConsL. art. X, § 29(C), the redactors changed the wording of the former provision from "[n]o proposal to amend or effect any change in existing laws or provisions of the constitution relating to any retirement system in this state shall be introduced into the legislature unless notice of intention to introduce such proposal shall have been published in the official state journal of the state on three separate days at least thirty days prior to the convening of the legislature in regular session!,]" La. Const, art. 19, § 25 (1921), to "[n]o proposal to effect any change in existing laws or constitutional provisions relaling to any retirement system for public employees shall be introduced in the legislature unless notice of intention to introduce the proposal has been published, without cost to the state, in the official state journal on two separate days. The last day of publication shall be at least thirty days before introduction of the bill," La. Const, art. X, § 29(C), thereby omitting the reference to a regular session, the redactors intended a change in the law. However, the presumption that applies when there is a change in the wording of a statute is just that, a presumption, which can be defeated by evidence such as exists here that no change was intended, and the constitutional provision was reworded simply to make it consistent with La. Const, art. Ill, § 13.

      . This case does not address the issue of whether the publication requirement conflicts with the waiver of notice contained in La. Const. Art. Ill, § 2(C) as the extraordinary session at issue was not an emergency session.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    The SHERWOOD FOREST COUNTRY CLUB v. Elmer B. LITCHFIELD, as Sheriff and ex Officio Tax Collector for the Parish of East Baton Rouge and Brian Wilson, as Assessor of East Baton Rouge Parish.
    No. 2008-C-0194.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 13, 2009.
    For majority opinion of the court, see La.App., 998 So.2d 56.
   Rehearing granted in part and otherwise denied.

Upon considering a motion for rehearing filed by plaintiff, a dismissal in favor of defendants is procedurally inappropriate on this record. Accordingly, we modify the disposition of this matter to withdraw the dismissal of plaintiffs petition with prejudice. Because Sherwood Forest Country Club did not show that it is entitled to a summary judgment, the original opinion correctly reverses the judgments of the lower courts.

Accordingly, it is ordered that the judgments of the lower courts are reversed, and this matter is remanded to the trial court for action consistent with this opinion.

REVERSED AND REMANDED TO THE DISTRICT COURT.


author:
JOHNSON, Justice.
     LANDRIEU, Associate Justice

text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Jake DESOTO.
    No. 2007-K-1804.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 17, 2009.

      James D. Caldwell, Attorney General, Charles Riddle, District Attorney, Norris J. Greenhouse, Assistant District Attorney, for applicant.
    Jonathan T. Gaspard, for respondent.
   JOHNSON, Justice.

|, Jake Desoto (Desoto) shot and killed his friend, Kain Roy, (Roy) in a hunting accident. He was charged by bill of indictment with negligent homicide in violation of LSA-R.S 14:32. Following trial on the merits, an Avoyelles Parish jury returned a unanimous verdict of guilty as charged. The trial court sentenced Desoto to serve five years without hard labor, with two years of the sentence suspended, and also ordered the defendant placed on supervised probation upon release from incarceration. A motion to reconsider sentence was denied. A Third Circuit majority affirmed the conviction on appeal. However, on rehearing, a split three-judge panel reversed the conviction, vacated the sentence, and entered a judgment of acquittal. We granted certiorari in this case to determine whether the appellate, court, on rehearing, erred in determining that the evidence did not support a finding of criminal negligence, and whether the court substituted its own findings of fact in place of-those of the trier of fact, the jury.

|-¿For reasons that follow, we reverse the ruling of the court of appeal, reinstate the jury verdict and sentence imposed by the trial court, and remand to the trial court for consideration of the sentencing error of failure to impose the probation supervision fee mandated by La.C.Cr.P. art. 895.1(C).

FACTS

On November 20, 2004, opening day of deer rifle season, Desoto, and his friend, Roy, set out from the hunting camp of Jerold Edward (Eddie) Knoll on an all terrain vehicle (four-wheeler) between 2:30 and 3:00 p.m. to hunt deer in the northeast corner of the Knoll property and the adjacent Beauregard property. Both of the men had working cellular phones with them. According to the report of Tom Konvicka, (a consulting meteorologist), introduced at trial, the day was characterized by rain, cloudy skies and temperatures hovered in the upper 50’s to middle 60’s. Rainfall amounts in Avoyelles were generally between 0.50 and 1.50 inches. Fog was also observed. Sunrise occurred at 6:42 a.m. and sunset occurred at 5:09 p.m. While en route to the hunting grounds, the four-wheeler ran out of gas and Desoto and Roy proceeded on foot toward a slough. The two men then separated to hunt individually from the hunting stands erected on the property. Roy went to hunt at a ladder stand called the “Eiffel Tower,” and Desoto headed over to a climbing free stand across the Beauregard field, east of the Eiffel Tower.

According to Desoto, he arrived at the climbing tree stand between 3:00 and 3:15 p.m., but stayed there for only about 20 minutes before leaving the stand, because it was windy and he had no jacket. He walked the tree line to the corner of the field to check the corn he had previously put out to attract deer. Desoto then walked toward the Eiffel Tower and was approximately 32 yards to the southwest of |,¿that stand.

Desoto claimed he phoned Roy, at 5:19 p.m., although the cellular phone records indicated that it was actually Roy who phoned Desoto. According to Desoto, Roy told him that he thought he saw a deer walking on “this side of the slough” and heading toward the field in the direction of the climbing tree stand and told Desoto to “stay in the field.” One minute later, at 5:20 p.m., cellular phone records show that Desoto received a call from his girlfriend, Candace Marcotte, which lasted for approximately 9½ minutes. According to Marcotte, the call ended abruptly when Desoto hung up on her after saying “I see a deer gotta go.” Moments later, Desoto fired one shot that struck Roy in the back of his neck.

Desoto stated that he waited for about five minutes, then walked in the direction of the shot, when he discovered Roy, face down, in about six to eight inches of water in the slough. He turned Roy’s body over, so that his face was out of the water, and tried to drag Roy’s body out of the water, but only managed a few feet. Desoto stated that he dropped his gun and ran to the camp for help, but he did not attempt to call for help using his cell phone. No one was at the camp when he arrived. He then located a four-wheeler at the camp, and drove it toward the direction where he thought the other hunters were located. He encountered Blake Knoll and Deputy Lee Clay, a Deputy Police Officer, and told them that “Kain is dead.” The three men went back to the camp, where they were met by Eddie Knoll. While at the camp, Deputy Clay placed the first call for assistance. The four men then went to the area where Desoto indicated he had left Roy’s body. According to Desoto, Eddie LKnolI cheeked the body for a pulse, confirmed that Roy was dead, and they all returned to the camp. Because it was now dark, they left one of the four wheelers at the scene with the lights on to indicate where the body was located.

Detective Schaub of the Avoyelles Parish Sheriffs Department located the shell casing determined to have been shot by Desoto. Detective Schaub measured a distance of 246 feet from the location of that cartridge to the location of Roy’s head. The location from which Desoto fired his gun was calculated to be 97 feet from the Eiffel Tower. While the gun Desoto used, a Remington 30-06 semi-automatic rifle mounted with a Redfield 3x9 scope, was ultimately retrieved from the place where Desoto dropped it, the power setting on the gun’s scope was never recorded and it could not be verified as to what setting defendant had the scope placed on at the time of the shooting.

The evidence presented at trial indicated that neither Desoto nor Roy had worn the required “Hunter’s Orange” clothing that day and neither were found to have been intoxicated. Desoto stated that he observed Roy’s white t-shirt and thought it was the underbelly of a deer, but photographs of the crime scene, showed that Roy was not wearing a white t-shirt, but was instead wearing a grey athletic tee shirt with “MSH” embossed on it.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Desoto was indicted by a grand jury for negligent homicide in violation of LSA-R.S. 14:32 on March 21, 2005. On February 2, 2006, an Avoyelles Parish jury unanimously found Desoto guilty as charged.

On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed Desoto’s conviction, but remanded the case to the trial court to correct the sentencing error of failure to impose the probation supervision fee mandated by La.C.Cr.P. art. 895.1(C). Judge Pickett wrote the 15majority opinion, and concluded that the evidence supported the jury’s verdict. She noted that a rational fact-finder could interpret Desoto’s ambiguous statement, that he had seen his friend “walking out into the field,” to mean that defendant “actually saw Roy enter the field and later fired his gun at either Roy or a deer.” State v. Desoto, 06-1115, at 27, 968 So.2d at 161. “If the defendant saw Roy in the field,” Judge Pickett found that, “his act of firing the gun, even at a deer, would have been a gross deviation below the standard of care expected of a reasonably careful person under like circumstances.” Id. Judge Pickett further opined that rational jurors could have found from the evidence that “defendant shot without clearly identifying his target,” an act that “also would have been a gross deviation below the standard of care expected of a reasonably careful person under like circumstances.” Id. Judge Pickett concluded that viewing the evidence, including Desoto’s own video taped statement, in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact could have found proof beyond a reasonable doubt that Desoto was guilty of negligent homicide. Id.

Chief Judge Thibodeaux dissented, finding that Desoto was hunting when it was dark, “cloudy rainy, and foggy with coffee weed in the field where the incident occurred.” Id., 968 So.2d at 172. The dissent labeled the shooting an “unfortunate accident,” finding nothing to prove that defendant knew his good friend was hunting in front of him. Id.

On May 23, 2007, defendant filed a motion for rehearing, arguing that the Third Circuit’s majority decision conflicted with State in the Interest of S.T., 95-2187 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/28/96), 677 So.2d 1071, and that Louisiana’s status as a “Sportsman’s Paradise” was at stake when conflicting-cases are “at odds ... as to what constitutes criminal negligence in a hunting accident scenario where a hunter is engaged in a lawful activity with no reckless conduct involved.” Counsel for Desoto | (¡sharply disagreed with Judge Pickett that reasonable jurors could have found from his statement that Desoto had actually seen his friend, as opposed to what he believed was a deer, walk out into the open field.

On rehearing, in a split decision penned by the previous lone dissenter, Chief Judge Thibodeaux, the Third Circuit reversed its earlier decision, vacated Deso-to’s conviction and sentence, and entered a judgment of acquittal. The Third Circuit aligned itself with the First Circuit in reaching the same decision as the appellate court in State in the Interest of S.T., supra, finding that no evidence of criminal negligence was demonstrated in another case in which a hunting accident resulted in a homicide after the shooter claimed that he “believed he shot at a deer or what he thought was a deer.” Desoto, 06-1115 at 1, 968 So.2d at 172-73.

In her concurrence, Judge Cooks opined that by hunting when it was getting dark and firing his gun when he was not absolutely sure what was in his sight,

[defendant violated a rule of hunting [which] does not necessarily equate to criminal negligence. The State’s position that a hunter must always be certain what he sees in his sight before shooting would mean we could never have a hunting “accident,” but simply de facto acts of criminal negligence. To the relief of many, including our esteemed vice president, this is not the intent of the statute.

Id., 06-1115 at 2,968 So.2d at 174.

Judge Pickett dissented from the Third Circuit’s decision on rehearing, citing this Court’s ruling in State v. Ware, 06-1703 (La.6/29/07), 959 So.2d 459, in which we reiterated the standard of review in evaluating sufficiency claims:

[A] reviewing court may impinge on the trier of fact’s discretion “only to the extent necessary to guarantee the fundamental due process of law.” State v. Mussall, 523 So.2d 1305 (La.1988).

Ware, 06-1703 at 8, 959 So.2d at 463-64.

|7In Judge Pickett’s view, the majority’s decision to reverse on rehearing “failed to accord due deference to the rational credibility choices made by the jury” and in fact “substituted its appreciation of the evidence for that of the fact finder.” Judge Pickett further disagreed:

I note, for example, that the writing judge states as fact that the defendant did not see Roy enter the field. There was, in fact, testimony from the defendant that could have caused the jury to conclude that the defendant did see Roy enter the field. This court’s substitution of its conclusions regarding the evidence for the conclusions of the jury is exactly what the Supreme Court in Ware reminds us is prohibited.

Desoto, 06-1115 at 2, 968 So.2d at 175.

Judge Pickett reiterated her view expressed on original hearing that rational jurors could have determined from defendant’s own statement that he shot knowing his friend had moved out from his safe perch in the “Eiffel Tower” deer stand into the same field as the deer he had spotted, and knowing as a subjective matter that he should not fire because he could not clearly identify his target. Desoto, 06-1115 at 1-2, 968 So.2d at 174-75.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

Where there is evidence presented by the prosecution to justify the jury’s conclusion that a defendant is guilty of criminal negligence, a court cannot reverse the conviction for failure of proof. State v. Minor, 241 La. 339, 129 So.2d 10 (La.1961). In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction for negligent homicide, an appellate court in Louisiana is controlled by the standard of review adjudged by the United States Supreme Court in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979),

“[T]he appellate court must determine that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, was sufficient to convince a rational trier of fact that all of the elements of the crime had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Captville, 448 So.2d 676, 678 (La.1984).

IsLSA-R.S. 14:32 Negligent Homicide provides:

A. Negligent homicide is the killing of a human being by criminal negligence.
B. The violation of a statute or ordinance shall be considered only as presumptive ■ evidence of such negligence.
C. (1) Except as provided for in Paragraph (2) of this Subsection, whoever commits the crime of negligent homicide shall be imprisoned with or without hard labor for not more than five years, fined not more than five thousand dollars, or both.

LSA-R.S. 14:12 defines criminal negligence as follows:

Criminal negligence exists when, although neither specific nor general criminal intent is present, there is such a disregard of the interest of others that the offender’s conduct amounts to a gross deviation below the standard of care expected to be maintained by a reasonably careful person under like circumstances. LSA-R.S. 14:12; State v. Pardon, 97-0248, p. 9 (La.App. 5 Cir. 10/15/97), 703 So.2d 50, 59.

The provisions of former La. Cr.C. arts. 29 to 32 (See, now LSA-R.S.14:32) dealing with homicide indicated the legislature’s intent that negligent homicide should constitute an offense of a lesser grade than murder or manslaughter and be included in the latter two as a lesser offense. State v. Stanford, 204 La. 439, 15 So.2d 817 (La.1943). The offense of negligent homicide is not an intentional crime and intent is not an element of negligent homicide. State v. Guillot, 277 So.2d 146 (La.1973).

| jurisprudence shows that the common element in negligent homicide eases involving firearms is a finding that a defendant acted in an unreasonably dangerous or unsafe manner at the time of the discharge of his weapon. Evidence of negligent homicide was found to be sufficient in State v. McFerson, 583 So.2d 516, (La.App. 3rd Cir.) writ denied, 588 So.2d 113 (La.1991), where it was determined that the defendant acted below the standard of care expected to be maintained by reasonably careful persons under similar circumstances when he brought a loaded gun into a bar, pulled the gun out of his pants pocket, and the gun discharged killing an innocent victim.

Similarly, in State v. Barberousse, 458 So.2d 569, (La.App. 3rd Cir.1984) aff'd, 480 So.2d 273 (La.1985), a defendant was found criminally negligent when he fatally shot his sister when he pulled out a loaded .38 caliber revolver, cocked it and pointed it at another person, supposedly to frighten that person. The gun discharged, with the bullet striking defendant’s sister in the chest and fatally wounding her. The courts have also found evidence sufficient in a case wherein the shooter was purportedly under duress when he fired his weapon. In State v. Parker, 431 So.2d 114 (La.App. 1st Cir.), writ denied 435 So.2d 433 (La.1983), the defendant was found guilty of negligent homicide even though the evidence indicated that he may have been harassed and fearful at the time of the shooting. Evidence indicated that the defendant shot through his door without first determining who was outside and while knowing that other members of his residence were not in the home, but expected to return to the residence.

In considering the sufficiency of evidence in cases involving negligent homicide it is useful to examine cases involving other mechanisms of injury. For instance, in comparing cases involving firearms and motor vehicles, the common | inthread is the use of a dangerous instrumentality at the time of the criminally negligent act(s). In State v. Mears, 445 So.2d 167, (La.App. 3rd Cir.), writ denied, 446 So.2d 1231 (La. 1983), evidence was sufficient to sustain a conviction for negligent homicide when it was determined that the defendant was driving in the dark with no headlights on when the vehicle he was driving struck and killed a pedestrian. In State v. Martin, 539 So.2d 1235 (La.1989), the conduct of a defendant driving at a high rate of speed, on a busy highway, following another vehicle very closely, was deemed a gross deviation below the standard of care and constituted gross negligence for purposes of the negligent homicide statute. Likewise, in a case involving a driver whose blood alcohol level was only slightly above the presumptive level for intoxication, evidence was sufficient to support a finding of negligent homicide when it was concluded that he was driving at a high rate of speed, on a foggy night, while attempting to pass three cars in a no-passing zone.

In State v. Barberousse, supra, though the victim’s blood alcohol level was high enough to kill her, notwithstanding her drunkenness, her death resulted from negligent homicide from a gunshot acci-dently fired into her chest. By analogy, in the case at bar, poor weather conditions, coupled with the actions of Desoto and the victim do not release Desoto from criminal liability. A victim’s own negligence does not negate a finding of criminal negligence. The fact that both Desoto and Roy were not wearing hunter’s orange clothing and were both walking on the hunting grounds when they were supposed to be in the hunting stands does not exculpate Desoto from being criminally negligent. Moreover, the fact that Desoto knew Roy was not wearing hunter’s orange, and thought that Roy was wearing a white shirt, was reason for him not to shoot at the mere sight of a flash of white color.

Here, the State was charged with the burden of showing that Desoto’s actions, Inwhich resulted in Roy’s death, amounted to a disregard of the interests of others, and were a gross deviation from the standard of care expected to be exercised by a reasonably careful hunter. To this end, the state established that Desoto was trained in hunting safety, and was therefore not ignorant of the standard of care expected of a reasonable hunter, and that Desoto knowingly acted in an unreasonably dangerous, and unsafe manner, when he discharged his weapon. Desoto knew the rules of hunting and demonstrated such in his recorded statement when he said that he told Roy, “... I told him good luck and told him the rules of not shooting a doe and I was the only one that could shoot a doe and he could shoot a six pointer or better.”

At trial, the state introduced the testimony of Sergeant Russell Dauzat, of the Louisiana Wildlife and Fisheries Department, a thirty-year veteran of that agency, who testified that a prospective hunter must complete training classes to obtain a Louisiana hunting license and safety certificate. Sergeant Dauzat also testified as to the standard of care for deer hunters. He testified that his investigation revealed that both Desoto and Roy possessed current, valid, hunting licenses and safety certificates and that to obtain them licences, they both had completed the required hunting classes. He testified that he assists in teaching the hunter education classes and that the first lesson taught is the prevention of accidents. One of the principle rules of safety in hunting is to “identify your target, make sure you know what you’re shooting at and what’s beyond that target.” The Louisiana Hunter Education Manual (LHEM), used in these classes, and introduced into evidence at trial, states that one of the “Ten Commandments of Shooting Safety” is “Be sure of your target and what |12⅛ beyond it.” Furthermore, the LHEM instructs that, “A safe hunter never shoots at a flash of color, a sound, or a shape in a tree.”

The State established through Sergeant Dauzat that it would be dangerous for a hunter not to wear hunter’s orange, and that it would be highly dangerous for De-soto, having been purportedly told by Roy that he saw a deer, and to “stay where he was,” to get out of his hunting stand, and walk to the area where Roy told him the deer was coming. The State also established through Sergeant Dauzat that it would be highly dangerous for a hunter to get out of his hunting stand, and walk within 97 feet of a fellow hunter, with a rifle, without telling the other hunter what he was doing.

Candice Marcotte, Desoto’s former girlfriend, testified that on the day of the shooting she spoke with Desoto, for approximately 9 ½ minutes, and that Desoto abruptly hung up on her, ending the conversation at 5:20 p.m. by saying “I see a deer gotta go.” She testified that she and Desoto were having a disagreement, and that during their conversation, Desoto did not mention that he had just spoken with Roy.

Perhaps the most damning evidence against Desoto was his video taped statement that the State presented to establish his actions as criminally negligent. On November 22, 2004, two days after the shooting, Desoto voluntarily gave a video taped interview to the police in which he described the events of the day of the shooting. During that interview, he expressed that he hesitated when taking the shot that killed Roy because he was unsure that what he was shooting at, was in fact, a deer. His statement also brought into question whether he actually saw Roy in the field when he took the shot at what he believed was a deer. The video taped statement was the only testimony of Deso-to presented at trial. During that interview the following colloquy occurred between Detective Schaub and Desoto:

11?,Jake: So I stayed and um. I stayed for I’m not sure, um, a little while, I mean, twenty thirty minutes you know and um I seen him walk him walk out.
[Detective] Dan [Schaub]: You seen.
Jake: I seen, I seen, I seen, he had a shirt on, Kain had a camoflage (sic) shirt on with a white shirt and um. I thought it was the underneath of a deer and I seen the deer, I seen the deer go-back.
Dan: Ok you seen it with your eyes.
Jake: With my own eyes, not scope, gun down to my side, I seen it. And um I told myself, I told myself, I said I’m not gonna shoot right now, I said, because it might be, it’s just not right, it’s not right. I don’t know, I don’t know what it is. I told myself that. Sure enough he turned broad, he turned broadside and I don’t know if Kain was ducking down, I don’t know what he was doing.
Dan: Ok. I mean just relax, Jake it’s ok. Alright, you said something very important, ok. You said that you had seen Kain and he was wearing camo-flage (sic) with a white shirt, where did you see him, was it by his stand, was it in the slough.
Jake: He was walking out into the field.
Jake: He must have been looking at me, he had to have been because his white was facing towards me and a little while later he turned and I guess maybe he seen the deer and he was bent down, but I when I seen him I knew I knew that it wasn’t a person or nothing like that cause he was bent over you know.
Dan: ... Are you looking through the scope now are you still doing this visually with you[r] own two eyes.
Jake: Looking through, I mean I’m looking with my own two eyes. As soon as he turns broad, broadside.
Dan: Ok. Did you have a picture in your scope of what you shot at.
Jake: I saw. I just seen the white....

In addition to Detective Schaub, Deso-to’s father, Mike Desoto, was present at the video taped interview. Desoto’s father was also allowed to question Desoto during 1 uthe interview. Despite clearly stating that he saw the victim walking in the field wearing a camouflage shirt when he took aim at the deer, Desoto, in the colloquy with his father, denied seeing Roy when he saw, what he thought, was a deer.

The video taped statement presents two competing scenarios: One in which Desoto first testifies that he saw Roy walking on the hunting ground, when he also saw a deer, and another where he later testified that he never saw Roy on the ground near the time of the shooting. Even granting that Desoto’s statements that he saw Roy “walking out into the field,” and “1 seen, he had a shirt on, Kain had a camouflage [sic] shirt on with a white shirt ...,” may have been critically ambiguous, and may have meant simply that what he believed at the time was a deer in the field, was, in retrospect, actually his friend, there was no ambiguity in the counsel Desoto gave himself just before firing: “I told myself, I told myself, I said I’m not gonna shoot right now, I said, because it might be, it’s just not right, it’s not right. I don’t know, I don’t know what it is.” There is no escaping the fact that to pull the trigger of a high-powered hunting rifle, capable of accurately hitting a target a football field away, without being sure of his target, was reckless disregard for the safety of others and created an unreasonable risk of harm to others.

The jury, having viewed Desoto’s video taped statement, was in the best position to observe Desoto’s demeanor in concert with his testimony, and make a credibility determination. The jury was also presented with the testimony of Eddie Knoll who testified that at approximately 5:25 p.m. he heard a shot coming from the direction of where Desoto and Roy were supposed to be hunting. (Recall that sunset occurred at 5:09 p.m.) Within five minutes of the shooting, he saw a deer clearly in his unobstructed view from his position of only 14 feet above the ground, (a distance much closer than Desoto was to Roy when he shot him). Eddie Knoll choose not to 11 stake a shot at the deer, because even though he was viewing it through the scope of his rifle, he could not determine if the deer was a mature buck, the only deer he was legally allowed to shoot. The actions of Eddie Knoll in carefully attempting to discern the exact subject in his sights, stood in stark contrast against De-soto’s actions of shooting where he thought he saw an appearance of something white.

Additionally, numerous photographs of the crime scene were entered into evidence at trial, including aerial photographs showing the layout of the hunting grounds where Roy was killed, and other photographs depicting the scene as viewed from the approximate position of Desoto to Roy. The jury was thus presented with credible descriptions and examples that were approximate and/or similar to the conditions under which Desoto made the decision to take the shot that killed Roy.

The Defendant’s reliance on State in Interest of S.T., supra, is misplaced. The two cases are easily distinguished, because unlike the case at bar, State in Interest of S.T., involved a minor whose un-refuted testimony was that he saw a buck, which he fixed in his scope, and after seeing the antlers and deer’s head and shoulder, he shot at the deer. This is in stark contrast to Desoto, who never testified that he actually saw a deer prior to discharging his weapon, but rather, that he saw a flash of white color and thinking that it might be the underbelly of a deer, shot at it.

The defense also argued in brief that Desoto believed Roy was positioned in the Eiffel Tower when he spotted what he thought was a deer, and had Roy been in the Eiffel Tower, he would have been well out of harm’s way when Desoto fired the shot. However, we only have Desoto’s statement as to what actually happened and what Desoto was thinking at the time of the shooting.

At no time did Desoto testify that he believed Roy was in the hunting stand when he shot his rifle. Roy called Desoto and purportedly told Desoto that he saw |1fia deer and to “stay in the field,” Desoto did not thereafter, call Roy to ascertain his location, or notify Roy that he was no longer in his hunting stand, but instead, Desoto walked into the open field. Deso-to’s actions, by shooting his rifle, even though he could not identify his target, constituted a gross deviation below the standard of care expected to be maintained by a reasonably careful person under like circumstances.

On rehearing, the appellate court framed the issue as “whether the Defendant believed he shot at a deer.” Desoto, 06-1115, at 1, 968 So.2d at 172. However, as Judge Pickett emphasized in her original opinion, the actual issue on appeal was whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the offender’s conduct amounted to a gross deviation below the standard of care expected to be maintained by a reasonably careful man under like circumstances. From this perspective, the appellate court erroneously substituted its own appreciation of the evidence for that of the fact finder and failed to accord due deference to the rational credibility choices made by the jury.

The state’s case is even stronger if, as Judge Pickett opined below, rational jurors could find from defendant’s statement that what he actually saw in the field was his friend, as well as a deer, and that he, nonetheless, pulled the trigger. Though an accident, Desoto’s actions were a gross deviation below the standard of care expected to be maintained by a reasonably careful man under like circumstances. Therefore we find that the Third Circuit erred in not giving due deference to the credibility determinations made by the trier of fact, and in failing to do so, erred by reversing Desoto’s conviction on rehearing.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, this Court reverses the decision of the Third Circuit on rehearing, 117reinstates the jury’s conviction for negligent homicide and the concomitant sentence previously imposed by the trial court in accordance with this opinion, and remands to the trial court for consideration of the sentencing error of failure to impose the probation supervision fee mandated by La.C.Cr.P. art. 895.1(C).

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

LANDRIEU, J. dissents with reasons.

LANDRIEU, Associate Justice

(Ad Hoc), dissents.

Ijfhe tragic consequence of an act of simple negligence does not magnify that act of simple negligence into an act of gross negligence.

The defendant made a serious mistake. After the victim told defendant that he saw a deer, he apparently left his position of safety and went to the spot where he thought the deer had been sighted. Believing the victim was the deer that had been described, defendant shot his best friend.

The defendant was negligent and the result was tragic. However, there is no evidence in the record of any action whereby a reasonable juror could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant grossly deviated below the standard of care expected to be maintained by a reasonably careful man under the circumstances.

      . Retired Judge Moon Landrieu sitting ad hoc for Knoll, J., recused.

        . State v. Desoto, 06-1115 (La.App.3 Cir. 3/14/07), 968 So.2d 146, on reh’g (8/15/07).

        . State v. Desoto, 07-1804 (La.9/19/08), 992 So.2d 965.

      . "Slough: Noun. A depression or hollow, usually filled with mud or mire, also slew; A stagnant swamp, bog, or pond, especially as part of a bayou, inlet or backwater.” Merriam-Webster's College Dictionary, 2003.

      . According to the autopsy report of the victim introduced at trial. Roy died from "ex-sanguination (loss of blood) and drowning due to falling into and inhalation of water due to gunshot wound of the posterobasal right neck." The gunshot wound caused a large gaping laceration of the victim's posterior basal neck, limited to the soft tissues, without cervical, honey or cerebral injury, and without injury to the carotid artery or the jugular vein although small branches of the carotid artery and jugular vein were transected. The direction of fire was from back to front, left to right, without deviation upward or downward.

      . Slate v. Desoto, 06-1115 (La.App. 3 Cir. 8/15/07), 968 So.2d at p. 172-73 (Cooks, J., concurs with reasons) (Pickett, J., dissents with reasons).

      . The Reporter’s Comment to LSA-R.S. 14:12 states that criminal negligence "corresponds to the concept of ‘gross negligence' in tort law.” See Restatement of the Law of Torts (1934) §§ 282-284. 500.
      The State is required to show more than a mere deviation from the standard of ordinary care to establish proof of criminal negligence. State v. Jones, 298 So.2d 774 (La.1974). The negligent homicide statute proscribes conduct that goes beyond carelessness, mistake, error in judgment or omission of duty. State v. Fenner, 94-1498 (La. App. 4 Cir. 11/16/95, 664 So.2d 1315). 664 So.2d 1315[. writ denied. 95-3001 (La.4/29/96), 672 So.2d 679], It is more than the mere failure to do something which a reasonable and prudent man would do, or the mere doing of something which a reasonable and prudent man might not do, on cool reflection, after considering the degree of harm likely to follow. Further, the "consequences” alone do not determine the criminal culpability of the actor. Stale v. Bowie, 95-0795. p, 2 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/13/96), 684 So.2d 68, 70. writ granted on

        other grounds, 96-2987 (La. 1/31/97), 687 So.2d 369.

      . Although shooting a doe (female deer) is generally prohibited, Desoto would have been permitted to shoot a doe because he had never before shot a deer and it was the first day of hunting season.

      . “All persons bom after September 1, 1969, must show proof of satisfactorily completing a Hunter Safety course approved by LDWF to purchase a basic Hunting License ...” LA Hunting Seasons and Wildlife Management Area Regulations (2004-2005).