author: KEATY, Judge.

text:
    HALL PONDEROSA, LLC v. PETROHAWK PROPERTIES, L.P.
    No. 11-1056.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.
    April 4, 2012.
    Rehearing Denied May 23, 2012.

      Kenneth Michael Wright, Attorney at Law, Lake Charles, LA, for Plaintiff'Ap-pellee, Hall Ponderosa, LLC.
    Jamie S. Manuel, Mayhall & Blaize, L.L.C., Baton Rouge, LA, for Defendant/Appellant, Petrohawk Properties, L.P.
    Court composed of SYLVIA R. COOKS, ELIZABETH A. PICKETT, and PHYLLIS M. KEATY, Judges.
   KEATY, Judge.

Ijn this action for reformation of a lease, the managers of Hall Ponderosa, LLC, asserted that an entire section of property owned by Hall Ponderosa was inadvertently left out of the lease agreement. Claiming mutual error, Hall Ponde-rosa sought to have the lease reformed to include that section of property and sought payment for that section’s acreage at the rate of bonuses, $15,000 per acre. After a bench trial on the merits, the trial court found that Hall Ponderosa had met its burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that mutual error existed. The trial court then ordered reformation of the lease to include the additional section and ordered Petrohawk Properties, L.P., to pay $15,000 per additional acre. After carefully reviewing the record, we find no evidence of proof, by clear and convincing evidence, that mutual error occurred. We further find that Hall Ponderosa was negligent in executing the lease agreement and cannot now seek to reform the lease. For the following reasons, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and render judgment in favor of Petrohawk Properties.

Facts and Procedural History

The basis for this case is a mineral lease executed between Hall Ponderosa and Pe-trohawk Properties. Hall Ponderosa is owned by descendants of Wallace Alford Hall and Frances Tipton Hall and was created so that property owned by the Hall descendants could be managed more effectively. Hall Ponderosa owns two pieces of property in Red River Parish that are subjects of the instant litigation. One tract is in Section 14 and is known as Stella Plantation, and the other is located in Section 13 and is known as the Town Dump. The properties are separated by a natural boundary, the Bayou Coushatta. These properties were contributed to Hall 12Ponderosa on June 26, 2008, the day before the lease in question was signed. At the time that the lease was signed, no one knew the exact size of either tract of land, but the managers of Hall Ponderosa believed that the Section 14 tract was about 170 acres and that the Section 13 tract was about thirty acres. Although the actual acreage of the tracts of land was unknown, the property descriptions for both tracts were available at the time the lease was signed and could have been included in the lease without a survey on the properties. Two of Hall Ponderosa’s managers, Tommy Wright and Greg Hall, were responsible for the lease with Petrohawk. Wright is an experienced landman, and Hall is a petroleum engineer with experience in oil and gas exploration.

Petrohawk leased certain mineral rights in the Section 14 property owned by Hall Ponderosa. Shortly before the lease was executed, in early summer 2008, Petro-hawk was involved in a “land rush” to acquire oil and gas leases in areas that might be within the Haynesville Shale region. Exploration had not progressed far enough along for anyone to know where exactly the Shale region was located. Initially, landmen were encouraged to acquire leases in a large area, including Red River Parish, Louisiana. As exploration progressed, the areas Petrohawk was interested in leasing became more defined.

At that time, Petrohawk contracted with thirteen firms that employed many land-men. One of the firms they contracted with was Cornay-Lowrey, which in turn employed Jeff Heard, one of many land-men working to acquire oil and gas | aleases for Petrohawk. Heard was the individual responsible for acquiring and negotiating the lease with Hall Ponderosa on behalf of Petrohawk.

Petrohawk employed a database manager to send blanket mail-outs to land owners on the tax rolls of parishes in the areas of interest. These mail-outs stated that Petrohawk was doing some oil and gas exploration in the area and might be interested in leasing the landowner’s property.

Wright’s mother, one of the Hall descendants, received two mail-outs, one for each tract of land she co-owned in Red River Parish. Shortly thereafter, on June 10, 2008, Heard contacted Wright’s mother by telephone. Wright spoke with Heard who indicated Petrohawk was interested in obtaining an oil and gas lease on the Hall property.

Wright relayed that conversation to his cousin, Hall. Hall then emailed a friend, who owned an oil and gas company, and explained that they owned two pieces of property totaling about 200 acres that were available for lease. The cousins were also in negotiations with Pride Energy as late as June 25, 2008, and, ultimately, ended negotiations because the details of that lease could not be agreed upon by the parties.

Heard testified that he ignored all property in Section 13 because it was near the town of Coushatta, it was hard to find large pieces of property in populated areas, and Petrohawk generally only wanted to lease property that was about 100 acres or more. He also testified that he knew that Section 13 was on the edge of the area of interest. Instead, Heard focused his attentions on Section 14, particularly Stella Plantation, which was about 170 acres according to old leases.

14After Heard’s telephone conversation with Wright, the two began negotiating a lease with input from Hall. All parties testified that the lease was executed quickly. The initial telephone conversation occurred on June 10, 2008, and the lease was executed on June 25, 2008. Wright made sure that the lease contained a competing nations clause and a provision that the bonus would not have to be returned even if the property totaled less than 170 acres once surveyed. Hall relied on Wright’s expertise as a landman in drafting the leases. The property description attached as Exhibit A to the lease was the exact property description included in the previous leases of Stella Plantation, which was provided to Heard by Wright for use in the instant lease.

Neither Wright nor Hall specifically stated to Heard that they owned the Section 13 property, and it needed to be included in the lease. Heard testified that he was not aware that they owned any property in Section 13; he only knew about and was only interested in the Stella Plantation. At the time that the parties were negotiating, the two properties had not been contributed to Hall Ponderosa. That contribution was not final until the day before the lease was signed, and Heard was not made aware of Section 13’s inclusion in the Hall Ponderosa contribution or of Hall Ponderosa’s intent to lease both pieces of property.

Wright saw the lease and the property description at issue, which only described the Section 14 tract, on the day the lease was signed. Hall testified that he did not receive a copy of the lease but that Wright told him it was acceptable to sign. Section 13 was not included in either document. Because the lease was executed so quickly, it contained some errors that needed to be cleaned up, and Heard said he would take care of them. Wright, Hall, and Heard then exchanged several emails in early July concerning the cleanup of the lease. Section 13 was not mentioned. In his final email to Wright containing the cleaned-up lease and ^signature pages, Heard outlined all of the changes he made to the lease. Again, Section 13 was not mentioned.

Hall Ponderosa then had its property surveyed. The surveyor determined that because of accretion, the Section 14 property was actually about 156.87 acres, and the Section 13 property was 144.55 acres. In November 2008, Wright contacted Heard and stated that they had unleased property in Section 13 on which they expected to receive lease offers. He asked Heard if Petrohawk was interested in leasing that property. Heard declined. In March 2009, Hall Ponderosa sent a letter to Petrohawk stating that the Section 13 property had mistakenly been left off of the lease, that the lease needed to be reformed to reflect the properties owned by Hall Ponderosa, and that they were entitled to the same bonus paid for the Section 14 property, $15,000 per acre. Pe-trohawk replied that they were mistaken.

Hall Ponderosa then filed the instant lawsuit making the same allegations: that they intended to lease their entire property to one entity, that Section 13 was not included in the lease, that the lease needed to be reformed to include Section 13, and remuneration for the additional acreage was owed. The trial court found that Hall Ponderosa met its burden in proving there had been a mutual error in the construction of the lease and that each party meant to lease all of Hall Ponderosa’s property. Based on its finding of mutual error, the trial court ordered that the lease be reformed to include the Section 13 property, an additional 144 acres, and that Petro-hawk pay nearly two million dollars to Hall Ponderosa as remuneration. It also found that Petrohawk was liable for attorney fees and costs. Petrohawk filed a motion for new trial, after which the trial court amended its judgment concerning the amount of judicial interest owed and the date interest began accruing. Petrohawk appealed, and Hall Ponderosa answered the appeal.

| Issues

Petrohawk avers that the trial court was erroneous in finding that Hall Ponderosa met its burden of proof, thereby warranting a finding of mutual error. It also asserts that the trial court erroneously cast them with attorney fees and costs after misinterpreting paragraph twenty-five of the lease. In its answer to the appeal, Hall Ponderosa prays that the trial court’s judgment be affirmed, that the language concerning legal interest be amended to that in the original April 18, 2011 judgment, and that they be awarded attorney fees for additional work done on appeal.

Standard of Review

Appellate courts employ the manifest error/clearly wrong standard to review judgments that determine whether mutual error existed in a contract because a finding of mutual error is essentially a finding of fact. Likewise, attorney fees and the date on which judicial interest begins to accrue are also subject to the manifest error standard of review. See Thibodeaux v. L.S. Womack, Inc., 94-1375 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/5/95), 653 So.2d 123, and Ashy v. Trotter, 04-612 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/10/04), 888 So.2d 344, writs denied, 05-180 (La.3/24/05), 896 So.2d 1045 and 05-347 (La.3/24/05), 896 So.2d 1047.

The supreme court provided guidance to courts of appeal on the application of the manifest error standard of review in Stobart v. State through Department of Transportation and Development, 617 So.2d 880 (La.1993). In this case, it reiterated a two-part test that must be met before a trial court’s finding of fact can be reversed:

1) The appellate court must find from the record that a reasonable factual basis does not exist for the finding of the trial court, and
|72) The appellate court must further determine that the record establishes that the finding is clearly wrong (manifestly erroneous).
See Mart v. Hill, 505 So.2d 1120, 1127 (La.1987).
This test dictates that a reviewing court must do more than simply review the record for some evidence which supports or controverts the trial court’s finding. Id. The reviewing court must review the record in its entirety to determine whether the trial court’s finding was clearly wrong or manifestly erroneous.

Id. at 882.

It is not an appellate court’s duty to determine whether the fact finder was correct. Rather, it is the duty of the appellate court to determine whether the findings were reasonable. Id.

Discussion

Hall Ponderosa filed suit to reform an oil and gas lease to include a tract of land not contained in the original lease and to obtain bonus payments of $15,000 per acre on the additional property. After a two-day trial, the trial court found that there were two mutual errors: the omission of Section 13 and the belief that the Hall Ponderosa property was 170 acres. The trial court reformed the lease to include the Section 13 property description and ordered that Petrohawk issue payment in remuneration for 131.42 acres at $15,000 an acre, totaling $1,971,300.

Generally, “[w]hen the words of a contract are clear and explicit and lead to no absurd consequences, no further interpretation may be made in search of the parties’ intent.” La.Civ.Code art. 2046. If the words of a contract are clear, explicit, and lead to no absurd results, it must be interpreted by reference to the “four corners” of the document and no further interpretation can occur in search of the parties’ intent. Hebert v. Ins. Ctr., Inc., 97-298 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1/7/98), 706 |8So.2d 1007, writ denied, 98-353, 716 So.2d 888 (La.3/27/98). Law and jurisprudence provide that courts are bound to give legal intent to contracts according to parties’ true intent, which must be determined by the words of the contract when these are clear, explicit, and lead to no absurd consequences. Ransom v. Camcraft, Inc., 580 So.2d 1073 (La.App. 4 Cir.1991).

However, when contracts do not reflect the parties’ true intents, “Reformation is an equitable remedy which is available to correct mistakes or errors in” those contracts. Teche Realty & Inv. Co., Inc. v. Morrow, 95-1473, p. 4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/17/96), 673 So.2d 1145, 1147. To succeed in a reformation action, the party seeking reformation must establish by clear and convincing evidence that mutual error and mistake occurred. Id.

A mutual mistake is a mistake shared by both parties to the instrument at the time of reducing their agreement to writing, and the mistake is mutual if the contract has been written in terms which violate the understanding of both parties; that is, if it appears that both have done what neither intended.

Id. (quoting Succession of Jones v. Jones, 486 So.2d 1124, 1127 (La.App. 2 Cir.), writ denied, 489 So.2d 249 (La.1986)). Reformation is only to be used “to correct mistakes or errors in the written instrument when such instrument, as written, does not express the true contract or agreement of the parties.” Brabham v. Harper, 485 So.2d 231, 233 (La.App. 3 Cir.1986). “The evidence of mutuality must relate to the time of the execution of the instrument and show that the parties then intended to say one thing and by mistake expressed another and different thing.” WMC Mortgage Corp. v. Weatherly, 07-75, p. 4 (La. App. 3 Cir. 6/13/07), 963 So.2d 413, 416, writ denied, 07-1475 (La.10/5/07), 964 So.2d 945 (quoting Teche Realty, 673 So.2d 1145).

^Reformation “is a personal action, even when applied to real estate, in which the burden is on the one seeking reformation to establish the mutual error and mistake by clear and convincing proof.” Agurs v. Holt, 232 La. 1026, 1032, 95 So.2d 644, 646 (La.1957). “Proof by clear and convincing evidence requires more than ‘a preponderance of the evidence,’ the traditional measure of persuasion, but less than ‘beyond a reasonable doubt,’ the stringent criminal standard.” Hines v. Williams, 567 So.2d 1139, 1141 (La.App. 2 Cir.), unit denied, 571 So.2d 653 (La.1990). “To prove a matter by clear and convincing evidence means to demonstrate that the existence of a disputed fact is highly probable, that is, much more probable than its nonexistence.” Id. “[This] distinct standard, persuasion by clear and convincing evidence, is usually applied “where there is thought to be special danger of deception, or where the court considers that the particular type of claim should be disfavored on policy grounds.’” Id. (quoting McCormick On Evidence, Section 340(6) (2d ed.1972)). In Louisiana, the contract is presumed to be a true reflection of the parties’ intent. Thus, reformation, which allows a party to amend portions of a contract, requires a higher burden of proof before it can be granted.

After carefully reviewing the record, we find that the trial court was manifestly erroneous in finding that Hall Ponderosa proved by clear and convincing evidence that it and Petrohawk intended to include the Section 13 property in the lease. We find that the record is void of a reasonable factual basis for the trial court’s finding of mutual error.

Testimony by Hall supports a conclusion that the trial court’s finding of mutual error was erroneous. Mutual error must “relate to the time of the execution of the instrument.” WMC Mortgage Corp., 963 So.2d at 416. Hall testified that they (he and Wright, who signed the lease on behalf of Hall Ponderosa) were “satisfied Imwith the terms of the oil and gas lease.” He further stated that they “were happy when the lease was signed.” These statements defeat a suggestion that, at the time the lease was signed, they intended to lease the Section 13 property.

Even if we ignore the plaintiffs assertion that Hall Ponderosa was happy with the lease when it was signed, the trial court was still manifestly erroneous when it found mutual error between the parties. Hall Ponderosa had the burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that Pe-trohawk intended to lease from Hall Ponderosa the Town Dump property located in Section 13. They failed to meet that burden.

Never, during their negotiations with Heard, did Hall or Wright mention owning property in Section 13. Although they told him they would be contributing all of their property to Hall Ponderosa before signing the lease, they never expressly mentioned that they wanted to lease all of their property to Petrohawk. The contribution of property was not completed until the day before the lease was signed. Heard testified that he did not even look at Section 13. Hall testified that the parties spent the majority of the time negotiating the terms of the lease and that there was little discussion concerning the property description because there was no question about title.

Wright, a landman who is experienced in negotiating oil and gas leases, testified that he made sure the lease included the specific term, delay rentals, drainage clause, warranty of title, and a favored nations clause. Wright sent a copy of a 1990 lease of the Stella Plantation, which he helped negotiate, to Heard on June 19, 2008, so that Heard could use it as the basis for the 2008 lease. Heard testified that Wright wanted the lease to reflect his (Wright’s) form. There are emails between the two men corroborating that testimony. In those emails, Wright never mentioned including Section 13 in the lease and never sent a Section 13 ^property description to Heard to be included in the lease, though he did send the Section 14 property description. Although Hall knew Hall Ponderosa owned property in Sections 13 and 14 when the lease was created and although he testified that he wanted to lease all of Hall Ponderosa’s property to one operator, he also testified that there was no specific conversation, email, or letter between him and Petrohawk that would indicate that Hall Ponderosa wanted the lease to include both Section 13 and Section 14.

After the original lease was signed, there were some small mistakes and omissions that needed to be “cleaned up.” The parties emailed back and forth several times negotiating these changes. Ultimately, the second and final version of the lease was signed in early July, 2008. During those negotiations, the Section 13 property was not mentioned, despite Wright’s testimony that he looked at the original lease and the property description before signing the instrument, and that he discussed the absence of Section 13 in the property description with Heard on the original signing date. Although Wright claims he told Heard the Section 13 property description was missing from the lease, he failed to mention it again until November 2008, despite negotiating other details with Heard subsequent to the alleged discussion of Section 13⅛ exclusion from the lease.

Hall Ponderosa’s contention that it intended to lease the Section 13 property did not arise until after they had their property surveyed and found out that Section 13 totaled 144.55 acres of land due to accretion from a river. At that time, Wright sent an email to Heard stating that they had “unleased property in Section 13,” that they expected to receive lease offers on the acreage, and inquired about Petrohawk’s interest in leasing the property. Wright testified that he used this language because he “isn’t a lawyer,” and he thought if it was not described, it was not leased. Although Wright is not a lawyer, he is a certified petroleum landman |12with over thirty years in the oil and gas industry and has negotiated mineral leases as part of his primary job duties. When questioned about the email, he stated, “it says what it says.” He also testified that what he intended to state, though did not, in his email was that the parties needed to conform the lease to include the Section 13 property. He failed to mention any agreement about amending the property description to include Section 13 and when questioned further, testified, “I said what I said, document speaks for itself.” The email from Wright to Heard states, in pertinent part: “To follow up with our telephone conversation today, I wanted to let you know that Hall Ponderosa, LLC has unleased acreage in Sec. 13, T12N, R10W, Red River Parish, La[.] which is contiguous with the property we own in Sec. 14.” The document further states, “I wanted to let you know of this information, as we expect to receive lease offers on this acreage. Please feel free to contact me. Have a good Thanksgiving!!”

Although the trial court discredited all of defendant’s testimony and greatly weighed the testimony of Hall and Wright, neither Hall nor Wright were able to give precise statements about their actions. Though they contend that they intended to lease all of the property to Petrohawk, they were unable to give clear answers for their failure to mention Section 13 during lease negotiations or to account for their choice of language in the November 2008 email in which they classified the Section 13 property as “unleased.” Further, Hall testified that they entered into the lease because they “wanted the money.” Finally, they were unable to explain why they waited until March 2009 to assert that the parties had agreed that Section 13 should be included in the lease, when they were aware of its exclusion in June 2008.

The trial court relies on Hall Pondero-sa’s aborted negotiations with Pride as part of its reasons for finding mutual error. Initially, Wright testified that | ^negotiations with Pride fell through because they had entered into a lease with Petrohawk, but in his deposition, he stated that the reason was because there was a problem with the lease terms. When questioned further at trial, Wright stated that an inability to agree to lease terms and language was one of the reasons they stopped negotiating with Pride. Tellingly, Wright testified, “[h]e [Heard] knows what he wants to lease” and “I know what I wanted to lease or our family wanted to lease.” There is absolutely nothing in the record to indicate that Heard ever intended to lease the Section 13 property. In fact, he testified that he did not know they owned property in Section 13.

Hall Ponderosa did not offer any evidence that Petrohawk intended to lease their property in Section 13. There are no emails, letters, or other written communications to indicate that Petrohawk intended to lease both properties. Further, testimony from both parties indicates that there was never a discussion about specific property descriptions or that Hall Ponde-rosa intended to lease all of its property to Petrohawk. The only property description exchanged between the parties in connection with drafting the lease was that of the Stella Plantation in Section 14. Finally, the contribution of real estate, which is the only document exchanged that contains any reference to the Section 13 property, was not completed until the day before the lease was signed and after negotiations were complete. Even if Hall Ponderosa had stated that it wanted to lease its property to Heard, Heard, who was only working on the Section 14 property, would not have had any way of knowing what Hall Ponderosa meant by “all of its property” when drawing up the lease, as neither Wright nor Hall ever mentioned owning property in Section 13.

Finally, Hall testified that he did not read the lease before signing it. Wright testified that he signed the lease even though the property description for Section 11413 was not attached. After the lease was signed, the parties negotiated “clean up” items. Section 13 was not mentioned. “The law of Louisiana is that one who signs an instrument without reading it has no complaint.” Capdeville v. White’s Temple, 99-1040, p. 2 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/22/99), 755 So.2d 923, 925 (quoting Tweedel v. Brasseaux, 433 So.2d 133 (La. 1983)). Although the law “does not compel people to read or to inform themselves of the contents of instruments which they may choose to sign, [... ] it holds them to the consequences, in the same manner and to the same extent as though they had exercised those rights.” Id. “[Signatures to obligations are not mere ornaments.” Id. Further, “[a] party cannot rescind an instrument which he negligently executed.” Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Chappuis, 239 So.2d 400, 406 (La.App. 3 Cir.), writ refused, 256 La. 915, 240 So.2d 375 (La.1970) (in which Judge Miller dissents with the majority opinion). Both Wright and Hall signed the original lease and the cleaned-up version of the lease. This was negligence on their part. Hall should not have signed the lease without reading it. Wright should not have signed a lease that did not reflect Hall Ponderosa’s intent. Wright’s negligence in signing a lease that he knew did not conform to Hall Pondero-sa’s intent and Hall’s negligence in failing to read the lease to which he affixed his name preclude them from seeking reformation of the lease due to error.

Disposition

For these reasons we find that Hall Ponderosa failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that mutual error existed in the lease contract. We reverse the trial court’s judgment in its entirety. We deny Hall Ponderosa’s request for attorney fees for work done on appeal. Accordingly, we need not address the remaining assignments of error. Costs are cast against Hall Ponderosa, LLC.

REVERSED AND RENDERED.

      . $15,000 per acre is the amount Hall Ponde-rosa was paid for the property included in the lease agreement.

      . The lease states that it was signed on June 25, 2008, but testimony indicates that the lease was actually signed on June 27, 2008.
      The original contribution of real estate contained property descriptions for two pieces of property, Section 13 and Section 14. The property description for the Section 13 property was inaccurate and was later corrected to reflect its actual location.

      . Tommy Wright and Greg Hall were the only two managers of Hall Ponderosa involved in the lease negotiations with Petrohawk. For purposes of this opinion, they are referred to as Wright and Hall.

      . Wright initially testified that he ended negotiations with Pride because they signed a lease with Petrohawk; however, his deposition and his answers later in his trial testimony indicate that the reason he stopped negotiating with Pride was because the parties could not come to an agreement concerning the lease terms.

      . This figure was computed by the trial court by subtracting 170 acres from the total acreage owned by Hall Ponderosa and multiplying that amount by $15,000.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: MADELEINE M. LANDRIEU, Judge.

license: Public Domain

text:
    Kyle MYERS and Lisa Myers v. NATIONAL UNION FIRE INS. CO. OF LOUISIANA, Petroleum Helicopters, Inc., and Textron, Inc. Michael E. LeBoeuf, Chassity LeBoeuf, Individually and on Behalf of their Minor Child, Mason LeBoeuf v. AIG Aviation, Inc., Petroleum Helicopters, Inc., and Textron, Inc.
    Nos. 2011-CA-0751, 2011-CA-1326.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.
    April 4, 2012.
    Randy P. Angelle, Christi R. Hemphill, Boyer, Hebert, Abels & Angelle, Breaux Bridge, LA, for Plaintiffs/Appellees, Kyle Myers and Lisa Myers.
    Evette E. Ungar, George W. Byrne, Jr., Cheryl L. Wild, Ungar & Byrne, APLC, New Orleans, LA, for Plaintiff/Appellee, Chassity LeBoeuf.
    Henry A. King, Michael L. Vincenzo, King Krebs & Jurgens, P.L.L.C., New Orleans, LA, Steve Sanfelippo, Ross Cunningham, Rose Walker, L.L.P., Dallas, TX, for Defendant/Appellee, Petroleum Helicopters, Inc.
    Colvin G. Norwood, Jr., Brian M. Le-Compte, McGlinchey Stafford, PLLC, New Orleans, LA, for Defendant/Appellant, Bell Helicopter Textron Inc.
    (Court composed of Judge EDWIN A. LOMBARD, Judge PAUL A. BONIN, Judge MADELEINE M. LANDRIEU).
   MADELEINE M. LANDRIEU, Judge.

hBell Helicopter Textron, Inc. [“Bell”], the manufacturer of a helicopter that was forced to make an emergency landing on the surface of the Gulf of Mexico, appeals two related rulings made by the trial court (one ruling in each of these two consolidated cases). The cases are personal injury actions initiated by passengers who were in the helicopter on August 19, 2004, when the forced landing occurred. At all pertinent times, Petroleum Helicopters, Inc. [“PHI”] was the owner and operator of the helicopter in question. In case No. 52823, Myers v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., the trial court issued an Order setting the matter for trial on damages alone “pursuant to this Court’s 2010 decision affirming the granting of [co-defendant] PHI’s exception of res judicata.” In Case No. 57566, LeBoeuf v. AIG Aviation, Inc., the trial court sustained an exception of res judicata filed jointly by PHI and the plaintiffs. After reviewing the record and the applicable law, we affirm both rulings.

LFACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW

The three passengers in the helicopter— Richard Tucker, Kyle Myers and Michael Le Boeuf — each filed a lawsuit seeking damages for injuries sustained as a result of the forced landing. In the first filed action, Richard Tucker and his spouse sued PHI and various insurers in the 25th Judicial District Court in Plaquemines Parish. PHI asserted a third party claim against Bell for indemnity and for the loss of the helicopter, alleging that a redhibi-tory defect of the helicopter had caused the crash landing. The Tuckers then amended their petition to include a direct claim against Bell. Because the Tuckers settled with both Bell and PHI prior to judgment, the trial court rendered judgment only on PHI’s redhibition claim against Bell. The trial court ruled in favor of PHI, finding that the helicopter had a redhibitory defect that was the sole cause of the accident and awarding damages to PHI for the loss of the helicopter and related search and salvage costs. Written reasons included in the trial court’s June 2, 2008 judgment detailed the court’s findings:

This Court finds that the sole cause of the in-flight failure of the tail rotor assembly, leading to the forced landing and subsequent loss of the Bell Model 412 Helicopter, Serial Number 36005, Registration Number N22347 (the “Helicopter”) on August 19, 2004 was a redhi-bitory defect or vice in design and construction of the tail rotor blades of the Helicopter manufactured and sold by Bell and installed on the Helicopter. The Court further finds that PHI’s inspection and safety procedures and its operation of the Helicopter at all pertinent times were, in all respects, proper and reasonable and that PHI was without fault in connection with the in-flight failure of the tail rotor ^assembly, forced landing, loss of the Helicopter and injuries, if any, sustained by the passengers and crew.

We affirmed the trial court’s judgment on March 28, 2009, and the Louisiana Supreme Court denied writs. Tucker is relevant to this appeal because it serves as the basis for the res judicata claims at issue here.

Subsequent to the filing of the Tucker action, Kyle Myers and his spouse filed suit in the same district court against PHI, its insurer National Union Fire Insurance Company [“National Union”], and Bell. The plaintiffs alleged that PHI was negligent in the inspection and operation of the helicopter and that Bell was liable under the Louisiana Products Liability Act [“LPLA”] for defects in the design and construction of the helicopter and the warnings attached thereto. After the Tucker trial but prior to the rendering of judgment, the Myers filed a motion to have their action consolidated with the Tucker action, which motion was denied. Still prior to the rendering of the Tucker judgment, the Myers, PHI and National Union filed a joint exception of res judica-ta, arguing that the forthcoming judgment in Tucker would be res judicata as to liability in their case. The trial court declined to rule on the exception until after the outcome of the Tucker trial. Following the rendering of judgment in Tucker, the Myers court denied the plaintiffs’ exception of res judicata without prejudice and withheld ruling on the defendants’ exception pending the outcome of Bell’s appeal of the Tucker judgment.

I/Two months prior to this court’s appellate decision in Tucker, the Myers filed a partial motion for summary judgment seeking to establish that they were free from fault in causing the accident and that they had satisfied their burden of proof against all defendants pursuant to the principle of res ipsa loquitur. After this court affirmed the trial court’s judgment in Tucker, the district court granted the Myers’ motion for partial summary judgment, holding that: “plaintiffs’ freedom from fault in causing or contributing to the forced landing subject to this litigation be and hereby is established as fact.” PHI and National Union then re-urged their exception of res judicata, which the trial court granted as to liability only. Bell appealed that decision to this court. On May 19, 2010, we affirmed the granting of the exception and remanded the matter to the district court for trial on the issue of damages. Myers v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Louisiana, 2009-1517 (La.App. 4 Cir. 5/19/10), 43 So.3d 207 [hereinafter referred to as Myers I ] Bell sought review of our decision in the Louisiana Supreme Court, which denied Bell’s writ application.

Citing Myers I, PHI moved for dismissal of the claims against it in the trial court, and Bell moved for a status conference to determine the procedural posture of the parties as a result of our decision. After hearing both motions, the trial court dismissed with prejudice the Myers’ claims against PHI by judgment rendered March 14, 2011. Then, on March 22, 2011, the trial court issued an Order stating, in pertinent part:

IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that liability for the August 19, 2012 helicopter crash has already been “actually litigated” and decided, pursuant to the Fourth Circuit’s | ¿ruling in [Myers /]. Accordingly, Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. is completely at fault for the helicopter accident at issue.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that a jury trial on the issue of damages only, including punitive damages, shall commence on March 12, 2012, at 9:30 a.m.

Bell took the instant appeal from this Order.

The remaining helicopter passenger, Michael LeBoeuf, and his spouse had filed a personal injury action against PHI, its insurer, and Bell in the 15th Judicial District Court for the Parish of Lafayette. After we issued our appellate opinion in Myers I, the LeBoeuf action was transferred and consolidated with the Myers action. Subsequently, the LeBoeuf plaintiffs and PHI filed a joint exception of res judicata on the same grounds as the exception that had been upheld by this court in Myers I. The trial court granted the exception on July 6, 2011, and Bell appealed that judgment. Bell’s appeal of the July 6, 2011 judgment was then consolidated with its pending appeal of the March 22, 2011 Order.

ISSUES

There are essentially three issues before this court:

(1) Did the trial court err by determining that all liability issues between the parties have been decided by Myers I, leaving only the issue of damages remaining for trial?
(2) Did the trial court err by granting the exception of res judicata in Le-Boeuf?
ln(3) Did the trial court err by ordering that the issue of Bell’s liability for punitive damages be tried with the issue of the amount of compensatory damages owed?

DISCUSSION

I. Myers I as Law of the Case

Bell contends that the trial court erred by setting the matter for trial on damages only pursuant to this Court’s directive in Myers I. In essence, Bell argues that the trial court should not have followed Myers I because it was wrongly decided. Conversely, appellees argue not only that Myers I was correct, but also that whether Myers I was correct or incorrect is irrelevant. They assert that the trial court was required to give effect to the decision in Myers I because it is law of the case. They further argue that, for the same reason, this court must affirm the trial court’s decision. We agree.

The “law of the case” doctrine generally refers to the binding effect of trial court and/or appellate court rulings during later stages of the same case, including the principle that an appellate court ordinarily will not reconsider its own rulings of law in a subsequent appeal in the same case. Bank One National Association v. Velten, 2004-2001, pp. 5-6 (La. App. 4 Cir. 8/17/05), 917 So.2d 454, 458; Petition of Sewerage and Water Bd. of New Orleans, 278 So.2d 81, 83 (La.1973). Analogous to res judicata, the law of the case provides for the preclusionary effect of prior rulings in the same case. Posey v. Smith, 453 So.2d 1016 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 1984). The Louisiana Supreme Court has cited the policy reasons behind this doctrine as being “(1) avoiding relitigation of the same issue; (2) promoting consistency of result in the same action; and (3) promoting efficiency and fairness to the parties by affording a single opportunity for the argument and decision of the 17matter at issue.” Day v. Campbel-Grosjean Roofing & Sheet Metal Corporation, 260 La. 325, 256 So.2d 105, 107 (1971).

In Myers I, we affirmed the trial court’s granting of an exception of res judicata brought jointly by the Myers and PHI on the grounds that the trial court’s judgment in Tucker (made final by this court’s affirmation and the Louisiana Supreme Court’s denial of writs) had conclusively determined the liability of the parties in Myers for the helicopter accident. As previously noted, the Tucker court had determined that Bell was one hundred percent at fault in causing the crash landing and that PHI was free from fault. In Myers I, we considered two issues to determine whether the trial court had erred in applying Louisiana’s res judicata law, La. R.S. 13:4231. Those issues were (1) whether the parties in Tucker and Myers were the “same” within the meaning of the statute; and (2) whether the judgment in Tucker had resolved the same liability issues as those presented in Myers.

Noting that “[t]he requirement that the parties be the same does not mean that the parties must have the same physical identity, but that the parties must appear in the ‘same quality or capacity,’ ” we held that the parties in Tucker and Myers satisfied this requirement. Myers I, supra, p. 7, 43 So.3d at 211(citing Berrigan v. Deutsch, Kerrigan & Stiles, LLP, 2001-0612, p. 6 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1/2/2002), 806 So.2d 163, 167). In so holding, we stated:

It is this Court’s view that the parties in this matter are the same as in the Tucker judgment. In neither case are the plaintiffs’ statuses an issue. The only parties that could be liable in this action, Bell and PHI, are in the same position as they were in the Tucker trial, where Bell was found to be completely at fault and PHI without any fault in causing the helicopter accident of August 19, 2004. They are appearing in the same capacities, and they are, in fact, the same parties. Appellant Bell is clearly liable for the accident, but the Myers and PHI still have to prove their damages in the trial court.

I8Myers I, supra, p. 8, 43 So.3d at 212.

The second issue raised by Bell in Myers I was whether the Meyers’ personal injury claims had been “actually litigated” for the purposes of res judicata. Bell argued that they had not been actually litigated because the Tuckers had settled with Bell and PHI prior to judgment, and therefore the judgment had resolved only PHI’s redhibition claim, which Bell asserted was “wholly different” from the plaintiffs’ personal injury claims. In rejecting Bell’s argument, we noted the broad scope of Louisiana’s res judicata law, which encompasses both claim preclusion and issue preclusion. Recognizing that issue preclusion bars re-litigation of “matters that have never been litigated but should have been advanced in the earlier suit,” we found that in Tucker, “Bell clearly had the opportunity to litigate its case as to liability.” Id., p. 10, 43 So.3d at 213. Thus, we held:

In light of the broad concept of res judicata that prevails in our jurisprudence, we conclude that the issue of fault for the helicopter crash is an issue that has been “actually litigated.” La. Rev.Stat. § 13:4231(3). Therefore, because the statutory requirements for res judicata have been met, we find no error in the decision of the district court to sustain the exception of res judicata as to Bell’s liability in this matter. This matter is remanded to the district court for trial as to damages and other proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Id., p. 10, 43 So.3d at 213.

The inescapable conclusion from the above-quoted decree is that the trial court did exactly as we instructed when it issued the Order that is the subject of this appeal. Although Bell insists that the issues it raises in the instant appeal are different from those we addressed in Myers I, their argument is unconvincing. Just as in Myers I, Bell again argues that the requirements of the res judicata statute have not been met under the facts presented. In support of its argument, Bell raises no new issues, and cites no facts that were not before us in Myers I.

|9We therefore conclude that, pursuant to the law of the case doctrine, our reconsideration of these issues is barred. Accordingly, the trial court did not err by issuing the Order reiterating that the liability for the helicopter crash had been determined and setting the matter for trial on damages.

II. Granting of Exception in LeBoeuf

Bell argues, for the same reasons asserted in its attempt to defeat the application of the law of the case doctrine, that the trial court erred by granting the exception of res judicata in LeBoeuf The LeBoeuf plaintiffs counterargue that if we were to reverse the granting of that exception, they would be unfairly placed in a different position than the other passengers in the helicopter. We agree that such a result would contravene the policy reasons behind Louisiana’s adoption of a broad concept of res judicata.

With regard to the issue of liability, the Myers plaintiffs and the LeBoeuf plaintiffs are in the same legal position because their interests were adequately represented by PHI in the Tucker litigation. Myers I, supra, p. 9, 43 So.3d at 212; see also, Duffy v. Si-Sifh Corporation, 98-1400 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1/9/99), 726 So.2d 438. We therefore find that the trial court did not err by granting the exception of res judica-ta filed by PHI and the LeBoeuf plaintiffs.

III. Trial of Punitive and Compensatory Damage Issues

Bell argues that the trial court erred by ordering that the punitive and compensatory damages issues be tried together. Bell contends this order is improper because Bell’s liability for punitive damages pursuant to maritime law, an issue raised by plaintiffs but not yet addressed, will have to be tried along with the issue of what amount of compensatory damages are owed by Bell. In support of this argument, Bell cites La. C.C.P. art. 1562, which states:

|1ftA. If it would simplify the proceedings or would permit a more orderly disposition of the case or otherwise would be in the interest of justice, at any time prior to trial the court may order, with the consent of all parties, separate trials on the issues of liability and damages, whether or not there is to be a jury trial on either issue.
B. If a defendant has been found liable by a jury, the court shall proceed with the trial on the remaining issues before the same jury unless all parties consent to a trial before a different jury.
C. Notwithstanding the provisions of Paragraph B of this Article, in a jury trial, the court may order, with the consent of all the parties, that a separate trial on the issue of damages shall precede a trial on the issue of liability.
D. If it would simplify the proceedings or would permit a more orderly disposition of the case or otherwise would be in the interest of justice, at any time prior to trial on the merits, the court may order, with the consent of all parties, a separate trial on the issue of insurance coverage, unless a factual dispute that is material to the insurance coverage issue duplicates an issue relative to liability or damages. The issue of insurance coverage shall be decided by the court alone, whether or not there is to be a jury trial on the issue of liability or damages.

We find nothing in this article that prohibits what the trial court has ordered in the instant case. Nor has Bell convinced us that trial of the punitive damage issues, including liability for said damages, before the same jury that is determining the amount of compensatory damages owed, would unduly influence or confuse the jury or prejudice Bell. We therefore decline to disturb the trial court’s Order.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, for the reasons stated, the trial court’s March 22, 2011 Order and its judgment granting of the exception of res judicata urged by the LeBoeuf plaintiffs and PHI are affirmed.

AFFIRMED

      . PHI had purchased the helicopter from Bell approximately fourteen years prior to the accident and had used it to ferry offshore workers to and from oil platforms. As a result of the accident, the helicopter was declared a total loss.

      . Myers v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 2009-1517 (La.App. 4 Cir. 5/19/10), 43 So.3d 207, writ denied, 2010-2049 (La. 11/12/10), 49 So.3d 892.

      . See Tucker v. Petroleum Helicopters, Inc., 2008-1019, p. 16 (La.App. 4 Cir. 3/23/09), 9 So.3d 966, 976 (quoting the trial court's judgment).

      . Tucker v. Petroleum Helicopters, Inc., 2008-1019 (La.App. 4 Cir. 3/23/09), 9 So.3d 966, writ denied, 2009-0901 (La.6/19/09), 10 So.3d 736.

        .Myers v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Louisiana, 2009-1517, p. 4 (La.App. 4 Cir. 5/19/10), 43 So.3d 207, 210.

      . Myers, supra, writ denied, 2010-2049 (La.11/12/10), 49 So.3d 892.

      . The March 22, 2011 Order is immediately appealable as a partial final judgment on liability pursuant to La.Code Civ. Pro. arts. 1911 and 1915(A)(5).

      . The petition was filed against AIG Aviation, Inc. as the alleged insurer of PHI.

      . Because of Michael LeBoeuf’s subsequent death in an accident unrelated to the helicopter crash at issue here, his child was substituted as plaintiff.


author: EDWIN A. LOMBARD, Judge.

text:
    STATE of Louisiana in the Interest of S.P.
    No. 2011-CA-1598.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.
    May 2, 2012.
    Order Granting Rehearing in Part June 4, 2012.

      Leon A. Cannizzaro, Jr., District Attorney, Felicity Strachan, Assistant District Attorney, New Orleans, LA, for The State of Louisiana.
    Katherine M. Franks, Louisiana Appellate Project, Abita Springs, LA, for Defendant/Appellant.
    (Court composed of Judge MAX N. TOBIAS, JR., Judge EDWIN A. LOMBARD, Judge DANIEL L. DYSART).
   EDWIN A. LOMBARD, Judge.

| ]The juvenile, S.P., appeals his adjudication as a delinquent. After review of the record in light of the applicable law and arguments of the parties, the judgment of the juvenile court is affirmed in part and reversed in part.

Relevant Facts and Procedural History

On the evening of May 25, 2011, the front passenger window of a Nissan Juke parked in the 2800 block of Constance Street was broken. A man sitting on his porch, Duncan Pace, heard the sound of glass breaking, then a woman in the neighborhood yelling. He then saw, in apparent response to the woman yelling, a young man wearing shoulder-length dreadlocks, an oversized black t-shirt with a white t-shirt collar underneath, a pair of rust-colored jean shorts, and black tennis shoes running towards Washington Avenue with a woman in pursuit. Mr. Pace joined the chase while his roommate called the New Orleans Police Department (NOPD). He followed the young man down Washington Avenue towards Tchoupitoulas Street, but lost sight of him when he turned off on Annunciation Street. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Pace flagged down the police officers responding to his roommate’s call and gave them a physical description of the young man. The police officers then spotted S.P., who matched the description given by Mr. Pace, |2climbing up a porch on Chippewa Street near Third Street. The officers, exiting their vehicle, called to him. Instead of responding and coming to speak to the officers, S.P. jumped over the porch rail onto a garbage can, jumped the alleyway fence, and fled. He was apprehended underneath a house in the 700 block of Third Street and taken into custody.

That same day, the State filed a petition charging S.P. with (1) simple burglary of an automobile in violation of La.Rev.Stat. 14:62; (2) simple criminal damage to the automobile in violation of La.Rev.Stat. 14:56; and (3) resisting an officer in violation of La. Rev. 14:108. No parent appeared on behalf of S.P. at the hearing on May 26, 2011, so the matter was reset for the following day. On May 27, 2011, S.P.’s sister appeared as his guardian, probable cause was found to support the charges, and bond was set at $6000.00. On May 31, 2011, represented by appointed counsel, S.P. appeared, entering a denial to the charges in the petition. In addition to accepting the answer, the judge conducted an inquiry into S.P.’s family and economic circumstances and set the matter for trial on June 20, 2011. On June 20, 2011, the State’s motion for continuance was granted, the trial was reset for July 28, 2011, and S.P. was released to the custody of his father to reside in Alabama pending trial. On July 28, 2011, after hearing the testimony of three witnesses, the trial court adjudicated S.P. delinquent on all counts. At the disposition hearing on October 20, 2011, the trial court ordered that S.P. serve three concurrent six-month dispositions in the custody of the Office of Juvenile Justice, but suspended the disposition, ordering S.P. to serve a one-year period of probation in Alabama. By written judgment, additional conditions of probation, including a curfew, were imposed.

| ^Applicable Law and Standard of Review

The State’s burden of proof is the same in a juvenile adjudication proceeding as in a criminal proceeding, ie., the State must prove every element of the alleged offence beyond a reasonable doubt. La. Ch.Code art. 883. We review a sufficiency of the evidence challenge under the standard enunciated in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), and, accordingly, must determine “whether the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, was sufficient to convince a rational trier of fact that all of the elements of the crime had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Captville, 448 So.2d 676, 678 (La.1984) (citation omitted). “[A]n appellate court cannot set aside a juvenile court’s findings of fact in the absence of manifest error or unless those findings are clearly wrong” and “[w]here there is conflicting testimony, reasonable evaluations of credibility and reasonable inferences of fact should not be disturbed upon review, even when the appellate court may feel that its own evaluations and inferences are as reasonable as those of the trial court.” In re A.J.F., 00-0948 (La.6/30/00), 764 So.2d 47, 61. Accordingly, if the factual findings “are reasonable in light of the record reviewed in its entirety, the court of appeal may not reverse even though convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it would have weighed the evidence differently.” Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So.2d 840, 844 (La.1989). Thus, where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the fact finder’s choice cannot be clearly wrong and an appellate court may not substitute its opinion for that of the juvenile court judge “who is in the unique position to see and hear the witnesses as they testify.” In re A.J.F., 764 So.2d at 62. Thus, absent internal contradiction or irreconcilable conflict with physical evidence, even a single ^witness's testimony is sufficient to support a factual conclusion. State v. Robinson, 02-1869 (La.4/14/2004), 874 So.2d 66.

Discussion

S.P. appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence underlying each offense for which he was adjudicated and arguing that the trial court erred in allowing a police officer to testify as to a statement made to him by a non-testifying witness.

The following evidence was adduced at trial.

Officer Troy Pichón of the NOPD testified and identified S.P. as the person he arrested in Orleans Parish on May 25, 2011. Officer Pichón stated, over defense counsel’s objection, that S.P. was positively identified by a witness to the incident as the person who committed the alleged burglary of an automobile. According to Officer Pichón, he and his partner, Officer Glenn Buckle, were canvassing the area when they were flagged down around Annunciation Street and Sixth Street by a witness who gave them a description of the alleged perpetrator’s hairstyle and clothing. Driving towards downtown on Chippewa Street, Officer Pichón saw S.P. When S.P. saw the police vehicle, he crossed the street from the park towards a house where other people were congregating on the porch of a woman who sold “candy and frozen cups to kids in the neighborhood.” Officer Pichón and his partner stopped their vehicle, exiting as S.P. reached the porch, and “asked him to come over.” In response S.P. jumped off the porch and over the fence into the side yard, then fled down the alleyway. Officer Pichón stated that S.P. was apprehended under a nearby house in the 700 block of Third Street.

Officer Buckle also testified and identified S.P. as the juvenile they arrested after responding to the call reporting a vehicular break-in. According to Officer | (¡Buckle, as he and his partner were canvassing the area, they observed a male fitting the perpetrator’s description but, upon seeing the police car “he ran, started jumping from yard to yard.” Officer Buckle stated the juvenile was eventually found underneath the residence at 726 Third Street. After stating that he observed the front passenger window of the vehicle “smashed out,” Officer Buckle identified photographs of the damaged vehicle submitted into evidence. However, Officer Buckle conceded on cross-examination that, although the perpetrator was described as wearing dark clothes, S.P. was wearing a white t-shirt when apprehended. According to Officer Buckle, in identifying S.P. as the perpetrator “[t]he first witness said he looked extremely similar although at the time [S.P.] was apprehended he was wearing a white t-shirt.” When asked whether the perpetrator was wearing a white t-shirt when the “first” witness observed the perpetrator, Officer Buckle responded “I didn’t speak with her directly but the second witness said that he was wearing a black t-shirt with a white one underneath it.” Officer Buckle stated that during his investigation he learned that the owner of the vehicle had not given anyone permission to break her window.

Mr. Pace testified that on May 25, 2011, he was sitting on his porch in the 2800 block of Constance Street with his roommate after work when he heard three loud bangs that “sounded like a window shattering.” After two or three seconds, he heard a woman yelling “hey you get out of there, get out of there, stop it.” Mr. Pace stated that he then observed a young African-American male running from Sixth Street towards Washington Avenue. According to Mr. Pace, the youth kept looking back, “obviously running from somebody.” He saw two dogs in pursuit of the youth and “then a middle 20 some year old female came running down the street behind them.” According to Mr. Pace, the youth was wearing a pair of dark Ujean shorts, a large oversized black t-shirt with “an exposed white collar,” and black tennis shoes. Mr. Pace joined the chase. Mr. Pace insisted that his identification of S.P. was valid because at one point during the chase, when he was within 50 yards of the youth, S.P. stopped and looked back. Although he lost sight of S.P. when he turned on Annunciation Street and subsequently gave up the chase, the police came to his house to ask him to come identify the youth. After he agreed to do so, the police brought him “[t]o where he was apprehended and had him out in handcuffs with an officer and they had the spotlights on him from the car.” According to Mr. Pace, he was sure of his identification of S.P. because his clothing was very distinct, including the white collar shirt (although he had shed the black over t-shirt), “and his face matched and whatnot [sic].... ” Mr. Pace conceded that he did not see S.P. reach into the vehicle or throw anything at the vehicle.

Sufficiency of the evidence with respect to simple burglary

La.Rev.Stat. 14:62 provides in pertinent part that simple burglary is the unauthorized entering of any vehicle “with the intent to commit a felony or any theft therein....”

Even viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, although the window was smashed there is no evidence of entry into the vehicle. Further, although smashing a window constitutes evidence of the intent to damage the vehicle (and, as discussed infra, supports his adjudication for simple criminal damage), it does not necessarily constitute evidence of an intent to enter the vehicle as, concomitantly, would be required to find him guilty of the lesser criminal offense of attempted simple burglary. See La.Code Crim. Proc. art. 17814(A)(43); La.Rev.Stat. 14:62. Accordingly, the judgment of the juvenile court is reversed with respect to the adjudication for simple burglary.

Sufficiency of the evidence with respect to simple criminal damage

La.Rev.Stat. 14:56(A)(1) provides in pertinent part that “[s]imple criminal damage to property is the intentional damaging of any property of another, without the consent of the owner....” Counsel for the juvenile argues, with citation to La.Rev.Stat. 14:56(B), that the record does not support an adjudication on this offense because there is no evidence of the actual cost of the damage done to the car. This argument is without merit. Even accepting that the penal provisions of the statute constitute an element of the offense, La. Rev.Stat. 14:56(B)(1) provides that whoever commits the crime of simple criminal damage and the damage is less than five hundred dollars “shall be fined not more than one thousand dollars or imprisoned for not more than six months or both,” thereby indicating that there is no minimum monetary damage threshold for the offense. In this case, although there is no testimony from the owner or the vehicle or damage estimate in the record, pictures of the broken window submitted into evidence were identified by the investigating officer and submitted into evidence. In addition, eye-witness testimony establishes that S.P. was seen fleeing the vicinity of the vehicle within seconds of the witness hearing the loud sound of breaking glass. Thus, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence supports the adjudication for simple criminal damage to property, a violation of La.Rev.Stat. 14:56(A).

Sufficiency of the evidence with respect to resisting an officer

La Rev.Stat. 14:108 provides in pertinent part that resisting an officer is the intentional resistance to a lawful detention or arrest when the offender knows or has reason to know that the person arresting or detaining him is acting in his |8official capacity. Pursuant to La.Code Crim. Proc. art. 215.1, an officer may stop a person in a public place whom he reasonably suspects has committed an offense and may demand of him his name, address, and an explanation of his actions.

In this case, S.P. fled when the officers exited their vehicle and asked him to “come over.” Based on the information known to officers at the time they exited the vehicle, ie., property had been damaged by an individual matching S.P.’s description, the officers had reason to stop and question him. When S.P. fled from the officers, thereby intentionally resisting them, it is undisputable that he knew they were police officers acting in an official capacity. Accordingly, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, sufficient evidence supports the juvenile’s adjudication for resisting an officer.

Hearsay evidence

Pursuant to La.Code Evid. 801(C), “ ‘[hjearsa/ is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the present trial or hearing, offered into evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” However, erroneous admission of evidence requires reversal only where there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence might have contributed to the verdict. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967); State v. Gibson, 891 So.2d 421 (La.1980). Therefore, the relevant inquiry is whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993); State v. Casey, 99-0023 (La.1/26/00), 775 So.2d 1022, 1033; see also State v. Johnson, 389 So.2d 1302 (La.1980) (admission of hearsay testimony is harmless error when the effect is merely cumulative or corrobative of other testimony adduced at trial).

In this case, Officer Pichón testified that S.P. was identified as the perpetrator by an unnamed, non-testifying witness and, as the State concedes, this | nwas clearly hearsay. However, because Mr. Pace identified S.P. as the perpetrator in court and testified that he identified the perpetrator shortly after his apprehension, the error was merely cumulative and, therefore, harmless.

Conclusion

The judgment of the juvenile court is affirmed in part and reversed in part. We affirm the delinquency adjudications based on the offenses of simple criminal damage and resisting an officer, but reverse the delinquency adjudication based on the offense of simple burglary.

AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART.

ORDER

On rehearing granted, this matter is remanded to the juvenile court for clarification as to the grade of the offense, La. Rev. Stat. 14:56, underlying S.P.’s adjudication. To all other extent, the juvenile’s application for rehearing is denied.


author: FREDERICKA HOMBERG WICKER, Judge.

text:
    Mitzi N. MATHERNE and Malcolm Matherne v. JEFFERSON PARISH HOSPITAL DISTRICT NO. 1 d/b/a West Jefferson Medical Center.
    No. 11-CA-1147.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fifth Circuit.
    May 8, 2012.
    Rehearing Denied June 5, 2012.

      R. Justin Garon, Michael Hingle, Attorneys at Law, New Orleans, LA, for Plaintiff/Appellant.
    Carl T. Conrad, Attorney at Law, Me-tairie, LA, for DefendanVAppellee.
    Panel composed of Judges SUSAN M. CHEHARDY, FREDERICKS HOMBERG WICKER, and MARC E. JOHNSON.
   FREDERICKA HOMBERG WICKER, Judge.

IgThe plaintiffs/appellants, Mr. Malcolm Matherne and Mrs. Mitzi Matherne, filed suit in the 24th Judicial District Court of Jefferson Parish, Louisiana on June 23, 2011, against the defendant/appellee, Jefferson Parish Hospital No. 1 d/b/a West Jefferson Medical Center (“West Jefferson”). The Mathernes sought damages for an injury Mrs. Matherne sustained when she fell as she was being transported, by West Jefferson’s employee, to her hospital bed. West Jefferson excepted to the petition on July 28, 2011, on the grounds of prematurity. West Jefferson alleged that Mrs. Matherne’s petition was premature because she failed to first present her claim to the medical review panel pursuant to La. R.S. 40:1299.41 of the Louisiana Medical Malpractice Act (“LMMA”). The court sustained the exception on September 20, 2011, and dismissed the plaintiffs’ ^petition. The Mathernes appeal the trial court’s ruling arguing that it erred in granting the exception of prematurity and dismissing their claim.

Discussion

The LMMA is set forth in La. R.S. 40:1299.41 et seq. The LMMA defines “malpractice” as

any unintentional tort or any breach of contract based on health care or professional services rendered, or which should have been rendered, by a health care provider, to a patient, including failure to render services timely and the handling of a patient, including loading and unloading of a patient,.... (Emphasis Added).

La. R.S. 40:1299.41(13)

A medical malpractice claim against a private qualified health care provider is subject to dismissal on an exception of prematurity if the claim has not first been presented to a medical review panel. La. R.S. 40:1299.47(A)(l)(a); La-Coste v. Pendleton Methodist Hosp., L.L.C., 07-0008, 07-0016, p. 6 (La.9/5/07), 966 So.2d 519, 523. The dilatory exception of prematurity questions whether the cause of action has matured to the point where it is ripe for judicial determination. Williamson v. Hosp. Sen. Dist. No. 1 of Jefferson, 04-0451, p. 4 (La.12/1/04), 888 So.2d 782, 785, citing, La. C.C.P. art. 926. The burden of proving prematurity is on the mover. Id. Therefore, West Jefferson must show that it is entitled to a medical review panel. Thus, the question before this Court is whether the Math-ernes’ claim falls within the statutory definition of malpractice.

The Louisiana Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that the LMMA and its limitations on tort liability for a qualified health care provider apply only to claims “arising from medical malpractice,” and that all other tort liability on the part of the qualified health care provider is governed by general tort law. LaCoste, supra, at 524. We, therefore, conduct a de novo review of the trial court’s grant of |4the dilatory exception of prematurity because the issue of whether a claim sounds in medical malpractice involves a question of law. Hernandez v. Diversified Healthcare-Abbeville, LLC, 09-0546, pp. 1-2 (La. App. 3 Cir. 11/4/09), 24 So.3d 284, 285, writ denied, 09-2629 (La.2/12/10), 27 So.3d 849.

In Coleman v. Deno, 01-1517, (La.1/25/02), 813 So.2d 303, the Louisiana Supreme Court set forth a six-part test to determine whether a negligent act is covered by the LMMA. The Coleman factors include: 1) whether the particular wrong is “treatment related” or caused by a dereliction of professional skill; 2) whether the wrong requires expert medical evidence to determine whether the appropriate standard of care was breached; 3) whether the pertinent act or omission involved assessment of the patient’s condition; 4) whether an incident occurred in the context of a physician-patient relationship, or was within the scope of activities which a hospital is licensed to perform; 5) whether the injury would have occurred if that patient had not sought treatment, and 6) whether the tort alleged was intentional. Id. at 315-16.

Applying the Coleman factors to the case before us, we find that the alleged negligent acts complained of are covered under the LMMA.

The first Coleman factor considers whether the particular wrong is “treatment related” or caused by a dereliction of professional skill. The record reflects that West Jefferson has an organizational-wide “Fall Assessment and Prevention” program, which focuses on assessing and identifying patients at risk for falls and on educating staff on fall prevention. The program mandates that West Jefferson employ a scoring system — the Morse Risk Fall Assessment — to determine all patients’ risk for falls. Some factors that comprise the risk assessment include fall history, ambulatory aid, and gait, which is the manner of | ¿movement. Once all factors are considered, patients are then assigned a score which is indicative of their risk for falls. Patients scoring 45 or higher are considered high risk.

In this case, West Jefferson performed a risk assessment on Mrs. Matherne on September 2, 2010, at 7:30 A.M. — approximately five hours before the fall occurred. The assessment indicated that Mrs. Math-erne had a history of falls and a weakened gait. Her overall fall-risk score at that time was 70, which is high risk. Because of the high-risk score, West Jefferson’s fall prevention program should have been implemented as part of Mrs. Matherne’s treatment. Because fall assessment is part of the treatment for all patients at West Jefferson, the first Coleman factor is satisfied.

Next, we consider the second Coleman factor, which is whether the wrong requires expert medical evidence to determine whether the appropriate standard of care was breached. Medical evidence is necessary in this case to determine whether West Jefferson breached the standard of care when an employee single-handedly attempted to transport a 250-pound elderly woman, suffering with a hematoma on her leg, from a bedside commode to her bed.

The third Coleman factor considers whether the pertinent act or omission involved assessment of the patient’s condition. This factor is easily satisfied because West Jefferson requires an assessment of all patients to determine their fall risk factor. The Fourth Coleman factor considers whether the incident occurred in the context of a physician-patient relationship, or was within the scope of activities which a hospital is licensed to perform. It is apparent that the injury in this case occurred during the scope of activities that West Jefferson was licensed to perform— transporting a patient who had been assessed as a high risk for falls. Thus, this factor is satisfied.

IfiThe fifth Coleman factor is whether the injury would have occurred if the patient had not sought treatment. Here, Mrs. Matherne was admitted to the hospital for treatment of her leg hematoma. If she had not sought treatment, she would not have been transported by the employee, and the fall would not have occurred. Therefore, the fifth Coleman factor is also satisfied. Finally, Mrs. Matherne does not allege that West Jefferson’s actions were intentional; thus the final Coleman factor, whether the tort alleged was intentional, is satisfied.

Although we find that all Coleman factors have been satisfied in this case, Mrs. Matherne relies on this Court’s decision in Jordan v. Stonebridge, 03-0588 (La.App. 5 Cir. 11/25/03), 862 So.2d 181, to argue that her claim does not fall within the statutory definition of medical malpractice. In that case, we determined that a resident’s injury, sustained while under full-time custodial care at a nursing home facility, did not fall under the LMMA. Jordan, supra, at 184. However, Jordan is distinguishable and does not support Mrs. Matherne’s argument. There, we found that Jordan was not undergoing medical treatment at the nursing home and that an assessment of his medical condition was not required. In this case, however, Mrs. Matherne was, in fact, admitted to West Jefferson for medical treatment of her leg hematoma, and she had a medical assessment performed to prevent exactly the type of injury that occurred.

Thus, by applying the six Coleman factors, we find that the trial court did not err in granting the exception of prematurity. The judgment appealed from is affirmed.

AFFIRMED


author: GREMILLION, Judge.

text:
    Wesley Peter ROZAS v. STATE of Louisiana, through the DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY & CORRECTIONS, OFFICE OF MOTOR VEHICLES.
    No. 12-56.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.
    May 16, 2012.
    Laura C. Hopes, Attorney at Law, Baton Rouge, LA, for Defendant/Appellant, State of Louisiana, through the Department of Public Safety and Corrections, Office of Motor Vehicles.
    Wesley Peter Rozas, In Proper Person, Cottonport, LA.
    Court composed of JAMES T. GENOVESE, SHANNON J. GREMILLION, and PHYLLIS M. KEATY, Judges.
   GREMILLION, Judge.

_JjThe State of Louisiana, through the Department of Public Safety and Corrections, Office of Motor Vehicles (OMV), appeals the judgment of the trial court ordering that it reinstate the Class E driver’s license of Wesley Peter Rozas. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

FACTS

Rozas was arrested in August 2009 for operating a vehicle while intoxicated in violation of La.R.S. 14:98. His blood alcohol concentration (BAC) at the time of the arrest was registered as .08g%, which is the limit at which one is presumed intoxicated. La.R.S. 14:98(A)(l)(b). This was the second occasion within five years Rozas had tested at .08g%. As a result, Rozas’s Class E driver’s license was suspended pursuant to La.R.S. 32:667(B)(1)(b), which requires the suspension of a license for 865 days when that driver has tested a BAC of .08g% twice within five years.

Rozas instituted judicial review proceedings in the Twelfth Judicial District Court. His suspension was stayed pending outcome of the judicial review. On January 8, 2010, Rozas and OMV entered a stipulated judgment whereby OMV agreed to issue Rozas a restricted driver’s license, and Rozas agreed to install an ignition interlock device on his vehicle, which Rozas did. Rozas also agreed to dismiss his action for judicial review upon issuance of the restricted driver’s license, but never actually received the restricted license from OMV. He testified that he went to the Marksville OMV location but was told that they did not issue restricted licenses. Therefore, he carried the judgment with him when he drove.

| ¡Hozas obtained a full reinstatement of his license on January 24, 2011. The license carried no restriction requiring an interlock. On January 27, 2011, Rozas had the interlock removed.

The State forwarded notice to Rozas that a condition of his reinstatement was maintaining an interlock for one year after reinstatement. Because Rozas removed the interlock, the State suspended his license. Rozas filed a motion for appeal of the suspension with the district court. That motion was heard on October 31, 2011. The trial court found that Rozas had entered into an agreement with the State and that he had fulfilled his obligations under the agreement. While the State showed that it mailed notices of the requirement that Rozas maintain the interlock for an additional 865 days, those notices were mailed to Rozas’s physical address, where Rozas testified he never receives mail and has no mail receptacle. The trial court found credible Rozas’s testimony that he never received those notices. Rozas testified that he learned that he was still required to have an interlock one day as he was en route to work in Galliano, Louisiana, and was stopped by police for driving 37 in a 25-mile-per-hour zone. The police officer who pulled him over informed Rozas that he was required to have an interlock. Because Rozas entered a valid agreement with the State and fulfilled all requirements of the agreement, the trial court ordered Rozas’s license reinstated.

The State appeals and assigns as error the trial court’s action in giving Rozas credit for the time he maintained the interlock device on his vehicle despite his failure to apply for and maintain a restricted driver’s license for 365 days.

ANALYSIS

As we have already noted, the suspension of a driver’s license for testing a BAC ,08g% or higher is governed by La.R.S. 32:667. Subsection (B)(1)(b) provides that on a driver’s second such test within five years, his license shall be ^suspended for 365 days without eligibility for a restricted license. A driver whose BAC was less than ,20g% is eligible for a restricted license upon furnishing proof that he has installed an interlock, and should OMV refuse to issue him one, he may obtain an ex parte court order requiring OMV to issue him one. La.R.S. 32:667(B)(3)(a).

Subsection (I) governs the installation of interlocks. Any driver whose BAC has tested .08g% or above within five years shall have an interlock installed as a condition of the reinstatement of his license. La.R.S. 32:667(I)(1)(b). The specific provision OMV maintains is at issue in this case is La.R.S. 32:667(I)(2) (emphasis added), which states:

(2) As to any person enumerated in Paragraph (1) of this Subsection, the ignition interlock device shall remain on the motor vehicle for a period of not less than six months. The ignition interlock device may be installed either prior to the reinstatement of the driver’s license, if the person has lawfully obtained a restricted driver’s license, or as a condition of the reinstatement of the driver’s license. When the driver’s license is suspended as described in this Subsection, the ignition interlock device shall remain on the motor vehicle for the same period as the suspension, with credit for time when the interlock device was installed and functioning as part of a restricted driver’s license.

The State maintains that because Rozas never received his restricted license, the 365-day interlock period never started. The language of the statute does seem to require the actual issuance of a restricted license.

However, this case does not involve the interpretation of the statutes governing an interlock; rather, it is a matter of interpreting the stipulated judgment, the agreement entered in open court by OMV and Rozas and reduced to a written judgment of the Twelfth Judicial District Court. The plain language of the agreement between Rozas and OMV required OMV to issue Rozas a restricted 14license. That language implies more than a passive duty on OMV’s part to allow Rozas to obtain a restricted license when he happened to be directed to the appropriate OMV office that in fact does issue restricted licenses. The agreement clearly and unequivocally contemplates that Rozas was required to maintain an interlock on his vehicle for 365 days, after which he was to be issued an unrestricted driver’s license if he committed no further infractions. No evidence suggests that Rozas did anything but live up to his obligations under that judgment. OMV failed to honor the judgment in several respect: in not issuing Rozas the restricted license; in issuing him an unrestricted license and suspending it three days later; in opposing his action for judicial review; and in appealing the judgment enforcing the stipulation.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. All costs of these proceedings, in the amount of $280.00, are taxed to the State of Louisiana through the Department of Public Safety and Corrections, Office of Motor Vehicles.

AFFIRMED.

      . The restricted license is a grant of restricted driving privileges pursuant to La.R.S. 32:415.1. and only allows the driver to operate a motor vehicle "as would enable him to earn his livelihood ...” Id.

      . If the driver's BAC is .20g% or higher, the suspension is two years for a first violation and four years for a second. La.R.S. 32:667(B)(1)(c).