author: GENOVESE, Judge.

text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Christopher Bryan CHENEVERT.
    No. 10-396.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.
    Nov. 3, 2010.

      Carey J. Ellis, III, Louisiana Appellate Project, Rayville, LA, for Defendant/Appellant, Christopher Bryan Chenevert.
    James C. “Jam”, Downs District Attorney — Ninth Judicial District, Monique Y. Metoyer, Assistant District Attorney, Alexandria, LA, for Appellee, State of Louisiana.
    Court composed of JOHN D. SAUNDERS, JIMMIE C. PETERS, and JAMES T. GENOVESE, Judges.
   GENOVESE, Judge.

| ,In this criminal case, Defendant, Christopher Bryan Chenevert, appeals his conviction of illegal use of a weapon, alleging insufficiency of the evidence. For the following reasons, we reverse his conviction, vacate and set aside his sentence, and enter an order of acquittal.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On January 10, 2009, at about 3:00 a.m., Defendant fired his pistol several times while standing outside on his porch. Defendant’s elderly neighbor became frightened and reported the gunshots; Defendant was arrested soon thereafter. Defendant was charged by bill of information with illegal use of a weapon, a violation of La.R.S. 14:94. Following a trial by jury, Defendant was found guilty as charged. He subsequently filed a motion for post verdict judgment of acquittal, which was denied. Defendant was sentenced to serve two years at hard labor, suspended, and placed on supervised probation for three years with general and special conditions of probation. He was also ordered to pay a fine of $500.00, plus court costs.

Defendant has appealed his conviction. He is now before this court on appeal, asserting that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of illegal use of a weapon.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

In his sole assignment of error, Defendant argues that the evidence presented was insufficient to support the ver-diet of illegal use of a weapon. The analysis for a claim of insufficient evidence is well settled:

When the issue of sufficiency of evidence is raised on appeal, the critical inquiry of the reviewing court is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, rehearing denied, 444 U.S. 890, 100 S.Ct. 195, 62 L.Ed.2d 126 (1979); State ex rel. Graffagnino v. King, 436 So.2d 559 (La.1983); State v. Duncan, 420 So.2d 1105 (La.1982); State v. Moody, 393 So.2d 1212 (La.1981). It is the role of the fact finder to weigh the respective credibility of the witnesses, and therefore, the appellate court should not second guess the credibility determinations of the triers of fact beyond the sufficiency evaluations under the Jackson standard of review. See State ex rel. Graffagnino, 436 So.2d 559 (citing State v. Richardson, 425 So.2d 1228 (La.1983)). In order for this Court to affirm a conviction, however, the record must reflect that the state has satisfied its burden of proving the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

State v. Kennerson, 96-1518, p. 5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/7/97), 695 So.2d 1367, 1371.

Illegal use of a weapon is defined in La.R.S. 14:94(A) as “the intentional or criminally negligent discharging of any firearm ... where it is foreseeable that it may result in death or great bodily harm to a human being.” In the instant case, Defendant contends that it was not foreseeable that the shots fired by him would cause or result in death or great bodily harm to another.

At trial, Sergeant Brian Phillips of the Rapides Parish Sheriffs Office testified that on January 10, 2009, he was dispatched to 1524 Hickory Hill Road, Pine-ville, Louisiana, between 3:00 and 3:30 a.m., to investigate reports of shots being fired. When he started checking the area, he noticed only one house with lights on. Sergeant Phillips pulled into the driveway and approached the residence. As he started up the steps, he saw empty shell casings scattered about the porch. Sergeant Phillips then returned to his truck to take cover while waiting for backup. When Deputy Eddie Andrus arrived, they approached the house and knocked several times until Defendant eventually opened the door. Defendant was asked to step outside; he was then handcuffed and given his Miranda warning.

Sergeant Phillips told Defendant about the reported gunfire, and Defendant admitted that he had fired his gun. When asked why he had fired his weapon, Defendant reported that he was depressed and wanted to shoot his newly acquired gun. Defendant indicated that he had been shooting at a tree between his home and lathe woods, but officers were unable to find any marks on the tree. When Defendant was told there were no marks on the tree, he then stated he “just shot around,” without specifically identifying the area at which he aimed his gun.

According to Sergeant Phillips, the shell casings that were recovered were found scattered in different places on the front porch and on the ground. Based on his eight years of experience as a firearms instructor, Sergeant Phillips opined that the locations of the shell casings were not consistent with shooting in one position. He explained that if the weapon was fired from a single location, the shell casings would have been ejected in a general area, not scattered around the area. Seven empty -shell casings were collected.

Sergeant Phillips did not check beyond the tree for evidence of shots fired because it was dark and the woods were thirty to forty yards behind Defendant’s home. A residence was located on one side of Defendant’s house, about one hundred feet away, and was occupied by an elderly woman, seventy-five to eighty years of age. Sergeant Phillips spoke to Defendant’s neighbor, who was scared as a result of shots being fired. Additionally, Sergeant Phillips noted a residence located directly across the street from Defendant’s house and two to three more residences going up the street. Lastly, Sergeant Phillips testified that Defendant appeared to have been drinking and admitted to same.

A video created by Defendant depicting the area around his house where he discharged his weapon was jointly submitted into evidence and played for the jury during the testimony of Sergeant Phillips. Defendant’s home, as portrayed in the video, appeared to be in a rural area, with the home positioned perpendicular to the road. One end of the home faces the woods, and the other end faces the road. Two residences can be seen from Defendant’s porch, one on the property adjacent to his Lporch and one directly across the street. Neither residence, however, is located between Defendant’s home and the tree and woods where he claims to have been aiming.

The majority of the video depicts a wooded area off the right end of the porch, the area where Defendant maintains he discharged his weapon. At least two large trees can be seen in the area before reaching the woods. On the video, Defendant measured the distance between the home and where the woods began. He concluded that the house was sixty-two yards from the woods. In the video, the woods appear thick, with no signs of residences or businesses in the wooded area.

While the video was playing for the jury, Sergeant Phillips directed the jury’s attention to the tree which Defendant initially stated was the target of his gunfire. Sergeant Phillips testified that he did not tour the wooded area where Defendant stated he had fired his weapon.

On cross examination, Sergeant Phillips testified that he did not have any physical evidence to indicate that Defendant shot in any direction other than the woods. He did not find nor was he shown any bullet holes in the neighbor’s house or the house across the street. Also, Sergeant Phillips did not walk any distance into the woods and could not tell if there was heavy, dense vegetation.

Deputy Eddie Andrus of the Rapides Parish Sheriffs Office testified that he was also dispatched that evening to investigate a report of shots having been fired. He arrived after Sergeant Phillips. Deputy Andrus also observed shell casings on Defendant’s porch. When Defendant was asked about the reported shots being fired, he admitted shooting his pistol at a tree located just out from his porch. Deputy Andrus also looked at the tree and could not find any bullet holes or nicks that would indicate that it had been struck by a bullet. Defendant was again asked where he had |Bshot his weapon, and he replied that he did not know.

According to Deputy Andrus, Defendant was extremely intoxicated as evidenced by his slurred speech, unsteady balance, and a strong odor of alcoholic beverage on his breath. Although Defendant never indicated that he had been shooting toward the wooded area, Deputy Andrus clarified that the tree at which Defendant allegedly aimed was located in the direction of the woods. Deputy Andrus stated that he could barely see the tree, however.

On cross examination, Deputy Andrus testified that the deputies briefly looked at the neighbor’s house using flashlights, but did not see anything. To his knowledge, none of Defendant’s neighbors reported bullet holes in their homes.

Defendant’s neighbor, Angela Lasyone, testified that she lived next door to Defendant. Mrs. Lasyone would often hear gunshots coming from the woods located behind her home and assumed that the shots were from hunters; however, she had never actually seen anyone in the woods.

Mrs. Lasyone’s husband, Odyest Earl Lasyone, testified that he had seen people in the woods behind his residence, the same woods that are behind Defendant’s home. He had seen squirrel and deer hunters in the woods as well as deer stands; however, he had never seen anyone hunting in the woods at 8:00 a.m. According to Mr. Lasyone, it was not unusual to hear firearms being discharged in the area. Lastly, Mr. Lasyone testified that his residence had never been struck by a bullet, nor was he aware of any bullet striking a structure in the neighborhood.

Lastly, Defendant took the stand and denied firing his weapon in the direction of his neighbor’s house. He maintained that he had not been drinking to the extent that he was unaware of what he was doing. Defendant testified that he had had about four, eight-ounce toddies of Jack Daniels mixed with Sprite and admitted that he used lato drink excessively on a frequent basis. He disagreed with the officers’ testimony that his balance was unsteady. With regard to his speech, however, Defendant maintained that his speech is usually slurred, but his eyes are not typically bloodshot.

Additionally, Defendant maintained that the tree at which he was shooting was located in the center of his property, not between his and his neighbors’ properties. Defendant’s video and the testimony of Sergeant Phillips confirm this assertion. Defendant also testified that when he told the officers that he was shooting around, he meant that he was shooting around the general area of the tree. Although it was dark, Defendant contended that he was able to see where he was aiming because his eyes were adjusted to the darkness and because he knew what was in his back yard.

Defendant agreed that it was disrespectful to his neighbor to discharge his gun at 3:00 a.m. He maintained, however, that it was not dangerous because he knew where he was aiming his weapon. Defendant added that the shell casings were scattered about his porch because they ricocheted off the roof of the porch when he fired his weapon. Lastly, Defendant stated that he was intoxicated, but knew where he had fired his gun.

This court was recently faced with a similar scenario in State v. Cain, 09-390 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/4/09), 21 So.3d 1104, writ denied, 09-2659 (La.6/18/10), 38 So.3d 320. In Cain, the intoxicated defendant fired a shot in the air on his rural property. An occupied residence was located about eight hundred yards from where the defendant fired his weapon. On appeal, this court concluded that the record was void of evidence that one could foresee that the defendant’s actions could result in death or great bodily harm. There was no one else around, and, although the defendant was facing the nearby residence, he fired straight up in the air, not in the direction of the residence. Also, there was no evidence that the defendant pointed the Jjweapon at anyone or anything. Lastly, the defendant lived on the back five acres of the jointly-owned property that consisted of many acres. There were trees on the property, and the defendant and the occupants of the nearby house were the only residents on the property. As such, the court concluded that the likelihood that the bullet the defendant fired in the air would hit anyone was negligible and unlikely to cause bodily harm or death.

Additionally, in Cain, 21 So.3d at 1108—09, this court discussed two other opinions in reaching its decision as follows:

In State v. Powell, 95-424 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/2/95), 664 So.2d 608, this court was faced with a similar situation. The defendant was charged under La.R.S. 14:94(E), which amongst other elements, the State had to prove that considering the time and place, it was foreseeable that death or great bodily harm might occur to another person. In Powell, the defendant drove by a residence and fired three to four shots from a .25 semiautomatic pistol. At the time the pistol was feed, four adults and a few children were in and around the front yard of the residence. The shots, however, were aimed in a direction opposite that of the residence, and, thus, the court concluded that it was not foreseeable that death or great bodily harm might occur.
In State v. Ordner, 06-1054 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/14/07), 951 So.2d 508, writ denied, 07-587 (La.10/26/07), 966 So.2d 572, however, this court held it was foreseeable that discharge of a weapon, including shooting in the air, could result in death or great bodily harm. The defendant in Ordner was charged with illegal use of weapons and aggravated battery. On the evening in question, the defendant went to a party on a river where at least twenty-fee to fifty young people were in attendance. The defendant had been drinking and brought a loaded gun to the party. Not long after his arrival, the defendant was approached by four men. In an attempt to stop a physical altercation, the defendant feed a shot in the air and the men took off running. The defendant, however, fired his gun two more times, even though the threat was over, striking and injuring a man who was trying to convince the defendant to put his weapon away and was never shown to have been a threat to the defendant. The court also observed that the State was required to show criminal negligence, not intent, for the illegal use of a weapon, and found the defendant was criminally negligent in firing the gun, regardless of his intention.
Like the defendant in Ordner, the Defendant was intoxicated, by his own admission, when he feed his weapon. However, unlike in | ¡¡Ordner, where the defendant there brought a loaded weapon to a party, Defendant in this case was on his own property, alone. Further, Defendant fired his gun only once and immediately cooperated with Deputy Paul after ascertaining he was a police officer. Ordner, after initially firing his gun once to stop an altercation, continued to fee his gun several more times after the threat was over. Therefore, the Ordner case is factually distinguishable from the facts presented here.

Considering this court’s rulings in Cain, Powell and Ordner, we fed that the State failed to meet its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt that it was foreseeable that the shots feed by Defendant could have resulted in death or great bodily harm as required by La.R.S. 14:94. There was no testimony or physical evidence to prove that Defendant feed his weapon in the direction of any of the nearby residences. Additionally, other than scattered bullet casings on Defendant’s porch, there was no evidence to challenge Defendant’s testimony that he fired his weapon toward the trees and wooded area just off the end of his porch. Lastly, Defendant fired his weapon at a time when it was highly unlikely that a neighbor would be outside and in danger of being struck by a bullet. Accordingly, even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we find the evidence insufficient to convict Defendant of illegal use of a firearm.

DISPOSITION

Defendant’s conviction of illegal use of a firearm is reversed, his sentence imposed on that conviction is vacated and set aside, and an order of acquittal is entered.

CONVICTION REVERSED; SENTENCE VACATED AND SET ASIDE; ACQUITTAL ENTERED.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: PAINTER, Judge.

license: Public Domain

text:
    Michael HINDELANG, III v. Regina Louviere HINDELANG.
    No. 10-397.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.
    Nov. 3, 2010.

      Christine M. Mire, Lafayette, LA, for Defendanb-Appellant, Regina Louviere Hindelang.
    Ronald D. Cox, Charles G. Fitzgerald, Lafayette, LA, for Plaintiff-Appellee, Michael Hindelang, III.
    Court composed of OSWALD A. DECUIR, J. DAVID PAINTER, and SHANNON J. GREMILLION, Judges.
   PAINTER, Judge.

| Regina Louviere Hindelang, Appellant herein, appeals the judgment of the trial court setting a final award of support. For the following reasons, we amend the judgment of the trial court and affirm it as amended.

FACTS

Regina Louviere and Michael Hinde-lang, III were married in 1997. Michael filed a petition for divorce in February 2008, and a final judgment of divorce was rendered in October 2008. The controversy currently before this court concerns an award of final support made to Regina. Regina asserts that the evidence shows that increased support is in order because she is in poor health and unable to work. The trial court ordered Michael to pay support to Regina in the , amount of $3,500.00 per month for twelve months, retroactive to the date of judicial demand, and to pay the mortgage note indebtedness in the amount of $3,060.00 per month for twelve months retroactive to the date of judicial demand. Regina appeals.

DISCUSSION

Final Periodic Support

A trial court’s determination regarding final periodic support is subject to the abuse of discretion standard of review. January v. January, 03-1578 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/7/04), 876 So.2d 98. Louisiana Civil Code Article 112 states:

A. When a spouse has not been at fault and is in need of support, based on the needs of that party and the ability of the other party to pay, that spouse may be awarded final periodic support in accordance with Paragraph B of this Article.
B. The court shall consider all relevant factors in determining the amount and duration of final support. Those factors may include:
(1) The income and means of the parties, including the liquidity of such means.
| g(2) The financial obligations of the parties.
(3) The earning capacity of the parties.
(4) The effect of custody of children upon a party’s earning capacity.
(5) The time necessary for the claimant to acquire appropriate education, training, or employment.
(6) The health and age of the parties.
(7) The duration of the marriage.
(8) The tax consequences to either or both parties.
C. The sum awarded under this Article shall not exceed one-third of the obligor’s net income.

Bhati v. Bhati, 09-1030, p. 7 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/10/10), 32 So.3d 1107, 1112.

An award of permanent spousal support is not meant to allow the receiving party to continue the lifestyle they had during the marriage. Rather, it is awarded in the amount required for maintenance. “Maintenance includes food, shelter, clothing, transportation, medical and drug expenses, utilities, household necessities and income tax liability generated by alimony payments.” Earle v. Earle, 43,925, p. 9 (La.App. 2 Cir. 12/3/08), 998 So.2d 828, 835, writ denied, 09-117 (La.2/13/09), 999 So.2d 1151.

Deposition of Regina’s Treating Physician

Regina first asserts that the trial court erred in refusing to allow into evidence the deposition of her treating physician, William Dupon, after he was found to be unavailable for trial. Alternatively, she argues that the trial court should have allowed a continuance on that grounds. She further asserts that the trial court erred in failing to consider his deposition testimony. However, the record contains the deposition of Dr. Dupon, which was introduced into evidence as “Regina-2.” Defendants have not | .¡appealed its introduction into evidence. Additionally, the trial court referred to the deposition in giving oral reasons for judgment. Therefore, we find this assignment of error to be without basis.

Regina’s Ability to Work

Regina next asserts that the trial court erred in refusing to accept the testimony that she was incapable of working due to her medical condition. Regina is correct in asserting that this testimony was uncontradicted.

“In evaluating evidence, the trier of fact should accept as true the uncontradicted testimony of a plaintiff witness absent a sound reason for its rejection.” Johnson v. Ins. Co. of No. America, 454 So.2d 1113, 1117 (La.1984)

With regard to the deposition of Regina’s treating physician, Dr. Dupon, the trial court stated that it did not believe Dr. Dupon’s testimony. However, it not give any reason for this disbelief. Therefore, we find that the testimony of Dr. Dupon should have been accepted by the trial court. While Michael argues that the fact that Regina was able to travel casts doubt on her ability to work, we find nothing of record to support the conclusion that this travel was accomplished without the kind of pain which prevents Regina from working or that the type and duration of the activities in which she participated while traveling equate with the effort and duration required for employment. Therefore, we find that Regina was unable to work at the time of trial and that the trial court erred in failing to take this into consideration in determining Regina’s earning capacity.

Amount and Duration of Final Support

Regina asserts two assignments of error concerning the appropriate amount of final support. She first asserts that the trial court erred in excluding from evidence ^documentation which substantiated Michael’s gross monthly income. However, Michael stipulated that he could afford to pay any amount Regina would need for maintenance. Therefore, we find that the error in excluding the documentary evidence of his income, if any, is harmless.

Regina next argues that the trial court erred in setting the amount and duration of final support. Regina argues that the monthly expenses she submitted to the court are reasonable when compared to Michael’s lifestyle. However, as we have stated, an award of final support is meant only for maintenance, not to provide the lifestyle the party might have enjoyed during the marriage. After reviewing the record, we note that the amounts submitted by Regina go far beyond that necessary for maintenance. Regina further asserts, for the first time on appeal, the argument that she relied to her detriment on Michael’s contractual commitment to support her in exchange for ceasing her pursuit of a doctoral degree in psychology. Since this was not raised in the trial court, we may not consider it for the first time on appeal. We find the amount awarded by the trial court to be sufficient for Regina’s maintenance.

Next, Regina argues that the trial court erred in limiting support to a period of one year from date of demand. We agree. As stated above, the trial court erred in failing to accept the uncontradict-ed testimony of Dr. Dupon that Regina was unable to work, the award of support should have been made for an indefinite period. There was no testimony with regard to a projected date on which Regina might be capable of returning to work. Should Regina be able to return to work at a future date, Michael may move the court to reduce or terminate support at that time.

_]¿Retroactivity of the Award of Final Support

Finally, Regina argues that the trial court erred in making the award of final support retroactive to the date of demand. We agree.

Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:321(B)(1) provides that: “A judgment that initially awards or denies final spousal support is effective as of the date the judgment is rendered and terminates an interim spousal support allowance as of that date.” While Michael argues that there was no interim spousal support order, our examination of the record reveals otherwise. On May 22, 2008, the trial court signed a temporary order converting the recommendations of the hearing officer into an order of the court. Among the recommendations .of the hearing officer was that Michael be ordered to pay interim spousal support in the amount of $18,595.00, retroactive to the date of judicial demand. The judgment was temporary pending a hearing on the existing motion for interim support. We find nothing of record which indicates that such a hearing was held. Further, we cannot find, and Michael does not point to, any judgment or order of the court terminating or modifying this order. Accordingly, the final support should have been ordered from the date of judgment on the motion for final periodic spousal support.

CONCLUSION

The judgment is amended to make the award of final periodic spousal support indefinite in term and to order that the award take effect on the date of the trial court’s judgment. In all other respects the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

AFFIRMED AS AMENDED.

      . No argument has been made with regard to the mortgage note payment.

      . We further note that the evidence of record does not support Regina’s position in this regard.


author: GREMILLION, Judge.

text:
    Ruby L. HAWKINS v. PILGRIM’S PRIDE CORPORATION.
    No. 10-402.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.
    Nov. 3, 2010.
    Dona Kay Renegar, Huval, Veazey, Felder, Aertker & Renegar, LLC, Lafayette, LA, for Defendant/Appellee, Pilgrim’s Pride Corporation.
    Richard Bray Williams, Williams Family Law Firm, L.L.C, Natchitoches, LA, for Plaintiff/Appellant, Ruby L. Hawkins.
    Court composed of OSWALD A. DECUIR, J. DAVID PAINTER, and SHANNON J. GREMILLION, Judges.
   GREMILLION, Judge.

hMs. Ruby L. Hawkins appeals the judgment of the Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ) maintaining the exception of prescription in favor of her former employer, Pilgrim’s Pride Corporation. For the reasons that follow, we reverse.

FACTS

Hawkins was employed at the chicken processing plant in Natchitoches, Louisiana, from 1979 until July 24, 2008, when Pilgrim’s Pride terminated her employment. Before her termination, Hawkins had been diagnosed with carpal tunnel syndrome and fibromyalgia. Hawkins had a long history of carpal tunnel issues, for which she underwent surgical procedures in December 2003 and January 2004. Following those procedures, Hawkins returned to modified duty at the plant. Unfortunately, in February 2008, Hawkins developed a worsening of her condition to the point that her treating physician, Dr. Robert E. Goodman, a Shreveport, Louisiana, rheumatologist, directed that she not work from February 11, 2008 through May 8, 2008, and that, when she did return to work, Hawkins not work in a cold environment. During this absence from work, Hawkins received benefits from a short-term disability insurer.

Hawkins attempted to return to work on May 8, 2008, but was not allowed to resume her duties. The company indicated that its policies prohibited an employee from working under restrictions that were not the result of a work-related illness.

Pilgrim’s Pride’s Human Resources Supervisor, Pearlie Hamilton, notified Hawkins that before she could return to work, Hawkins would have to supply a release to assume the essential duties of her job from her doctor. This notification was sent to Hawkins on May 14, 2008, and required Hawkins to supply the requested documentation no later than May 21, 2008. Hawkins furnished no such release. |2 Pilgrim’s Pride notified Hawkins of her termination by letter dated July 24, 2008.

Hawkins filed a Disputed Claim for Compensation with the Office of Workers’ Compensation on May 19, 2009, seeking supplemental earnings benefits, statutory penalties, attorney fees, and legal interest. Pilgrim’s Pride interposed an exception of prescription, arguing that Hawkins’ claim was untimely as it was brought more than a year after she became disabled from work and more than three years after the last payment of compensation to Hawkins. The hearing on this exception was held on November 9, 2009. The WCJ ruled from the bench maintaining Pilgrim’s Pride’s exception. Judgment was signed on November 30. Hawkins then perfected this appeal.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

Hawkins assigns as error the WCJ ruling that the date she was disabled as a result of an occupational disease was February 11, 2008.

ANALYSIS

The compensation for disability resulting from occupational diseases is governed by La.R.S. 23:1031.1. The statute specifies that work-related carpal tunnel syndrome is an occupational disease. La.R.S. 23:1031.1(B).

Revised Statute 23:1031.1(E) governs prescription in occupational disease claims and provides:

All claims for disability arising from an occupational disease are barred unless the employee files a claim as provided in this Chapter within one year of the date that:
(1) The disease manifested itself.
(2) The employee is disabled from working as a result of the disease.
(3) The employee knows or has reasonable grounds to believe that the disease is occupationally related.

| .^Subsection (E) uses no conjunction between the three paragraphs. The courts, however, have ruled that prescription on the claim does not begin to toll until all three conditions have been met. Bynum v. Capital City Press, 95-1395 (La.7/2/96), 676 So.2d 582.

The WCJ reasoned that Hawkins first manifested carpal tunnel syndrome in 2003. There was little doubt that she knew the carpal tunnel syndrome was work-related. The issue on which the exception turned was the date Hawkins was disabled from work as a result of the condition. For the WCJ, that date was February 11, 2008, when Dr. Goodman excused her from work.

This represents a finding of fact on the WCJ’s part, and is thus subject to review under the manifest error standard. Id. This standard of review requires the appellate court review the entire record, not to determine whether the WCJ was right or wrong, but whether his conclusion is reasonably supported by the record. See Cosse v. Allen-Bradley Co., 601 So.2d 1349 (La.1992); Housley v. Cerise, 579 So.2d 973 (La.1991); Sistler v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 558 So.2d 1106 (La.1990). We are constrained both by the WCJ’s capacity to evaluate the witnesses and by the proper allocation of constitutional authority between the administrative officer and the appellate court. Where two permissible views are reflected in the record, the WCJ’s finding of fact can never be wrong. Stobart v. State through Dept. of Transp. and Dev., 617 So.2d 880 (La.1993).

The February 11 letter from Dr. Goodman relates at least a degree of Hawkins’ disability to carpal tunnel syndrome. It informs its reader, however, that on May 8, 2008, Hawkins could return to work in conditions that do not expose her to cold. This was not a new restriction on Hawkins’ employment. She had been restricted |4from a cold environment by Dr. Gordon Mead, who performed the two carpal tunnel release procedures.

The WCJ viewed this case as one involving disability for a period of limited duration. It is not disputed that the prescriptive period in this case commenced when Hawkins was “disabled” from work. The dispute is as to when this date arrived.

Hawkins contends that the case of LaCour v. Hilti Corp., 98-2691 (La.5/18/99), 733 So.2d 1193, disposes of this issue. A discussion of LaCour is warranted. The claimant in LaCour was a jackhammer salesman engaged in outside sales. He developed difficulties with carpal tunnel syndrome and elbow tendinitis that was related to his sales activities. Between April 1992 and August 1995, LaCour underwent three surgical procedures related to those conditions. After each surgery, Mr. LaCour received short-term disability, and he was told repeatedly by his doctors that he needed to modify his job or expect more problems.

The LaCour Court had to answer the same question that challenges this court. Namely, on what date was the third and final Bynum condition met? Stated more directly, on what date was Mr. LaCour “disabled”? There were three dates in contention.

The earliest date, November 14, 1995, was the date that his employer sent him a letter advising that if he was “physically unable to return to work” by January 11, 1996, he would no longer be an “employee.” The next date chronologically was a non-specific date in December 1995 when, according to Mr. LaCour’s testimony, he “finally realized that he was unable to return” to work. Obviously, the last date was the termination date of January 11, 1996 provided by the employer in its November 14,1995 letter.

| sThe WCJ ruled that the last date, January 11, 1996, was the date LaCour had become disabled, because that was the date he was forced to terminate his employment. The supreme court agreed and stated expressly that, “January 11, 1996 was the date when Mr. LaCour’s disability began because that was the date when he was forced to terminate his employment and all three factors set forth in Bynum were met.” LaCour, 733 So.2d at 1195-96.

In LaCour, the Supreme Court found that the termination date was the disability date. Hawkins contends that LaCour stands for the proposition that, as a matter of law, prescription on occupational disease claims does not commence until the employee is terminated. We agree. The supreme court clearly stated that it was not until LaCour’s condition forced his termination that his disability commenced. The present matter is almost directly on point, and we find LaCour binding.

CONCLUSION

The workers’ compensation judge found that Hawkins was disabled as of February 11, 2008, when she was excused from work by Dr. Goodman. We find that the LaC-our case, however, stands for the proposition that under these circumstances, the date of termination marks the commencement of the prescriptive period under La. R.S. 23:1031.1. Hawkins was terminated by letter dated July 24, 2008. Because Hawkins initiated her claim for compensation within a year of her termination, it was timely filed.

The judgment of the Workers’ Compen-. sation Judge is reversed. Costs of this appeal are taxed to defendant/appellee, Pilgrim’s Pride Corporation.

REVERSED.