text:
    Betty Marie NELSON and Earl Lavon Nelson, Appellants v. Hudson HOLLIDAY and Darrin Harris, Appellees.
    No. 2011-CA-00101-COA.
    Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
    March 20, 2012.

      Tadd Parsons Dawn Smith, attorneys for appellants.
    Joseph H. Montgomery, Poplarville, attorney for appellees.
    Before GRIFFIS, P.J., MAXWELL and RUSSELL, JJ.
   GRIFFIS, P.J.,

for the Court:

¶ 1. This case turns on whether a residence is a “modular” home as opposed to a “manufactured” or “mobile” home. Hudson Holliday and Darrin Harris, the property developers, seek to enforce protective covenants on the property. They claim the current landowners placed a disallowed “manufactured” home on the property. Betty Marie and Earl Lavon Nelson claim that they placed a “modular” home on their property, which was within the protective covenants. After both parties filed motions for summary judgment, the chancellor granted summary judgment in favor of Holliday and Harris without a hearing. The Nelsons now appeal. We find a genuine issue of a material fact in dispute. Therefore, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

FACTS

¶ 2. Holliday and Harris developed a parcel of real property located on H. Burge Road in Pearl River County, Mississippi. They properly executed and recorded protective covenants that covered the property.

¶ 8. On February 24, 2006, Holliday and Harris conveyed to James and Suzanne Yareha by warranty deed a parcel of the property subject to the protective covenants. On January 14, 2008, the Varehas conveyed the parcel by warranty deed, subject to the protective covenants, to Betty and Earl Nelson. On February 27, 2008, the Nelsons placed a residential structure on the parcel.

¶ 4. On April 7, 2008, Holliday and Harris filed a complaint for enforcement of declaration of protective covenants, for removal of manufactured housing, and for preliminary and permanent injunction. The complaint alleged that the protective covenants provided that “[mjanufactured housing will not be allowed on the property.” The complaint also alleged that the residence the Nelsons placed on the property was “manufactured housing” and in violation of the protective covenants.

¶ 5. On April 29, 2008, the Nelsons filed their answer and counterclaim. Both Betty and Earl Lavon Nelson signed this pleading, their signature was acknowledged and it was stated under oath that the “matters, facts, and things set out in the above and foregoing complaint are true and correct.” In this pleading, the Nelsons denied that the residence was a “manufactured home” and claimed that it was a “modular home.” The Nelsons attached three documents. Exhibit “A” was a letter from the State Fire Marshal that stated this “Frankin-built structure, bearing serial number ..., is considered a modular home.” Exhibit “B” was a compilation of plans and specifications for the residence, which were approved by the State Fire Marshal. Exhibit “C” was a letter dated November 29, 2007, from Hudson Holliday, which read “[tjhis is to clarify that it is permissible to construct or place a modular home on the property that we sold along H. Burge Road.” The Nelsons’ counterclaim asked for damages and sanctions under the Litigation Accountability Act.

¶ 6. On January 15, 2010, the Nelsons filed a motion for summary judgment. In the motion, the Nelsons argued that they were entitled to summary judgment because the residence in question was a “modular home,” which did not violate the covenant.

¶ 7. On November 3, 2010, Holliday and Harris responded and filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. They argued that the residence was “manufactured housing” and in violation of the covenant. To support their motion, Holliday and Harris attached several documents including the Nelsons’ response to the requests for admissions, and they cited the statutory definitions in Mississippi Code Annotated section 75-49-3 (Rev.2000). The record does not contain a response from the Nelsons.

If 8. The record does not include a transcript of a hearing on the motions for summary judgment. On December 23, 2010, the chancellor denied the Nelsons’ motion and granted Holliday and Harris’s motion for summary judgment. The chancellor found the Nelsons’ residence was manufactured housing, found that the residence was in violation of the covenants, and ordered the immediate removal of the residence. It is from this judgment that the Nelsons now appeal.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 9. The standard of review of an order granting summary judgment is de novo. PPG Architectural Finishes, Inc. v. Lowery, 909 So.2d 47, 49 (¶ 8) (Miss.2005) (citing Hurdle v. Holloway, 848 So.2d 183, 185 (¶ 4) (Miss.2003)). It is well settled that “[a] summary judgment motion is only properly granted when no genuine issue of material fact exists. The moving party has the burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue of material fact exists within the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits.” Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted).

ANALYSIS

¶ 10. The ultimate issue presented in this case will be decided based on whether the Nelsons’ residence is considered a “modular” home or a “manufactured” home. The chancellor determined that it was a “manufactured” home and granted Holliday and Harris’s motion for summary judgment. The Nelsons argue that the chancellor’s summary judgment should be reversed because there were genuine issues of material fact in dispute. Thus, this Court must determine whether there are any genuine issues of material fact in dispute and whether Holliday and Harris are entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. M.R.C.P. 56. We must determine whether there are any issues to be tried.

¶ 11. The Nelsons refer the Court to their sworn pleading and the documents attached. In the pleading, the Nelsons stated that the residence was a “modular home.” They included three attachments. First, they offered a letter a letter dated April 16, 2008, from the Chief Deputy State Fire Marshal to the seller of the residence, Lonnie Woods of Woods Home Center, LLC. The letter stated that “the noted Franklin-built structure, bearing the serial number ALFRH-038-13636 AB, is considered a modular home.” The Chief Deputy State Fire Marshal is authorized by statute to implement and enforce the regulations involving this chapter of the statute. See Miss.Code Ann. § 75-49-3(g). Second, the Nelsons offered approximately twenty-three pages of engineering plans and specifications for the residence. Third, they offered a letter from Holliday; this letter stated that “it is permissible to construct or place a modular home on the property.”

¶ 12. Holliday and Harris offered three documents to support their motion for summary judgment. First, they offered what they refer to as the “affidavit of Gregory Rodriguez ... indicating that the home could be moved in a matter of hours at a reasonable expense and is not placed upon a foundation.” The document states:

DROD Mobile Home Transport
[address and phone no.]
Movement of 32 x 80 on homeowners land. Breakdown would consist of 6 to 8 hours depending on inside trim, and carpet. Average estimate is between $4,500.00 to $4,800 within 50 mile radius. Any attachments such as porches, decks, would consist in more time and labor which would alter estimate.
State of Mississippi
County of Pearl River
Personally appeared before me, the undersigned authority in and for the above referenced county and state, the within named Darren Rodriguez, who, after being by me first duly sworn, states on his oath that the matters, facts and things set out in the above and foregoing are true and correct as therein stated.
This, the 13th day of October, 2010.
[Signed and notarized]

This “affidavit” does not state whether “Gregory Rodriguez” and “Darren Rodriguez” are the same person. The document appears to be a bid to remove a “mobile” home. However, the “affidavit” does not identify the Nelsons’ residence as the “mobile” home that is to be removed. This Court does not read the “Affidavit of Gregory Rodriguez” as Holliday and Harris characterize it in their motion. Indeed, the “affidavit” does not provide much specificity as to the personal knowledge of Rodriguez. This “affidavit” offers little if any information to support the motion for summary judgment.

¶ 13. Second, Holliday and Harris attached the Nelsons’ responses to requests for admissions. The Nelsons admitted the following:

REQUEST NO. 2: Do you admit that Defendants received the attached correspondence from Plaintiffs’ counsel? [No correspondence is in the record.]
RESPONSE: Admitted.
REQUEST NO. 3: Do you admit the home in controversy does not have a power meter physically attached to the exterior of the home?
RESPONSE: Admitted.
REQUEST NO. k: Do you admit that the power meter for the home in controversy is located on a separate wooden pole near the home?
RESPONSE: Admitted.
REQUEST NO. 5: Do you admit that no chain wall was constructed as a foundation for the home?
RESPONSE: Admitted.
REQUEST NO. 6: Do you admit that tie-downs or anchor straps were used to anchor the home to the ground?
RESPONSE: Admitted.
REQUEST NO. 7: Do you admit that the anchor straps used to secure the home were screwed into the earth?
RESPONSE: Admitted.
REQUEST NO. H: Do you admit that the steps for the dwelling are not attached to the home, but rather are either fiberglass or concrete structures placed there to provide access?
RESPONSE: Admitted.
REQUEST NO. 16: Do you admit that no crane was used in the location of the home in controversy on the property?
RESPONSE: Admitted.
REQUEST NO. 17: Do you admit that the home in controversy was delivered by transport truck in two sections?
RESPONSE: Admitted.
REQUEST NO. 19: Do you admit that the home vendor advised Defendants the Hampton Bay home they purchased was a “modular” home?
RESPONSE: Admitted.
REQUEST NO 20: Do you admit that the home vendor advised Defendants the Hampton Bay home they purchased was not “manufactured” housing?
RESPONSE: Admitted.

Holliday and Harris argued that these admissions established that the residence was not permanently fixed to the foundation. Several of the responses seem to indicate that the home placed on the Nelsons’ property was not permanently affixed to the land. However, the response to requests no. 19 and 20 seem to support the Nelsons’ argument that the home was a “modular” home and thus permissible to be placed on the property.

¶ 14. Third, Holliday and Harris attached a “copy of the advertisement of Woods Home Gallery where the mobile home was purchased dated June 6, 2008, that appeared in Swap Shop News indicating that Woods had the largest selection of ‘manufactured’ homes in Southwest Mississippi.” There is no supporting affidavit or any information to indicate how it is relevant to the home involved in this case.

¶ 15. Holliday and Harris’s motion for summary judgment argued the definitions of certain relevant terms in section 75-49-3, which states:

(a) “Manufactured home” means a structure defined by, and constructed in accordance with, the National Manufactured Housing Construction and Safety Standards Act of 1974, as amended (42 USCS 5401 et seq.), and manufactured after June 14,1976.
(b) “Mobile home” means a structure manufactured before June 15, 1976, that is not constructed in accordance with the National Manufactured Housing Construction and Safety Standards Act of 1974, as amended (42 USCS 5401 et seq.). It is a structure that is transportable in one or more sections, that, in the traveling mode, is eight (8) body feet or more in width and thirty-two (32) body feet or more in length, or, when erected on site, is two hundred fifty-six (256) or more square feet, and that is built on a permanent chassis and designed to be used as a dwelling with or without a permanent foundation when connected to the required utilities, and includes any plumbing, heating, air conditioning and electrical systems contained therein; except that such term shall include any structure which meets all the requirements and with respect to which the manufacturer voluntarily files a certification required by the commissioner and complies with the standards established under this chapter.
(c) “Modular home” means a structure which is: (i) transportable in one or more sections; (ii) designed to be used as a dwelling when connected to the required utilities, and includes plumbing, heating, air conditioning and electrical systems with the home; (iii) certified by its manufacturers as being constructed in accordance with a nationally recognized building code; and (iv) designed to be permanently installed at its final destination on an approved foundation constructed in compliance with a nationally recognized building code. The term “modular home” does not include manufactured housing as defined by the National Manufactured Housing Construction and Safety Standards Act of 1974.

In essence, Holliday and Harris argue that there is no genuine issue of material fact in dispute and they are entitled to a judgment as a matter of law because the Nelsons’ residence is not on a permanent foundation so it cannot be determined to be “modular.”

¶ 16. Our de novo review requires that we examine the pleadings, admissions and affidavits and determine whether there is a genuine issue of a material fact in dispute. Neither party has objected to the consideration of the materials offered by the other. Therefore, we must consider all of the evidence submitted to determine whether a factual dispute exits. Having done so, we conclude that there is a genuine issue of a material fact in dispute over whether the residence was a “modular” or “manufactured” home. Finding a genuine issue of material fact in dispute, we conclude that this matter was not proper for a summary judgment. Therefore, we reverse the chancery court’s judgment, and we remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

¶ 17. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CHANCERY COURT OF PEARL RIVER COUNTY IS REVERSED, AND THIS CASE IS REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE APPELLEES.

LEE, C.J., IRVING, P.J., BARNES, ISHEE, ROBERTS, MAXWELL AND RUSSELL, JJ., CONCUR. CARLTON, J., CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY. FAIR, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.

      . Paragraph V of the complaint indicates that a copy of the protective covenants was attached. Yet the record before this Court does not include a copy of the protective covenants. In an action to enforce restrictive or protective covenants on land, a full and complete copy of such document should be attached to the complaint. M.R.C.P. 10(d). Likewise, a complete copy should be part of the record presented to this Court on appeal. M.R.A.P. 10(a).
      Nevertheless, in Paragraph VI of the complaint, the complaint alleged that ‘‘[s]aid Declaration of Protective Covenants contains the following language, ‘Manufactured housing will not be allowed on the property.’ " The Nelsons' answer admitted the allegations of Paragraph VI except they denied that they were in violation of the covenants.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: IRVING, P.J., ROBERTS, J., BARNES, J.,

license: Public Domain

text:
    Will Robertson BROWN, Appellant v. STATE of Mississippi, Appellee.
    No. 2010-CP-01305-COA.
    Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
    March 20, 2012.

      Will Robertson Brown, pro se.
    Office of the Attorney General by Billy L. Gore, attorney for appellee.
    Before IRVING, P.J., BARNES and ROBERTS, JJ.
   IRVING, P.J.,

for the Court:

¶ 1. On July 19, 2010, Will Robertson Brown filed, in the Circuit Court of Jackson County, a motion for post-conviction relief (PCR), a seeking to set aside several guilty pleas that he had entered more than fifteen years earlier. The circuit court dismissed Brown’s PCR motion as being time-barred pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated section 99-39-5(2) (Supp.2011). Feeling aggrieved, Brown appeals, asserting that his trial counsel was ineffective, his guilty pleas were involuntary, and the circuit court erred by accepting his guilty pleas without a factual basis and without informing him of the elements of the offenses to which he pleaded guilty.

¶ 2. We hold that the circuit court correctly found that Brown’s PCR motion was time-barred. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court dismissing Brown’s PCR motion.

FACTS

¶ 3. On April 18, 1995, Brown pleaded guilty to two counts of aggravated assault (one on a law-enforcement officer) and third-degree arson. The circuit court accepted his guilty pleas and sentenced him to serve seventeen years for aggravated assault, seventeen years for arson, and three years for aggravated assault on a law-enforcement officer, all to be served in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC). The circuit court ordered the sentences to run concurrently to one another and concurrently with the federal sentence that Brown was presently serving.

¶ 4. Over fifteen years later, on July 19, 2010, Brown filed a PCR motion attacking the voluntariness of his guilty pleas entered on April 19, 1995. He also alleged that his lawyer was ineffective and that the circuit court failed to inform him of the elements of the offenses. He further alleges that the circuit court had no factual basis to accept his guilty pleas. The circuit court “reviewed the pleadings and the court files and determined that no eviden-tiary hearing was necessary.” As stated, the court held that Brown’s PCR motion was time-barred because it was filed more than three years after the entry of the judgment of conviction, and Brown did not demonstrate that any of the enumerated exceptions to the time bar were applicable. Therefore, the circuit court entered an order on July 27, 2010, summarily dismissing Brown’s PCR motion.

ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUES

¶ 5. An appellate court will not reverse the circuit court’s dismissal of a PCR motion absent a finding that the decision was clearly erroneous. Jackson v. State, 67 So.3d 725, 730 (¶ 16) (Miss.2011). Questions of law are reviewed de novo. Id.

¶ 6. The circuit court correctly found that Brown’s PCR motion was time-barred. Brown entered his guilty plea on April 18, 1995, but he did not file his PCR motion until over fifteen years later. Section 99-39-5(2) provides that PCR motions “shall be made ... within three (3) years after entry of the judgment of conviction” in cases involving guilty pleas. This section also provides certain exceptions to the time bar, such as intervening decisions of the United States Supreme Court or the Mississippi Supreme Court, newly discovered evidence, DNA evidence subject to testing, claims that the sentence has expired, and claims that parole or conditional release has been unlawfully revoked. Miss.Code. Ann. § 99-39-5(2)(a)-(b). Additionally, “errors affecting fundamental constitutional rights are excepted from the procedural bars....” Rowland v. State, 42 So.3d 503, 506 (¶ 9) (Miss.2010).

¶ 7. Brown has failed to prove that one of the exceptions to the time bar applies or that the circuit court committed any error affecting any of his fundamental rights when it accepted his guilty pleas. The record contains no guilty-plea transcript and no affidavits to support any of the issues that Brown has raised on appeal. Brown has only provided mere assertions in his brief and no authority to support his assertions. On review, “we limit our inquiry to those facts ‘contained strictly in the record, and not upon mere assertions in the briefs.’ ” Ross v. State, 16 So.3d 47, 60 (¶ 35) (Miss.Ct.App.2009) (quoting Ward v. State, 935 So.2d 1047, 1057 (¶ 29) (Miss.Ct.App.2005)). Pursuant to Rule 28(a)(6) of the Mississippi Rules of Appellate Procedure, an appellant must support his contentions regarding the issues presented with “citations to authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on.” (Emphasis added). Therefore, we hold that the circuit court properly dismissed Brown’s PCR motion.

¶ 8. THE JUDGMENT OF THE JACKSON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT DISMISSING THE MOTION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO JACKSON COUNTY.

LEE, C.J., RUSSELL AND FAIR, JJ., CONCUR. MAXWELL, J., CONCURS IN PART AND IN THE RESULT WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION. ISHEE, J., CONCURS IN PART WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION. ROBERTS, J., CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY GRIFFIS, P.J., MAXWELL AND FAIR, JJ. BARNES, J., SPECIALLY CONCURS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY ISHEE, J. CARLTON, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.

ROBERTS, J.,

Concurring in result only:

¶ 9.1 concur with the majority’s analysis that Brown is time barred from pursuing his post-conviction relief (PCR) petition under Mississippi Code Annotated section 99-39-5 (Supp.2011) with no applicable exceptions; however, I write separately to address an unspoken concern fundamental to this Court’s authority to even address Brown’s PCR petition on appeal. My concern lies in the determination that Brown has standing to bring his PCR petition at all. Circuit Court Judge Kathy King Jackson summarily dismissed Brown’s PCR petition because it was filed more than “three (3) years after the time in which the petitioner’s direct appeal is ruled upon by the Supreme Court of Mississippi or, in case no appeal is taken, within three (3) years after the time for taking an appeal from the judgment of conviction or sentence has expired, or in case of a guilty plea, within three (3) years after entry of the judgment of conviction.” Miss.Code Ann. § 99-39-5(2). The circuit judge found that none of the exceptions found in Mississippi Code Annotated section 99-39-5(2)(a)(i-ii) or Mississippi Code Annotated section 99-39-5(2)(b) permitted Brown to bring his out-of-time PCR petition. The circuit judge was imminently correct in her findings.

¶ 10. From its enactment in 1984 until its March 16, 2009, amendment, the Mississippi Uniform Post-Conviction Collateral Relief Act required any convicted offender who filed a PCR petition be “in custody under sentence of a court of record of the State of Mississippi.” If not, he would have no standing to even file a PCR motion attempting to collaterally attack his conviction. This Court has articulated this notion on numerous occasions. See Gates v. State, 904 So.2d 216, 218 (¶ 7) (Miss.Ct.App.2005), Torns v. State, 866 So.2d 486, 489 (¶ 11) (Miss.Ct.App.2004), Weaver v. State, 852 So.2d 82, 85 (¶ 7) (Miss.Ct.App.2003). However, on March 16, 2009, the Mississippi Legislature passed S.B. 2709 amending the above-quoted language and replacing it with the following language: “Any person sentenced by a court of record of the State of Mississippi, including a person currently incarcerated, civilly committed, on parole or probation or subject to sex offender registration for the period of the registration or for the first five (5) years of the registration, whichever is the shorter period.... ” Miss.Code Ann. § 99-39-5(l)(emphasis added). Recently, we hinted at the Legislature’s expansion of the standing requirement in Parker v. State, 47 So.3d 732, 734 (¶ 8) (Miss.Ct.App.2010) (quoting Mississippi Code Annotated section 99-39-5 (Rev.2007)), when we stated “[pjrior to March 16, 2009, to be eligible to seek post-conviction relief under section 99-39-5, a prisoner had to be ‘in custody under sentence of a court of record of the State of Mississippi’” After March 16, 2009, the Legislature “expand[ed] the availability of post-conviction relief to a broader range of previously convicted individuals.” Id. In that case, Charles Lee Parker filed his PCR petition prior to the amendment’s effective date, and the amendment was not retroactive; therefore, he did not have standing to file. Id. at (¶¶ 9-12).

¶ 11. It is my judgment the new statute’s language “[a]ny person sentenced by a court of record in the State of Mississippi” is clear and unambiguous. It is not the duty of this Court to determine the wisdom of the Legislature’s actions in amending the statute’s language. Instead, it is our duty to interpret and apply the statute as written. See Russell Inv. Corp. v. Rus sell, 182 Miss. 385, 419, 182 So. 102, 107 (1938); Clark v. State, 169 Miss. 369, 384-85, 152 So. 820, 824 (1934). Further, the supreme court has stated that “[w]hen the words of a statute are plain and unambiguous there is no room for interpretation or construction, and we apply the statute according to the meaning of those words.” Coleman v. State, 947 So.2d 878, 881 (¶ 10) (Miss.2006) (citing Harrison v. State, 800 So.2d 1134, 1137 (¶ 12) (Miss.2001)). It is patently obvious that any convicted offender presently on parole, probation or subject to sex offender registration is not a “prisoner in custody” as the previous statute required; yet, such offenders now have standing to file a PCR petition under the amended language of the statute. Also rather obvious to me is the fact that the Legislature chose, through its amendment, to expand the scope of standing to permit those rare individuals, such as those with newly discovered evidence (i.e., DNA), an opportunity to prove innocence even though at the time of filing they are not in custody, on parole or probation, or subject to sex offender registration. This is especially true for those individuals who, though maintaining actual innocence, entered a “best interest” guilty plea under the principles established in North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970). In such rare cases, these individuals who proved their claim would be restored to their pre-con-viction status without the innumerable collateral consequences of being a convicted felon. I also recognize the reality that the overwhelming majority of PCR petitioners no longer in custody will be either time or subsequent writ barred from bringing their PCR petitions.

¶ 12. In the current case, the majority fails to mention facts relevant and essential to this Court’s exercise of its jurisdiction. It is undisputed that Brown was a federal inmate serving a federal sentence in a federal facility in the state of Indiana when he filed his PCR petition on July 19, 2010, attacking his April 19, 1995, convictions of aggravated assault, arson, and assault on a law enforcement officer. Brown’s federal sentence was enhanced under the federal sentencing guidelines, in part, based on his prior circuit court felony convictions. It appears from Brown’s PCR petition that he is attempting to lay a foundation for a future reduction in his federal sentence if he is successful in having his state court convictions overturned. Although neither Brown nor the State raise any jurisdictional issues on appeal, such as Brown’s standing to file a PCR petition, it is the affirmative duty of this Court to ensure we have proper jurisdiction over the matter before addressing its merits. Winborn v. State, 213 Miss. 322, 323, 56 So.2d 885, 885 (1952). In Winbom, the supreme court stated: “We are confronted in the outset with the question of our jurisdiction of this appeal, and while the question is not raised by either party, it becomes our duty to raise it of our own motion.” Id. “A lack of standing ‘robs the court of jurisdiction to hear the case[;]’ ” therefore, the appropriate disposition would be to dismiss the case. Pruitt v. Hancock Med. Ctr., 942 So.2d 797, 801 (¶ 14) (quoting McNair v. U.S. Postal Serv., 768 F.2d 730, 737 (5th Cir.1985)). By failing to address the issue of standing and also reaching the merits of Brown’s PCR petition, the majority is, at least impliedly, concluding that we have jurisdiction. I agree that Brown does have standing under the amended PCR statute and that the circuit court and this Court have jurisdiction to address the merits.

¶ 13. Regrettably, twice within the last year we have stated directly, if not indfer-entially, that a PCR petitioner who files his petition after March 16, 2009, must still be a “prisoner in custody under sentence of a court of record of the State of Mississippi.” In both cases, the PCR petitioners filed their petitions after the effective date of the amendment; therefore, I would find that these petitioners were entitled to the benefit of the expanded language found in the amended PCR statute and that our conclusions were incorrect. The first case is Wilson v. State, 76 So.3d 733 (Miss.Ct.App.2011). In June 2011, this Court affirmed the circuit court’s dismissal of Bobby Earl Wilson Jr.’s PCR petition on the ground that Wilson lacked standing to challenge his 1994 conviction. Id. at 735 (¶ 11). Wilson originally filed a “Motion to Amend Petition for a Writ of Coram No-bis” in November 2009 acknowledging he was not eligible to file a PCR motion because he was no longer “in custody” for the 1994 conviction he was attacking. Id. at 734-5 (¶ 6). This Court found that Wilson’s motion should be construed as a PCR petition but that “[e]ven if Wilson’s motion is treated as a PCR [petition], Wilson lacks standing to bring the [petition] because he is no longer ‘serving time under the sentence he complains of.’ ” Id. at 735-6 (¶¶ 10-11). Further, in footnote 3, we acknowledged the 2009 amendment, but stated that “even under the expanded standing requirements, Wilson lacks standing. When Wilson filed his motion in 2009 challenging his 1994 conviction, he was no longer incarcerated for that conviction, nor was he on parole or probation for that conviction.” Id. at 736 n. 3 (¶ 11).

¶ 14. The second case involves the very same defendant as the current case, but Brown then was attacking a 1986 arson conviction through a 2010 PCR motion. In Brown v. State, 71 So.3d 1267, 1269(¶ 7) (Miss.Ct.App.2011) (citing Smith v. State, 914 So.2d 1248, 1250 (¶ 7) (Miss.Ct.App.2005)), we stated: “Post-conviction relief applies only to a prisoner who is in the custody of the State, serving a sentence imposed by a Mississippi court.” This Court ultimately affirmed the circuit court’s denial of Brown’s PCR motion on the ground that Brown was “not currently in the custody of the MDOC and [was] also procedurally time-barred from filing a PCR motion.” Id. at (¶ 8).

¶ 15. In a genuine effort to maintain the jurisprudential integrity of this Court, I would now acknowledge our prior errors. To the extent that Wilson and Brown state or imply that a PCR petitioner who filed a PCR petition after March 16, 2009, must still be in custody for the conviction he is currently attacking, I submit that those two cases should be overruled. Otherwise, I concur with result reached by the majority.

GRIFFIS, P.J., MAXWELL AND FAIR, JJ., JOIN THIS OPINION.

BARNES, J.,

specially concurring:

¶ 16. I fully concur with the majority that Brown’s motion for post-conviction relief (PCR) is time-barred. However, I cannot leave unchallenged Judge Roberts’s conclusion in his separate opinion that the amendment to Mississippi Code Annotated section 99-39-5 eliminated the requirement that a person be in custody under the Mississippi sentence that he is challenging, and thus, Brown had standing to bring a motion for post-conviction relief. While the amendment alters the definition of custody to some extent, it does not delete the requirement of custody.

¶ 17. The 2009 amendment to section 99-39-5 was a “technical correction” passed by the Legislature in Senate Bill 2709, which was partially titled, “An Act to Improve the Preservation and Accessibility of Biological Evidence” (hereafter “the Act”). The declared Legislative intent was to preserve “biological evidence” in order to assist law enforcement in “ ‘cold’ case investigations” and “[i]nnocent people mistakenly convicted of the serious crimes for which biological evidence is probative.” 2009 Miss. Law Ch. 339 (S.B.2709). The Mississippi Supreme Court has stated: “It is a general rule in construing statutes that this Court will not only interpret the words used, but will consider the purpose and policy which the legislature had in view of enacting the law. The court will then give effect to the intent of the legislature.” Kelly v. Int’l Games Tech, 874 So.2d 977, 979 (¶ 7) (Miss.2004) (quoting Sec. of State v. Wiesenberg, 633 So.2d 983, 990 (Miss.1994)). Also, the supreme court has held that “ordinarily[,] a new statute will not be considered as reversing long-established principles of law and equity unless the legislative intention to do so clearly appears.” Thorp Commercial Corp. v. Miss. Road Supply Co., 348 So.2d 1016, 1018 (Miss.1977).

In the construction of a statute!,] the object is to get at its spirit and meaning, its design and scope; and that construction will be justified which evidently embraces the meaning and carries out the object of the law, although it is against the letter and the grammatical construction of the act. In determining the proper construction of a statute, the entire legislation on the subject-matter, its policy, reason, as well as the text, must be looked to.

Miss. Ins. Guar. Ass’n v. Gandy, 289 So.2d 677, 680 (Miss.1973) (quoting Ott v. Lowery, 78 Miss. 487, 499-500, 29 So. 520, 521 (1901)).

¶ 18. The previous language of Mississippi Code Annotated section 99-39-5 (Rev.2007) allowed “[a]ny prisoner in custody under sentence of a court of record of the State of Mississippi” to bring a PCR motion, provided one of nine situations existed. (Emphasis added showing language deleted in 2009). As Judge Roberts notes in his separate opinion, this subsection of the statute was revised in 2009 to allow a PCR motion to be filed by:

Any person sentenced by a court of record of the State of Mississippi, including a person currently incarcerated, civilly committed, on parole or probation or subject to sex offender registration for the period of the registration or for the first five (5) years of the registration, whichever is the shorter period, may file a motion to vacate, set aside or correct the judgment or sentence, a motion to request forensic DNA testing of biological evidence, or a motion for an out-of-time appeal ....

Miss.Code Ann. § 99-39-5(1) (Supp.2011) (emphasis added showing language added in 2009). The following was added to the list of situations in which a PCR motion could be filed:

(f) That there exists biological evidence secured in relation to the investigation or prosecution attendant to the petitioner’s conviction not tested, or, if previously tested, that can be subjected to additional DNA testing, that would provide a reasonable likelihood of more probative results, and that testing would demonstrate by reasonable probability that the petitioner would not have been convicted or would have received a lesser sentence if favorable results had been obtained through such forensic DNA testing at the time of the original prosecution.

Miss.Code Ann. 99-49-5-(l)(f) (Supp.2011). While the amended language broadens the scope of custody to those still suffering the effects of their sentence even after their physical release from prison, in my opinion, this amended language does not afford any person who has ever been convicted by a court in Mississippi to challenge his completed sentence through PCR merely because the Mississippi sentence enhances his subsequent sentence.

¶ 19. Prior to the amendment, this Court held that a prisoner seeking post-conviction relief from a prior expired conviction used “as a basis for his habitual offender status” was not considered to be in custody under section 99-39-5. Wilson v. State, 990 So.2d 828, 830 (¶ 6) (Miss.Ct.App.2008). Also, in Parker v. State, 47 So.3d 732, 734 (¶¶ 11-12) (Miss.Ct.App.2010), this Court, in discussing the prior version of the statute, stated:

It is undisputed that Parker was incarcerated in a federal correctional facility- and not under custody of a sentence of a court of record of the State of Mississippi-when he filed his 2008 PCR motion. Therefore, this court, like the circuit court, lacks jurisdiction to consider his request for post-conviction relief.
[W]e decline Parker’s invitation to expand the reach of the pre-March 16, 2009, version of section 99-39-5(1) to all petitioners whose sentences are based on prior Mississippi convictions. Restraint dictates that we follow our established precedent and the Legislature’s explicit mandate that to seek post-conviction relief petitioners must be “in custody under sentence of a court of record of the State of Mississippi,” which Parker was not.

(Emphasis added).

¶ 20. Even more recently, this Court held that a person must still be considered in custody of his Mississippi sentence, even after the enactment of the 2009 amendment. In Wilson v. State, 76 So.3d 733 (Miss.Ct.App.2011), this Court reviewed a petitioner’s challenge to a previous conviction that enhanced his sentence as a habitual offender. Noting the 2009 amendment to section 99-39-5, we concluded that “even under the expanded standing requirements, Wilson lacked standing. When Wilson filed his motion in 2009 challenging his 1994 conviction, he was no longer incarcerated for that conviction, nor was he on parole or probation for that conviction.” Id. at 736, n. 3 (¶ 11) (emphasis added). In Brown v. State, 71 So.3d 1267, 1269 (¶ 7) (Miss.Ct.App.2011), we discussed this issue of standing in regard to the same prisoner and clearly found that Brown was not considered to be in custody under the revised language of section 99-39-5. While that case dealt with different convictions than the ones in the present case, I find no distinction relating to the “in custody” issue. See also Reed v. State, 70 So.3d 1174, 1176 (¶ 5) (Miss.Ct.App.2011) (since the petitioner “was not incarcerated or on parole or probation[,] .... [he] was not entitled to maintain a motion for post-conviction relief.”).

¶ 21. While no longer explicitly stated, I find the amended language of section 99-39-5 indicates that the petitioner must be currently “in custody” for the sentence he is challenging. In interpreting a statute, we must look at the context of the wording in order to determine the Legislature’s intent. Claypool v. Mladineo, 724 So.2d 373, 382 (¶ 32) (Miss.1998) (citation omitted).

¶ 22. Custody is the primary factor in determining how long the State must preserve biological evidence under the Act. In the “Definitions” section of the Act, “custody” is defined as “persons currently incarcerated; civilly committed; on parole or probation; or subject to sex offender registration for the period of the registration or for the first five (5) years of the registration, whichever is the shorter period.” See Miss.Code Ann. § 99^49 — 1 (2)(c) (Supp. 2011). This is precisely the same terminology included in section 99-39-5 to replace the term “custody.” The Legislature merely deleted the term “custody” from section 99-39-5 and replaced it with the definition of “custody” from the Act. Thus, the revision is a “technical correction” to the PCR process to make it correspond to the other provisions of the Act.

¶ 23. Under the Act, biological evidence must be preserved only as long as the person or co-defendants “remain in custody.” The term “remain” is defined as “continuing] in the same state or condition.” The American Heritage Dictionary 1525 (3rd ed. 1992). When the person no longer “remains in custody,” the State may destroy the biological evidence related to the conviction. See Miss.Code 99^49-l(3)(a)(ii),(e),(f)(ii)(l),(g). As the biological evidence — the preservation of which is the primary purpose of the Act — can be destroyed upon a person’s release from custody (as defined by the Act), it does not make sense that the technical correction to the PCR process would extend standing beyond that same point in time. Accordingly, I cannot envision that the Legislature intended to amend section 99-39-5 to provide any person sentenced by a Mississippi court, and who is now free from any constraints of that sentence, standing to challenge the completed sentence.

¶ 24. Although Brown argues that the Mississippi convictions enhanced his federal sentence and that he is still suffering the effect of the Mississippi sentences, this is not sufficient to give him standing for post-conviction relief. In Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 492, 109 S.Ct. 1923, 104 L.Ed.2d 540 (1989), the United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether a federal sentence may be challenged by attacking a prior conviction that had expired. It held that once a petitioner’s sentence has “fully expired,” the mere fact that the prior conviction may be used to enhance a subsequent sentence does not render him still “in custody” for that conviction. The Supreme Court later expanded its holding in Daniels v. United States, 532 U.S. 374, 121 S.Ct. 1578, 149 L.Ed.2d 590 (2001) and Lackawanna County District Attorney v. Coss, 532 U.S. 394, 121 S.Ct. 1567, 149 L.Ed.2d 608 (2001). In Daniels, it stated:

If ... a prior conviction used to enhance a federal sentence is no longer open to direct or collateral attack in its own right because the defendant failed to pursue those remedies while they were available (or because the defendant did so unsuccessfully), then the defendant is without recourse. The presumption of validity that attached to the prior conviction at the time of sentencing is conclusive, and the defendant may not collaterally attack his prior conviction through a motion under [28 United States Code section] 2255.

Daniels, 532 U.S. at 382, 121 S.Ct. 1578. This holding in Daniels is grounded “on considerations relating to the need for finality of convictions and ease of administration.” Coss, 532 U.S. at 402, 121 S.Ct. 1567.

¶ 25. While these Supreme Court eases concern federal law, I find them instructive as to the policy underlying our prior jurisprudence. I believe that if the Legislature had intended to make such an extensive change to Mississippi law — to allow a person to file a PCR motion on a conviction for which he is not currently in custody but that is being used to enhance a subsequent sentence — it would have used clear language to do so. See Thorp, 348 So.2d at 1018. Nothing in the 2009 Act indicates that allowing relief for an enhanced sentence was ever the intent of the Legislature. Therefore, I do not find Judge Roberts’s position on Brown’s standing complies with the spirit or meaning of the amendment.

ISHEE, J„ JOINS THIS OPINION.

      . Section 1 of the Act is now codified in Mississippi Code Annotated section 99-49-1 (Supp.2011).

      . The State may destroy biological evidence prior to a person’s release from custody, provided he is given notice. 2009 Miss. Laws Ch. 339 § 3(f) (S.B.2709) (codified in Miss. Code Ann. § 99 — 49—1 (3)(f)). However, ”[i]f, after providing notice under paragraph (f)(ii) of this subsection of its intent to destroy evidence, the state receives a written request for retention of the evidence, the state shall retain the evidence while the person remains in custody.” Id. at § 3(g) (emphasis added).

      . Mississippi Code Annotated section 99-39-9 (Supp.2011) also states that a motion by a petitioner must be limited to one judgment, and "[i]f a petitioner desires to attack the validity of other judgments under which he is in custody, he shall do so by separate motions.” (Emphasis added).


author: SHAW, Justice.

text:
    STEWART TITLE GUARANTY COMPANY v. SHELBY REALTY HOLDINGS, LLC.
    1100215.
    Supreme Court of Alabama.
    Oct. 14, 2011.
    Eddie Leitman and Christopher R. Hood of Leitman, Siegel, Payne & Campbell, P.C., Birmingham, for appellant.
    Bruce F. Rogers and John W. Clark IV of Bainbridge, Mims, Rogers & Smith, LLP, Birmingham, for appellee.
   SHAW, Justice.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, Southern Division (“the district court”), has certified to this Court a question pursuant to Rule 18, Ala. R.App. P. We initially accepted the certified question; however, for the reasons discussed below, we now decline to answer it.

Facts and Procedural History

In its certification to this Court, the district court provided the following background information:

“On May 29, 2003, Shelby Realty [Holdings, LLC (‘Shelby Realty1),] purchased a mortgage on certain Property and foreclosed on the Property the same day. On June 10, 2003, Shelby Realty recorded the foreclosure deed in the records of the Probate Court of Jefferson County, Alabama. In its capacity as an agent for Stewart Title [Guaranty Company (‘Stewart Title’) ], Birmingham Title Services Corporation issued a [title insurance ] policy in favor of Defendant Shelby Realty insuring fee simple title to the Property in Shelby Realty.
“On April 20, 2004, Birmingham-Southern College filed suit against Shelby Realty, alleging that the College had fee simple title to the Property, and that Shelby Realty only possessed a leasehold interest in the Property. On April 22, 2005, Judge Smallwood held that the College retained its fee simple interest in the Property, and that Shelby Realty had only a leasehold interest.
“On December 28, 2006, Shelby Realty and the College entered into a Purchase and Sale Agreement whereby Shelby Realty sold to a subsidiary of the College Shelby Realty’s interest in the Property. Stewart Title then sent a check to Shelby Realty in the amount of $264,000.00, which Stewart Title claims represents the difference in the value of the fee interest in the Property subject to the College’s ownership of the fee interest, assuming that the Property was used as apartments. On January 8, 2008, counsel for Shelby Realty sent a letter to Stewart Title enclosing a Proof of Loss on behalf of Shelby Realty, and asserting that Shelby Realty was entitled to additional amounts under the terms of the Policy predicated upon Shelby Realty’s future intended use of the Property as condominiums.
“The parties dispute how liability should be determined under the policy, whether Shelby Realty is entitled to damages related to its intended use of the Property or only for the way the Property was actually used at the time of the loss.”

To aid the district court in determining this issue, it certified the following question to this Court:

“Under a title insurance policy, is the insured’s valuation evidence limited to the use to which the property is being devoted as of the date of the discovery of the defect in title, or is an insured allowed to recover damages for the highest intended and best use of the property, even if the property was not being used in that manner at the time of the loss?”

Discussion

The title-insurance policy at issue in this case appears to be American Land Title Association’s standard “Owner’s Policy,” as revised in 1992. The pertinent portion of the policy states:

“This policy is a contract of indemnity against actual monetary loss or damage sustained or incurred by the insured claimant who has suffered loss or damage by reason of matters insured against by this policy and only to the extent herein described.
“(a) The liability of the Company under this policy shall not exceed the least of:
“(i) the Amount of Insurance stated in Schedule A; or,
“(ii) the difference between the value of the insured estate or interest as insured and the value of the insured estate or interest subject to the defect, lien or encumbrance insured against by this policy.”

(Emphasis added.)

We note, initially, that the certified question is framed in the abstract, with no reference to any specific language in the policy, i.e., as an evidentiary issue with broad application. However, the dispute in this case, as demonstrated by the arguments of the parties, appears to involve the determination of the date that should be used to ascertain the value of the certain property foreclosed on by Shelby Realty and as to which Birmingham Southern College held fee-simple title. This Court has not had an occasion to discuss the valuation method prescribed by the type of title-insurance policy at issue here. Various authorities note that courts, in construing similar policies, have selected differing dates for setting the value of the subject property, including the value of the property on the date the insured purchased the property or, as Stewart Title suggests, the date the defect in the title is discovered. See, e.g., Barlow Burke, Law of Title Insurance § 7.04 (Aspen Publishers, Inc. 2010); James L. Gosdin, Title Insurance: A Comprehensive Overview, p. 186 (2d ed.2000); and Swanson v. Safeco Title Ins. Co., 186 Ariz. 637, 641, 925 P.2d 1354, 1358 (Ariz.Ct.App.1995) (“ ‘It seems quite apparent to us that liability should be measured by diminution in the value of the property caused by the defect in the title as of the date of the discovery of the defect, measured by the use to which the property is then devoted.’ ” (quoting Overholtzer v. Northern Counties Title Ins. Co., 116 Cal.App.2d 113, 130, 253 P.2d 116, 125 (1953))). The valuation method proposed by Shelby Realty is based in part on methods used to value property in eminent-domain situations, where a condemnee is often entitled to present evidence of the highest and best use of the condemned tract. See, e.g., Historic Blakely Auth. v. Williams, 675 So.2d 350, 352 (Ala.1995), and Fohn v. Title Ins. Corp. of St. Louis, 529 S.W.2d 1, 4 (Mo.1975).

Although the district court asks us to choose between two valuation methods proposed by other decisions, after further review of the arguments presented by the parties and of the text of the title-insurance policy, it appears that the question cannot be answered without resorting to the specific language of the policy. See Southern Title Guar. Co. v. Prendergast, 478 S.W.2d 806 (Tex.Civ.App.1972) (noting that a title-insurance policy may establish a formula for computing property valuation). Specifically, we note that there is language in the policy here that appears to address the appropriate valuation method. For example, the policy appears to limit Stewart Title’s liability to pay, upon demonstration of “actual monetary loss,” to the lesser of “the [ajmount of [ijnsurance stated in Schedule A,” i.e., the policy limits of coverage, or “the difference between the value of the insured estate or interest as insured and the value of the insured estate or interest subject to the defect, lien or encumbrance insured against by [the] policy.” (Emphasis added.) No definitions of the terms “actual monetary loss” or “as insured” are provided in the policy; however, the term “actual monetary loss” could be deemed to restrict damages to those based on the real, current status of the property as it was being used at the time the defect in title was discovered. See Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Huntington Nat’l Bank, 87 Ohio St.3d 270, 274, 719 N.E.2d 955, 960 (1999) (discussing the use in a title policy of the phrase “actual loss,” noting that “[t]he word ‘actual’ means something that exists in fact or reality,” and concluding that “the parties intended for an insured’s loss ... to be a real loss, one based on fact, not speculation or possibility”). Further, the reference to the “value” of the property “as insured” could be construed as limiting the consideration of the use of the property to the use either when the policy was purchased or when the defect in title was discovered. See Bender v. Kansas Secured Title & Abstract Co., 34 Kan.App.2d 399, 407-08, 119 P.3d 670, 676-77 (2005) (noting a distinction between “estate or interest as insured,” language identical to the language here and quoted above, and improvement of the property “to the best available alternative”). Thus, the title-insurance policy itself would appear to control the proper valuation in this case.

The parties, in their briefs to this Court, do not address the construction of the policy at issue and instead refer this Court to various authorities discussing how valuation may be determined in various title-insurance contexts. Additionally, it is not apparent from the materials before us that the district court has had the opportunity to address whether the specific language of the policy would control the determination of the value of the property.

Rule 18, Ala. R.App. P., provides that this Court may answer questions from federal courts only where “there are no clear controlling precedents” and the answer to the question is “determinative of said cause.” Construing an insurance policy treads no new ground under Alabama law, and precedent determinative of such an analysis is well settled. Public Bldg. Auth. of Huntsville v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 80 So.3d 171, 180 (Ala.2010) (“[T]he interpretation of a contract does not present a novel legal issue. Rather, the rules of contract construction and interpretation are well established in Alabama....”). Furthermore, and perhaps more importantly, because the district court might determine that the valuation issue can be properly and fairly resolved by looking to the specific language of the policy, answering the certified question would necessitate our fashioning a broad rule with the possibility that it would have no application to the particular facts presented. That possibility also renders us unable to answer the question. See Palmore v. First Unum, 841 So.2d 233, 235 (Ala.2002) (“In order for this Court to consider a certified question from a federal court, the question must be, among other things, ‘determinative of [the underlying] cause.’” (quoting Rule 18(a), Ala. R.App. P.)). Therefore, we see no grounds under Rule 18 that will allow this Court to answer the question. Heatherwood Holdings, LLC v. First Commercial Bank, 61 So.3d 1012, 1026 (Ala.2010) (declining to answer a certified question where “existing Alabama law is sufficient to guide the [certifying court]”).

Conclusion

We respectfully decline to answer the question certified by the district court.

QUESTION DECLINED.

MALONE, C.J., and WOODALL, STUART, BOLIN, PARKER, MAIN, and WISE, JJ., concur.

MURDOCK, J., concurs in the result.

      . In its brief to this Court, Shelby Realty points out that the factual statement included with the district court’s certification erroneously referred to the subject insurance coverage as a "homeowner’s” policy. (Shelby Realty’s brief, at p. 4 n. 2.) See Metmor Fin., Inc. v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 645 So.2d 295, 297 (Ala.1993) (" ‘Title insurance’ is defined as ‘insurance of owners of property, or others having an interest therein or liens or encumbrances thereon against loss by encumbrance, or defective titles, or invalidity or adverse claim to title.’ § 27-5-10, Ala.Code 1975.”).

      . "[T]his Court will rephrase a question certified to it in order to address the ‘basic issue implicated by th[e] question' and 'contemplated by the [court] in its certification.'" Holcim (US), Inc. v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 38 So.3d 722, 726-27 (Ala.2009) (quoting John Deere Co. v. Gamble, 523 So.2d 95, 99 (Ala.1988)).

      . We note, as reflected in the facts supplied by the district court, that the executed proof of loss submitted by Shelby Realty indicated both that Shelby Realty "intended to refurbish and renovate the existing structures on the Property, and ultimately sell the individual, formerly apartment, units as condominiums” and that, "as a result of the judicial determination that Shelby was not vested with fee simple title, Shelby was unable to carry out its planned renovation and sale of the Property.... ” Stewart Title argues that all evidence presented in the district court supports Stewart Title's position that it was unaware that the property was purchased for development and, more specifically, that "[it] had no knowledge of Shelby Realty’s ‘intention’ to develop the Property into condominiums.” Reply brief, at p. 18 n. 7.

      . We do not decide the proper reading of the policy, because that issue is not before us.


author: PER CURIAM.

text:
    COLBERT COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION et al. v. Felecia JAMES, individually and as mother of J.H., a minor child.
    1100181.
    Supreme Court of Alabama.
    Oct. 21, 2011.

      Stanley E. Munsey, Tuscumbia; and Heath F. Trousdale, Florence, for appellants Colbert County Board of Education and the individual members of the Board.
    Brandy Murphy Lee of Lee Law Firm, LLC, Birmingham, for appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

The Colbert County Board of Education (“the Board”); and the individual members of the Board; Billy Hudson, superintendent of the Colbert County School System; Jackie Witt, principal of Colbert County High School; and Jeff Burbank, an assistant principal at Colbert County High School (hereinafter referred to collectively as “the individually named defendants”), appeal from the trial court’s judgment granting Felecia James’s motion for a preliminary injunction. We dismiss the appeal in part, reverse the trial court’s judgment entering the preliminary injunction, and remand the cause.

Facts and Procedural History

On or about May 21, 2010, an incident occurred at Colbert County High School (“CCHS”) involving J.H., James’s minor child, and another minor enrolled in CCHS. The incident, the details of which are in dispute, led Burbank to suspend both students for three days for allegedly fighting on school property during school hours. Burbank also required each of the suspended students to attend the Colbert County School System’s alternative school (“the alternative school”) for 15 days at the beginning of the following academic school year, i.e., the 2010-2011 school year. It also appears that there was a notation placed in J.H.’s academic file to the effect that he had been suspended and placed in the alternative school because of fighting.

James appeared before the Board to discuss the situation on June 24, 2010. The Board apparently took no action, and, on July 20, 2010, James, “individually and as mother and guardian of J.H.,” sued the Board and the individually named defendants asserting state-law and federal-law claims and seeking injunctive relief, declaratory relief, compensatory damages, punitive damages, costs, interest, and “any other relief to which [James] may be entitled.” On July 21, 2010, James filed a motion for a temporary restraining order, a preliminary injunction, and a permanent injunction, alleging, in pertinent part, as follows:

“1. [The Board and the individually named defendants have] wrongfully imposed discipline on [J.H.].
“2. [J.H.’s] school record wrongfully shows he was found to be fighting at school.
“3. [The Board and the individually named defendants] intend on further wrongfully imposing discipline on [J.H.] when school begins on Monday, August 9, 2010 and [the Board is] scheduled to impose three (3) weeks of the first six (6) week grading period in suspension/alternative school due to the wrongful application of the [Board’s] policies, procedures, and practices as well as [the Board and the individually named defendants’] failure to provide [J.H.] procedural and substantive due process.
“4. [James] has a likelihood of success on the merits. See complaint attached hereto as Exhibit A.
“5. There is no adequate remedy available by law.
“6. [J.H.] will suffer irreparable harm without the injunction.
“7. The hardship imposed on the [Board and the individually named defendants] will not unreasonably outweigh the benefit accruing to the requesting party.
“8. A temporary restraining order and injunction will not prejudice the [Board and the individually named defendants].
“9. The temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction and permanent injunction are proper. SouthTrust Bank of Alabama, N.A. v. Webb-Stiles Co., 931 So.2d 706, 708 (Ala.2005) (quoting Ormco Corp. v. Johns, 869 So.2d 1109, 1113 (Ala.2003), quoting in turn Perley v. Tapscan, Inc., 646 So.2d 585, 587 (Ala.1994)).
“10. [James] has made a diligent effort to contact [the Board] to discuss resolution without success.
“11. No bond is necessary because no damage to the [Board and the individually named defendants] will attach with the entry of a temporary restraining order, preliminary and permanent injunction.
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, [James] respectfully requests the Court grant a temporary restraining order and injunction prohibiting the [Board and the individually named defendants] from imposing wrongful discipline on [J.H.] and requiring removal of references to wrongfully imposed discipline on [J.H.] pending further order of this Court.”

The Board and the individually named defendants did not file a response to James’s motion for injunctive relief, although they did file an answer to James’s complaint. A hearing on James’s motion was set for August 3, 2010.

On July 29, 2010, the Board and the individually named defendants filed a motion for a summary judgment asserting absolute immunity on the part of the Board and State-agent immunity on the part of the individually named defendants. A hearing on the summary-judgment motion was set and then continued to January 10, 2011.

Following the August 3, 2010, hearing on James’s motion for injunctive relief, the trial court entered a preliminary injunction against the Board and the individually named defendants on August 4, 2010, holding as follows:

“Upon consideration of the evidence and submissions, the Court finds that [James] will suffer irreparable harm without the injunction; [James] has no adequate remedy at law; [James] has at least a reasonable chance of success on the ultimate merits; and the hardship imposed on the [Board and the individually named defendants] will not unreasonably outweigh the benefit accruing to [James]. SouthTrust Bank of Alabama, N.A. v. Webb-Stiles Co., 931 So.2d 706, 708 (Ala.2005) (quoting Ormco Corp. v. Johns, 869 So.2d 1109, 1113 (Ala.2003), quoting in turn Perley v. Tapscan, Inc., 646 So.2d 585, 587 (Ala.1994)).
“Specifically, [J.H.] will suffer irreparable harm with implementation of discipline (three weeks of alternative school) currently imposed as it will carry forward to the school in which he is newly enrolled if the Court does not enjoin the implementation of said discipline. [James] has at least a reasonable chance of success on the ultimate merits that [J.H.] was denied due process or the conduct of the [Board and the individually named defendants] otherwise violates the Constitution or laws of the United States, or the Constitution of this State, or laws, rules, or regulations of this State enacted or promulgated for the purpose of regulating the activities of a governmental agency; or the [Board and the individually named defendants] acted willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, in bad faith, beyond his or her authority, or under a mistaken interpretation of the law. Ex parte Jones, [52 So.3d 475] (Ala.2010) (quoting Ex parte Cranman, 792 So.2d 392 (Ala.2000)); Ex parte Rizk, 791 So.2d 911 (Ala.2000). The implementation of said discipline will also likely cause ... J.H. to suffer irreparable harm to his right to education and opportunities resulting [therefrom] due to the stigma and discipline that is recorded ... in his student records. [J.H.] may lose his membership in leadership and extra-curricular activities in addition to losing the opportunity to be college educated or accepted otherwise in school. Therefore, the [Board and the individually named defendants] are hereby enjoined from imposing the discipline to [J.H.] as indicated in [J.H.’s] ‘Notice of Student Suspension’ and are hereby directed to remove any and all reference to said discipline and ‘fighting1 from [J.H.’s] school records. The Court also hereby finds that there is no hardship, prejudice, damage or harm to the [Board and the individually named defendants] in ordering said injunction. Otherwise stated, the hardship to the [Board and the individually named defendants] will not unreasonably outweigh the benefit accruing to [J.H.].”

On August 4, 2010, the same day the trial court entered the judgment issuing the preliminary injunction, the Board and the individually named defendants, except Burbank, filed a motion pursuant to Rule 59(e), Ala. R. Civ. P., to alter, amend, or vacate the trial court’s judgment. Those defendants argued that there was no evidence before the trial court upon which it could have entered a preliminary injunction against the Board and the individually named defendants because, they argued, no evidence had been submitted. Those defendants argued that the trial court erred in entering the preliminary injunction relying solely on James’s complaint and her unverified motion requesting in-junctive relief.

On September 17, 2010, James filed a response to the Board and the individually named defendants’ summary-judgment motion and the Rule 59(e) motion. James attached numerous affidavits to her response and states in her brief on appeal that those affidavits “were present at the hearing before the [trial court] on August 3, 2010.” James’s brief, at p. 37. A hearing on the Rule 59(e) motion was set for September 22, 2010, but was continued to January 10, 2011. The trial court never ruled on the Rule 59(e) motion; thus, that motion was denied by operation of law on November 2, 2010. See Rule 59.1, Ala. R. Civ. P. The Board and the individually named defendants appealed on November 8, 2010.

Standard of Review

This Court set forth the standard for reviewing a trial court’s decision to enter a preliminary injunction in Holiday Isle, LLC v. Adkins, 12 So.3d 1173, 1175-76 (Ala.2008):

“We have often stated: ‘The decision to grant or to deny a preliminary injunction is within the trial court’s sound discretion. In reviewing an order granting a preliminary injunction, the Court determines whether the trial court exceeded that discretion.’ SouthTrust Bank of Alabama, N.A. v. Webb-Stiles Co., 931 So.2d 706, 709 (Ala.2005).
“A preliminary injunction should be issued only when the party seeking an injunction demonstrates:
“ ‘ “(1) that without the injunction the [party] would suffer irreparable injury; (2) that the [party] has no adequate remedy at law; (8) that the [party] has at least a reasonable chance of success on the ultimate merits of his case; and (4) that the hardship imposed on the [party opposing the preliminary injunction] by the injunction would not unreasonably outweigh the benefit accruing to the [party seeking the injunction].” ’
“Ormco Corp. v. Johns, 869 So.2d 1109, 1113 (Ala.2003) (quoting Perley v. Tapscan, Inc., 646 So.2d 585, 587 (Ala.1994)).
“To the extent that the trial court’s issuance of a preliminary injunction is grounded only in questions of law based on undisputed facts, our longstanding rule that we review an injunction solely to determine whether the trial court exceeded its discretion should not apply. We find the rule applied by the United States Supreme Court in similar situations to be persuasive; ‘We review the District Court’s legal rulings de novo and its ultimate decision to issue the preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion.’ Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 428, 126 S.Ct. 1211, 163 L.Ed.2d 1017 (2006); see also Justice Murdock’s special writing while sitting as a judge on the Court of Civil Appeals in City of Dothan v. Eighty-Four West, Inc., 871 So.2d 54, 60 (Ala.Civ.App.2003) (Murdock, J., concurring specially on application for rehearing) (cited with approval in McGlathery v. Richardson, 944 So.2d 968, 970 (Ala.Civ.App.2006)).”

Discussion

I. Immunity Issues

Initially, although not argued by the Board and its members, we must consider whether the Board and its members are immune from the state-law claims filed against them. Atkinson v. State, 986 So.2d 408, 411 (Ala.2007) (holding that issues of § 14, Ala. Const.1901, State immunity “may be raised at any time ... by a court ex mero motu”). Section 14, Ala. Const.1901, provides “[t]hat the State of Alabama shall never be made a defendant in any court of law or equity.” In Ex parte Monroe County Board of Education, 48 So.3d 621 (Ala.2010), this Court held:

‘““Section 14, Ala. Const.1901, provides ‘[t]hat the State of Alabama shall never be made a defendant in any court of law or equity.’ This section affords the State and its agencies an ‘absolute’ immunity from suit in any court. Ex parte Mobile County Dep’t of Human Res., 815 So.2d 527, 530 (Ala.2001) (stating that Ala. Const.1901, § 14, confers on the State of Alabama and its agencies absolute immunity from suit in any court); Ex parte Tuscaloosa County, 796 So.2d 1100, 1103 (Ala.2000) (‘Under Ala. Const, of 1901, § 14, the State of Alabama has absolute immunity from lawsuits. This absolute immunity extends to arms or agencies of the state....’). Indeed, this Court has described § 14 as an ‘almost invincible’ ‘wall’ of immunity. Alabama State Docks v. Saxon, 631 So.2d 943, 946 (Ala.1994). This ‘wall of immunity’ is ‘nearly impregnable,’ Patterson v. Gladwin Corp., 835 So.2d 137, 142 (Ala.2002), and bars ‘almost every conceivable type of suit.’ Hutchinson v. Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ala., 288 Ala. 20, 23, 256 So.2d 281, 288 (1971). Moreover, if an action is an action against the State within the meaning of § 14, such a case ‘presents a question of subject-matter jurisdiction, which cannot be waived or conferred by consent.’ Patterson, 835 So.2d at 142-43.”
‘Haley v. Barbour County, 885 So.2d 783, 788 (Ala.2004) (emphasis added). For purposes of § 14 immunity, county boards of education are considered agencies of the State. Louviere v. Mobile County Bd. of Educ., 670 So.2d 873, 877 (Ala.1995) (“County boards of education, as local agencies of the State, enjoy [§ 14] immunity.”). Thus, this Court has held that county boards of education are immune from tort actions. See Brown v. Covington County Bd. of Educ., 524 So.2d 623, 625 (Ala.1988); Hutt v. Etowah County Bd. of Educ., 454 So.2d 973, 974 (Ala.1984).’
“Ex parte Jackson County Bd. of Educ., 4 So.3d [1099] at 1102-03 [ (Ala.2008) ].
“In Ex parte Hale County Board of Education, 14 So.3d 844 (Ala.2009), this Court revisited the issue whether county boards of education were immune from suit, overruling Sims v. Etowah County Board of Education, 337 So.2d 1310 (Ala.1976), and Kimmons v. Jefferson County Board of Education, 204 Ala. 384, 85 So. 774 (1920), and stating that ‘because county boards of education are local agencies of the State, they are clothed in constitutional immunity from suit’ and that the immunity accorded a county board of education is absolute.”

48 So.3d at 624-25. Therefore, because the Board is absolutely immune under § 14 from the state-law claims filed against it, the trial court lacked jurisdiction over those claims against the Board, and its judgment entering a preliminary injunction against the Board based upon the state-law claims is void; thus, insofar as the Board is appealing from the trial court’s void judgment, the appeal is due to be dismissed. See Ex parte Citizens Bank, 879 So.2d 535, 540 (Ala.2003) (holding “that an appeal from a void judgment must be dismissed”). Further, based upon the Board’s absolute immunity under § 14, the state-law claims against the Board are due to be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

As to the Board members in their official capacities, this Court has held in Alabama Department of Transportation v. Harbert International, Inc., 990 So.2d 831, 839 (Ala.2008):

“Not only is the State immune from suit under § 14, but ‘[t]he State cannot be sued indirectly by suing an officer in his or her official capacity....’ Lyons [v. River Road Constr., Inc.], 858 So.2d [257,] 261 [ (Ala.2003) ]. ‘Section 14 prohibits actions against state officers in their official capacities when those actions are, in effect, actions against the State.’ Haley v. Barbour County, 885 So.2d 783, 788 (Ala.2004). To determine whether an action against a State officer is, in fact, one against the State, this Court considers
“‘whether “a result favorable to the plaintiff would directly affect a contract or property right of the State,” Mitchell [v. Davis, 598 So.2d 801, 806 (Ala.1992) ], whether the defendant is simply a “conduit” through which the plaintiff seeks recovery of damages from the State, Barnes v. Dale, 530 So.2d 770, 784 (Ala.1988), and whether “a judgment against the officer would directly affect the financial status of the State treasury,” Lyons [v. River Road Constr., Inc.], 858 So.2d [257] at 261 [ (Ala.2003) ].’
“Haley, 885 So.2d at 788. Additionally, ‘[i]n determining whether an action against a state officer is barred by § 14, the Court considers the nature of the suit or the relief demanded, not the character of the office of the person against whom the suit is brought.’ Ex parte Carter, 395 So.2d 65, 67-68 (Ala.1980).”

The Board members in their official capacities are immune under § 14 from the state-law claims filed against them insofar as those claims seek monetary damages. Thus, because the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the state-law claims seeking monetary damages filed against the Board members in their official capacities, those claims are due to be dismissed.

Insofar as James seeks injunc-tive relief against the Board members in their official capacities, we note:

“The immunity afforded State officers sued in their official capacities, however, is not unlimited:
“ ‘[Section 14] immunity from suit does not extend, in all instances, to officers of the State acting in their official capacity. Unzicker v. State, 346 So.2d 931 (Ala.1977). In limited circumstances the writ of mandamus will lie to require action of state officials. This is true where discretion is exhausted and that which remains to be done is a ministerial act. See Hardin v. Fullilove Excavating Co., Inc., 353 So.2d 779 (Ala.1977); Tennessee & Coosa R.R. Co. v. Moore, 36 Ala. 371 (1860). Action may be enjoined if illegal, fraudulent, unauthorized, done in bad faith or under a mistaken interpretation of law. Wallace v. Board of Education of Montgomery Co., 280 Ala. 635, 197 So.2d 428 (1967). If judgment or discretion is abused, and exercised in an arbitrary or capricious manner, mandamus will lie to compel a proper exercise thereof. The writ will not he to direct the manner of exercising discretion and neither will it lie to compel the performance of a duty in a certain manner where the performance of that duty rests upon an ascertainment of facts, or the existence of conditions, to be determined by an officer in his judgment or discretion. See Barnes v. State, 274 Ala. 705, 151 So.2d 619 (1963).’
“McDowell-Purcell, Inc. v. Bass, 370 So.2d 942, 944 (Ala.1979).
“Moreover, certain causes of action are not barred by § 14:
“ ‘ “There are four general categories of actions which in Aland v. Graham, 287 Ala. 226, 250 So.2d 677 (1971), we stated do not come within the prohibition of § 14: (1) actions brought to compel State officials to perform their legal duties; (2) actions brought to enjoin State officials from enforcing an unconstitutional law; (3) actions to compel State officials to perform ministerial acts; and (4) actions brought under the Declaratory Judgments Act ... seeking construction of a statute and its application in a given situation. 287 Ala. at 229-230, 250 So.2d 677. Other actions which are not prohibited by § 14 are: (5) valid inverse condemnation actions brought against State officials in their representative capacity; and (6) actions for injunction or damages brought against State officials in their representative capacity and individually where it was alleged that they had acted fraudulently, in bad faith, beyond their authority or in a mistaken interpretation of law. Wallace v. Board of Education of Montgomery County, 280 Ala. [635] at 639, 197 So.2d 428 [ (1967) ]; Unzicker v. State, 346 So.2d 931, 933 (Ala.1977); Engelhardt v. Jenkins, 273 Ala. 352, 141 So.2d 193 (1962).” ’
“Drummond Co. v. Alabama Dep’t of Transp., 937 So.2d 56, 58 (Ala.2006) (quoting [Ex parte] Carter, 395 So.2d [65,] 68 [ (Ala.1980) ]) (emphasis omitted). These actions are sometimes referred to as ‘exceptions’ to § 14; however, in actuality these actions are simply not considered to be actions “‘against the State” for § 14 purposes.’ Patterson v. Gladwin Corp., 835 So.2d 137, 142 (Ala.2002). This Court has qualified those ‘exceptions,’ noting that ‘ “[a]n action is one against the [S]tate when a favorable result for the plaintiff would directly affect a contract or property right of the State, or would result in the plaintiffs recovery of money from the [S]tate.”’ Alabama Agric. & Mech. Univ. v. Jones, 895 So.2d 867, 873 (Ala.2004) (quoting Shoals Cmty. Coll. v. Colagross, 674 So.2d 1311, 1314 (Ala.Civ.App.1995)) (emphasis added in Jones).”

Harbert, 990 So.2d at 839-40.

James alleged in her amended complaint that the challenged actions of all the defendants, including the Board members, “were willful, malicious, fraudulent, in bad faith, beyond [their] authority, or under a mistaken interpretation of the law.” Therefore, the Board members are not immune under § 14 from James’s state-law claims insofar as James is seeking injunctive relief based upon the Board members’ alleged fraud, bad faith, or actions that were beyond the Board members’ authority or that were taken under a mistaken interpretation of law.

We also note that the Board and its members are not immune under § 14 from the federal-law claims filed against them. See Abusaid v. Hillsborough County Bd. of County Comm’rs, 405 F.3d 1298, 1315 (11th Cir.2005) (holding that “state sovereign immunity principles are no bar to § 1983 claims against a county”). Further, State-agent immunity, raised by the individually named defendants in their summary-judgment motion still pending before the trial court, but not raised in this appeal, would not operate to bar actions against State agents seeking injunctive or declaratory relief. See Matthews v. Alabama Agric. & Mech. Univ., 787 So.2d 691, 698 (Ala.2000) (noting that an action seeking injunctive or declaratory relief against a State agent is not barred by the doctrine of State-agent immunity). Thus, we now address the merits of the preliminary injunction.

II. Preliminary Injunction

On appeal, the Board and the individually named defendants argue that “[t]he [t]rial [e]ourt abused its discretion when it issued its [preliminary [[Injunction without any evidence in support of its issuance.” The Board and the individually named defendants’ brief, at p. 7. We agree.

This Court has held that, “[u]nder prevailing Alabama law, [one requesting a preliminary injunction is] obligated to establish a number of elements as conditions necessary to support the issuance of a preliminary injunction.” Teleprompter of Mobile, Inc. v. Bayou Cable TV, 428 So.2d 17, 20 (Ala.1983). In Bayou Cable, this Court reviewed a trial court’s issuance of a preliminary injunction. In reversing the trial court’s issuance of the preliminary injunction, this Court determined that the party requesting the preliminary injunction had “presented no evidence supporting its contention that it would suffer irreparable injury if the preliminary injunction was not issued.” Id. This Court held that the trial court’s judgment issuing a preliminary injunction was in error because the trial court had failed to follow the provisions of Rule 65(d)(2), Ala. R. Civ. P., and because “there was no evidence of an irreparable injury or lack of an adequate remedy at law.” Id.

In the present case, there is nothing to indicate that any evidence had been presented to the trial court before it issued the preliminary injunction against the Board and the individually named defendants. There is no transcript in the record of the August 3, 2010, hearing at which the trial court considered the merits of James’s motion seeking injunctive relief. James does, however, describe in her brief before this Court the August 3, 2010, hearing, as follows:

“In the instant case, the Court set a hearing on August 3, 2010. None of the Defendants or witnesses on their behalf appeared. Defendants filed motions to continue the hearing. Counsel for Defendants did appear. Plaintiff appeared with several witnesses, some of whom executed affidavits properly pending before the Court prior to the hearing on the Defendants’ Motion to Alter, Amend or Vacate on September 22, 2010. After the court spoke with all counsel and determined without objection that there would be no harm or damage[] to Defendants with the entry of a [preliminary] injunction and the irreparable harm to the plaintiff was imminent, the Court entered an order granting the [preliminary] injunction. At the same time, the Court instructed counsel that the testimony on the merits would be held on September 22, 2010.”

James’s brief, at pp. 34-35. Although James indicates that she appeared with witnesses at the August 3, 2010, hearing, she does not indicate, nor does anything in the record indicate, that any of those witnesses testified. Instead, James indicates that the trial court only “spoke with all counsel.”

In Bamberg v. Bamberg, 441 So.2d 970 (Ala.Civ.App.1983), the Court of Civil Appeals held that

“ ‘[e]vidence that goes beyond the unverified allegations of the pleadings and motion papers must be presented to support or oppose a motion for a preliminary injunction.’ 11 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2949, at 469 (1973). In other words, at a preliminary injunction hearing an unverified pleading, without proof of its averments, is insufficient in and of itself upon which to base the issuance of a preliminary injunction.... While [R]ule 65 of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure does not explicitly require that oral testimony be presented at a preliminary injunction hearing, some type of evidence which substantiates the pleadings is implicitly required by subsection (a)(2) of that rule.... At a preliminary injunction hearing, ... evidence may take the form of a verified pleading, an affidavit, a deposition, a stipulation, an admission, a written exhibit and/or oral testimony; however, unsworn, or unaffirmed, statements of parties or factual assertions and arguments of counsel would not meet muster.”

441 So.2d at 971. In the present case, James did not submit a verified complaint or a verified preliminary-injunction motion, and it is apparent from James’s own description of the August 3, 2010, hearing that no evidence was submitted to the trial court at that time. Instead, James states that affidavits “were present at the hearing before the [trial court] on August 3, 2010.” James’s brief, at p. 37. However, James first submitted those affidavits to the trial court on September 17, 2010, as attachments to her opposition to the Board and the individually named defendants’ summary-judgment motion and the Rule 59(e) motion, and there is nothing to indicate that the trial court ever considered those affidavits before it entered the preliminary injunction on August 4, 2010.

Although the trial court indicated that it was relying upon its “consideration of the evidence and submissions,” there is nothing in the record to indicate that any evidence had been presented when it entered the preliminary injunction. Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s judgment issuing the preliminary injunction against the Board to the extent, if any, that the trial court issued the preliminary injunction against the Board based on James’s federal-law claims, and we reverse the judgment issuing the preliminary injunction against the individually named defendants based upon the complete lack of any evidence supporting the issuance of the preliminary injunction. See Bayou Cable, supra (reversing the trial court’s judgment issuing a preliminary injunction because “there was no evidence of an irreparable injury or lack of an adequate remedy at law”); International Molders & Allied Workers Union v. Aliceville Veneers Div., Buchanan Lumber Birmingham, 348 So.2d 1385 (Ala.1977) (no evidence to sustain the entry of a preliminary injunction); and Bamberg, supra (reversing the trial court’s judgment issuing a preliminary injunction based upon the “complete lack of any supportive evidence”).

The Board and the individually named defendants present other arguments; however, our disposition of the immunity issues and this issue pretermits any discussion of the other arguments raised by the Board and the individually named defendants.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, insofar as the Board is appealing the entry of the preliminary injunction against it based upon the state-law claims filed by James, we dismiss the appeal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Because we are reversing the judgment entering the preliminary injunction, we see no need to order the trial court to vacate the preliminary injunction entered against the Board insofar as it is based on those claims. We also order that James’s state-law claims against the Board and her claims seeking monetary damages against the Board members in their official capacities be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Further, because there was not sufficient evidence to support its issuance, we reverse the trial court’s judgment entering the preliminary injunction against the individually named defendants and, insofar as the preliminary injunction against the Board is based upon James’s federal-law claims, against the Board.

APPEAL DISMISSED IN PART; JUDGMENT ENTERING PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION REVERSED; AND CAUSE REMANDED.

MALONE, C.J., and WOODALL, STUART, BOLIN, PARKER, SHAW, MAIN, and WISE, JJ., concur.

      . The individual Board members are Linda Evans, president, and Charles Carter, Mary Moore, Max Eady, Joe Latham, and Frank Williamson.

      . James filed an amended complaint on August 26, 2010, which the Board and individually named defendants answered.

      3. Although James indicated in her motion that the complaint was attached to the motion, it does not appear from the record that anything was attached to her motion.

      . It is unclear from the complaint whether James asserts claims against the individually named defendants in their personal capacities. However, in the motion for a summary judgment those defendants argue that they are entitled to State-agent immunity, which applies only to claims against State agents acting their personal capacities. See Ex parte Cranman, 792 So.2d 392 (Ala.2000).

      . On August 12, 2010, before the hearing on the Board and the individually named defendants' summary-judgment motion, the Board and the individually named defendants petitioned this Court for a writ of mandamus directing the trial court to enter a summary judgment on their behalf based on the defenses of absolute immunity and State-agent immunity. This Court denied the Board and the individually named defendants' petition for a writ of mandamus by order of the Court on January 6, 2011. Ex parte Colbert County Bd. of Educ. (No. 1091545, January 6, 2011).