author: SHEPHERD, J.

text:
    The STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Robert MARCEL, Appellee.
    No. 3D09-2178.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Aug. 31, 2011.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Nicholas Merlin, Assistant Attorney General, for appellant.
    Antonio G. Jimenez, for appellee.

      Before SHEPHERD, CORTIÑAS, and LAGOA, JJ.
   SHEPHERD, J.

The appellee, Robert Marcel, pled nolo contendere to the offense of unlawfully and intentionally touching a person under sixteen years of age in a lewd or lascivious manner, in violation of section 800.04(6)(c), Florida Statutes (2001). Marcel was eighteen-years old at the time of the offense, and the victim fourteen-years old. The trial court withheld adjudication and sentenced Marcel to three-years probation. As a consequence of plea, Marcel automatically was designated a sexual offender, subject to lifetime registration and reporting requirements contained in section 943.0435, Florida Statutes (2001). .

Seven years after the offense, the Florida Legislature added section 943.04354 to the Florida Statutes, providing an exception to the stigma of sex offender registration for consensual conduct by young people who satisfy certain specific conditions — -so-called “Romeo and Juliet offenders.” See § 943.04354, Fla. Stat. (2007); Miller v. State, 17 So.3d 778, 781 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009). One of the criteria for relief is that the defendant be “not more than [four] years older than the victim of th[e] violation who was [fourteen] years of age or older but not more than [seventeen] years of age at the time the person committed th[e] violation.” § 943.04354(l)(c), Fla. Stat. (2007). The trial court in this case found this condition was met and granted relief to Marcel. The State seeks reversal on the ground the trial court erred in its finding that this criteria was satisfied. For the reasons stated below, we agree with the State.

The disagreement in this case revolves around the application of the phrase “not more than” in section 943.04354(l)(c) of the Florida Statutes. At the time of the violation in this case, Marcel was four years, three months, and eight days older than the victim. The State argues Marcel fails to meet the criteria for removal from registration under the statute because he is “more than” four years older than the victim. Marcel argues, and the trial court agreed, months and days should not be counted when determining the difference in age, rather the “completed years of life” should be considered. Under this interpretation of what is called the “birthday rule,” a defendant would not be more than four years older than the victim until the person was five years older. On this analysis, Marcel would satisfy the condition we are called upon to interpret until he reached his nineteenth birthday.

Marcel has not brought- to our attention any case to support the use of his proposed interpretive rule in this case. Our ovm research has revealed the rule is used only in computing age, when required by a statute, but not in calculating time, as the legislative enactment in this case requires. See State v. Moore, 167 N.C.App. 495, 606 S.E.2d 127 (2004) (statutory rape statute encompassing victims “who [are] [thirteen, fourteen, or fifteen] years old” includes victim who was fifteen-years and two-days-old); see also State v. Yarger, 181 Ohio App.3d 132, 908 N.E.2d 462 (2009) (holding that a defendant was an “adult” under statute defining “adult” as “an individual who is eighteen years of age or older” even though he was about eight hours short of his birth time at the time of the offense); People v. Anderson, 108 Ill.App.3d 563, 64 Ill.Dec. 136, 439 N.E.2d 65 (1982) (finding that a defendant who shot victim on his birthday, but was approximately seven hours short of his birth time at the time of the crime was nevertheless seventeen-years old for purposes of being charged as an adult). These cases are distinguishable on their face from the case before us.

The argument made by Marcel also contravenes the plain language of the statute. The Legislature expressly limited eligibility under the statute to persons “not more than 4 years older than the victim.” The word “more” is a common term and commonly understood to mean “greater” or “of a larger quantity or amount.” Webster’s 3d New Int’l Dictionary 1469 (1993). The phrase is uncomplicated, and no canons of construction are necessary to its interpretation. See Koile v. State, 934 So.2d 1226, 1230-31 (Fla.2006) (stating that where a statute is clear on its face, “courts will not look behind the statute’s plain language for legislative intent or resort to rules of statutory construction to ascertain intent” (quoting Daniels v. Fla. Dep’t of Health, 898 So.2d 61, 64-65 (Fla.2005))). If a defendant is one day past the four-year eligibility limit prescribed by section 943.04354 of the Florida Statutes, he is ineligible to petition for relief. Marcel and the victim in our case were four years, three months, and eight days apart in age on the date of the offense. This clearly is “greater” or “of a larger amount” than four years. Marcel does not meet the temporal eligibility condition necessary to pretermit his registration obligations under section 943.0435 of the Florida Statutes.

States outside of Florida also have enacted laws similar to the Romeo and Juliet Law. Of particular note is State v. Faulk, 200 N.C.App. 118, 683 S.E.2d 265 (2009), where at issue was a statutory rape statute requiring a defendant to be more than four years older than the victim. Applying the birthday rule, the defendant argued he was only four years older than his victim, since he was nineteen-years old and she was fifteen-years old at the time of the violation. Id. at 266. The appellate court disagreed, and held the defendant was more than four years older than his victim when the difference in age between them was four years and five months. Id. at 267. In reaching its ruling, the court emphasized the distinction between calculating age — in which the birthday rule could be applied — and calculating time — in which a more precise calculation was required. Id. Similarly, in State v. Jason B., 248 Conn. 543, 729 A.2d 760 (1998), the Connecticut Supreme Court determined that a juvenile sex offender was more than two years older than his fourteen-year-old victim where the age difference between them was two years, three months, and seven days. The court reasoned that “common sense dictates that in comparing the relative ages of individuals, the difference in their ages is determined by reference to their respective birth dates.” Id. at 767.

Finally, the defendant’s plea for application of the rule of lenity is not availing. “The touchstone of the rule of lenity is statutory ambiguity.” Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 107, 111 S.Ct. 461, 112 L.Ed.2d 449 (1990). As we already have stated, there is no ambiguity in the statutory language we are called upon to consider in the case before us. As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes concluded over one hundred years ago, “[wjhatever the consequences, we must accept the plain meaning of plain words.” United States v. Brown, 206 U.S. 240, 244, 27 S.Ct. 620, 51 L.Ed. 1046 (1907).

Accordingly, we reverse the trial court order granting removal from the sex offender registry, with directions to deny the petition.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: RAMIREZ, J.

license: Public Domain

text:
    SOL MELIÁ, S.A., etc., Appellant, v. Lila FONTANA, Appellee.
    No. 3D11-602.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Aug. 31, 2011.
    White & Case and Stephen M. Corse and Moneyede M. Martin, Miami, for appellant.
    Dickman, Epelbaum & Dickman and Robert J. Dickman, Coral Gables; Philip D. Parrish, Miami, for appellee.
    Before RAMIREZ, CORTINAS, and SALTER, JJ.
   RAMIREZ, J.

Sol Meliá, S.A. d/b/a Meliá Caribe Tropical (“Sol Meliá”), appeals a non-final order of the trial court partially denying its motion to quash service. Sol Meliá argues that the trial court erred when it ruled that Fontana could properly serve Sol Me-liá by serving its Florida subsidiary, Sol Group Corporation (“Sol Group”). Because there is insufficient evidence to establish Sol Meliá’s requisite control over Sol Group, we find substituted service of process on Sol Group ineffective and reverse the order below.

Sol Meliá is a Spanish corporation that maintains its principal place of business in Palma de Mallorca, Spain. Sol Group is an indirect subsidiary of Sol Meliá and is based in Miami, Florida. Sol Group is owned and operated by Sol Group, B.V., a holding company that is a direct subsidiary of Sol Meliá. Sol Group provides sales, marketing and other administrative services to corporations that own and/or operate resorts in Mexico, South America and the Caribbean. The corporations to which Sol Group provides services are either direct or indirect subsidiaries of Sol Meliá.

Lila Fontana filed suit against Sol Meliá after she allegedly slipped and broke her hip entering a Jacuzzi at hotel Meliá Car-ibe Tropical in Punta Cana, Dominican Republic. Sol Meliá owns the hotel, and the hotel is managed by Dominican Marketing and Services, N.V., an indirect subsidiary of Sol Meliá. In turn, Sol Group has a contract with Dominican Marketing to provide marketing and administrative services for the hotel.

Following her initial injury and subsequent medical procedures, Fontana attempted to serve Sol Meliá by delivering process to Sol Group’s general counsel in the company’s Miami office. Sol Meliá filed a motion to quash service alleging first, that Fontana’s service on Sol Group was improper, and second, that service on Sol Group could not be effective service on Sol Meliá. Sol Meliá submitted two affidavits in support of its motion to quash service, one of Sol Meliá’s general counsel and a second of Sol Group’s general counsel.

The affidavit supplied by Sol Meliá’s general counsel establishes that Sol Meliá does not: do business in Florida, maintain an office in Florida, own any real or personal property in Florida, pay taxes or file returns in Florida, or have any representatives routinely present in Florida. Similarly, the affidavit of Sol Group’s general counsel established that Sol Meliá and Sol Group are separate and distinct companies that maintain separate bank accounts, books and records. Additionally, Sol Group’s general counsel stated that Sol Group, “is not and never has been, authorized to conduct business or accept service in Florida on Meliá’s behalf.”

Fontana opposed Sol Meliá’s motion and argued three points in support of proper service. First, Fontana focused on Sol Meliá’s December 31, 2009 Financial Report, which states in pertinent part:

Sol Meliá, S.A. and its subsidiary companies and associates (hereon [sic] the ‘Group’ or the ‘Company’) make up a group made up of companies that are mainly engaged in general tourist activities and more specifically in the management and operation of its own hotels, rental under management or franchise, and of vacation club operations.

Further, section 4 entitled “Consolidation Scope” defines “subsidiaries” as, “those companies controlled, directly or indirectly, by the parent company, in such a way that the latter can direct financial and operating policies with an aim to obtain profit for the company.” Additionally, Fontana focused on Sol Meliá’s website, which lists Sol Group under, the heading “Central and North American Division Corporate Offices.” Finally, Fontana pointed the fact that Sol Meliá’s chief executive officer and chief financial officer are directors of Sol Group, while another senior Sol Meliá executive is Sol Group’s secretary.

After reviewing the case file and hearing counsels’ arguments, the trial court found sufficient record evidence to justify service under section 48.081(2), Florida Statutes (2009). The trial court subsequently denied Sol Meliá’s motion to the extent it argued Sol Group was not authorized to accept service of process on Sol Meliá’s behalf, and the court granted Fontana sixty days to re-serve Sol Meliá by serving process on Sol Group’s registered agent. We disagree with the trial court’s conclusion that Sol Group is authorized to accept service of process on Sol Meliá’s behalf.

The determination of whether a trial court properly ruled on a motion to quash service of process under section 48.081, Florida Statutes (2009), is a question of law which we review de novo. See Alvarado v. Cisneros, 919 So.2d 585, 587 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006).

Where a foreign corporation does not have any officers, directors, managers or business agents in Florida, section 48.081(3) provides that process against the foreign corporation may be served on an agent who is transacting business for the corporation in the state. See § 48.081(3), Fla. Stat. (2009). However, the fact that Sol Group is the wholly-owned indirect subsidiary of Sol Meliá does not, by itself, support substituted service. See Aquila Steel Corp. v. Fontana, 585 So.2d 426, 427 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991). See also Mac Millan-Bloedel, Ltd. v. Canada, 391 So.2d 749 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980). Rather, substitute service of process is only permitted where the plaintiff demonstrates, “that the parent corporation exercised such a degree of control over its subsidiary that the activities of the subsidiary were in fact the activities of the parent within the state.” Aquila, 585 So.2d at 427; Volkswagenwerk Atkiengelselischaft v. McCurdy, 340 So.2d 544, 546 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976).

We conclude that the evidence Fontana proffered in support of substitute service fails to demonstrate the requisite degree of control. Specifically, the Financial Reports, website listing, and fact that the two corporations share directors are insufficient to establish that Sol Meliá and Sol Group were “alter egos,” or that Sol Meliá “thoroughly controlled” Sol Group. Aquila, 585 So.2d at 427; Vega Glen v. Club Mediterranee S.A., 359 F.Supp.2d 1352, 1357 (S.D.Fla.2005). Fontana provided no evidence to demonstrate that Sol Meliá’s control over the manner in which Sol Group provides services or conducts its day-to-day activities. Accordingly, the fact that the requisite control may merely be inferred from the nature of the companies’ relationship is insufficient to support substitute service under section 48.081(3), Florida Statutes (2009). We therefore reverse the trial court’s order partially denying Sol Meliá’s motion to quash service.

Reversed.


author: PER CURIAM.

text:
    Harold GOVONI, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 4D09-2371.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    Aug. 31, 2011.
    Paul Morris of Law Offices of Paul Morris, P.A., Miami, and William D. Matthew-man of Seiden, Alder, Matthewman & Bloch, P.A., Coral Springs, for petitioner.

      No appearance for respondent.
   ON REMAND FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA

PER CURIAM.

We reconsider on remand our opinion in Govoni v. State, 17 So.3d 809 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009), which was quashed by the Florida Supreme Court following its decision in Govoni v. State, 67 So.3d 1048 (Fla.2011). As ordered by the Supreme Court, we apply its decision in Dennis v. State, 51 So.3d 456 (Fla.2010), approving Peterson v. State, 983 So.2d 27 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008), to the facts of this case. Accordingly, we grant the petition for writ of prohibition and direct the trial court to follow the procedure set forth in Dennis.

Petition Granted.

GROSS, HAZOURI and DAMOORGIAN, JJ., concur.


text:
    Sonya D. WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. FLORIDA UNEMPLOYMENT APPEALS COMMISSION, et al., Appellees.
    No. 3D11-1204.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Aug. 31, 2011.
    Sonya D. Williams, in proper person.
    Louis A. Gutierrez, Senior Attorney (Tallahassee), for appellee Florida Unemployment Appeals Commission.
    Before WELLS, C.J., and RAMIREZ and ROTHENBERG, JJ.
   PER CURIAM.

Sonya D. Williams appeals the final order of the Unemployment Appeals Commission (“the Commission”) affirming the decision of the appeals referee, who concluded that Ms. Williams did not qualify for unemployment benefits because she voluntarily left her employment without good cause. Because the determination of whether an employee voluntarily terminated her employment or was discharged is a factual determination to be made by the referee or hearing officer, see Gulfview Animal Hosp. v. Zemke, 741 So.2d 1163, 1164 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999); credibility of the witnesses, lies within the sole discretion of the fact finder, see Glover v. Sanford Child Care, Inc., 429 So.2d 91, 92 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983); and this Court may only reverse if the findings are not supported by competent, substantial evidence, see Aldana-Chiles v. Fla. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 930 So.2d 808, 810 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006), we affirm.

Affirmed.


text:
    Jose Angel CABRERA, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 3D11-1986.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Aug. 31, 2011.

      Ricardo Corona, Coral Gables, and Nina Tarafa, for appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, for appellee.
    Before WELLS, C.J., and SUAREZ and SALTER, JJ.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. See Hernandez v. State, 61 So.3d 1144 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011).


text:
    Henry Symean DEMAYO, Appellant, v. STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL SERVICES, Appellee.
    No. 3D10-1901.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Aug. 31, 2011.
    Abadin Cook and Kai E. Jacobs, Miami, for appellant.
    Robert Alan Fox, Senior Attorney, for appellee.
    Before CORTIÑAS, SALTER and EMAS, JJ.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. § 120.569(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (2010).


text:
    Demeritt RUCKER, Appellant, v. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, etc., et al., Appellees.
    No. 3D10-3165.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Aug. 31, 2011.
    Kenneth M. Kaplan, for appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Toni C. Bernstein, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for appellee, Department of Revenue, Child Support Enforcement.
    Before SHEPHERD and SALTER, JJ., and SCHWARTZ, Senior Judge.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. See Applegate v. Barnett Bank of Tallahassee, 377 So.2d 1150 (Fla.1980).


text:
    J.S. and C.L., Petitioners, v. S.M.M., Respondent.
    No. 2D11-959.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Sept. 2, 2011.
    Jane H. Grossman of Law Offices of Jane H. Grossman, St. Petersburg, for Petitioners.
    Laurel Farrell, Johnson City, Tennessee, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

J.S., the married husband, and C.L., the married wife, petition for a writ of certio-rari seeking to quash the trial court’s order that found that S.M.M., the putative biological father, had standing to pursue a paternity action concerning N.L., a child conceived and born while J.S. and C.L. were married. The trial court’s order included a requirement that N.L. and S.M.M. submit to DNA testing. Because the trial court’s order departs from the essential requirements of the law and results in harm that cannot be corrected on appeal, we grant the petition and quash the order.

J.S. and C.L. were married on September 20, 2005. N.L. was born on September 29, 2008. It is clear from these dates that J.S. and C.L. were married when N.L. was both conceived and born. J.S. was not present for N.L.’s birth because he was stationed out of state with the military, and C.L. refused to name the father at the hospital. Thus, the space for the father’s name on the birth certificate states, “mother refuses information on husband.” Nevertheless, the birth and N.L.’s neonatal treatment were paid for through military health insurance benefits available through J.S.’s active duty military status. Moreover, pursuant to section 882.013(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2008), J.S. is the “legal father” of N.L. Through this statute, the legislature has codified the public policy in Florida that the “legal father” of any child born of a married woman must be that woman’s husband unless a paternity action has been resolved prior to the child’s birth.

On May 27, 2009, J.S. filed a petition for dissolution of marriage from C.L. In that petition, he denied that any children were born of the marriage. However, J.S. subsequently dismissed the dissolution petition on November 27, 2009. J.S. and C.L. are still married, and no dissolution proceedings are currently pending.

During the seven months that the dissolution petition was pending, S.M.M. filed a paternity action, seeking to establish his paternity of N.L. and to establish visitation, child support, and the division of other expenses. Both J.S. and C.L. opposed this petition and moved to dismiss it for lack of standing. Purportedly in compliance with the supreme court’s opinion in Kendrick v. Everheart, 390 So.2d 53, 60-61 (Fla.1980), the trial court held an eviden-tiary hearing concerning whether S.M.M. had standing to pursue the paternity action. After considering the evidence presented, the trial court found that S.M.M. had standing, and it permitted the paternity action to proceed and ordered N.L. and S.M.M. to undergo DNA testing. J.S. and C.L. now ask this court to quash this order.

Review by certiorari is appropriate when an order departs from the essential requirements of the law and causes harm that cannot be remedied on direct appeal. See Dep’t of Revenue ex rel. T.E.P. v. Price, 958 So.2d 1045, 1046 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007); see also Allstate Ins. Co. v. Langston, 655 So.2d 91, 94 (Fla.1995); Martin-Johnson, Inc. v. Savage, 509 So.2d 1097, 1099 (Fla.1987). In this case, S.M.M. contends that this petition should be dismissed because J.S. and C.L. cannot establish irreparable harm. However, this court has held that an erroneous order for genetic testing “cannot be corrected through a direct appeal, for the improper genetic testing requiring a blood draw would have already been completed” and thus any error in the order “must be corrected through certiorari proceedings.” Price, 958 So.2d at 1046; see also State, Dep’t of Revenue ex rel. Sharif v. Brown, 980 So.2d 590, 590 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (holding that a potentially erroneous order requiring a mother and child to submit to genetic testing for a determination of paternity “threatens what we have held to be irreparable harm that cannot be cured on plenary appeal”); Dep’t of Revenue v. Long, 937 So.2d 1235, 1237 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (holding that the fact of subjecting the child “to a potentially intrusive test ... is enough to constitute irreparable harm”); cf. Lohman v. Carnahan, 963 So.2d 985, 987 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (reviewing order denying motion to dismiss paternity action by certiorari). Therefore, the trial court’s order in this case, which denied J.S. and C.L.’s motion to dismiss by finding that S.M.M. had standing and which ordered potentially intrusive DNA testing of N.L., would result in irreparable harm if improper. Accordingly, we have certiorari jurisdiction over this petition.

Turning to the merits, we conclude that the trial court departed from the essential requirements of the law when it determined that S.M.M. had standing to challenge the paternity of N.L. — a child of an intact marriage. In this respect, this case is essentially indistinguishable from S.B. v. D.H., 736 So.2d 766 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999). In that case, the mother and father had a tumultuous relationship. They had married, divorced, remarried, separated, and reconciled. Id. at 766. During the parties’ separation, the mother conceived a child. Id. There was no dispute that this child was both conceived and born while the parties were married. Id. Nevertheless, S.B., the putative biological father, filed a paternity action seeking shared parental responsibility and visitation. Id. The trial court dismissed the petition, and S.B. appealed.

This court first noted that H.H., the married husband, was the “legal father” by virtue of the fact that he was married to the mother when the child was born. Id. at 767. We noted that the statutory provision making H.H. the “legal father” “recognizes the time-honored presumption of legitimacy.” Id. We also noted that “[tjhis presumption is so strong it ‘can defeat even the claim of a man proven beyond all doubt to be the biological father.’” Id. (quoting Dep’t of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v. Privette, 617 So.2d 305, 308 (Fla.1993)). Because of the strength of this statutory presumption, this court held that “a putative biological father [] cannot maintain [a] paternity action concerning a child conceived by a married woman when both the married woman and her husband object.” Id.; see also I.A. v. H.H., 710 So.2d 162, 164 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998); Lohman, 963 So.2d at 987. Further, “[s]o long as the husband and wife are married and have no pending divorce proceeding, we will not authorize the trial court to conduct any qualitative evaluation of whether the marriage is ‘intact.’” S.B., 736 So.2d at 767; see also S.D. v. A.G., 764 So.2d 807, 809 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). Thus, because D.H. and H.H. were married when the child was conceived and born and because they were unified in their opposition to S.B.’s petition to establish paternity, this court agreed with the trial court that S.B. had no standing to challenge the child’s paternity, and we affirmed the dismissal.

The facts in this case are legally indistinguishable. There is no question, and no dispute, that J.S. and C.L. were married when N.L. was conceived and born. While there was a dissolution case pending at one point, that case has been dismissed, and J.S. and C.L. are unified in their opposition to S.M.M.’s petition to establish paternity. Therefore, pursuant to the plain, unambiguous, and controlling holdings of S.B., S.D., I.A., and Lohman, S.M.M. had no standing to pursue this paternity action, and the trial court departed from the essential requirements of the law in finding otherwise.

In addition, the cases relied upon by S.M.M. are all distinguishable in legally relevant ways. In Kendrick, three of the five children were born when the husband and wife were not married. 390 So.2d at 55. And in L.J. v. A.S., 25 So.3d 1284 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010), and Nevitt v. Bonomo, 53 So.3d 1078 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010), the husband and wife were divorced before the children at issue were born. Thus, none of those three cases dealt with legally legitimate children who were conceived and bom during the marriages, as is the case here. Further, in Van Nostrand v. Olivieri, 427 So.2d 374, 375 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983), the husband and wife were not unified in their opposition to the paternity action, with the wife actually seeking to have her current husband declared the legal father in place of her former husband, to whom she had been married when the child was conceived and born. See also Fernandez v. McKenney, 776 So.2d 1118, 1120 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001) (allowing paternity action to proceed even though the children were conceived and born during an intact marriage because the mother supported— rather than opposed — the paternity action) (Sharp, J., concurring specially). Here, however, J.S. and C.L. are unified in their opposition to S.M.M.’s petition. Because of these factual differences, none of these cases are controlling, and their discussions concerning how the putative biological father could establish standing to pursue a paternity action are irrelevant to the resolution of this case.

We recognize that the Fourth District reached the opposite result in Lander v. Smith, 906 So.2d 1130 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005). In that case, the child was conceived and born while the husband and wife were separated. Id. at 1131. The mother placed the putative biological father’s name on the birth certificate and accepted support from him for the child. Id. The putative biological father also had a relationship with the child while the husband lived in another state. Id. Despite the fact that the child was conceived and born during an intact marriage and both the husband and wife objected to the paternity petition, the Fourth District allowed the case to proceed, finding that “ ‘common sense and reason are outraged’ by rigidly applying the presumption of legitimacy to bar” the putative biological father’s paternity action. Id. at 1134.

However, the Fourth District specifically limited Lander to its unique facts in Lohman and declined to follow it, instead following the public policy as set forth by the legislature and holding:

Where the paternity of a child born to an existing marriage has been so acknowledged and where the husband and wife “have decided to raise [the] child of their marriage and to accept all the rights and responsibilities of parenthood,” a man who may have contributed his DNA to the child “has no statutory or constitutional right to intrude into that private decision.”

Lohman, 963 So.2d at 987 (quoting S.B., 736 So.2d at 767). Lander has not been cited in any subsequent opinion, other than Lohman which refused to follow it. Thus, it appears that Lander is an outlier that does not, by itself, define the essential requirements of the law or require denial of this certiorari petition.

Finally, S.M.M. argues that J.S. and C.L. waived the issue of whether S.M.M.’s petition was proper when they did not seek review of the initial denial of their motion to dismiss. However, in I.A., this court noted that granting relief to a putative biological father who has no standing to seek such relief constitutes “an error that is of such a fundamental nature that we are duty bound to correct it.” 710 So.2d at 164. While the appendix supplied to this court is not sufficient to establish that any such waiver occurred in this case, the fundamental error in allowing S.M.M. to proceed with a paternity action under these circumstances would render this court “duty bound to correct it” even if such a waiver had occurred.

Accordingly, because the trial court’s order departs from the essential requirements of the law and results in irreparable harm, we grant the petition, issue the writ, and quash the trial court’s order permitting S.M.M.’s paternity action to proceed. We also certify conflict with Lander.

Petition granted; conflict certified.

WHATLEY, VILLANTI, and WALLACE, JJ., Concur.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Felix LEWIS.
    No. 2011-KK-1607.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 8, 2011.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. D, No. 377-032; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-K-0569.

Writ granted. Defendant’s motion, although styled a “Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence/Motion for Order of Specific Performance of Plea Agreement,” is in fact a petition for post-conviction relief, which the trial court granted. Defendant’s motion was filed twelve years after his conviction and sentence became final and is time barred pursuant to the provisions of La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Accordingly, the ruling of the trial court is reversed and vacated and defendant’s motion is hereby denied.

JOHNSON, J., would deny.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Edward ALLEN, et al.
    No. 2011-KK-1459.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 10, 2011.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. L, No. 491-394; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-K-0574.

Denied.

GUIDRY, J., would grant.


text:
    Timothy PETTITT v. Deborah PETTITT.
    No. 2011-CC-1766.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 10, 2011.
   In re Pettitt, Deborah; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div A, No. 2011-3003; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-C-1066.

Stay denied; writ denied.


author: JOHNSON and KNOLL, JJ„

text:
    Toni Swain ORRILL, et al. v. LOUISIANA CITIZENS FAIR PLAN, et al.
    No. 2011-CC-1711.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 11, 2011.
   In re Orrill, Toni et al.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div L, No. 05-11720; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-C-0939.

Denied.

JOHNSON and KNOLL, JJ„

would grant the application, allow the parties to disseminate notice to the class and set a new date for a bellwether trial.


text:
    In re Michael J. RILEY, Sr.
    No. 2011-OB-1786.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 17, 2011.
   In re Riley Sr., Michael J.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Appeal of the Decision of the Board Office of Disciplinary Board, No. ll-DB-028.

Denied.


author: JOHNSON and GUIDRY, JJ„

text:
    Succession of Simon HARRELL, et al. v. ERRIS-OMEGA PLANTATION, INC., et al.
    No. 2011-CC-1806.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 17, 2011.
   In re Succession of Clara Hadnot Harrell; Succession of Simon Harrell et al.;— Plaintiff(s); Applying For Writ of Certio-rari and/or Review, Parish of Rapides, 9th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 222,091; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW 11-00859.

Stay denied; writ denied.

JOHNSON and GUIDRY, JJ„

concur in the denial. The issue of whether the relator should be granted a continuance based on conflicts with the trial dates is premature since this issue must first be considered by the court of appeal.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Walter R. COX, Sr. v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-1937.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 19, 2011.
   In re Cox Sr., Walter R.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 8925-05; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 10-00818.

Granted for the sole purpose of transferring the application to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, for its consideration on the merits.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Ray C. JOHNSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-1565.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 19, 2011.
   In re Johnson, Ray C.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Lasalle, 28th Judicial District Court Div. 0, No. 80324; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 09-01337.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Charles COLLINS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-1616.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 19, 2011.
   In re Collins, Charles; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Ascension, 23rd Judicial District Court Div. A, Nos. 20412, 20413; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2009-KW-2192.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Mozine JOHNSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-1615.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 19, 2011.
   In re Johnson, Mozine; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 05-2244; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 10-KH-467.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Bruce BOSLEY v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-1608.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 19, 2011.
   In re Bosley, Bruce; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Iberville, 18th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 1819-94; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 KW 0656.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Willie BELL v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-1607.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 19, 2011.
   In re Bell, Willie; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Natchitoches, 10th Judicial District Court Div. A, Nos. C96-8436-A, 02-C4-1467; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 10-00574.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Timothy LEWIS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-1606.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 19, 2011.
   In re Lewis, Timothy; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Tangipahoa, 21st Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 85398; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 KW 0820.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; State v. Parker, 98-0256 (La.5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694; La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Chris LEWIS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-1592.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 19, 2011.
   In re Lewis, Chris; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. F, No. 346-972; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2010-K-0663.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; State v. Parker, 98-0256 (La.5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694; La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Craig LEGAUX v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-1591.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 19, 2011.
   In re Legaux, Craig; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 07-2579; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 10-KH-383.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Larry JONES v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-1588.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 19, 2011.
   In re Jones, Larry; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Richland, 5th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. F-2006-100; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 45,-599-KH.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Tjianna KELLY v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-1586.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 19, 2011.
   In re Kelly, Tjianna; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. 2, No. 185,799; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 45,725-KH.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Gary DUNCAN v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-1570.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 19, 2011.
   In re Duncan, Gary; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 396411; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 KW 0584.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; State v. Parker, 98-0256 (La.5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694; La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Kendal HERNANDEZ v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-2038.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 19, 2011.
   In re Hernandez, Kendal; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Iberia, 16th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 08-417; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 10-00107.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Michael D. EZELL v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-2037.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 19, 2011.
   In re Ezell, Michael D.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Tensas, 6th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 64,795; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 45,-789-KH.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189. Cf. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4(D).


text:
    STATE ex rel. Curtis SMITH v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-1645.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 19, 2011.
   In re Smith, Curtis; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Vermilion, 15th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 38601; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 09-01305.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Alex R. WHITE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-1644.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 19, 2011.
   In re White, Alex R.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 264647; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 KW 0742.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Wallace R. JAMES v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-1643.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 19, 2011.
   In re James, Wallace R.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Iberville, 18th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 1242-08; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2009 KA 2327.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Derrick HOWARD v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-1620.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 19, 2011.
   In re Howard, Derrick; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 97-3403; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 09-WR-497.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Vincent SIMMONS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-1619.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 19, 2011.
   In re Simmons, Vincent; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Avoyelles, 12th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 77-CR-37596.

Denied. Repetitive. Cf. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4(D).

KNOLL, J., recused.


text:
    Gerald A. WORACHEK v. Richard STALDER, James LeBlanc et al.
    No. 2010-CI-1663.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 19, 2011.
   In re Worachek, Gerald A.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Ascension, 23rd Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 98169; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 CA 0059.

Denied.

WEIMER, J., recused.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Willie MEYERS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-1731.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 19, 2011.
   In re Meyers, Willie; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Martin, 16th Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 01-210615; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, Nos. KH 10-00288, KH 10-00460.

Denied. Moot.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Cleveland LAWSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-1717.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 19, 2011.
   In re Lawson, Cleveland; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. M, No. 05-1552; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 10-KH-447.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Terry PIERCE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-1715.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 19, 2011.
   In re Pierce,- Terry; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. E, No. 278-616.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Derrick Dewayne DAVIS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-1713.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 19, 2011.
   In re Davis, Derrick Dewayne; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Rapides, 9th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 277,493; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 10-00060.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Montie B. MONTGOMERY v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-1710.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 19, 2011.
   In re Montgomery, Montie B.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Webster, 26th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 68,082; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 45,524-KH.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172. See also State v. Cotton, 09-2397 (La.10/15/10), 45 So.3d 1030.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Kenneth RATCLIFF v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-1696.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 19, 2011.
   In re Ratcliff, Kenneth; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. F, No. 359-453; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2010-K-0815.

Denied. See State ex rel. Fleury v. State, 93-2898 (La.10/13/95), 661 So.2d 488.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Bobby STEVENSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-1695.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 19, 2011.
   In re Stevenson, Bobby; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 00-6104; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 08-WR-1061.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Frederick GREER v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-1694.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 19, 2011.
   In re Greer, Frederick; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. 2, No. 259,101; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 45,-698-KH.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Allen CROSBY v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-1693.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 19, 2011.
   In re Crosby, Allen; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. F, No. 271-972.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189. Cf. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4(D).


text:
    STATE ex rel. Stanley LEWIS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-2006.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 19, 2011.
   In re Lewis, Stanley; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. F, No. 465-001; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2010-K-0780.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Levy E. DICKERSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-2005.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 19, 2011.
   In re Dickerson, Levy E.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedíal Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. P, No. 98-797; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 10-KH-566.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Darrell JOHNSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-1995.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 19, 2011.
   In re Johnson, Darrell; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. I, No. 309-728; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2010-K-1047.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Charles LAWRENCE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-1754.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 19, 2011.
   In re Lawrence, Charles; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedíal Writs, Parish of West Feliciana, 20th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 10-WRC-234.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Samuel Tyrone JEFFERS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-1753.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 19, 2011.
   In re Jeffers, Samuel Tyrone; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. 2, No. 156,667; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 45,713-KH.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Arthur L. FORD v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-1752.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 19, 2011.
   In re Ford, Arthur L.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. F, No. 818-625; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2010-K-0746.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Terry Julius DOMINGUE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-1751.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 19, 2011.
   In re Domingue, Terry Julius; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 85452; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 10-00364.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172. See also State v. Thomas, 08-2912, (La.10/16/09), 19 So.3d 466.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Lamarcus McGEE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-1750.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 19, 2011.
   In re McGee, Lamarcus; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Tangipahoa, 21st Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 502070; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 KW 0381.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Perry L. SIMMS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-1886.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 19, 2011.
   In re Simms, Perry L.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Landry, 27th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 87-K-0525; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 10-00156.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Emanuel JYLES v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-1885.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 19, 2011.
   In re Jyles, Emanuel; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. F, No. 370-803; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2010-K-1008.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; cf. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4(D).


text:
    STATE ex rel. Ricky VALENTINE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-1884.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 19, 2011.
   In re Valentine, Ricky; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. E, Nos. 418-106, 448-390; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 10-KH-0997.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Anthony BROWN v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-1877.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 19, 2011.
   In re Brown, Anthony; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. 3, No. 152,634; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 45,-750-KH.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Vashon KELLY v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-1875.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 19, 2011.
   In re Kelly, Vashon; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. L, No. 94-4525; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, Nos. 09-KH-446, 08-WR-1011.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Marcus GULLY v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-1858.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 19, 2011.
   In re Gully, Marcus; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. 2, No. 237,563; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 45,-749-KH.

Denied. Repetitive. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4(A).


text:
    STATE ex rel. Leroy FIELDS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-1857.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 19, 2011.
   In re Fields, Leroy; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. C, No. 313-017; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2010-K-0909.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; cf. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4(D).


text:
    STATE ex rel. Albert J. BROWN v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-1855.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 19, 2011.
   In re Brown, Albert J.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Vernon, 30th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 69646; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 10-00420.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Robert JONES v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-1854.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 19, 2011.
   In re Jones, Robert; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. J, No. 334151; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 10 KW 0770.

Denied. To the extent that relator seeks a cost estimate of documents available to him under the Public Records Law, he must first address his request to the records’ custodians. R.S. 44:31; State ex rel. Shelton v. State, 00-1901 (La.9/14/01), 796 So.2d 672; State ex rel. McKnight v. State, 98-2258 (La.App. 1st Cir.12/3/98), 742 So.2d 894.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Andrew D. WETZEL v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-1883.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 19, 2011.
   In re Wetzel, Andrew D.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedi.al Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 472552.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Torrance HARMON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-1968.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 19, 2011.
   In re Harmon, Torrance; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Mary, 16th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 2010-182718; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 10 KW 0882.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Antonio DAVENPORT v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-1963.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 19, 2011.
   In re Davenport, Antonio; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. 2, No. 248,534; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. KH-10-45746.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Kenneth Wayne BELL v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-1962.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 19, 2011.
   In re Bell, Kenneth Wayne; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Rapides, 9th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 276,875; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 10-00239.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Nathaniel J. PARISH v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-1961.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 19, 2011.
   In re Parish, Nathaniel J.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Washington, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 04-CR3-91325; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010-KW-0941.

Denied. See State ex rel. McKnight v. State, 98-2258 (La.App. 1st Cir.12/3/98), 742 So.2d 894.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Vanessa BROOKS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-1949.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 19, 2011.
   In re Brooks, Vanessa; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Vernon, 30th Judicial District Court Div. A, Nos. 75526, 77265; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 10-00376.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Reginald LEWIS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-1947.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 19, 2011.
   In re Lewis, Reginald; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Catahoula, 7th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 02-1691; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 10-00106.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. James Dennis WILSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-1946.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 19, 2011.
   In re Wilson, James Dennis; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Bossier, 26th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 113,226; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 45,-060-KA.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Marion WHITE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-1945.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 19, 2011.
   In re White, Marion; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 457746; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 KW 0630.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Calvin BREAKFIELD v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-1943.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 19, 2011.
   In re Breakfield, Calvin; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. 2, No. 259,740; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 45,-744-KH.

Denied.


text:
    Michael HOFFPAUIR v. James LeBLANC, et al.
    No. 2010-CI-1940.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 19, 2011.
   In re Hoffpauir, Michael; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of West Feliciana, 20th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 20,929; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 CW 1238.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Matthew CURTIS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-1987.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 19, 2011.
   In re Curtis, Matthew; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 9142-02; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 10-00467.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. John PITTMAN, Jr. v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-1985.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 19, 2011.
   In re Pittman Jr., John; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Mary, 16th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 09-179886 (99-153763); to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 KW 0881.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Arthur THOMAS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-1981.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 19, 2011.
   In re Thomas, Arthur; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 07-4055; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 10-KH-588.

Denied.

GUIDRY, J., recused.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Tyron B. ASH v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-1980.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 19, 2011.
   In re Ash, Tyron B.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. I, No. 388-809; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2010-K-1007.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; State v. Parker, 98-0256 (La.5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694; La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Marcellus HARVEY v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-1979.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 19, 2011.
   In re Harvey, Marcellus; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. J, No. 375-595; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2010-K-0814.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Arien Lamar DELCO v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-1974.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 19, 2011.
   In re Delco, Arien Lamar; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Terrebonne, 32nd Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 438144; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 KW 1033.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189. See also State ex rel. Hall v. State, 99-0326 (La.9/24/99), 871 So.2d 1071.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Anthony Carnell WILLIAMS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-1969.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 19, 2011.
   In re Williams, Anthony Carnell; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Ouachita, 4th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 94-F0045; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 45,796-KH.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189. Cf. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4(D).


text:
    STATE ex rel. Andre RANDOLPH v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-1910.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 19, 2011.
   In re Randolph, Andre; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 96-7456; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 10-KH-376.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Keith THOMPSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-1784.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 19, 2011.
   In re Thompson, Keith; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. F, No. 304-916; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2010-K-0756.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Jimmy D. SPRINKLE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-1772.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 19, 2011.
   In re Sprinkle, Jimmy D.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedíal Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 99-4313; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 08-WR-1053.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Linroy DOUGLAS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-1769.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 19, 2011.
   In re Douglas, Linroy; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. L, No. 00-7001; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 08-WR-1040.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Norton HAMILTON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-1768.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 19, 2011.
   In re Hamilton, Norton; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial

Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. I, No. 273-594; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2010-K-0831.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Marcus A. AUGILLARD.
    No. 2010-KH-1767.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 19, 2011.
   In re Augillard, Marcus A.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. B, No. 415-745; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2010-K-0907.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; State v. Parker, 98-0256 (La.5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694; La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172. See also State v. Dorthey, 623 So.2d 1276 (La.1993).


text:
    STATE ex rel. Rufus HAMPTON, III v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-1766.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 19, 2011.
   In re Hampton III, Rufus; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Webster, 26th Judicial District Court Div. C, Nos. 65,855, 65,856, 67,750, 65,931; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 45,427-KH.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Darrell James FONTENOT v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-1758.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 19, 2011.
   In re Fontenot, Darrell James; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson Davis, 31st Judicial District Court Div. O, No. CR-312-08; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 09-1044.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Beverly A. STOKES v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-1757.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 19, 2011.
   In re Stokes, Beverly A.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. P, No. 98-2659; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 10-KH-436.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Elrick J. GALLOW v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-1756.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 19, 2011.
   In re Gallow, Elrick J.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Evangeline, 13th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 58,285; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 10-00369.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189. Cf. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4(D).


text:
    STATE ex rel. Joseph E. HOWARD v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-1755.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 19, 2011.
   In re Howard, Joseph E.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Ascension, 23rd Judicial District Court Div. D, Nos. 16,126, 16,698; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, Nos. 2010 KW 0702, 2005 KW 1027.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Sugar Ray LEWIS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-1839.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 19, 2011.
   In re Lewis, Sugar Ray; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. F, No. 372-469; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2010-K-1002.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; State v. Parker, 98-0256 (La.5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Anthony J. FONTENOT, Jr. v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-1838.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 19, 2011.
   In re Fontenot Jr., Anthony J.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 12398-05; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 10-00181.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Dallas C. TAYLOR v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-1837.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 19, 2011.
   In re Taylor, Dallas C.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Ouachita, 4th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 06F2683; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 45,-791-KH.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Carl O. CHRISTIAN, Jr. v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-1819.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 19, 2011.
   In re Christian Jr., Carl O.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 03-4568; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 10-KH-510.

Denied.

GUIDRY, J., recused.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Don O. JORDAN v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-1817.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 19, 2011.
   In re Jordan, Don O.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 08-619; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 10-KH-523.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Terry J. BRADLEY v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-1811.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 19, 2011.
   In re Bradley, Terry J.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 07-02-0096; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 KW 0976.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Bela ANDRASI. v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-1803.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 19, 2011.
   In re Andrasi, Bela; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 1-74-8047-1.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; cf. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4(D).


text:
    STATE ex rel. Carolyn MOORE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-1795.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 19, 2011.
   In re Moore, Carolyn; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 85-147; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 08-WR-1059.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Alvin BRATTON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-1794.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 19, 2011.
   In re Bratton, Alvin; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. 2, No. 196,603; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 45,-740-KH.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Samuel WILLIAMS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-1791.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 19, 2011.
   In re Williams, Samuel; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. A, No. 443-906; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2010-K-1010.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Derrick HANDY v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-1994.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 19, 2011.
   In re Handy, Derrick; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Ouachita, 4th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. F2148-2; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 45,-903-KH.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Guy FRANK v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-1989.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 19, 2011.
   In re Frank, Guy; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Divs. A, B, Nos. 374-843, 386-127, 405-072; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, Nos. 2003-K-1261, 2010-K-1096.

Denied. See State ex rel. Fleury v. State, 93-2898 (La.10/13/95), 661 So.2d 488.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Wilson JARROW v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-1988.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 19, 2011.
   In re Jarrow, Wilson; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 07-2349; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 10-KH-555.

Denied.

GUIDRY, J., recused.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Curtis SMITH v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-1853.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 19, 2011.
   In re Smith, Curtis; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Vermilion, 15th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 38601; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 10-00210.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Michael FERNANDEZ v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-1849.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 19, 2011.
   In re Fernandez, Michael; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Martin, 16th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 137,416; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 10-00561.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Vincent PRINCE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-1848.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 19, 2011.
   In re Prince, Vincent; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Landry, 27th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 94-K-4394; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 10-00500.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Juventino MUNOZ v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-1846.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 19, 2011.
   In re Munoz, Juventino; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. J, No. 93-6645; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 08-WR-930.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. David PUGH Jr. v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-1840.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 19, 2011.
   In re Pugh Jr., David; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. 3, No. 257-550; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 45,-739-KH.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Bret FORNEA v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-1718.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 19, 2011.
   In re Fornea, Bret; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. B, Nos. 209089, 265816, 260179, 260076; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 KW 0813.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


author: JUDE G. GRAVOIS, Judge. EDWARDS, J.,

text:
    Robert L. PHILLIPS, Sr. and Ilse Phillips v. Brandy BUSH, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, Hertz Claim Management Corporation, United Services Automobile Association, General Dynamics Corporation and/or General Dynamic Information Technology, Inc., and XYZ Insurance Company.
    No. 10-CA-821.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fifth Circuit.
    April 26, 2011.
    Michelle D. Robert, Jennifer G. Ahner, Attorneys at Law, New Orleans, LA, for Plaintiff/Appellee.
    Robert I. Siegel, Tara E. Clement, Attorneys at Law, New Orleans, LA, for Defendant/Appellant.
    Panel composed of Judges MARION F. EDWARDS, SUSAN M. CHEHARDY, and JUDE G. GRAVOIS.
   JUDE G. GRAVOIS, Judge.

|2The defendant, American Home Assurance Company, has appealed the summary judgment granted in favor of plaintiffs, Robert and Ilse Phillips. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff Robert Phillips, a resident of Arizona, was on a business trip in Louisiana for his employer General Dynamics Corporation (“General Dynamics”) when the rental car he was driving was rear-ended by a car being driven by another driver. As a result of this accident, Mr. Phillips and his wife filed suit against the insurer of General Dynamics, American Home Assurance Company (“American Home”) seeking to recover uninsured motorist (“UM”) benefits. American Home answered the suit denying that it provided UM benefits to General Dynamics.

^Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Summary Judgment requesting that the trial court find the UM rejection form signed by General Dynamics invalid because the rejection form did not contain the policy number of the General Dynamics policy. American Home filed a cross-motion for summary judgment seeking to have the rejection form declared valid and finding that the American Home policy did not provide UM coverage. After a hearing on the motions, the trial court found the UM rejection form invalid, thereby granting plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and denying American Home’s motion for summary judgment. This timely appeal of that judgment by American Home followed.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, the appellate court reviews evidence de novo; under such standard, the appellate court looks at pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, in making an independent determination that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Marigny v. Allstate Ins. Co., 95-0952 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1/31/96), 667 So.2d 1229, writ denied, 96-0693 (La.4/26/96), 672 So.2d 910. Because this case involves cross-motions for summary judgment, our task is to determine whether either party has established that there are no genuine issues of material fact and whether either party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Duncan v. U.S.A.A. Ins. Co., 06-0363 (La.11/29/06), 950 So.2d 544, 547. In conducting this de novo review, we are guided by the burdens of proof imposed upon a movant in a motion for summary judgment, which are set forth in C.C. P. art. 966(C)(2):

The burden of proof remains with the movant. However, if the movant will not bear the burden of proof at trial on the matter that is before the court on the motion for summary judgment, the movant’s | ¿burden on the motion does not require him to negate all essential elements of the adverse party’s claim, action, or defense, but rather to point out to the court that there is an absence of factual support for one or more elements essential to the adverse party’s claim, action, or defense. Thereafter, if the adverse party fails to produce factual support sufficient to establish that he will be able to satisfy his evidentiary burden of proof at trial, there is no genuine issue of material fact.

In their motion for summary judgment, plaintiffs contend that the UM rejection form signed by General Dynamics’ assistant treasurer John Wethern is not valid because the policy number is not contained on the form. Plaintiffs note that the line designated for the policy number reads: “All policies for the same first Named Insured”. Plaintiffs argue that these words clearly imply that General Dynamics had more than one policy of insurance with American Home, thus the waiver is invalid since it cannot be known which policy the waiver refers to.

In its cross-motion, American Home argues that the rejection form is valid because at the time the form was signed, the policy number was not yet known. In support of this position, American Home attached an affidavit from Mr. Wethern stating he had authority to reject UM coverage, that General Dynamics did not desire UM coverage, and that “[t]he insurance policy number for the policy associated with the Rejection Form, the July 1, 2003 through June 30, 2004 policy, was not available to me at the time I signed the form.”

LSA-R.S. 22:1295 governs the issuance of uninsured motorist coverage in Louisiana. LSA-R.S. 22:1295(l)(a)(ii) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

Such rejection, selection of lower limits, or selection of economic-only coverage shall be made only on a form prescribed by the commissioner of insurance. The prescribed form shall be provided by the insurer and signed by the named insured or his legal representative. The form signed by the named insured or his legal representative which initially rejects such coverage, selects lower limits, or selects economic-only coverage shall be conclusively presumed to become a part of the policy or contract when issued and delivered, irrespective of whether physically attached thereto. A properly completed and signed form creates a rebuttable presumption |5that the insured knowingly rejected coverage, selected a lower limit, or selected economic-only coverage. The form signed by the insured or his legal representative which initially rejects coverage, selects lower limits, or selects economic-only coverage shall remain valid for the life of the policy and shall not require the completion of a new selection form when a renewal, reinstatement, substitute, or amended policy is issued to the same named insured by the same insurer or any of its affiliates.

In Duncan, supra, the Louisiana Supreme Court addressed whether the UM coverage form, prescribed for selection of UM coverage by the commissioner of insurance, must contain the insurance policy number in order for a waiver to be effective. Therein, the UM coverage form, which was executed by the insured, contained a blank line for the policy number; no policy number appeared on this line. Duncan, 950 So.2d at 546. The Court found that the UM statute requires that the blank for the policy number contained on the insurance commissioner’s form be filled in to effectuate a valid waiver of UM coverage, concluding that “the failure to fill in the policy number on the form prescribed by the commissioner of insurance invalidates the UM waiver, and consequently, the UM coverage is equal to the liability limits of the policy.” Duncan, 950 So.2d at 554.

Since Duncan, the Supreme Court has concluded, however, that filling in the policy number is not essential to a valid UM coverage waiver when the policy number “does not exist at the time the UM waiver form is completed.” Carter v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 07-1294 (La.10/5/07), 964 So.2d 375, 376. Insurance Commissioner Bulletin LIRC 98-03 specifically provides, “[I]n the case where a policy number is not available, the space for the policy number may be left blank or a binder number may be inserted.” Further, in Gray v. American Nat. Property & Cas. Co., 07-1670 (La.2/26/08), 977 So.2d 839, 847, n. 2, the Court stated:

Following Duncan, this court acknowledged in Carter v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 07-1294 (La.10/5/97 [07]), 964 So.2d 375, that “the Commissioner of Insurance’s regulations specifically allow omission of the policy number if it does not exist at the time [the] UM waiver form is completed.” ... The record in this case indicates that the policy number was available when the UM selection form(s) were signed. Therefore, we will continue to refer to the “six tasks” necessary for a valid UM selection form in this case. We note however that a case where the policy number is not available, only five “tasks” would be necessary for a valid UM selection form.

In support of its contention that the policy number was not available at the time the rejection form was signed, American Home submitted the affidavit of Mr. Wethern, the person authorized to sign the form on behalf of General Dynamics. Plaintiffs contend that this argument is without merit since General Dynamics renewed this policy every year. Thus, plaintiffs conclude that a policy number was available to American Home at the time the waiver was signed.

This Court has followed Carter in several cases and found a UM rejection form valid when the policy number did not exist at the time of the execution of the rejection form. Flores v. Doe, 08-1259 (La.App. 5 Cir. 6/23/09), 19 So.3d 1196; Ferguson v. Bocskov, 07-924 (La.App. 5 Cir. 3/25/08), 983 So.2d 162; Baide v. Allen, 07-652 (La.App. 5 Cir. 12/11/07), 974 So.2d 688. However, in each of those cases, the UM rejection form was signed at the time the application for insurance was made. Further, in support of its position that the rejection form was valid, the insurer submitted an affidavit from its representative or employee which explained that the policy number does not exist at the time the rejection form was filed because it was filled out with the application for insurance.

The record in the instant case reflects that General Dynamic’s policy with American Home commenced on July 1, 2001 and was renewed on a yearly basis, although a different policy number was assigned to the policy by American Home |7for each renewal period. Accordingly, when the UM waiver form was signed by Mr. Weth-ern on June 30, 2003, he at least had available to him the policy number for the policy period from July 1, 2002 through June 30, 2003.

As stated above, the insurer bears the burden of proving a valid rejection of UM coverage. The plaintiff does not bear the burden of proving that the UM rejection form is invalid. For this reason, in the case at bar, plaintiffs were not required to negate all essential elements of American Home’s defense; rather they were just required to point out that there is an absence of support for one or more elements essential to American Home’s defense. See La. C.C.P. art. 966(C)(2). We find that the UM rejection form attached to the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment was sufficient to point out the absence of proof for an essential element of American Home’s defense, i.e., that the policy number was not included on the form. Once the plaintiffs pointed out the absence of proof of an essential element of American Home’s defense, the burden then shifted to American Home to produce factual support sufficient to establish that it would be able to carry its evidentiary burden of proof at trial. See La. C.C.P. art. 966(C)(2). Rather than oppose the motion, American Home filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. In an attempt to prove that the policy number was not available at the time the rejection form was signed, American Home attached the affidavit of the person authorized to reject UM coverage for General Dynamics attesting that a policy number was not available. However, the record is void of any evidence from the insurer, American Home, to establish that at the time the waiver was signed, American Home did not have a policy number available. Further, as indicated |8above, Mr. Wethern obviously had available to him the policy number for the policy period from July 1, 2002 through June 30, 2003 when he signed the UM waiver form on June 30, 2003. Thus, we find that American Home did not present sufficient evidence to show that a policy number was not available to it at the time the waiver was signed by Mr. Wethern.

CONCLUSION

Because American Home failed to carry its burden of producing factual support sufficient to establish that it would be able to satisfy its evidentiary burden of proof at trial, the trial court properly granted the summary judgment filed by plaintiffs and properly denied the cross-motion for summary judgment filed by American Home. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

AFFIRMED

EDWARDS, J., concurs with reasons.

EDWARDS, J.,

concurring.

hi concur in the finding that the UM waiver was invalid. However, I note for the record that the insurer’s principal, General Dynamics, is no longer a party to these proceedings.

      . Carter has been followed by other circuits as well. See, for example, Johnson v. Citizen, 07-1209 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/5/08) 978 So.2d 1087.

      . American Home does not dispute that the original policy that commenced on July 1, 2001 was renewed every year.

      . The affidavit further attests that at no time did General Dynamics "ever desire to obtain underinsured/uninsured motorist’s coverage in the State of Louisiana.” However, it is well settled that "the intent of the parties does not control in this area of the law.” Gray, supra, 977 So.2d at 849.

      . This holding pretermits a discussion of plaintiffs' argument relative to the language used by American Home on the line designated for policy number.