author: RANDOLPH, Justice, KITCHENS, Justice,

text:
    Daniel P. DARE, M.D. v. Sharon S. STOKES and Paul H. Stokes.
    No. 2010-CA-00023-SCT.
    Supreme Court of Mississippi.
    May 26, 2011.
    Holmes S. Adams, Ridgeland, Elizabeth Finlay Archer, John Simeon Hooks, Ridge-land, attorneys for appellant.
    Michael J. Malouf, William Edward Ballard, Jackson, attorneys for appellees.
   RANDOLPH, Justice,

for the Court:

¶ 1. Dr. Daniel Dare appeals from an adverse ruling of the Chancery Court of Warren County, Mississippi, denying his intervention in the modification of a property settlement agreement entered into by Paul and Sharon Stokes, which was incorporated into their judgment of divorce. The chancellor found that Dare did not have a legally protected interest in Paul and Sharon’s divorce. We agree.

FACTS

¶ 2. Paul and Sharon Stokes were married on May 25, 1985. On November 29, 1997, one child was born to the marriage. In October 2007, Sharon began having an affair with Dare. Shortly after the affair began, Paul filed for a divorce based on irreconcilable differences. On April 7, 2008, Paul amended his complaint, adding habitual cruel and inhuman treatment and adultery as grounds for the divorce.

¶ 3. On July 3, 2008, Paul and Sharon filed their joint motion to withdraw all contested pleadings and proceeded on irreconcilable-differences grounds. The chancellor then entered a final judgment of divorce which incorporated the child-custody and property-settlement agreement (“PSA”) “entered into” and “executed by” Paul and Sharon. The PSA specifically stated that it was “by and between” only Paul and Sharon “with respect to settlement of child custody, support, visitation, property rights and other matters.” “[F]or and in consideration of the mutual covenants” contained within the PSA, Paul and Sharon agreed, in pertinent part, as follows:

COVENANT NOT TO SUE. Husband hereby covenants and agrees that he will not sue, nor file any lawsuit or any legal action in any Court of this State, or in any Court of any jurisdiction, against Wife, or any other person, regarding any matters relating to the dissolution of their marriage, including any suit for any damages, including, but not limited to, alienation of affection.

¶ 4. On July 13, 2009, Paul filed a petition for modification of the PSA, seeking to delete the provision that barred him from bringing suit against “any other person” for “alienation of affection.” On August 19, 2009, the chancellor held a hearing on Paul’s petition for modification, which Sharon did not contest. The chancellor then entered an order modifying the “Covenant Not to Sue” section of the PSA “by deleting the words ‘or any other person.’ ”

¶ 5. On September 17, 2009, Dare received a letter from Paul’s counsel stating that Paul had retained him to pursue an action against Dare for alienation of affection. One month later, Dare filed a motion to intervene pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 24. At the hearing on December 10, 2009, the chancellor considered arguments from both Paul and Dare, then made a bench ruling denying Dare’s motion to intervene. In so ruling, the chancellor noted that Dare was not named in the original complaint for divorce, the amended complaint for divorce, or the PSA itself. The chancellor found that Dare had no legally cognizable interest in Paul and Sharon’s divorce.

¶ 6. Aggrieved by the chancellor’s denial of his motion to intervene, Dare appealed.

ANALYSIS

¶ 7. The chancery court’s denial of a motion for intervention of right is reviewed de novo. See Madison HMA, 35 So.3d at 1215. Under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 24, a putative intervenor must:

(1) ... make timely application, (2) ... have an interest in the subject matter of the action, (3) ... be so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect his interest, and (4) his interest must not already be adequately ... represented by existing parties.

Cohen v. Cohen, 748 So.2d 91, 93 (Miss. 1999) (citing Perry County v. Ferguson, 618 So.2d 1270, 1271 (Miss.1993); Guar. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Pittman, 501 So.2d 377, 381 (Miss.1987)).

¶ 8. The underlying “subject matter of the action” is Paul and Sharon’s divorce. Cohen, 748 So.2d at 93. In Hulett v. Hulett, 152 Miss. 476, 119 So. 581 (1928), we declared a rule which prohibits intervention by third parties in divorce proceedings, “in the absence of a statute permitting such intervention.... ” Id. at 585. See also N. Shelton Hand, Jr., Mississippi Divorce, Alimony, and Child Custody § 7.1, at 169 (5th ed. 1998) (“[Djivorce actions are for the exclusive use of the parties to the divorce itself. Third party intervention is not to be allowed.”). In Hulett, several men were accused of engaging in adulterous behavior and sought to intervene in the underlying divorce proceeding to file answers denying the allegations. See Hulett, 119 So. at 585. However, their “purpose for intervention was merely ... to deny the allegations and basically clear their good names.” Cohen, 748 So.2d at 95 (citing Hulett, 119 So. at 581). This was insufficient to allow third-party intervention in the divorce proceeding. See Hulett, 119 So. at 585.

¶ 9. In the eighty-two years since this rule was announced, the lone exception to that general rule is found in Cohen, a post-Rules decision which involved a “specific set of rare, unusual facts.” Cohen, 748 So.2d at 91. Edward Cohen sought and was granted a divorce from his first wife, then later married his second wife, Carolyn. See id. at 92. Shortly after the marriage, Edward’s first wife filed a motion to set aside the divorce. See id. As Carolyn was then married to Edward, she was faced with a most unique legal dilemma, not of her own making, and the potential of an outcome which would invalidate her marriage. Thus, Carolyn filed a motion to intervene, claiming she had an interest in the divorce proceedings. See id. at 93. This Court, recognizing the uniqueness of Carolyn’s quandary, granted a “rare exception” to the general rule prohibiting the intervention of third parties in divorce proceedings. Id. at 91, 96. Yet even in Cohen, we reiterated that this Court has long held that it is not permissible for a person “not a party to the suit, to intervene in a divorce suit.” Id. at 93 (quoting Hulett, 119 So. at 585). We emphasized that “there would seldom be factual situations which would warrant intervention by a third party in a divorce proceeding^]” and that Cohen “should not be construed to routinely allow third party interventions. Hulett remains valid law as it relates to most attempts at intervention in divorce proceedings by third parties.” Id. at 96.

¶ 10. Contrary to the dissent’s assertions otherwise, the facts presented here do not rise to the level required to overcome the general prohibition to the intervention of third parties in divorce proceedings, as decreed in Cohen. Divorce is between two individuals, a husband and a wife. In Cohen, it was clear that the third party had a real interest in the divorce proceedings. See id. If the divorce had been set aside, the second marriage would have been void. But Dare has no analogous legally protected interest in the present divorce proceedings. As the chancellor found, the PSA was a contract between, and for the benefit of, Paul and Sharon. Dare was not named in the PSA, and it provides for no legal obligations or duties owed expressly to Dare. As such, intervention is inappropriate. The circumstances that will warrant an exception to the general rule that third parties cannot intervene in divorce proceedings must be limited to the most unique circumstances. The chancellor’s denial of Dare’s motion to intervene comports with this principle. Moreover, given Dare’s attempt to in-termeddle in the divorce proceedings, after having meddled with the marital relationship of Paul and Sharon Stokes, justice hardly “demands intervention” by Dare. Id. (in Cohen, this Court held that “justice demands intervention by Carolyn.”). We reiterate that Cohen “should not be construed to routinely allow third-party interventions. Hulett remains valid law as it relates to most attempts at intervention in divorce proceedings by third parties.” Id.

CONCLUSION

¶ 11. The Chancery Court of Warren County’s denial of Dare’s motion to intervene is thus affirmed.

¶ 12. AFFIRMED.

WALLER, C.J., CARLSON AND DICKINSON, P.JJ., LAMAR, CHANDLER, PIERCE AND KING, JJ., CONCUR. KITCHENS, J„ DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION.

KITCHENS, Justice,

dissenting:

¶ 13. I must respectfully dissent. While I agree with the majority that Cohen v. Cohen, 748 So.2d 91 (Miss.1999), controls, I would find that intervention is appropriate. Dr. Dare has a legally cognizable interest that was not adequately protected by the parties to the modification of the divorce decree, and he should therefore be allowed to intervene.

¶ 14. As the majority rightly reports, this Court, in Cohen, 748 So.2d 91, examined the doctrine regarding third-party intervention in divorce proceedings. While it approved of the general application of the holding in Hulett v. Hulett, 152 Miss. 476, 119 So. 581, 585 (1928), i.e., that third-party intervention is prohibited in divorce proceedings, Cohen disapproved a formalistic or mechanical approach that would unnecessarily bar intervention in every instance. “The general rule prohibits intervention by third parties in divorce casesf,] Hulett v. Hulett, 152 Miss. 476,119 So. 581 (1928)[;] however, rare exceptions which are distinguished do exist.” Cohen, 748 So.2d at 92. Thus, Cohen clearly allows, indeed requires, intervention in divorce cases in those rare instances in which a third party can demonstrate “an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action and he is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant’s interest is adequately represented by existing parties.” Id. at 93 (quoting M.R.C.P. 24(a)(2)).

¶ 15. Most divorce cases do not seriously implicate the interests of strangers to the marriage. There is, however, no ontological distinction that separates a domestic dispute from other equitable matters before a trial court. The fact that marriage is a compact between two persons and the fact that divorce dissolves that compact do not foreclose the possibility that the activities of the parties to the compact, or other circumstances, may drag significant interests of other persons into the dispute. Where the facts of the case show that the third party can meet the four-part test outlined by Cohen, the court should allow intervention.

¶ 16. There is nothing routine about the posture of this case. A cursory examination of the facts clearly shows that Dr. Dare’s motion met the requirements for intervention as of right under Rule 24 of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure. He plainly has an interest in the subject matter; the relevant clause of the property settlement contemplates a class of potential defendants of which he is a member. Indeed, the abstract language of the clause notwithstanding, the class of potential defendants reasonably could be construed as a class of one, namely, Dr. Dare. If the clause had in fact named Dr. Dare as a potential defendant, the question of whether he should be allowed to intervene instantly would be answered in the affirmative. But there is no requirement that a third-party beneficiary to a contract be named in the document, and it is well settled that “[a] third person may enforce a promise made for his benefit even though he is a stranger to the contract or to the consideration.” Miss. High School Activities Ass’n, Inc. v. Farris By and Through Farris, 501 So.2d 393, 395-96 (Miss.1987) (citing Bums v. Washington Savings, 251 Miss. 789, 171 So.2d 322, 324 (1965)). Unlike the intervenors in Hulett, 119 So. at 585, whose only interest was the protection of their reputations in their community, this clause, as originally incorporated, relieved Dr. Dare of considerable potential liability for both actual and punitive damages under an alienation of affection claim. The disposition of Paul Stokes’s motion to strike that clause, once granted, impeded Dr. Dare’s very real interest in not being sued and not merely his intangible reputation. And it is obvious that neither Paul nor Sharon Stokes acted to protect that interest for Dr. Dare. The majority implicitly recognizes Dr.. Dare’s obvious interest in this decree in its disapproval of his “attempt to intermeddle in the divorce proceedings, after having meddled with the marital relationship.” Maj. Op. at ¶ 10.

¶ 17. As Dr. Dare clearly has an interest in the subject matter that is not protected by the parties, and as the disposition will impede his ability to protect his interest in not being sued, I would reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings consistent with the foregoing analysis.

      . Regarding the denial of a motion for permissive intervention, an abuse-of-discretion standard of review is applied. See Madison HMA, Inc. v. St. Dominic-Jackson Mem'l Hosp., 35 So.3d 1209, 1215 (Miss.2010).

      . This fact renders the dissent’s argument on "[i]f the clause had in fact named [Dare] as a potential defendant,” inapposite. (Diss. Op. at ¶ 16).


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: CHANDLER, Justice,

license: Public Domain

text:
    Dennis TAYLOR v. STATE of Mississippi.
    No. 2010-KA-00807-SCT.
    Supreme Court of Mississippi.
    June 2, 2011.

      Office of Indigent Appeals by George T. Holmes, Leslie S. Lee, Jackson, attorneys for appellant.
    Office of the Attorney General by W. Glenn Watts, Scott Stuart, Jackson, attorneys for appellee.
    Before CARLSON, P.J., LAMAR and CHANDLER, JJ.
   CHANDLER, Justice,

for the Court:

¶ 1. On April 7, 2010, Dennis Taylor was convicted by a Lincoln County jury of one count of robbery pursuant to Mississippi Code Section 97-3-73 and one count of conspiracy pursuant to Mississippi Code Section 97 — 1—l(i). Taylor was sentenced to fifteen years, three suspended, for robbery, and five years, all five suspended, for conspiracy. The sentences were set to run consecutively. Arguing the verdicts were against the weight and sufficiency of the evidence, Taylor appealed to this Court. Finding no error, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW

¶2. On May 15, 2009, Dennis Taylor, Lakesha Bledsoe (Nussie), and Emmanuel Smith, Jr. (Bubblehead) were indicted for robbery of J & B Handy Mart, Inc. (Handy Mart), located in Brookhaven, Mississippi, in violation of Mississippi Code Section 97-3-73, and conspiracy to rob the Handy Mart in violation of Mississippi Code Section 97-1-1.

¶ 3. The robbery occurred on December 29, 2008. The Handy Mart clerks on duty during the robbery, Tequierra Wells and Holly Sutton, testified to what transpired on that date. Wells said she had turned on the gas pump for several individuals, and after getting gas, they drove off without paying. Later that day, three individuals, whom she recognized as the ones who had driven off without paying for gas, came inside the Handy Mart. Wells stepped outside in an effort to see their car, but it was not in view, so she went back inside the store.

¶ 4. Shortly after entering the Handy Mart, one of the individuals went to the back of the store to get beer, while the other two individuals waited at the front of the store. One of the individuals walked around the corner where the clerks were standing and said, “If we didn’t give him the money that he was going to take our lives.” Wells testified that she and Sutton first refused to give him money, but ultimately opened the cash drawer, because the man said, “I’m not going to tell you again. Open that drawer now or you and the other girl will not live to see the next day.” The man took the money when Sutton opened the cash register, and the three robbers left the store. Wells testified she gave the three individuals the money only because she was scared. She quit her job after this incident. Sutton also never returned to work at the Handy Mart. A few days before trial, Wells identified Taylor as the man who had threatened her and Sutton, from a photograph shown to her by police.

¶ 5. According to passengers in the car occupied by the robbers, the following events took place. On December 29, 2008, Marcus Lee, Taylor, Nussie, and Bubble-head went to the Handy Mart in Lee’s gold Chrysler and stole gas. They then returned to Kimberly Black’s residence. Tina Dixon was staying with Black. The two girls joined the group, and they returned to the Handy Mart in Lee’s gold Chrysler.

¶6. When they arrived at the Handy Mart, Taylor, Nussie, and Bubblehead got out of the car and said they were going inside to buy something. Dixon testified that Taylor was wearing a towel on his head. Bubblehead came out with two cases of beer, and Nussie and Taylor were saying, “we did it.” Lee also testified that Nussie said, “we did it,” as she was getting into the car. Dixon and Black asked to get out of the car, because they wanted nothing to do with a robbery.

¶ 7. Taylor said he was upset that no one “had his back” during the robbery, but Nussie assured Taylor she “had his back.” From the Handy Mart, the passengers went to the Hilltop Motel in Hazelhurst. Dixon and Black stayed in a room, while Taylor, Bubblehead, and Nussie shared a room. Taylor, Bubblehead, and Nussie shared the money from the robbery. After spending the night at the Hilltop Motel, the passengers went to a mall in Jackson. Taylor and Nussie bought clothing. After leaving the mall in Jackson, the passengers returned to Brookhaven, where they learned the police were looking for them.

¶ 8. Taylor testified in his own defense, and stated he was living in New Hebron, Mississippi, at the time of the robbery. He said he had lived in Lincoln County for only a short period of time when he became involved in a romantic relationship with a girl named Jessica. He claimed that he had heard about the robbery, but denied having been involved. Taylor testified to having a close, brotherly relationship with Bubblehead, and to having had sexual relationships with both Dixon and Black. He said he was not with the people who had robbed the Handy Mart, and he had not traveled to Jackson with any of the passengers in Lee’s car. He said he would not “hang out with” the likes of Lee.

¶ 9. Taylor watched the video surveillance of the Handy Mart, and referring to the person with the towel over his head, Taylor stated, “It ain’t even my style of walking or style of dressing or none of that.” Taylor testified that in December 2008, he was a scaffold builder and was working out of town.

¶ 10. The parties stipulated that Bonnie Holmes and her husband owned the Handy Mart, and that approximately $1,200 had been stolen from the store. After the State rested, the defense moved for directed verdicts of acquittal, which were denied. All three defendants were found guilty on both charges. Taylor was sentenced to fifteen years, three suspended, for robbery, and five years, all five suspended, for conspiracy. The sentences were set to run consecutively.

DISCUSSION

I. Whether there was sufficient evidence that Taylor participated in a conspiracy.

¶ 11. Taylor asserts there was not sufficient evidence to prove he conspired to rob the Handy Mart. We disagree. In determining whether the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict, the relevant question is whether, “after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Bush v. State, 895 So.2d 836, 843 (Miss.2005) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979)). “If the facts and inferences so considered point in favor of the defendant on any element of the offense with sufficient force that reasonable [jurors] could not have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty, granting the motion [for judgment not withstanding the verdict] is required.” Bush, 895 So.2d at 843 (citing Edwards v. State, 469 So.2d 68, 70 (Miss.1985) (citing May v. State, 460 So.2d 778, 781 (Miss.1984))).

¶ 12. To determine whether the evidence was sufficient to support a conspiracy conviction, we turn to Mississippi Code Section 97-1-1 (i), which states, “If two (2) or more persons conspire either: (a) to commit a crime; or ... (h) to accomplish any unlawful purpose, or a lawful purpose by an unlawful means; such persons and each of them, shall be guilty of a felony-” Miss.Code Ann. § 97-1-1 (i) (Rev. 2006). It is undisputed that a crime occurred, therefore, subsection (a) has been met. It is also undisputed that more than one person participated in the robbery of the Handy Mart. Therefore, this Court is charged with the task of determining whether the evidence was sufficient to find Taylor conspired with another individual or individuals to commit the robbery.

¶ 13. This Court has held that parties entering into a conspiracy must understand “they are entering into a common plan and knowingly intend to further its common purpose.” Griffin v. State, 480 So.2d 1124, 1126 (Miss.1985) (citing McDonald v. State, 454 So.2d 488, 495 (Miss.1984)). “The agreement need not be formal or express, but may be inferred from the circumstances, particularly by declarations, acts, and conduct of the alleged conspirators.” Griffin, 480 So.2d at 1126. See also Clayton v. State, 582 So.2d 1019 (Miss.1991).

¶ 14. There is direct evidence- that Taylor, Nussie, and Bubblehead walked into the Handy Mart; while one served as lookout, one took beer, and the other took money. The three argued over who had whose back while robbing the Handy Mart. Later, the three divided the money.

¶ 15. After the robbery, Nussie said, “we did it.” Although Taylor asserts this statement was incomplete, because Nussie did not specify what “it” was, we find her statement sufficient to prove conspiracy. The trial judge stated,

... There has been testimony to the effect of, we did it, which would tend to prove that there was a conspiracy between one or more persons to commit that crime ... there is testimony that corroborates the manner in which the crime was carried out.... There is testimony with regard to a dispute among the alleged conspirators as to their levels of participation.

¶ 16. In a similar case, Ellis v. State, 778 So.2d 114, 118 (Miss.2000), this Court stated:

Here there is testimony that three individuals were riding in the car together. The driver asks one of the passengers is he about to “do that,” to which the passenger replies that he is about to “do that” now ... the driver asked the first passenger if he had done that, to which he replied in the affirmative ... these facts would allow a rational jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Ellis and Holden had conspired to kill Johnson.

The language “do that” was sufficient to establish a conspiracy in Ellis, and “we did it,” in conjunction with the other evidence in this case, is- enough for a rational jury to find that Taylor, Nussie, and Bubblehead entered into a conspiracy to rob the Handy Mart.

¶ 17. Taylor argues this case is synonymous with Johnson v. State, 642 So.2d 924 (Miss.1994). In that case, Johnson was asked by an undercover agent to find a source for cocaine. Johnson then took the agent to the home of a man named Spruill. Id. at 926. Johnson and the agent asked Spruill to sell them cocaine, and Spruill sold drugs to the agent. Id. Johnson was convicted of conspiracy to sell cocaine. This Court reversed Johnson’s conspiracy conviction, finding insufficient evidence that Spruill and Johnson had conspired, because Spruill did not know Johnson would bring an individual to his house to buy cocaine. Johnson, 642 So.2d at 928. In this case, there is evidence the three perpetrators were knowingly involved in a common plan to commit robbery.

¶ 18. In Glenn v. State, 996 So.2d 148, 150 (Miss.Ct.App.2008), Glenn, the driver of the car, was convicted of conspiracy to commit attempted armed robbery. The Court of Appeals held:

The evidence was sufficient to establish Glenn’s guilt of each element of conspiracy. The evidence also was sufficient to enable a reasonable juror to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Glenn-knowing of the plan to rob the bank-drove Green, Daniels, and Smith to the bank, waited for them outside, and then served as the getaway driver.
Id. at 157. In Glenn, serving as getaway driver was enough to uphold a guilty verdict Id. at 157. There is substantially more evidence to support the jury’s verdict in this case. Taylor went into the Handy Mart with two other active participants in the robbery, helped robbed the store, and assumed the role of getaway driver. Taylor, Nussie, and Bubblehead then discussed “who had Taylor’s back” during the robbery and divided the money three ways.

¶ 19. In Carr v. State, 208 So.2d 886, 889 (Miss.1968), the Court held “to sustain a conviction, the evidence must show beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused committed the act charged, and that he did so under such circumstances that every element of the offense existed.” There was evidence Taylor knew of the plan to rob the Handy Mart and proceeded to act out the plan and serve as getaway driver. The evidence shows that Taylor, Nussie, and Bubblehead entered into an agreement to rob the Handy Mart. Because every element of the conspiracy statute has been met, the evidence is sufficient for a reasonable jury to have found Taylor guilty of conspiracy.

II. Whether the verdicts are against the overwhelming weight of the evidence.

¶ 20. Taylor argues the conspiracy verdict is against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Mississippi Code Section 97 — 1—l(i) states, “[i]f two (2) or more persons conspire either: (a) to commit a crime; or ... (h) to accomplish any unlawful purpose, or a lawful purpose by any unlawful means; such persons, and each of them, shall be guilty of a felony....” Miss Code Ann. § 97 — 1—1 (i) (Rev.2006). It has been established that Taylor and two others entered into a plan to commit a crime. The evidence clearly supports all elements of the conspiracy statute.

¶ 21. Taylor also asserts the robbery conviction is unsupported by the weight of the evidence. “When reviewing a denial of a motion for a new trial based on an objection to the weight of the evidence, we will only disturb a verdict when it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence that to allow it to stand would sanction an unconscionable injustice.” Bush, 895 So.2d at 844 (citing Herring v. State, 691 So.2d 948, 957 (Miss. 1997)). The evidence should be viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict. Dilworth v. State, 909 So.2d 731, 737 (Miss. 2005). The trial court will grant a new trial “only in exceptional cases in which the evidence preponderates heavily against the verdict.” Id. (citing Amiker v. Drugs for Less, Inc., 796 So.2d 942, 947 (Miss.2000)).

¶22. Applying this standard, we find that the verdict was not against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Mississippi Code Section 97-3-73 states, “Every person who shall feloniously take the personal property of another, in his presence or from his person and against his will, by violence to his person or by putting such person in fear of some immediate injury to his person, shall be guilty of robbery.” Miss.Code Ann. § 97-3-73 (Rev.2006).

¶ 23. The sum of $1,200 was taken from the Handy Mart; this was personal property of Bonnie Holmes and her husband. Both store clerks testified that Taylor demanded they give him the money several times, and ultimately insisted the money be given to him or the clerks would not “live to see another day.” Both clerks were afraid for their lives due to Taylor’s threats. The frightening experience caused both clerks to quit their jobs.

¶ 24. Taylor argues there was no showing of possible immediate injury to the clerks. He cites Clayton v. State, 759 So.2d 1169, 1172 (Miss.1999), arguing Clayton was not convicted of robbery because he did not take action “intending to intimidate.” In Clayton, Clayton walked behind a woman and snatched her purse. The victim was never put in fear, because she did not see Clayton coming and he did not speak to her. Id. But, in this case, Taylor walked behind the counter at the Handy Mart to where the clerks were standing, and he continually threatened their lives until they gave him money.

¶ 25. Taylor next asserts that, even if the clerks were in fear, there is no causal connection between being placed in fear and relinquishing the money. But Wells testified that fear was the only reason they gave money to Taylor.

CONCLUSION

¶26. The evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s verdicts on both charges, and the verdicts were not against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. For these reasons, we affirm.

¶ 27. COUNT I: CONVICTION OF ROBBERY AND SENTENCE OF FIFTEEN (15) YEARS IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, WITH THE FIRST TWELVE (12) YEARS TO SERVE AND WITH THREE (3) YEARS SUSPENDED ON POST RELEASE SUPERVISION, WITH CONDITIONS, AFFIRMED. COUNT II: CONVICTION OF CONSPIRACY AND SENTENCE OF FIVE (5) YEARS IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, SUSPENDED ON POST RELEASE SUPERVISION, AFFIRMED. SENTENCE IN COUNT II SHALL RUN CONSECUTIVELY TO THE SENTENCE IN COUNT I.

WALLER, C.J., CARLSON AND DICKINSON, P.JJ., RANDOLPH, LAMAR, KITCHENS, PIERCE AND KING, JJ., CONCUR.

      . Bledsoe (Nussie) and Smith (Bubblehead) will be referred to by nickname to avoid confusion, as they are referred to by nickname throughout the proceeding.


author: WALLER, Chief Justice,

text:
    The MISSISSIPPI COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE v. Talmadge LITTLEJOHN.
    No. 2010-JP-01954-SCT.
    Supreme Court of Mississippi.
    June 9, 2011.

      Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance by John B. Toney, Ayanna B. Butler, attorney for appellant.
    Jack F. Dunbar, attorney for Appellee.
   WALLER, Chief Justice,

for the Court:

¶ 1. The Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance moves this Court to publicly reprimand Talmadge D. Little-john, chancery court judge for the First Chancery District of Mississippi, for misusing the powers of contempt and to assess him the costs of this proceeding in the amount of $100. Judge Littlejohn has admitted all charges of misconduct and joins the Commission’s recommendations. After conducting an independent inquiry of the record and giving careful consideration to the findings of fact and recommendations of the Commission, we adopt the agreed-upon sanctions.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2. On October 11, 2010, the Commission filed a formal complaint charging Judge Littlejohn with judicial misconduct in violation of Article 6, Section 177A of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890, as amended. On November 12, 2010, Judge Littlejohn and the Commission joined in an Agreed Statement of Facts and Proposed Recommendation. According to the agreed statement, on or about October 6, 2010, Judge Littlejohn, acting in his official capacity as chancery judge, ordered that attorney Danny Lampley be incarcerated for criminal contempt after Lampley refused to recite the “Pledge of Allegiance to the American Flag” in open court. Rather than verbally recite the pledge, Lampley chose to stand quietly. The record contains no proof that Lampley said or did anything to disrupt court proceedings, subvert justice, or embarrass the court. Judge Littlejohn admits that his actions violated Lampley’s First Amendment rights as recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 63 S.Ct. 1178, 87 L.Ed. 1628 (1943). The Commission and Judge Little-john jointly recommend that Judge Little-john be publicly reprimanded and assessed costs of this proceeding in the amount of $100.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 3. In reviewing judicial misconduct cases, this Court conducts an “ ‘independent inquiry of the record,’” and in doing so, “ ‘accord[s] careful consideration [of] the findings of fact and recommendations of the Commission, or its committee, which has had an opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses.’” Miss. Comm’n on Judicial Performance v. Boone, 60 So.3d 172, 176 (Miss.2011) (citing In re Removal of Lloyd W. Anderson, Justice Court Judge, 412 So.2d 743, 746 (Miss.1982)).

DISCUSSION

I. Judge Littlejohn violated Canons 1, 2A, 3B(2), 3B(4), and 3B(8) of the Mississippi Code of Judicial Conduct, thus causing this matter to be actionable under Article 6, Section 177A of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890, as amended.

¶ 4. The Commission and Judge Littlejohn acknowledge that he violated Canons 1, 2A, 3B(2), 3B(4), and 3B(8) of the Mississippi Code of Judicial Conduct.

A. Canons 1, 3B(2), and 3B(k)

¶ 5. Canon 1 states:

An independent and honorable judiciary is indispensable to justice in our society. A judge should participate in establishing, maintaining, and enforcing high standards of conduct, and shall personally observe those standards so that the integrity and independence of the judiciary will be preserved. The provisions of this Code should be construed and applied to further that objective.

¶ 6. Canon 3B(2) states, “[a] judge shall be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence in it. A judge shall not be swayed by partisan interests, public clamor, or fear of criticism.” And, finally, Canon 3B(8) provides that “[a] judge shall dispose of all judicial matters promptly, efficiently and fairly.”

¶ 7. The Commission found that Judge Littlejohn had violated Canons 1, 3B(2), and 3B(8) when he held Lampley in criminal contempt for failing to recite the pledge of allegiance in open court. These actions, according to the Commission, infringed upon Lampley’s right to free speech under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642, 63 S.Ct. 1178. Judge Little-john thus compromised the integrity and independence of the judiciary and violated his adjudicative responsibilities to be faithful to the law and to dispose of all judicial matters fairly.

B. Canons 2A and 3B(h)

¶8. Canon 2A provides that “[a] judge shall respect and comply with the law and shall act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.” Canon 3B(4) states that “[j]udges shall be patient, dignified, and courteous to litigants, jurors, witnesses, lawyers, and others with whom they deal in their official capacities, and shall require similar conduct of lawyers, and of their staffs, court officials, and others subject to their direction and control.”

¶ 9. The Commission found that Judge Littlejohn had violated Canons 2A and 3B(4) by incarcerating Lampley for expressing his First Amendment rights. The Commission stated that Judge Little-john was “discourteous and intolerant” toward Lampley, and that his actions created an impression that individuals with certain viewpoints are specially positioned to influence him.

¶ 10. We agree that Judge Littlejohn violated Canons 1, 2A, 3B(2), 3B(4), and 3B(8) of the Mississippi Code of Judicial Conduct. Article 6, Section 177A of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890, as amended, authorizes this Court to “remove from office, suspend, fine or publicly censure or reprimand any justice or judge of this state for: ... (e) conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice which brings the judicial office into disrepute_” Miss. Const, art. 6, § 177A. The Commission and Judge Littlejohn acknowledge, and we agree, that his actions were prejudicial to the administration of justice and that they brought the judicial office into disrepute.

II. Judge Littlejohn’s actions warrant a public reprimand and assessment of costs in the amount of $100.

¶ 11. To determine the appropriate sanction in judicial misconduct cases, this Court considers several criteria, known as the Gibson factors:

(1) the length and character of the judge’s public service; (2) whether there is any prior case law on point; (3) the magnitude of the offense and the harm suffered; (4) whether the misconduct is an isolated incident or evidences a pattern of conduct; (5) whether moral turpitude was involved: and (6) the presence or absence of mitigating or aggravating circumstances.

Miss. Comm’n on Judicial Performance v. Gibson, 883 So.2d 1155, 1158 (Miss.2004), overruled in part on other grounds by Boone, 60 So.3d at 174.

A. The length and character of the judge’s public service

¶ 12. Judge Littlejohn has been a member of the Mississippi Bar for fifty years, a municipal judge for sixteen years, and a chancery judge for eight years. He also has served as a district attorney and a member of the Mississippi House of Representatives and Senate.

B. Prior caselaw

¶ 13. This Court repeatedly has sanctioned judges for misusing contempt powers. In Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance v. Walker, 565 So.2d 1117, 1125-26 (Miss.1990), we publicly reprimanded a judge who held in contempt and incarcerated an attorney for making statements which the judge found offensive, but which were not directed at the authority of the court. Likewise, in Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance v. Sanders, 749 So.2d 1062, 1067-1069, 1073 (Miss.1999), this Court publicly reprimanded and assessed costs to a judge for failing to use the appropriate procedure before incarcerating a clerk of court for contempt.

C.The magnitude of the offense and the harm suffered

¶ 14. “Immeasurable harm occurs when a judge who is trusted as the gatekeeper to justice for all our citizens, fails to learn and apply fundamental tenets of the law.” Miss. Comm’n on Judicial Performance v. Britton, 936 So.2d 898, 906 (Miss.2006). The First Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees Lampley the right to remain silent during the pledge. See Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642, 63 S.Ct. 1178. Judge Littlejohn violated both Lampley’s right of free speech and the law of contempt when he incarcerated Lampley. This abuse of the judicial office harmed Lampley by forcing him to endure five hours of unjustified incarceration.

¶ 15. Judge Littlejohn’s actions also injured the integrity and independence of the judiciary. His intolerance toward Lampley created the impression that individuals with certain viewpoints are in a special position to influence Judge Little-john. Furthermore, the incident was broadcast by numerous local, state, and national media, which further damaged public perception of the judiciary.

D.An isolated incident or a pattern of conduct

¶ 16. Littlejohn’s actions were an isolated incident and do not evidence a pattern of conduct.

E.Moral turpitude

¶ 17. Moral turpitude includes, but is not limited to, actions which involve interference with the administration of justice, misrepresentation, fraud, deceit, bribery, extortion, or other such conduct that brings the judiciary into disrepute. Miss. Comm’n on Judicial Performance v. Bradford, 18 So.3d 251, 256 (Miss.2009) (citing Gibson, 883 So.2d at 1157). However, actions that interfere with the administration of justice or which bring the judiciary into disrepute do not automatically involve moral turpitude. Miss. Comm’n on Judicial Performance v. Roberts, 952 So.2d 934, 942 (Miss.2007). This Court has clarified that moral turpitude exists when judges abuse the legal system in a manner that violates fundamental standards of decency and honesty. Miss. Comm’n on Judicial Performance v. Sanford, 941 So.2d 209, 217 (Miss.2006).

¶ 18. The Commission and Judge Litt-lejohn acknowledge that his conduct did not involve moral turpitude. We adopt these findings because Judge Littlejohn did not misuse the legal system in a way that violates fundamental decency and honesty, nor did his conduct involve fraud, misrepresentation, extortion, or other similar conduct.

F.The presence or absence of mitigating or aggravating factors

¶ 19. Several mitigating factors exist. First, Judge Littlejohn willingly admitted his misconduct and cooperated fully with the Commission in its investigation. Second, Judge Littlejohn entered into an agreed statement with the Commission without the requirement of a hearing, which brought a prompt resolution of the matter. Third, Judge Littlejohn has changed the way he conducts the recitation of the pledge in court. From this point forward, he promises to respect and protect the First Amendment rights of anyone who refrains from reciting the pledge in his courtroom.

CONCLUSION

¶ 20. Judge Littlejohn violated Canons 1, 2A, 3B(2), 3B(4), and 3B(8) of the Mississippi Code of Judicial Conduct, and his actions constituted conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice which brought the judicial office into disrepute under Article 6, Section 177A of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890, as amended. After conducting an independent review of the record and according careful consideration to the findings of fact and recommendations of the Commission, this Court agrees that Judge Littlejohn should be publicly reprimanded and assessed costs of this proceeding in the amount of $100.

¶ 21. CHANCERY COURT JUDGE TALMADGE D. LITTLEJOHN SHALL BE PUBLICLY REPRIMANDED IN OPEN COURT BY THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF UNION COUNTY ON THE FIRST DAY OF THE NEXT TERM OF THAT COURT IN WHICH A JURY VENIRE IS PRESENT, WITH JUDGE LITTLE-JOHN PRESENT, FOLLOWING THE ISSUANCE OF THE MANDATE OF THIS COURT. JUDGE LITTLEJOHN IS ASSESSED COSTS OF $100.

CARLSON AND DICKINSON, P.JJ., RANDOLPH, LAMAR, KITCHENS, CHANDLER, PIERCE AND KING, JJ., CONCUR.

      . See, e.g., Miss. Comm’n on Judicial Performance v. Willard, 788 So.2d 736, 742-46 (Miss. 2001) (judge removed from office for several violations, including misuse of contempt powers); Miss. Comm’n on Judicial Performance v. Gunter, 797 So.2d 988, 989-92 (Miss.2001) (judge fined, publicly reprimanded, and assessed-costs for misusing contempt powers and treating a minor defendant intemperately); Miss. Comm’n on Judicial Performance v. Byers, 757 So.2d 961, 963, 970-73 (Miss. 2000) (judge fined, publicly reprimanded, and assessed costs for multiple offenses, the most serious of which was abuse of contempt powers).


author: ISHEE, J„

text:
    Harold Donell HARGETT a/k/a Junior, Appellant v. STATE of Mississippi, Appellee.
    No. 2008-KP-00958-COA.
    Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
    Sept. 7, 2010.
    Rehearing Denied Dec. 14, 2010.

      Harold Donell Hargett, Pro Se.
    Office of the Attorney General by Jeffrey A. Klingfuss, Jackson, attorney for appellee.
    Before MYERS, P.J., ISHEE and ROBERTS, JJ.
   ISHEE, J„

for the Court:

¶ 1. A Pike County grand jury indicted Harold Hargett for the sale of less than thirty grams of marijuana and the sale of ten dosage units of hydrocodone in violation of Mississippi Code Annotated section 41-29-139 (Rev.2009). Hargett was found guilty by a jury on both charges. The circuit court sentenced Hargett as a habitual offender to six years for the sale of marijuana and sixty years for the sale of hydrocodone, with the sentences to run concurrently, all in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC). After denial of his post-trial motions, Hargett timely appeals. Finding no error, we affirm.

FACTS

¶ 2. The Mississippi Bureau of Narcotics (MBN) was contacted by confidential informants who stated that one of them could buy marijuana and hydrocodone from Har-gett. The informant further stated that he knew Hargett and that he already had spoken to him about a possible drug purchase. MBN agents Chad Griffen and Sheldon Jolliff arranged for the informant to attempt to make a drug purchase from Hargett at Hargett’s house.

¶ 3. Upon arrival at the house, the informant, wearing an audio monitoring device, entered the house and inquired about the purchase of marijuana and hydrocodone. The purchase was made, and the informant identified Hargett as the seller.

DISCUSSION

I. Prior Acts

¶ 4. In his initial allegation of error, Hargett points to four specific instances where the State either mentioned or elicited evidence or testimony referencing prior crimes, wrongs, or bad acts in violation of the trial court’s ruling on a motion in limine. While Hargett ably cites the applicable law, he has failed to consider the many exceptions to Mississippi Rule of Evidence 404(b).

¶ 5. The standard of review regarding the admission or exclusion of evidence is abuse of discretion. Jones v. State, 904 So.2d 149, 152 (¶ 7) (Miss.2005). The admissibility of evidence rests within the discretion of the trial court, and reversal will be appropriate only when an abuse of discretion resulting in prejudice to the accused occurs. Clemons v. State, 732 So.2d 883, 887 (¶ 18) (Miss.1999).

¶ 6. Generally, evidence of a crime, other than the one for which the accused is being tried, is not admissible. Palmer v. State, 939 So.2d 792, 795 (¶ 8) (Miss.2006). However, there are exceptions to this general rule as provided by Mississippi Rule of Evidence 404(b), which states:

Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.

¶ 7. Further, evidence of other crimes or bad acts also is admissible to tell the complete story so as not to confuse the jury. Palmer, 939 So.2d at 795 (¶ 9); Ballenger v. State, 667 So.2d 1242, 1257 (Miss. 1995). “[T]he State has a legitimate interest in telling a rational and coherent story of what happened. Where substantially necessary to present to the jury the complete story of the crime, evidence or testimony may be given even though it may reveal or suggest other crimes.” Palmer, 939 So.2d at 795 (¶ 9) (citations and quotation marks omitted).

¶ 8. “Even where evidence of other crimes is admissible under [Rule] 404(b), it [cannot] be admitted unless it also passes muster under [Mississippi Rule of Evidence] 403. That is, the risk of undue prejudice must not substantially outweigh its probative value.” Ballenger, 667 So.2d at 1257. As noted above, Hargett points to four specific instances where he felt the State had violated Rule 404(b). However, after a full and careful review of the record, it is clear that each questioned instance falls squarely within the exceptions provided in Rule 404(b). Accordingly, Hargett’s first allegation of error is without merit.

II. Peremptory Strike

¶ 9. In his second allegation of error, Hargett asserts that, due to the trial court’s failure to strike a juror for cause, he was forced to strike said juror, and consequently, he was unable to strike a subsequent juror due to no remaining challenges. Unfortunately, his claim of error in the jury selection is without basis in the record. Hargett struck five other jurors after he had accepted the subsequent juror, of which he now complains.

¶ 10. Further, because Hargett failed to object to the jury-selection process in the trial court, this issue is procedurally barred on appeal. Sanders v. State, 678 So.2d 663, 669-70 (Miss.1996).

¶ 11. Finally, had Hargett not been procedurally barred from making this claim, we find that the issue is also without merit. In Chisolm v. State, 529 So.2d 635, 639 (Miss.1988), the supreme court stated:

[T]his Court has held on more than one occasion that when a trial court fails to sustain a challenge for cause by the defense, it must be shown that the defense had exhausted all of its peremptory challenges before the trial court’s refusal to allow the challenge for cause.

¶ 12. Hargett had failed to exhaust all of his peremptory challenges before the trial court refused the strike for cause. Accordingly, Hargett’s second allegation of error is not only procedurally barred, but it is also wholly without merit.

III. Overwhelming Weight of the Evidence

¶ 13. In his next allegation of error, Hargett claims that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a new trial because the overwhelming weight of the evidence went against his verdicts of guilty. “When reviewing a denial of a motion for a new trial based on an objection to the weight of the evidence, we will only disturb a verdict when it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence that to allow it to stand would sanction an unconscionable injustice.” Bush v. State, 895 So.2d 886, 844 (¶ 18) (Miss.2005).

¶ 14. After review of the record and the evidence presented at trial, we are of the opinion that allowing Hargett’s guilty verdicts to stand will not sanction an unconscionable injustice. Therefore, his third allegation of error is without merit.

IV. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

¶ 15. In his final allegation of error, Hargett claims that his counsel made numerous errors during trial, which effectively deprived him of his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel. The standard for reviewing an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim is well settled. Our supreme court also has detailed that:

a defendant must prove that his attorney’s performance was deficient, and that the deficiency was so substantial as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-696, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); Wilcher v. State, 479 So.2d 710, 713 (Miss.1985); Stringer v. State, 454 So.2d 468, 477 (Miss.1984). This Court looks at the totality of circumstances to determine whether counsel’s efforts were both deficient and prejudicial. Carney v. State, 525 So.2d 776, 780 (Miss.1988); Read v. State, 430 So.2d 832, 839 (Miss.1983). “Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance [is] highly deferential.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052. There is a strong but rebuttable presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Carney, 525 So.2d at 780; Gilliard v. State, 462 So.2d 710, 714 (Miss.1985). Only where it is reasonably probable that but for the attorney’s errors, the outcome of the trial would have been different, will we find that counsel’s performance was deficient. Dickey v. State, 662 So.2d 1106, 1109 (Miss.1995); Reed v. State, 536 So.2d 1336, 1339 (Miss.1988).

Holly v. State, 716 So.2d 979, 989 (¶37) (Miss.1998).

¶ 16. After reviewing Hargett’s specific claims, and after our review of the record, we find that each instance Hargett complains of falls within the protected realm of trial strategy. A complaint regarding counsel’s failure to ask certain questions, or make certain objections, falls within the ambit of trial strategy. Houston v. State, 887 So.2d 808, 815 (¶ 34) (Miss.Ct.App.2004) (citing Cole v. State, 666 So.2d 767, 777 (Miss.1995)). As this Court generally defers to counsel’s judgment at trial, we are reluctant to define counsel’s trial strategy as ineffective assistance of counsel in such matters. Id. Accordingly, we find this allegation of error is without merit.

¶ 17. THE JUDGMENT OF THE PIKE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT OF CONVICTION OF COUNT I, SALE OF LESS THAN THIRTY GRAMS OF MARIJUANA, AND COUNT II, SALE OF TEN DOSAGE UNITS OF HYDRO-CODONE, AND SENTENCE AS A HABITUAL OFFENDER OF SIX YEARS FOR COUNT I AND SIXTY YEARS FOR COUNT II TO RUN CONCURRENTLY IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, AND TO PAY A $1,000 FINE FOR COUNT I, A $5,000 FINE FOR COUNT II, AND $300 IN RESTITUTION TO THE MISSISSIPPI BUREAU OF NARCOTICS, IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO PIKE COUNTY.

KING, C.J., LEE AND MYERS, P.JJ., GRIFFIS, BARNES AND CARLTON, JJ., CONCUR. ROBERTS AND MAXWELL, JJ., CONCUR IN RESULT ONLY. IRVING, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.


author: IRVING, J.,

text:
    Cynthia A. STEWART, P.A., Appellant v. BRIDGE PROPERTIES, LLC, Appellee.
    No. 2009-CA-00305-COA.
    Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
    Sept. 28, 2010.
    Rehearing Denied Feb. 8, 2011.
    Certiorari Denied June 9, 2011.

      Cynthia Ann Stewart, appellant, pro se.
    William Stacy Kellum III, attorney for appellee.
    Before MYERS, P.J., IRVING and MAXWELL, JJ.
   IRVING, J.,

for the Court:

¶ 1. After Cynthia A. Stewart, an attorney, abandoned premises that she had leased from Bridge Properties, LLC, Bridge Properties successfully sued her in the Hinds County County Court for rent for the months remaining on the contract. A judgment was entered against Stewart in the amount of $35,263.40. Stewart appealed to the Hinds County Circuit Court, which affirmed the judgment of the county court. Stewart’s appeal is now before this Court, where Stewart asserts that: (1) the circuit court should have found that the doctrine of accord and satisfaction necessitated a ruling in her favor; (2) the circuit court erred in finding that a viable lease was presented to the county court; (3) the circuit court erred in affirming the county court’s finding that the leased premises were inhabitable; (4) the circuit court erred in affirming the county court’s finding that Bridge Properties made a sufficient attempt to mitigate its damages; and (5) the circuit court erred in finding that Stewart was not entitled to damages for her expenditures in moving out of the leased premises.

¶2. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

FACTS

¶ 3. Stewart and Bridge Properties entered into a lease agreement on October 28, 2003. The leased premises were located at 222 North President Street, Jackson, Mississippi, and Stewart paid Bridge Properties $1,700 per month in rent. The lease specified that Stewart would receive use of the property for 36.5 months for the consideration of $62,050, to be paid in monthly installments of $1,700. Stewart rented suite 802 and used it as office space; later, Stewart and Bridge Properties agreed to increase the amount of space rented in return for an additional $800 per month in rent. Stewart sublet office space to Cynthia Speetjens and Judson Lee, both of whom are also attorneys.

¶ 4. The parties proceeded with the lease agreement without issue until 2005. Stewart contends that problems with the property began early that year and continued until she felt that the premises were no longer usable for business purposes. In July 2005, Stewart and her office mates vacated the premises. There is some dispute as to exactly when Stewart vacated the premises; as the county court found, Stewart was out by July 31, 2005, at the latest. It is also undisputed that Stewart was initially unable to access the premises on the day that she moved out due to the fact that Tyson Bridge, the owner of Bridge Properties, changed the locks to the office due to Stewart being two months behind in her rental obligations. On July 22, 2005, Lee provided Bridge with a check for $7,500, upon which Bridge provided either Stewart or Lee with a key to the premises, and they proceeded to move their belongings out of the office.

¶ 5. Bridge testified that he realized that Stewart, Speetjens, and Lee had vacated the premises sometime in late July 2005, when Bridge arrived at the building and noticed that the space that had been rented by Stewart was empty. It is undisputed that Stewart did not provide Bridge Properties with any written notice of her intent to vacate the premises. However, Stewart testified that she informed Bridge orally of her intent to vacate about two weeks before she left the premises; Bridge denied that any such conversation took place. On August 8, 2005, a week or two after Bridge realized that Stewart had vacated the premises, Bridge sent Stewart a letter reminding her that the term of the lease had not expired and that she was in violation of the lease due to her abandonment of the premises. The record indicates that a second letter was sent to Stewart on October 4, 2005, again reminding her that she was in default of the lease. The letter stated that it was a final demand and that Bridge Properties might “exercise any available rights and remedies under the law” if Stewart did not continue paying rent. On November 21, 2005, Bridge Properties filed a complaint against Stewart in the county court, alleging that Stewart was in default of the lease; the complaint requested $10,200 in damages for unpaid rent and for attorney’s fees and court costs. Stewart filed an answer and counterclaim, and on May 24, 2006, a motion for summary judgment. In her counterclaim, Stewart sought damages from Bridge Properties for her moving expenses incurred when she relocated her office to Madison, Mississippi.

¶ 6. At trial, Stewart testified that the premises had become unsuitable for business due to non-functioning air conditioning, frequent electrical outages, screaming matches between Bridge and his then-wife, leaks in the ceiling, an unidentified brown substance that collected on the walls and floor, a non-functioning alarm system, and the large number of transient individuals in the area.

.¶ 7. Regarding the air conditioning, Stewart testified that the air conditioner was turned off “after business hours and on weekends....” Stewart stated that this was contrary to her understanding of her lease agreement. However, the lease submitted into evidence clearly states that air conditioning would be provided only during normal business hours. Bridge testified that he would turn the air conditioner on at other times if a request was made in advance to do so. Stewart also testified that the air conditioner did not function properly during business hours, such that she and her office mates “would sometimes have to leave the office to be able to work.” When questioned regarding how ■frequently the air conditioning was insufficient, Stewart testified that “by the time it got hot, it was constant. By the time it got hot and stayed hot, it was constant.” Stewart asserted that she and her office mates “complained constantly” to “anybody that would listen.” Stewart claimed that complaints had been made to Bridge personally regarding the air conditioning. Lee testified that the temperature was sometimes warm in his office; when questioned as to the frequency of the problems, Lee stated that he observed problems “like once a week.” Speetjens’s recollection of the frequency of air conditioning problems differed from both Stewart’s and Lee’s; when asked about how frequently the air conditioner malfunctioned, Speetjens stated: “It wasn’t every week certainly, but it was not uncommon....” Despite the severity of the problems that Stewart described, there is no evidence that any complaint was ever made to any Bridge Properties employee by e-mail or in writing. Thus, there was only testimony to prove that there had ever been a problem with the air conditioning. Bridge Properties’ witnesses testified that the air conditioner functioned properly. Jim Peters, a building-repair consultant who worked for Bridge Properties, testified that during the time that Stewart rented, there was “more than one occasion, less than five, to ever have any problems [with the air conditioning].” Peters testified that he had to have a repairman add Freon to the air conditioner one time during the time period in question; Peters indicated that all of the problems or repairs were “very routine.”

¶ 8. As to the alarm, Stewart testified that she was given a code to use with the security system but that it “didn’t work.” Stewart elaborated that “[t]here was no cause and effect between putting any numbers into the pad or not putting any numbers into the pad and anything that happened as a result of doing or not doing that.” Stewart testified that the alarm system never worked. Bridge testified that the alarm system worked properly but that he eventually turned it off because the tenants in the building were unable to remember their access codes or properly enter them; as a result, the alarm was set off numerous times without an actual intrusion.

¶ 9. Stewart testified that the electricity in the office was so insufficient that if the microwave in the office was used, “the lights went out in the back half of the office.” She testified that the circuit in question had a refrigerator, microwave, and coffee pot that were connected to it. Stewart indicated that the electrical problems occurred on a “daily” basis. Speetjens testified that the problems occurred “all the time,” but when asked more specifically as to the frequency of the problems, Speetjens stated that they happened “[a]t least once a week if not more.” As with the air conditioning, Stewart testified that she and her staff complained to Bridge Properties employees, including Bridge, on a frequent basis. Lee testified that he recalled the suite losing power on “several occasions”; when questioned as to frequency, Lee testified that the suite lost power “about once a week.” Like Stewart’s complaint with the air conditioning, there is no documentary evidence to show that a complaint was ever made regarding the electrical wiring. Travis Grace, an employee of Bridge Properties, testified that the kitchen contained a 20-amp breaker that Stewart’s office had overused. Grace stated that he informed Stewart and her office mates that they had too many appliances plugged in, which was causing the electrical problems. Grace testified that even if too many appliances were turned on, the situation was easily remedied by throwing the relevant breaker. Bridge testified that the first time that the electricity had problems was when one of Stewart’s employees attempted to use her hairdryer in the kitchen while running other appliances.

¶ 10. When asked to describe the various leaks on the premises, Stewart testified that: “The main water leak was in Ms. Speetjens’[s] office, and it required more than one bucket, and it occurred every time it rained, and the buckets were still there when we left.” Lee testified that there were leaks in his office and in Speetjens’s office. Lee indicated that the leak in his office ruined a file, which Bridge Properties paid to have recopied. Ed Peters, an attorney who occasionally worked with Stewart, testified that there were regular leaks and stains in Speetjens’s office. Grace testified that he recalled one leak in Speetjens’s office but that it was repaired, and that there were no further complaints about leaks. Like Grace, Bridge recalled only the leak in Speetjens’s office; he testified that the leak was repaired shortly after it was brought to Bridge Properties’ attention.

¶ 11. When asked about other leaks, Stewart testified about the unidentified brown substance that came from the ceiling: “There was another leak that was in the hallway across from the kitchen. It was not a rain leak because it occurred regardless of the weather. It was some kind of sludge that came out of the ceiling, down the wall, and on the floor. It was extremely nasty.” Stewart testified that this substance did not only come with rain but that it dripped down the wall on a “daily” basis. She further testified that Bridge Properties employees had cleaned the substance up two or three times but that she and her office mates also cleaned it themselves. Lee testified that the brown stain in the hallway was cleaned a few times by the cleaning crew but that Bridge Properties never did anything to repair the leak.

¶ 12. As to the alleged fights between Bridge and his wife, Stewart testified that the couple fought “several” times during the spring and summer of 2005. She indicated that she could not see the fights, but that: <£You could hear the voices. They were in another part of the building. I don’t know whether they were in the back part ... or in the side part.... But you could hear it all over at least the third floor.” Stewart testified that these arguments caused her concerns when scheduling appointments with her clients, as the incidents were “embarrassing” and unpredictable. Testimony was also introduced showing that Bridge was arrested once on the property, although the arrest report indicated that the arrest was carried out without incident. Speetjens testified that she heard disturbances between Bridge and his estranged wife “on maybe four occasions.” Bridge denied that he had any arguments with his estranged wife during Stewart’s occupancy.

¶ 13. Stewart testified that the number of homeless people around the building became a concern, “particularly since there was no security.” Stewart indicated that she saw homeless people urinating in the parking lot of the office and that the problem became severe enough that she instructed her secretary to complain to Bridge about the situation. Stewart also thought that she might have personally complained to Bridge about the situation. Lee related seeing a vagrant urinating in the office’s parking lot one day during lunch; Lee testified that he did not observe any other problems with vagrants but that a paralegal had expressed concerns, leading Lee to try “to stay later than everybody else at night if they needed [him] to walk them out.” Bridge Properties’ witnesses acknowledged that there may have been homeless people around the office but that the presence of such individuals was well known before Stewart entered into the lease.

¶ 14. At trial, Stewart claimed an affirmative defense of accord and satisfaction; essentially, Stewart argued that Bridge Properties accepted Lee’s $7,500 check in lieu of fulfillment of the remainder of the contract. There was a significant dispute at trial as to exactly what occurred on the morning of July 22, 2005, when Lee tendered the check to Bridge. The facts related to that morning will be discussed in more detail later in this opinion. Stewart also claimed that Bridge Properties did not act appropriately to mitigate its damages from her vacancy. Bridge disputed this at trial, stating that he had contacted a realtor and attempted to lease the office space.

¶ 15. After hearing all of the testimony, the county court recessed and eventually issued a judgment finding that Stewart had failed to prove that the office was unusable for business purposes. The county court found that, pursuant to the lease agreement, Stewart had abandoned the premises, and thus defaulted on the lease. Accordingly, the county court ordered Stewart to pay Bridge Properties $35,263.40 in attorney’s fees and rent, representing the rental amounts for the remainder of the lease’s term. In its order, the county court stated the following in pertinent part:

Plaintiff contends that Defendant breached the lease agreement and moved out of the demised premises without any justification. The Defendant contends 1.) that the premises became uninhabitable because of several individual reasons and also because of the totality of the individual reasons[,] and 2.) there was an accord and satisfaction between Plaintiff and Defendant where they agreed to mutually terminate the lease agreement as of the end of July 2005.
1.) Analysis of uninhabitability of the premises:
a.) Defendant alleges that the security system never worked. Plaintiff testified that Defendant could not figure out how to work the alarm code and that nothing was wrong with it. Plaintiff had ADT Security Systems, Inc.[,] activate the existing alarm system in the building on June 9, 2004, and pre-paid an annual fee of $420.00, plus tax, for the alarm service .... Defendant offered no proof that the alarm system didn’t work other than her own testimony that it didn’t.
b.) Defendant alleges that beginning April 2005 the air conditioning developed problems and it would not adequately cool the offices and from time to time work would have to be taken to another location to be done and clients would complain. This allegation was somewhat corroborated by other witnesses for Defendant. Defendant [sic] argues that there was no problem with the air conditioning and he would know because his office was on the same floor as Defendant’s and serviced by the same unit. Plaintiff had full[-] and part[-]time employees that visited all of the properties owned by Plaintiff on an almost daily basis and they testified that there was no problem, and if there was a problem[,] all Defendant had to do was tell them and it would have been repaired. Jim Peters, an employee or consultant of Plaintiff[,] testified that he turned the air conditioning on every day at 4:30 a.m. and that nobody from Defendant’s office had ever complained to him about a problem. He did testify that there were routine maintenance problems, but they were always immediately corrected. Additionally, Cynthia A. Stewart was someone whom Jim Peters had personally known for many years prior to the lease agreement being entered into[,] and she had his cell number to call if there were any problems with the premises, not just the air conditioning. Travis Grace, Vice President of Operations for the Plaintiff[,] testified that he was in and out of the office next door to the Defendant’s 4 or 5 times a day during this period of time and never experienced any problems with the air[-]conditioning system. Air conditioning was only provided during business hours and had to be specially requested after hours....
c.) Defendant alleges that after April 2005 on one occasion from one of the office windows she could see what looked to her like a homeless person urinating in the parking lot[,] and there would be homeless people from time to time in the area of the building. Plaintiff was not present at these times and therefore did not deny the allegations. However, Plaintiff pointed out in his testimony that the building is located in downtown Jackson and is very close to a park that for years has been plagued by vagrants, homeless[,] and undesirables, and that these conditions have existed for many years prior to Defendant entering into the lease agreement.
d.) Defendant contends that after April 2005 roof leaks developed in one of the offices and that buckets had to be placed there to collect the rain and that a substance at the leak sites smelled and looked horrible. Plaintiff admitted that there was a leak but that he sent Travis Grace to the roof to repair it, that it was only one leak, and that it was repaired.
e.) Defendant alleges that after April 2005 the electricity in the break room was not working properly and the electricity would go off from time to time. Travis Grace testified that there was a 20[-]amp breaker for the break room which was more than adequate. He also testified that when called to the room to see what the problem was[,] he discovered a hairdryer and other appliances that were overloading the circuit. In any event, he said all Defendant had to do was unplug some of the extra appliances and throw the tripped breaker.
f.) Defendant alleges that toward the end of 2004 and into 2005[,] Tyson Bridge and his wife were going through a bad divorce[,] and things got so bad that police were called to the building and he and his wife would get into yelling matches. Testimony did show a police report dated December 30, 2004[,] where officers went to the subject premises and arrested Tyson Bridge for the felony of house burglary but he was arrested there “without incident” ....
The Court finds as a matter of fact that the Defendant’s complaints, whether taken individually or cumulatively, do not warrant or justify the cancellation of the lease agreement ... or rise anywhere close to a level that would render the demised premises uninhabitable for their intended purposes.
3.) Mitigation of damages: The undisputed testimony of the Plaintiff is that after Defendant vacated the premises[,] he talked to four realtors, put a “for rent” sign on the building, and showed the demised premises three or four times during the remaining term, all in an attempt to mitigate his damages. The Court finds as a matter of fact that the Plaintiff used reasonable efforts to mitigate his damages but was unsuccessful in doing so.
4.) Counter-Claim of Cynthia A. Stewart, P.A.: While the Court heard testimony that Counter-Plaintiff suffered damages as a result of her move from the demised premises to her new office in Madison, Mississippi, this Court finds as a matter of fact that the Counter-Defendant’s actions or inactions as alleged by the Counter-Plaintiff were not the cause, the contributing cause, or the proximate cause of the Counter-Plaintiff vacating the premises in July 2005, and therefore the Court finds for the Counter-Defendant with regard ... to the Counter-Claim.

ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUES

¶ 16. Our supreme court has discussed the standard of review to be applied in cases that originate in the county court and are then appealed to the circuit court:

The county court was the fact finder, and the circuit court, as well as [the Mississippi Supreme Court or Court of Appeals], are bound by the judgment of the county court if supported by substantial evidence and not manifestly wrong. W.H. Hopper & Assoc[s.], Inc. v. DeSoto County, 475 So.2d 1149, 1152 (Miss.1985); Dungan v. Dick Moore, Inc., 463 So.2d 1094, 1100 (Miss.1985); Ellis v. S. Pellegrini, Inc., 163 Miss. 385, 391, 141 So. 273[, 274] (1932). Insofar as its findings of fact and conclusions of law are concerned, the judgment of a circuit or county court in a non-jury trial is entitled to the same deference on appeal as a chancery court decree. Rives v. Peterson, 493 So.2d 316, 317 (Miss.1986). That is, it will be assumed the trial judge made all necessary findings of fact in favor of appellee, whether stated or not. Brown v. Williams, 504 So.2d 1188, 1191 (Miss.1987); Rives [493 So.2d at 317]; Bryant v. Cameron, 473 So.2d 174, 179 (Miss.1985); Dungan ..., [463 So.2d at 1100]; Cotton v. McConnell, 435 So.2d 683 (Miss.1983). Moreover, if the judgment of such court can be sustained for any reason, it must be affirmed, and even though the trial judge based it upon the wrong legal reason. Shewbrooks v. A.C. [&] S., Inc., 529 So.2d 557[, 564] (Miss.1988); Allgood v. Bradford, 473 So.2d 402[, 411] (Miss.1985); Briggs v. Benjamin, 467 So.2d 932[, 934] (Miss.1985); Tedford v. Dempsey, 437 So.2d 410[, 418] (Miss.1983); Taylor v. F. & C. Contracting Co. ..., 362 So.2d 625[, 628] (Miss.1978); Tex[] Gas Transmission Corp. v. City of Greenville, 242 So.2d 686[, 689-90] (Miss.1970); Lee v. Memphis Publ[’g] Co., 195 Miss. 264, [278,] 14 So.2d 351[, 353] (1943).

Patel v. Telerent Leasing Corp., 574 So.2d 3, 6 (Miss.1990) (emphasis added).

1. Accord and Satisfaction

¶ 17. In her first contention of error, Stewart contends that she successfully established the affirmative defense of accord and satisfaction.

¶ 18. In Mississippi, there are four elements that must be satisfied in order for an accord and satisfaction to exist: (1) something of value must be offered “in full satisfaction of a demand”; (2) the offer must be “accompanied by acts and declarations [that] amount to a condition that if the thing is accepted, it is accepted in satisfaction”; (3) “the party offered the thing of value” must “understand that if he takes it, he takes subject to such conditions”; and (4) the party offered the item must “actually ... accept the item.” Waggoner v. Williamson, 8 So.3d 147, 156 (¶ 18) (Miss.2009) (quoting Channel v. Loyacono, 954 So.2d 415, 426 (¶39) (Miss.2007)).

¶ 19. In its ruling, the county court found the following regarding an accord and satisfaction:

Cynthia A. Stewart testified that she told Tyson Bridge a couple of weeks before July 22, 2005[,] that she, the other lawyers in her office, and her staff were all vacating the premises and would be out by the end of July 2005. This notification was not in writing and no one else was present. On the morning of July 22, 2005[,] she along with the rest of her staff arrived at the premises to discover that the locks on the door to the office had been changed and no one could get in. After what the parties testified to as very heated exchanges in the hallway, Tyson Bridge opened the door to allow attorney Jud Lee to enter the premises for the purpose of getting one of his personal checks and paying all of the past due rent owed to Plaintiff by the Defendant. He in fact did so and wrote a check to the Plaintiff in the amount of $7,500.00[,] which the Plaintiff cashed.... Both parties agree that this was the total sum due to the Plaintiff for past due and current rent up to July 31, 2005. Defendant contends that the payment of this check ... was an accord and satisfaction.
... Defendant offers no evidence to prove accord and satisfaction. No one was present other than Cynthia A. Stewart and Tyson Bridge when Cynthia A. Stewart alleges the accord and satisfaction was reached, [and] the check which she claims was consideration for the accord and satisfaction ... makes no indication on the front or back that it was intended for that purpose[,] and there is no writing or any other evidence whatsoever to support the Defendant’s contention ....
Additionally, paragraph 18 of the lease agreement ... addresses the issue of surrender of premises. “No action of the Landlord or its agents during the term hereby granted shall be deemed an acceptance of a surrender of the Demise[d] Premises, and no agreement to accept a surrender of the Demised Premises shall be valid unless the same be made in writing and subscribed to by the Landlord.” Defendant offers no evidence to show that Plaintiff accepted a surrender of the premises pursuant to the lease agreement....
Defendant has failed to prove the affirmative defense of accord and satisfaction by a preponderance of the evidence.

¶ 20. As already stated, we employ a highly deferential standard of review in county court eases. Having reviewed the record, we find no reason to reverse the judgment of the county court on this point. Bridge testified that the July 22, 2005, check was tendered to pay the past due amount of rent that was owed, not to release Stewart from the lease. The county court was within its rights in finding Bridge’s testimony regarding the check more compelling than Stewart’s. Accordingly, there is no merit to Stewart’s arguments on this point.

2. Viability of Lease

¶ 21. Stewart argues that the lease attached to Bridge Properties’ complaint was insufficient because it did not adequately describe the leased premises.

¶ 22. While the property description in the lease did not describe the leased premises, the signature page containing Stewart’s signature clearly stated the address of the property. Furthermore, the lease was offered into evidence at trial without objection from Stewart.

¶ 23. There is no merit to this contention of error.

3. Uninhabitability

¶ 24. As discussed earlier in this opinion, Stewart and her witnesses essentially testified as to the uninhabitability of the premises, while Bridge Properties’ witnesses testified to the contrary. Again, there is no documentary evidence to support Stewart’s assertions. The county court was entitled to find Bridge Properties’ witnesses more compelling as to the inhabitability of the premises. See In re Estate of Grubbs v. Woods, 753 So.2d 1043, 1052-53 (¶ 39) (Miss.2000).

¶25. This contention of error is also without merit.

Jp. Mitigation of Damages

¶ 26. Bridge testified that he contacted a realtor and put up a “for rent” sign in an effort to rent the premises after Stewart’s departure. The county court did not err in finding that Bridge Properties acted to mitigate the damages caused by Stewart’s early departure. Therefore, this contention of error is without merit.

¶27. Furthermore, this issue is procedurally barred due to Stewart’s failure to offer any authority or argument on this point; the entirety of Stewart’s argument reads: “The Plaintiff failed to adequately mitigate his damages in that the proof he offered at trial in support thereof was insufficient and was not a reasonable, good faith effort to mitigate his damages.”

5. Counterclaim

28. Stewart’s argument on this point is also inadequate; it reads, in its entirety: “The Appellant reasonably incurred expenses in locating other office space as a result of the uninhabitable nature of the demised premises which expenses were directly and proximately caused by the Appellee’s failure to properly maintain the premises.” There are no citations to any authority or to the record in this case. Simply put, there is not enough argument here for this Court to even consider Stewart’s claim.

¶ 29. Regardless, there is no merit to any claim that Stewart was entitled to damages. We have affirmed the county court’s finding that the premises were not uninhabitable; furthermore, as the county court found, there was no evidence presented as to Stewart’s expenses other than her own testimony.

¶ 30. This contention of error is also without merit.

¶ 31. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HINDS COUNTY IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE APPELLANT.

KING, C.J., MYERS, P.J., GRIFFIS, ISHEE, ROBERTS, CARLTON AND MAXWELL, JJ., CONCUR. LEE, P.J., AND BARNES, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.


author: ROBERTS, J.,

text:
    STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant v. Nancy MOYER, Appellee.
    No. 2009-CA-01534-COA.
    Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
    Dec. 14, 2010.
    Rehearing Denied March 8, 2011.
    Certiorari Denied June 9, 2011.
    H. Scot Spragins, Goodloe Tankersley Lewis, Oxford, attorneys for appellant.
    John B. Gillis, Oxford, attorney for ap-pellee.
    Before KING, C.J., ROBERTS and CARLTON, JJ.
   ROBERTS, J.,

for the Court:

¶ 1. A jury found that Jack Butler was liable for a total of $10,000 damages that Nancy Moyer sustained when Butler’s and Moyer’s cars collided. Moyer had previously settled with Butler for more than the value of the $10,000 judgment but less than the limits of Butler’s auto liability policy. However, Moyer had also filed a claim for uninsured-motorist benefits against her insurance provider, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company. Despite State Farm’s argument that it should not be held liable for the jury’s damages award because Butler did not qualify as an uninsured motorist, the Quitman County Circuit Court ordered State Farm to satisfy the $10,000 judgment arising from the jury’s verdict. Aggrieved, State Farm appeals. We find that the circuit court erred. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court and render judgment for State Farm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2. In 1994, Moyer and Butler were involved in a car wreck. Almost three years later, Moyer sued Butler for negligence. Both Moyer and Butler were insured by State Farm. Moyer also sued State Farm and claimed she was entitled to uninsured-motorist benefits. Butler’s liability policy’s limit applicable to the accident was $25,000. Moyer had five stacked uninsured/underinsured policies that provided for a total of $125,000 in uninsured-motorist benefits. State Farm argued that Moyer was only entitled to uninsured-motorist benefits if her damages exceeded the limits of Butler’s auto liability policy.

¶ 8. In 1999, Moyer settled with Butler for $12,000. That $12,000 was paid by State Farm as part of Butler’s auto liability policy. Butler’s policy had also previously paid $4,671.12 toward Moyer’s medical bills. Consequently, Moyer received $16,671.12 from Butler through State Farm.

¶ 4. In October 1999, State Farm and Moyer attempted to mediate Moyer’s remaining claim for uninsured-motorist benefits. State Farm’s position was that Moyer was not entitled to uninsured-motorist benefits because Moyer had settled for less than Butler’s policy limits; therefore, Butler was not an uninsured motorist. Moyer terminated the mediation after State Farm stated its position.

¶ 5. In January 2001, Moyer filed a supplemental complaint. According to Moyer’s supplemental complaint, State Farm was liable not .only for uninsured-motorist benefits, but also for acting in bad faith during the failed mediation. Moyer’s bad-faith claim was later dismissed after- State Farm successfully moved for partial summary judgment on the issue.

¶ 6. On June 1, 2009, Moyer and State Farm went to trial on Moyer’s remaining claim for uninsured-motorist benefits. The jury ultimately found that the underlying car wreck was due to Butler’s negligence. The jury also awarded Moyer $10,000 as her total damages arising from the accident. However, Moyer had settled with Butler approximately ten years earlier. Moyer sought to have State Farm satisfy the jury’s award of damages. The circuit court agreed that State Farm was responsible for satisfying Moyer’s judgment.

¶ 7. State Farm filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment or, alternatively, for satisfaction of judgment. During a hearing on State Farm’s motion, State Farm argued that it was entitled to a setoff as a matter of law and as a matter of equity. State Farm also argued that Moyer had agreed to setoff her damages when she and Butler settled. Moyer argued that State Farm was barred from arguing that it was entitled to a contractual setoff of damages because State Farm had failed to enter Moyer’s policy into evidence during the trial. Ultimately, the circuit court agreed that State Farm was not entitled to a setoff and denied State Farm’s motion. Aggrieved, State Farm appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶8. In its post-trial motion, State Farm requested relief under Rule 59 or Rule 60(b)(5) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure. A trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion filed under Rule 59 is a matter left to the trial court’s discretion. Journeay v. Berry, 953 So.2d 1145, 1160 (1151) (Miss.Ct.App.2007). We will reverse the trial court if it abused its discretion or if its decision would result in a miscarriage of justice if it were allowed to stand. Id. We also review a trial court’s decision to deny a Rule 60 motion under the abuse-of-discretion standard of review. Harvey v. Stone County Sch. Dist., 982 So.2d 463, 468 (¶ 8) (Miss.Ct.App.2008).

ANALYSIS

¶ 9. State Farm argues that the circuit court erred by holding that State Farm must satisfy Moyer’s $10,000 judgment against Butler. Moyer vigorously argues that State Farm is barred from arguing that it is entitled to a setoff. Moyer takes the position that because State Farm never entered Moyer’s policy into evidence, State Farm is not entitled to a setoff. Nevertheless, after careful consideration, we find that this appeal does not turn on the setoff provisions of Moyer’s insurance policy. Instead, this appeal turns on Butler’s settlement, whether he qualified as an uninsured motorist, and the precise language of the jury’s verdict.

¶ 10. As mentioned, by way of its “motion to alter or amend the judgment, or in the alternative, for satisfaction of judgment,” State Farm requested relief under either Rule 59 or Rule 60(b)(5). Rule 60(b)(5) sets forth that: “On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party ... from a final judgment ... for the following reasons: (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or ... it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application.... ” The jury found that Butler — not State Farm — was negligent and liable for Moyer’s damages. By proper jury instruction, the jury was instructed to quantify all of Moyer’s damages arising from the auto accident that occurred in 1994. The jury found that Moyer had sustained a total of $10,000 in damages as a result of Butler’s negligence. However, through his State Farm auto liability policy, Butler had previously paid Moyer more than $16,000 in damages. Moyer did not present any evidence that Butler had exhausted the policy limits of his insurance. Moreover, Moyer did not present any evidence that Butler qualified as an underin-sured motorist or an uninsured motorist under Moyer’s policy. Under the precise circumstances of this case, as Moyer’s uninsured-motorist-insurance provider, State Farm could only be responsible for the damages attributed to Butler if Butler qualified as an uninsured motorist. Consequently, State Farm is not obligated to satisfy the jury’s award of damages for negligence attributed to Butler that had already been satisfied by Butler. Succinctly put, Butler had already paid more than the amount of damages that the jury awarded, and there was no evidence that Butler had exhausted the limits of his insurance. “[A] plaintiff is only entitled to one satisfaction.” Turner v. Pickens, 711 So.2d 891, 893 (¶ 7) (Miss.1998) (citing Medley v. Webb, 288 So.2d 846, 848 (Miss.1974)). “He cannot recover the full amount due to him and still sue another joint tortfeasor because he thinks the damages awarded to him were inadequate.” Id. Accordingly, the circuit court erred when it denied State Farm’s motion for satisfaction of judgment. We, therefore, reverse the judgment of the circuit court and render judgment that the jury’s verdict and award of damages against Butler has been satisfied.

¶11. THE JUDGMENT OF THE QUITMAN COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT IS REVERSED AND RENDERED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE APPELLEE.

KING, C.J., LEE AND MYERS, P.JJ., IRVING, BARNES, ISHEE, CARLTON AND MAXWELL, JJ., CONCUR.' GRIFFIS, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.

      . We note that the circuit court had previously granted Moyer’s motion for partial summary judgment, finding that there was no genuine issue of material fact that Butler’s vehicle was an uninsured/underinsured motor vehicle as defined by Mississippi Code Annotated section 83-11-103(c)(iii) (Rev. 1999) because the limit of Butler’s bodily injury coverage was $25,000, and the limit of Moyer's stacked uninsured motorist coverage was $125,000. Nevertheless, the jury’s verdict was for less than the limits of Butler’s bodily injury coverage. It was also for less than the amount for which Moyer had previously settled with Butler.