author: ROBERTS, J.,

text:
    Virginia MASSEY, Appellant v. Ronald E. LAMBERT and Patricia Renee Lambert, Appellees.
    No. 2011-CA-00296-COA.
    Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
    March 27, 2012.
    William Harvey Barton, Brandon C. Jones, attorneys for appellant.

      Gerald Alan Dickerson, attorney for ap-pellees.
    Before GRIFFIS, P.J., ROBERTS and CARLTON, JJ.
   ROBERTS, J.,

for the Court:

¶ 1. Virginia Massey sued siblings Ronald E. Lambert and Patricia Renee Lambert and claimed that she had adversely possessed some of their property. The Greene County Chancery Court found that Virginia and her predecessor in title failed to present a prima facie case of adverse possession based on evidence that Virginia and her predecessor in title, her husband, had permission to use the disputed property. Aggrieved, Virginia appeals and argues that the chancellor erred when he held that Virginia and her predecessor in title had permission to use the disputed property. Finding no error, we affirm.

FACTS

¶2. Both Virginia’s and the Lamberts’ properties derived from Elliot McLeod. Virginia’s husband, Jacob Dennis Massey (Dennis) acquired an acre of property from McLeod in 1961 and built a machine shop shortly thereafter. Approximately eight years later, John Edsel Lambert acquired property from McLeod. The property that John acquired adjoined the western border of the property that Dennis had acquired in 1961.

¶ 3. Not long after John acquired his property, he discovered that Dennis’s shop had actually been built on John’s property. According to John, he brought his discovery to Dennis’s attention. John’s understanding was the he and Dennis would swap property foot-for-foot so the shop would not be on John’s property. However, John and Dennis never carried out their plan to swap property. Dennis died intestate in 1979, leaving Virginia and their children as his heirs. Virginia’s children gave her quitclaim deeds regarding their shares of Dennis’s property.

¶ 4. Virginia sued John’s adult children, Ronald and Patricia. According to Virginia, she had acquired the disputed property by adverse possession. The parties went to trial on February 22, 2010 and March 26, 2010. The testimony and other evidence produced at trial will be discussed below.

¶ 5. On June 4, 2010, the chancellor issued his findings of fact, conclusions of law, and judgment. The chancellor held that Virginia failed to present a prima facie case of adverse possession because her use of the property — as well as her predecessor in title’s use of the property— was permissive. Specifically, the chancellor held as follows:

The proof has shown that [Virginia] made use of the property in question for a continuous and uninterrupted period of ten years. However, [Virginia’s] late husband, [Dennis] ... acknowledged [John’s] ownership and, therefore, the use was neither under claim of ownership nor hostile. Finally, the use by [Virginia] and her family was with permission of [John] and permissive use does not ripen into adverse possession. The evidence submitted does not support [Virginia’s] position. To the contrary, the proof has shown that [Virginia’s] use was permissive.

To support that conclusion, the chancellor relied on the following evidence:

[John] testified that he and [Dennis] ... discussed the problem and agreed that the workshop was constructed on the parcel owned by [the Lamberts]. To resolve the problem, [Dennis] and [John] discussed the possibility of exchanging parcels of land of equal size and value in a manner which would allow [Dennis] to obtain title to the parcel upon which the workshop was situated. [John] and [Dennis] were unable to finalize such a transaction prior to the death of [Dennis] However, [John] did give [Dennis] permission to use the land upon which the workshop was situated.

Aggrieved, Virginia appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 6. This Court has a limited standard of review in examining and considering the decisions of a chancellor. Cook v. Robinson, 924 So.2d 592, 594 (¶ 9) (Miss.Ct.App.2006) (citing Ellison v. Meek, 820 So.2d 730, 734 (¶ 11) (Miss.2002)). “When reviewing a chancellor’s decision, we will accept a chancellor’s findings of fact as long as the evidence in the record reasonably supports those findings. In other words, we will not disturb the findings of a chancellor unless those findings are clearly erroneous or an erroneous legal standard was applied.” Id. (quotation omitted). “The chancellor, as the trier of fact, evaluates the sufficiency of the proof based on the credibility of witnesses and the weight of their testimony.” Id (quotation omitted). We review questions of law de novo. Id.

ANALYSIS

¶ 7. The Mississippi Legislature has enacted the following statute regarding adverse possession:

Ten (10) years’ actual adverse possession by any person claiming to be the owner for that time of any land, uninterruptedly continued for ten (10) years by occupancy, descent, conveyance, or otherwise, in whatever way such occupancy may have commenced or continued, shall vest in every actual occupant or possessor of such land a full and complete title....

Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-13(1) (Rev.2003). One who seeks to acquire real property by adverse possession must demonstrate the following six essential elements by clear and convincing evidence: the property must be (1) under claim of ownership; (2) actual or hostile; (3) open, notorious, and visible; (4) continuous and uninterrupted for a period of ten years; (5) exclusive; and (6) peaceful. Cook, 924 So.2d at 595 (¶ 11). Clear and convincing evidence has been defined as follows:

that weight of proof which produces in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established, evidence so clear, direct and weighty and convincing as to enable the fact[-]finder to come to a clear conviction, without hesitancy, of the truth of the precise facts of the case.

Moran v. Fairley, 919 So.2d 969, 975 (¶ 24) (Miss.Ct.App.2005) (quoting Travelhost, Inc. v. Blandford, 68 F.3d 958, 960 (5th Cir.1995)). “Clear and convincing evidence is such a high standard [of proof] that even the overwhelming weight of the evidence does not rise to the same level.” Id. (citing In re C.B., 574 So.2d 1369, 1375 (Miss.1990)).

¶ 8. Virginia called five witnesses. Her son, Kenneth Massey, testified that he and his uncle, Elliot, helped Dennis mark the property Dennis acquired from Elliot. According to Kenneth, they intended to ensure that Dennis acquired a full acre of property. Billy Brewer, the Greene County surveyor, testified regarding his survey of Virginia’s property. He explained that the error in this case originated from the fact that Virginia’s deed runs to the cen-terline of state highway 68. It appears that Dennis, Kenneth, and Elliot began their measurements from the edge rather than the center of state highway 68. Virginia also called her son, Ronnie Massey, and her daughter, Judy McLeod, who testified regarding their family’s use of the disputed property.

¶ 9. The Lamberts called three witnesses. Surveyor Benjamin Proctor testified regarding his own survey of Virginia’s property. Ronnie Lambert’s testimony primarily consisted of explaining his and his sister’s acquisition of John’s property. According to the chancellor, the case turned on the testimony of the Lamberts’ other witness: their father, John.

¶ 10. John testified that he discovered that Dennis’s shop encroached on his property after John had his property surveyed in 1969. According to John, Dennis’s shop “needed to go [e]ast to be on the property that he had a deed to.” John then went on to testify:

Well, the agreement between Mr. Massey and I — we found it out. He had a good business going there, and he got upset when he found it out, the property wasn’t — that the shop was not on his deeded land. So I waited to discuss it, I said, Dennis, don’t get too upset about it, you’ve got property to the North of me, and you’ve got — your wife has got property to the [e]ast of me, I said. We agreed to swap foot for foot.

Virginia’s attorney objected on the basis that “[a]ny agreements would be violative of the statute of frauds, any agreements would violate hearsay objections.” The chancellor did not sustain the objection. Instead, the chancellor stated that John “can just testify about what he did.” John then testified, “we would swap footage, foot by foot, for equal value.” During cross-examination, John was asked whether his position was that he did not want Virginia to have the property where the shop had been. John responded:

No, that’s not — because I agreed with [Dennis] that we would swap land of equal value.... I never made any claims against any of them because [Dennis] and I agreed. And where you see that they had their original plot laid out, I have never taken any trees down because he and I agreed to swap land.

¶ 11. As mentioned, the chancellor concluded that Virginia failed to prove adverse possession by clear and convincing evidence based on John’s testimony that he had given Virginia and her predecessor in title, Dennis, permission to use the disputed property. We do not find that the chancellor erred. It is true that “[a]n occupant of land who mistakenly believes the land lies within the boundaries established by his own deed, when the land actually belongs to another, may acquire title to that land by adverse possession.” Niebanck v. Block, 35 So.3d 1260, 1265 (¶ 15) (Miss.Ct.App.2010) (quotation omitted). However, “[i]f possession is permitted by the owner, it cannot be adverse.” Id. at 1266 (¶ 17) (citation omitted). “Adverse possession is totally inconsistent with that of permissive use.” Id. (quoting Thornhill v. Caroline Hunt Trust Estate, 594 So.2d 1150, 1153 (Miss.1992)). Virginia bore the burden of proving adverse possession by clear and convincing evidence. John testified that he and Dennis agreed to swap property foot by foot to resolve the fact that Dennis had mistakenly built his shop on land that he did not own. There was no evidence that John ever withdrew his permission or his desire to exchange property so that Virginia could obtain the disputed property. In fact, John testified that he was still willing to conduct the exchange. To be clear, this case does not turn on the existence of a formal agreement between Dennis and John. It turns on a lack of clear of convincing evidence of a prima facie case of adverse possession based on the presence of evidence that Dennis was aware that his shop was not on his property and John permitted Dennis’s — and, by extension, Virginia’s — continued use of the shop because they had discussed exchanging land. Accordingly, we find no merit to Virginia’s claim on appeal.

¶ 12. THE JUDGMENT OF THE GREENE COUNTY CHANCERY COURT IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE APPELLANT.

LEE, C.J., IRVING AND GRIFFIS, P JJ., BARNES, ISHEE, CARLTON, MAXWELL, RUSSELL AND FAIR, JJ., CONCUR.

      . John and Virginia are first cousins.

      . After John acquired property from McLeod, John deeded it to his children, Ronald and Patricia, and reserved a life estate for himself and his wife.

      . At the time of trial, the concrete slab was all that remained of the thirty foot by sixty foot shop.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    Craig Steve BENTRUP, Appellant v. STATE of Mississippi, Appellee.
    No. 2010-CP-01791-COA.
    Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
    March 27, 2012.
    Craig Steve Bentrup, appellant, pro se.
    Office of the Attorney General by Lisa Lynn Blount, attorney for appellee.
    Before GRIFFIS, P.J., ROBERTS and CARLTON, JJ.
   ROBERTS, J.,

for the Court:

¶ 1. On July 20, 2010, Craig Steve Bentr-up filed a “motion for writ of habeas corpus” in the Harrison County Circuit Court. The circuit court entered an order on November 3, 2010, denying Bentrup’s “motion for writ of habeas corpus”. Feeling aggrieved, Bentrup, acting pro se, appeals this denial.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 2. On June 24, 2010, Bentrup was arrested in Biloxi, Mississippi and charged with burglary, possession of a weapon by a convicted felon, and felony fleeing. Bentr-up was held in the Harrison County Jail with bond set at $50,000 on each charge. Bentrup was also held on a “no bond de-tainer” because he had absconded from Missouri on a twenty year sentence with sixteen years mandatory as a result of a prior, felony conviction.

¶ 3. Less than one month later, and before he was indicted, Bentrup filed a “motion for writ of habeas corpus” on July 20, 2010, asserting that his imprisonment was in violation of a multitude of his constitutional rights. He argued that his imprisonment was “in direct violation of the ‘excessive bail clause’ of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.” He further argued that his Fourteenth Amendment and Sixth Amendment rights to assistance of counsel were violated since an attorney had not yet been appointed to him. He next asserted that his imprisonment was “tantamount to involuntary servitude in direction violation of the Thirteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.” Next, he submitted that he was subject to cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. He requested the circuit court grant his “motion for writ of habeas corpus” and “summarily dismiss[,] with prejudice[,] the present charges pending in Harrison County[,]” or appoint him an attorney and/or reduce his bond.

¶4. On September 10, 2010, Bentrup filed a “writ of mandamus or notice of appeal” in the circuit court. In this document, Bentrup asserted that the circuit court was bound to follow Uniform Rule of Circuit and County Court 2.07 when dealing with his “motion for writ of habeas corpus” such as appointing him an attorney. He also alleged that in his “motion for writ of habeas corpus”, he raised the issues of illegal confinement and life-threatening prison conditions.

¶ 5. Bentrup was indicted on October 25, 2010, as a habitual offender, for burglary of an inhabited dwelling, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and felony fleeing. On the same day, Bentrup filed a motion seeking to amend his July 20, 2010, “motion for writ of habeas corpus”. In this motion, he argued that he was denied access to the courts because he “attempted to assist in a class action writ of habeas corpus filed by four (4) foreign nations held illegally.” He also raised the issue of his treatment while in prison in Harrison County and the prison conditions calling them “life threatening.”

¶ 6. In an order filed on November 3, 2010, the circuit court judge denied Bentr-up’s “motion for writ of habeas corpus”. The circuit court judge stated that Bentr-up had not been indicted at the time of the original “motion for writ of habeas corpus” and noted that pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated section 11-43-1, “[t]he principal function of a writ of habeas corpus is to test the legality of detention prior to conviction. He further noted that “[Tissues such as defendant’s right to a speedy trial, evidentiary issues, and issues of guilt or innocence are to be determined by the trial court and not by writ of habeas corpus.” Further, the Mississippi Department of Corrections’ web site indicates that Bentrup is currently an inmate at the Central Mississippi Correctional Facility serving a ten-year sentence for residential burglary. See http://www.mdoc.state.ms. us/InmateDetails.asp?PassedId=172019 (last viewed February 14, 2012).

¶ 7. On appeal, Bentrup raises the following five issues:

I. Whether the circuit court erred by not appointing Bentrup an attorney
II. Whether the circuit court erred in not granting an omnibus hearing
III. Whether the circuit court erred in its assessment of the purpose for writ of habeas corpus
IV. Whether the circuit court erred in denying an evidentiary hearing
V., Whether the circuit court erred in not granting leave to amend “motion for writ of habeas corpus”

ANALYSIS

¶ 8. It is well-established law in Mississippi that “[c]ases in which an actual controversy existed at trial but the controversy has expired at the time of review become moot.” Wilson v. Mallett, 50 So.3d 366, 368 (¶ 6) (Miss.Ct.App.2006) (quoting J.E.W. v. T.G.S., 935 So.2d 954, 959 (¶ 14) (Miss.2006)). This Court has “no power to issue advisory opinions.” Id.

¶ 9. On appeal, we are reviewing the circuit court’s November 3, 2010, denial of Bentrup’s “motion for writ of habeas corpus[.]” With this in mind, we find that the issues raised on appeal and in Bentrup’s “motion for writ of habeas corpus” are now moot. Bentrup was indicted prior to his habeas corpus hearing, has been convicted, and is now an inmate in the custody of the MDOC; therefore, there is no longer any controversy regarding the issues he raised in his “motion for writ of habeas corpus.”

¶ 10. THIS APPEAL IS DISMISSED AS MOOT. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO HARRISON COUNTY.

LEE, C.J., IRVING AND GRIFFIS, P.JJ., ISHEE, CARLTON, RUSSELL AND FAIR, JJ., CONCUR. BARNES AND MAXWELL, JJ., CONCUR IN RESULT ONLY.

      . According to the appellee's brief, on January 19, 2011, the Mississippi Supreme Court dismissed Bentrup’s motion for writ of mandamus as moot because he had been indicted.


author: IRVING, P.J.,

text:
    Glenn Todd WILSON, Appellant v. MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Appellee.
    No. 2011-CC-00288-COA.
    Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
    March 27, 2012.

      Lee Turner, attorney for appellant.
    Office of the Attorney General by R. Stewart Smith Jr., attorney for appellee.
    Before IRVING, P.J., ISHEE and RUSSELL, JJ.
   IRVING, P.J.,

for the Court:

¶ 1. This appeal arises out of Glenn Todd Wilson’s termination from the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC) for falsifying official documents. Wilson appealed his termination to the Employee Appeals Board (EAB), which affirmed his termination. Wilson then requested a review by the Full EAB, which also upheld his termination. Wilson appealed to the Forrest County Circuit Court, which affirmed the EAB. Feeling aggrieved, Wilson appeals and asserts that there is insufficient evidence supporting his termination and that the disciplinary action taken was too severe.

¶ 2. Finding no error, we affirm.

FACTS

¶ 3. Wilson worked as a Field Officer III at the Forrest County Probation and Parole Office. On November 11, 2008, Wilson was away from the office, so his supervisor, Michael Upshaw, oversaw the reporting process for offenders normally supervised by Wilson. Thomas Bouchee, an offender assigned to Wilson, reported to the office that day. When Bouchee signed his “Report Verification Form,” which offenders sign each time they report to the office, Upshaw noticed that his signature was notably different from the preceding signatures on the form. When he questioned Bouchee about the disparity, Bouchee stated that “it had been a long time since he had signed his file.” Up-shaw inspected the remainder of Bou-chee’s file and noticed that the signature on the “Firearms and Voting Laws Form” did not match the signature he had just obtained.

¶ 4. Upshaw reviewed the files of four other offenders and noticed additional signature discrepancies. When Wilson returned to the office, Upshaw questioned him regarding the files. Wilson admitted to signing offenders’ names to documents, but he explained that he had done so because one offender had a cast on his hand, another had a child in her arms, and one was elderly. He also admitted that there were other files where he had signed offenders’ names. However, he denied that he had signed documents on behalf of Bou-chee.

¶ 5. The MDOC charged Wilson with violating two Group III offenses:

Falsification of records, such as, but not limited to, vouchers, reports, time records, leave records, employment applications, or other official state documents. An act or acts of conduct occurring on or off the job which are plainly related to job performance and are of such nature that to continue the employee in the assigned position could constitute negligence in regard to the agency’s duties to the public or to the state employees.

According to the Mississippi State Employee Handbook, commission of one Group III offense may result in the following disciplinary actions: (1) written reprimand, (2) suspension without pay for thirty days, (3) demotion, or (4) dismissal. The MDOC terminated Wilson based on the above offenses.

¶ 6. Additional facts, as necessary, will be related during our analysis and discussion of the issues.

ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUES

¶7. When reviewing a decision of an administrative agency, an appellate court employs a limited standard of review. Miss. Transp. Comm’n v. Anson, 879 So.2d 958, 963 (¶ 12) (Miss.2004). Accordingly, we will not disturb the agency’s decision absent a finding that it was: “(a) [n]ot supported by any substantial evidence; (b) [arbitrary or capricious; or (c) [i]n violation of some statutory or constitutional right of the employee.” Id. at (¶ 13) (quoting Miss.Code Ann. § 25-9-132(2) (Rev.2010)).

¶8. Wilson argues that the circuit court erred in affirming the EAB’s decision to uphold his termination. Specifically, Wilson alleges that the EAB’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence and was arbitrary and capricious. Additionally, Wilson argues that a lesser punishment would have been more appropriate given the nature of his offense.

¶ 9. At the hearing before the EAB, Upshaw testified that after he noticed the inconsistent signatures in Bouchee’s file, he reviewed the files of four other offenders who reported to Wilson. His review of the files revealed inconsistent signatures on official documents, including report-verification forms, firearms, and voting-rights forms, and waivers of extradition. Up-shaw testified that the report-verification form is used to verify that an offender properly reports to his supervising officer. He further testified that Wilson’s practice of signing in for some offenders, raised questions about whether those offenders had properly reported. Additionally, Up-shaw explained that the firearms-and-voting-rights form and the waiver of extradition are used in court proceedings.

¶ 10. Wilson admitted to signing documents for offenders, but he explained that he did so because one offender had a cast on his hand, one was holding her child, and another was elderly. Wilson also admitted to signing documents on behalf of a “few” other offenders. However, Wilson claimed that there was no standard operating procedure regarding file maintenance among probation offices. He explained that when he worked at the Pearl River County Probation and Parole Office, officers maintained files electronically and did not routinely keep paper files. However, Upshaw testified that in the Hattiesburg office, “[ejverybody is supposed to be doing a paper file.” Additionally, Charles Burnell, the Assistant Director of Community Corrections, testified that he had never heard of a field officer signing documents on behalf of offenders. Burnell further testified that as of July 2007, all offices were required to keep paper and electronic files in accordance with the American Correctional Association (ACA) guidelines. Wilson acknowledged in his testimony that he knew about the ACA requirements regarding file maintenance.

¶ 11. Based on our review of the record, there was substantial evidence in support of the MDOC’s decision to terminate Wilson. While Wilson denied signing documents in Bouchee’s file, he admitted to signing official documents in other offenders’ files. Additionally, Wilson admitted that he was aware of the ACA requirements regarding file maintenance. Finally, Wilson acknowledged that the Pearl River County office’s procedures were “totally different” from those of the Forrest County office. Thus, there was sufficient evidence that Wilson had falsified official documents. This issue is without merit.

¶ 12. Wilson contends that a less severe punishment was warranted based on the nature of his offense and on the fact that he had never been counseled regarding his job performance prior to this incident. While the EAB may modify an agency’s adverse employment decision, its authority is restricted where the personnel action taken by the agency is permissible under the policies, rules, and regulations of the Mississippi State Personnel Board. Johnson v. Miss. Dep’t of Corrs., 682 So.2d 367, 369 (Miss.1996) (concluding that the EAB erred in setting aside an agency’s decision to terminate an employee who committed a Group III offense given that termination was a permissible disciplinary action under personnel policies). However, the EAB is not bound by an agency’s decision simply because it followed its rules and regulations — the allegations against the employee must be supported by substantial evidence. Miss. Dep’t of Corrs. v. Pennington, 59 So.3d 636, 639-40 (¶¶ 15-17) (Miss.Ct.App.2011).

¶ 13. As discussed above, MDOC’s allegation that Wilson falsified records was supported by substantial evidence. Falsification of records constitutes a Group III offense and may result in the following disciplinary actions: a written reprimand, suspension without pay for up to thirty working days, demotion, or dismissal. Wilson’s punishment was a permissible disciplinary action based on his violation. Furthermore, the fact that Wilson had never been disciplined prior to this incident is of no moment. See Walley v. Miss. Dep’t of Corrs., 766 So.2d 60, 64 (¶ 15) (Miss.Ct.App.2000) (rejecting an employee’s argument that his demotion for a Group III offense was inappropriate given that he had never been disciplined before).

¶ 14. Because there was substantial evidence that Wilson committed the Group III offense of falsification of official documents, and termination was a permissible disciplinary action, the EAB did not err in affirming the MDOC’s decision to terminate Wilson. Likewise, the circuit court did not err in affirming the EAB. This issue is without merit.

¶ 15. THE JUDGMENT OF THE FORREST COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE APPELLANT.

LEE, C.J., GRIFFIS, P.J., BARNES, ISHEE, ROBERTS, CARLTON, MAXWELL, RUSSELL AND FAIR, JJ., CONCUR.

      . Wilson has not suggested on appeal that the EAB's decision was in violation of his constitutional rights.


author: MALONE, Chief Justice. MURDOCK, Justice

text:
    EMPLOYERS MUTUAL CASUALTY COMPANY v. HOLMAN BUILDING CO., L.L.C., et al.
    1100106.
    Supreme Court of Alabama.
    Oct. 28, 2011.

      Richard W. Lewis and Mark T. Davis of Austill, Lewis & Pipkin, P.C., Birmingham, for appellant.
    Scott M. Salter and Philip G. Piggott of Starnes Davis Florie LLP, Birmingham, for Holman Building Co., L.L.C.
   MALONE, Chief Justice.

Employers Mutual Casualty Company (“Employers Mutual”) appeals from the denial of its motion to intervene in a case pending in the Jefferson Circuit Court. We affirm.

Procedural History

This case is factually and procedurally complex. On May 25, 2010, George Cha-vous, Lorine Chavous, Terrell Hopkins, Raeshonda Hopkins, Sharon Spivey, Cynthia Conner, Kenturah Felton, Kimberly Marable, and Chris Hill (hereinafter referred to collectively as “the initial plaintiffs”) sued Holman Building Co., L.L.C. (“Holman”), and Interior/Exterior Building Supply Company, L.P. (“Interior”), based on alleged problems in newly constructed houses they had purchased in the Hamilton Parc subdivision in 2006 and 2007. In their complaint, the initial plaintiffs alleged that Holman, which constructed the houses, and Interior, which supplied the drywall used in construction, had built and sold them houses constructed with drywall manufactured in China. According to the complaint, that drywall “emits sulfuric gases, causing damage to the home[s]” and to the inhabitants, including the initial plaintiffs. The initial plaintiffs further alleged that the houses “were not built in accordance with the applicable building code and residential eonstr[u]ction industry standards.” Based on these allegations, the initial plaintiffs brought claims individually and on behalf of a class (“the putative class”) of “all persons who own a home in the Hamilton Parc Subdivision located in Birmingham, Alabama which was constructed by Holman Building Co., L.L.C.” Those claims included negligence and wantonness in constructing the houses of improper materials; negligent and wanton repair of the houses; negligent and wanton hiring, supervision, and training; fraudulent and/or innocent misrepresentation; fraudulent suppression; breach of warranty; nuisance; trespass and continuing trespass; conspiracy; ordinary products-liability claims; claims asserted under the Alabama Extended Manufacturer’s Liability Doctrine; deceptive trade practices; and breach of contract. The initial plaintiffs sought compensatory and punitive damages and demanded a jury trial.

On June 15, 2010, Interior filed an answer containing 84 affirmative defenses. On June 25, 2010, Holman filed a motion for a more definite statement of the initial plaintiffs’ fraud claims and alleged 46 affirmative defenses to the complaint.

On June 29, 2010, Holman filed a cross-claim against Interior alleging that Interi- or had supplied Holman with the defective drywall. Holman sought indemnity from Interior and alleged negligence, wantonness, breach of warranty, fraudulent misrepresentation, fraudulent suppression, and breach of contract.

On July 19, 2010, Interior filed a third-party complaint against Knauf Insulation GmbH a/k/a Knauf USA; Knauf Gips KG; Knauf International GmbH; and Knauf Plasterboard Tianjin Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to collectively as “the Knauf defendants”), alleging that the Knauf defendants manufactured and sold the defective drywall used in the construction of the houses purchased by the initial plaintiffs. Interior alleged the following against the Knauf defendants: breach of contract, breach of express and implied warranties, and negligence. Interior also sought indemnity and contribution from the Knauf defendants for any liability Interior suffered as a result of this action.

On July 21, 2010, Interior filed an answer to Holman’s cross-claim in which it asserted 84 affirmative defenses to the cross-claim.

On August 6, 2010, the initial plaintiffs, together with additional individuals Evelyn Rodgers and Torey Combs, filed an amended complaint, both in their individual capacities and on behalf of the putative class. (The initial plaintiffs, Rodgers, Combs, and the putative class members are hereinafter referred to collectively as “the plaintiffs.”) In the amended complaint, the plaintiffs asserted the same claims as were asserted in the initial complaint.

On August 16, 2010, Holman filed a renewed motion for more definite statement of the plaintiffs’ fraud claims and asserted 46 affirmative defenses to the amended complaint. On August 28, 2010, Interior filed an answer to the plaintiffs’ amended complaint and reasserted its 84 affirmative defenses to the plaintiffs’ claims. On August 26, 2010, Knauf Insulation GmbH filed an answer to Interior’s third-party complaint and asserted 56 affirmative defenses to Interior’s third-party complaint against it.

On September 2, 2010, Employers Mutual moved to intervene in the action. As grounds for its motion, Employers Mutual stated that it had issued Holman one commercial general-liability (“CGL”) policy for each year from 2001 to 2010 (for a total of 10 CGL policies) and that it had issued Holman one umbrella policy for each year from 2002 to 2010 (for a total of 9 umbrella policies). Employers Mutual further alleged that a number of coverage issues would be presented with regard to which, if any, of the 19 insurance policies would provide coverage for the claims asserted against Holman. Employers Mutual further alleged that each of these coverage issues implicated “important questions concerning coverage to potentially be resolved by the jury.” Specifically, Employers Mutual stated that the following coverage issues would implicate questions of fact for determination by a jury:

“a. A maximum of one (1) of [Employers Mutual’s] CGL policies may ultimately be implicated in the lawsuit and there is a question regarding which policy is potentially implicated;
“b. There is a question regarding whether some or all of the claims alleged against Holman trigger any of the Insuring Agreements of [Employers Mutual’s] policies;
“c. There is a question regarding whether some or all of the claims asserted against Holman allege an ‘occurrence,’ as required by the Insuring Agreements of each of [Employers Mutual’s] policies;
“d. Even if one of [Employers Mutual’s] CGL policies is implicated, there is a question regarding whether some or all of the claims asserted against Holman allege ‘bodily injury,’ as required by the Insuring Agreements of each of [Employers Mutual’s] policies;
“e. Even if one of [Employers Mutual’s] CGL policies is implicated, there is a question regarding whether some or all of the claims asserted against Holman allege ‘property damage,’ as required by the Insuring Agreements of each of [Employers Mutual’s] policies;
“f. There is a question regarding whether any alleged ‘bodily injury or ‘property damage’ commenced during any of [Employers Mutual’s] policy periods, as required by the Insuring Agreements of [Employers Mutual’s] policies;
“g. Even if one of [Employers Mutual’s] CGL policies is implicated, there is a question regarding whether Holman’s knowledge of ‘bodily injury or ‘property damage’ prior to [Employers Mutual’s] policy periods precludes the application of any of the Insuring Agreements of [Employers Mutual’s] policies;
“h. Even if one of [Employers Mutual’s] CGL policies is implicated, there is a question regarding whether some of the Plaintiffs’ claims are barred by the substantive law of the State of Alabama and are due to be dismissed, which means that [Employers Mutual] owes no duty to defend and/or indemnify Holman as to such claims;
“i. Even if one of [Employers Mutual’s] CGL policies is implicated, there is a question regarding whether the following exclusions contained in the policies apply to bar some or all of the claims and/or damages asserted against Holman, in whole or in part, as follows: (1) Expected or Intended Injury Exclusion, (2) Pollution Exclusion, (3) Damage to Property Exclusion, (4) Damage to Your Product Exclusion, (5) Damage to Your Work Exclusion, (6) Damage to Impaired Property Exclusion, (7) Recall of Product Exclusion, (8) the Continuous or Progressive Injury or Damage Exclusion, and (9) the Absolute Exclusion for Fraud, Misrepresentation, Deceit, or Suppression or Concealment of Fact.
“j. Even if one of [Employers Mutual’s] CGL policies is implicated, there is a question regarding whether some or all of the claims against Holman trigger the insuring agreements of one (1) of the Commercial Umbrella policies issued by [Employers Mutual] to Holman, and whether the following exclusions contained in the Commercial Umbrella policies apply to bar some or all of the claims and/or damages asserted against Holman, in whole or in part, as follows: 1) Property Damage — General Exclusion, 2) Property Damage to Your Product, Work, Impaired Property Exclusion, 3) Product Recall Exclusion, 4) Pollution Exclusion, or 5) Continuous or Progressive Injury or Damage Exclusion.
“k. Lastly, each of the umbrella policies issued by [Employers Mutual] to Holman contains Endorsement Form CU7187 (11/88), which provides that the coverage provided by the respective umbrella policies will not be broader than the underlying CGL policies issued by [Employers Mutual].”

Accordingly, Employers Mutual sought permissive intervention pursuant to Rule 24(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., for the limited purposes of participating in discovery and of moving either for a special-verdict form or a general-verdict form with interrogatories pertaining to the numerous coverage issues or for a bifurcated trial to resolve those coverage issues. On September 3, 2010, Holman filed a brief opposing Employers Mutual’s motion to intervene. On September 10, 2010, Employers Mutual filed a reply in support of its motion to intervene. On September 15, 2010, the plaintiffs filed an opposition to Employers Mutual’s motion to intervene.

On September 15, 2010, the following letter was filed in the case by the Honorable J. Scott Vowell, the presiding judge of the Jefferson Circuit Court:

“Ladies and Gentlemen:
“A number of Chinese Drywall cases have been filed in Shelby, St. Clair, Tuscaloosa and Jefferson Counties. In order to achieve a ‘just, speedy and inexpensive determination’ of these cases (Rule 1, Ala. R. Civ. P.), the Presiding Judges of the circuits in the counties listed above have decided to coordinate the management of these cases. We also want to work with the [multidistrict litigation] Court in New Orleans in order to avoid duplication of discovery. “At my request, Art Edge, who represents some of the plaintiffs in these cases, has provided me with a list of the pending cases of which he is aware. If any of you know of any other related cases, either pending or about to be filed, please send a copy of this notice to any lawyers who are not on our list. “We invite you to meet with the presiding judges of the four Circuits in Courtroom 370, Jefferson County Courthouse, Birmingham, at 4 p.m. on Wednesday, September 22, 2010, for a discussion about the litigation. While Alabama has no multi-circuit consolidation statute, there is no reason the Bench and Bar cannot be innovative in working together to achieve our mutual goals in this interesting litigation. We urge you to be present and to be prepared to offer your suggestions for our consideration.”

Attached to the September 15, 2010, letter was a computer spreadsheet listing the pending “Chinese drywall” cases: 12 separate cases were pending in the Jefferson Circuit Court; 7 were pending in the Shelby Circuit Court; and 2 were pending in the St. Clair Circuit Court. The Tuscaloosa Circuit Court was listed as having “no pending eases to date.” All the listed cases arose out of claims pertaining to the use of drywall manufactured in China in the construction of houses. The majority of these cases listed numerous individuals as plaintiffs and had multiple defendants.

On September 17, 2010, the trial court entered an order denying Employers Mutual’s motion to intervene. On October 22, 2010, Employers Mutual filed a notice of appeal from that order.

Standard of Review

“Permissive intervention is within the broad discretion of the trial court and the court’s ruling on a question of permissive intervention will not be reversed unless the court clearly [exceeds] its discretion.” Mutual Assurance, Inc. v. Chancey, 781 So.2d 172, 175 (Ala.2000) (citing Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Anglen, 630 So.2d 441, 442 (Ala.1993) (“Universal II”)). On such a review, ‘“a reviewing court is not free to merely substitute its judgment for that of the trial court.’ ” Ex parte Anonymous, 803 So.2d 542, 557 (Ala.2001) (Lyons, J., concurring specially) (quoting In re Jane Doe 01-01, 141 Ohio App.3d 20, 23, 749 N.E.2d 807, 809 (2001) (citations omitted)). Thus, “ ‘ “when we are asked to review a denial of permissive intervention, the question on appeal is not whether ‘the factors which render permissive intervention appropriate under [Alabama] Rule of Civil Procedure 24(b) were present,’ but is rather ‘whether the trial court [clearly exceeded its] discretion in denying the motion.’ ” ’ ” QBE Ins. Corp. v. Austin Co., 23 So.3d 1127, 1130 (Ala.2009) (quoting Universal II, 630 So.2d at 443, quoting in turn New Orleans Pub. Serv. Inc. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 732 F.2d 452, 470-71 (5th Cir.1984)).

Analysis

In Universal Underwriters Insurance Co. v. East Central Alabama Ford-Mercury, Inc., 574 So.2d 716 (Ala.1990) (“Universal I ”), this Court “recognized the dilemma faced by insurers in situations where the insured was being sued on claims that might or might not be covered by the insurance policy,” Universal II, 630 So.2d at 443, and adopted a procedure whereby an insurer could seek permissive intervention in such a case for the purpose of seeking a bifurcated trial in which insurance matters would be tried subsequent to the underlying tort claims. QBE Ins. Corp., 23 So.3d at 1131 n. 1. In Universal I, this Court “emphasize[d] that because of the many factors involved, a bifurcated trial is not a matter of right for the insurer, but, rather, the decision of whether to allow intervention under this alternative procedure will rest within the discretion of the trial court as governed by the interests of justice and those factors articulated in Ala. R. Civ. P. 42(b).” Universal I, 574 So.2d at 723-24. See also Chancey, 781 So.2d at 176 (Lyons, J., concurring specially) (“Whether to allow an insurer permissive intervention, pursuant to Rule 24(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., in a tort action against its insured, so that the insurer can invoke Rule 49, Ala. R. Civ. P.,[] and thereby obtain clarification of coverage issues, falls within the sound discretion of the trial court.”).

Alternatively, an insurer may seek permissive intervention in the underlying tort litigation against the insured for the purpose of requesting a special-verdict form or a general-verdict form aceompa-nied by interrogatories so that it may ascertain the basis of the jury’s verdict in the event the jury finds against its insured. See, e.g., Chancey, 781 So.2d at 174-75; Universal II. In Universal II and Chan-cey, supra, this Court reaffirmed its holding that such intervention was permissive in nature and, thus, was within the “broad discretion” of the trial court. Chancey, 781 So.2d at 175.

Accordingly, as Employers Mutual expressly recognizes, an insurer’s right to intervene in a civil action against its insured — either to seek a bifurcated trial or to request a general-verdict form with interrogatories or a special-verdict form — is permissive only. Chancey, 781 So.2d at 174-75; Universal I; and United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Adams, 485 So.2d 720 (Ala.1986). “[A]n insurer has no absolute right to intervene in an action against its insured.” QBE Ins. Corp., 23 So.3d at 1130.

However, Employers Mutual points out that in Universal I and Universal II the insurer seeking to intervene did not request different forms of relief in the alternative. Seizing on this distinction, Employers Mutual asks this Court to hold that, (1) where an insurer meets the criteria for permissive intervention and (2) where, as in this case, the insurer seeks “both forms of relief ..., under Universal I and Universal II, ... a trial court loses its discretion to deny the motion” for permissive intervention. Employers Mutual’s brief, at 17 (emphasis added).

We decline to so hold. A motion for permissive intervention is inherently within the discretion of the trial court. Rule 24(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., sets out the criteria for permissive intervention. The rule provides, in pertinent part:

“Upon timely application anyone may be permitted to intervene in an action ... when an applicant’s claim or defense and the main action have a question of law or fact in common.... In exercising its discretion the court shall consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties.”

(Emphasis added.) See also Ex parte Scott, 728 So.2d 172, 184 (Ala.1998) (holding that the use of the word “may” indicates that a procedural rule is permissive rather than mandatory). Nothing in Rule 24(b) deprives a trial court of its discretion to grant or deny a motion seeking permissive intervention merely because the putative intervenor seeks multiple forms of relief in the alternative.

Further, in light of the requirements of Rule 24(b) for permissive intervention, and without substituting our judgment for that of the trial court, we hold that the trial court did not exceed its discretion in denying Employers Mutual’s motion for permissive intervention. Given the complexity of this case, the trial court was clearly within its discretion to deny Employers Mutual’s request to intervene for the purpose of obtaining a bifurcated trial of insurance-coverage issues or a special verdict or a general verdict accompanied by answers to interrogatories.

Moreover, because the trial court was faced with the task not only of managing this single complex case, but also of coordinating its case management with judges in three other circuits as well as with federal multidistrict litigation, this case provides a prime example of the need for discretion in a trial court’s ruling on an insurer’s motion for permissive intervention. As we stated in Universal I:

“The comments to Rule 42(b) ... emphasize that a trial court has broad freedom to order separate trials on different issues or with respect to different parties in order to effectuate the goals of justice and judicial economy.... The Court noted [in Coburn v. American Liberty Ins. Co., 341 So.2d 717 (Ala.1977),] that the trial court is in a ‘position to evaluate, within the posture of the case, the matter of trial convenience and to shape the order of trial. ’ See also Ex parte R.B. Ethridge & Assocs., Inc., 494 So.2d 54 (Ala.1986) (Rule 42(b) gives the trial courts great flexibility in complex litigation cases)....”

574 So.2d at 724 (emphasis added). See also Mangiafico v. Street, 767 So.2d 1103, 1105 (Ala.2000) (“It is well established that a trial court must be vested with the authority ‘to manage its affairs in order to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.’ Iverson v. Xpert Tune, Inc., 553 So.2d 82, 87 (Ala.1989).”).

Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order denying Employers Mutual’s motion for permissive intervention.

AFFIRMED.

WOODALL, STUART, PARKER, SHAW, MAIN, and WISE, JJ., concur.

BOLIN, J., concurs in the result.

MURDOCK, J., dissents.

MURDOCK, Justice

(dissenting).

Until today, no published opinion of an appellate court in this State has addressed a case in which a liability insurer had made a dual request for intervention, i.e., a request that the trial court allow intervention under either the procedure outlined in Universal Underwriters Insurance Co. v. East Central Alabama Ford-Mercury, Inc., 574 So.2d 716 (Ala.1991) (“Universal I”), or the procedure contemplated by Universal Underwriters Insurance Co. v. Anglen, 630 So.2d 441 (Ala.1993) (“Universal II”), and the trial court has denied relief under both. The main opinion upholds such a denial in the present case. I respectfully dissent because I believe the trial court erred in not allowing one form of intervention or the other.

The main opinion explains that there are multiple liability insurance coverage issues presented in this case:

“On September 2, 2010, Employers Mutual [Casualty Company] moved to intervene in the action. As grounds for its motion, Employers Mutual stated that it had issued Holman [Building Co., L.L.C.,] one commercial general-liability (‘CGL’) policy for each year from 2001 to 2010 (for a total of 10 CGL policies) and that it had issued Holman one umbrella policy for each year from 2002 to 2010 (for a total of 9 umbrella policies). Employers Mutual further alleged that a number of coverage issues would be presented with regard to which, if any, of the 19 insurance policies would provide coverage for the claims asserted against Holman. Employers Mutual further alleged that each of these coverage issues implicated ‘important questions concerning coverage to potentially be resolved by the jury.’ Specifically, Employers Mutual stated that the following coverage issues would implicate questions of fact for determination by a jury:
“ ‘a. A maximum of one (1) of [Employers Mutual’s] CGL policies may ultimately be implicated in the lawsuit and there is a question regarding which policy is potentially implicated;
“‘b. There is a question regarding whether some or all of the claims alleged against Holman trigger any of the Insuring Agreements of [Employers Mutual’s] policies;
“ ‘c. There is a question regarding whether some or all of the claims asserted against Holman allege an “occurrence,” as required by the Insuring Agreements of each of [Employers Mutual’s] policies;
“ ‘d. Even if one of [Employers Mutual’s] CGL policies is implicated, there is a question regarding whether some or all of the claims asserted against Holman allege “bodily injury,” as required by the Insuring Agreements of each of [Employers Mutual’s] policies;
“ ‘e. Even if one of [Employers Mutual’s] CGL policies is implicated, there is a question regarding whether some or all of the claims asserted against Holman allege “property damage,” as required by the Insuring Agreements of each of [Employers Mutual’s] policies;
“ ‘f. There is a question regarding whether any alleged “bodily injury” or “property damage” commenced during any of [Employers Mutual’s] policy periods, as required by the Insuring Agreements of [Employers Mutual’s] policies;
“ ‘g. Even if one of [Employers Mutual’s] CGL policies is implicated, there is a question regarding whether Holman’s knowledge of “bodily injury” or “property damage” prior to [Employers Mutual’s] policy periods precludes the application of any of the Insuring Agreements of [Employers Mutual’s] policies;
“ ‘h. Even if one of [Employers Mutual’s] CGL policies is implicated, there is a question regarding whether some of the Plaintiffs’ claims are barred by the substantive law of the State of Alabama and are due to be dismissed, which means that [Employers Mutual] owes no duty to defend and/or indemnify Holman as to such claims;
“ ‘i. Even if one of [Employers Mutual’s] CGL policies is implicated, there is a question regarding whether the following exclusions contained in the policies apply to bar some or all of the claims and/or damages asserted against Holman, in whole or in part, as follows: (1) Expected or Intended Injury Exclusion, (2) Pollution Exclusion, (3) Damage to Property Exclusion, (4) Damage to Your Product Exclusion, (5) Damage to Your Work Exclusion, (6) Damage to Impaired Property Exclusion, (7) Recall of Product Exclusion, (8) the Continuous or Progressive Injury or Damage Exclusion, and (9) the Absolute Exclusion for Fraud, Misrepresentation, Deceit, or Suppression or Concealment of Fact'.
“ ‘j. Even if one of [Employers Mutual’s] CGL policies is implicated, there is a question regarding whether some or all of the claims against Holman trigger the insuring agreements of one (1) of the Commercial Umbrella policies issued by [Employers Mutual] to Holman, and whether the following exclusions contained in the Commercial Umbrella policies apply to bar some or all of the claims and/or damages asserted against Holman, in whole or in part, as follows: 1) Property Damage — General Exclusion, 2) Property Damage to Your Product, Work, Impaired Property Exclusion, 3) Product Recall Exclusion, 4) Pollution Exclusion, or 5) Continuous or Progressive Injury or Damage Exclusion.
“ %. Lastly, each of the umbrella policies issued by [Employers Mutual] to Holman contains Endorsement Form CU7187 (11/88), which provides that the coverage provided by the respective umbrella policies will not be broader than the underlying CGL policies issued by [Employers Mutual].’ ”

84 So.3d at 858-59.

The main opinion also notes, however, that there are 21 separate cases pending in Jefferson County and two other Alabama counties, each of which involves claims similar to those presented here; those cases have been filed by different plaintiffs against Holman Building Co., L.L.C., and other defendants. Although the presiding judge of the Jefferson Circuit Court attempted to structure some coordination of those cases, based on a case-management order entered by the presiding judge on September 27, 2010, it appears that the trial of each individual plaintiffs action will proceed as a separate action with its own separate trial. Therefore, unlike my colleagues, I cannot conclude that the pen-dency of these separate actions has a material bearing on the question before us.

In Universal I, this Court recognized the dilemma faced by insurers in situations where the insured was being sued on claims that might or might not be covered by the insurance policy, and we adopted an alternate procedure involving permissive intervention and a bifurcated trial. Alternatively, as indicated in Universal II, an insurer may seek permissive intervention in the underlying tort litigation against the insured for the purpose of requesting a special-verdict form or a general-verdict form accompanied by interrogatories so that it may ascertain the basis of the jury’s verdict in the event the jury finds against its insured.

By depriving Employers Mutual Casualty (“EMC”) of both of the two alternative procedures outlined in Universal I and Universal II, today’s decision leaves EMC with no choice but to attempt to litigate, in a separate, subsequent action, the extent of its liability, if any, to the insured. Such an attempt in a separate action would be inadequate. In QBE Insurance Corp. v. Austin Co., 23 So.3d 1127 (Ala.2009), I found merit in the insurer’s argument as to the inadequacy of such an action:

“I conclude that a subsequent declaratory-judgment action by QBE would not be an adequate substitute for QBE’s intervention in this action and that QBE likely would suffer definite prejudice if it is not allowed to intervene. Again, I believe there is merit in much of QBE’s argument:
“ ‘A declaratory judgment action by QBE would not be an adequate remedy to protect its interest in this case. The coverage issues in this case are entirely fact based. A separate declaratory judgment action cannot determine the factual basis for the damages awarded in this action if there is a general verdict, and therefore, a declaratory' judgment cannot determine the extent of damages awarded for covered consequential damages, versus noncovered damages for replacement or repair of the insured’s work. Further, even if a declaratory judgment was an effective remedy for QBE to resolve coverage issues, such an action would be wasteful of judicial resources, since the coverage questions can be more efficiently resolved in this action.’ ”

28 So.3d at 1135 (Murdock, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).

I find merit in the similar argument made by the insurer in the present case:

“Plaintiffs seek recovery against EMC’s insured, Holman Building Company, LLC. A substantial question exists as to whether some or all of the counts alleged by Plaintiffs against Holman trigger one of the Insuring Agreements) of EMC’s respective CGL policies.
“For example, EMC may have no duty to indemnify Holman for these claims alleging ‘property damage’ through operation of the Damage to Your Work Exclusion in EMC’s respective policies, which are valid under Alabama law_ Thus, some of the damages claimed by Plaintiffs are outside the coverage provided by one (1) of EMC’s policies to Holman; and EMC would have no duty to indemnify Holman for the damages which do not trigger one (1) of EMC’s policies.
“In contrast, Plaintiffs also allege they have suffered ‘mental anguish’, which is considered ‘bodily injur/ under a CGL Policy....
“Therefore, as the Court can see, some of the claims alleged by Plaintiffs may potentially trigger EMC’s duty to indemnify Holman for the some of the losses claimed by Plaintiffs, and some of Plaintiffs’ claims may not trigger EMC’s duty to indemnify Holman.”

EMC’s brief, at 21-23 (footnotes omitted). Referring to Universal I, EMC continues by noting, correctly in my opinion, as follows:

“Universal argued, as EMC does here, ‘that if a general verdict is returned against the insured defendants, Universal will have no way to determine what claims are covered under the policy. Based on these arguments. Universal asserts that it has an interest relating to the subject matter of the action that, under the rules of fairness and equity, gives it a right of intervention,[ ] or, in the alternative, that permissive intervention should be allowed.’ Universal I, 574 So.2d, at 718-9. As Universal correctly pointed out, this Court has recognized, ‘the impossibility of going behind a general verdict to determine the theories on which the jury based its verdict ’. Universal I, at 720 (emphasis supplied) ((citing Alabama Hosp. Ass’n Trust v. Mutual Assur. Soc. of Alabama, 538 So.2d 1209, 1215 (Ala.1989) (‘Since no special interrogatories were submitted to the jury, it is not possible for this Court to now determine what was the basis for the jury verdict finding Lloyd Noland liable.’)).”

EMC’s brief, at 24-25 (emphasis added in brief). See generally Root v. City of Mobile, 592 So.2d 1051, 1053 (Ala.1992) (“The purpose of Rule 24 is to anticipate future litigation, to discourage a multiplicity of lawsuits, and to relieve the intervener from the possible prejudice of stare decisis in subsequent litigation involving the same questions of law and fact. Thus, as a general proposition, Rule 24 is to be liberally construed to allow intervention.”).

I also believe this Court should further examine EMC’s argument that the denial of any intervention by an insurer in a case such as this gives rise to due-process concerns. See, e.g., Alabama Hosp. Ass’n Trust v. Mut. Assur. Soc. of Alabama, 538 So.2d 1209 (Ala.1989) (holding that, if a jury enters a general verdict against an insured, the insurer cannot “go behind” the jury verdict to determine the basis for the jury’s award); Baptist Mem’l Hosp. v. Bowen, 591 So.2d 74, 78 (Ala.1991) (“Additionally, because the verdict form was ‘general’ rather than ‘specific’ we cannot determine exactly why the jury found against Baptist alone.”). The problem presented for both sides is not unlike the problem addressed by this Court in Alabama Hospital Association Trust:

“The issue in this case is whether the verdict in the [prior] case against Lloyd Noland [Foundation, Inc.,] was based upon the jury’s finding that Lloyd No-land was liable because of the negligence of the two medical doctors, Habachy and Park. This is impossible to resolve, because the verdict of the jury was a general one and because there was evidence from which the jury could have found liability as to Lloyd Noland based upon the negligence of other employees of Lloyd Noland. Absent a special verdict, the fact of coverage is impossible to prove.”

538 So.2d at 1216 (emphasis added).

      . Rule 49 governs verdict forms generally, including general verdicts, special verdicts, and interrogatories.

      . When applying the exceeds-its-discretion standard, " 'a reviewing court is not free to merely substitute its judgment for that of the trial court.' ” Ex parte Anonymous, 803 So.2d at 557 (Lyons, J., concurring specially) (quoting In re Jane Doe 01-01, 141 Ohio App.3d at 23, 749 N.E.2d at 809). See also QBE Ins. Corp., 23 So.3d at 1130 (" ' “[W]hen we are asked to review a denial of permissive intervention, the question on appeal is not whether ‘the factors which render permissive intervention appropriate under [Alabama] Rule of Civil Procedure 24(b) were present,’ but is rather 'whether the trial court [clearly exceeded its] discretion in denying the motion.' ” ’ ” (quoting Universal II, 630 So.2d at 443, quoting in turn New Orleans Pub. Serv. Inc., 732 F.2d at 470-71)).

      . There appears to be much wisdom in the views expressed by Justice Jones in Universal I regarding the practice of allowing an insurer to intervene for the purpose of requesting interrogatories under Rule 49, Ala. R. Civ. P. Some of Justice Jones’s views, as expressed in his special writing, are as follows:
      "Having voluntarily offered to submit itself to the jurisdiction of the court, and thus having agreed to be bound by the jury verdict in the trial by the plaintiff against its potential insured, Universal, the insurer, asks simply to be allowed to intervene for the limited purpose of invoking Rule 49, which authorizes the jury’s use of special interrogatories to designate under which, if any, of the claims it found for the plaintiff.
      "One would have thought (or at least I did) that the intervention prescribed in Lowe v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 521 So.2d 1309 (Ala.1988), would be interpreted as direct authority (if, indeed, common sense was not of itself sufficient authority) for the proposition that Universal’s interest in the outcome of the instant litigation, albeit both limited and contingent, would permit intervention concomitant with its limited interest. Indeed, Nationwide’s interest in the Lowe case was equally limited and contingent.
      "The insurer’s interest in both this case and in Lowe, in a broad sense, deals with the issue of coverage. In Lowe, the insured had no underinsured coverage (and, thus, the insurer had no liability) unless the jury’s verdict for the plaintiff exceeded the amount of the primary coverage. Here, the insurer has no liability to the plaintiff, unless the jury awards the plaintiff damages under a theory of liability for which the policy provides coverage. A general verdict for this plaintiff may be sufficient for execution against these defendants, but, because certain of the plaintiff's theories are clearly outside the coverage provided by the policy, it would obviously not be sufficient for execution against Universal. This, then, is the classic case for the invocation of Rule 49.”
      574 So.2d at 727. Justice Jones also responded to concerns that special interrogatories might confuse the jury by noting that "trial judges know how to draft fair and impartial jury instructions, including interrogatories contemplated by Rule 49,” and that he could not understand how the plaintiff would be prejudiced, rather than aided, by the trial court’s granting of the petition for limited intervention for the purpose of proposing such interrogatories. 574 So.2d at 728.

      . Rule 24(a)(2), Ala. R. Civ. P., provides for "intervention of right”:
      "when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action and the applicant is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the applicant’s ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing parties.”
      We have not been asked in this case to revisit the holding in Universal I that a liability insurer is not entitled to intervene as a matter of right in a case such as this.