text:
    STATE ex rel. Bobby LEWIS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-0196.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 13, 2012.
   In re Lewis, Bobby;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. F, No. 397-585; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 10-K-1786.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    STATE ex rel. David A. LEE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-0203.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 13, 2012.
   In re Lee, David A.;-Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. C, No. 405-129; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2010-K-1742.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Emanuel WILLIAMS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-0182.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 13, 2012.
   In re Williams, Emanuel;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. J, No. 348-945; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2010-K-1724.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172. See also State v. Cotton, 09-2397 (La.10/15/10), 45 So.3d 1030.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Stanley COLQUITT v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-0147.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 13, 2012.
   In re Colquitt, Stanley;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Morehouse, 4th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 2005-F-1017; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. KH-10-45714.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; State v. Parker, 98-0256 (La.5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694; La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Aubrey Brian McCartney, Jr. v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-0148.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 13, 2012.
   In re McCartney Jr., Aubrey Brian;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Rapides, 9th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 294,309; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 10-648.

Denied.

GUIDRY, J., recused.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Leonard PERKINS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-0164.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 13, 2012.
   In re Perkins, Leonard;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 91-1188; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 10-KH-522.

Denied.

GUIDRY, J., recused.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Lukas LEMEUNIER v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-0072.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 13, 2012.
   In re Lemeunier, Lukas;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 03-6180; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 10-KH-839.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Charles Ray MARSHALL v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-0110.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 13, 2012.
   In re Marshall, Charles Ray;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. 4, No. 170,198; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 46,255-KH.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Morris HARRISON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-2800.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 13, 2012.
   In re Harrison, Morris;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Madison, 6th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 53,226; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 46,164-KH.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Terrence K. BENOIT v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-2801.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 13, 2012.
   In re Benoit, Terrence K.;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Iberia, 16th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. CR-04-1005; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH-10-01113.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Mozine JOHNSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-2802.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 13, 2012.
   In re Johnson, Mozine;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 05-2244; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 10-KH-910.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. John P. GIVENS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-2840.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 13, 2012.
   In re Givens, John P.;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Mary, 16th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 2000-156556; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 KW 1497.

Denied. State ex rel. Bernard v. Cr. D.C., 94-2247, p. 1 (La.4/28/95), 653 So.2d 1174, 1175.


text:
    STATE ex rel. John SAYLOR v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-2841.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 13, 2012.
   In re Saylor, John;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 00-3551; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 10-KH-793.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Brett Robert CRIST v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-2842.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 13, 2012.
   In re Crist, Brett Robert;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 427274; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 KW 1702.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Louis LEDET v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-2843.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 13, 2012.
   In re Ledet, Louis;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Assumption, 23rd Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 03-118; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 KW 1300.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Titrus DAVIS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-0024.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 13, 2012.
   In re Davis, Titrus;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. N, No. 99-5583; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, Nos. 09-KH-703, 09-WR-512.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Ray MASON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-0025.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 13, 2012.
   In re Mason, Ray;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Bossier, 26th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 106,507; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 46,167-KH.

Denied. See State ex rel. Fleury v. State, 93-2898 (La.10/13/95), 661 So.2d 488.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Luqman M. SHABAZZ, (aka Eric Gross) v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-0027.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 13, 2012.
   In re Luqman M. Shabazz a/k/a Eric Gross;-Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 9-97-416; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 KW 1455.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Travis Demon WILSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-0059.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 13, 2012.
   In re Wilson, Travis Demon;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Ascension, 23rd Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 20337; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 KW 1688.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Stephen WINDSOR v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-0063.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 13, 2012.
   In re Windsor, Stephen;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. I, No. 389-171; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2010-K-1473.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189. See also State ex rel. Fleury v. State, 93-2898 (La.10/13/95), 661 So.2d 488.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Emmitt J. JONES v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-0064.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 13, 2012.
   In re Jones, Emmitt J.;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. J, No. 79-0234; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 09-WR-514.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; State v. Parker, 98-0256 (La.5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Phillip Terrell WASHINGTON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-2653.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 13, 2012.
   In re Washington, Phillip Terrell—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Terrebonne, 32nd Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 495910; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 KW 1350.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Wilbert JONES v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-2647.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 13, 2012.
   In re Jones, Wilbert;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 64427.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Derrick LEE v. Burl CAIN, Warden.
    No. 2011-KP-0843.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 13, 2012.
   In re Lee, Derrick;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 06-03-0655.

Granted in part. The district court is ordered to release all of relator’s medical and psychiatric health records compiled by the Department of Public Safety and Corrections. In all other respects the application is denied.

KNOLL and CLARK, JJ., to deny.


text:
    Dallas RICHARD v. COASTAL CULVERT & SUPPLY, INC.
    No. 2011-C-2459.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 13, 2012.
   In re Coastal Culvert & Supply Inc.;—Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certio-rari and/or Review Office of Workers’ Compensation District 4, No. 08-04568; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 11-232.

Denied.

VICTORY and CLARK, JJ., would grant.


text:
    Harold THIBODEAUX v. Melinda TRAHAN, et al.
    No. 2011-C-2458.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 13, 2012.
   In re Lafayette Parish School Board; Trahan, Melinda; Defendant(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 2007-5620-C; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 11-0328.

Denied.


text:
    James LYNCH v. A DOOR WORKS, INC.
    No. 2011-C-2457.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 13, 2012.
   In re A Door Works Inc.;—Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review Office of Workers’ Compensation District 03, No. 08-05111; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 11-414.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant.


text:
    Kenneth D. LOPEZ v. TOWN OF ZWOLLE.
    No. 2011-C-2452.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 13, 2012.
   In re Town of Zwolle;—Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review Office of Workers’ Compensation- # 2, No. 09-02719; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 11-287.

Denied.

VICTORY and CLARK, JJ„ would grant.


text:
    Alan KITE v. KITE BROS., et al.
    No. 2011-C-2436.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 13, 2012.
   In re Kite, Alan;—Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Beauregard, 36th Judicial District Court Div. B, Nos. C-2006-0241, 2007-1110-B; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, Nos. 11-334, 11-335.

Denied.


text:
    Dyna MITTE v. PROGRESSIVE SECURITY INS. CO.
    No. 2011-C-2429.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 13, 2012.
   In re Mitte, Dyna;—Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. J, No. 2006-0803-J; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CA 10-1301.

Denied.


text:
    Brenna DAVIS v. WOMEN AND CHILDREN’S HOSPITAL LAKE CHARLES.
    No. 2011-C-2426.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 13, 2012.
   In re Davis, Brenna;—Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 2009-4518; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 11-0318.

Denied.


text:
    Jane MURDOCK v. Leonard LALLA.
    No. 2011-CC-2412.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 13, 2012.
   In re Murdock, Jane;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. H, No. 2010-9623; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-C-1436.

Denied.


text:
    Elbert WHITE v. LA. RISK REVIEW PANEL, et al.
    No. 2011-CI-0065.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 13, 2012.
   In re White, Elbert;-Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 585,043; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 10 CA 1125.

Denied.


text:
    Prudencio VERA v. THE GRAND, LTD., et al.
    No. 2011-CC-2413.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 13, 2012.
   In re Laredo Offshore Services, Inc.; The Grand, LTD. et al.; Defendant(s); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Plaquemines, 25th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 57-515; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-01139.

Granted. The judgment of the district court is reversed. Relators’ motion to compel is granted. See Hodges v. Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Ins. Co., 433 So.2d 125, 129 (La.1983) (explaining one of the basic objectives of the Louisiana discovery process is “to afford all parties a fair opportunity to obtain facts pertinent to the litigation ... ”).


text:
    Jeryd ZITO v. ADVANCED EMERGENCY MEDICAL SERVICES, INC. and Empire Indemnity Insurance Company.
    No. 2011-C-2382.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 13, 2012.
   In re Advanced Emergency Medical Services Inc. et al.; Empire Indemnity Insurance Company; — Defendant(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Plaquemines, 25th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 54-669; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-CA-0218.

Granted.


text:
    Milton WILSON v. Fred OHLER, et al.
    No. 2011-CI-0116.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 13, 2012.
   In re Wilson, Milton;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 2008-16380; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 CW 1775.

Denied.


text:
    SCHWEGMANN FAMILY TRUST NO. 2 v. WHITE III, LLC.
    No. 2011-CC-2406.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 13, 2012.
   In re White III LLC;—Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. M, No. 10-10992; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-C-0611.

Denied.


text:
    Dr. Susan HOOPER, D.C. v. TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANY and Robert and Leah Payne.
    No. 2011-C-2391.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 13, 2012.
   In re Payne, Leah; Payne, Robert; The Travelers Indemnity Company of Illinois; Travelers Property Casualty Company of America F/K/A; — Defendant(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Plaquemines, 25th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 50-974; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, Nos. 2010-CA-1685, 2011-CA-0220.

Denied.

VICTORY and CLARK, JJ., would grant.


text:
    Garry Neil PRATER v. Supervisor Sandra ORTEGO and Parole Officer Lee Hubbard.
    No. 2011-CI-0207.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 13, 2012.
   In re Prater, Garry Neil;—Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. O, Nos. 575,517, 577,340; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 CA 0944.

Denied.


text:
    Judy DAVIS v. STATE of Louisiana, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND DEVELOPMENT and the Office of Risk Management.
    No. 2011-C-2456.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 13, 2012.
   In re Davis, Judy;—Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review Office of Workers’ Compensation District 1-E, No. 07-09286; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 11-404.

Denied.


text:
    David L. WILLIS, et ux. v. GULF COAST BUILDING SUPPLY, et al. Karen Brown v. Home State County Mutual Insurance Company, et al. David Frick v. Home State County Mutual Insurance Company, et al.
    No. 2011-C-2455.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 13, 2012.
   In re Brown, Karen; Frick, David; Willis, David L. et al.; Willis, Donna;—Plaintiffs); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Vernon, 30th Judicial District Court Div. B, Nos. 75991, 76891, 76890; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, Nos. 11-272, 11-273, 11-274.

Denied.


text:
    Dr. Ralph SLAUGHTER v. BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF SOUTHERN UNIVERSITY AND AGRICULTURAL AND MECHANICAL COLLEGE.
    No. 2011-C-2112.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 13, 2012.
   In re Slaughter, Dr. Ralph;—Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 582-307; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 CA 1114.

Denied.

JOHNSON, J., would grant.


text:
    Dr. Ralph SLAUGHTER v. BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF SOUTHERN UNIVERSITY AND AGRICULTURAL AND MECHANICAL COLLEGE.
    No. 2011-C-2110.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 13, 2012.
   In re Slaughter, Dr. Ralph;—Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 582,307; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 CA 1049.

Denied.

JOHNSON, J„ would grant.


text:
    Gregory JEANLOUIS v. Richard STALDER/Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections.
    No. 2011-CI-0183.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 13, 2012.
   In re Jeanlouis, Gregory;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 559,230; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 CA 0965.

Denied.


text:
    David JACOBSON v. STATE of Louisiana, James Leblanc, Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections.
    No. 2011-CI-0114.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 13, 2012.
   In re Jacobson, David;—Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 587,691; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 CA 0986.

Denied.


text:
    OLD REPUBLIC INSURANCE COMPANY and Koch Specialty Plant Services, Inc. v. VALERO REFINING-NEW ORLEANS, LLC and Valero Energy Corporation.
    No. 2011-CC-2428.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 13, 2012.
   In re Koch Specialty Plant Services Inc.;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Charles, 29th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 73,241; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 11-C-868.

Denied.


text:
    John CONRY and Conry and Associates, LLC v. Mark SUBERVILLE, Tim Smith, Mary Richaux Suberville, Strategic Ventures, LLC, 1100 Clearview Parkway, LLC.
    No. 2011-CC-2408.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 13, 2012.
   In re Conry & Associates, LLC; Conry, John et al.;—Plaintiff(s); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. M, No. 695-569; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 11-C-792.

Denied.


text:
    David O. BORDELON, et al. v. GRAVITY DRAINAGE DISTRICT NO. 4 OF WARD 3 OF CALCASIEU PARISH, et al.
    No. 2011-C-2438.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 13, 2012.
   In re American Alternative Insurance Corp.; Gravity Drainage District No. 4 of Ward 3 of Calcasieu Parish et al.;—Defendants); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 2006-4422-A; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 10-1318.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant.


text:
    Kevin RUSHING v. Jerry GOODWIN, Warden, David Wade Correctional Center, James Leblanc, Secretary, Department of Corrections, Colonel Brad Rogers, and Colonel James Arnold.
    No. 2011-CI-0498.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 13, 2012.
   In re Rushing, Kevin;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 587,660; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 CA 1482.

Denied.


text:
    JEFFERSON DAVIS PARISH SCHOOL BOARD through SALES/USE TAX DEPT. v. LOUISIANA MACHINERY RENTALS, LLC. Jefferson Davis Parish School Board through Sales/Use Tax Dept. v. Louisiana Machinery Company, LLC.
    No. 2011-C-2437.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 13, 2012.
   In re Louisiana Machinery Company LLC; Louisiana Machinery Rentals LLC et al.;-Defendant(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson Davis, 31st Judicial District Court Div. O, Nos. C863-10, C864-10; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, Nos. 11-510, 11-512.

Denied.


text:
    Frances ROBERTSON, Phillis Castille, Leslie Robertson, and Stewart Robertson, Individually and on behalf of their deceased Husband and Father, respectively, Harris J. Robertson v. DOUG ASHY BUILDING MATERIALS, INC., et al.
    No. 2011-C-2468.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 13, 2012.
   In re Georgia-Pacific Corporation LLC;—Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 532,769; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, Nos; 2010 CA 1552, 2010 CA 1547.

Denied.


text:
    Frances ROBERTSON, Phillis Castille, Leslie Robertson, and Stewart Robertson, Individually and on Behalf of their Deceased Husband and Father, respectively, Harris J. Robertson v. DOUG ASHY BUILDING MATERIALS, INC., et al.
    No. 2011-C-2431.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 13, 2012.
   In re Union Carbide Corporation;—Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 532,769; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 CA 1551.

Denied.


text:
    Frances ROBERTSON, Phillis Castille, Leslie Robertson, and Stewart Robertson, Individually and on Behalf of their Deceased Husband and Father, respectively, Harris J. Robertson v. DOUG ASHY BUILDING MATERIALS, INC., et al.
    No. 2011-C-2430.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 13, 2012.
   In re Sherwin-Williams Company;—Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 532,769; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 CA 1552.

Denied.


text:
    Frances ROBERTSON, Phillis Castille, Leslie Robertson, and Stewart Robertson, Individually and on Behalf of their deceased Husband and Father, respectively, Harris J. Robertson v. DOUG ASHY BUILDING MATERIALS, INC., et al.
    No. 2011-C-2433.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 13, 2012.
   In re Georgia-Pacific Corporation LLC;—Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 532,769; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 CA 1552.

Not considered.


text:
    Sterling PITTMAN v. The OFFSHORE DRILLING COMPANY, f/k/a R & B Falcon Drilling USA, Inc., Transocean Offshore Deep Water Drilling, Inc., f/k/a Transocean Sedco Forex, PXP Gulf Coast, Inc., f/k/a 3TEC Energy Corporation, ABC Insurance Company and XYZ Insurance Company.
    No. 2011-C-2439.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 13, 2012.
   In re Pittman, Sterling;—Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Plaquemines, 25th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 50-288; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2010-CA-1684.

Denied.


text:
    Frances ROBERTSON, Phillis Castille, Leslie Robertson, and Stewart Robertson, Individually and on Behalf of their deceased Husband and Father, respectively, Harris J. Robertson v. DOUG ASHY BUILDING MATERIALS, INC., et al.
    No. 2011-C-2432.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 13, 2012.
   In re Union Carbide Corporation;—Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 532,769; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 CA 1552.

Not considered.


author: CARTER, C.J.

text:
    CARROLLTON PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH v. The PRESBYTERY OF SOUTH LOUISIANA OF the PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH (USA).
    No. 2011 CA 0205.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.
    Sept. 14, 2011.
    Rehearing Denied Oct. 24, 2011.

      John Anthony Dunlap, Russell L. Foster, Harry M. Barton, New Orleans, LA, E. Wade Shows, Baton Rouge, LA, for Defendant/Appellant, The Presbytery of South Louisiana of the Presbyterian Church (USA).
    Eugene R. Groves, Lloyd J. Lunceford, Baton Rouge, LA, for Plaintiff/Appellee, Carrollton Presbyterian Church.
    Before CARTER, C.J., PARRO and HIGGINBOTHAM, JJ.
   CARTER, C.J.

12This matter is before this court on appeal by the defendant, the Presbytery of South Louisiana (hereinafter referred to as “the Presbytery”), from a judgment in a suit for declaratory judgment and permanent injunction rendered in favor of plaintiff, Carrollton Presbyterian Church (hereinafter referred to as “Carrollton”), and from an order of contempt.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Carrollton and the Presbytery are constituent members of the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) (hereinafter “PCUSA”). The PCUSA’s governing document is its constitution, comprised of two books, one of which is the Book of Order. The Book of Order outlines the PCUSA’s organizational structure, pursuant to which, the Presbytery (one of the PCUSA’s governing bodies) exercises certain supervisory powers and authority over Carrollton (a local church), subject to review by the next higher governing body.

Carrollton was organized in 1855 and incorporated as a Louisiana corporation in 1894. Over the course of years, Carrollton acquired property in its name, including the immovable property in New Orleans that is the site of Carrollton’s sanctuary. Carrollton also sold property it held in its name. In recent years Carrollton’s membership had declined, and there was some talk of Carrollton dissolving, although Car-rollton did not formally petition to do so. Carrollton also began investigating a potential sale of its sanctuary property.

The declaratory judgment portion of this dispute raises the issue of whether Carroll-ton holds, in full and exclusive ownership, property held in its name, and therefore, may sell its property as it desires. The Presbytery maintains that Carrollton is subject to the Book of Order’s express trust provision, which creates an express trust in church property in favor of the PCUSA. Carrollton argues that the trust provision of the Book of Order does not comply with Louisiana trust law Land further contends that the provision is inapplicable here, as Carrollton timely exercised its option to exempt itself from the trust provision.

After Carrollton amended its petition, the district court granted a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) prohibiting the Presbytery from establishing an administrative commission to take jurisdiction over Carrollton’s “session.” After finding that Carrollton set forth a prima facie showing that it would prevail on the merits of the suit, the district court issued a preliminary injunction effective against the Presbytery and pertaining to all property held by or for Carrollton, enjoining the Presbytery from filing documents in the mortgage and conveyance records of Orleans Parish that would create a cloud on Carrollton’s title to its property, or interfering with Carrollton’s right to determine ownership, use, control, or disposition of its property. The preliminary injunction further enjoined the Presbytery from: changing the church locks; initiating disciplinary action against Carrollton’s ministers or members in relation to the subject matter of this litigation; dissolving Car-rollton or appointing or initiating processes leading to appointment of an administrative commission to assert jurisdiction over Carrollton to assume control over its governance of or control of the subject property; or interfering with Carrollton in any way pertaining to ownership, control, use, or disposition of church property.

The district court then granted Carroll-ton’s motion for summary judgment, declaring that all property held by, for, or in Carrollton’s name is held and owned by Carrollton, which holds and owns all property in its name in full, complete, and unfettered ownership in accordance with Louisiana law and further, that the express trust provisions relied on by the Presbytery are unenforceable and without legal effect as to the subject property. Additionally, the district court issued a permanent injunction enjoining the Presbytery from asserting ownership, use, |4control, or a trust over any property titled in. Carrollton’s name and also from taking any action that could affect Carroll-ton’s property rights, which specifically included, but was not limited to, the actions enumerated in the preliminary injunction.

The Presbytery now appeals.

JURISDICTION

After lodging of the appellate record, this court, ex proprio motu, issued a rule to show cause why this appeal should not be dismissed, as it appeared that the motion for appeal was untimely filed. The matter was briefed and the record corrected, in part, by the district court. Having examined the record herein, we are satisfied that a motion and order for appeal were timely filed with the district court. Although the order of appeal was not signed within the delays for perfecting a suspensive appeal, it is apparent that this was due to ongoing litigation regarding the amount of the suspensive appeal bond. Thus, the fault for the order not being timely signed is not clearly imputable to the appellant. Since the motion and order were timely filed, the appeal will not be dismissed because the order was not timely signed. See Traigle v. Gulf Coast Aluminum Corp., 399 So.2d 183, 186 (La.1981); Hill v. Hill, 412 So.2d 1156, 1157 (La.App. 1 Cir.1982). Accordingly, the rule to show cause is hereby recalled and the appeal maintained as qualified herein.

Unrelated to the rule to show cause, Carrollton filed a motion to partially dismiss this appeal. While these matters were proceeding below, the parties were engaged in numerous discovery disputes that prompted court-ordered production of 1 sdocuments and motions for contempt and sanctions. On the same date that the district court rendered the summary judgment at issue in this appeal, it signed an order (“the order”) granting a motion for contempt filed by Carrollton and ordering the Presbytery to pay all costs, fees, and expenses reasonably incurred with the motion for contempt, and making other rulings pertaining to the production of certain documents. The order of appeal purports to grant the Presbytery a suspensive appeal of both the summary judgment and the order. Carrollton contends that this court lacks appellate jurisdiction to consider the order at this time, as it is interlocutory and unrelated to the merits of the final judgment appealed. The Presbytery argues that the order constitutes a final judgment under La.Code Civ. Proc. Ann. art. 1915 A(6), which provides for the finality of judgments imposing sanctions or disciplinary action pursuant to La.Code Civ. Proc. Ann. arts. 191, 863, or 864 and La.Code Evid. Ann. art. 510 G.

The order does not purport to be a judgment imposing sanctions or disciplinary action pursuant to La.Code Civ. Proc. Ann. arts. 191, 863, or 864, or La.Code Evid. Ann. art. 510 G. Rather, the order holds a party in contempt and orders that party to pay an unspecified amount. We do not find that this falls under the rubric of La.Code Civ. Proc. Ann. art. 1915 A(6). See Succession of Bell, 06-1710 (La.App. 1 Cir. 6/8/07); 964 So.2d 1067, 1072.

The order is interlocutory since it does not determine the substantive merits of the case and is not separately appeal-able. Succession of Bell, 964 So.2d at 1072. In general, when an unrestricted appeal is taken from a final judgment determinative of the merits, the appellant is entitled to seek review of all adverse and prejudicial interlocutory judgments, in addition to the review of the final judgment. State ex rel. Div. of Admin., Office of Risk Mgt. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Louisiana, 10-0689 (La.App. 1 Cir. 2/11/11); 56 So.3d 1236, 1242, writ denied, 11-0849 (La.6/3/11); 63 So.3d 1023. In the ease of a restricted Rappeal, an appellant may also appeal an interlocutory judgment involving the same or related issues. Id.

The appeal herein is restricted to the merits of the declaratory judgment and preliminary injunction. At the time this appeal was taken, Carrollton’s motion for sanctions remained outstanding. Our review of the record convinces us that the order relates to the motion for sanctions, rather than to the merits of the declaratory judgment or permanent injunction. The documents at issue in the order were ordered to be produced after the merits of the declaratory judgment or permanent injunction were decided. Thus, we find that this interlocutory ruling is not subject to review on appeal of the unrelated judgment on the declaratory judgment and permanent injunction. Accordingly, the motion for partial dismissal is granted and appeal of the order is dismissed.

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

The character of the underlying action herein is one for declaratory judgment and permanent injunction; however, the judgment before the court on appeal was rendered pursuant to a motion for summary judgment. Thus, our review is pursuant to the summary judgment standard. See La.Code Civ. Proc. Ann. art. 1877; Bonvillian v. State ex rel. Department of Insurance, 08-0591 (La.App. 1 Cir. 12/23/08); 5 So.3d 233, 235.

Appellate courts review summary judgments de novo, using the same criteria that govern the trial court’s consideration of whether summary judgment is appropriate. Bozarth v. State, LSU Medical Center/Chabert Medical Center, 09-1393 (La.App. 1 Cir. 2/12/10); 35 So.3d 316, 323. The motion should be granted only if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to |7material fact, and that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. La.Code Civ. Proc. Ann. art. 966 B; Bozarth, 35 So.3d at 323.

The burden of proof on a motion for summary judgment is on the moving party. If the moving party will not bear the burden of proof at trial on the matter that is before the court, the moving party’s burden is to point out to the court that there is an absence of factual support for one or more elements essential to the adverse party’s claim, action, or defense. Thereafter, the burden shifts to the adverse party to prove that there are genuine issues of material fact by providing factual evidence sufficient to establish the ability to satisfy the evidentiary burden of proof at trial. La.Code Civ. Proc. Ann. art. 966 C(2).

A fact is material when its existence or nonexistence may be essential to the plaintiffs cause of action under the applicable theory of recovery. Facts are material if they potentially insure or preclude recovery, affect a litigant’s ultimate success, or determine the outcome of the legal dispute. Bozarth, 35 So.3d at 324. Because it is the applicable substantive law that determines materiality, whether a particular fact in dispute is material can be seen only in light of the substantive law applicable to the case. Bozarth, 35 So.3d at 324; Saizan v. Pointe Coupee Parish School Bd., 10-0757 (La.App. 1 Cir. 10/29/10); 49 So.3d 559, 563, writ denied, 10-2599 (La.1/14/11); 52 So.3d 905.

The instant matter is a church property dispute. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits courts from resolving such disputes on the basis of religious doctrine and practice. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602, 99 S.Ct. 3020, 61 L.Ed.2d 775 (1979). Rather, we must employ “neutral principles of law,” examining certain religious documents, such as a church constitution, with an attitude of neutrality and non-entanglement. Fluker Community Church v. Hitchens, 419 So.2d 445, 447 (La.1982).

|8The Book of Order’s express trust provision, which the Presbytery contends applies to the subject property, is set forth in G-8.0201 as follows:

All property held by or for a particular church ... whether legal title is lodged in a corporation, a trustee or trustees, or an unincorporated association, and whether the property is used in programs of a particular church or of a more inclusive governing body or retained for the production of income, is held in trust nevertheless for the use and benefit of the [PCUSA],

Further, the Book of Order, G-8.0501, provides:

A particular church shall not sell, mortgage, or otherwise encumber any of its real property and it shall not acquire real property subject to an encumbrance or condition without the written permission of the presbytery transmitted through the session of the particular church.

The same chapter of the Book of Order also contains an exception provision in G-8.0701:

The provisions of this chapter shall apply to all particular churches of the [PCUSA] except that any church which was not subject to a similar provision of the Constitution of the church of which it was a part, prior to the reunion of the Presbyterian Church in the United States and The United Presbyterian Church in the United States of America to form the [PCUSA], shall be excused from that provision of this chapter if the congregation shall, within a period of eight years following the establishment of the [PCUSA], vote to be exempt from such provision in a regularly called meeting and shall thereafter notify the presbytery of which it is a constituent church of such vote. The particular church voting to be so exempt shall hold title to its property and exercise its privileges of incorporation and property ownership under the provisions of the Constitution to which it was subject immediately prior to the establishment of the [PCUSA]. This paragraph may not be amended.

There is no dispute that Carrollton timely exercised its right to except as provided in G-8.0701.

Prior to the reunion referred to in G-8.0701, Carrollton was subject to The Book of Church Order of the Presbyterian Church in the United States (“PCUS”), which, in § 6-8, pertinently provided:

Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to require a particular church to seek or obtain the consent or approval of any chui'ch court above the level of the particular church in order to buy, sell or | ^mortgage the property of that particular church in the conduct of its affairs as a church of the PCUS.

Apparently inconsistent was § 6-3, which purported to create a trust over church property, stating:

All property held by or for a particular church, whether legal title is lodged in a corporation, a trustee or trustees, or an unincorporated association, and whether the property is used in programs of the particular church or retained for the production of income, is held in trust nevertheless for the use and benefit of the Presbyterian Church in the United States.

The Presbytery has advanced the argument that, even if Carrollton is not subject to the express trust provision of the Book of Order, it would still be subject to the express trust provision of the Book of Church Order. However, G-8.0701 allows a church to be excused from a provision in that chapter of the Book of Order that is not substantially similar to a provision of its prior governing constitution. As the two purported express trust provisions in the Book of Order and Carrollton’s prior governing constitution (The Book of Church Order) are substantially similar, this could only mean that G-8.0701 provided Carrollton a means of opting out of G-8.0501, which requires the presbytery’s authorization to sell, mortgage, or encumber property, since that provision is in sharp contrast to § 6-8 of The Book of Church Order, which allowed a church to buy, sell, or mortgage “property of that particular church.” As the district court recognized in written reasons for issuance of a preliminary injunction, “the unfettered right to dispose of all of one’s property is mutually exclusive of any right by a third party to dictate the disposition of that same property.” In other words, in allowing Carroll-ton to fall back on § 6-8, G-8.0701 negated any express trust as provided by G-8.0201.

Moreover, we agree with both Car-rollton and the district court that, even if we were not persuaded that Carrollton is exempt from the Book of Order’s express trust provision, Louisiana trust law would apply to this dispute over Louisiana property. In Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. at 602, 99 S.Ct. 3020, the United States Supreme Court recognized a state’s “obvious and legitimate interest in the peaceful resolution of property disputes, and in providing a civil forum where the ownership of church property can be determined conclusively.” The Court went on to note that application of the neutral-principles approach “relies exclusively on objective, well-established concepts of trust and property law familiar to lawyers and judges.” Jones, 443 U.S. at 603, 99 S.Ct. 3020. Although the Court opined that a trust in favor of a general church could be created by the constitution of the general church being made to recite an express trust provision in favor of the denominational church, the Court noted “the civil courts will be bound to give effect to the result indicated by the parties, provided it is embodied in some legally cognizable form.” Jones, 443 U.S. at 606, 99 S.Ct. 3020 (emphasis added). We are not persuaded by the Presbytery’s contention that the requirement of a “legally cognizable form” was met simply by the PCUSA’s amending its constitution.

The subject property is situated in Louisiana, and, applying neutral principles of law, we find that any purported trust would be subject to the form requirements set forth in Louisiana’s Trust Code. It is undisputed that those form requirements have not been met. The public records relating to the subject property reflect that the property is owned by Carrollton. There is no mention of the property being held in trust in the deeds themselves and it is not disputed that no trust instrument relating to the property has been filed of record in Orleans Parish. See La.Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:2092.

The Presbytery has also advanced the argument that Carrollton was actually in the process of dissolving, thereby invoking the Book of Order, G-8.0301, which provides:

|n Whenever property of, or held for, a particular church of the [PCUSA] ceases to be used by that church as a particular church of the [PCUSA] in accordance with this Constitution, such property shall be held, used, applied, transferred, or sold as provided by the presbytery.

The record is clear that Carrollton’s church population had declined and Car-rollton was seeking to sell the property it held. However, the record evidence does not create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Carrollton was in the process of dissolving. The deposition testimony of Reverend Cutter, who was at the time of his deposition the General Presbyter of the Presbytery, explained that dissolution is a long, drawn-out process and that there was no formal request from Carrollton that it be dissolved. Reverend Roeling, treasurer of the Presbytery, also attested to there being no petition for dissolution by Carrollton and that Carrollton was a part of the PCUSA. Although the record contains references to talk of dissolution, we are not persuaded that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to Car-rollton being in the process of dissolving, so as to invoke G-8.0301 and grant the Presbytery control over any sale of the property.

After examining the governing religious documents with an attitude of neutrality, as we are mandated, we find that summary judgment was appropriately granted as to the declaratory judgment.

We turn now to the Presbytery’s assertion that the permanent injunction issued by the district court unconstitutionally inhibits the free exercise of religion by the Presbytery. The Presbytery’s complaint is limited to its position that the grant of injunctive relief unconstitutionally entangled the court in matters of church governance. The Presbytery does not contend that the injunctive relief was otherwise improperly granted.

The Presbytery specifically complains about language contained in the February 13, 2009 TRO issued by the district court. However, the TRO has since expired. See La.Code Civ. Proc. Ann. art. 3604. Although noting that both the | ^preliminary and permanent injunctions include language restricting the stated prohibitions to the property and subject matter of this lawsuit, the Presbytery contends the injunctions are merely superficial alterations of the TRO such that they continue to exceed the jurisdiction of the district court.

Preliminary injunctions merge into and are superseded by permanent injunctions. Mount Gideon Baptist Church, Inc. v. Robinson, 01-0749 (La.App. 1 Cir. 2/15/02); 812 So.2d 758, 762, writ denied, 02-1229 (La.6/21/02); 819 So.2d 1024; Green v. Champion Ins. Co., 577 So.2d 249, 260 (La.App. 1 Cir.), writ denied, 580 So.2d 668 (La.1991). Thus the parties are now controlled by the permanent injunction, set forth in the judgment on appeal as follows:

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a Permanent Injunction be and it is hereby issued against the Presbytery of South Louisiana of the Presbyterian Church (USA), its officers, agents, employees, and counsel, and any persons or entities in active concert or participation with the Presbytery, or acting by or through the Presbytery or on its behalf or in its stead. This Permanent Injunction pertains to all Property held by or for Carrollton Presbyterian Church, both immovable (real) together with all buildings and improvements thereon, and movable (personal), whether corporeal or incorporeal, wherever located, whether held by, for or in the name of Carrollton Presbyterian Church of New Orleans or its successor corporation Carrollton Presbyterian Church (collectively “Personal and Real Property”), which immovable Property is more particularly described in Attachment “A” hereto. The Presbytery is enjoined from filing any documents in the mortgage and conveyance records of Orleans Parish to assert ownership, use or control, or rights to determine ownership, use or control, to any immovable Property titled in the name of the Carrollton Presbyterian Church or to assert a trust on behalf of the Presbytery or other affiliated third party over immovable Property titled in the name of Carrollton Presbyterian Church, or otherwise held by or for Carrollton Presbyterian Church, the effect of which would be to place a cloud on the title of said immovable Property, or otherwise interfere with or disturb Plaintiffs ownership, use, control, or disposition of Plaintiffs Personal or Real Property, or interfere with Plaintiffs right to determine the ownership, use, control, or disposition of Personal or Real Property held by or for Carrollton Presbyterian Church or held in the possession of, control of, or owned by or titled in the name of Carrollton Presbyterian Church.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Presbytery of South Louisiana of the Presbyterian Church (USA), and any persons or entities in active concert or participation with it, on its behalf or in its stead, whether acting directly or indirectly, are permanently enjoined 113from taking any action that could affect the property rights of Carrollton Presbyterian Church, including but not limited to: 1) seeking to change the locks of Car-rollton Presbyterian Church; 2) initiating any disciplinary or other retaliatory action against the employees, officers, ministers or members of Carrollton Presbyterian Church which directly or indirectly arises from or is connected to any property issue raised in, prompted by, or related to the subject matter of this litigation; 3) dissolving Carrollton Presbyterian Church or appointing or initiating processes leading to the appointment of an administrative commission to assert original jurisdiction, directly or indirectly, over Carrollton Presbyterian Church in order to assume or effect control over the ownership, use, or disposition of the Personal or Real Property; or, 4) otherwise interfering with the normal duties and responsibilities of the officers, ministers, and employees of Carrollton Presbyterian Church, the governing body of Plaintiff (the session), or the board of trustees (the governing body of Plaintiff) or any designees thereof in any way that pertains to the ownership, control, use, or disposition of the Personal or Real Property held by, for or in the name of Carrollton Presbyterian Church, which claims to Plaintiffs Personal and Real Property are fully adjudicated herein, as reflected by this Final Declaratory Judgment.
Nothing in this Permanent Injunction shall preclude the Presbytery from taking ecclesiastical action for non-pretex-tual ecclesiastical cause that is unrelated to this litigation or any property issue raised in, prompted by, related to, or affecting the ownership, control, use, or disposition of the Personal or Real Property held by, for or in the name of Carrollton Presbyterian Church.

The Presbytery contends that the prohibitions against disciplinary actions and dissolution (or appointment of an administrative commission) “strike at the very heart of the internal governance of the PCUSA and, specifically, the powers granted to the Presbytery by the Book of Order.”

We reiterate that the courts of this state have jurisdiction to adjudicate church property disputes. See Fluker Community Church, 419 So.2d at 447. However, courts must be mindful not to overreach their jurisdiction and become entangled in questions of church doctrine. Washington v. James, 42,345 (La.App. 2 Cir. 8/15/07); 962 So.2d 1154, 1159.

In written reasons for issuing the preliminary injunction, the district court stated:

Even assuming that Carrollton could not show a deprivation of a constitutional right, there is also evidence that the congregation’s missions and ministries would be irreparably harmed without the luissuance of the injunction. Perhaps the best evidence of this looming hardship is the synod[’s] administrative commission’s unilateral decision to dissolve Carrollton in an effort to terminate its existence.
I have concluded that the balance of hardships tilts in favor of the congregation. Without the injunction, Carrollton may very well cease to exist. This is simply not the case for [the Presbytery]. [The Presbytery’s] argument that the congregation will be able to appeal any decision of the synod also rings hollow. It was the synod, after all, that acted to dissolve Carrolton in the first place.
[The Presbytery’s] argument that a civil court has no business resolving the present dispute echoes its position that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. I have already rejected this argument. [The Presbytery] has consistently attempted to reframe this entire case as a fight over ecclesiastical principles and hierarchical discipline. These issues are peripheral, however, and do not preclude the availability of relief from this court. Far from disserving the public interest and entangling the court in religious matters, the issuance of the injunction will ensure that litigants on both sides of this issue are able to resolve complex property disputes before a neutral body, just as the Fluker court required.

Having carefully considered this matter, we find no unconstitutional breach by the district court. The injunctive relief is narrowly focused and restricted to actions affecting the property that is the subject matter of this litigation. Contrast Thompson v. Bank One of Louisiana, 05-1101 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1/11/06); 925 So.2d 555; writ denied, 06-0321 (La.4/28/06); 927 So.2d 288 (holding that a court-ordered permanent reinstatement of a particular pastor of a church would, under the circumstances presented, violate the Constitutional principle of separation of church and state found in the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, which has been interpreted to forbid courts from interfering with ecclesiastical matters of religious groups). The prohibited actions enumerated in the injunction are specifically limited to instances affecting the instant church property dispute. Thus, we find no error.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the rule to show cause issued by this court on February 17, 2011, is recalled. The motion for partial dismissal filed by Carrollton | l5is granted. The appeal of the judgment of December 4, 2009, is maintained, and the appeal of the order of December 4, 2009, is dismissed. The judgment of December 4, 2009, is affirmed. Costs of this appeal are assessed to the Presbytery of South Louisiana of the Presbyterian Church (USA).

RULE TO SHOW CAUSE RECALLED; MOTION FOR PARTIAL DISMISSAL GRANTED; APPEAL MAINTAINED AS TO JUDGMENT OF DECEMBER 4, 2009; APPEAL DISMISSED AS TO ORDER OF DECEMBER 4, 2009; JUDGMENT OF DECEMBER 4, 2009 AFFIRMED.

PARRO, J., concurs.

      . The "session” is the governing body of the local church.

      . After this court issued the rule to show cause, Carrollton advanced the argument that the timely filed order of appeal could not be considered, because it was filed into the record by Carrollton and not by the Presbytery. Additionally, Carrollton pointed out that the suspensive appeal bond was not filed within the delay provided by La.Code Civ. Proc. Ann. art. 2123. However, Carrollton did not file a motion to dismiss the suspensive appeal within three days of the return date or lodging, as required by La.Code Civ. Proc. Ann. art. 2161. Accordingly, the suspensive appeal is not invalid for these reasons. See Wright v. Jefferson Roofing, Inc., 93-1217 (La.1/14/94); 630 So.2d 773, 776.

      . Carrollton represented in brief and again at oral argument that the matter is currently under advisement by the district court.

      . Further, we note that in Jones, 443 U.S. at 609, 99 S.Ct. 3020, the Supreme Court con-eluded that it was not declaring what the law of Georgia was.


author: EZELL, Judge.

text:
    AVOYELLES PARISH SCHOOL BOARD v. Jacob P. BORDELON, et al.
    No. CA 11-126.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.
    Oct. 5, 2011.

      Maxwell J. Bordelon, Jr., Marksville, LA, for Defendant/Appellee, Lake Rous-eau, Inc.
    Robert Ronald Faucheux Jr., Law Offices of Robert R. Faucheux, Laplace, LA, for Defendants/Appellees, Robert Ronald Faucheux Jr., Darlene Bourgeois Fau-cheux, Crystal LeBlanc Bourgeois.
    James Thompson Lee, Avoyelles Parish Assistant District Attorney, Bunkie, LA, for PlaintiffyAppellee, Avoyelles Parish School Board.
    Robert G. Nida, Randall Lee Wilmore, Christie C. Wood, Gold, Weems, Bruser, Sues & Rundell, Alexandria, LA, for Defendants/Appellants, Jacob P. Bordelon, Marilyn Bordelon.
    Benjamin Ascher Luke, Marksville, LA, for Defendant/Appellee, Alligator Bayou Properties, LLC.
    Court composed of ELIZABETH A. PICKETT, BILLY HOWARD EZELL, and SHANNON J. GREMILLION, Judges.
   EZELL, Judge.

hThe Avoyelles Parish School Board filed a petition seeking a right of passage from its Section 16 lands. The trial court located a right of a passage which included lands owned by Marilyn and Jacob Borde-lon. The Bordelons have appealed the trial court’s judgment asserting several assignments of error. The School Board answered the appeal alleging that the trial court erred in placing hourly restrictions on the use of the right of passage.

FACTS

On August 22, 2008, the Avoyelles Parish School Board filed a petition for a right of passage for land located in Section 16, Township 1 North, Range 6 East. Named as defendants were the Bordelons, Darlene and Robert Faucheux, Crystal Bourgeois, Brian Bourgeois, and Alligator Bayou Properties. Later, Lake Rouseau, Inc. and Horseshoe Lake Land Management, LLC, were added as defendants.

By a consent judgment rendered December 1, 2008, the trial court appointed Michael Moreau as an expert surveyor to advise the court concerning matters of existing roadways, topography, and distances from the School Board property to the nearest public road. Subsequently, the trial court filed notice that it would visit the properties that were the subject of the litigation on February 13, 2009. On August 7, 2009, the trial court issued a judgment stating that the trial set for August 12, 2009, would take place in two phases. The first phase of the trial involved the issue of the location of the right of passage. The second phase concerned the issue of indemnity to the landowner who is determined to be burdened with the right of passage.

Following the trial on the merits of the location of the right of passage, a partial judgment was entered on September 28, 2009, which ordered Mr. Moreau to make an investigation of property owned by the State of Louisiana to determine if there was a 12roadway on the property currently in use that could provide access to the School Board properties. The State owned the property to the south and east which bordered the School Board property with a wildlife refuge known as Pomme de Terre Wildlife Management area. Mr. Moreau was also ordered to conduct a survey as an extension of his previous survey of the Bordelon/Faucheux route. Mr. Moreau completed the surveys on October 28, 2009, and provided testimony about them on January 22, 2010.

The trial court determined that the School Board was entitled to a right of passage along Horseshoe Lake Road through the Bourgeois, Bordelon, and Fau-cheux properties. Partial judgment was signed on February 11, 2010. An amended partial judgment was entered on February 24, 2010, as a result of a typographical error to designate the width of the conventional servitude of passage to be thirty feet in width as opposed to twenty feet in width.

On July 15, 2010, the second phase of the trial was held to determine the amount of indemnification to be paid by the School Board to the Bordelons. On October 12, 2010, judgment was signed awarding $11,000 to the Bordelons as indemnification for the right of passage. A final judgment was entered on November 28, 2010.

The Bordelons appeal the judgment to this court asserting several assignments of error. They argue that the trial court erred in failing to order the joinder of all necessary parties; the trial court erred in finding that the Bordelon property should suffer with the right of passage; and the trial court erred in awarding only $11,000 as indemnification. The Bordelons also filed a peremptory exception of non-join-der of parties under La.Code Civ.P. art. 641. The School Board answered the appeal asking that the hourly restrictions placed on the use of the right of passage be removed.

J^JOINDER OF PARTIES

The Bordelons claim that the judgments are absolute nullities due to the failure to join several parties who have interests in the litigation. They claim that the right of passage granted by the trial court encompasses a portion of land owned by their daughter, Vickie Arnouville. The Bordelons also claim that Martco Partnership was a necessary party because it owns the standing timber on the Faucheuxs’ property which is directly in the path of the servitude. Finally, the Bordelons argue that the State of Louisiana, Department of Wildlife and Fisheries is a necessary party because it owns the adjoining property to the south of the School Board property with an existing roadway.

Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 641 (emphasis supplied) provides for the joinder of parties as follows:

A person shall be joined as a party in the action when either:
(1) In his absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties.
(2) He claims an interest relating to the subject matter of the action and is so situated that the adjudication of the action in his absence may either:
(a) As a practical matter, impair or impede his ability to protect that interest.
(b) Leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring multiple or inconsistent obligations.

“It is well settled that the lack of an indispensable party to a proceeding in the trial court is fatal to any adjudication of the dispute.” Shamich v. Liquid Transp. Corp., 07-1282, p. 6 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1/30/08), 975 So.2d 161, 164. “A party shall be deemed necessary for just adjudication when that party’s presence is absolutely necessary to protect its substantial rights.” Id. at 164-65. “[A]n adjudication made without making a person described in Article 641 a party to the litigation is an |4absolute nullity.” Stephenson v. Nations Credit Fin. Servs. Corp., 98-1688, 98-1689, p. 10 (La.App. 1 Cir. 9/24/99), 754 So.2d 1011, 1019.

This court has held that “[t]he owners of property over which a public right of way servitude or a servitude of passage is sought have an interest in the subject matter of the litigation and their absence would impair their ability to protect that interest.” Griffith v. Cathey, 99-923, p. 5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/2/00), 762 So.2d 29, 33, writ denied, 00-1875 (La.10/6/00), 771 So.2d 85.

The amended judgment signed on February 24, 2010, widened the servitude of passage from twenty feet to thirty feet. The trial court stated that the purpose of the amended judgment was to correct a typographical error in the first judgment. None of the parties has questioned this amendment as a correction of a typographical error. However, with this correction, the right of passage now affects land owned by Ms. Arnouville as shown by the surveys entered into evidence.

In brief the School Board contends that it passed a resolution on May 3, 2011, waiving the need for a thirty-foot right of passage, removing any need to involve Ms. Arnouville. This resolution occurred after the judgment was signed and an appeal was taken.

An appellate court can only consider facts and evidence which were part of the record on appeal. La. Code Civ.P. art. 2164. “Appellate briefs of parties are not part of the record on appeal, and the appellate court cannot consider facts referred to in appellate briefs.” Ledet v. National Car Rental System Inc., 96-1270, p. 11 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/4/97), 694 So.2d 1236, 1242.

Therefore, we find that this resolution cannot be considered by this court. As a property owner affected by the right of passage, Ms. Arnouville is a party who must be joined in this action.

|sThe Bordelons also assert that Martco Partnership should have been made a party to the litigation. Martco has a timber deed that runs to the year 2050 on the Faucheuxs’ land which is included in the path of the right of passage.

Standing timber is a separate immovable when it belongs to a person other than the owner of the land. La.Civ.Code art. 464. Therefore, Martco is also an owner of the property over which the right of passage is sought. With its standing timber potentially affected by the location of the right of passage, Martco is also a party that must be joined in this action.

Finally, the Bordelons also claim that the State of Louisiana, Department of Wildlife and Fisheries must also be named as a defendant in this matter. The Department of Wildlife and Fisheries owns the land south of the School Board’s Section 16 property which is known as the Pomme de Terre Wildlife Management Area. It is located off of Louisiana Highway 451. Evidence indicated that there is an existing roadway on the property that could provide access to the Section 16 property.

This issue was litigated heavily in the trial court below. Evidence was introduced, surveys were performed, and physical visits to the Department of Wildlife and Fisheries property all occurred at the trial court level. The trial court decided that this was not the most suitable location for the right of passage to the School Board’s property. However, the Department of Wildlife and Fisheries is the owner of property that could be potentially burdened with the right of passage. The Article 641 requirements for joinder of a party needed for just adjudication are met.

When the failure to join a party is pleaded successfully in the appellate court, the appellate court can remand the case to permit an amendment of the petition to join the party and for further evidence. La.Code Civ.P. art. 646. We, therefore, maintain the Bordelons’ peremptory exception of nonjoinder of parties. There is no need for us to address the other issues raised by the Bordelons since we are remanding this case in |6order to join several parties whose property rights could potentially be affected by the location of the right of passage.

The amended judgment of February 24, 2010, and the judgment of February 11, 2010, are reversed. This matter is remanded to permit an amendment of the petitions to join Vickie Arnouville, Martco Partnership, and the State of Louisiana, Department of Wildlife and Fisheries. In accordance with La.R.S. 13:5112, the district court assessed all court costs to the Avoyelles Parish School Board which totaled $4,912.04. Costs of this appeal are also assessed against the Avoyelles Parish School Board in the amount of $2,796.50 for total court costs in the amount of $7,708.54.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

      . Section 16 lands were set aside by the Continental Congress in 1785 and are held in trust for the benefit of public education. Ebey v. Avoyelles Parish Sch. Bd., 03-765 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/17/03), 861 So.2d 910, writ denied, 04-196 (La.3/26/04), 871 So.2d 349.

      . Prior to this phase of the trial, the School Board and the Faucheuxs and Bourgeois’ entered into a settlement agreement.


author: KEATY, Judge.

text:
    SUCCESSION OF Donnie Dewayne CARLTON.
    No. 11-288.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.
    Oct. 5, 2011.
    Rehearing Denied Nov. 23, 2011.

      Thomas 0. Wells, Attorney at Law, Alexandria, LA, for Appellees, Monica Player, Roy A. Carlton, Margie Prather, Shirley Manuel, Shonna Vilo.
    Gwenda R. Lamb, Attorney at Law, Alexandria, LA, for Appellant, Melba Stuck-ey Phillips.

      Court composed of ULYSSES GENE THIBODEAUX, Chief Judge, MARC T. AMY, and PHYLLIS M. KEATY, Judges.
   KEATY, Judge.

11 This is an appeal from a judgment sustaining an exception of res judicata in favor of the movant, decedent’s sister, and against decedent’s aunt. For the following reasons, we find that the movant did not meet her burden of proving that the claim at issue was barred by res judicata. Accordingly, we reverse and remand.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Decedent, Donnie Dewayne Carlton, died in September, 2008. In July, 2009, two of his aunts, Ellen Wise and Melba Phillips, filed a petition for probate of notarial testament and a petition for possession. The trial court granted a judgment of possession in August, 2009. Also in August, 2009, decedent’s sister, Monica Player, filed to annul the probated testament. In September, 2009, she filed a motion for summary judgment, alleging that decedent’s testament was null because it lacked an attestation clause. The trial court granted the motion, declared the testament null and annulled its August 2009 order for probate and judgment of possession. Wise and Phillips appealed to this court, and we affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment. See Succession of Carlton, 09-1389 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/7/10), 34 So.3d 1015.

In April, 2010, decedent’s wife and illegitimate son filed a joint petition for possession in a new suit which spurred Player to file a “Motion for New Trial, Exception of Peremption or In The Alternative Petition to Annul Judgment of Possession, Contempt and Perjury.”

Meanwhile, Phillips was allegedly given decedent’s Bible, in which she found a second page of decedent’s will. Phillips and Wise then filed a petition for probate of notarial testament on July 12, 2010, alleging that the newly-found | ^second page contained a valid attestation clause and was signed by decedent and the same notary and witnesses on the same date as the first page of the will.

Phillips and Wise filed this document and sought to have it read in conjunction with the previously filed single-page testament that was the subject of our review and ruling in Succession of Carlton, 34 So.3d 1015. The petition for probate was denied by the trial court with a note that a conference would be scheduled upon request.

On September 9, 2010, Player filed an exception of res judicata, alleging that the validity of the will had already been adjudicated in the other suit and was a final judgment, and that Phillips and Wise were, therefore, precluded from asking the court to probate the will as a two-page document under the doctrine of res judicata.

On October 11, 2010, at a hearing on Player’s rule to annul the probated testament, the trial court discussed the pending exception of res judicata on the record and made several statements concerning its position on the validity of that exception. It did not rule on the exception.

On November 8, 2010, the trial court presided over a hearing on the exception of res judicata. Evidence was not introduced. After hearing argument from counsel for the respective parties, the trial court granted the exception on January 14, 2011.

Phillips now appeals that judgment which sustained Player’s exception of res judicata. Additional assignments of error are also before us: that the trial court improperly considered matters not before it on October 11, 2010 and that the trial |scourt improperly denied the order of probate filed July 15, 2010. Finally, Player filed a motion to dismiss a portion of the record and that issue is also before us.

DISCUSSION

We will begin our discussion with the issue concerning the October hearing. Judgments beyond the pleadings are nullities. Benware v. Means, 98-203 (La.App. 1 Cir. 5/12/00), 760 So.2d 641, writ denied, 00-2215 (La.10/27/00), 772 So.2d 650. In this case, the judgment stems from a November 8, 2010 hearing on Player’s exception of res judicata. At that hearing, the matter of res judicata was properly before the court, and the subsequent judgment deals exclusively with the matters discussed in the November hearing. There is no relief that we can provide for matters discussed at the October hearing, as that judgment is not before us on appeal. We note that the matters appellant objects to from the October hearing were discussed and then set for a hearing on November 8. They were not decided on October 11. This assignment of error lacks merit.

Player filed a motion to dismiss the portions of this appeal related to the trial court’s order dated July 15, 2010, which denied the probate of the testament. Player complains that an appeal of this order is untimely. This court has previously held that “although an interlocutory judgment may itself not be appealable, it is nevertheless subject to review by an appellate court when a judgment which is ap-pealable is rendered in the case.” Firemen’s Pension and Relief Fund for City of Lake Charles v. Boyer, 420 So.2d 1323, 1324 (La.App. 3 Cir.1982). An interlocutory judgment is defined by La.Code Civ.P. art. 1841 as “[a] judgment that does not determine the merits but only preliminary matters in the course of the action.” We find that this order was interlocutory and is subject to our review because it is encompassed within the appealable judgment of January 14, 2011. Accordingly we deny Player’s motion to dismiss.

|4Having determined that a review of the July 15 Order is appropriate, we now turn to the question of whether the trial'court improperly denied Phillips’ motion and order to probate filed on July 12, 2010. Phillips cites La.Code Civ.P. art. 2891 in support of her. complaint that the trial court erroneously denied her order of probate. Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 2891 states that “[a] notarial testament ... [does] not need to be proved. Upon production of the testament, the court shall order it filed and executed and this order shall have the effect of probate.” Problematic with this line of reasoning is Phillips’ failure to produce the testament. As noted previously, the instant suit is a separate and distinct suit from that involving the single-page testament previously filed for probate. The two suits were not consolidated. The only document filed into the record in support of the petition to probate was the alleged second page of the testament. Reference is made to the first page, but it was not filed into the record in any form. The second page of the testament, containing only an attestation clause, is not “a testament.” Therefore, the trial court had no obligation to “order it filed and executed” giving the order the effect of probate. This assignment of error is without merit.

Finally, we must determine whether the trial court erred in granting Player’s exception of res judicata. “The res judicata effect of a prior judgment is a question of law that is reviewed de novo.” Morales v. Parish of Jefferson, 10-273, p. 6 (La.App. 5 Cir. 11/9/10), 54 So.3d 669, 672 (citations omitted).

In order for an exception of res judicata to be sustained, the mover must prove that

(1) the judgment is valid; (2) the judgment is final; (3) the parties are the same; (4) the cause or causes of action asserted in the second suit existed at the time of final judgment in the first litigation; and (5) the cause or causes of action asserted in the second suit arose out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the first litigation.

Burguieres v. Pollingue, 02-1385, p. 8 (La.2/25/03), 843 So.2d 1049, 1053.

At the hearing on the exception of res judicata, evidence was not admitted. Although it is obvious from the record that the trial court was familiar with the initial proceedings concerning the validity of the will, a final judgment was not admitted into evidence. “Evidence not properly and officially offered and introduced cannot be considered, even if it is physically placed in the record. Documents attached to memo-randa do not constitute evidence and cannot be considered as such on appeal.” Denoux v. Vessel Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 07-2143, p. 6 (La.5/21/08), 983 So.2d 84, 88.

“The burden of proof is on the party pleading the exception to establish the essential facts to sustain the plea of res judicata.” Bond v. Bond, 35,971, p. 3 (La.App. 2 Cir. 4/3/02), 813 So.2d 1148, 1149 (citations omitted). “The cornerstone of res judicata is a valid and final judgment and La. R.S. 13:4231 sets out the circumstances under which a valid and final judgment shall be conclusive between the same parties. When, however, there is no proof of such facts in the record, the plea cannot be sustained.” Id. at 1149-50 (citation and footnote omitted). Because Player failed to introduce a final judgment into evidence at the hearing on her exception, she failed to prove an essential element of res judicata, defeating the exception. The trial court erred when it sustained the exception of res judicata, and we reverse the judgment.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is reversed and this matter is remanded for further proceedings. Costs are assessed against Monica Player.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

      . The single-page will that was the subject of the previous suit was deemed invalid because it did not contain an attestation clause.

      . This rule was actually a rule to show cause why a public inventory should not be ordered. It was incorrectly captioned.


author: PAINTER, Judge.

text:
    Clayton BIAS, et al. v. Federico DEL TORO, et al.
    No. 11-291.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.
    Oct. 5, 2011.

      Dorwan G. Vizzier, Broussard, Halcomb, & Vizzier, Alexandria, LA, for Plaintiffs/Appellants, Clayton Bias, individually and as administrator of the estate of his minor child, Courtney Bias, and Danielle Bias, and Jeremy Bias.
    James R. Shelton, Durio, McGoffin, Stagg & Ackermann, Lafayette, LA, for Defendants/Appellees, Dr. Federico Del Toro, Dr. Rolando Saenz, and Louisiana Medical Insurance Company.
    Marc W. Judice, Michelle R. Judice, Ju-dice & Adley, Lafayette, LA, for Defendants/Appellees, Dr. Steven J. Snatic and Louisiana Medical Mutual Insurance Company.
    Court composed of JOHN D. SAUNDERS, J. DAVID PAINTER, and JAMES T. GENOVESE, Judges.
   PAINTER, Judge.

^Plaintiffs in this medical malpractice suit appeal the grant of summary judgment in favor of one of the multiple healthcare-provider defendants and his insurer as well as the denial of their motion to continue. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the grant of summary judgment in favor of Dr. Steven Snatic and his insurer, Louisiana Medical Mutual Insurance Company (LAMMICO), and remand that matter to the trial court.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The present matter arises out of a medical malpractice claim brought by Plaintiffs, Clayton Bias, individually and as administrator of the minor child, Courtney Bias, and Danielle Bias, and Jeremy Bias, against Dr. Federico Del Toro (a physician practicing in the field of internal medicine), Dr. Steven Snatic (a neurologist), Dr. Rolando Saenz (an infectious disease physician), Dr. Akshey Gupta (a nephrologist), and LAMMICO (which insured each of the named healthcare providers). Defendants treated the decedent, Ruby Bias, who was the wife of Clayton and the mother of Courtney, Danielle, and Jeremy, at Our Lady of Lourdes Regional Medical Center in Lafayette, Louisiana, from February 4, 2007, until her death on February 23, 2007. Mrs. Bias had a history of lupus and was taken to the emergency room at Opelousas General Hospital on February 4, 2007, after her husband was unable to awaken her from a nap. She was transferred to Our Lady of Lourdes later that day. She was eventually diagnosed with cryptococcal meningitis. Plaintiffs claim that Defendants failed to provide appropriate care, that her underlying medical condition was misdiagnosed, and that Mrs. Bias died as a result thereof.

A medical review panel, comprised of Dr. Julio E. Figueroa, II (a specialist in the field of infectious disease), Dr. Kevin R. Hargrave (a neurologist), and Dr. |4Leo P. Blaize (a specialist in internal medicine), found that the care administered by the named healthcare providers was appropriate and within the standard of care because Mrs. Bias was appropriately diagnosed with membranous glomerulonephri-tis and that when she presented with encephalopathy. The panel further found that it was appropriately assumed and diagnosed, based on MRI and CT findings, that she had cerebritis, and treatment of this presumptive diagnosis did result in improvement of her condition. The panel specifically noted that it is well established in the literature that a diagnosis of crypto-coccal meningitis is difficult to make and even more so in an immunocompromised patient.

Following the medical review panel’s April 5, 2010 opinion, Plaintiffs filed this suit. Dr. Del Toro, Dr. Saenz, and LAM-MICO filed a motion for summary judgment based on the panel opinion. Dr. Snatic, Dr. Gupta, and LAMMICO also filed a motion for summary judgment. The motions alleged that despite the lapse of over two years from the filing of the complaint, Plaintiffs failed to identify any experts to testify to as to a breach in the standard of care. The motions for summary judgment were set for hearing on December 13, 2010. Plaintiffs moved for a continuance based on their allegation that their expert physician, Dr. David Pitrak, had advised them that he would be unable to provide an affidavit until after the first week of December 2010. The motion to continue was addressed by telephone conference and denied by the trial court. The hearing on the motions for summary judgment went forward as scheduled, with Plaintiffs re-urging their motion to continue, which was again denied. Plaintiffs submitted the affidavit of Dr. Paul O. War-shawsky, a cardiologist and board certified internist, in opposition to the motions for summary judgment. The trial court then denied the motion for summary judgment as to Dr. Del Toro and LAMMICO as his insurer. The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment in favor of Dr. Saenz, Dr. Snatic, |fiDr. Gupta, and LAM-MICO as the insurer of these physicians. As Plaintiffs had no opposition to the motions of Dr. Saenz and Dr. Gupta, this appeal concerns only the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Dr. Snatic and his insurer, LAMMICO, and the denial of Plaintiffs’ motion to continue.

DISCUSSION

In Djorghi v. Glass, 09-461, pp. 2-3 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/4/09), 23 So.3d 996, 998, writ denied, 09-2614 (La.2/5/10), 27 So.3d 306, this court discussed the standard of review applicable to summary judgments in medical malpractice cases:

A motion for summary judgment is reviewed on appeal de novo, with the appellate court using the same criteria as the trial court to determine whether summary judgment is appropriate; whether there is a genuine issue of material fact, and whether the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. La.Code Civ.P. art. 966; Samaha v. Rau, 07-1726 (La.2/26/08), 977 So.2d 880. A motion for summary judgment shall be granted if “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to material fact, and the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” La. Code Civ.P. art. 966(B). Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 966(C)(2) provides:
The burden of proof remains with the movant. However, if the movant will not bear the burden of proof at trial on the matter that is before the court on the motion for summary judgment, the movant’s burden on the motion does not require him to negate all essential elements of the adverse party’s claim, action or defense, but rather to point out to the court that there is an absence of factual support for one or more elements essential to the adverse party’s claim, action, or defense. Thereafter, if the adverse party fails to produce factual support sufficient to establish that he will be able to satisfy his evidentiary burden of proof at trial, there is no genuine issue of material fact.
In the present case, the defendant, who is the movant in the Motion for Summary Judgment, does not bear the burden of proof at trial on the issue of whether medical malpractice was committed. Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:2794(A) provides “that a medical malpractice plaintiff must establish the following elements by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) the standard of care applicable to the defendant; (2) that the defendant breached the standard of care; and (3) that there was a causal connection between the breach and the | f,resulting injury.” See Brown v. Riverland Med. Ctr., 06-1449, p. 4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/7/07), 952 So.2d 889, 892, writ denied 07-0740 (La.6/1/07), 957 So.2d 177. Expert testimony is generally required for a medical malpractice plaintiff to establish the applicable standard of care and breach of that standard of care. Samaha, 977 So.2d 880. Thus, the defendant is only required to point out that there is an absence of factual support for one or more elements essential to the plaintiffs claim to support that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Id.

Here, Dr. Snatic will not bear the burden of proof at trial on the issue of whether medical malpractice was committed. Plaintiffs must prove the three aforementioned things. La.R.S. 9:2794(A). Dr. Snatic met his initial burden of proof on his motion for summary judgment based on the panel’s opinion that there was no breach in the applicable standard of care, which is an essential element of Plaintiffs’ claim. Thus, the burden shifted to Plaintiffs. In an attempt to meet that burden, Plaintiffs submitted the affidavit of Dr. Warshawsky. Defendants, Dr. Snatic and LAMMICO, contend that this affidavit was insufficient to defeat their motion for summary judgment because it did not demonstrate the “training or experience” required by La.R.S. 9:2794(D)(l)(c).

Ordinarily, “[wjhen alleged acts of negligence raise issues peculiar to a particular medical specialty, then only those qualified in that specialty may offer evidence of the applicable standards.” Richard v. Wijayasuriya, 93-1410, p. 10 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/5/94), 645 So.2d 708, 713, writ denied, 95-158 (La.3/17/95), 651 So.2d 273 (citing Boudreaux v. Panger, 490 So.2d 1083 (La.1986) and Felice v. Valleylab, Inc., 520 So.2d 920 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1987), writs denied 522 So.2d 562, 522 So.2d 563 (La.1988)). However, this court, in Hebert v. Podiatry Ins. Co. of America, 96-567, p. 10 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/9/96), 688 So.2d 1107, 1113, writs denied, 96-2726, 96-2728 (La.1/6/97) 685 So.2d 117, recognized that:

“it is a specialist’s knowledge of the requisite subject matter, rather than the specialty within which the specialist practices, which determines whether a specialist may testify as to the degree of care 17which should be exercised; ....” Turner [v. Massiah, 94-29 (La.App. 5 Cir. 7/1/94)], 641 So.2d [610,] at 617[, reversed in part on other grounds, 94-2548 (La.6/16/95); 656 So.2d 636]; Soteropulos [v. Schmidt], 556 So.2d [276] at 278 [ (La.App. 4 Cir.1990) ]. Where medical specialties overlap, a specialist in one field can testify as to the standard of care applicable to a procedure which is common to both disciplines, where there is no proof that the standard of care is different in each discipline. The party offering the expert must prove the witness’ training, expertise, and skill in the procedure. Ricker v. Hebert, 94-1743 (La.App. 1 Cir. 5/5/95); 655 So.2d 493. The determination of an expert’s qualifications to testify as to the standard of care must be made on a case-by-case basis. McLean v. Hunter, 495 So.2d 1298 (La.1986).

The trial court determined that the affidavit of Dr. Warshawsky did not contain any assertions that he possessed, by experience or training, competency in the field of neurology. Based on this finding, the trial court stated: “There simply is no assertion that he possesses that experience or training, so there is no need to even think about evaluating the credibility of such assertions.”

After our thorough review of the record, we find that there is a specific assertion in Dr. Warshawsky’s affidavit that the standards of care of internal medicine and neurology that are at issue in this case with respect to the care and treatment of Mrs. Bias by Dr. Snatic, that is the diagnosis and treatment of cryptococeal meningitis and associated complications in patients with lupus, are common to the specialties of internal medicine and neurology and that the standards of care “are common to both the specialties and are equivalent and known” to him. Dr. Warshawsky further opined that Dr. Snatic breached the standard of care, that said breach contributed to the progression of the cryptococeal meningitis, and that said breach caused Mrs. Bias to lose a substantial chance of survival. We find that there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether or not Dr. Snatic deviated from the standard of care as alleged by Plaintiffs, and, thus, the trial court erred in granting the summary judgment in favor of Dr. Snatic. We [^therefore reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Dr. Snatic and his insurer and remand the matter to the trial court for further proceedings.

Plaintiffs finally argue that, if we agree with the trial court that the affidavit of Dr. Warshawsky was insufficient to defeat the motion for summary filed by Dr. Snatic, then we should find an abuse of discretion by the trial court in not granting their motion to continue. We will not disturb the denial of a motion for continuance absent a showing of an abuse of discretion by the trial court. Hargrove v. Goods, 41,817 (La.App. 2 Cir. 2/28/07), 953 So.2d 968. However, based on our reversal of the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor or Dr. Snatic and his insurer, we need not address this issue.

DECREE

For all of the foregoing reasons, the summary judgment granted in favor of Dr. Snatic and his insurer, LAMMICO, is reversed, and the matter is remanded for further proceedings. Costs of this appeal are assessed to Defendants/Appellees, Dr. Steven J. Snatic and LAMMICO.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.