author:
PER CURIAM.
     KNOLL, Justice, CLARK, J.,

text:
    In re Wade RICHARD.
    No. 2010-B-1479.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 30, 2010.
    Charles Bennett Plattsmier, Baton Rouge, Robert Samuel Kennedy, Jr., Shreveport, for Applicant.
    Wade Paul Richard, for Respondent.
   ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

PER CURIAM.

11 This disciplinary matter arises from formal charges filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) against respondent, Wade Richard, an attorney licensed to practice law in Louisiana but currently on interim suspension for threat of harm to the public. In re: Richard, 06-0256 (La.2/15/06), 921 So.2d 103.

UNDERLYING FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The ODC filed two separate sets of formal charges against respondent. Respondent answered the formal charges and denied any misconduct. The two matters were consolidated by order of the hearing committee chair for a hearing on the merits.

09-DB-015

Count I

In 2002, Acadia Parish law enforcement authorities executed a search warrant at respondent’s law office in Crowley, Louisiana. Among the items seized at that time was respondent’s computer, which contained evidence indicating respondent had | falsified an MRI report and sold it to others, who intended to use the falsified record to illegally obtain narcotic prescription drugs. An Acadia Parish grand jury subsequently returned a three-count indictment charging respondent with intentionally furnishing a false or fraudulent medical report in order to obtain a controlled dangerous substance; conspiracy to possess a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance (Oxycodone) by falsifying a medical report; and forgery of medical documents, all felonies under state law. In 2005, respondent executed a written agreement with the Acadia Parish District Attorney’s Office by which he agreed to withdraw from the practice of law for nine months in exchange for a dismissal of the criminal charges.

The ODC alleged respondent violated the following provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 8.4(b) (commission of a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer) and 8.4(c) (engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation).

Count II

In June 2006, the ODC received correspondence from the Bank of Commerce & Trust Company reporting that respondent’s trust account was overdrawn in the amount of $233.84. Respondent failed to reply to the ODC’s inquiry regarding the matter, necessitating the issuance of a subpoena to compel his sworn statement. However, respondent was incarcerated on the date the sworn statement was scheduled, and thus he did not appear.

The ODC alleged respondent violated the following provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 1.15 (safekeeping property of clients or third parties) and 8.1(c) (failure to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation).

U09-DB-015

In November 2006, respondent was charged with one count of second-degree robbery and one count of second-degree battery. The criminal charges stemmed from a September 24, 2006 incident in which respondent went to the home of his father, Daniel Richard, and attempted to remove a two-gallon can of gasoline from his father’s truck, without permission. Mr. Richard told respondent to drop the gasoline can and leave the premises. In response, respondent approached Mr. Richard, who was standing on the porch, and pushed him down. When Mr. Richard tried to retrieve the gasoline can from respondent’s possession, respondent pushed him down again. Thereafter, Mr. Richard went inside and attempted to dial 911. Respondent followed Mr. Richard into his residence and disconnected the call. As a result of the confrontation, Mr. Richard began bleeding from his wrist. Mr. Richard sought medical attention for his injury and subsequently learned one of his fingers was broken, requiring surgery. In 2009, respondent pled no contest to criminal mischief and was sentenced to serve thirty days in jail, with credit for time served. The remaining charges were dropped pursuant to a plea agreement.

The ODC alleged respondent violated Rule 8.4(b) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

After the two sets of formal charges were consolidated, this matter proceeded to a hearing on the merits. The ODC called several witnesses to testify at the hearing, and respondent testified on his own behalf and on cross-examination by the ODC. During his testimony, respondent explained how he came to create the altered MRI report. According to respondent, he agreed to let Robert Fontenot come to his office Rafter hours to use his computer. At this time, respondent was defending Mr. Fontenot in an unrelated drug charge matter. When Mr. Fontenot arrived, he handed respondent a copy of his MRI report and requested that respondent create a “duplicate original.” Respondent offered to make photocopies of the report, but in response, Mr. Fontenot indicated that the report “needs to be printed out of a printer, not a copy machine.” Respondent confirmed that what Mr. Fontenot wanted him to do was “print this document as is out of my computer,” a request respondent thought was a waste of time. Nevertheless, respondent agreed to comply with Mr. Fontenot’s request for a fee of $50.

Respondent testified that he “typed out” Mr. Fontenot’s MRI report, printed the document, and gave it to him. According to respondent, Mr. Fontenot then asked him to change the report by putting “somebody else’s name on it.” Respondent protested that changing the patient’s name “doesn’t make it an MRI,” but he agreed to do what Mr. Fontenot asked and typed the name of Tanya Hanks on the report. Respondent also typed in Ms. Hanks’s date of birth (information he said he obtained from Mr. Fontenot) and altered the billing number and the MRI exam date. The only information respondent did not change was the diagnosis, which he testified he left the same so Mr. Fontenot “knew that was his diagnosis.” Asked why he would have made the altered report at all, respondent testified he was trying to “test” his abilities “of using the computer and creating a document.”

In any event, respondent denied giving the altered MRI report to Mr. Fontenot. Respondent testified that he printed the MRI report after he finished changing it and |s“just threw it on my desk.” Asked whether he knew Mr. Fontenot would take the altered MRI report and use it to obtain illegal drugs, respondent first said he did not, but then admitted he “knew it was a longshot possibility.”

In his defense, respondent argued all the criminal charges against him were formally dismissed. Respondent noted his written agreement with the Acadia Parish District Attorney, in which he agreed to “voluntarily withdraw” from the practice of law for a period of nine months.

Hearing Committee Report

After consideration of the consolidated charges, the hearing committee made the following factual findings based upon the evidence and testimony at the hearing:

1. Respondent conspired with Robert Fontenot, Ted Langlinais, and Tanya Hanks to commit forgery and, in fact, forged medical records for the purpose of illegally obtaining controlled substances.

2. The testimony of Ms. Hanks in its entirety was both compelling and credible.

3. Respondent failed to produce required trust account records for the ODC. These records were available from the bank and obtained by the ODC for the purpose of the hearing.

4. [In May 2006], respondent created an overdraft in his client trust account in the amount of $233.84.

5. As of July 27, 2009, that overdraft had not been addressed.

6. On [September 24, 2006], respondent went to the home of his father and took a can of gasoline, without consent.

7. On [September 24, 2006], respondent battered his father, breaking his father’s finger and inflicting severe pain and mental anguish.

1 ñ8. Mr. Daniel Richard’s testimony concerning this incident was completely credible, and the testimony of respondent incredible.

9. On July 27, 2009, during his testimony at the hearing before the committee, respondent committed perjury.

Based on these facts, the committee determined respondent violated Rules 1.15, 8.1(c), 8.4(b), and 8.4(c) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. The committee also found that by committing perjury during the hearing, respondent engaged in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, a violation of Rule 8.4(d), which was not charged in the formal charges.

The committee determined respondent intentionally violated duties owed to the public by committing forgery and perjury, which conduct involves dishonesty, fraud, and deceit. As to his perjury, respondent’s conduct involved substantial prejudice to the administration of justice. Relying on the ABA’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, the committee determined the baseline sanction is disbarment.

The committee found the following aggravating factors present: prior disciplinary offenses and substantial experience in the practice of law (admitted 1988). The committee found no mitigating factors present. Under the circumstances, the committee recommended respondent be disbarred.

| Neither respondent nor the ODC filed an objection to the hearing committee’s recommendation.

Disciplinary Board Recommendation

After reviewing the consolidated matters, the disciplinary board found most of the hearing committee’s factual findings are supported by the record. However, the board determined the committee was only partially correct in finding that respondent failed to produce required bank records which were obtained by the ODC for the purpose of the hearing. The board noted that although the ODC requested respondent’s trust account bank statement for June 2006 — a request with which respondent did not comply because he purportedly did not have a copy of the statement at the time of the request — the record does not indicate that the ODC requested any other bank statements, or that any statements were offered into evidence at the hearing by the ODC.

Additionally, the board declined to adopt the committee’s factual finding that respondent committed perjury in his testimony before the committee. Citing In re: Harris, 00-1825 (La.l1/13/00), 774 So.2d 963, wherein an attorney manufactured evidence and presented perjured testimony in an attempt to avoid discipline, the board pointed out that an attorney’s post-formal charge conduct should be treated as separate and distinct misconduct in a subsequent disciplinary proceeding.

Based upon these findings, the board determined respondent violated Rules 8.4(b) and 8.4(c) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. However, the board found the alleged violations of Rules 1.15 and 8.1(c) were not proven by clear and convincing evidence, nor was the uncharged violation of Rule 8.4(d) found by the committee.

| sWith regard to Rule 1.15, the board concluded the mere fact that respondent created an overdraft in his client trust account, without more, is insufficient to establish a rule violation. Respondent provided uncontroverted testimony that his client trust account balance was $61.19 when he voluntarily ceased practicing law. Respondent further testified that no client funds remained in his trust account when he inadvertently used the account to pay a doctor bill on behalf of a friend. The ODC presented no evidence to establish that the $61.19 remaining in respondent’s trust account at the time of the overdraft belonged to a client or other interested person.

With regard to Rule 8.1(c), the board determined there is insufficient evidence to establish that respondent failed to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation of the trust account overdraft. The record contains little relevant information concerning the ODC’s request for respondent’s trust account records. Further, although the ODC alleges respondent’s failure to appear for a scheduled sworn statement on November 14, 2006 constitutes a failure to cooperate, the evidence in the record, including a proces verbal given by the ODC, fully establishes that respondent was incarcerated at the time; therefore, respondent could not have attended the sworn statement.

The board determined respondent knowingly violated a duty owed to the public by engaging in criminal conduct. His conduct resulted in actual injury. Respondent’s commission of a criminal act undermines the public’s confidence in the integrity of attorneys. His actions in forging medical records allowed others to circumvent the laws pertaining to controlled dangerous substances, and his actions during the altercation with his father resulted in actual injury to his father. Relying on the ABA’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, the board determined the applicable baseline sanction in this matter is disbarment.

Rln aggravation, the board identified the following factors: prior disciplinary offenses, a pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses, refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the conduct, vulnerability of the victim, and substantial experience in the practice of law. The board found no mitigating factors are present.

Turning to the issue of an appropriate sanction, the board determined that each instance of respondent’s misconduct, standing alone, warrants a two-year suspension from the practice of law; however, taken together, respondent’s conduct warrants the harsher sanction of disbarment, particularly in light of his prior reprimand for engaging in criminal conduct. The board observed that respondent has a “demonstrated propensity to engage in criminal activity,” which leads to the conclusion that he lacks the requisite good moral character and fitness necessary to practice law.

Based on this reasoning, the board recommended respondent be disbarred, retroactive to the date of his interim suspension.

The ODC filed an objection to the disciplinary board’s report and recommendation, seeking the imposition of permanent disbarment. Accordingly, the case was docketed for oral argument pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 11(G)(1)(b).

DISCUSSION

Bar disciplinary matters fall within the original jurisdiction of this court. La. Const, art. V, § 5(B). Consequently, we act as triers of fact and conduct an | ^independent review of the record to determine whether the alleged misconduct has been proven by clear and convincing evidence. In re: Banks, 09-1212 (La.10/2/09), 18 So.3d 57. While we are not bound in any way by the findings and recommendations of the hearing committee and disciplinary board, we have held the manifest error standard is applicable to the committee’s factual findings. See In re: Caulfield, 96-1401 (La.11/25/96), 688 So.2d 714; In re: Pardue, 98-2865 (La.3/11/94), 633 So.2d 150.

In this consolidated matter, the record reflects that respondent forged a medical record at the request of a client whom he represented on drug charges. Based on respondent’s own testimony, it appears he suspected his client intended to take the forged record to buy drugs. Moreover, respondent was convicted of criminal mischief stemming from a violent physical altercation with his elderly father. This conduct violated Rules 8.4(b) and 8.4(c) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

Having found evidence of professional misconduct, we now turn to a determination of the appropriate sanction for respondent’s actions. In determining a sanction, we are mindful that disciplinary proceedings are designed to maintain high standards of conduct, protect the public, preserve the integrity of the profession, and deter future misconduct. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Reis, 513 So.2d 1173 (La.1987). The discipline to be imposed depends upon the facts of each case and the seriousness of the offenses involved considered in light of any aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Whittington, 459 So.2d 520 (La.1984).

The baseline sanction for respondent’s misconduct is clearly disbarment. Respondent acted knowingly, if not intentionally, causing actual injury. The record supports the aggravating factors found by the disciplinary board. The mitigating Infactor of imposition of other penalties or sanctions is also present. Given these facts, we find no reason to deviate downward from the baseline sanction of disbarment.

Accordingly, based on our review of the record, we conclude the disciplinary board’s recommendation is appropriate, and we will order that respondent be disbarred.

DECREE

Upon review of the findings and recommendations of the hearing committee and the disciplinary board, and considering the record, briefs, and oral argument, it is ordered that Wade Paul Richard, Louisiana Bar Roll number 19119, be and he hereby is disbarred, retroactive to February 15, 2006, the date of his interim suspension. His name shall be stricken from the roll of attorneys and his license to practice law in the State of Louisiana shall be revoked. All costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.

KNOLL and CLARK, JJ., dissent and assign reasons.

GUIDRY, J., dissents and would impose permanent disbarment.

KNOLL, Justice,

dissenting.

|,In my view, the criminal conduct of respondent is a total disgrace to our time honored profession. To add “insult to injury,” when asked why he would have made the altered report at all, he explained he was trying to “test” his abilities “of using the computer and creating a document.” To accept his explanation as truthful would be an insult to this Court.

I find respondent’s forgery of a medical record to assist his client obtain illegal drugs so reprehensible as to qualify him for permanent disbarment. In exchange for financial compensation, respondent altered a medical document and provided it to his client, who intended to use it to fraudulently obtain controlled dangerous substances, Oxycodone. Respondent has thereby clearly demonstrated he lacks the good moral character and fitness to practice law in Louisiana. The numerous aggravating factors present simply reinforce my conclusion.

Accordingly, I dissent and would order respondent be permanently disbarred.

CLARK, J.,

dissenting.

|TI believe permanent disbarment, rather than disbarment, is the appropriate sanction for respondent’s misconduct. Respondent knocked his father down twice, broke his father’s finger, and prevented his father from calling 911. Additionally, for a fifty-dollar charge, he created a false MRI report for a client he represented on a drug charge, altering the name, the billing number, and the MRI date of the original MRI report. Respondent committed perjury when he explained the forgery as “test[ing]” his abilities “of using the computer and creating a document.” When asked if he knew his drug client would take the altered MRI report and use it to obtain illegal drugs, respondent denied having such knowledge; however, he later admitted he “knew it was a longshot possibility.”

Furthermore, in 1999, respondent was publicly reprimanded by the disciplinary board after he pled no contest to a misdemeanor charge of unauthorized use of a movable valued at less than $1,000. This criminal charge resulted from respondent stealing property from a client.

In summary, after considering respondent’s prior disciplinary offenses, pattern of misconduct, refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of his conduct, the vulnerability of the victim (his older father), and the fact that the recipient of the altered MRI was the client he represented on drug charges, I respectfully dissent, firmly believing respondent should be permanently disbarred.

       Retired Judge Philip C. Ciaccio, assigned as Justice ad hoc, sitting for Chief Justice Catherine D. Kimball.

      . The first set of formal charges, 09-DB-015, originally consisted of three counts; however, during the formal hearing, the ODC withdrew Count III because the complainant in that matter passed away before the hearing took place. Accordingly, this opinion does not address Count III, and simply refers to 09-DB-015 as if it consisted of two counts.

      . No "duplicate” MRI was found on respondent’s computer hard drive.

      . Ms. Hanks testified to her involvement with Robert Fontenot and Ted Langlinais in an ongoing scheme to obtain prescription drugs, some of which they intended to sell and some of which they intended to use to satisfy their own addictions. Ms. Hanks admitted she paid $75 for the forged MRI report created by respondent and assisted in the forgery to facilitate her continued drug abuse.

      . Respondent had testified that his mother, now deceased, gave him permission to take the gasoline can.

      . Although respondent testified he had no idea Mr. Fontenot might use the forged MRI to obtain drugs, he subsequently admitted he was aware that Mr. Fontenot might, in fact, pursue that course of action. The hearing committee found this direct contradiction under oath constitutes perjury.

      . In 1999, respondent consented to be publicly reprimanded by the disciplinary board after he pled no contest to a misdemeanor charge of unauthorized use of a movable valued at less than $1,000. The criminal charge stemmed from respondent's theft of a knife, a pistol, and a caller ID box from his client in a domestic matter.

      . Respondent testified that he suffers from bipolar disorder and depression, but on the whole, the committee did not believe he successfully established the mitigating factor of mental disability, given his actions at the hearing, which the committee characterized as “bizarre,” and "the lack of any evidence in progress in treatment.”

      . Respondent did not file a timely objection to the disciplinary board’s recommendation. However, after this court ordered briefing in response to the ODC’s objection, respondent filed a pleading captioned "Wade P. Richard’s Objections to the Report of the Louisiana Attorney Disciplinary Board.” In this pleading, respondent asserted that the board's recommendation of disbarment is excessive in light of the court's prior jurisprudence. He also objected to some of the conclusions drawn by the hearing committee based on the facts presented at the hearing.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Scott Allen COOPER.
    No. 2010-KK-2344.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 27, 2010.
   In re State of Louisiana; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 88706; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KW 10-01195.

Granted.


text:
    In re Katrina Canal BREACHES LITIGATION.
    No. 2010-CQ-1-823.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 29, 2010.
   In re United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit; —Other; Applying For Certified Question United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, No. 09-30485.

Certification Granted.


text:
    In re PERKINS, Don A. et al. v. ENTERGY CORPORATION et al.
    No. 2010-C-1902.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 1, 2010.
   In re National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pa.; —Relator; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Iberville, 18th Judicial District Court Div. D, Nos. 45,646, 46,647, 45,718; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, Nos. 2009 CA 0632, 2009 CA 0633, 2009 CA 0634.

Writ application withdrawn on relator’s motion.


text:
    INNOVATIVE HOSPITALITY SYSTEMS, L.L.C. v. Johnny ABRAHAM, et al.
    No. 2010-CC-1285.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 5, 2010.
   In re First Specialty Ins. Corp.; —Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 2008-1677; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW 10-00217.

Granted and remanded to court of appeal for briefing, argument and full opinion.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Joseph MERANTA.
    No. 2010-KO-0896.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 12, 2010.
   In re Meranta, Joseph; —Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. J, No. 368,641; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2009 KA 1378.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. David SAMPOGNARO.
    No. 2010-K-0905.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 12, 2010.
   In re Sampognaro, David; —Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Charles, 29th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 06-0066; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 09-KA-671.

Denied.

GUIDRY, J., recused.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Deitray LOMAX.
    No. 2010-K-0935.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 12, 2010.
   In re Lomax, Deitray; —Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. L, No. 471-564; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2009-KA-1129.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Tyrone WELLS.
    No. 2010-OK-1118.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 12, 2010.
   In re Phillips, Eusi; State of Louisiana; —Other(s); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. K, No. 441-698; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2009-K-1701.

Denied.

GUIDRY, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Martha FRANCO.
    No. 2010-KK-2542.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 15, 2010.
   In re State of Louisiana; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. C, No. 496-187; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2010-K-1556.

Writ granted. The trial court’s ruling, vacating the previously obtained guilty plea in this matter is reversed. The guilty plea, which was made knowingly and voluntarily, is reinstated. The matter is remanded to the trial court for a sentencing hearing, during which the amount of restitution may be determined.

JOHNSON, J., votes to deny stay and deny writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Eric Dale MICKELSON.
    No. 2010-KK-2235.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 19, 2010.
   In re State of Louisiana; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. 4, No. 262,256; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 46017-KW.

Writ granted. We find no abuse of the trial court’s discretion in finding evidence of the defendant’s unadjudicated offense to be admissible during the penalty phase of the defendant’s capital trial. Accordingly, the ruling of the court of appeal is reversed. The trial court ruling is reinstated.


text:
    Mitchell S. GLASGOW, et al. v. PAR MINERALS CORPORATION, et al.
    No. 2010-C-2011.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 19, 2010.
   In re Glasgow, Karen; Glasgow, Mitchell S. et al.; —Plaintiff(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Allen, 33rd Judicial District Court Div. B, No. C-2008430; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 10-64.

Granted.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Alvin LOUIS.
    No. 2010-KK-2547.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 24, 2010.
   In re State of Louisiana; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. K, No. 125266; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KW 10-01323.

Writ granted. The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed, and this matter is remanded to the district court for further proceedings. See, State v. Cooper, 2010-2344 (La.11/16/10), 50 So.3d 115.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Cedrick HAWKINS.
    No. 2010-KK-2602.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 24, 2010.
   In re State of Louisiana; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. D, No. 454-388; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2010-K-1395.

Stay denied; writ denied.

VICTORY and KNOLL, JJ., would grant.


text:
    SUCCESSION OF Arthur Louis ROBINSON v. Suzanne D. HARLAN and Charles G. Harlan.
    No. 2010-CC-2616.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 29, 2010.
   In re Davis, Julie Robinson; Robinson, Braden P. et al.; Robinson, Terri M.;— Defendant(s); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. M, No. 545,320; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 CW 2171.

Stay denied. Writ denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Allen SCOTT.
    No. 2010-KK-2633.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 30, 2010.
   In re State of Louisiana; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. F, No. 489-041; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2010-K-1656.

Stay denied. Writ denied.

VICTORY and KNOLL, JJ., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Clayton MINGO.
    No. 2010-KK-2601.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 2, 2010.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. C, No. 492 — 469; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2010-K-1528.

Stay denied. Writ denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Matthew BELL.
    No. 2010-KK-2630.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 2, 2010.
   In re Bell, Matthew; —Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. A, No. 500-135; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2010-K-1634.

Stay denied; writ denied.


text:
    Quinn L. DUCOTE and Judy Ducote v. UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY.
    No. 2010-CC-2116.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 10, 2010.
   In re Ducote, Judy; Ducote, Quinn L. et al.; —Plaintiff(s); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Rap-ides, 9th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 218,842; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, Nos. CW 10-00735, CW 10-00742.

Moot; Plaintiffs motion to dismiss granted.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Robbie DANIEL v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2009-KH-2679.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 10, 2010.
   In re Daniel, Robbie; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Pointe Coupee, 18th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 71-123; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2009 KW 1639.

Granted for the sole purpose of transferring the pleading to the district court for its consideration. The district court is directed to provide this Court with a copy of its ruling.

CLARK, J., would deny.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana in the Interest of D.E.
    No. 2010-CJ-2645.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 15, 2010.
   In re Gentry, Charlie; Gentry, Janet; — Other(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Caddo, Juvenile Court for Caddo Parish, No. 138,047; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 45,809-JAC.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant.


text:
    In re Ruben HERNANDEZ, Jr.
    No. 2010-B-1927.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 15, 2010.
   In re Hernandez Jr., Ruben.; —Plaintiff; Applying for Rehearing of this Court’s action dated November 5, 2010; to the Office of Disciplinary Board No. 07-DB-042 C/W 08-DB-062.

Denied.


text:
    Jonathon GUILLORY v. PROGRESSIVE SECURITY INS. CO., et al.
    No. 2010-C-2519.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 17, 2010.
   In re Guillory, Dana; Guillory, Jonathon et al.; —Plaintiff(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Calca-sieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 2006-1743; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, Nos. CA 09-1056, CA 09-1508.

Denied.


text:
    Steven W. RICHARDSON v. GEICO INDEMNITY COMPANY.
    No. 2010-C-2473.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 17, 2010.
   In re Government Employees Insurance Co.; —Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. 0, No. 559,997; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 CA 0208.

Denied.


text:
    Joe CUPIT v. Lyda Gilfoil HERNANDEZ and Isidro Hernandez.
    No. 2010-C-2466.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 17, 2010.
   In re Cupit, Joe; —Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Madison, 6th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 07298; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 45,670-CA.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. James BERTRAND.
    No. 2010-KK-2465.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 17, 2010.
   In re Bertrand, James; —Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Evangeline, 13th Judicial District Court Div. A, Nos. 79,492, 79,490; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KW 10-00929.

Denied.

WEIMER, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Matthew MILEY.
    No. 2010-KK-2464.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 17, 2010.
   In re Miley, Matthew; —Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Livingston, 21st Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 24251; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 KW 1553.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Gerald CHINN.
    No. 2010-KK-2462.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 17, 2010.
   In re Chinn, Gerald; —Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. B, Nos. 09-09-0996, 09-09-0999; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 KW 0916.

Denied.


text:
    LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY v. SHAMROCK DEMOLITION WASTE HAULERS OF LOUISIANA, LLC.
    No. 2010-2460.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 17, 2010.
   In re Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality; —Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 580,287; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 CA 0089.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Clarence SINGLETON.
    No. 2010-KK-2454.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 17, 2010.
   In re State of Louisiana; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. K, No. 480-846; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2010-K-0889.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Desmond JOSEPH.
    No. 2010-KK-2453.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 17, 2010.
   In re State of Louisiana; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. A, Nos. 485-695, 487-860; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2010-K-1057.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Jerome WHITE.
    No. 2010-KK-2442.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 17, 2010.
   In re White, Jerome; —Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. K, No. 494-998; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2010-K-1112.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. August WILLIAMS.
    No. 2010-KD-2441.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 17, 2010.
   In re Williams, August; —Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. F, No. 202-536.

Denied.

JOHNSON, J., would grant and docket.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. MOREL G. LEMOINE DISTRIBUTORS, INC., Martin G. Lemoine and Veronica Lemoine.
    No. 2010-KK-2439.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 17, 2010.
   In re Lemoine, Morel G.; Lemoine, Veronica; Morel G. Lemoine Distributors Inc. et al.; —Defendant(s); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Pointe Coupee, 18th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 70287F, FI, F2; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 KW 1044.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Casey E. BATTS.
    No. 2010-KK-2438.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 17, 2010.
   In re Batts, Casey E.; —Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of W. Baton Rouge, 18th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 080324; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 KW 11770.

Denied.


text:
    Walter and Carolyn DOUGLAS, individually and on Behalf of their Minor Daughter, Shametha Douglas v. CHILDREN’S HOSPITAL, Michelle M. Zembo, M.D., and Charles B. Hill, M.D.
    No. 2010-C-2451.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 17, 2010.
   In re Douglas, Carolyn; Douglas, Shametha; Douglas, Walter et al.; —Plaintiffs); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. E, No. 95-1190; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2010-CA-0213.

Denied.


text:
    Ervin Martin DAVIS, Jr. v. PEOPLES BENEFIT LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY.
    No. 2010-C-2440.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 17, 2010.
   In re Peoples Benefit Life Ins. Co.; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certio-rari and/or Review, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd, Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 2006-15178; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2020 CA 0194.

Denied.


text:
    Jonathon GUILLORY v. PROGRESSIVE SECURITY INS. CO., et al.
    No. 2010-C-2419.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 17, 2010.
   In re American Home Assurance Co.; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certio-rari and/or Review, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 2006-1743; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, Nos. CA 09-1508, CA 09-1056.

Denied.


text:
    PERFORMANCE ENERGY GROUP, L.L.C. v. PIPELINE CONSTRUCTION AND MAINTENANCE, INC., GOM Fabricators, L.L.C, Michael A. Fesi, Sr., Michael A. Fesi, Jr., Barrett Dazee, Steven Fonseca and Harvey Pertuit, Jr.
    No. 2010-CC-2418.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 17, 2010.
   In re Fesi Jr., Michael A.; Fesi Sr., Michael A.; GOM Fabricators, L.L.C; Pipeline Construction and Maintenance, Inc. et al.; —Defendant(s); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Terrebonne, 32nd Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 156,272; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, Nos. 2010 CW 0615, 2010 CW 1089.

Denied.


text:
    Dr. and Mrs. Wayne PIERCE, et al. v. JESUIT HIGH SCHOOL.
    No. 2010-CC-2417.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 17, 2010.
   In re Jesuit High School; —Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. K, No. 07-14877; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2010-C-1156.

Denied.

VICTORY and WEIMER, JJ., would grant.


text:
    AMERICAN CENTURY CASUALTY COMPANY, et al. v. Charles F. SALE.
    No. 2010-C-2410.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 17, 2010.
   In re American Century Casualty Company, et al.; Barett, Michelle; Franklin, Ashley; —Plaintiff(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 528,063; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 45,560-CA.

Denied.


text:
    Sybil A. BOOTH, Individually, and as Mother and Natural Tutrix of her Minor Daughter, Anjanee A. Booth. v. ORLEANS PARISH SCHOOL BOARD and Robert Williams.
    No. 2010-C-2398.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 17, 2010.
   In re Orleans Parish Sch. Bd. et al.; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certio-rari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. K, No. 2001-16313; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2009-CA-1505.

Denied.

VICTORY and CLARK, JJ., would grant.


text:
    BOSSIER PARISH SCHOOL BOARD v. RICHARD LEBLANC ARCHITECTS, INC., et al.
    No. 2010-C-2396.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 17, 2010.
   In re Bossier Parish School Board; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Bossier, 26th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 128,556; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 45,632-CA.

Denied.


text:
    M & M GAMING, INC., et al. v. LAFAYETTE INSURANCE COMPANY, et al.
    No. 2010-CC-2395.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 17, 2010.
   In re Lafayette Insurance Company; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Bernard, 34th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 107-206; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2010-C-1063.

Denied.

VICTORY and GUIDRY, JJ., would grant.


text:
    Beverly FARMER, Individually and as the Provisional Tutrix of Virginia Martin et al. v. WILLIS-KNIGHTON MEDICAL CENTER.
    No. 2010-CC-2394.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 17, 2010.
   In re Willis-Knighton Medical Center;— Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 521,823; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, Nos. 46,063-CW, 46,067-CW.

Denied.


text:
    Dwayne HALEY v. Cheryl G. LEARY.
    No. 2010-C-2265.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 17, 2010.
   In re Haley, Dwayne; —Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. M, No. 2002-17470; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2009-CA-1626.

Denied. Although relator named several members of this Court as parties, we are permitted to act on the application pursuant to the rule of necessity. See United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 101 S.Ct. 471, 66 L.Ed.2d 392 (1980).


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Christopher BROWDER.
    No. 2010-KK-2247.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 17, 2010.
   In re Browder, Christopher; —Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. F, No. 454-863; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2010-K-0887.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Eugene DOUGLAS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-2148.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 17, 2010.
   In re Douglas, Eugene; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 03-10-1000; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 KW 1032.

Denied. Moot.


text:
    Warren LESTER, et al. v. EXXON MOBIL CORPORATION, Chevron USA, Inc., Intracoastal Tubular Services, Inc., Alpha Technical Services, Inc., OFS, Inc., et al.
    No. 2010-C-2244.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 17, 2010.
   In re Gauthreaux, Chase Manning et al.; Gauthreaux, Evelyn; Gauthreaux, Gregory Joseph; Meerman, Donna Lee; —Plaintiffs); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 630-402; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 09-CA-1105.


text:
    Walter And Carolyn DOUGLAS, individually and on Behalf of their Minor Daughter, Shametha Douglas v. CHILDREN’S HOSPITAL, Michelle M. Zembo, M.D., and Charles B. Hill, M.D.
    No. 2010-C-2139.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 17, 2010.
   In re Louisiana, State of; —Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. E, No. 95-1190; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No.2010-CA-0213.

Denied.


text:
    Melvin DYSON, Sr., et al. v. Dr. Kevin U. STEPHENS, et al.
    No. 2010-C-2131.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 17, 2010.
   In re Louisiana Medical Mutual Insurance Company; Stephens, Dr., Kevin U. et al.; —Defendant(s); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. B, No. 04-14065; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2010-C-1055.

Denied.


text:
    Greg MITCHELL, Clodine M. Gordon, Linda Brown, Bertha Oxly, Janice Bell, et al. v. EAST BATON ROUGE PARISH, et al.
    No. 2010-C-2075.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 17, 2010.
   In re Bell, Janice; Brown, Linda; Gordon, Clodine M.; Mitchell et al., Greg; Oxly, Bertha; —Plaintiffs); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. M, No. 432,169; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2009 CA 1076.

Denied.

JOHNSON, VICTORY and KNOLL, JJ., would grant.


text:
    TORBERT LAND COMPANY, L.L.C. v. Tommy MONTGOMERY and Lillian Montgomery.
    No. 2010-C-2009.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 17, 2010.
   In re Torbert Land Co. L.L.C.; —Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Pointe Coupee, 18th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 41,328; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2009 CA 1955.

Denied.

JOHNSON and KNOLL, JJ., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Robert Allen SNELLING.
    No. 2010-K-1301.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 17, 2010.
   In re Snelling, Robert Allen; —Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson Davis, 31st Judicial District Court Div. 0, No. 391-08; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 09-1313.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Ronnie ROY.
    No. 2010-K-1297.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 17, 2010.
   In re Roy, Ronnie; —Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Avoyelles, 12th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 147-684; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 09-1410.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Larry MITCHELL.
    No. 2010-KK-1273.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 17, 2010.
   In re Mitchell, Larry; —Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 451323; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2009 KA 2184.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Nelson JACKSON.
    No. 2010-K-1265.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 17, 2010.
   In re Jackson, Nelson; —Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Livingston, 21st Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 21695; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2009 KA 1930.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Michael Kemper PERCY,
    No. 2010-KO-1253.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 17, 2010.
   In re Percy, Michael Kemper; —Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson Davis, 31st Judicial District Court Div. 0, No. CR-639-08-3; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 09-1319.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Michael A. COE.
    No. 2010-KO-1245.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 17, 2010.
   In re: Coe, Michael A.; —Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. N, No. 08-1709; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 09-KA-1012.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Erskine L. ROBINSON a/k/a Erskine Robertson.
    No. 2010-K-1242.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 17, 2010.
   In re Robinson A/K/A, Erskine L.; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certio-rari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. G, No. 472-452; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2009-KA-1137.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Nicky A. LANDOR.
    No. 2010-K-1230.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 17, 2010.
   In re Landor, Nicky A.; —Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 423940; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2009 KA 1740.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Jarvis Jermaine SHELVIN.
    No. 2010-KO-1225.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 17, 2010.
   In re Shelvin, Jarvis Jermaine; —Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. K, No. 110,925; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 09-1283.

Denied.


text:
    STATE OF LOUISIANA v. Rhine REYNOLDS
    No. 2010-KO-1213.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 17, 2010.
   In re Reynolds, Rhine; —Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of W. Baton Rouge, 18th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 072482; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2009 KA 2257.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Timothy J. MAZIQUE.
    No. 2010-K-1198.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 17, 2010.
   In re Mazique, Timothy J.; —Defendant; Applying For Writ of Mandamus and/or Writ of Prohibition, Parish of St. Charles, 29th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 08-216; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 09-KA-845.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Keyowaski M. DOUCET.
    No. 2010-KO-1195.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 17, 2010.
   In re Doucet, Keyowaski M.; —Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Evangeline, 13th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 77660-FA; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 09-1065.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Lawrence Kivin NIXON.
    No. 2010-KO-1194.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 17, 2010.
   In re Nixon, Lawrence Kivin; —Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson Davis, 31st Judicial District Court Div. 0, No. CR-760-08-3; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 09-1332.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Larry POLK, et al.
    No. 2010-KK-1186.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 17, 2010.
   In re Polk, Joanie; Polk, Laramie; Polk, Larry et al.; Ochsner, Daniel; — Defendants); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, First Parish Court, Parish of Jefferson, No. F1757515; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 10-KH-133.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Markell FLETCHER.
    No. 2010-KP-1056.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 17, 2010.
   In re Fletcher, Markell; —Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. B, No. 372-250; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2010-K-0153.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Mark A. CROSS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-0152.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 17, 2010.
   In re Cross, Mark A.; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caldwell, 37th Judicial District Court Div. 0, No. 75,194; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 45,-254-KH.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. BADON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-0150.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 17, 2010.
   In re Badon, Edward; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. H, No. 367-715; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2009-K-1533.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; see also State ex rel. Fleury v. State, 93-2898 (La.10/13/95), 661 So.2d 488; cf. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4(D).


text:
    STATE ex rel. James STEPHON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-0137.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 17, 2010.
   In re James, Stephon; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. J, Nos. 343846, 394007; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2009 KW 1523.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Clovis JULIEN v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-0134.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 17, 2010.
   In re Julien, Clovis; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Bernard, 34th Judicial District Court Div. A, Nos. 15^437, 15^439.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Thomas WILLIAMS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-0133.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 17, 2010.
   In re Williams, Thomas; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Lasalle, 28th Judicial District Court Div. 0, No. 8783.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Anthony Jerod GUILLORY v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-0131.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 17, 2010.
   In re Guillory, Anthony Jerod; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Allen, 33th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. CR02-2407; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 09-01011.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; see also State ex rel. Hall v. State, 99-0326 (La.9/24/99), 871 So.2d 1071.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Leotis THOMAS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-0130.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 17, 2010.
   In re Thomas, Leotis; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 248,904; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 43,-783-KA.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Kevin LOVE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-0128.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 17, 2010.
   In re Love, Kevin; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. A, No. 483-327; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2009-K-1475.

Denied. Moot.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Excell LIVERS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-0109.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 17, 2010.
   In re Livers, Excell; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. G, No. 478-658; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, Nos. 2009-K-1427, 2009-K-1427.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Dennis Ray WASHINGTON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-0108.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 17, 2010.
   In re Washington, Dennis Ray; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Lincoln, 3rd Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 1976-F-24138.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Theortric GIVENS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-0095.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 17, 2010.
   In re Givens, Theortric; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. D, No. 253-215.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Bernard SMITH v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-0067.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 17, 2010.
   In re Smith, Bernard; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. C, No. 409-380; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2009-K-1370.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Carlton D. BROOKS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-0066.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 17, 2010.
   In re Brooks, Carlton D.; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 225,723; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. KH 09^5030.

Denied.


text:
    Otis R. McKINLEY v. Warden Lynn COOPER; Avoyelles Correctional Center.
    No. 2010-CI-0017.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 17, 2010.
   In re McKinley, Otis R.; —Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. 0, No. 553,225; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2009 CA 0537.

Denied.


text:
    Richard LAY v. Sergeant Ronnie SPEARS, Lt. Richard Steadman, Warden Robert Tanner and Lt. Thomas Mitchell.
    No. 2009-CI-2824.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 17, 2010.
   In re Lay, Richard; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Washington, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 098500; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2009 CW1158.

Denied.

WEIMER, J., recused.


text:
    Richard LAY v. Robert TANNER, et al.
    No. 2009-CI-2821.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 17, 2010.
   In re Lay, Richard; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 98501-C; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2009 CW 1096.

Denied.

WEIMER, J., recused.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Leon J. HORNE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2009-KH-2604.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 17, 2010.
   In re Home, Leon J.; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 283-104; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2009 KW 1440.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Dwayne Lee RODRIGUES v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2009-KH-2499.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 17, 2010.
   In re Rodrigues, Dwayne Lee; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. K, No. 94-2590; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 08-WR-1086.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Trave WILSON.
    No. 2009-K-1838.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 17, 2010.
   In re Wilson, Trave; —Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. H, No. 475-619; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2009-K-0783.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Kelly BARNES v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2009-KH-2385.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 17, 2010.
   In re Barnes, Kelly; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Washington, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 08CR399918; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2009 KW 0513.

Denied. Relator has an adequate remedy on appeal


text:
    STATE ex rel. Benjamin C. WHITE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2009-KH-1028.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 17, 2010.
   In re White, Benjamin C.; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedíal Writs, Parish of Lincoln, 3rd Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 47,628; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 44,-530-KH.

Denied.


text:
    Justo E. ROQUE, Jr. v. Miguel A. ELIAS, a Professional Law Corporation.
    No. 2010-OC-2420.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 17, 2010.
   In re Roque Jr., Justo E.; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. P, No. 670-351; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 10-C-340.

Not considered; not timely filed. See State v. Crandell, 05-1060 (La.3/10/06), 924 So.2d 122; Morris v. Stueben, 01-0137 (La.1/26/01), 781 So.2d 1220.


text:
    In re Appeal of Decision of DISCIPLINARY BOARD NO. 10-PDB-061.
    No. 2010-OB-2298.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 17, 2010.
   In re White, Bradley; —Plaintiff; Applying For Appeal of Decision of the Disciplinary Board Office of Disciplinary Board, No. 10-PDB-061.

Leave to appeal denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Thedrick EDWARDS.
    No. 2009-K-1612.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 17, 2010.
   In re Edwards, Thedrick; —Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. N, No. 07-06-0032; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2008 KA 2011.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Hilton WRIGHT v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2009-KH-2506.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 17, 2010.
   In re Wright, Hilton; —Plaintiff; Applying for Reconsideration of this Courts action dated November 5, 2010; Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court, Div. G, No. 268-605; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2009-K-1389.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Victor L. BARRON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2009-KH-2280.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 17, 2010.
   In re Barron, Victor L.; —Plaintiff; Applying for Reconsideration of this Court’s action dated September 24, 2010; Parish of Concorida, 7th Judicial District Court Div. A. Nos. 00-2158. 00-2159: to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 09-00632.

Reconsideration denied.


text:
    In re Appeal of Decision of DISCIPLINARY BOARD NO. 10-PDB-026.
    No. 2010-OB-2225.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 17, 2010.
   In re Horton, Denise M.; —Plaintiff; Applying For Appeal of Decision of the Disciplinary Board Office of Disciplinary Board, No 10-PDB-026.

Leave to appeal denied.

VICTORY, J., would remand to Office of Disciplinary Counsel (ODC) for further investigation.

GUIDRY, J., would remand to Office of Disciplinary Counsel (ODC) for further investigation.


text:
    In re Appeal of Decision of the DISCIPLINARY BOARD NO. 10-PDB-028.
    No. 2010-OB-2171.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 17, 2010.
   In re LeMaire, Kevin; —Plaintiff; Applying For Appeal of Decision of the Disciplinary Board Office of the Attorney Disciplinary Board, No. 10-PDB-028.

Leave to appeal denied.


text:
    Cynthia BRIDGES, Secretary, Louisiana Department of Revenue v. HERTZ EQUIPMENT RENTAL CORPORATION.
    No. 2010-C-2328.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 17, 2010.
   In re Bridges, Cynthia Sec. et al.; Louisiana, State of; Revenue, Department of; —Plaintiff(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 639-878; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 45,647-CA.

Granted.


author: CLARENCE E. McMANUS, Judge.

text:
    Randal W. GREFF, Jr. a/k/a Randel W. Greff and Randal W. Greff a/k/a Randy W. Greff, as the Administrator of the Estate of His Minor Child, Dustin James Greff v. Patrick E. MILAM, individually, and as Trustee of the Tri Greff Trust, et al.
    No. 10-CA-249.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fifth Circuit.
    Oct. 12, 2010.
    Warren Horn Heller, Draper, Hayden, Patrick & Horn, Attorney at Law, New Orleans, Louisiana, for Plaintiff/Appellant.

      Kevin M. Wheeler, Larry E. Demmons, Taggart Morton Law Frim, Attorneys at Law, New Orleans, Louisiana, for Defendant/Appellee.
    Panel composed of Judges EDWARD A. DUFRESNE, JR., CLARENCE E. McMANUS, and MARC E. JOHNSON.
   CLARENCE E. McMANUS, Judge.

| ¡Plaintiff, Randy Greff Jr., appeals from the trial court grant of summary judgment, dismissing his claim for trust proceeds filed against the Tri-Greff Trust and Patrick Milam, trustee. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

In Greff v. Milam, 08-726 (La.App. 5 Cir. 2/10/09), 8 So.3d 693, (footnotes omitted), we set forth the procedural and factual summary of this case as follows:

This is a suit by beneficiaries of a trust arising out of the termination of their trust benefits. The trial court granted a partial summary judgment that dismissed the claims of one plaintiff as to some of the defendants, but denied summary judgment as to the other plaintiff. In addition, a motion for partial summary judgment by other defendants is still pending. The plaintiff whose claims were partially dismissed has appealed. We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
On July 27, 1990 Leon J. Greff, as Set-tlor, created an irrevocable inter vivos trust by a document titled “Act of Donation Creating an Irrevocable Inter Vivos Trust,” by Leon J. Greff to Ernest A. Burguieres, III and Patrick E. Milam, dated July 27, 1990. The trust instrument gave the trust the name “The Tri Greff Trust,” named two co-Trustees, Ernest A. Burguieres, III and Patrick E. Milam, and stated the Trust was set up under the laws of Florida, particularly the Florida Trust Statutes.
The Tri Greff Trust created a “class college educational trust” for the benefit of Leon J. Greffs great-grandchildren. The instrument states, “This Trust is being created for the sole purpose of giving an opportunity to the Great Grandchildren of Leon J. Greff to secure an education which will prepare them to secure more from life than would otherwise be available.... ”
|sTo participate in the Trust, the prospective beneficiaries are required to comply with certain criteria in their academic performances. A beneficiary in grades 5 though 8 is required to “maintain a ‘B Plus’ average or a ‘2.5 G.P.A.’ on a ‘4.0 scale[’], each school year.” A beneficiary in high school is required to take a college-preparatory curriculum that includes designated subjects, and to “maintain a 3.0 grade point average on a 4.0 scale for the school year.”
In the case of 5th-through-8th-grade and high-school beneficiaries, if the beneficiary fails to maintain the designated average the Trustees are charged with determining the cause for such failure. If the failure was due to a cause beyond the beneficiary’s control, the Trustees may maintain the benefits for another term, during which the Trustees “shall make every effort to remove the cause or the causes of the failure” to maintain the grade average. If the cause or causes cannot be removed and the beneficiary does not achieve the required grade average within a year, the Trustees “shall disqualify the beneficiary” from any future benefits and the “beneficiary’s interest in the trust shall be forfeited.”
The Trust requires that each beneficiary be enrolled and attending full time classes in a college or university by their 20th birthday, or forfeit all interest and benefits. A beneficiary may select and attend any accredited college or university of his choice, “except he must secure a BA or BS degree within 5 years or original enrollment” and “must maintain a ‘B Plus’ or a ‘3.0 point average’ on a scale of 4.0 ... to continue to secure the benefits of the trust.”
The Trust also provided,
Should any of the beneficiaries become physically or mentally disabled and ... unable to attend or be tutored in college subjects they have been studying, they shall receive one sixth of their proportional shall [sic] of the funds as allocated, until fully expended, subject to review and the joint approval of the trustees after receiving all medical data surrounding the condition of such beneficiary.
It is uncontested that plaintiffs Randal W. Greff, Jr., known as “Randy Jr.,” and his younger brother, Dustin James Greff, are great-grandchildren of the Settlor and as such were eligible to be beneficiaries of the Trust. Both were receiving benefits under the Trust for several years, until 2004, when the sole remaining Trustee, Patrick Milam, determining they were disqualified from receiving benefits because of low grade point averages, and discontinued payments.
Randy Jr. and Dustin (through his father, Randal W. Greff, Sr., as administrator of his estate) filed suit against the Trustee in August 2004. They asserted the Trustee wrongfully disqualified them as beneficiaries and wrongfully ceased paying them benefits; that he breached his fiduciary duty by failing to give ac-countings as required by the trust instrument; that he failed to comply with the trust’s requirement to appoint a co-trustee to replace Ernest Burguieres (who resigned several years after inception of the trust). The plaintiffs also alleged the Trustee failed to comply with various provisions of the Trust before deciding the plaintiffs were no longer entitled to receive the benefits of the Trust.
|/The plaintiffs asserted the Trust was negligently and/or improperly drafted, and provisions of the Trust are vague, ambiguous, and subject to varying interpretations that frustrate and prohibit satisfying the Trust’s stated goals and educational purposes. The plaintiffs seek judicial reformation of the Trust, requesting that the court determine the true intent of the Settlor and modify the Trust accordingly. They ask the court to disregard the ambiguous and unclear terms of the Trust, and render an interpretation that allows the beneficiaries an opportunity to achieve the stated goals of the Trust and fulfill the intent of the Settlor.
The plaintiffs also seek to have Milam removed as Trustee and to recover against him all educational expenses they have incurred since the date the Trustee failed and/or refused to pay same, as well as future such expenses pending a ruling on their petition.
In addition to Milam, sued individually and as Trustee, the plaintiffs named as defendants numerous other potential beneficiaries of the Trust, including all present and future great grandchildren of the Settlor, and all contingent beneficiaries of the Trust.
The Trustee filed an incidental demand against the plaintiffs as well as the other beneficiary-class defendants, seeking a declaratory judgment confirming and ratifying his past interpretations of the Trust’s provisions. The Trustee later filed a reconventional demand against Randy Jr., in which he sought to recover funds to which the Trustee claimed Randy Jr. was not entitled, and which the Trustee alleged Randy Jr. fraudulently induced the Trustee to pay to him.
Thereafter the Trustee filed a motion for partial summary judgment against the plaintiffs, asserting there was no issue of material fact and he was entitled to judgment as a matter of law that he acted properly in disqualifying them from receiving further benefits of the Trust. Subsequently the other defendants, all contingent beneficiaries of the Trust, filed a motion for partial summary judgment, on the same basis as the Trustee.
The trial court granted partial summary judgment on the Trustee’s motion as to Randy Jr., but denied partial summary judgment on the Trustee’s motion as to Dustin. The record does not indicate there was any ruling on the motion for partial summary judgment by the contingent beneficiaries. Randy Jr. has appealed.

This Court dismissed Randy Jr.’s appeal, finding that it was not a final judgment subject to immediate appeal. Thereafter, both Randy Jr., as plaintiff, and defendants filed a joint motion to amend the judgment, seeking to have the judgment designated as final for purposes of immediate appeal alleging that there is no just reason for delay. The trial court granted the motion and amended the | ¿judgment accordingly. Randy Jr. has now appealed from the judgment as amended.

A motion for summary judgment should be granted “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, show that there is no genuine issue as to material fact and that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” LSA-C.C.P. art. 966(B). The initial burden of proof is with the mover to show that no genuine issue of material fact exists. If the moving party will not bear the burden of proof at trial, the moving party must only point out that there is an absence of factual support for one or more elements essential to the adverse party’s claim, action, or defense. The non-moving party must then produce factual support sufficient to establish that he will be able to satisfy his evidentiary burden of proof at trial. If the non-moving party fails to do so, there is no genuine issue of material fact and summary judgment should be granted. LSA-C.C.P. art. 966(C)(2); Callis v. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Service, Dist. # 1, 07-580 (La.App. 5 Cir. 12/27/07), 975 So.2d 641, 643.

Summary judgments are reviewed on appeal de novo. An appellate court thus asks the same questions as does the trial court in determining whether summary judgment is appropriate: whether there is any genuine issue of material fact, and whether the mover-appellant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Crawley v. Coastal Bridge Co. Inc., 09-181 (La.App. 5 Cir. 11/10/09), 24 So.3d 315, 317, writ denied 10-0076 (La.3/26/10), 29 So.3d 1258.

In this appeal, Randy Jr. alleges that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment and dismissing his claims, as there remained genuine issues of material fact as to whether Milam could perform his duties without the concurrence of a co-trustee, whether Milam complied with all his duties under the trust, and whether Randy, Jr. suffered from a “mental disability.”

| fiRandy Jr. first alleges that there exist genuine issues of material fact as to whether Milam could administer the trust without the appointment of a co-trustee.

The trust was created by Leon Greff, on July 27, 1990, with two trustees — Patrick Milam and Ernest Burguieres, III. The trust stated that it would be governed by the laws of Florida. The trust was created to provide educational financing for Greffs great grandchildren.

Section VI of the Trust sets forth the powers and responsibilities of the Trustees and it provides:

The Trustees shall have all of the powers that are conferred upon Trustees under applicable law, of the State of Florida. Should future changes in the Law expand such powers then the said Trustees shall have such expanded powers. In addition to any powers conferred by Law the Trustees shall have the following powers, to-wit:
2. To administer the Trust Money and Property concurrently. Any decision as to the administration of the Trust Money and Property shall be joint and unless each Trustee concurs in the such (sic) decision then the premise under consideration shall not be executed.

Section VIII of the Trust controls in the event that one of the trustees is unable to perform his duties, and it states that

In the event a trustee should resign, die or become disabled and con not (sic) longer perform the powers and responsibilities of Trustee herein then the other trustee shall appoint a Trustee to assume the responsibilities and powers herein set out.
The interpretation of any provision, in this document, shall be within the exclusive power of the Trustees named herein. In the event there is a disagreement as to the application or interpretation of any provision of this document, between the said Trustees, then and in that event, either Trustee may apply to a court of competent jurisdiction and seek a declaratory judgment concerning such particular provision.

By deposition, Mr. Burguieres testified that he served as a trustee for four years, until November of 1994. At that time, he resigned because he was worried about malpractice and also because Greff had not yet transferred assets to the trust.

|7Mr. Milam testified that he attempted to find another trustee but was unsuccessful.

Randy Jr. alleges that Milam’s action in terminating his trust benefits is void, because he did not have the concurrence of a second trustee, as was required by the trust instrument. Milam’s response is two-fold.

First, Milam contends that the provisions of the Florida Trust Code allowed him to act unilaterally. FSA-737.404(2) provided at the time of the trust and also at the time of Randy Jr.’s disqualification that:

If two or more trustees are appointed to perform a trust and any of them is unable or refuses to accept the appointment or, having accepted, ceases to be a trustee, the surviving or remaining trustees shall perform the trust and succeed to all the powers, duties, and discretionary authority given to the trustees jointly.

Here, Milam testified that his co-trustee resigned from the trust and that he was unable to find someone else who was willing to serve as co-trustee. His testimony was not controverted by appellant. We believe that the Florida statutes do give Milam the authority to act in this case.

Milam secondly argues that the failure to appoint a co-trustee is irrelevant to the matter before the court. He contends that the trust instrument provides that if the two trustees are unable to agree, then the trustees are to file for declaratory judgment, which would present to the court the same issue that is currently before it, which is whether Randy met the requirements of the trust so as to be entitled to receive trust funds.

We agree that the issue, as presented to the court, is properly before us. Assuming arguendo that any appointed trustee would disagree with Milam’s conclusion that Randy is disqualified, the appropriate remedy would have been to appear before the court, as has occurred in this instant case.

|sIn his second allegation, Randy Jr. alleges that there are material issues of fact as to whether Milam complied with his duties under the trust, and if so, whether the provisions of the trust were vague, ambiguous and inconsistent and subject to interpretation or reformation.

As noted above, the trust provided that its participants were to maintain certain grade point averages. The trust further provided that, for the 5th through 8th grade beneficiary and the high school beneficiary, if the beneficiary did not maintain the appropriate average, the trustee was to determine the cause and to make efforts to remove the cause if possible. No such condition was imposed on the trustee for the college attending beneficiary.

Randy contends that the trust is ambiguous, and that the creator of the trust intended to require the trustees to ascertain and provide assistance for the struggling college beneficiary. He then contends that appellee did not inquire as to why he was struggling at LSU, and did not provide assistance in the form of tutoring or counseling, or any assistance whatsoever.

The document in question clearly states that the trustee is charged with finding the causes of failure in grade school and high school, but no such requirement is stated for college beneficiaries. If the creator of the trust had intended to make the trustee responsible for college students, he could have placed those provisions in that portion of the trust document. The fact that he did not shows that the creator of the trust did not intend for the trustees to be responsible for determining the reasons for failure of college beneficiaries. The document on its face is not vague and ambiguous, and therefore the trial court did not err in finding no material fact with regards to whether the trustee adequately performed his duties regarding Randy Jr.’s college education.

19Finally, Randy, Jr. alleges that there are material issues of fact as to whether he suffers from a “mental disability” sufficient to prevent him from achieving his educational goals. He alleges that his diagnosed ADD is a sufficient mental disability and therefore he is entitled to trust benefits.

The Disability Provision of the Trust, Article VII, Section 4, provides that:

Should any of the beneficiaries become physically or mentally disabled and such beneficiaries are unable to attend or be tutored in college subjects they have been studying, they shall receive one sixth of their proportional share of the funds allocated, until fully expended, subject to review and the joint approval of the trustees after receiving all medical data surrounding the medical condition of such beneficiary.

To support Ms claim that he suffers from a mental disability, Randy introduced the testimony of Dr. Kim Van Geffen, Randy was diagnosed with ADHD (Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder.) She stated that 1/3 of those who suffer from this disorder do not outgrow it and retain significant issues that can affect their ability to perform academically. However, Dr. Van Geffen did not conclude that Randy was unable to attend or be tutored in his college subjects. Instead, she stated that the preferred treatment for ADHD relative to academic performance is tutoring.

As the appellee points out in his brief, the record reflects that Randy Jr. successfully completed high school and was accepted into LSU. He met the requirements of the trust during his first semester, and he continued to attend college for two years after that. Randy Jr. also admitted that after LSU, he attended classes at UNO.

Therefore, we conclude that appellee presented undisputed facts to make a pri-ma facie showing that Randy Jr. was not so disabled that he could not attend college, or be tutored in failing classes and Randy Jr. did not present evidence to rebut this showing.

| mFor the above discussed reasons, we find no error in the trial court’s ruling granting summary judgment in favor of defendants, and dismissing the claims of Randy Greff, Jr. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. All costs are assessed against appellant.

AFFIRMED.

      . Appellees cite Florida Statutes Annotated, 737.404(2), which was repealed by Florida Laws 2006, c.2006-217, § 48, eff. July 1, 2007; Florida Laws 2008, c.2008-5, § 16, eff. July 1, 2008, and replaced with Florida Statutes Annotated 736.0703(2). FSA-736.0703(2) provides that "If a vacancy occurs in a cotrusteeship, the remaining cotrus-tees or a majority of the remaining cotrustees may act for the trust.”


author: MARC E. JOHNSON, Judge.

text:
    Chandan PRASAD v. Sid BULLARD.
    No. 10-CA-291.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fifth Circuit.
    Oct. 12, 2010.

      Scott G. Wolfe, Jr., Seth J. Smiley, Wolfe Law Group, L.L.C., Attorneys at Law, New Orleans, LA, for Plaintiff/Appel-lee.
    Kurt C. Garcia, Attorney at Law, Ken-ner, LA, for Defendant/Appellant.
    Panel composed of Judges EDWARD A. DUFRESNE, JR., WALTER J. ROTHSCHILD, and MARC E. JOHNSON.
   MARC E. JOHNSON, Judge.

12Pefendant/appelIant, Sid Bullard, appeals from a judgment ordering him to submit to arbitration. For the reasons that follow, we reverse.

Plaintiff, Chandan Prasad (“Dr. Pra-sad”), entered into a contract with Bullard Capital, L.L.C., d/b/a Contract Services, to complete the construction of a house. A dispute regarding the construction contract arose and, pursuant to the contract, Dr. Prasad submitted an arbitration demand to the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”). The arbitration demand asserted claims against Bullard Capital, L.L.C. (“Bullard Capital”), Contract Services, L.L.C. (“Contract Services”), and defendant, Sid Bullard, as the principal for both companies and “his misrepresentations, misallocation of funds, [and] commingling of assets between the identified' organizations.” Both Bullard Capital and Contract Services filed an answer to the arbitration demand and asserted a counter claim. In the answer, Mr. Bullard challenged the jurisdiction and venue of the AAA as it related to him personally on the basis he was not a party to the contract between Dr. Prasad and Bullard Capital.

13Pr. Prasad subsequently filed a Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Order Compelling Sid Bullard to Arbitrate in the 24th Judicial District Court. Dr. Prasad indicated that a dispute over a contract had arisen between Bullard Capital and Contract Services and that the matter was proceeding through arbitration as required by the contract. He further indicated that Mr. Bullard refused to recognize the jurisdiction of the AAA over him. Dr. Prasad asserted that, although Mr. Bullard did not sign the contract, he was bound to the contract, including the arbitration provision, as the sole member in Bullard Capital and Contract Services and under the theories of piercing the corporate veil, alter ego, and third party beneficiary. As such, Dr. Prasad sought a declaratory judgment and order compelling Mr. Bullard to submit to arbitration.

Mr. Bullard responded to the petition by asserting the contract was only between Dr. Prasad and Bullard Capital and claimed that he “neither accepts nor recognize[s] the jurisdiction and venue over him by the American Arbitration Association in this matter.”

After a hearing, the trial court granted Dr. Prasad’s Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Order Compelling Arbitration. In its reasons for judgment, the trial court relied on Arthur Andersen, LLP v. Carlisle, — U.S. —, 129 S.Ct. 1896, 173 L.Ed.2d 832 (2009), as well as Louisiana jurisprudence favoring arbitration, and found that because a contract may be enforced against a non-party to the contract under certain circumstances, including piercing the corporate veil and alter ego, Mr. Bullard was required to submit to arbitration.

Mr. Bullard appeals the decision of the trial court claiming the trial court erred in finding the contract between Dr. Prasad and Bullard Capital, which contained an arbitration clause, was enforceable against him, a non-signatory. Mr. Bullard relies on Ciaccio v. Cazayoux, 519 So.2d 799 (La.App. 1st Cir.1987), and Woodrow Wilson Const. Co., Inc. v. MMR-Radon Constructors, Inc., 93-2346 (La.App. 1 Cir. 4/8/94), 635 So.2d 758, writ denied, 94-1206 (La.7/1/94), 639 So.2d 1167, to support his position that he cannot be required to submit to arbitration because he never agreed to arbitration. He contends he was not a party to the contract and, because corporations are distinct legal entities separate from the individuals who comprise them, the contract, including the arbitration clause, cannot be enforced against him.

Arbitration is a process of dispute resolution in which a neutral third party renders a decision after a hearing at which the parties have an opportunity to be heard. The purpose of arbitration is the speedy disposition of differences through informal procedures without resort to court action. Horseshoe Entertainment v. Lepinski, 40,753, p. 5 (La.App. 2 Cir. 3/8/06), 923 So.2d 929, 933, writ denied, 06-792 (La.6/2/06), 929 So.2d 1259. A determination of whether to compel arbitration is a question of law and, thus, appellate review is simply to determine whether the trial court was legally correct or legally incorrect. Id. at 5, 923 So.2d at 934.

Arbitration is a matter of contract and a court cannot compel a party to submit to arbitration any disputes that the party has not agreed to submit. Lakeland Anesthesia, Inc. v. United Healthcare of Louisiana, Inc., 03-1662, pp. 7-8 (La.App. 4 Cir. 3/17/04), 871 So.2d 380, 386-87, writs denied, 04-969 and 04-972 (La.6/25/04), 876 So.2d 834. The authority of an arbitrator to resolve disputes is derived from the parties’ advance agreement to submit such grievances to arbitration. Horseshoe Entertainment, 40,753 at 6, 923 So.2d at 934, citing AT & T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers of America, 475 U.S. 643, 106 S.Ct. 1415, 89 L.Ed.2d 648 (1986). Thus, unless the parties clearly and | ¿unmistakably provide otherwise, the question of whether the parties agreed to arbitrate is to be decided by the court and not the arbitrator. Id.

There is a strong presumption in favor of arbitration. Aguillard v. Auction Management Corp., 04-2804, pp. 24-25 (La.6/29/05), 908 So.2d 1, 18. The Louisiana Supreme Court has stated that “even when the scope of an arbitration clause is fairly debatable or reasonably in doubt, the court should decide the question of construction in favor of arbitration.” Aguillard, 04-2804 at 25, 908 So.2d at 18.

The validity, irrevocability, and enforceability of arbitration agreements are recognized in the Louisiana Binding Arbitration Law (“LAL”), La. R.S. 9:4201. The LAL is virtually identical to the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14, and, thus, federal jurisprudence provides guidance for resolving arbitration issues. Aguillard, supra. Both the LAL and FAA provide for specific enforcement of arbitration agreements. Lakeland Anesthesia, 03-1662 at 9, 871 So.2d at 387. In deciding whether to compel arbitration, the threshold inquiry is whether the parties agreed to arbitrate their disputes. This is a two-fold inquiry: (1) whether there is a valid arbitration agreement, and (2) whether the dispute in question falls within the scope of that agreement. Lakeland Anesthesia, 03-1662 at 9, 871 So.2d at 388; Saavedra v. Dealmaker Developments, LLC, 08-1239, p. 7 (La.App. 4 Cir. 3/18/09), 8 So.3d 758, 763, writ denied, 09-875 (La.6/5/09), 9 So.3d 871.

Arbitration agreements are contracts and must be enforced according to their terms. Such agreements must be interpreted by applying accepted rules of state contract law, or La. C.C. arts. 2045 to 2057. Lakeland Anesthesia, 03-1662 at 8, 871 So.2d at 387. Whether a party is obligated to arbitrate is a matter of contract and, thus, the question of who is bound by an arbitration agreement is a function of the intent of the parties, as expressed in the terms of the agreement. Bridas S.A.P.I.C. v. Government of Turkmenistan, 345 F.3d 347, 355 (5th Cir.2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 937, 124 S.Ct. 1660, 158 L.Ed.2d 357 (2004).

In the present case, the arbitration provision contained in the contract provides:

In the case of any dispute between the parties, the Parties hereby agree that the dispute will be adjudicated by binding arbitration. The Parties hereby submit to the jurisdiction of the American Arbitration Association, and agree to arbitrate their differences in accordance with the American Arbitration Association’s Construction Industry Rules. The cost of the arbitration proceeding shall be split equally between the parties. Arbitration proceedings will be conducted in New Orleans, Louisiana.

The contract was signed by Dr. Prasad and Bullard Capital by its duly authorized agent, Aaron Robinson. It is undisputed that Mr. Bullard never signed the contract and is not mentioned in the contract. Thus, he is not a party to the contract. Generally, in order to be subject to arbitral jurisdiction, the party must be a signatory to a contract containing an arbitration clause. Bridas, 345 F.3d at 354.

However, there are circumstances under which a contract may be enforced against a non-signatory. In Arthur Andersen, LLP v. Carlisle, — U.S. —, 129 S.Ct. 1896, 1902, 173 L.Ed.2d 832 (2009), the United States Supreme Court observed that “ ‘traditional principles’ of state law allow a contract to be enforced by or against nonparties to a contract through ‘assumption, piercing the corporate veil, alter ego, incorporation by reference, third-party beneficiary theories, waiver and estoppel.’ ” Id.

Juridical persons, such as corporations and limited liability companies, are distinct from their members. La. C.C. art. 24. Generally, members of a limited liability company (“LLC”) are not personally liable for the debts, obligations and other liabilities of the LLC to third parties and a LLC member is not a proper party in any proceeding against the LLC. La. R.S. 12:1320(B). However, third parties [7can bring claims against a member for “any fraud practiced upon him, because of any breach of professional duty or other negligent or wrongful act by such person, or in derogation of any right which the limited liability company may have against any such person because of any fraud practiced upon it by him.” La. R.S. 12:1320(D). Thus, under certain circumstances, a court can pierce the corporate veil in order to reach the “alter ego” of the corporate member and hold the corporate member liable for the debts of the corporation. Peyton Place, Condominium Associates, Inc., v. Guastella, 08-365, p. 25 (La.App. 5 Cir. 5/29/09), 18 So.3d 132, 149.

Due to the beneficial role of the corporate concept, the limited liability attendant to corporate ownership should be disregarded only in exceptional circumstances. Id. “Courts do not lightly pierce the corporate veil even in deference to the strong policy favoring arbitration.” Bridas, 345 F.3d at 359, quoting, ARW Exploration Corp. v. Aguirre, 45 F.3d 1455, 1461 (10th Cir.1995). Before the corporate entity is disregarded on the basis it is simply the alter ego of the member, proof of fraud or deceit is usually required. The corporate entity may also be disregarded when the individualities of the corporation and member cease to exist. Bergman v. Nicholson Management and Consultants, Inc., 594 So.2d 491, 499 (La.App. 4th Cir.1992), writ denied, 600 So.2d 646 (La.1992).

When a party seeks to pierce the corporate veil, the totality of the circumstances is determinative. The Louisiana Supreme Court has identified five nonexclusive factors to be used in determining whether to apply the alter ego doctrine: (1) commingling of corporate and shareholder funds; (2) failure to follow statutory formalities for incorporating and transacting corporate affairs; (3) undercapitalization; (4) failure to provide separate bank accounts and bookkeeping 1 srecords; and, (5) failure to hold regular shareholder and director meetings. Riggins v. Dixie Shoring Co., Inc. 590 So.2d 1164, 1168 (La.1991). The involvement of a sole shareholder in a corporation is insufficient alone to establish a basis for disregarding the corporate entity. Town of Haynesville, Inc. v. Entergy Corp., 42,019, p. 8 (La.App. 2 Cir. 5/2/07), 956 So.2d 192, 197, writ denied, 07-1172 (La.9/21/07), 964 So.2d 334. In determining whether to pierce the corporate veil to impose contractual or legal obligations on an individual, competing policies supporting the recognition of a separate corporate existence and those justifying piercing the veil must be weighed to determine if there is some misuse of the corporate privilege or other justification for limiting it under the facts of a particular situation. Peyton Place, supra. A trial court’s finding that the corporate entity should be disregarded is a finding of fact which is subject to the manifest error standard of review. Id.

In his petition for declaratory judgment, Dr. Prasad asserted Mr. Bullard is personally bound to the contract containing the arbitration clause as a non-signatory under the theories of piercing the corporate veil and alter ego. However, Dr. Prasad offered no evidence to support his claims that Mr. Bullard is bound under the theories of piercing the corporate veil and/or alter ego. The only allegation of fact in the petition relating to piercing the corporate veil was that Mr. Bullard was the sole member in Bullard Capital. As stated above, the mere involvement of a sole member is insufficient to pierce the corporate veil.

While we recognize that a non-signatory may be bound by an arbitration clause in a contract in some circumstances, we find the trial court erred in ordering Mr. Bul-lard, as a non-signatory, to submit to arbitration in this case. The record is completely devoid of any evidence justifying piercing the veil of the corporate entity and binding its member to a contract signed by the LLC. Without any | ^evidence to show Mr. Bullard committed fraud as a member of Bullard Capital or was the alter ego of Bullard Capital, there is no justification for piercing the corporate veil and binding Mr. Bullard, as a non-signatory, to the arbitration clause in the contract between Dr. Prasad and Bullard Capital. We express no opinion as to whether the corporate veil can be pierced at a later stage in the proceedings.

For these reasons, we reverse the trial court’s judgment granting a declaratory judgment and ordering Mr. Bullard to submit to arbitration.

REVERSED.

      . The theory of piercing the corporate veil applies to limited liability companies and is not limited to corporations. See ORX Resources, Inc. v. MBW Exploration, LLC, 09-662, p. 7 (La.App. 4 Cir. 2/10/10), 32 So.3d 931, 935, writ denied, 10-530 (La.5/7/10), 34 So.3d 862.