author: DREW, J.

text:
    Matha Lee CURRY, Plaintiff-Appellant v. HEALTHSOUTH NORTH REHABILITATION HOSPITAL-HOMER CAMPUS, Sue Weathers, and Columbia Casualty Insurance Company, Defendant-Appellee.
    No. 46,015-CA.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.
    March 11, 2011.

      Smith & Nwokorie by Brian G. Smith, Anselm N. Nwokorie, for Appellant.
    Lugenbuhl, Wheaton, Peck, Rankin & Hubbard by Lisa Brener, Kathy A. Rito, New Orleans, for Appellee.
    Before WILLIAMS, CARAWAY and DREW, JJ.
   DREW, J.

lain this medical malpractice case in which the defendant hospital admitted liability, Matha Curry appeals the award of general and special damages and the assessment of costs. We reverse that part of the judgment ordering Curry to pay any part of the costs of doctors’ depositions and medical records. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

FACTS

Matha Curry, a resident of Arkansas who was born in 1925, was injured while a patient at Healthsouth Rehabilitation Hospital in Homer, Louisiana. Curry, who was suffering from the effects of a stroke that occurred several years earlier, was at Healthsouth to receive physical rehabilitation. On August 29, 2002, a nurse tech, Sue Weathers, was assisting Curry to stand at her bedside. While Curry had her right hand on the bed rail, the bed began rolling backward and Curry lost her balance. Although Weathers was able to ease Curry to the floor, Curry’s right arm had become entangled in the bed rail, causing two fractures of the upper right arm, one near the shoulder and the other near the elbow. The long-term effects of the fracture of the right proximal humerus and of the supracondylar area of the right humerus were disputed by the parties. Curry contended that the fractures rendered her right arm and hand useless. Healthsouth countered that paralysis caused by an earlier stroke had essentially rendered the right arm and hand nonfunctional prior to the August 29 accident.

The matter was submitted to a medical review panel, before which Healthsouth admitted liability. The panel concluded that Curry’s stroke was | sthe primary cause of the loss of use of her right arm and hand. The panel added that the disability caused by the fractures was minimal at best, that the disability lasted approximately two months, and the fractures did not cause or contribute to any further permanent impairment of her ability to function.

Curry subsequently filed suit against Healthsouth, Sue Weathers, and Columbia Casualty Insurance Company. She alleged that despite suffering from a stroke and having minimal paralysis, she was able to use her right arm on a limited basis until the accident, and that afterward she lost total use of her right arm. In its answer, Healthsouth admitted that Curry’s fall was the result of its negligence.

Pursuant to Healthsouth’s stipulation and Curry’s motion for summary judgment, the trial court entered judgment against Healthsouth on the issue of liability. The trial court subsequently conducted a brief bench trial on the issue of damages where it heard testimony from Curry’s son. Curry’s medical records dating back to 1992 and medical billing records were accepted into evidence. The trial court also was provided with the depositions of Curry, Weathers, Dr. Greg Vigna, and Dr. Stephen Wheat.

The trial court awarded $30,000.00 in general damages for pain and suffering, and $3,198.90 in special damages for medical expenses. The trial court recognized a Medicare lien of $2,064.25 and a Medicaid lien of $452.99. Court costs were assessed against Healthsouth. The costs of Dr. Wheat’s deposition, to which Curry’s attorney had arrived three hours late, were assessed against Curry. The costs of the medical records and Dr. Vigna’s deposition were ordered to be shared equally between Curry and Healthsouth.

14Curry has appealed, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding a low amount of general damages, that the trial court was manifestly erroneous in awarding only $3,198.90 in medical expenses, and the trial court erred in its assessment of the costs of medical records and depositions.

DISCUSSION

General Damages

The trier of fact has much discretion when assessing damages in cases of offenses, quasi offenses, and quasi contracts. La. C.C. art. 2324.1. Before an appellate court may disturb an award for general damages, the record must clearly reveal that the trial court abused its broad discretion in making the award, based on the facts and circumstances peculiar to the case and the individual under consideration. Youn v. Maritime Overseas Corp., 623 So.2d 1257 (La.1993). It is only after an articulated analysis of the facts discloses an abuse of discretion that resort to prior awards in similar cases is proper. Dixon v. Tillman, 29,483 (La.App.2d Cir.5/7/97), 694 So.2d 585, writ denied, 97-1430 (La.9/19/97), 701 So.2d 174.

Dr. Fred Murphy started treating Curry in April of 1992, initially for complaints related to her right knee. In 1997, Curry began receiving services from the Southwestern Arkansas Development Council (“SADC”), which sent aides to Curry’s apartment to assist her with meal preparation, personal care and grooming, basic upkeep and home management, laundry, and shopping. At the time, Curry was living alone in an apartment for the elderly in a government-owned housing complex.

When Dr. Murphy examined Curry on June 19,1998, she complained that she was having trouble using her right arm and leg, a condition which |fishe said had developed over the prior few weeks. She also stated that she was unable to walk without her walker and that she dragged her right leg. Dr. Murphy suspected a stroke had affected the right side of her body.

Curry began physical therapy the next month with Magnolia Hospital Home Health, which seemed to help with weakness on her right side. However, by the following January, she was complaining to Dr. Murphy of being unable to get around very well. A partial right-sided hemipare-sis was noted. Curry also complained to Dr. Murphy about having shortness of breath.

Curry underwent a quadruple coronary artery bypass in April of 1999. A few months later, toileting was added to the tasks performed by the aides provided by SADC. Curry fell in July of 1999 and fractured her left ankle. She was examined at Magnolia Hospital in Arkansas for decreased level of consciousness. The following November, a CT scan of her head was performed after a change in mental status was noted. Curry had been able to sign her name. However, in November of 1999, instead of signing her name to an SADC aide visit report, Curry marked the report with an “x.”

Dr. Murphy noted after examining Curry in February of 2000 that she had increased spasticity and contractures on her right side, and that she was having difficulty using her right arm and leg.- Dr. Murphy noted three months later that Curry had done better with physical therapy and was able to move around a little more with assistance and her walker. Curry moved into a disabled apartment in her complex in June of 2000.

Curry was taken to Magnolia Hospital in October of 2000 with complaints of chest pain and shortness of breath. She returned to Magnolia Hospital in July of 2001 with the same complaints. In November of 2001, IfiDr. Murphy examined her after she passed out. Curry received heart stents in May of 2002. Later that May, she was taken to Magnolia Hospital after she experienced a decreased level of consciousness. Curry returned to Magnolia Hospital in July of 2002 after she nearly fainted.

Curry’s ability to care for herself had decreased to the point that by July of 2002, she needed an aide’s help seven days a week with bathing, combing her hair, skin care, dressing, toileting, mobility transfers, meal preparation, housekeeping, and basic home upkeep. She also needed help once a week with shampooing her hair, laundry, and shopping. Curry was bed and wheelchair bound, and she stood to pivot with transfers. It was noted by SADC that Curry was then totally dependent on aides for all care. Curry marked with an “x” instead of signing a personal care assessment and service plan form from SADC.

Dr. Murphy wanted Curry to have physical therapy and additional strengthening of the leg. She had been confined to a wheelchair for approximately a year. Curry was admitted to Healthsouth on August 1, 2002. She marked a consent release form at Healthsouth with an “x” instead of signing her name.

It was noted at Healthsouth that she was unable to transfer herself from her wheelchair to a bed or a toilet. Curry was hopeful that rehabilitation would make her strong enough to return home and live independently at the wheelchair level.

An examination done shortly after admission showed that gross and fine coordination of the right arm was impaired. Two sensation tests (stereognosis and pro-prioception) were performed. Stereogno-sis was tested in the right fingers and was found to be impaired. Proprioception was tested 17in the right shoulder, elbow, wrist and fingers, and was found to be impaired in all four areas tested.

Staff at Healthsouth discovered Curry unresponsive to verbal stimuli on August 10, 2002. She was taken to Homer Memorial Hospital for evaluation. She was discharged from there with a diagnosis of a urinary tract infection and bradycardia.

Curry was readmitted to Healthsouth on August 14, 2002. She again marked a general consent release form with an “x” instead of her signature. Dr. Greg Vigna, a physical medicine rehabilitation doctor at Healthsouth, considered Curry’s rehabilitation potential to be fair at that time. However, Dr. Vigna noted on August 19, 2002, that he was unsure if Curry would reach independence at wheelchair level prior to discharge. Dr. Vigna noted four days later that he felt Curry could reach a minimum assistance level, but doubted she could reach a level where only supervision was required. Dr. Vigna thought her rehabilitation potential was guarded on August 25. She still needed moderate assistance with transfers at that time, but was progressing slowly to needing only minimum assistance.

Curry was able to ambulate 50 feet using a walker and with minimum assistance on August 28, 2002. Dr. Vigna noted that she still needed minimum assistance with upper extremity dressing, and moderate assistance with transfers and lower extremity dressing. Curry broke her arm the following morning.

Curry was initially taken on August 29 to Claiborne Family Medical Center for treatment of her broken arm. A sling and swathe were used to immobilize her right arm so that it would heal properly. She was also examined by orthopedic surgeon Dr. Edward Anglin, who thought the | sproximal humerus fracture was well aligned, and the supracondylar humerus fracture was nondisplaced. Dr. Anglin ordered followup x-rays in two weeks.

After returning to Healthsouth, Curry began complaining of chest pain and shortness of breath late on August 29. She was transferred to Homer Memorial Hospital for evaluation, where she was admitted and found to have chest pain secondary to the right arm fractures. She was discharged to Healthsouth on September 3, 2002.

Dr. Vigna evaluated Curry on September 4. He noted weakness of the right wrist extension, but he thought it was likely caused by the prior stroke. The goal of rehabilitation remained getting Curry to a level where she required only minimum assistance.

Dr. Anglin examined Curry on September 11. He found limited motion of the right shoulder and no active motor function of the right hand. X-ray of the right shoulder showed the proximal humerus fracture was well aligned and impacted. Dr. Anglin recommended continuation of the sling and swathe and followup in two weeks.

Dr. Vigna noted on September 15, that in his opinion, it was unsafe for Curry to live alone even before she broke her arm. Three days later, Dr. Vigna noted that Curry was tolerating therapy well, but she was quite dependent, and her prognosis was poor for functional independence. Curry was beginning to get movement back in the right shoulder on September 21.

Dr. Anglin examined Curry on September 25. Swelling of the right deltoid biceps region was present, and her right shoulder motion was limited. An x-ray showed that the proximal humerus fracture had fairly 19good alignment. Dr. Ang-lin recommended that she have a followup visit in two weeks.

Dr. Vigna found that Curry had a stable hand grip as well as elbow extension on September 29. He found no evidence of radial nerve injury at that time. Curry was beginning range of motion activities by doing pendulum and circumduction movements with her right arm. Dr. Vigna thought that overall Curry had a poor prognosis.

Dr. Vigna noted on October 4 that Curry did not complain of right arm pain while making pendulum movements. She seemed to be tolerating range of movement exercises well. He further noted that he did not think that Curry had been able to live independently even prior to fracturing her right arm.

Dr. Vigna recorded on October 6 that progress had been slow and Curry was agreeable to being placed in a nursing home. He noted that she still needed moderate assistance with transfers.

Dr. Anglin examined Curry on October 9. Curry reported mild pain, and there was mild swelling of the right shoulder. Curry experienced pain with rotation or any movement of the right shoulder. An x-ray of the right shoulder showed a proximal humerus fracture with overlapping fracture fragment. The overall alignment was acceptable. He recommended that she get a followup x-ray of the right shoulder in two weeks.

On October 18, 2002, Curry was discharged from Healthsouth to Meadow-brook Nursing Home. The discharge instructions stated that Curry needed set-up assistance with eating and grooming; moderate assistance with bathing, toileting, dressing, toilet transfers, and tub/shower transfers; and total assistance with meal prep and housekeeping.

lioOn November 7, 2002, Curry was taken to Magnolia Hospital after she fell while being transferred to her bed and landed on her right knee. She complained of right knee pain and soreness in her right arm. It was noted that Curry had decreased motor strength in her right arm. Curry told the emergency room physician that this was her baseline from her prior stroke. An x-ray of the right humerus showed a healing proximal humerus fracture. Curry returned to Magnolia Hospital on November 20 with complaints of nausea and having almost fainted. She again went to Magnolia Hospital on January 29 with complaints of chest pain and shortness of breath.

A chest x-ray taken at Magnolia Hospital on February 12, 2003, showed an old healed fracture of the proximal right humerus. An x-ray of the right shoulder taken on February 17 showed no acute fracture or subluxation.

Curry returned to Magnolia Hospital on March 3, 2003, complaining of dizziness and reduced levels of consciousness; on April 11, 2003, complaining of reduced levels of consciousness and elevated blood pressure; and on July 14, 2003, complaining of chest pain.

Dr. Vigna testified at his deposition that the goals of Curry’s rehabilitation were to get her independent at a wheelchair level so she could get in and out of the wheelchair by herself, go to the bathroom by herself, and dress herself. Dr. Vigna thought her right arm was essentially nonfunctional because of the stroke. Her right shoulder could not put the hand where it needed to be, and her right hand could not grasp objects. Dr. Vigna thought Curry was in slow decline from her stroke, and her condition was not going to improve. The objective was to keep her from getting worse through therapy. Dr. Vigna felt that even if Curry had never broken her |1Tright arm, she still would have been placed in a nursing home as he did not think she could live independently. Dr. Vigna expected the recovery period for a humerus fracture in someone with normal arm function to be two to four months. In Curry’s case, he thought it would be about two months because of her poorly functioning arm.

The trial court concluded that the fractures were most likely resolved as much as they would be by February 17, 2003. The trial court found that the fractures did not cause Curry to have a permanent, total disability. However, the court found that because the fractures kept Curry from undergoing the rehabilitation planned for her at Healthsouth, the fractures diminished any chance that she had of improving the existing paralysis of her right arm and hand with therapy.

Based upon our review of this record, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding $30,000.00 in general damages to this elderly stroke victim with preexisting paralysis on the right side whose arm fractures resolved in approximately six months and did not cause permanent disability.

Special Damages

Special damages are those which have a “ready market value,” such that the amount of damages theoretically may be determined with relative certainty, including medical expenses. Guillory v. Lee, 2009-0075 (La.6/26/09), 16 So.3d 1104. An appellate court, in reviewing a trial court’s factual conclusions with regard to special damages, must satisfy a two-step process based on the record as a whole: there must be no reasonable factual basis for the trial court’s conclusions, and the finding must be clearly wrong. Id.

| scurry argues that the amount awarded was clearly wrong as evidenced by a Medicare lien of over $44,000.00 related to the treatment of the fractures. The Medicare payment summary form showing this lien does not demonstrate how these charges were related to treatment for the fractures. For example, Speciality Hospital of North Louisiana was reimbursed more than $18,000.00 for treatment from September 3 to October 18, 2002. Presumably, this was Healthsouth, where Curry was undergoing rehabilitation to deal with the effects of the stroke on her right arm and leg. As another example, Magnolia Health Care Center was reimbursed more than $20,000.00 for treatment provided from October 18, 2002 to January 25, 2003. Presumably, this was Meadowbrook nursing home where Curry went to live after being discharged from Healthsouth.

The diagnosis codes provided on the Medicare form are not sufficient to specifically establish the relationship between the fractures and the medical expenses that were reimbursed. Accordingly, the trial court was not clearly wrong in awarding $3,198.90 in special damages.

Assessment of Costs

La. C.C.P. art.1920 provides that “[except as otherwise provided by law, the court may render judgment for costs, or any part thereof, against any party, as it may consider equitable.” La. R.S. 13:4533 sets out expenses that are allowed to be taxed as costs, which include “the costs of the clerk, sheriff, witness’ fees, costs of taking depositions and copies of acts used on the trial, and all other costs allowed by the court.” See also La. R.S. 13:3666 regarding the compensation of expert witnesses and the costs of medical reports and copies of hospital records.

113The trial judge has great discretion in awarding costs, and his assessment of costs can be reversed by the appellate court only upon a showing of an abuse of discretion. Succession of Pitman, 42,654 (La.App.2d Cir.10/24/07), 968 So.2d 871; Malant v. Willis-Knighton Pierremont Health Center, 44,988 (La.App.2d Cir.3/8/10), 32 So.3d 1058, twit denied, 2010-0761 (La.6/4/10), 38 So.3d 304.

Curry proceeded in forma pauperis in this matter. Regarding the waiver of costs for an indigent party, La. C.C.P. art. 5186 states:

An account shall be kept of all costs incurred by a party who has been permitted to litigate without the payment of costs, by the public officers to whom these costs would be payable. If judgment is rendered in favor of the indigent party, the party against whom the judgment is rendered shall be condemned to pay all costs due such officers, who have a privilege on the judgment superior to the rights of the indigent party or his attorney. If judgment is rendered against the indigent plaintiff and he is condemned to pay court costs, an affidavit of the account by an officer to whom costs are due, recorded in the mortgage records, shall have the effect of a judgment for the payment due.

The discretion provided in La. C.C.P. art.1920 is limited in a pauper case by the more specific provision found in La. C.C.P. art. 5186, which mandates the assessment of costs to the party against whom judgment is rendered. Ulyanov v. Ulyanov, 2009-0642 (La.App. 4th Cir.9/23/09), 23 So.3d 380.

Healthsouth argues that the sharing of the costs of the medical records and Dr. Vigna’s deposition was not an abuse of discretion because the trial court acted fairly in light of what had occurred with a prior attempt to settle the case. The claim was mediated in December of 2006, and the parties agreed to settle the case for $37,250.00. Healthsouth tendered a check in that amount to Curry with the condition that Curry execute a receipt and | urelease agreement. Curry negotiated the check in June of 2007 without executing the agreement. Healthsouth filed a motion for return of funds in March of 2009 to recover the money.

While we are sympathetic to the frustrations experienced by Healthsouth in its good-faith attempt to settle the matter, the provisions of La. C.C.P. art. 5186 are mandatory. The assessment of the costs of the doctors’ depositions and medical records against Curry was an abuse of discretion. Those costs are to be assessed against Healthsouth.

Healthsouth also argues that the issue of who pays Dr. Wheat’s deposition avoids the clutches of art. 5186 because it is more along the lines of a sanction than the assessment of a cost. We find this argument unpersuasive. The trial court never referred to it as a sanction. The trial court did mention that it was the subject of a prior ruling; however, that ruling is not in the record before this court.

CONCLUSION

We affirm the award of $30,000 in general damages and $3,198.90 in medical expenses. We reverse the assessment of any cost of the doctor depositions and medical records against Curry. Appeal costs are assessed against Healthsouth.

AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART.

      . Weathers filed the exception of prematurity asserting that Curry had not submitted the claim against her to a medical review panel. The exception was maintained, and the petition against Weathers was dismissed.

      . Dr. Vigna had treated Curry at Healthsouth.

      . Dr. Wheat had been a member of the Medical Review Panel.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: CHANDLER, Justice, LAMAR, Justice,

license: Public Domain

text:
    Laura CARPENTER v. Tangela BERRY, Ricky Banks and The Guardianship of Ryheim Banks.
    No. 2009-CA-01200-SCT.
    Supreme Court of Mississippi.
    Feb. 10, 2011.
    Rehearing Denied April 28, 2011.

      Heber S. Simmons, III, Christopher G. Henderson, Seth Hall, Ridgeland, attorneys for appellant.
    Shane F. Langston, Rebecca M. Lang-ston, John T. Givens, Jackson, Timothy W. Porter, Patrick C. Malouf, Ridgeland, attorneys for appellees.
   CHANDLER, Justice,

for the Court:

¶ 1. In this case, Guardians

¶2. of a minor child settled all claims against the defendant, Laura Carpenter. Approximately three years after approving the settlement, the Guardians filed a petition to set aside the settlement, and the chancellor granted the requested relief under Rule 60(b) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure. Carpenter argues the chancellor abused his discretion in setting aside the settlement. We affirm in part and reverse in part. We affirm the set-aside of the minor’s settlement. But we reverse the set-aside of the settlement of the Guardians’ individual claims.

FACTS

¶ 3. On June 4, 2004, Tangela Berry and Ricky Banks filed a negligence action in the circuit court for damages related to Berry’s pregnancy and the birth of their son, Ryheim Banks. They named as defendants: Tom Carey, M.D.; Natchez Community Hospital, Inc.; OB-GYN Clinic, Inc.; Donielle Daigle, M.D.; Laura Carpenter [registered nurse]; and Jane Does 1-4.

¶ 4. While the negligence action was pending in circuit court, Berry and Banks obtained Letters of Guardianship and petitioned the chancery court for authority to settle minor’s claim against Laura Carpenter. The Guardians requested approval of a $25,000 settlement to be apportioned among the parties (Berry, Banks, and Ry-heim), with $10,000 of it as the attorney’s fee. Under the proposed settlement, the Guardians agreed to execute an agreed order of dismissal with prejudice of their individual claims against Carpenter.

¶ 5. At the hearing on the petition, the Guardians’ attorney, Everett Sanders, did not call or question any witnesses. He informed the court that Carpenter’s “involvement, individually, is negligible” and that the $25,000 settlement offer was “appropriate.” He also proposed that the amount be apportioned, with $10,000 for attorney’s fees, $5,000 going into an account for the minor, and $5,000 to each parent. Sanders informed the court that $400,000 had been billed in connection with the minor, and that he was trying to have Medicaid waive any claim against the settlement proceeds.

¶ 6. Carpenter’s attorney questioned Berry and Banks regarding the settlement. They confirmed that the settlement agreement would release all existing and future claims against Carpenter for the care and treatment rendered. They also confirmed that it was their decision, based on advice from their attorneys, to settle Ryheim’s claims against Carpenter for $25,000. Berry and Banks provided no testimony regarding the substance of the claims or damages incurred.

¶ 7. On August 11, 2005, the chancellor entered an order authorizing settlement of the claims and approving the apportionment. The chancellor attached the Guardians’ proposed release as an exhibit to his order. The chancellor found the settlement to be a “fair and reasonable settlement of a doubtful claim and it is in the best interest of the minor and all others[.]” The chancellor also granted the Guardians’ ore terms motion to deposit the minor’s proceeds from the settlement in an interest-bearing account.

¶ 8. On July 21, 2008, the Guardians, with new counsel, filed a petition to set aside the settlement under “Rule 60(b).” They argued that the settlement agreement was no longer in the child’s best interest under J & J Timber Co. v. Broome, 932 So.2d 1 (Miss.2006), which held that settlement with a tortfeasor precluded recovery against the tortfeasor’s employer under a theory of vicarious liability. But the Guardians abandoned this argument after this Court decided Whitaker v. T & M Foods, 7 So.3d 893 (Miss.2009), which held that the retroactive application of J & J Timber to the releases at issue violated the Contracts Clause of the Mississippi Constitution.

¶ 9. The Guardians filed an amended petition to set aside settlement under “Rule 60(b).” See Miss. R. Civ. P. 60(b). In their amended petition, the Guardians argued that the chancellor still should set aside the settlement based on their recent discovery that Carpenter had a $1,000,000 insurance policy with coverage in this matter. They argued that the policy never was disclosed to them or the court prior to the settlement. The Guardians also argued that prior counsel had failed to make any effort to prosecute the case or conduct any discovery in order to negotiate a proper settlement.

¶ 10. In response to the amended petition to set aside settlement, Carpenter argued that the chancellor had no authority to consider the motion under Rule 60(b)(1), (2), or (3) because it was untimely. Carpenter also argued that the parties had entered into a settlement one year after the Guardians had filed the complaint in circuit court, and that the Guardians’ former counsel had had adequate time to review medical records and discuss with experts a reasonable settlement value. Carpenter argued that setting aside the settlement would be an injustice and would force her to litigate a case that the circuit court had dismissed with prejudice three years earlier.

¶ 11. The Guardians then filed a supplement to their amended petition to set aside settlement. Attached to the supplement were affidavits, in which both Guardians averred that they never were informed by their previous counsel of Carpenter’s potential liability, any expert opinions regarding Carpenter’s negligence, the value of their case, or the amount of Carpenter’s liability insurance. The Guardians claimed that, had they known this information, they never would have agreed to the settlement of $25,000.

¶ 12. After a hearing, the chancellor issued an order granting the petition to set aside settlement. Without identifying a specific subsection of Rule 60(b), the chancellor found that:

[TJhere was insufficient evidence at the time of settlement and at the August 11, 2005, hearing on Petition to Approve Settlement to establish that Petitioner’s settlement with Defendant Laura Carpenter was fair and reasonable and in the best interests of the minor, Ryheim Banks. Further, additional evidence has been presented to the Court which demonstrates that the $25,000 settlement with Ms. Carpenter was not fair and reasonable and in the minor’s best interest.

Carpenter argues on appeal that the chancellor abused his discretion in setting aside the settlement under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b).

DISCUSSION

I. Whether the chancellor abused his discretion by not including findings of fact and conclusions of law with his order.

¶ 13. As a preliminary matter, Carpenter argues the chancellor abused his discretion by not including findings of fact and conclusions of law with his order. In support of this argument, Carpenter relies on Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) and our decision in Tricon Metals & Services, Inc. v. Topp, 516 So.2d 286 (Miss.1987). Rule 52(a) provides that:

In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury the court may, and shall upon the request of any party to the suit or when required by these rules, find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon and judgment shall be entered accordingly.

Miss. R. Civ. P. 52(a) (emphasis added).

¶ 14. Carpenter does not allege that any party requested findings of fact or conclusions of law or that such findings were required by rule. She argues that the discretionary language of Rule 52(a) is modified by our decision in Tricon Metals. In Tricon Metals, the Court determined “whether and when a trial court should make findings of fact and conclusions of law” when not requested by either party. Tricon Metals, 516 So.2d at 287, 239. We held that “[wjhere ... a case is hotly contested and the facts greatly in dispute and where there is any complexity involved therein, failure to make findings of ultimate fact and conclusions of law [under Rule 52(a) ] will generally be regarded as an abuse of discretion.” Id. at 239. This Court will remand for findings of fact and conclusions of law where it is not “obvious from a review of the record such that the absence of written findings may be excused.” Precision Interlock Log Homes, Inc. v. O’Neal, 689 So.2d 778, 780 (Miss.1997).

¶ 15. After reviewing the chancellor’s order, we find that he did not grant the Rule 60(b) petition without any reasoning. His order communicates to the parties and to this Court that he found “insufficient” evidence to support the settlement and “additional” evidence that it should be set aside. Additional evidence was presented through the petitions and hearing. We find that the chancellor did not abuse his discretion, as the issue at hand is not complex, nor are the facts greatly in dispute.

II. Whether the chancellor abused his discretion in setting aside the settlement.

¶ 16. The chancellor considered the petition to set aside the settlement under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). This Court must evaluate the granting of a Rule 60(b) motion for abuse of discretion. Cucos, Inc. v. McDaniel, 938 So.2d 238, 245 (Miss.2006) (citing Montgomery v. Montgomery, 759 So.2d 1238, 1240 (Miss.2000)). We are bound to affirm the chancellor’s decision unless it was manifestly wrong, clearly erroneous, or applied an incorrect legal standard. Id.

¶ 17. Carpenter correctly argues that the chancellor had no discretion to rule on the motion pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1), (2), or (3), since the chancellor had approved the settlement three years prior. Rule 60(b) specifically provides that a motion under sections (1), (2), or (3) “shall be made ... not more than six months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken.” Miss. R. Civ. P. 60(b). So the chancellor must have proceeded under Rule 60(b)(5) or Rule 60(b)(6), because Rule 60(b)(4) is inapplicable. Miss. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4) (under Rule 60(b)(4), the court may relieve a party from final judgment if “the judgment is void”). Under Rule 60(b)(5), the court may relieve a party from final judgment if:

(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment have prospective application.

Miss. R. Civ. P. 60(b) (emphasis added). And under Rule 60(b)(6), the court may grant relief for “any other reason justifying relief from the judgment.” Miss. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6).

¶ 18. “Relief under Rule 60(b)(6) is reserved for extraordinary and compelling circumstances,” and the rule is a “grand reservoir of equitable power to do justice in a particular case.” Briney v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 714 So.2d 962, 966 (Miss.1998). The determination of whether a Rule 60(b)(6) motion has been made within a reasonable time is considered on a case-by-case basis. Miss. R. Civ. P. 60(b); Cucos, 938 So.2d at 245. The following factors are relevant in adjudicating a Rule 60(b)(6) motion:

(1) That final judgments should not lightly be disturbed; (2) that the Rule 60(b) motion is not to be used as a substitute for appeal; (3) that the rule should be liberally construed in order to achieve substantial justice; (4) whether the motion was made within a reasonable time; (5) [relevant only to default judgments]; (6) whether if the judgment was rendered after a trial on the merits-the movant had a fair opportunity to present his claim or defense; (7) whether there are intervening equities that would make it inequitable to grant relief; and (8) any other factors relevant to the justice of the judgment under attack.

M.A.S. v. Miss. Dep’t of Human Sens., 842 So.2d 527, 530 (Miss.2003) (citing Briney, 714 So.2d at 968).

¶ 19. This is no ordinary Rule 60(b) case, because it involved the rights of a minor under guardianship. “A minor under guardianship is a ward of the Chancery Court.” Matter of Consenatorship of Mathews, 633 So.2d 1038, 1039 (Miss.1994) (quoting Welch v. Childers, 195 Miss. 415, 420, 15 So.2d 690, 691 (1943)). This Court has articulated a chancellor’s duty toward a minor under guardianship as follows:

Infants and persons of unsound mind are disabled under the law to act for themselves. Long ago it became the established rule for the court of chancery to act as the superior guardian for all persons under such disability. This inherent and traditional power and protective duty is made complete and irre-fragable by the provisions of our present state constitution. It is not competent for the Legislature to abate the said powers and duties or for the said court to omit or neglect them. It is the inescapable duty of the said court and or the chancellor to act with constant care and solicitude towards the preservation and protection of the rights of infants and persons non compos mentis. The court will take nothing as confessed against them; will make for them every valuable election; will rescue them from faithless guardians, designing strangers, and even from unnatural parents, and in general will and must take all necessary steps to conserve and protect the best interest of these wards of the court. The court will not and cannot permit the rights of an infant to be prejudiced by a[] waiver, or omission or neglect or design of a guardian, or of any other person, so far as within the power of the court to prevent or correct. Grif. Chan. Prac. §§ 45, 360, 530, 533. All persons who deal with guardians or with courts in respect to the rights of infants are charged with the knowledge of the above principles, and act to the contrary thereof at their peril.

Id. (quoting Union Chevrolet Co. v. Arrington, 162 Miss. 816, 826, 827, 138 So. 593, 595 (1932)).

¶ 20. Additional considerations are presented because the procedures promulgated by our court rules pertaining to the settlement of Ryheim’s claims were not followed. Mississippi Code Section 93-13-59 states, in part:

Guardians may be empowered by the court, or chancellor in vacation, to sell or compromise claims due their wards, on the same proceedings and under the same circumstances prescribed in reference to the sale or compromise by an executor or administrator of claims belonging to the estate of a deceased person.

Miss.Code Ann. § 93-13-59 (Rev.2004). Uniform Rule of Chancery Court Procedure 6.10 provides, in part:

Every petition for authority to compromise and settle a claim for wrongful death or injury shall set forth the facts in relation thereto and the reason for such compromise and settlement and the amount thereof. The material witnesses concerning the injury or death and the damages resulting therefrom shall be produced before the Chancellor for examination. Where counsel representing the petition has investigated the matter and advised settlement, he shall so appear and give testimony touching the result of his investigation.

Unif. Chañe. Ct. R. 6.10. The settlement proceedings reflect a departure from the requirements of Rule 6.10. While the petition for settlement requested that the Chancellor find the settlement of $25,000 to be a fair, just, and equitable settlement in the minor’s best interest, it did not state “the reason for such compromise and settlement.” Unif. Chañe. Ct. R. 6.10. It set forth only a cursory description of the facts relating to the claim. And, no “material witnesses concerning the injury or death and the damages resulting therefrom” were “produced before the Chancellor for examination.” Id. Thus, the chancellor had no witness testimony before him substantiating the minor’s injury and the potential value of the case.

¶ 21. The case of Joyce v. Brown, 304 So.2d 634 (Miss.1974), presented a similar situation regarding a fatal error in a minor’s settlement proceeding. In. Joyce, the chancery court entered a decree allowing the settlement of minor’s doubtful claim. Id. at 634. Although the decree had required the guardian to post a $6,000 bond as mandated by statute, the guardian failed to post a bond. Id. at 635. The guardian signed a release, endorsed a $8,500 draft in settlement of the claims, and delivered the release and the draft to her attorney. Id. at 634-35. Subsequently, the attorney died and the settlement money could not be found. Id. at 635. But when the guardian brought suit to set aside the settlement, the chancery court denied relief. Id.

¶ 22. This Court reversed for a hearing on negligence and damages. Id. at 636. The Court found that, by statute, a guardian lacks authority to settle a minor’s claims without posting the bond required by the chancellor’s decree that authorized the guardian to act. Id. at 635. Therefore, the Court found, “it is incumbent upon those paying money to a guardian to make certain that the chancellor’s decree is faithfully executed in every respect.” Id. at 636. The Court observed that the Browns had paid $8,500 to Joyce and had accepted a release without first ascertaining that Joyce had posted the required bond and was empowered to settle the case. Id. The Court stated that “[t]he omissions of both parties were fatal to a valid settlement of the minor’s claim.” Id.

¶ 23. Similar considerations are present in this case. Evidence before the chancellor showed that the prior proceedings were flawed and not in the best interest of the minor child. Specifically, the petition for settlement was incomplete, and there was no witness testimony on the minor’s injury or damages. The prior settlement proceedings were inadequate to have enabled the chancellor’s determination that the settlement was fair and reasonable to the minor under guardianship. It is apparent that the chancellor recognized his error in approving the settlement, as well as his ultimate duty to assure that the settlement was fair to the minor under guardianship, and appropriately set aside the settlement.

¶24. The chancellor properly exercised the discretion afforded by Rule 60(b)(6) by finding that the need to fairly protect the ward’s interests outweighed the need for finality, and it cannot be said under these facts that the chancellor’s decision to set aside the minor settlement agreement was manifestly wrong or clearly erroneous. Therefore, we affirm the set-aside of the minor’s settlement. To reiterate our pronouncement in Joyce, we note that it is incumbent upon a settling defendant to assure that all of the procedures set out by this Court are followed or risk a set-aside of the settlement. See Joyce, 304 So.2d at 636. We clarify that, because the chancellor had no special duty to protect the Guardians, and the Guardians’ claims were properly dismissed by the order as agreed by the parties, we affirm the set-aside of the minor’s settlement only. To the extent that the chancellor’s order disturbed the settlement of the Guardian’s individual claims, it is reversed.

CONCLUSION

¶ 25. The facts of this case implicate the chancellor’s extraordinary duty as the superior guardian of a ward of the court to protect and preserve the interests of the ward. Union Chevrolet Co., 162 Miss, at 826, 827, 138 So. at 595. The procedures promulgated by Rule 6.10 were not followed in settling the minor’s claims, and the chancellor acted within his discretion in setting aside the minor’s settlement. Therefore, we affirm in part and reverse in part the order granting the Guardians’ petition to set aside the settlement. We affirm the set-aside of the minor’s settlement, and reverse the set-aside of the settlement of the Guardian’s individual claims.

¶ 26. AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART.

RANDOLPH AND KITCHENS, JJ., CONCUR. GRAVES, P.J., CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY. LAMAR, J., CONCURS IN PART AND DISSENTS IN PART WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY WALLER, C.J., CARLSON, P.J., AND DICKINSON, J. PIERCE, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.

LAMAR, Justice,

Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part:

¶ 27. Almost three years after the chancellor conducted a hearing and entered an order authorizing settlement of claims on behalf of a minor child, the Guardians filed a petition to set aside the settlement. Why? Because they discovered that Carpenter had $1,000,000 in insurance coverage.

¶ 28. In support of their petition to set aside the settlement, the Guardians failed to present any evidence relevant to Carpenter’s liability or the value of their case against Carpenter. The amount of Carpenter’s insurance policy is irrelevant to the degree of any alleged negligence by Carpenter and has little or no connection to determining whether a settlement on behalf of this minor is fair and reasonable or in his best interest.

¶29. In providing a cursory examination of Rule 60(b), a plurality of this Court ignores the express requirement that a movant must file a Rule 60(b)(5) or (b)(6) motion within a reasonable time. This Court has ruled that a “reasonable time is determined on a case-by-case basis, turning on the facts in each individual case.” In determining reasonableness, the court should consider “whether the party opposing the motion has suffered prejudice from the delay and whether the movant can show good cause for failure to act sooner.” We also have ruled that when considering a Rule 60(b) motion, the court must balance the equities and consider the merits of the motion versus the need to achieve finality

¶ 30. The Guardians have failed to show good cause (or for that matter any cause) to excuse their delay, but have instead blamed their former counsel. This Court has clearly said that “neither ignorance nor carelessness on the part of an attorney will provide grounds for rehef ’ under Rule 60(b).

¶ 31. Furthermore, Carpenter fully performed her obligation under the settlement agreement, having paid the $25,000 settlement in 2005. Undoubtedly, she will be prejudiced if the settlement is set aside. A Rule 60(b) motion should not be granted when it is merely an attempt to relitigate a case which is final in all respects. I would find that the chancellor abused his discretion in granting the Rule 60(b) motion.

WALLER, C.J., CARLSON, P.J., AND DICKINSON, J., JOIN THIS OPINION.

      . Tangela Berry and Ricky Banks.

      . Ryheim Banks was born September 24, 2003, with serious physical problems and mental retardation.

        .See Miss.Code Ann. § 93-13-59 (Rev.2004) (providing that guardians can "compromise claims due their wards”).

      . The record is unclear as to whether this amount constitutes medical expenses.

      . At the hearing on the petition to set aside the settlement, the court was informed that "All parties agree that the settlement that was approved by this Court for this minor did not intend and did not, on its face, release the vicarious claims that the minor and the parents have against Natchez Community Hospital."

      . Miss. R. Civ. P. 60(b).

      . Cucos, Inc. v. McDaniel, 938 So.2d 238, 245 (Miss.2006).

      . Id. at 246.

      . Lose v. Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R. Co., 584 So.2d 1284, 1286 (Miss.1991) (emphasis added) (citing Briney v. U.S.'Fid. & Guar. Co., 714 So.2d 962, 968 (Miss. 1998)).

      . Stringfellow v. Stringfellow, 451 So.2d 219, 221 (Miss.1984).

      . Id.


author: RANDOLPH, Justice,

text:
    Reginald DeShawn BRADLEY v. STATE of Mississippi.
    No. 2009-KA-01948-SCT.
    Supreme Court of Mississippi.
    March 31, 2011.
    Rehearing Denied June 23, 2011.
    Office of Indigent Appeals by Justin Taylor Cook, Leslie S. Lee, Jackson, attorneys for appellant.
    Office of the Attorney General by John R. Henry, Jr., attorney for appellee.
   RANDOLPH, Justice,

for the Court:

¶ 1. Following his indictment for third-offense felony shoplifting, Reginald DeSh-awn Bradley proceeded to trial in the Circuit Court of Lowndes County, Mississippi, represented by court-appointed counsel. At trial, Bradley moved to represent himself. Pursuant to Uniform Circuit and County Court Rule 8.05, the circuit court examined Bradley and informed him of the risks of pro se representation. See URCCC 8.05. Thereafter, the circuit court allowed Bradley to represent himself, with his appointed counsel ordered to act as “standby counsel.” From Bradley’s subsequent conviction and sentence to five years imprisonment in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections (“MDOC”), and the denial of his post-trial motions, proceeds the present appeal.

FACTS

¶2. Bradley was indicted for third-offense felony shoplifting under Mississippi Code Section 97-23-93. See Miss.Code Ann. § 97-23-93 (Rev.2006). Thereafter, counsel was appointed for Bradley, and the matter was set for trial on November 12, 2009.

¶ 3. At trial, following voir dire, Bradley informed the circuit court that he “wanted to speak on [his] own behalf. I want to cross-examine myself.” Bradley’s appointed counsel advised the circuit court that Bradley had “a plethora of motions ... that are usually filed pre-trial and during trial and post-trial, all prepared ... and I’ve advised him that what he needed to do was tell you that he wanted to act as his own attorney.... [F]or an example, he wanted to file a motion for summary judgment....” After examining Bradley and informing him of the dangers and risks of pro se representation, consistent with Uniform Circuit and County Court Rule 8.05, the circuit court permitted Bradley to represent himself. See URCCC 8.05. Bradley’s appointed counsel was ordered to act as “standby counsel.”

¶ 4. Following Bradley’s unsuccessful efforts to exonerate himself, he was convicted and sentenced to five years imprisonment in the custody of the MDOC. After the denial of his post-trial motions, Bradley filed notice of appeal.

ANALYSIS

¶ 5. On appeal, Bradley asserts that the circuit court erred: (1) in allowing him to represent himself; (2) in failing to inform properly him of his right to counsel; and (3) in failing to obtain a knowing and voluntary waiver of his right to counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See U.S. Const, amend. VI.

¶ 6. In support of his position, Bradley first cites Conn v. State, 251 Miss. 488, 170 So.2d 20 (1964), which provided that:

“[w]hile an accused may waive the right to counsel, whether there is a proper waiver should be clearly determined by the trial court, and it would be fitting and appropriate for that determination to appear upon the record.” [Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 465, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938) ] .... In accordance with these mandatory decisions we hold that there must be an intelligent and competent waiver of counsel by the defendant and that the trial court should so determine, and further, that such determination, as well as the facts on which it is based, should appear on the record.

Conn, 170 So.2d at 23 (other citations omitted). Bradley further cites Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975), for the proposition that “[w]hen an accused manages his own defense, he relinquishes, as a purely factual matter, many of the traditional benefits associated with the right to counsel. For this reason, in order to represent himself, the accused must ‘knowingly and intelligently’ forgo those relinquished benefits.” Id. at 835, 95 S.Ct. 2525. Finally, Bradley cites Uniform Circuit and County Court Rule 8.05, which requires that:

[w]hen the court learns that a defendant desires to act as his/her own attorney, the court shall on the record conduct an examination of the defendant to determine if the defendant knowingly and voluntarily desires to act as his/her own attorney. The court shall inform the defendant that:
1. The defendant has a right to an attorney, and if the defendant cannot afford an attorney, the state will appoint one free of charge to the defendant to defend or assist the defendant in his/her defense.
2. The defendant has the right to conduct the defense and that the defendant may elect to conduct the defense and allow whatever role (s)he desires to his/her attorney.
3. The court will not relax or disregard the rules of evidence, procedure or courtroom protocol for the defendant and that the defendant will be bound by and have to conduct himself/herself within the same rules as an attorney, that these rules are not simple and that without legal advice his/her ability to defend himself/herself will be hampered.
4. The right to proceed pro se usually increases the likelihood of a trial outcome unfavorable to the defendant.
5. Other matters as the court deems appropriate.
After instructing the defendant and ascertaining that the defendant understands these matters, the court will ascertain if the defendant still wishes to proceed pro se or if the defendant desires an attorney to assist him/her in his/her defense. If the defendant desires to proceed pro se, the court should determine if the defendant has exercised his right knowingly and voluntarily, and, if so, make the finding a matter of record. The court may appoint an attorney to assist the defendant on procedure and protocol, even if the defendant does not desire an attorney, but all disputes between the defendant and such attorney shall be resolved in favor of the defendant.

URCCC 8.05.

¶ 7. Bradley cites the correct law and rule. But a review of the record reveals that the circuit judge exhibited a keen awareness of the law and rule, and properly applied both. The record reflects that Bradley knew that he had a right to counsel, as counsel had been appointed to represent him. Furthermore, Bradley knew that his court-appointed counsel was representing him both before and after Bradley elected to manage his own defense, expressly agreeing to counsel’s continued assistance, by stating, “I don’t mind him just being there, being a standby counsel.... ” Finally, the trial transcript validates the circuit court’s compliance with the law and rule, as noted:

BY THE COURT: ... Now, do you want to represent yourself? Is that what you’re telling me? And have Mr. Goodwin as standby counsel?
BY THE DEFENDANT: I can — I will — yeah, I prefer to. I think I’ll help myself better.... []
BY THE COURT: ... Now, let me tell you this, just so you’ll know: I’ve been involved in a lot of trials in my lifetime. I was an assistant district attorney, and since then I’ve been a judge. I have never seen anybody represent themselves and win.
BY THE DEFENDANT: That don’t make no difference. I’m not worried about that.[]
BY THE COURT: Let me ask you a few questions. How far did you go in school?
BY THE DEFENDANT: Well, I went to the ninth [grade], but I was going to the tenth [grade]. I dropped out — I passed the ninth and went to the tenth, but I dropped out in the tenth.
BY THE COURT: Okay. You can read and write; is that correct?
BY THE DEFENDANT: Uh-huh (Indicating an affirmative response.) Very well.
BY THE COURT: Do you know anything about the Rules of Evidence or any of those kind of rules that you’re going to have to know when we’re trying this case?
BY THE DEFENDANT: Not 100 percent. I know enough where I’m speaking upon — on my — I’m just — I want my motion to be heard and just speak about on my motions, but as far as evidence, putting evidence forward, ain’t no evidence I’m really going to put forward. I’m just basically saying what they got is plainly circumstantial, and [Cjonfrontation. [CJlause plainly states that — that you can’t....

¶ 8. After the circuit court addressed Bradley’s various motions, granting some and denying others, its examination of Bradley continued, as follows:

BY THE COURT: ... Well, that’s why I think it’s better if you let Mr. Goodwin try this case, instead of you. I mean you wrote all these motions, right? Did you do these?
BY THE DEFENDANT: Uh-huh (Indicating an affirmative response.)
BY THE COURT: Well, you’re not dumb, I can tell that, but the problem is I don’t think you understand the [C]on-frontation [Cjlause in ... [Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36,124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004) ] well enough to ... understand the nuances of that case. Now, if you want to represent yourself, I think you can. You’re not ... stupid, you’re not ... mentally retarded.
BY THE DEFENDANT: ... I’m trying to get the case down pat, because I’m looking — I’m looking at this, common sense will tell you I’m not guilty. I didn’t steal nothing, ain’t nobody about seen me steal nothing.
BY THE DEFENDANT: — everything is plainly he say, she say.
BY THE COURT: Okay.
BY THE DEFENDANT: Ain’t ... nobody got nothing for me. Ain’t nobody got no camera, ain’t got nothing.
BY THE COURT: Mr. Bradley, juries have to hear that, and we have to have evidence. And if there’s no evidence, then I’m going to turn you loose. But if there’s evidence, then a jury gets to make the decision.
BY THE DEFENDANT: All right.
BY THE COURT: If you want to try this case, I’m going to have to hold you — you need to understand, I’ve got to hold you to the same rules as if you’re an attorney. And if you’re doing something—
BY THE DEFENDANT: Could you give me some ... rules or ... you know, just some fine point rules that I can—
BY THE COURT: No, sir, I can’t.
BY THE DEFENDANT: ... I’m saying what you going to tell me not to do.
BY THE COURT: No, sir, I can’t do that, because I couldn’t do that for the State and I couldn’t do that if Mr. Goodwin was trying the case.
BY THE DEFENDANT: Well, I still ... want — it don’t make no difference, I want to—
BY THE COURT: You need to understand—
BY THE DEFENDANT: I’d rather go pro se. I just want to go pro se. It don’t make no difference.
BY THE COURT: I can’t help you. Now Mr. Goodwin can—
BY THE DEFENDANT: I understand. I’ll go pro se. It don’t make no difference . . . [].
BY THE COURT: ... Now, you’re going to listen. I cannot favor one side or the other. Mr. Goodwin will be here to help you to try this case. If you want to ask him about objections and things like that, he will help you. I think you’re making a mistake if you try this case by yourself. Mr. Goodwin is an excellent trial lawyer, and he’ll do an excellent job for you. If you insist on defending yourself, I will let you....

The circuit court further stated that while Bradley could proceed pro se, his appointed counsel would act as “standby counsel.”

¶ 9. Following a lunch break, Bradley again reiterated that he wished to represent himself, as follows:

BY THE COURT: Your lawyer will help you, if you let him help you. Have you decided, do you ... want to argue this case and examine the witnesses and things like that?
BY THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
BY THE COURT: And you understand the difficulty in representing yourself and all of that. I’ve talked to you about that, right?
BY THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
BY THE COURT: And it’s a decision that you’re freely making?
BY THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
BY THE COURT: All right. Mr. Goodwin, have you discussed with Mr. Bradley the difficulties of self-representation?
BY MR. GOODWIN: Yes, sir. At the appropriate time when the evidence comes in, though, I will tell him object, I will tell him why.
BY THE COURT: All right.
BY MR. GOODWIN: You know, and that’s all I can really do at this point.
BY THE COURT: Well, the Supreme Court has indicated unless I believe he’s not competent, and he’s — while argumentative, I have no reason to believe that he’s delusional or any other indication. He has filed motions ... with the Court that shows that he’s, you know, not totally—
BY MR. GOODWIN: He understands the theory of the objections that I would make at trial.
BY THE COURT: Yes, sir.
BY MR. GOODWIN: He doesn’t understand the Constitutional or the rule basis on it, so I will just tell him to object. BY THE COURT: Fair enough. All right.
BY MS. CLEMONS: So Your Honor, for clarification, Mr. Bradley will be handling both opening and closing as well?
BY THE COURT: Is that right, Mr. Bradley? You’re going to do the opening statement and the closing argument?
BY THE DEFENDANT: Yeah. Basically, I got my closing argument down pat, but I’m just going to — just speak out the mind on the opening part.

¶ 10. The aforementioned transcript excerpts unequivocally reveal that the circuit court abided by our law and the requirements of Uniform Circuit and County Court Rule 8.05. See URCCC 8.05. Bradley made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel.

CONCLUSION

¶ 11. Accordingly, this Court affirms the final judgment and sentence of the Circuit Court of Lowndes County as to Bradley.

¶ 12. CONVICTION OF THIRD-OFFENSE SHOPLIFTING AND SENTENCE OF FIVE (5) YEARS IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, AFFIRMED. APPELLANT SHALL PAY RESTITUTION IN THE AMOUNT OF $42.21, A FINE OF $200.00 AND ALL COURT COSTS.

WALLER, C.J., CARLSON AND DICKINSON, P.JJ., LAMAR, KITCHENS, CHANDLER, PIERCE AND KING, JJ., CONCUR.

      . See URCCC 8.05(1) & (2).

      . See URCCC 8.05(4).

      . See URCCC 8.05(2), (3), & (4).