author: COHEN, J.

text:
    Hubert GRAVES, III, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 5B11-2847.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Aug. 24, 2012.
    Paula C. Coffman Orlando, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Anthony J. Golden, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Ap-pellee.
   COHEN, J.

Hubert Graves was convicted by a jury of lewd or lascivious battery and lewd or lascivious molestation. He was sentenced to consecutive fifteen-year terms in the Department of Corrections. He raises two issues on appeal, only one of which merits discussion. Graves claims his convictions on both charges violate double jeopardy.

The evidence adduced at trial reflects that the victim, K.A., was raised by Graves and his wife in Georgia. Graves was K.A.’s step-grandfather. K.A. alleged that Graves molested her on multiple occasions over a period of years. The incident which gave rise to Florida charges occurred during a family reunion. K.A., who was thirteen years old at the time, testified she fell asleep on a couch at the home of a relative and was awakened as Graves carried her to a bedroom. She remembers being turned over on the bed and having her pants and underwear removed. K.A. testified Graves penetrated her vagina with his penis.

As to the lewd or lascivious battery count, the information alleged that Graves “did with his penis penetrate or have union with the sexual organ” of K.A., a person twelve years of age or older, but less than sixteen years of age. As to the lewd or lascivious molestation count, the information alleged that Graves intentionally touched K.A., a person twelve years of age or older but less than sixteen years of age, in a lewd or lascivious manner, and specifically that he “did touch the genitalia of K.A.” The information did not specify the manner of the touching; however, the evidence introduced at trial is clear that the only touching of the victim’s genitalia coincided with the penetration or union alleged in the lewd or lascivious battery count.

In determining the constitutionality of multiple convictions and sentences arising from the same criminal transaction, legislative intent is the polestar. State v. Anderson, 695 So.2d 309, 311 (Fla. 1997). The question becomes whether the Legislature intended to authorize separate punishments. Here, there is no clear legislative intent to allow for multiple punishments for both lewd or lascivious battery and lewd or lascivious molestation, other than the Legislature’s general position, as articulated in section 775.021(4)(b), Florida Statutes (2011), to convict and sentence for each criminal offense committed in the course of one criminal episode or transaction.

Absent a clear statement of legislative intent, courts employ the Blockburger test to determine whether multiple punishments are permissible. Codified in section 775.021, Florida Statutes, that test provides:

Whoever, in the course of one criminal transaction or episode, commits an act or acts which constitute one or more separate criminal offenses, upon conviction and adjudication of guilt, shall be sentenced separately for each criminal offense; and the sentencing judge may order the sentences to be served concurrently or consecutively. For the purposes of this subsection, offenses are separate if each offense requires proof of an element that the other does not, without regard to the accusatory pleading or the proof adduced at trial.

§ 775.021(4)(a), Fla. Stat. For offenses that satisfy this test, multiple punishments are allowed unless one of three exceptions apply:

1. Offenses which require identical elements of proof.
2. Offenses which are degrees of the same offense as provided by statute.
3. Offenses which are lesser offenses the statutory elements of which are subsumed by the greater offense.

§ 775.021(4)(b), Fla. Stat.

In the instant case, it is undisputed that Graves’ conduct was but a single transaction. Looking merely at the elements of the two charges brought against him, lewd or lascivious battery requires the oral, anal, or vaginal penetration by, or union with, the sexual organ of another, or the anal or vaginal penetration of another by any other object. Lewd or lascivious molestation requires proof that the defendant intentionally touched in a lewd or lascivious manner the breasts, genitals, genital area, buttocks, or clothing covering those parts of the victim; or proof that the defendant intentionally forced or enticed the victim to so touch him or her.

Simply examining the elements of the offenses, both of which can clearly be committed in a multitude of ways, each statute contains an element not within the other. Despite its label, lewd or lascivious battery does not require the State to prove lascivious intent. Penetration, if by the defendant, must be of the victim’s anus, vagina or mouth. If by the victim, penetration must be of the defendant’s anus, vagina, or mouth. Penetration with any other object must be of either the victim’s anus or vagina. Union, which is defined as contact, must be with the anus, vagina, or mouth by either the defendant’s or victim’s sexual organ. Conversely, lewd or lascivious molestation requires a licentious intent. See Roughton v. State, 92 So.3d 284 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012). The touching can be by either the defendant or, if forced or enticed, by the victim. The touching could be of the breasts, buttocks, or clothing covering those areas, as well as the genitals or genital area.

However, a literal application of the codified Blockburger test is problematic when offenses can be committed in such a wide variety of ways, especially in light of the instruction that courts are to undergo a double jeopardy analysis “without regard to the accusatory pleading or the proof adduced at trial.” See § 775.021(4)(a), Fla. Stat. In terms of alternative conduct statutes and statutes concerning distinct criminal acts, it is not difficult to find differing elements in each even though there are no accusations of such conduct by the accused. Thus, in Gibbs v. State, 698 So.2d 1206 (Fla.1997) (involving alternative conduct statute), and State v. Meshell, 2 So.3d 132 (Fla.2009) (addressing distinct act statute), the court looked to the charging document to determine the specific conduct alleged. In Gibbs, the defendant was charged with trafficking in cocaine and simple possession of the same cocaine. Noting that trafficking in cocaine can be committed by either selling, purchasing, delivering, bringing into the State, or possessing cocaine, the supreme court concluded that, pursuant to section 775.021(4)(a), Florida Statutes, it was precluded from examining the evidence to determine whether each charge involved the same quantum of cocaine. The supreme court went on to state:

[W]e recognize that an alternative conduct statute, such as the cocaine trafficking statute, requires an analysis that breaks the conduct elements into the specific alternative conduct which is in the other statute being compared. The conduct element of the trafficking statute is not compared by considering the entire range of conduct including possession, sale, purchase, and delivery, but rather by comparing only trafficking possession with simple possession.

698 So.2d at 1209. Unless the Gibbs court reviewed the information, there would be no way to determine whether the defendant was charged with trafficking based upon a sale, purchase, delivery, or possession. Double jeopardy would have been violated only if the trafficking was based upon possession of the same drugs which formed the basis of the simple possession charge.

Likewise, in Meshell, the defendant was charged with multiple counts of lewd or lascivious battery. The issue was whether separate convictions could be obtained for performing oral sex on the victim, for having the victim perform oral sex upon him, and for either union with or penetration of the victim’s vagina with his penis. Despite language to the contrary, the only way to know whether the specific acts with which the defendant was charged are “sexual acts of a separate character and type requiring different elements of proof,” is by reference to the charging document. 2 So.3d at 135. This is consistent with the approach this Court has taken in similar double jeopardy cases. See, e.g., Rough-ton, 92 So.3d 284 n. 1; Latimer v. State, 44 So.3d 1239 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010).

If, as in Gibbs, we do not look at the entire theoretical range of conduct encompassed by the statute but rather compare only the conduct alleged in the information, the lewd or lascivious battery count alleged either penetration or union of Grave’s penis with the vagina of the victim. Thus, the range of conduct included union, which is defined as contact with or touching of the victim’s vagina. The lewd or lascivious molestation count alleged an unspecified touching, in a lewd or lascivious manner, of the victim’s genitalia. Based upon the lack of specificity in the charging document, that touching could have occurred with the defendant’s penis. The only element contained in the lewd or lascivious molestation count, not subsumed within the lewd or lascivious battery count, is a requirement of a lascivious intent. To avoid a violation of double jeopardy, each offense must contain an element not within the other. Thus, Graves should have been convicted of only one offense. Because both offenses are punishable by a term of imprisonment up to fifteen years, we reverse and remand for entry of a judgment of acquittal for the offense which scores lower on the sentencing guidelines.

AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part.

SAWAYA and JACOBUS, JJ., concur.

      . § 800.04(4)(a), Fla. Stat. (2003).

      . § 800.04(5)(a), Fla. Stat. (2003).

      . Blockburger v. U.S., 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932).

      . Before addressing the exceptions, the court first must determine whether the conduct charged was part of a single episode or transaction. Only if the offenses are part of the same criminal transaction is the codified Blockburger analysis applied. Depending on the circumstances, a defendant can commit the same crime multiple times during the same criminal episode and be charged with each occurrence or violate the same statute in a different number of ways without implicating double jeopardy. See State v. Meshell, 2 So.3d 132, 136 (Fla.2009) (affirming convictions of distinct sex acts because they were of a separate character and type).

      .To determine whether an offense occurred during the same criminal transaction, courts examine "whether there are multiple victims, whether the offenses occurred in multiple locations, and whether there has been a 'temporal break’ between the offenses.” Staley v. State, 829 So.2d 400, 401 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (citing Garrison v. State, 654 So.2d 1176, 1177 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)).

      . The words "lewd” and "lascivious” both mean a wicked, lustful, unchaste, licentious, or sensual intent on the part of the person doing an act. Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 11.10(c).

      . Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 11.10(a).

        .Roughton, which this Court recently decided, represents a similar situation. There, the defendant was convicted of sexual battery on a person under twelve years of age and lewd or lascivious molestation of a victim less than twelve years of age. As in the instant case, the convictions in Roughton were based upon the same act. In affirming both convictions, we found the lewd or lascivious molestation charge to require a lascivious intent while the sexual battery does not. Additionally, we noted the different anatomy protected by each statute.

      . This holding was reaffirmed in footnote four in State v. Paul, 934 So.2d 1167, 1173(Fla. 2006) receded from on other grounds, Valdes v. State, 3 So.3d 1067 (Fla.2009), where the court examined multiple charges involving lewd or lascivious conduct and lewd or lascivious exhibition.

      . While we do not look at the evidence adduced at trial for purposes of this analysis, we note that the only evidence of the lewd or lascivious molestation presented was a touching with the defendant's penis. The jury, through a note sent to the court, understood this as well.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: PER CURIAM.

license: Public Domain

text:
    Danny TIBURCIO, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, et al., Respondent.
    No. 5D12-2296.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Aug. 27, 2012.
    Robert Wesley, Public Defender, and Daniel S. Spencer, Assistant Public Defender, Orlando, for Petitioner.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Megan Saillant, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

Petitioner seeks release from the Florida State Hospital because he is incompetent to proceed on his criminal charges and cannot be restored to competency in the foreseeable future. Petitioner also seeks dismissal of the pending charges. The State concedes that Petitioner’s continued detention is unlawful, but argues that the dismissal of the charges is premature because five years have not elapsed since Petitioner was found incompetent. See Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.213(a)(1). We agree with the State on both issues.

Accordingly, we grant the Petition in part and deny it in part. We direct the trial court to order Petitioner’s release. Although the State has indicated that it does not intend to seek civil commitment at this time, this decision is without prejudice to the State instituting civil commitment proceedings.

PETITION GRANTED IN PART; DENIED IN PART.

ORFINGER, C.J., TORPY and COHEN, JJ., concur.


author: LaROSE, Judge.

text:
    The TOWN OF LONGBOAT KEY, Florida, a municipality of the State of Florida, Petitioner, v. ISLANDSIDE PROPERTY OWNERS COALITION, LLC, a Florida limited liability company; The Sanctuary at Longboat Key Club Community Association, Inc., a Florida nonprofit corporation; and L’Ambiance at Longboat Key Club Condominium Association, Inc., a Florida nonprofit corporation, Respondents. Key Club Associates, Limited Partnership, a Florida limited partnership; and Islandside Development, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company, Petitioners, v. Islandside Property Owners Coalition, LLC, a Florida limited liability company; The Sanctuary at Longboat Key Club Community Association, Inc., a Florida nonprofit corporation; and L’Ambiance at Longboat Key Club Condominium Association, Inc., a Florida nonprofit corporation, Respondents.
    Nos. 2D12-490, 2D12-495.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Aug. 29, 2012.

      Sylvia H. Walbolt and Leah A. Sevi of Carlton Fields, P.A., Tampa; and David P. Persson and Kelly Martinson Fernandez of Hankin, Persson, Davis, McClenathen & Darnell, Sarasota, for Petitioners.
    Jim D. Syprett of Syprett, Meshad, Res-nick, Lieb, Dumbaugh, Jones, Krotec & Westheimer, P.A., Sarasota; and John Patterson of Livingston, Patterson, Strickland & Siegel, P.A., Sarasota, for Respondents in 2D12-490.
    Robert K. Lincoln and Michael J. Furen of Icard, Merrill, Cullis, Timm, Furen & Ginsburg, P.A., Sarasota, for Respondents in 2D12-495.
   LaROSE, Judge.

This case comes to us for second-tier certiorari review. The Town of Longboat Key and others challenge the circuit court’s order quashing Town Ordinance 2009-25, which approved a $400 million redevelopment plan for the Longboat Key Club. After careful consideration, we deny the certiorari petition.

Relevant Background

Key Club Associates, Limited Partnership, Islandside Development, LLC, and the owners of the Longboat Key Club (collectively, Key Club) applied for a development order to expand the Longboat Key Club. The Town’s Planning and Zoning Board considered the application in public hearings. The Board transmitted the application to the Town Commission accompanied with the Board’s recommendation for approval, subject to certain conditions.

The Town Commission conducted its own hearings and determined that the application violated the Town’s Zoning Code (Code). Key Club asked the Town Commission to extend the hearings while Key Club pursued a Code amendment. The Town adopted Town Ordinance 2010-16, approving Key Club’s proposed amendment. Key Club amended its original application, and the Town Commission resumed the approval process.

Because it is relevant to the arguments on appeal, we note that during the continued process, Monica Simpson, the planning, zoning, and building director, reported to the Town Commission that she could not recommend approval. Ms. Simpson’s staff modified the proposed development plan based on their objections and the concerns of the public. Key Club' proposed another series of changes to the plan. Again, Ms. Simpson expressed reservations. Following a final set of hearings, the Town Commission approved the development order.

Islandside Property Owners Coalition, LLC, the Sanctuary at Longboat Key Club Community Association Inc., and L’Ambiance at Longboat Key Club Condominium Association, Inc. (collectively, IPOC), petitioned the circuit court for a writ of certio-rari to quash the development order, citing seven conflicts with the Code. The circuit court granted the writ. The Town and Key Club (collectively, the Town) petition for second-tier certiorari review of that decision. See Fla. R.App. P. 9.080(b)(2)(B). The Town contends that the circuit court departed from the essential requirements of the law in two respects: (1) the circuit court exceeded its certiorari jurisdiction by reweighing the evidence, and (2) the circuit court erred in not deferring to the Town’s interpretation of the Code under Rinker Materials Carp, v. City of North Miami, 286 So.2d 552 (Fla.1973).

We limit our review to considering: (1) whether the circuit court afforded procedural due process and (2) whether the circuit court departed from the essential requirements of the law. See Custer Med. Ctr. v. United Auto. Ins. Co., 62 So.3d 1086, 1092 (Fla.2010). Because the parties do not contend that the circuit court denied them due process, we assess only whether the circuit court departed from the essential requirements of the law.

A departure from the essential requirements of the law requires more than a simple legal error or an erroneous conclusion based on misapplication of the correct law. Id. We may only overturn the circuit court “when there has been a violation of a clearly established principle of law resulting in a miscarriage of justice.” Id. (quoting Combs v. State, 436 So.2d 93, 96 (Fla.1983)). The Town has not met this exacting standard.

The Circuit Court Did Not Reweigh Evidence

The Town first argues that the circuit court improperly reweighed the evidence before the Town Commission. On first-tier certiorari review, the circuit court was limited to determining whether: (1) the Town afforded procedural due process, (2) the Town observed the essential requirements of the law, and (3) competent, substantial evidence supported the Town’s decision. See City of Deerfield Beach v. Vaillant, 419 So.2d 624, 626 (Fla.1982). A court departs from the essential requirements of the law if it reweighs the record evidence. See id.

The Town posits that the circuit court deferred too much to Ms. Simpson’s position against approval. The circuit court referred to Ms. Simpson twice in the “Background” section of its order. “On May 28, 2010, Monica Simpson ... issued a staff report indicating she could not recommend approval.... ” Later, the court notes that “[o]n June 28, 2010, Director Simpson issued a revised staff report on Key Club’s ... revised application and proposed conditions. The ... Staff Report and Ms. Simpson’s testimony indicated that Key Club’s application and requested departures did not comply with the Zoning Code.” The Town contends that these references reflect the circuit court’s efforts to find evidence to quash the development order rather than assessing the record as a whole to determine whether competent, substantial evidence supported the Town’s decision.

The Town protests that the circuit court “relied on,” “gave weight to,” and “simply seize[d] on” Ms. Simpson’s statements to support its final order. The Town, citing Broward County v. G.B.V. International, Ltd., 787 So.2d 838, 846 n. 25 (Fla.2001), argues that the presence of this information and the absence of any testimony favoring approval show that the circuit court reweighed the evidence. This is not firm ground. In G.B.V. International, “according to the plain language of its order” it was apparent that the circuit court “combed the record and extracted its own factual finding.” Id. at 845.

Reweighing of the evidence is simply not apparent from “the plain language of [the] order” before us. To the contrary, we can see that the circuit court assiduously applied the appropriate factors in its first-tier certiorari review. “This court need not defer to a construction of the Zoning Code by the Town or Ms. Simpson if the language of the Code is clear and unambiguous.” Additionally, the circuit court’s analysis focused with precision on the specific words in the Code and their definitions, only mentioning Ms. Simpson’s testimony to summarize the arguments before making its own decision utilizing statutory interpretation. The circuit court did not claim that the Town lacked competent, substantial evidence to approve the application nor did the circuit court scour the record for evidence to rebut the Town’s decision. See Clay Cnty. v. Kendale Land Dev., Inc., 969 So.2d 1177, 1181 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (determining that when a circuit court examines whether the agency’s findings are supported by competent, substantial evidence, the court cannot conduct an independent review searching for evidence to rebut the agency’s decision).

The Town urges us to conclude that “this recitation [of Ms. Simpson’s position] establishes that the circuit court made its own review of the record evidence, selected certain evidence as relevant background, and then returned to that evidence in the body of its order.” We must reject a position that would thwart the rendering of reasoned judicial decisions. The Town’s argument reaches too far and would encourage a judge to omit any meaningful background information in an order lest he or she be accused of impropriety. This hardly promotes judicial transparency, sound explanation, and rational analysis. Our careful review of the record uncovers nothing suggesting that the circuit court relied on Ms. Simpson’s testimony to reach its decision.

The Circuit Court Was Not Required to Defer to the Town’s Interpretation of the Code

The Town next argues that the circuit court departed from the essential requirements of the law by not “acknow-ledg[ing] or applying] controlling principles of Florida law from Rinker Materials Corp.” According to the Town, the circuit court should have applied the Town’s interpretation of the Code because zoning regulations should be both consistently applied and construed to favor property owners.

In Rinker Materials Corp., a property owner applied for a permit to construct a concrete batching plant. Id., 286 So.2d at 554. The city council denied the permit. The circuit court and district court denied certiorari relief. Id. at 553. The supreme court remanded for the grant of relief after determining that the district court erroneously interpreted the applicable zoning ordinances. Id. “In failing to apply the plain and ordinary meaning and common usage of the language of the ordinance in determining intent, the district court misapplied the established decisional rules of statutory construction.” Id. The supreme court concluded that local ordinances are subject to the same rules of interpretation as are state statutes; a court interpreting local ordinances must first look to the plain and ordinary meaning of the words in the ordinance. Id. at 553-54. If the plain and ordinary meaning is clear, then “other rules of construction and interpretation are unnecessary and unwarranted.” Id. at 554. In the end, the supreme court determined that the city council’s interpretation of its own ordinances was improper because it violated the clear and ordinary meaning of the ordinance. Id. at 555-56.

Rinker Materials Corp. bolsters the circuit court’s decision. The circuit court limited its analysis to the wording of the Code; it eschewed extraneous evidence of intent. See id. at 554 (“The intent of the North Miami City Commission in its enactment of the zoning ordinance in issue is to be determined primarily from the language of the ordinance itself and not from conjecture [ajliunde.”). When a term in the Code lacked definition, the circuit court utilized the proper rules of statutory construction, turning to the dictionary meaning to find the plain and ordinary meaning of undefined terms. See Baker Cnty. Med. Servs., Inc. v. Aetna Health Mgmt., LLC, 31 So.3d 842, 845 (Fla. 1st DCA) (“[Wjhen a statute does not define a term, we rely on the dictionary to determine the definition.”), review denied, 44 So.3d 1177 (Fla.2010).

For example, IPOC claimed that the development order approved commercial uses that the Code did not allow. The circuit court determined, in relevant part, that:

The clear and unambiguous language of § 158.002(D) of the Zoning Code requires that any uses permitted in the [Gulf Planned Development] be “designated,” that is, to be indicated, set apart, marked out or made known. Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th Ed. Nowhere in the Zoning Code are commercial offices, meeting rooms, spas or commercial recreational uses such as the golf clubhouse set out, indicated or otherwise identified or made known to be permitted in the [Gulf Planned Development], The Court finds that the Development Order violates [the] Zoning Code by permitting such uses on the North Parcel and therefore departs from the essential requirements of the law.

Using the Code wording, aided by dictionary definition, the circuit court discerned the meaning of the Code. No rule required adherence to the Town’s self-serving interpretation. See Holly v. Auld, 450 So.2d 217, 219 (Fla.1984) (“[Wjhen the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no occasion for resorting to the rules of statutory interpretation and construction; the statute must be given its plain and obvious meaning.” (quoting A.R. Douglass, Inc. v. McRainey, 102 Fla. 1141, 137 So. 157, 159 (1931))).

The Town argues that the Code is ambiguous, thus requiring the circuit court to defer to the Town’s reasonable interpretation. See Fla. Hosp. v. Agency for Health Care Admin., 823 So.2d 844, 848 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002) (holding that an agency’s interpretation is afforded deference by the court unless the plain language of the ordinance runs contrary to the agency’s interpretation). In support of this argument, the Town cites its longstanding tradition allowing similar nonresidential developments. Vanderbilt Shores Condominium Association v. Collier County, 891 So.2d 583, 584 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004), blunts that attack. Tradition cannot displace the plain meaning of a local code.

In Vanderbilt Shores Condominium Association, several condominium associations challenged a county building permit approving a development plan for a fifteen-unit condominium. Id. They complained that the design violated the zoning code. Id. The circuit court claimed that it must apply the county’s interpretation as long as the interpretation was not unreasonable or clearly erroneous and cited the county’s “longstanding interpretation of its Land Development Code.” Id. Despite the county’s tradition and interpretation, we determined that “the associations’ interpretation of the Land Development Code appears to be correct” and “the County’s interpretation here appears to be clearly erroneous.” Id. at 584, 585. Although we affirmed the lower court’s order on different grounds, we noted that while “great weight must be given to the administrative construction of a statute by the officials charged with its administration,” a court cannot afford such deference when the interpretation is unreasonable or erroneous. Id. at 585.

The Town’s longstanding interpretation of its Code cannot tie the circuit court’s hands. To allow such a result would countenance a shifting-sands approach to Code construction that would deny meaningful judicial review of local quasi-judicial decisions. The meaning of a code would remain in flux. Such an approach does not promote consistency in the application of law. As the wording of its laws binds a legislature, the Town is bound by the wording of its Code. This mounts a bulwark against the Town’s unfettered exercise of power. See Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Brevard Cnty. v. Snyder, 627 So.2d 469, 474 (Fla.1993) (noting that local governments and agencies must strictly adhere to town development plans and zoning codes); City of Miami v. Rosen, 151 Fla. 677, 10 So.2d 307, 309 (1942) (discussing the limited scope of authority under which municipal ordinances are valid); Ocean’s Edge Dev. Corp. v. Town of Juno Beach, 430 So.2d 472, 474-75 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983) (determining that courts cannot amend local ordinances “as the town would have liked it to read” by ignoring the language of the code “in favor of after-the-fact expert testimony as to legislative intent to fill in the cracks” because property owners and residents have every right to depend on the wording of the code.) As the circuit court noted, the Town is free to amend the Code. See Carroll v. City of Miami Beach, 198 So.2d 643, 645 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967) (“[T]he City is bound by the express terms of its own ordinance.... If the City desires a different meaning for its ordinance in the future, it may amend, modify, or change the same by legislative process.”).

In only one instance did the circuit court agree that a Code provision was ambiguous. Section 158.128(D) described the minimum number of off-street parking spaces required for a development, accompanied by a table in the section describing the minimum parking spaces for different uses. The table includes the term “additional uses” with no definition. The Town argued that the northern parcel of land required fewer spaces because, combined, the north and south parcel of the development had enough spaces and that “additional uses” permitted the Town to approve a single site plan with enough spaces regardless if the plan included separate parcels. The circuit court determined that this interpretation was unreasonable because “[t]he Town’s interpretation of the ‘additional use’ provision creates clear conflicts with the other provisions of the same section of the Zoning Code that require safe and adequate parking.” The circuit court properly applied the law in this instance by first determining whether the statute was ambiguous and then determining if the Town’s interpretation was unreasonable. See Office of Fire Code Official of Collier Cnty. Fire Control & Rescue Dists. v. Fla. Dep’t of Fin. Sens., 869 So.2d 1283, 1237 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (holding that while an agency’s reasonable interpretation of an ordinance binds a court, a court cannot “defer to an implausible and unreasonable statutory interpretation adopted by an administrative agency”). The circuit court was bound by the interpretation only if it determined the Town’s interpretation reasonable.

Because of the limited scope of our second-tier certiorari review, we see no need to analyze further each of the seven individual areas that IPOC challenges as conflicting with the Code. See Custer Med. Ctr., 62 So.3d at 1092; State, Dep’t of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Edenfield, 58 So.3d 904, 906 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (“[A] misapplication or an erroneous interpretation of the correct law does not rise to the level of a violation of a clearly established principle of law.”). The circuit court properly applied the concepts of statutory construction as required by Rinker Materials Corp.

Conclusion

The trial court did not depart from the essential requirements of the law in quashing the development order. There is no indication that the circuit court reweighed the evidence, and the circuit court properly construed the Code in accordance with Rinker Materials Corp. Therefore, we deny the petition.

Petition denied.

KHOUZAM and BLACK, JJ„ Concur.

      . The quotation from Rinker Materials Corp. that the Town summarizes reads, "Since zoning regulations are in derogation of private rights of ownership, words used in a zoning ordinance should be given their broadest meaning when there is no definition or clear intent to the contrary and the ordinance should be interpreted in favor of the property owner.” 286 So.2d at 553 (emphasis added).


author: NORTHCUTT, Judge.

text:
    Priscilla MELLETTE, f/k/a Priscilla Kellerman-Pate, Appellant, v. TRINITY MEMORIAL CEMETERY, INC., d/b/a Trinity Memorial Gardens, a Florida profit corporation, Appellee.
    No. 2D10-5204.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Aug. 29, 2012.

      Joel D. Eaton of Podhurst Orseck, P.A., Miami, and Weldon E. Brennan of Brennan, Holden & Kavouklis, P.A., Tampa, for Appellant.
    Hinda Klein and Karen E. Berger of Conroy, Simberg, Ganon, Krevans, Abel, Lurvey, Morrow, & Schefer, P.A., Hollywood, for Appellee.
   NORTHCUTT, Judge.

Trinity Memorial Cemetery disinterred the body of Adam Kellerman-Pate at the request of his mother, Joni Pate, and sent it for reburial in Texas, where Ms. Pate resided. The removal of Adam’s body was done without the knowledge or permission of his widow, Priscilla Mellette. She sued Trinity for damages based on theories of tortious interference with a dead body and reckless infliction of emotional distress. On Trinity’s motion, the circuit court entered summary judgment in its favor. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

The discovery depositions taken in this case reflected that in 2002 Adam died in a car accident at the age of twenty-one. He was survived by his wife of several months, Priscilla, who was injured in the accident. Adam’s mother purchased a plot at Trinity, and he was buried there. Shortly after the burial, Ms. Pate told Priscilla that she wanted to move Adam’s body to Texas if Priscilla remarried. Priscilla said that she would consider this request if Ms. Pate would continue to maintain the plot and headstone at Trinity as a memorial to Adam. Ms. Pate refused, whereupon Priscilla told her that she would not consent to moving the body.

Priscilla remarried in December 2005, and thereafter she received several letters from Ms. Pate and other family members seeking permission to rebury Adam’s body in Texas. Priscilla ignored the requests. In mid-January 2008, she telephoned Trinity and told its representative, Diane Say-egh, that she feared Ms. Pate would attempt to have Adam’s body disinterred and moved to Texas. Sayegh assured her that the body could not be moved without the signatures of both the spouse of the decedent and the owner of the burial plot. Priscilla told Sayegh not to permit a disinterment, and she left a telephone number where she could be reached if anything transpired.

When Priscilla next spoke to Sayegh, in late February 2008, Sayegh informed her that Adam’s body had been disinterred and shipped to Texas. Sayegh transferred Priscilla to Timothy Schurdell, the family service advisor at Trinity who had handled the disinterment. Schurdell advised Priscilla that her late husband’s body had been removed on January 30 at the request of Ms. Pate, who owned the plot and who, Schurdell asserted, was the next of kin with rights to the body. He told Priscilla that she had not been contacted because she had no rights to the body.

In deposition testimony, Trinity’s president, Lewis Friedland, acknowledged that he knew Florida law required the next of kin’s approval of a disinterment and that Trinity’s files reflected that Priscilla was Adam’s next of kin. However, no one consulted the files before proceeding with the disinterment. When Ms. Pate made her request, Schurdell followed Trinity’s procedure in effect at the time; he simply filled out the disinterment form identifying Ms. Pate as the owner of the burial plot, erroneously believing her to be next of kin.

Friedland conceded that it was an error not to obtain Priscilla’s approval. He acknowledged that Schurdell’s mistake was compounded by his failure to consult the original interment file, the funeral director’s failure to confirm the next of kin on the form, and another employee’s failure to ensure that appropriate policies and procedures were in place. Friedland admitted that the form Trinity used for disin-terments did not require the signatures of both the plot owner and the statutory next of kin.

On Trinity’s motion, the circuit court entered summary judgment in its favor on both counts of Priscilla’s complaint. A court may grant a summary judgment only when the record shows that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Sherry v. Regency Ins. Co., 884 So.2d 175, 177 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (citing Roll v. Talcott, 191 So.2d 40 (Fla.1966)). Our review of a summary judgment is de novo. Volusia Cnty. v. Aberdeen at Ormond Beach, L.P., 760 So.2d 126 (Fla.2000). In this case, the facts surrounding the disinterment are not seriously disputed. The issue is whether those facts cannot support Priscilla’s causes of action as a matter of law, thereby warranting summary judgment in Trinity’s favor.

There is no question that the disinterment in this case violated Florida law. Section 497.384(3), Florida Statutes (2007), provides that a disinterment must be authorized in writing by “a legally authorized person or a court of competent jurisdiction.” When Trinity disinterred Adam’s body in January 2008, “legally authorized person” was in pertinent part defined as follows:

“Legally authorized person” means, in the priority listed, the decedent, when written inter vivos authorizations and directions are provided by the decedent; the surviving spouse, unless the spouse has been arrested for committing against the deceased an act of domestic violence as defined in s. 741.28 that resulted in or contributed to the death of the deceased; a son or daughter who is 18 years of age or older; a parent; a brother or sister who is 18 years of age or older; a grandchild who is 18 years of age or older; a grandparent; or any person in the next degree of kinship....

§ 497.005(37), Fla. Stat. (2007) (emphasis supplied). Thus, under the circumstances of this case Trinity was not permitted to remove the body without Priscilla’s written permission. Nevertheless, the circuit court determined that Trinity’s conduct “was not so outrageous as to rise to the level of outrageousness necessary to sustain a claim for the infliction of emotional distress or tortious interference with a dead body.” As we will explain, we disagree.

A. Tortious interference with a dead body.

The Florida Supreme Court recognized a cause of action for tortious interference with a dead body in Kirksey v. Jernigan, 45 So.2d 188, 189 (Fla.1950). In that case, the court held that the impact rule, precluding recovery for mental pain and anguish unconnected to a physical injury in negligence eases, did not extend to cases where the wrongful act is such as to reasonably imply malice or where, “from the entire want of care of attention to duty, or great indifference to the persons, property, or rights of others,” malice justifying exemplary damages will be imputed. Id. (citing 15 Am.Jur., Damages, § 179; Restatement of Torts § 47(b)). Further, the court wrote:

The right to recover, in such cases, is especially appropriate to tortious interference with rights involving dead human bodies, where mental anguish to the surviving relatives is not only the natural and probable consequence of the character of wrong committed, but indeed is frequently the only injurious consequence to follow from it.

Id. In Gonzalez v. Metropolitan Dade County Public Health Trust, 651 So.2d 673, 676 (Fla.1995), the supreme court declined to expand the tort to encompass merely negligent conduct. It reaffirmed the Kirksey court’s holding requiring a showing of physical injury or willful and wanton conduct.

In this case, Priscilla has not claimed a physical injury. Accordingly, to warrant summary judgment, Trinity was required to establish that its admitted misconduct was not willful or wanton as a matter of law.

We have found no Florida case involving a cemetery’s improper disinterment of a body. But we note that Kirksey involved a funeral home’s unlawful withholding of a child’s body from its mother as security for its embalming fee. The court observed:

It is well settled that, in the absence of testamentary disposition to the contrary, a surviving spouse or next of kin has the right to the possession of the body of a deceased person for the purpose of burial, sepulture or other lawful disposition which they may see fit. And the invasion of such right by unlawfully withholding the body from the relative entitled thereto is an actionable wrong, for which substantial damages may be recovered.

Kirksey, 45 So.2d at 189-90 (citations omitted). Certainly, a surviving spouse’s right to direct the disposition of her deceased’s body is no less invaded when the party to whom she has entrusted the body disinters it and ships it out of state without her knowledge and against her expressed wishes.

Several cases involving improper actions by a funeral home when preparing a body for viewing are also analogous. In Sherer v. Rubin Memorial Chapel, Ltd., 452 So.2d 574 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984), the circuit court dismissed Sherer’s suit for damages based on the mishandling of a corpse. That theory is materially identical to the tort involved here, in that a plaintiff pursuing either cause of action must prove willful, wanton, or malicious behavior by the defendant. See id. at 575. In Sherer the defendant funeral home’s employees dressed another body in the decedent’s clothes and placed it in her casket for an open-casket funeral. When the decedent’s relatives discovered the error, the employees first tried to convince them that the body was actually their loved one. After the employees finally admitted their mistake, they placed the decedent’s unprepared corpse in the casket and simply threw her clothes on top of the body. Id. at 574. Applying Kirksey, the district court reversed the dismissal of the complaint.

In a similar case alleging tortious interference with a dead body, Halpin v. Kraeer Funeral Homes, Inc., 547 So.2d 973 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989), the court reversed a summary judgment in favor of the funeral home where, again, the wrong body was placed in a casket for a viewing. The employees in that case also attempted to convince the mourners that the stranger’s body was their decedent, and when the employees finally found the correct body and placed it in the casket, its appearance was unsatisfactory. The court pointed out that whether the plaintiff was entitled to damages based on these facts was a matter for a jury to decide. Id. at 978.

Whereas in Sherer and Halpin the funeral homes mishandled the corpses by misplacing them, Trinity mishandled Adam’s body by intentionally removing it from its resting place and sending it to another state — even though Priscilla had expressly voiced her opposition and Trinity had vouched that it could not be done without her signature. Indeed, Florida law forbade Trinity to disinter the body without Priscilla’s written authorization. Yet, its standard form for disinterments did not even call for the signature of the deceased’s next of kin, and Trinity proceeded to remove the body and transport it away without even informing her. We cannot conclude as a matter of law that Trinity’s conduct did not exhibit an “entire want of care of attention to duty” or was not so wanton as to render it liable for intentionally interfering with a dead body.

On this count, Trinity was not entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, we reverse the summary judgment entered in favor of Trinity on Priscilla’s cause of action for tortious interference with a dead body.

B. Reckless infliction of emotional distress.

The facts supporting this cause of action are essentially the same as the ones supporting Priscilla’s claim for tor-tious interference with a body. This tort is grounded on “outrageous conduct causing severe emotional distress.” Dominguez v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y of U.S., 438 So.2d 58, 59 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983), approved by Crawford & Co. v. Dominguez, 467 So.2d 281 (Fla.1985). A plaintiff seeking recovery under this theory must prove that the defendant acted recklessly and that his conduct was extreme and outrageous. Johnson v. Thigpen, 788 So.2d 410, 412 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001).

Outrageous conduct is that which goes “beyond all bounds of decency” and is “regarded as odious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” Gallogly v. Rodriguez, 970 So.2d 470, 471 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (quoting LeGrande v. Emmanuel, 889 So.2d 991, 994-95 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004)). In a context similar to the one at issue here, the court in Williams v. City of Minneola, 575 So.2d 683, 691 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991), remarked:

As for what is outrageous or reckless and what is not, we emphasize that our society ... shows a particular solicitude for the emotional vulnerability of survivors regarding improper behavior toward the dead body of a loved one, and the special deference paid by courts to family feelings where rights involving dead bodies are concerned is central to our decision. This area is unique, and once it is entered, behavior which in other circumstances might be merely insulting, frivolous, or careless becomes indecent, outrageous and intolerable.

(footnote omitted).

We recognize that the question of whether conduct is in fact outrageous is one of law that a circuit court may decide on summary judgment. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Steadman, 968 So.2d 592, 595 n. 1 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007). But we review the circuit court’s decision in this regard de novo, and we cannot say that as a matter of law Trinity’s conduct did not reach the level of outrageousness required to support this tort. Two cases from this district involving cremation illustrate what acts can constitute outrageous conduct in the unique context described in Williams.

This court upheld a directed verdict in favor of a cremation service in Matsumoto v. American Burial & Cremation Services, Inc., 949 So.2d 1054 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006). In that case the decedent’s brother and the decedent’s companion, who held his power of attorney, directed the defendant funeral home to cremate the body. Both of them advised the funeral home that the decedent had an estranged daughter, but neither of them knew her married name, where she lived, or how to contact her. The funeral home cremated the body and delivered the ashes to the decedent’s brother, who scattered them on their mother’s grave. Id. at 1056.

Upon learning of her father’s death and cremation, the decedent’s daughter sued the funeral home for interference with the body. The daughter claimed that her father had wanted a military funeral and burial, but her father’s companion and his brother testified that the decedent had more recently directed each of them to have his remains cremated. The funeral home moved for and was granted a directed verdict and a dismissal on the ground that its conduct was not outrageous. Id.

On appeal, we remarked that the daughter’s claim was more accurately couched as one for outrageous conduct causing severe emotional distress. We also pointed out that whether conduct is sufficiently odious to support the tort must be evaluated objectively; the subjective feelings of the person affected by the conduct is not controlling. Id. Further, the funeral home had followed statutory dictates when permitting the decedent’s brother to direct the disposition because no other person was available to tell the funeral home how to proceed. The daughter presented no evidence that the funeral home had any reason to doubt the information provided by the decedent’s companion or his brother. Under those circumstances, we held, the funeral home’s conduct was not outrageous, and the court properly dismissed the suit. Id.

In contrast to the Matsumoto case, this court affirmed a jury’s determination that a cremation society had acted outrageously in Smith v. Telophase National Cremation Society, Inc., 471 So.2d 163 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985). Smith had arranged for the society to cremate his body after his death. When his widow came to collect his ashes, the defendant’s business manager at first was unable to locate them, but after excusing herself she returned with an unlabeled plastic container and represented that it held Smith’s ashes. Mrs. Smith embarked on a trip to scatter the ashes in places that had been significant to the deceased. In the course of that endeavor she discovered a partial bridge among the ashes in the container. Her late husband had not had bridge work. The cremation society had given Mrs. Smith the ashes of another deceased person because it had scattered her husband’s ashes at sea, apparently in direct contravention of his wishes. Id. at 165-66.

On appeal, the cremation society challenged the trial court’s refusal to direct a verdict on Mrs. Smith’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. We discussed the requirement that the conduct necessary to support that cause of action had to exceed all possible bounds of decency. Relying on the Restatement of Torts, we specifically noted that in determining whether conduct was outrageous, we looked to whether the recitation of facts was such that an average member of the community would exclaim “outrageous!” Id. at 166 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 (1965)). Against that standard, we could not say that the evidence in the case did not support the jury’s finding in favor of Mrs. Smith.

Likewise, here we cannot conclude as matter of law that Trinity’s conduct in disregard both of the statute governing disinterment and of the expressed wishes of the deceased’s widow was insufficiently condemnable to support her cause of action. Moreover, because the outrageousness test is objective, it is of no moment that Priscilla testified that she did not believe Trinity meant to hurt her. Therefore, we must reverse the summary judgment entered in favor of Trinity on this count of Priscilla’s complaint.

Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

DAVIS and VTLLANTI, JJ„ Concur.

      . The statutory definition has since been revised and renumbered as section 497.005(39), Florida Statutes (2010). As between the decedent’s surviving spouse and the decedent’s parent, the priority remains the same.

      . The statute defining a "legally authorized person” was then section 470.002(18), Florida Statutes (2002).


author: CRENSHAW, Judge.

text:
    In the Interest of A.R. and A.R., children. Department of Children and Family Services and Guardian Ad Litem Program, Appellants, v. T.C. and D.R., Appellees.
    No. 2D12-84.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Aug. 29, 2012.
    Jeffrey Dana Gillen, Statewide Appeals Director, West Palm Beach, for Appellant Department of Children and Family Services.
    Jennifer Sue Paullin, Statewide Guardian ad Litem, Tavares, for Appellant Guardian ad Litem Program.
    J.L. Ray LeGrande of LeGrande & Le-Grande, P.A., Fort Myers, for Appellee T.C.
    D.R., pro se.
   CRENSHAW, Judge.

The Department of Children and Family Services appeals a final order denying the Department’s petition for termination of the parental rights of T.C., the mother, and D.R., the father, to their two minor children. The Department’s appeal as it relates to the father is moot, and therefore dismissed, because the father has since executed surrenders of his parental rights. However, we reverse and remand for further proceedings as to the mother because the trial court erred as a matter of law in concluding that it had no statutory authority to terminate the mother’s parental rights based on section 39.806(1)0), Florida Statutes (2011).

The Department’s petition sought termination of the mother’s parental rights based in part on section 39.806(1)0), which permits termination where “[o]n three or more occasions the child or another child of the parent or parents has been placed in out-of-home care pursuant to this chap-tern and the conditions that led to the child’s out-of-home placement were caused by the parent or parents.” To support this ground for termination, the Department relied in part upon a prior occasion of out-of-home placement that occurred in April 2007. The trial court concluded it had “no statutory authority to terminate based on this reason because the amendment to section 39.806(1)(Z) was subsequent (July 1, 2008) to this action and the statute is not applied retroactively.”

We review de novo the trial court’s interpretation of section 39.806(1)(Z) and we conclude that the trial court erred as a matter of law in determining that it was precluded from considering out-of-home placements that preceded the effective date of the statute. Here, the most recent out-of-home placement which triggered the Department’s termination petition occurred after the enactment of section 39.806(1)(Z). And because the pivotal removal occurred after the effective date of July 1, 2008, a consideration of out-of-home placements predating the statute does not constitute retroactive application of the statute. The plain language of section 39.806(1)(Z) permits the trial court to consider the history of prior out-of-home placements, and it does not preclude a consideration of out-of-home placements predating the effective date of the statute.

Like other statutory provisions recognizing the danger posed by repetitive bad behavior, section 39.806(1)0 was designed to protect children when parents continually engage in conduct warranting out-of-home placement_ [And] there is nothing improper, retroactive, or violative of [a parent’s] rights in the [legislature’s decision to authorize the courts to consider additional factors when making termination of parental rights decisions.

Accordingly, we reverse the order denying the Department’s petition for termination of the mother’s parental rights, and we remand for the trial court to reevaluate the petition based on section 39.806(1)(Z).

Dismissed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

DAVIS and MORRIS, JJ., Concur.

      . See Heart of Adoptions, Inc. v. J.A., 963 So.2d 189, 194 (Fla.2007) (stating issues of statutory interpretation are subject to de novo review).

        . We therefore do not reach the issue of whether section 39.806(1)(Z) may be applied retroactively.

      . K.J. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 33 So.3d 88, 90 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (Hawkes, C.J., concurring).


author: PALMER, J.

text:
    Charles SCHOFIELD and Julia D. Schofield, Appellants, v. WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., et al., Appellees.
    No. 5D11-1935.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Aug. 31, 2012.
    Richard W. Withers, Craig R. Lynd, and Joanna Tolbert of Kaufman, Englett & Lynd, L.L.C., Orlando, for Appellant.
    Nancy C. Ciampa of Carlton Fields, P.A., Miami, and Michael K. Winston and Dean A. Morande of Carlton Fields, P.A., West Palm Beach, for Appellees.
   PALMER, J.

Charles and Julia Schofield appeal the non-final order entered by the trial court denying their motion to quash service of process. Because the process server failed to strictly comply with section 48.081(5), Florida Statutes (2009), we reverse.

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., filed a mortgage foreclosure complaint against the Schofields. A process server personally served Julia Schofield and served Charles, through Julia, with a summons, a copy of the complaint, and a notice of lis pendens. However, the process server failed to include the date and time of service, his identification number, or his initials on any of the documents served on the Schofields.

The Schofields filed a motion to quash service of process and a verification of pleading, asserting that the process server failed to comply with the terms of section 48.031(5), Florida Statutes (2009). The statute provides: “A person serving process shall place, on the copy served, the date and time of service and his or her identification number and initials for all service of process.” The trial court entered an order denying the Schofields’ motion.

The Schofields argue that the trial court should have granted their motion to quash because the process server failed to comply with section 48.031(5). We agree.

Service of process must strictly comply with all relevant statutory provisions. See Shurman v. Atl. Mortg. & Inv. Corp., 795 So.2d 952, 954 (Fla.2001) (holding that “statutes governing service of process are to be strictly construed and enforced”); Re-Employment Servs., Ltd. v. Nat’l Loan Acquisitions Co., 969 So.2d 467, 471 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007) (holding that “courts require strict construction of, and compliance with, the provisions of statutes governing service of process”). Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order denying the Schofields’ motion to quash service of process.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

ORFINGER, C.J., and EVANDER, J. concur.

      . Appellate jurisdiction is proper pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(3)(C)(i) (2011).


text:
    Oscar Nicholas DYER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D11-6609.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Sept. 5, 2012.
    Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and Steven L. Seliger, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Brooke Poland, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED. State v. Adkins, 96 So.3d 412, 2012 WL 2849485 (Fla.2012).

MARSTILLER, RAY, and SWANSON, JJ., concur.


text:
    Lena Mae ANDERSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D11-4945.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Sept. 5, 2012.
    Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and Steven L. Seliger, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Jennifer J. Moore, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED. State v. Adkins, 96 So.3d 412, 2012 WL 2849485 (Fla.2012).

MARSTILLER, RAY, and SWANSON, JJ., concur.


text:
    Charles Kimbrell GARRARD, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D11-5742.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Sept. 5, 2012.
    Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and Steven L. Seliger, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Charlie Mccoy, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED. State v. Adkins, 96 So.3d 412, 2012 WL 2849485 (Fla.2012).

MARSTILLER, RAY, and SWANSON, JJ., concur.


text:
    Susan HAMPTON-CARTER, Appellant, v. REEMPLOYMENT ASSISTANCE APPEALS COMMISSION and Reliable Alarm Technology, Appellee.
    No. 1D12-3588.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Sept. 7, 2012.

      Susan Hampton-Carter, pro se, Appellant.
    A. Robert Whaley, General Counsel, for Appellee Reemployment Assistance Appeals Commission, Tallahassee (no appearance).
   PER CURIAM.

DISMISSED. Fla. R.App. P. 9.110(c); see generally Raysor v. Raysor, 706 So.2d 400 (Fla. 1st DCA1998).

VAN NORTWICK, WETHERELL, and MAKAR, JJ., concur.


text:
    James Leroy SMITH, Petitioner, v. The STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 1D12-1181.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Sept. 7, 2012.
    Patrece C. Cashwell, Pensacola, for Petitioner.
    Pamela, Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Heather Flanagan Ross, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

Petitioner is granted a belated appeal of the January 8, 2012, judgments and sentences in Escambia County Circuit Court case numbers 2011-CF-002176A, 2011-CF-002643A and 2011-CF-002644A. Upon issuance of mandate in this cause, a copy of this opinion shall be provided to the clerk of the circuit court for treatment as the notice of appeal. Fla. R.App. P. 9.141(c)(6)(D). If petitioner qualifies for appointed counsel, the trial court shall appoint counsel to represent petitioner on appeal.

PETITION GRANTED.

WOLF, CLARK, and MARSTILLER, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Barbara ALVAREZ, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D11-1468.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    Sept. 12, 2012.
    Jack A. Fleischman of Fleischman & Fleischman, P.A., West Palm Beach, and Luis E. Reynoso of Law Offices of Walter A. Reynoso, P.A., Coral Gables, for appellant.
    No appearance required for appellee.
   On Request To Certify Question to the Florida Supreme Court

PER CURIAM.

We certify the following question, also certified in Barrios-Cruz v. State, 63 So.3d 868 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011), as a question of great public importance:

SHOULD THE RULING IN PADILLA V. KENTUCKY, — U.S. -, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 176 L.Ed.2d 284 (2010), BE APPLIED RETROACTIVELY IN POSTCONVTCTION PROCEEDINGS?

WARNER, POLEN and GROSS, JJ., concur.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Edmond D. SPENCER v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-1734.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 3, 2012.
   In re Spencer, Edmond D.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Washington, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. E, Nos. 0640746, 064076; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, Nos. 2011 KW 1806, 2012 KW 0717.

Relator represents that the district court has failed to act timely on a motion for production of transcripts of post-conviction proceedings and a motion for constructive contempt, pursuant to La.C.Cr.P. art. 23 filed on or about September 2, 2010. If relator’s representation is correct, the district court is ordered to consider and act on the motion(s). If relator’s representation is incorrect, the district court is ordered to accept, file and act upon the pleading which is herewith transferred to the district court. The district court is ordered to provide this Court with a copy of its judgment.


text:
    Clifford J. DUPLESSY v. Fulton A. DUPLESSY, Jr.
    No. 2012-C-1759.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 3, 2012.
   In re Duplessy Jr., Fulton A.; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 675-520; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 12-CA-69.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana in the Interest of K.B.
    No. 2012-CJ-1745.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 8, 2012.
   In re Louisiana Department of Children and Family; — Other; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 8489JJ; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 CW 1076.

Granted. Considering the procedural posture of this case, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the intervention. Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeal is reversed and the judgment of the district court is reinstated.

JOHNSON and KNOLL, JJ., would deny.


text:
    Jerianne Mcpherson SCHNEIDER v. David Glenn SCHNEIDER.
    No. 2012-CC-1793.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 9, 2012.
   In re Schneider, Jerianne Mcpherson;— Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Rapides, 9th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 244,109 G; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CM 12-737.

Stay denied. Writ denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Charles BARNES.
    No. 2012-KK-1421.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 10, 2012.
   In re Barnes, Charles; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. A, No. 504-844; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2012-K-0630.

Stay denied. Writ denied.


text:
    STATE in the Interest of E.M.M.
    No. 2012-CJ-1794.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 13, 2012.
   In re Louisiana Department of Children and Family Services; Office of Community Services; — Other(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. L, No. JC-20100077; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 12-229. .

Granted. The judgment of the court of appeal is reversed, and the judgment of the district court is reinstated for the reasons assigned by the dissenting judge in the court of appeal.

JOHNSON, J., would deny the writ.


text:
    Christopher JONES v. Lisa Marie Chatelain JONES.
    No. 2012-CJ-1789.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 13, 2012.
   In re Jones, Lisa Marie Chatelain;— Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. L, No. 2011-13039; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, Nos. 2012 CW 1068, 2012 CW 1075.

Stay denied. Writ denied.


text:
    LOUISIANA FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, et al. v. STATE of Louisiana, et al. Louisiana Association Of Educators, et al. v. State of Louisiana, et al. Louisiana School Boards’ Association, et al. v. State of Louisiana, et al.
    No. 2012-CC-1822.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 15, 2012.
   In re Louisiana Federation of Teachers; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 612733; 613142; 613320; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 CW 1255. •

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Ernest KING.
    No. 2012-KD-1850.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 15, 2012.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. D, No. 505-860; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2012-K-1212.

Denied. Moot.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Ernest KING.
    No. 2012-KD-1855.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 15, 2012.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. D, No. 505-860; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2012-K-1215.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Ernest KING.
    No. 2012-KD-1858.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 16, 2012.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. D, No. 505-860; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2012-K-1218.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Kenneth DAVIS.
    No. 2012-KK-1866.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 17, 2012.
   In re Davis, Kenneth; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 11-4403; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 12-K-541.

Stay denied. Writ denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Derrick CARTER.
    No. 2012-KD-1867.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 21, 2012.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. H, No. 511-184; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2012-K-1226.

Stay denied. Writ denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Michael JOHNSON.
    No. 2012-KK-1889.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 21, 2012.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. A, No. 511-782; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2012-K-1109.

Stay denied. Writ denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant stay.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Francis BRAUNER v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-OK-2631.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 22, 2012.
   In re Brauner, Francis; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. K, No. 394-652.

Granted. The district court is ordered to act expeditiously on relator’s application for post-conviction relief which the Docket Master for the Orleans Parish Criminal District Court indicates was filed on March 2, 2010. The court is further directed to provide this Court with a copy of its ruling when it has acted.

VICTORY and CLARK, JJ., would transfer the case to the court of appeal based on defendant’s intentional bypassing of that court.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Joseph LEMAR, Jr. v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-2771.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 22, 2012.
   In re Lemar Jr., Joseph; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 04-96-0375; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011 KW 1682.

Granted in part, otherwise denied. The district court is ordered to provided relator with a copy of the judgment denying relief of his application for post conviction relief. See La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.1; State ex rel. Hackett v. State, 96-0224 (La.2/2/96), 666 So.2d 1097; State ex rel. Foy v. State, 96-0225 (La.2/2/96), 666 So.2d 1097; State ex rel. Baker v. State, 95-2228 (La.12/8/95), 664 So.2d 410; State ex rel. Whittaker v. Lombard, 559 So.2d 116 (La.1990).


text:
    STATE ex rel. James CHARGOIS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-0166.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 22, 2012.
   In re Chargois, James; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Iberia, 16th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 96 CR-36; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 11-01165.

Granted in part; otherwise denied. If it has not already done so, the district court is ordered to provide relator with a copy of the judgment denying relief of his motion to correct an illegal sentence. See La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.1; State ex rel. Hackett v. State, 96-0224 (La.2/2/96), 666 So.2d 1097; State ex rel. Foy v. State, 96-0225 (La.2/2/96), 666 So.2d 1097; State ex rel. Baker v. State, 95-2228 (La.12/8/95), 664 So.2d 410; State ex rel. Whittaker v. Lombard, 559 So.2d 116 (La.1990).


text:
    STATE ex rel. Clinton SAM v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-2102.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 22, 2012.
   In re Sam, Clinton; — Plaintiff; Applying for Reconsideration of this Court’s action dated May 25, 2012, and from Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. P, No. 03-3995; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. ll-KH-805.

Reconsideration denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. King George MURRAY, III v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-2104.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 22, 2012.
   In re Murray III, King George; — Plaintiff; Applying for Reconsideration of this Court’s action dated June 22, 2012, and from Parish of Ouachita, 4th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 94-F0167; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 46,-830-KH.

Reconsideration denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Mario CHARLES v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-2196.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 22, 2012.
   In re Charles, Mario; — Plaintiff; Applying for Reconsideration of this Court’s action dated May 25, 2012, and from Parish of Terrebonne, 32nd Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 345943; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011 KW 1347.

Reconsideration denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Dino Jay SCHWERTZ v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-2281.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 22, 2012.
   In re Schwertz, Dino Jay; — Plaintiff; Applying for Reconsideration of this Court’s action dated May 25, 2012, and from Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. 1, No. 449563; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011 KW 1373.

Reconsideration denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Archie TYNER v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-2283.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 22, 2012.
   In re Tyner, Archie; — Plaintiff; Applying for Reconsideration of this Court’s action dated June 1, 2012, and from Parish of Webster, 26th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 51565; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 46,856-KH.

Reconsideration denied.


text:
    Michael SHOEMAKER v. James LeBLANC, Secretary, Department Of Public Safety And Corrections; Burl Cain, Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary; Gary Aymond; and Preston Bordelon.
    No. 2011-CI-2390.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 22, 2012.
   In re Michael Shoemaker; — Plaintiff; Applying for Reconsideration of this Court’s Order dated June 15, 2012; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit No. 2011 CA 0210; Parish of East Baton Rouge; 19th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 564,534.

Reconsideration denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Aaron LEAGEA v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2009-KH-2209.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 22, 2012.
   In re Leagea, Aaron; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 04-85-1269; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2009 KW 1260.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. James THOMAS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2009-KH-2505.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 22, 2012.
   In re Thomas, James; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. J, No. 308-887; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, Nos. 2009-K-0692, 2009-K-1223.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. James THOMAS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-2007.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 22, 2012.
   In re Thomas, James; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. J, No. 308-887; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2010-K-0996.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Derrick K. RICK v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-1414.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 22, 2012.
   In re Rick, Derrick K.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Tangipahoa, 21st Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 98377; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011 KW 0383.

Denied. The result is correct.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Eugene TOBIAS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-1570.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 22, 2012.
   In re Tobias, Eugene; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. I, No. 286-384; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-K-0813.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Terrence LEE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-2067.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 22, 2012.
   In re Lee, Terrence; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Bienville, 2nd Judicial District Court Div. C, Nos. 44532, 44726, 41519, 41369, 43648, 43442, 43137, 42410, 41730; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 46,835-CW.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Victor DURDEN v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-2199.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 22, 2012.
   In re Durden, Victor; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. 3, No. 207087; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 46919-KH.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Michael BATES v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-2446.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 22, 2012.
   In re Bates, Michael; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory , and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Charles, to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. ll-KA-721.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Michael BISHOP v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-2541.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 22, 2012.
   In re Bishop, Michael; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Terrebonne, 32nd Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 381798; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011 KW 1721.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Freddie James WHEELER v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-2610.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 22, 2012.
   In re Wheeler, Freddie James; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. K, No. 117886; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 11-00111.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. John Fitzgerald BONVILLAIN, Sr. v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-2626.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 22, 2012.
   In re Bonvillain Sr., John F.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Terrebonne, 32nd Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 443,293; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011 KW 1408.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Shedrick BRUMFIELD v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-2627.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 22, 2012.
   In re Brumfield, Shedrick; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 272390; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011 KW 1567.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. George BROWN v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-2628.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 22, 2012.
   In re Brown, George; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Tangipahoa, 21st Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 701318; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011 KW 1617.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Dwayne JACKSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-2629.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 22, 2012.
   In re Jackson, Dwayne; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Tangipahoa, 21st Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 79832; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011 KW 1659.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Edmond D. SPENCER v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-2667.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 22, 2012.
   In re Spencer, Edmond D.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Washington, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 96-CR1-064076; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011-KW-1493.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Ray BINGHAM v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-2669.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 22, 2012.
   In re Bingham, Ray; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Franklin, 5th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 2004-F6B7; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 46,-939-KH.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Jemetric DEBROW v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-2679.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 22, 2012.
   In re Debrow, Jemetric; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. 3, No. 186,019; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 47,-070-KH.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Edward R. WYNN v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-2735.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 22, 2012.
   In re Wynn, Edward R.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. B, No. 272-897; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-K-1537.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    Garry U. JONES, Sr. v. LOUISIANA BOARD OF PAROLE, Jake Jacobs, Winzer Andrews & Greta Jones.
    No. 2011-CI-2736.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 22, 2012.
   In re Jones Sr., Garry U.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. O, No. 596,242; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011 CA 0756.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Percy ALLEN v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-2739.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 22, 2012.
   In re Allen, Percy; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. F, No. 474-262; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-K-1534.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Alvin MEAD v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-2753.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 22, 2012.
   In re Mead, Alvin; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. H, No. 395-920; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-K-1449.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Darrol B. BROWN v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-2755.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 22, 2012.
   In re Brown, Darrol B.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Rapides, 9th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 261,509; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, Nos. KH 11-01196, KH 11-01202.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.