author: CARLSON, Presiding Justice,

text:
    John Willis GILBERT, Jr. v. STATE of Mississippi.
    No. 2009-KA-01539-SCT.
    Supreme Court of Mississippi.
    Nov. 10, 2010.

      Office of Indigent Appeals by Leslie S. Lee, Jackson, Phillip W. Broadhead, Oxford, attorneys for appellant.
    Office of the Attorney General by Stephanie Breland Wood, attorney for appel-lee.
    Before CARLSON, P.J., RANDOLPH and KITCHENS, JJ.
   CARLSON, Presiding Justice,

for the Court:

¶ 1. John Gilbert, Jr. was convicted of aggravated assault stemming from an incident between him and Alice Stapleton. Gilbert was sentenced as a habitual offender to life in prison without parole under Mississippi Code Section 99-19-83 (Rev. 2007). After the trial judge denied Gilbert’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or in the alternative, a new trial, Gilbert perfected this appeal, alleging errors at the trial-court level. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court of Coahoma County.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE TRIAL COURT

¶ 2. Gilbert and Stapleton were romantically involved prior to the altercation between them. At one point, Gilbert and Stapleton lived together, despite Gilbert’s being married to another woman. Eventually, Stapleton moved out of their apartment, and Gilbert frequently visited Sta-pleton at her new apartment.

¶ 3. The altercation between Gilbert and Stapleton occurred on December 18, 2008. Gilbert, Stapleton, and Stapleton’s daughter, Jamie Stapleton (Jamie), all were in Stapleton’s apartment watching television. Stapleton was lying on a sofa under some sheets when the altercation began. The testimony as to what occurred during the altercation is in dispute. Gilbert testified that, while he was leaning over Stapleton to kiss her goodbye, she pulled out a knife and swung it at him. He testified that he and Stapleton struggled over the knife and that he eventually took the knife from Stapleton, dropped it, and ran out the door.

¶ 4. Stapleton testified that Gilbert stabbed her while she was lying on the sofa. She testified that Gilbert first stabbed her in the ear while she was lying down and then in the chest, left arm, and back of the neck after she had stood up. Stapleton also testified that she and Gilbert had struggled over the knife and that he eventually had run out the back door of the apartment.

¶ 5. Jamie testified that she fell asleep while watching television but woke up when she heard her mother and Gilbert struggling. She testified that she saw Gilbert stab Stapleton and that Stapleton attempted to fight off Gilbert. Jamie then began hitting Gilbert and told him to stop.

¶ 6. Officer Sims, a criminal investigator with the Clarksdale Police Department, was assigned to investigate the case. Sims testified a large amount of blood and several blood-soaked bandages were on the floor of Stapleton’s apartment. After viewing the scene, Sims went to Gilbert’s home and knocked on his door. When Gilbert came to the door, his clothes had blood on them, and he had a large cut on his hand. Sims placed Gilbert under arrest and took him to the police department.

¶ 7. At trial, Sims testified that Gilbert had refused to speak with him after he had given Gilbert his Miranda rights. Defense counsel objected to this testimony and moved for a mistrial. The trial judge sustained the objection, overruled the motion for a mistrial, and admonished the jury to disregard Sims’s statement.

¶ 8. Sims also bagged Gilbert’s belt, shirt, and pants and took the items to the Mississippi Crime Laboratory, along with blood samples from both Stapleton and Gilbert. A forensic pathologist testified that seven of the eight stains on Gilbert’s clothing matched his DNA and one matched Stapleton’s DNA. During his testimony, the forensic pathologist referred to Stapleton as the “victim.” Defense counsel previously had filed a motion in limine to prohibit testimony referring to Staple-ton as the “victim.” The trial court denied this motion but granted Gilbert a continuing objection to the use of the term “victim.”

¶9. The jury found Gilbert guilty of aggravated assault. Gilbert then moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), or in the alternative, a new trial, and the trial court denied this motion. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court granted the State’s motion to amend the habitual-offender portion of Gilbert’s indictment to reflect the correct crimes for which Gilbert previously had been convicted. Gilbert was sentenced to life in prison as a habitual offender under Mississippi Code Section 99-19-83. See Miss.Code Ann. § 99-19-83 (Rev.2007).

DISCUSSION

¶ 10. Gilbert presents four issues for this Court’s consideration: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying Gilbert’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, motion for new trial; (2) whether the trial court erred in denying Gilbert’s motion for mistrial; (3) whether the trial court erred in allowing testimony referring to Stapleton as the “victim;” and (4) whether Gilbert’s sentencing as a habitual offender under Mississippi Code Section 99-19-83 was proper.

I. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING GILBERT’S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL.

¶ 11. Gilbert asserts that the trial court erred in failing to grant his motion for JNOV because the evidence presented by the State was insufficient. Also, Gilbert asserts that the trial court erred in failing to grant his motion for new trial because the jury verdict was against the great weight of the evidence.

A. Gilbert’s Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict

¶ 12. Gilbert claims the trial court erred in denying his motion for JNOV because the State did not present sufficient evidence to meet the required burden of proof. In analyzing the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and asks if “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Bush v. State, 895 So.2d 836, 843 (Miss.2005) (quoting Jackson v. Va., 443 U.S. 307, 315, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979)). A person is guilty of aggravated assault if he “attempts to cause or purposely or knowingly causes bodily injury to another with a deadly weapon or other means likely to produce death or serious bodily harm.” Miss.Code Ann. § 97-3-7(2)(b) (Rev.2006).

¶ 13. Gilbert argues that no rational trier of fact could have found him guilty, because the witness testimony offered against him was biased and, as a result, the testimony was not credible. Two of the witnesses offered by the State against Gilbert were Stapleton and her daughter, Jamie. First, Gilbert asserts that Staple-ton’s testimony was biased because she was motivated to protect herself from potential prosecution resulting from the altercation with Gilbert and because she was jealous of Gilbert’s relationship with his wife. Secondly, Gilbert claims Jamie’s testimony was biased because she was pregnant and was motivated to testify in favor of her mother in order to have a place to live. Further, Gilbert argues that the testimony of Stapleton and Jamie was inconsistent with their pretrial statements and the evidence found at the scene.

¶ 14. The State presented photographic evidence of Stapleton’s injuries, and Stapleton and Jamie both testified that Gilbert had stabbed Stapleton. This Court may not “pass upon the credibility of witnesses and, where the evidence justifies a verdict, it must be accepted as having been found worthy of belief.” Massey v. State, 992 So.2d 1161, 1163 (Miss.2008) (quoting Davis v. State, 568 So.2d 277, 281 (Miss.1990)).

¶ 15. When the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, “a rational trier of fact could have found” beyond a reasonable doubt that Gilbert was guilty of aggravated assault. Bush, 895 So.2d at 843 (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 315, 99 S.Ct. 2781). Thus, the trial court did not err when it denied Gilbert’s motion for'JNOV attacking the sufficiency of the evidence.

B. Gilbert’s Motion for New Trial

¶ 16. Gilbert claims the trial court erred in denying his motion for new trial because the verdict was against the great weight of the evidence. When reviewing the denial of a motion for new trial, this Court will “only disturb a verdict when it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence that to allow it to stand would sanction an unconscionable injustice.” Bush, 895 So.2d at 844 (citing Herring v. State, 691 So.2d 948, 957 (Miss.1997)). The Court should grant a new trial only “in exceptional cases in which the evidence preponderates heavily against the verdict.” Id. (quoting Amiker v. Drugs for Less, Inc., 796 So.2d 942, 947 (Miss.2000)).

¶ 17. Both Stapleton and Jamie testified that Gilbert had assaulted Stapleton. Also, Stapleton’s blood was found on Gilbert’s clothing, and Stapleton had five wounds resulting from the attack. This is not an exceptional case “in which the evidence preponderates heavily against the verdict.” Id. (quoting Amiker, 796 So.2d at 947). Accordingly, the trial judge did not err in denying Gilbert’s motion for a new trial.

¶ 18. In sum, we find that the trial judge did not err when he dismissed Gilbert’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or in the alternative, a new trial. Thus, there is no merit to this issue.

II. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING GILBERT’S MOTION FOR MISTRIAL.

¶ 19. Gilbert claims that the trial court erred when it denied his motion for mistrial after Officer Sims testified to Gilbert’s exercise of his Miranda rights. Specifically, Officer Sims testified that he had read Gilbert his Miranda rights and then Gilbert had “refused to speak with [him] about the incident.” Gilbert’s attorney promptly objected to the testimony and moved for mistrial. The trial court sustained the objection, denied the motion for mistrial, and then admonished the jury to disregard Officer Sims’s statement.

¶ 20. The standard of review for denial of a motion for mistrial is abuse of discretion. Rollins v. State, 970 So.2d 716, 720 (Miss.2007) (citing Withers v. State, 907 So.2d 342, 352 (Miss.2005)). “The trial court must declare a mistrial when there is an error in the proceedings resulting in substantial and irreparable prejudice to the defendant’s case.” Gossett v. State, 660 So.2d 1285, 1290 (Miss.1995) (citing URCCC 5.15). The trial court has “considerable discretion in determining whether a mistrial is warranted since the judge is best positioned for measuring the prejudicial effect.” Id. (citing Roundtree v. State, 568 So.2d 1173, 1178 (Miss.1990)). If the trial judge determines that the error did not result in substantial and irreparable prejudice, the “judge should admonish the jury to disregard the impropriety in order to cure its prejudicial effect.” Id. at 1291 (citing Perkins v. State, 600 So.2d 938, 941 (Miss.1992)).

¶ 21. Gilbert asserts that Officer Sims’s testimony regarding Gilbert’s invoking his right to silence violated his constitutional right to a fair trial. Officer Sims testified to the events that occurred after he had located Gilbert. The following is the relevant part of the testimony:

[Prosecutor]: “Once you — so once you located him, what, if anything, did you do?”
Officer Sims: “Well, I knocked on the door of the residence, and a gentleman opened the door which was not Mr. Gilbert. I asked him if Mr. Gilbert was at the residence. He said that he was. He kind of went back further in to the residence. Mr. Gilbert came to the door. He had blood-stained clothing. He had a large cut on his hand. At that time, I placed him under arrest, took him to the Clarksdale Police Department and read him his Miranda Rights and attempted to interview him, and he refused to speak with me about the incident.”
[Gilbert’s Attorney]: “I’m going to object to this.”
Court: “I sustain the — well, exactly what are you objecting to?”
[Gilbert’s Attorney]: “I’m objecting to his — may we approach the bench, your Honor?”
Counsel approached the bench.
Court: “Sure.”
[Gilbert’s Attorney]: “The officer says that he — I’m objecting to the fact that the officer is testifying that the defendant refused to talk to him. He had no obligation to talk to him.”
Court: “Counsel is expanding on some of his answers. He needs to restrict his answers to the questions that are asked. You know, he simply asked — I mean he advised him of his Miranda Rights. That answers the question.”
[Prosecutor]: “I was trying not to lead, but with the Court’s indulgence, I’ll lead a little more.”
Court: “I’ll give you some limited latitude.”
[Prosecutor]: “I’m not trying.”
[Gilbert’s Attorney]: “I would like again to move for a mistrial.”
Court: “I’ll sustain the objection, but I will overrule the objection for a mistrial.”
All counsel return from the bench.
Court: “The jury will disregard the last comment with regard to the defendant’s statement. The defendant can — actually they have a constitutional right to speak or not to speak, and if a defendant exercises his constitutional right not to speak, that is his right.”

¶ 22. “It is improper and ordinarily, reversible error to comment on the accused’s post-Miranda silence.” Emery v. State, 869 So.2d 405, 408 (Miss.2004) (citing Quick v. State, 569 So.2d 1197,1199 (Miss.1990)). However, there are exceptions to this general rule. Id. Specifically, when the defendant’s post-Miranda rights are mentioned only once and the judge admonishes the jury concerning the statement, the violation will not result in reversible error. Higgins v. State, 502 So.2d 332, 335 (Miss.1987); see also Williams v. State, 445 So.2d 798, 806 (Miss.1984) (holding that the trial court did not commit reversible error when it refused to grant defendant’s motion for mistrial after a testifying police officer referred to defendant’s exercise of Miranda rights only once and the judge admonished the jury to disregard the remark).

¶ 23. In Higgins, the testifying officer stated that after he had given the defendant his Miranda rights, the defendant had stated “I want to talk to my lawyer.” Higgins, 502 So.2d at 334. The defense attorney then objected and moved for a mistrial. Id. The trial judge sustained the objection and then admonished the jury to disregard the officer’s statement. Id. This Court found that, because there was only a single reference to the defendant’s exercise of his Miranda rights and the judge had admonished the jury to disregard the testimony, the statement had not resulted in reversible error. Id. at 3B5.

¶ 24. Similar to Higgins and Williams, in the present case, there was only one mention of Gilbert’s exercise of his Miranda rights. Further, the trial judge promptly admonished the jury to disregard Officer Sims’s comment. Accordingly, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion when he denied Gilbert’s motion for a mistrial; therefore, we find this issue to have no merit.

III. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING TESTIMONY REFERRING TO ALICE STAPLETON AS THE “VICTIM.”

¶ 25. When this Court considers on appeal an assignment of error directed at the trial court’s admission or exclusion of evidence, our standard of review is abuse of discretion. Clark v. State, 40 So.3d 531, 542 (Miss.2010) (citing Evans v. State, 25 So.3d 1054, 1057 (Miss.2010)).

¶ 26. Gilbert asserts that the trial court erred by allowing an expert witness for the State to refer to Stapleton as the “victim.” Gilbert previously had filed a motion in limine requesting that the trial court disallow any testimony referring to Stapleton as the “victim;” however, the trial court denied this motion. But the trial court granted Gilbert a continuing objection to the use of the term “victim” throughout the trial.

¶ 27. During Gilbert’s trial, an expert witness testified to the results of DNA tests conducted on the blood stains on Gilbert’s clothing. Gilbert asserts that the trial court erred in allowing the following testimony: “There was one blood stain found on the pants that is consistent with the referenced blood stain sample of the victim. Therefore, Alice Stapleton is not excluded as a DNA donor to this sample.”

¶ 28. While this Court has not reviewed the issue of a witness referring to an accuser as “the victim,” we find the reasoning of the Court of Appeals in Taconi v. State, 912 So.2d 154, 156-57 (Miss.Ct.App.2005), to be sound, and accordingly adopt the holding. In Taconi, the Court of Appeals held that it was not reversible error for a prosecutor to refer to the accuser as the “victim,” despite the trial court previously having granted a motion in limine on those grounds. Id.

¶29. We find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the testimony referring to Stapleton as the “victim.” The trial court previously had denied Gilbert’s motion in limine regarding the term “victim,” and the use of the word was isolated and not emphasized. Therefore, we find no merit in this assignment of error.

IV. WHETHER GILBERT’S SENTENCING AS A HABITUAL OFFENDER UNDER MISSISSIPPI CODE SECTION 99-19-83 WAS PROPER.

¶ 30. Gilbert was sentenced to life in prison as a habitual offender under Mississippi Code Section 99-19-83 (Rev.2007). Gilbert asserts two reasons in support of his claim of error regarding his sentence. First, Gilbert claims that the State’s amendment to his indictment was one of substance rather than form. Second, Gilbert claims that the State’s speculation as to the meanings of abbreviations contained within certain documents resulted in a failure of the State to meet its burden of proof at the sentencing hearing.

A. Amendment of the Indictment

¶ 31. “The question of whether an indictment is fatally defective is an issue of law and enjoys a relatively broad standard of review.” Conley v. State, 790 So.2d 773, 781 (Miss.2001) (citing Peterson v. State, 671 So.2d 647, 652 (Miss.1996)). Indictments may be amended only as to form, never substance. Evans v. State, 813 So.2d 724, 728 (Miss.2002) (quoting Mitchell v. State, 739 So.2d 402, 404 (Miss.Ct.App.1999)). An amendment regarding the habitual-offender status of an indictment is permissible, as it affects only sentencing and not substance. Burrell v. State, 726 So.2d 160, 162 (Miss.1998).

¶ 32. Gilbert’s original indictment listed four offenses in the habitual-offender section: intimidating a witness, unlawful use of a phone, obstructing an officer, and attempted homicide. All convictions occurred in Wisconsin. However, Gilbert was not convicted of attempted homicide in Wisconsin, because he had pleaded guilty to a lesser charge of first-degree reckless endangerment. At the sentencing hearing in today’s case, the State moved to amend the indictment to reflect the conviction of first-degree reckless endangerment, rather than attempted homicide. Gilbert’s original indictment contained the following language:

and upon conviction the said defendant is hereby charged under MCA § 99-19-83 to be .sentenced to life imprisonment, and/or under MCA § 99-19-81 to be sentenced to the maximum term of imprisonment prescribed for such felony, namely, twenty (20) years, and such sentence shall not be reduced or suspended nor shall such person be eligible for parole or probation; in that the said defendant shall, then and there have been convicted at least twice previously of a felony or federal crime upon charges separately brought and arising out of separate incidents at different times, and shall have been sentenced to and served separate terms of one (1) year or more in this state or elsewhere; and to the extent that the specifics of said convictions and sentences are known to the Grand Jury at this time, they are more particularly described as follows:
the above specifics may be and shall be amended whether by addition, deletion, substitution, or in any other manner whatsoever as many times as necessary to correctly state the specifics of any and all convictions, including, but not limited to the above, relevant to the above charge that the defendant shall be sentenced under MCA § 99-19-83 and/or MCA § 99-19-81.

¶ 33. In Lacy v. State, 629 So.2d 591, 594 (Miss.1993), this Court found no error in the trial court’s permitting an amendment to the indictment to reflect the actual crimes for which the defendant previously had been convicted. In Lacy, the defendant’s original indictment listed three Nevada convictions for burglary, conspiracy to commit burglary, and attempted grand larceny. Id. The indictment was amended to reflect the actual crimes for which the defendant was convicted: attempted burglary, conspiracy to commit robbery, and attempted grand larceny. Id. This Court held that the trial court did not err in allowing these amendments, because the amendments did not deprive the defendant of fair notice or impair his ability to defend. Id. at 595.

¶ 34. Similar to Lacy, the amendment to Gilbert’s indictment reflected the actual crime for which he was convicted. This amendment affects only sentencing, not the substance of Gilbert’s indictment. Accordingly, the trial court did not err when it allowed the amendment.

B. Burden of Proof Under Mississippi Code Section 99-19-83

¶ 35. The State must prove habitual-offender status beyond a reasonable doubt. Dalgo v. State, 435 So.2d 628, 630-31 (Miss.1983). The State charged Gilbert as a habitual offender under Section 99-19-83, which reads as follows:

Every person convicted in this state of a felony who shall have been convicted twice previously of any felony or federal crime upon charges separately brought and arising out of separate incidents at different times and who shall have been sentenced to and served separate terms of one (1) year or more in any state and/or federal penal institution, whether in this state or elsewhere, and where any one (1) of such felonies shall have been a crime of violence shall be sentenced to life imprisonment, and such sentence shall not be reduced or suspended nor shall such person be eligible for parole or probation.

Miss.Code Ann. § 99-19-83 (Rev.2007).

¶ 36. Gilbert claims that the State did not meet its burden of proof because it speculated as to the meaning of abbreviations in certain documents used to enhance the sentence under the habitual-offender statute. The trial court and the prosecutor discussed the meaning of some abbreviations contained in these documents during the sentencing hearing. Specifically, the trial court and prosecutor discussed whether “int.” meant “intentional,” if “eond.” meant “conditional,” and if “inj.” meant “injury.”

¶ 37. The trial court stated that it was satisfied that the State had met its burden of proof concerning the requirements of Section 99-19-83 such that Gilbert should be sentenced to life without parole as a Section 99-19-83 habitual offender. The trial court found that Gilbert previously had been convicted of at least two felonies, intimidation of a witness and reckless endangerment; that Gilbert had served one year or more for each crime; and that reckless endangerment was a crime of violence. The trial court’s judgment of conviction and sentence stated that Gilbert had been:

convicted at least twice previously of felony crimes in the State of Wisconsin, upon charges separately brought and arising out of separate incidents at different times, and on each said previous conviction the defendant was sentenced to and served separate terms of one (1) year or more in the State of Wisconsin penal institutions, at least one of such prior felonies also being a crime of violence.

¶ 38. We find from the record before us that the trial court did not err in finding that the State had presented sufficient evidence showing that Gilbert had met the requirements of Section 99-19-83. The discussion between the State and the trial court as to the meanings of some abbreviations in the sentencing documentation did not show that the State had failed to meet its burden of proof. As to Gilbert’s conviction of first-degree reckless endangerment, the Wisconsin documents clearly reveal that Gilbert was convicted of “[rjeckless endanger 1st Deg; Use of Weapon in Crime.” Therefore, the trial court did not err in sentencing Gilbert as a habitual offender under Section 99-19-83.

¶ 39. Based on our discussion on this issue, we find no merit in this assignment of error.

CONCLUSION

¶ 40. For the reasons stated, we affirm John Willis Gilbert, Jr.’s conviction and sentence as imposed by the Coahoma County Circuit Court.

¶ 41. CONVICTION OF AGGRAVATED ASSAULT AND SENTENCE OF LIFE IMPRISONMENT, AS A HABITUAL OFFENDER, IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, AFFIRMED. SENTENCE SHALL NOT BE REDUCED OR SUSPENDED NOR SHALL APPELLANT BE ELIGIBLE FOR PAROLE OR PROBATION. SENTENCE SHALL RUN CONSECUTIVE TO ANY AND ALL SENTENCES PREVIOUSLY IMPOSED.

WALLER, C.J., GRAVES, P.J., DICKINSON, RANDOLPH, LAMAR, KITCHENS, CHANDLER AND PIERCE, JJ., CONCUR.

      . Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-68, 471, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: GRAVES, Presiding Justice,

license: Public Domain

text:
    Rochester Eugene PRESLEY a/k/a Ronald Starks a/k/a Zee Zee Zelazurra a/k/a Zee Zee Zela Zuro. v. STATE of Mississippi.
    No. 2007-CP-01193-SCT.
    Supreme Court of Mississippi.
    Nov. 18, 2010.

      Rochester Eugene Presley, appellant, pro se.
    Office of the Attorney General by Billy L. Gore, attorney for appellee.
    Before GRAVES, P.J., DICKINSON and CHANDLER, JJ.
   GRAVES, Presiding Justice,

for the Court.

¶ 1. On November 12, 2004, Rochester Presley pleaded guilty to grand larceny. The Circuit Court of Forrest County, Mississippi, Judge Robert B. Helfrich presiding, sentenced Presley to ten years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC) with all ten years suspended upon Presley’s good behavior and compliance with the conditions of probation. On June 2, 2005, the trial court held a probation-revocation hearing and found that Presley had violated the terms and conditions of his probation, and sentenced Presley to serve the remainder of his sentence in the custody of MDOC. Presley now appeals.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW

¶2. On November 12, 2004, Presley pleaded guilty to grand larceny and was sentenced to serve ten years in the custody of MDOC with all ten years suspended for good behavior and compliance with the conditions of probation. Specifically, as a condition of Presley’s probation, he was not to commit any offenses against the laws of this state or any other state. After being released on probation, Presley was accompanied by Derrick Minor, an investigator for the Office of the Public Defender, to the Greyhound Bus Station. While Minor knew Presley had a bus ticket, he did not wait around to see Presley get on the bus.

¶ 3. Only hours after being released on probation, Presley broke into Grayco Systems in Hattiesburg, Mississippi, taking, among other things, keys to a 1995 Ford F-150 pickup truck and the F-150 truck itself. Although some details are not clear from the record, Presley drove the stolen truck to Orangeburg County, South Carolina, where the truck was found.

¶ 4. Upon discovering the truck, Officer Richard Murphy of the Orangeburg Sheriffs Department found Presley approximately 300 yards away from the truck. Presley told Officer Murphy that the truck was his uncle’s. After checking the vehicle identification number, Officer Murphy discovered that the truck was stolen. Officer Murphy then placed Presley under arrest. While patting Presley down, officers found the set of keys to the truck in Presley’s pocket. Presley subsequently was tried and convicted of commercial burglary and grand larceny.

¶ 5. On May 24, 2005, the district attorney filed a petition for revocation, alleging that Presley had violated the terms of his suspended sentence by committing commercial burglary and grand larceny. That same day, Presley was served with a notice of hearing on the petition for revocation. On June 2, 2005, a hearing was held in the Circuit Court of Forrest County, Judge Robert B. Helfrich presiding.

¶ 6. At the hearing, Detective Rusty Keyes of the Hattiesburg Police Department testified that Presley was arrested in Orangeburg, South Carolina, for possession of the stolen truck. Det. Keyes stated that, based on his investigation, he had concluded that Presley had stolen the truck. This conclusion was based on the fact that Presley was discovered within approximately 300 yards of the vehicle and had the keys in his pocket. In addition, computer wires belonging to computers that were stolen from Grayco were found in the stolen truck. Upon cross-examination of Det. Keyes, Presley pointed out that Det. Keyes did not personally discover the truck keys on Presley. However, Det. Keyes stated that he was the supervising detective for the Hattiesburg Police Department and that the Orangeburg Sheriffs Office had reported to him that it had found the keys to the truck on Presley. Furthermore, Presley was given the opportunity to make closing remarks regarding the incident in South Carolina. At all times Presley denied involvement in stealing the truck from Grayco Systems and driving it to South Carolina.

¶ 7. Notwithstanding Presley’s claim, the trial court found that Presley was in violation of the terms and conditions of his probation, thereby revoking his probation, and sentencing Presley to the remainder of the ten-year sentence. Thereafter, Presley filed his motion for post-conviction relief. On June 22, 2007, the trial court entered its Opinion and Order denying Presley’s motion. Presley now appeals the trial court’s judgment.

ANALYSIS

¶ 8. On appeal, Presley contends that he was denied due process when he was not provided a preliminary hearing for the purpose of determining whether probable cause existed to believe that he had violated a condition of his probation as required by the Supreme Court of the United States in Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973) (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972)).

¶ 9. At the outset, we note that our Court of Appeals, in Hubbard v. State, 919 So.2d 1022, 1027 (Miss.Ct.App.2005), held that a defendant is procedurally barred from arguing that he was denied the right to a preliminary hearing where the defendant failed to raise the issue at his formal revocation hearing. It is clear from the record that Presley failed to raise the issue that he was denied the right to a preliminary hearing at his formal revocation hearing. Therefore, we find that Presley is procedurally barred from raising this issue on appeal.

¶ 10. Notwithstanding the procedural bar, Presley’s claim is without merit. “When reviewing a lower court’s decision to deny a petition for post-conviction relief this Court will not disturb the trial court’s factual findings unless they are found to be clearly erroneous. However, when questions of law are raised the applicable standard of review is de novo.” Brown v. State, 731 So.2d 595, 598 (Miss.1999) (citing Bank of Miss. v. S. Mem’l Park, Inc., 677 So.2d 186, 191 (Miss.1996)).

¶ 11. When facing a revocation of probation, a probationer is entitled to a preliminary hearing and a final revocation hearing. Riely v. State, 562 So.2d 1206, 1210 (Miss.1990) (citing Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 786, 93 S.Ct. 1756). The purpose of a preliminary revocation hearing is to determine that reasonable grounds exist for revocation by someone not directly involved in the case and to determine if probable cause exists to believe that a violation has been committed. Berdin v. State, 648 So.2d 73, 76 (Miss.1994). Further, the minimum due-process requirements for a final revocation hearing include:

(a) written notice of the claimed violations of [probation or] parole; (b) disclosure to the [probationer or] parolee of evidence against him; (c) opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses [unless the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation]; (e) a ‘neutral and detached’ hearing body such as a parole board, members of which need not be judicial officers or lawyers; and (f) a written statement by the factfinder as to the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking [probation or] parole.

Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 786, 93 S.Ct. 1756 (quoting Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489, 92 S.Ct. 2593).

¶ 12. Presley argued that he never received notice of a preliminary hearing, thereby preventing him from being able to call witnesses and present evidence on his behalf. He further alleged that he never received a preliminary hearing. This Court finds that, although Presley did not receive a “preliminary hearing,” Presley was afforded all the necessary due-process safeguards required for the decision of whether probable cause existed to revoke his probation as required by Gagnon.

¶ 13. This Court further finds that this case is similar to Rusche v. State, 813 So.2d 787 (Miss.Ct.App.2002), and that the same reasoning should be applied. In Rusche, the defendant complained that he did not receive due process as required by Morrissey and Gagnon because he was not given both a preliminary probable-cause hearing and a more formal final hearing. Rusche, 813 So.2d at 789-790. Essentially, Rusche argued that he was given only one hearing and that he was constitutionally entitled to another hearing before his probation could be revoked. However, the Court of Appeals likened Rusche’s situation with that of a suspect who is arrested and confined. The Court of Appeals reasoned:

Under procedural rules arising out of due process considerations, that suspect is entitled to a preliminary hearing to determine probable cause to continue his confinement shortly after his arrest. URCCC 6.03; Johnson v. State, 749 So.2d 306, 308 (Miss.Ct.App.1999). If such a hearing is not conducted and the suspect is subsequently tried, convicted, and sentenced, then the failure to grant a preliminary hearing, though clearly erroneous, is, nevertheless, subjected to harmless error analysis. Esparam v. State, 595 So.2d 418, 423 (Miss.1992). The rationale behind that ruling lies in the fact that an illegal detention, of itself, does not act to vitiate a subsequent conviction. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 119, 95 S.Ct. 854, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975).
We can determine no appropriate reason to apply a different line of reasoning to the matter now before us. Under harmless error analysis, the failure to provide Rusche with an immediate informal ‘probable cause’ hearing shortly after the State began proceedings to revoke his probation will not be seen to render ineffective the subsequent formal proceeding at which Rusche was afforded all the due process protections required under Morrissey unless there is some showing of prejudice to Rusche arising out of the failure to conduct the hearing — that prejudice necessarily extending beyond the issue of the State’s right to continue his confinement in the interim.

Rusche, 813 So.2d at 790.

¶ 14. In this case, although a preliminary hearing was not conducted, Presley was given a full hearing on the issue of revocation of probation. Thus, the failure to grant such a preliminary hearing, though clearly erroneous, should, nevertheless, be subjected to harmless-error analysis. Rusche, 818 So.2d at 790 (citing Esparaza v. State, 595 So.2d 418, 423 (Miss.1992)).

¶ 15. Under harmless-error analysis, we find the failure to provide Presley with a preliminary probable-cause hearing did not render ineffective the formal proceeding at which Presley was afforded all the due-process protections required by Mor-rissey, and Presley was not prejudiced by the trial court’s failure to hold a preliminary hearing. Rusche, 813 So.2d at 790.

¶ 16. On May 24, 2005, Presley was served with notice in the form of a Notice of Hearing on the Petition to Revoke Suspended Sentence by the Forrest County Sheriffs Department. On June 2, 2005, the trial court held a hearing at which testimony for both sides was presented to the trial court. The trial court thereafter concluded that Presley had violated the terms and conditions of his suspended sentence and revoked his probation. Thus, the trial court provided Presley with all the due-process protections required under Morrissey and Gagnon as to the determination of whether probable cause existed to believe Presley had violated the conditions of his probation. Therefore, this Court finds that Presley was not prejudiced and accordingly concludes that the trial court’s failure to hold a preliminary probable-cause hearing was harmless error.

CONCLUSION

¶ 17. This Court finds that Presley was afforded all the due-process safeguards required by Morrissey and Gagnon and concludes that the trial court’s failure to conduct a preliminary probable cause hearing was harmless error. Accordingly, the trial court’s decision denying Presley post-conviction relief is affirmed.

¶ 18. AFFIRMED.

WALLER, C.J., CARLSON, P.J., DICKINSON, RANDOLPH, LAMAR, KITCHENS, CHANDLER AND PIERCE, JJ., CONCUR.

      . On September 13, 2005, Presley was indicted for commercial burglary of Grayco Systems and grand larceny for stealing the F-150 truck. On April 4, 2006, Presley was found guilty by a jury for the charges of burglary of Grayco Systems and grand larceny for the truck. On March 18, 2008, the Mississippi Court of Appeals affirmed the jury's verdict. Presley v. State, 994 So.2d 191 (Miss.Ct.App.2008).


author: CARLSON, Presiding Justice, WALLER, Chief Justice,

text:
    Jay JONES v. CITY OF RIDGELAND.
    No. 2009-CT-00984-SCT.
    Supreme Court of Mississippi.
    Nov. 18, 2010.

      Kevin Dale Camp, Jackson, John Michael Duncan, attorneys for appellant.
    Boty McDonald, Jackson, attorney for appellee.
   ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI

CARLSON, Presiding Justice,

for the Court:

¶ 1. Jay Jones entered a plea of nolo contendere in the Municipal Court of Ridgeland for driving under the influence (DUI), possession of an open container of alcohol, and careless driving. Jones appealed to the County Court of Madison County and, after a trial de novo, he was found guilty of DUI and careless driving. Jones then appealed to the Circuit Court of Madison County, which affirmed the judgment of the county court. Jones appealed to us, and we assigned this case to the Court of Appeals. The City of Ridge-land filed a motion to dismiss, and the Court of Appeals granted the motion pursuant to Mississippi Code Section 11-51-81 (Rev.2002). Having granted Jones’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari, we now consider the issue of the constitutionality of the “three-court rule” found in Section 11 — 51— 81.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 2. On Saturday evening, June 10, 2006, Ridgeland police officers Michael Ivy and Grady Fisher were on patrol near the intersection of Old Canton Road and Lake Harbour Drive. Ivy was driving the police cruiser, and Fisher occupied the front seat, passenger side, of the vehicle. As they proceeded east on Lake Harbour Drive, they passed the Buffalo Wild Wings Restaurant located on the north side of Lake Harbour Drive. In the area of Buffalo Wild Wings, Lake Harbour Drive is a boulevard with two lanes for east-bound traffic and two lanes for west-bound traffic. Fisher observed what he believed to be an argument among several males in the Buffalo Wild Wings parking lot. Fisher alerted Ivy, who traveled a short distance in order to “cross over” and travel west-bound back to the Buffalo Wild Wings parking lot. By the time the officers reached the parking lot, a man later identified as Jay Jones was exiting the parking lot in his vehicle. Jones’s vehicle almost collided with the police officers’ patrol car. Jones was not wearing a seat-belt. The officers followed Jones’s vehicle out of the parking lot and observed Jones making an unusually wide turn as he pulled out of the parking lot traveling west on Lake Harbour Drive. Jones then turned right at the nearby intersection and proceeded north on Old Canton Road, after failing to stop at the red light at the intersection. Jones also failed to stop as he traveled north on Old Canton Road, although Ivy and Fisher by then had activated the blue lights and siren of their police cruiser. Once a second patrol car pulled alongside Jones’s vehicle, Jones stopped on Old Canton Road. As he approached Jones’s car, Ivy observed Jones passing a beer bottle to his passenger. When he arrived at the driver’s side door of Jones’s vehicle, Ivy detected a strong odor of alcohol coming from inside the vehicle. Ivy administered a field-sobriety test to Jones and a Breathalyzer test, which was positive for the presence of alcohol. Jones was arrested and charged with DUI, careless driving, and possession of an open container.

¶3. Jones pleaded nolo contendere in the Municipal Court of Ridgeland and appealed to the County Court of Madison County, where he was afforded a trial de novo, Judge Ed Hannan presiding. At his county-court trial, Jones filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that the police officers had lacked probable cause to stop his vehicle. The motion was denied, and Judge Hannan found Jones guilty of DUI and careless driving, sentencing him to forty-eight hours in jail and fining him $700 for the DUI and $50 for careless driving. Jones then filed a notice of appeal in the Circuit Court of Madison County. The circuit court, sitting as an appellate court, affirmed the county court’s judgment of conviction and sentence. Jones then filed a notice of appeal with this Court, arguing that the county court had erred when it had denied his motion to dismiss due to the police officers’ lack of probable cause to conduct a stop of his vehicle. We assigned this case to the Court of Appeals.

¶4. After Jones filed his appellant’s brief, the City of Ridgeland filed a motion to dismiss the appeal. The motion was based on the “three-court rule” contained within Mississippi Code Section 11-51-81 (Rev.2002). In due course, the Court of Appeals entered an order dismissing Jones’s appeal pursuant to Section 11 — 51— 81. Jones’s motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals, and this Court granted Jones’s subsequently filed petition for writ of certiorari. Upon granting certiorari, we entered an order allowing the parties to brief the issue of the constitutionality of the “three-court rule” in Section 11-51-81, and we likewise invited the Attorney General of Mississippi to submit a brief on this issue. We now have received additional briefs from Jones and the Attorney General.

DISCUSSION

¶ 5. Before the Court of Appeals, Jones’s main argument was that the county-court judge had erred when he had failed to dismiss the charges against him. Jones had alleged that the City of Ridgeland police officers who had stopped him on the night in question had lacked probable cause to do so. However, whether we reach this issue today depends on our disposition of the critical issue before this Court, the constitutionality of the “three-court rule” contained in Section 11-51-81. Thus, we first discuss this issue.

I. WHETHER THE “THREE-COURT RULE” IN MISSISSIPPI CODE SECTION 11-51-81 IS CONSTITUTIONAL.

¶ 6. The Court of Appeals dismissed Jones’s appeal pursuant to Mississippi Code Section 11-51-81 (Rev.2002), which prohibits defendants who are aggrieved by a decision originating in justice or municipal court, and who have appealed to both county court and circuit court, from successfully appealing to this Court unless two requirements are met: (1) the appeal must involve a federal or state constitutional question, and (2) either the circuit court judge or a Supreme Court justice must “allow” the appeal. Section 11-51-81 reads:

All appeals from courts of justices of the peace, special and general, and from all municipal courts shall be to the county court under the same rules and regulations as are provided on appeals to the circuit court, but appeals from orders of the board of supervisors, municipal boards, and other tribunals other than courts of justice of the peace and municipal courts, shall be direct to the circuit court as heretofore. And from the final judgment of the county court in a case appealed to it under this section, a further appeal may be taken to the circuit court on the same terms and in the same manner as other appeals from the county court to the circuit court are taken: Provided that where the judgment or record of the justice of the peace, municipal or police court is not properly certified, or is certified at all, that question must be raised in the county court in the absence of which the defect shall be deemed as waived and by such waiver cured and may not thereafter be raised for the first time in the circuit court on the appeal there to; and provided further that there shall be no appeal from the circuit court to the supreme court of any case civil or criminal which originated in a justice of the peace, municipal or police court and was thence appealed to the county court and thence to the circuit court unless in the determination of the case a constitutional question be necessarily involved and then only upon the allowance of the appeal by the circuit judge or by a judge of the supreme court.

Miss.Code Ann. § 11-51-81 (Rev.2002) (emphasis added).

¶7. Of the eighty-two counties in Mississippi, twenty counties have county courts. The litigants in these twenty counties whose cases originate in justice or municipal court and are appealed to county court and then to circuit court may not appeal to this Court unless their cases concern a constitutional question and the circuit judge or a supreme court justice allows the appeal. On the other hand, litigants in the sixty-two counties that do not have county courts may appeal to this Court when their cases originate in justice or municipal court and are appealed to circuit court, which conducts a trial de novo. We find that the effect of this statute is that it prevents this Court from hearing appeals from cases originating in the justice or municipal courts of the twenty counties having county courts; thus, the statute usurps this Court’s constitutional power to establish procedural rules. Accordingly, today we announce that the “three-court rule” in Section 11-51-81 is unconstitutional and void.

¶ 8. The Mississippi Constitution grants the three coequal branches of government their power and prohibits the branches from infringing on the power granted to another. Article 1, Section 1, of our Constitution creates the three branches of government. “The powers of the government of the state of Mississippi shall be divided into three distinct departments, and each of them confided to a separate magistracy, to-wit: those which are legislative to one, those which are judicial to another, and those which are executive to another.” Miss. Const, art. 1, § 1 (1890). Article 1, Section 2, of our Constitution further separates the three branches and prohibits one branch from exercising the power of another. “No person or collection of persons, being one or belonging to one of these departments, shall exercise any power properly belonging to either of the others.” Miss. Const, art. 1, § 2.

¶ 9. The separation-of-powers doctrine outlined in Article 1, Sections 1 and 2, of our Constitution prescribes the limitations on the power of each branch of government. This doctrine ensures that the coequal branches do not encroach on the power of the others. Alexander v. State By and Through Allain, 441 So.2d 1329, 1385-36 (Miss.1983). Further, this Court has held that “[t]he rule is well settled that the judicial power cannot be taken away by legislative action. Nor may the Legislature regulate the judicial discretion or judgment that is vested in the courts. Any legislation that hampers judicial action or interferes with the discharge of judicial functions is unconstitutional.” City of Belmont v. Miss. State Tax Comm’n, 860 So.2d 289, 297 (Miss.2003) (citing 16A Am.Jur.2d Constitutional Law § 286, at 209-10 (1998)).

¶ 10. We also must be cautious not to encroach on the constitutional powers belonging to the Legislature. See Finn v. State, 978 So.2d 1270, 1273 (Miss.2008) (citing Miss. Ethics Comm’n v. Grisham, 957 So.2d 997, 1003 (Miss.2007)). Our appellate jurisdiction is granted by both the Constitution and the Legislature “by general law.” Miss. Const, art. 6, § 146. Further, we have consistently held that a litigant’s right to an appeal is statutory and “not based on any inherent common law or constitutional right.” Gill v. Miss. Dep’t of Wildlife Conservation, 574 So.2d 586, 590 (Miss.1990); Fleming v. State, 553 So.2d 505, 506 (Miss.1989) (citing Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751, 103 S.Ct. 3308, 3312-13, 77 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983)).

¶ 11. While the Legislature has the constitutional power to determine our appellate jurisdiction, the Constitution also grants the judiciary the power to establish its own rules of practice and procedure. Article 6, Section 144, states that “[t]he judicial power of the state shall be vested in a Supreme Court and such other courts as are provided for in this Constitution.” Miss. Const, art. 6, § 144. “The phrase ‘judicial power’ in Section 144 of the Constitution includes the power to make rules of practice and procedure, not inconsistent with the Constitution, for the efficient disposition of judicial business.” S. Pac. Lumber Co. v. Reynolds, 206 So.2d 334, 335 (Miss.1968) (citations omitted). The “fundamental constitutional concept of separation of powers” gives this Court the “inherent power ... to promulgate procedural rules.” Newell v. State, 308 So.2d 71, 76 (Miss.1975) (citing Matthews v. State, 288 So.2d 714, 715 (Miss.1974); Gulf Coast Drilling & Exploration Co. v. Permenter, 214 So.2d 601, 603 (Miss.1968); and S. Pac. Lumber. Co., 206 So.2d at 335 (Miss.1968)).

¶ 12. The issue before us is whether the Legislature may allow some litigants to appeal to this Court, while placing the restrictions of a constitutional question and approval from a circuit judge or Supreme Court justice on others. More specifically, does the “three-court rule” in Section 11-51-81 infringe on this Court’s constitutional “power to make rules of practice and procedure[?]” S. Pac. Lumber Co., 206 So.2d at 335. In addressing this issue, “we are unable to ignore the constitutional imperative that the Legislature refrain from promulgating procedural statutes.... ” Wimley v. Reid, 991 So.2d 135, 138 (Miss.2008). “We believe no citation of authority is needed for the universally accepted principle that if there be a clash between the edicts of the Constitution and the legislative enactment, the latter must yield.” Newell, 308 So.2d at 77. “The rule is well settled that the judicial power cannot be taken away by legislative action. Nor may the Legislature regulate the judicial discretion or judgment that is vested in the courts.” 16A Am.Jur.2d Constitutional Law § 286, at 209-10 (1998).

¶ 13. In 1975, we first exercised our constitutional right to promulgate procedural rules in Newell. Newell, 308 So.2d at 76. Based on this authority, we adopted the Rules of Civil Procedure in 1981, the Rules of Evidence in 1985, and the Rules of Appellate Procedure in 1995. This power is also supported by statute. Mississippi Code Section 9-3-61 states in part:

As a part of the judicial power granted in Article 6, Section 144, of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890, the Supreme Court has the power to prescribe from time to time by general rules the form of process, writs, pleadings, motions, rules of evidence and the practice and procedure for trials and appeals in the Court of Appeals and in the circuit, chancery and county courts of this state and for appeals to the Supreme Court from interlocutory or final orders of trial courts and administrative boards and agencies, and certiorari from the Court of Appeals.

Miss.Code Ann. § 9-3-61 (Rev.2002).

¶ 14. The Mississippi Rules of Appellate Procedure begin by stating “[t]hese rules govern procedure in appeals to the Supreme Court of Mississippi and the Court of Appeals of the State of Mississip-pi_” M.R.A.P 1. The comment to Rule 1 explains that the rules “are not to be construed to extend or limit jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.” Keeping in mind this Court’s constitutional rule-making authority and the Legislature’s constitutional authority to establish our appellate jurisdiction, the essential inquiry then becomes whether Section 11-51-81 is a legislative grant of jurisdiction or an infringement on our power to promulgate rules of procedure.

¶ 15. We view the statute to be procedural in nature rather than jurisdictional. Procedure is defined as “[t]he mode of proceeding by which a legal right is enforced, as distinguished from the substantive law which gives or defines the rights, and which, by means of the proceedings, the court is to administer; the machinery, as distinguished from its product.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1203-04 (6th ed.1990). When appealing to this Court, litigants use our Rules of Appellate Procedure as their “mode of proceeding” to ensure that the contested “legal right is enforced.” The “three-court rule” in Section 11-51-81 essentially turns off this Court’s “machinery” in the appeals process.

¶ 16. We feel it important to emphasize that today’s opinion is not intended to address, one way or the other, other statutes which provide for the right to an appeal. We limit our holding today to the “three-court rule” contained within Section 11-51-81 — that and that alone.

¶ 17. The issue of legislative usurpation of this Court’s rule-making power is not without precedent. In Newell, we held that a statute prohibiting trial judges from instructing the jury on the testimony or weight of the evidence unless one of the parties had requested the instruction was an unconstitutional infringement on the judiciary’s inherent rule-making authority. Newell, 308 So.2d at 77-78. This Court in Newell characterized procedural statutes as “legislative suggestions,” to be followed only “unless determined to be an impediment to justice or an impingement upon the Constitution.” Id. at 76. In Glenn v. Herring, 415 So.2d 695, 698 (Miss.1982), we held that a statute requiring trial judges to render opinions in cases taken under advisement within six months violated the doctrine of separation of powers by impinging on our power to promulgate procedural rules. In Moran v. Necaise, 437 So.2d 1222, 1225 (Miss.1983), we exercised our rule-making power by prescribing a thirty-day time period after entry of judgment for perfecting an appeal, voiding a statute providing a forty-five-day time period for perfecting appeals.

¶ 18. For an appreciable period of time in our nation’s history, the power to promulgate the courts’ rules of practice and procedure was legislative. Many courts, including this Court and several courts of our sister states, have since found this power to be judicial, rather than legislative. In accordance with this power, the courts have judicially enacted rules and subsequently found statutes that trespass into the realm of judicial rule-making to be void. For example, the District Court of Maryland has held that a statutory prescription of the time period in which a person must be brought to trial was an unconstitutional encroachment on the judiciary. U.S. v. Howard, 440 F.Supp. 1106, 1113 (D.C.Md.1977).

¶ 19. The Attorney General argues that voiding the statute will cause this Court to be “overwhelmed with appeals.” However, “[t]he fact that a given law or procedure is efficient, convenient, and useful in facilitating functions of government, standing alone, will not save it if it is contrary to the Constitution.” Alexander, 441 So.2d at 1339 (citing INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944, 103 S.Ct. 2764, 2780-81, 77 L.Ed.2d 317, 340 (1983)).

¶ 20. In the end, we conclude that the “three-court rule” found in Mississippi Code Section 11-51-81 (Rev.2002) contravenes the constitutional mandates imposed upon the Legislature and the judiciary. The Legislature may not “exercise any power properly belonging” to the judiciary. Miss. Const, art. 1, § 2. We thus find this portion of Section 11-51-81 to be unconstitutional:

[A]nd provided further that there shall be no appeal from the circuit court to the supreme court of any case civil or criminal which originated in a justice of the peace, municipal or police court and was thence appealed to the county court and thence to the circuit court unless in the determination of the case a constitutional question be necessarily involved and then only upon the allowance of the appeal by the circuit judge or by a judge of the supreme court.

It is within this Court’s power to determine the rules of practice and procedure, and we are of the opinion that the framers of the Constitution never intended that the Legislature determine which litigants may appeal to this Court and which litigants must end their pursuit of justice in the circuit court. Accordingly, we find today that this Court has jurisdiction to hear the merits of Jones’s appeal.

¶21. Having found a portion of Section 11-51-81 to be unconstitutional, we need to make perfectly clear that our finding on this issue in no way affects the constitutionality of the remainder of Section 11-51-81. Mississippi Code Section 1-8-77 (Rev.2005) states in pertinent part:

If any section, paragraph, sentence, clause, phrase or any part of any act passed hereafter is declared to be unconstitutional or void, or if for any reason is declared to be invalid or of no effect, the remaining sections, paragraphs, sentences, clauses, phrases or parts thereof shall be in no manner affected thereby but shall remain in full force and effect.

Thus, it is -without question from express legislative language that this statute is severable, and the remainder of the statute is effective. Lewis v. State, 765 So.2d 498, 500 (Miss.2000). See also O’Neal v. Simpson, 350 So.2d 998, 1003 (Miss.1977).

¶ 22. Because of our disposition on this issue, we now proceed to address the issue originally raised by Jones on appeal.

II. WHETHER LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS HAD PROBABLE CAUSE TO STOP JONES PRIOR TO HIS ARREST.

¶ 23. At his trial in county court, Jones filed a motion to dismiss the charges against him based on what Jones believed to be the police officers’ lack of probable cause to stop his vehicle as it traveled north on Old Canton Road in the City of Ridgeland on the night in question. The county-court judge requested that the parties submit briefs on the issue of probable cause to stop and subsequently denied Jones’s motion to dismiss. Jones was found guilty of DUI and careless driving. While this case was before the Court of Appeals, that court dutifully dismissed Jones’s appeal pursuant to Section 11-51-81. Understandably, based on the dismissal pursuant to statute, there was no need for the Court of Appeals to consider the merits of Jones’s lack-of-probable-cause argument. We do so now.

¶ 24. “When considering a motion to dismiss, this Court’s standard of review is de novo.” Meadows v. Blake, 36 So.3d 1225, 1229 (Miss.2010) (citing Scaggs v. GPCH-GP, Inc., 931 So.2d 1274, 1275 (Miss.2006)).

¶25. “An automobile stop is ... subject to the constitutional imperative that it not be ‘unreasonable’ under the circumstances. As a general matter, the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred.” Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996) (citing Del. v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 659, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979); Pa. v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977)). The test for determining probable cause in Mississippi is the totality of the circumstances. Harrison v. State, 800 So.2d 1134, 1138 (Miss.2001) (citing Haddox v. State, 636 So.2d 1229, 1235 (Miss.1994)). Probable cause has been defined as:

a practical, nontechnical concept, based upon the conventional considerations of every day life on which reasonable and prudent [persons], not legal technicians, act. It arises when the facts and circumstances within an officer’s knowledge, or of which [that officer] has reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient in themselves to justify a [person] of average caution in the belief that a crime has been committed and that a particular individual committed it.

Conway v. State, 897 So.2d 1095, 1098 (Miss.1980) (quoting Strode v. State, 231 So.2d 779, 782 (Miss.1970)).

¶ 26. While Jones makes a laek-of-probable-cause-to-stop argument, he likewise argues that the stop was illegal because the events causing Ivy to stop Jones occurred on private property and were not a violation of any law. Jones directs our attention to Vaughan v. Lewis, 236 Miss. 792, 112 So.2d 247 (1959), in which this Court held that statutes regulating public roadways and intersections “obviously have no legal application ... so far as the regulation of traffic on private property is concerned.” Vaughan, 236 Miss. at 798, 112 So.2d at 249. However, Vaughan unquestionably has no application to the facts of today’s case. Vaughan involved a collision between two trucks on private property during the construction of the Columbus Air Force Base in Lowndes County. This Court merely held that the statutory rules of the road had no application to an accident occurring on private property. Id. Obviously, Vaughan lends us no guidance in considering the facts of today’s case, in which two City of Ridgeland police officers were dutifully patrolling the city streets of Ridgeland when they observed a disturbance in the private parking lot of Buffalo Wild Wings, a business open to the general public and situated within the corporate limits of the City of Ridgeland.

¶ 27. Police officers may enter private property that is open to the general public to investigate criminal activity. Waldrop v. State, 544 So.2d 834, 838 (Miss.1989) (citing 1 W. Lafave, Search and Seizure, § 2.3, 318 (1978)). This Court has held that a valid traffic stop may be based on observations made on private property. Dies v. State, 926 So.2d 910, 919 (2006). In Dies, Mississippi Bureau of Narcotics agents observed the smell of burnt marijuana coming from a car in the parking lot of a bar in Columbus, Mississippi. Id. at 913. Rather than stopping the defendant in the parking lot, the agents contacted a Columbus police officer and informed the officer of what they had observed. Id. Based on the observations made by the narcotics agents, the police officer stopped the defendant after he had driven his car out of the parking lot and onto a public road. Id. This Court held that the stop was valid, partly because the information observed by the agents was “in space that was open to the public” and “[t]he agents in no way entered into a space in which [the defendant] had a reasonable expectation of privacy.” Id. at 918.

¶ 28. Similar to Dies, in the present case, Ivy observed illegal activity on private property and subsequently stopped Jones on a public road. Additionally, based on the totality of the circumstances, we find that Ivy did have probable cause to stop Jones. Ivy testified that Jones had been arguing with another man in the Buffalo Wild Wings parking lot, had nearly collided with his patrol car, had appeared intoxicated, and was not wearing a seat-belt. Ivy decided to stop Jones and watched as he exited the parking lot and entered a public road. Upon exiting the parking lot, Jones made an unusually wide turn on to a public road and failed to stop at a red light. Ivy testified that, based on these observations, he formed the opinion that Jones was driving under the influence. The evidence also revealed that Jones ran the red light at the Lake Harbour Drive/ Old Canton Road intersection and proceeded north on Old Canton Road. Likewise, even though Ivy and Fisher had activated the blue lights and siren of their police cruiser, Jones still failed to stop as he traveled north on Old Canton Road. Only after a second patrol car pulled alongside Jones’s vehicle, did Jones finally stop on Old Canton Road. As he approached Jones’s car, Ivy observed Jones passing a beer bottle to his passenger, and once he arrived at the driver’s side door of Jones’s vehicle, Ivy detected a strong odor of alcohol coming from inside the vehicle. Ivy administered to Jones a field-sobriety test and a Breathalyzer test which was positive for the presence of alcohol.

¶29. These circumstances are “sufficient in themselves to justify a [person] of average caution in the belief that a crime has been committed and that” Jones committed it. Conway, 397 So.2d at 1098 (quoting Strode, 231 So.2d at 782). Accordingly, we find that the county court did not err in denying Jones’s motion to dismiss based on the police officers’ alleged lack of probable cause to stop Jones’s vehicle on the city streets of Ridgeland.

CONCLUSION

¶ 30. We granted certiorari to determine the constitutionality of the “three-court rule” in Section 11-51-81. We hold that the three-court rule found in the statute is unconstitutional because it usurps this Court’s constitutional rule-making power and violates the doctrine of separation of powers. Thus, we state today that any litigant whose case originates in either justice court or municipal court, and whose case is ultimately decided by the circuit court, whether it be via a trial de novo or on appellate review from a final judgment of the county court conducted by the circuit court under the applicable statute, shall have the right to appeal to this Court.

¶ 31. Finally, in considering the merits of the additional issue raised on appeal, we find no merit in Jones’s contention that the City of Ridgeland police officers lacked probable cause to conduct a traffic stop of the vehicle Jones was driving. Therefore, we vacate the Court of Appeals’ judgment of dismissal. We affirm the Madison County Circuit Court’s judgment which affirmed the judgment of conviction and sentence entered by the County Court of Madison County.

¶ 32. THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IS VACATED. THE JUDGMENT OF THE MADISON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT IS REINSTATED AND AFFIRMED. THE CONVICTION BY THE COUNTY COURT OF MADISON COUNTY OF DUI FIRST OFFENSE AND CARELESS DRIVING AND SENTENCE OF FORTY-EIGHT (48) HOURS IN JAIL AND A FINE OF FIFTY (50) DOLLARS, WITH CONDITIONS, AFFIRMED.

GRAVES, P.J., DICKINSON, KITCHENS, CHANDLER AND PIERCE, JJ., CONCUR. RANDOLPH, J., CONCURS IN PART II AND IN RESULT ONLY WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION. WALLER, C.J., CONCURS IN PART AND IN RESULT WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY RANDOLPH AND LAMAR, JJ.

WALLER, Chief Justice,

concurring in part and in result:

¶ 33. By striking down the three-court rule as a violation of separation of powers, the majority asserts that this Court — not the Legislature — dictates the right to appeal. According to the majority, this Court has the power to determine its own jurisdiction. I believe that such a concept is foreign to our Constitution and to our laws.

¶ 34. Though I agree that Jones’s conviction and sentence should be affirmed, I strongly disagree with the majority’s treatment of Section 11-51-81 of the Mississippi Code, also known as the three-court rule. Miss.Code Ann. § 11-51-81 (Rev. 2002). First of all, we should not address the constitutionality of the three-court rule because that issue was not raised before the circuit court, the Court of Appeals, or in Jones’s petition for writ of certiorari to this Court. But if we must address the issue, I find the rule to be constitutional. The three-court rule does not violate the separation-of-powers doctrine because the Legislature determines the right to appeal and sets, along with our Constitution, this Court’s appellate jurisdiction. Furthermore, the equal-protection argument was laid to rest long ago by this Court and by the Supreme Court of the United States. Worley v. Pappas, 161 Miss. 330, 135 So. 348 (1931); see Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U.S. 22, 11 Otto 22, 25 L.Ed. 989 (1879).

¶ 35. Even if the three-court rule arguably does violate the separation-of-powers doctrine, I believe that this Court should adopt the rule as its own, considering that the rule does not violate any constitutional rights and because of our longstanding recognition and application of the rule.

¶ 36. For these reasons, which are elaborated further below, I respectfully concur in part and in result.

DISCUSSION

I. Because the constitutionality of the three-court rule was not challenged at trial or on appeal, we should not address the issue.

¶ 37. The constitutionality of the three-court rule was not raised in Jones’s petition for writ of certiorari. The Court, instead, asked for supplemental briefing on that particular issue when it granted Jones’s petition.

¶ 38. As a principle of sound judicial administration, we generally do not consider issues that were not first presented to and decided by the trial court. E.g., Educ. Placement Servs. v. Wilson, 487 So.2d 1316, 1320 (Miss.1986); Luther T. Munford, Mississippi Appellate Practice § 3.7, 3-24 (2006) (citing Wilson, 487 So.2d at 1320). Challenges to the constitutionality of a statute, in particular, are not considered unless specifically pleaded. E.g., State ex rel. Carr v. Cabana Terrace, Inc., 247 Miss. 26, 37, 153 So.2d 257, 260 (Miss.1963) (citing Pacific States Box and Basket Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176, 56 S.Ct. 159, 80 L.Ed. 138 (1935)).

¶ 39. I do not contest this Court’s right to ask parties to file supplemental briefing on an issue. Miss. R.App. P. 28(a)(3). I believe we have the authority to do so even as to issues that were not raised at trial or on appeal. But we should use care and the utmost restraint in doing so to refrain from becoming “the originators instead of the settlers of litigious disputes.” See V.A. Griffith, C.J., Mississippi Chancery Practice § 564 (2d ed.1950). I fail to see the urgent need for us, at our own insistence, to address the constitutionality of a statute that, in my judgment, poses no threat to the fabric of our judicial system and for which no wrong was asserted on appeal. I believe it would have been better to have simply addressed the issues raised before us and left the constitutionality of the three-court rule for a case where that issue is assigned as error on appeal.

¶ 40. Though I disagree with the Court’s decision to raise and request supplemental briefing on the constitutionality of the three-court rule, that decision stands. As a result, I am compelled to express why I believe that the three-court rule is, in fact, constitutional.

II. Because the Legislature prescribes whether or not a right of appeal exists and defines, alongside our Constitution, this Court’s appellate jurisdiction, the three-court rule does not violate the separation-of-powers doctrine.

¶ 41. In considering the constitutionality of the three-court rule, we should bear in mind that legislative enactments carry a strong presumption of constitutionality. E.g., Estate of McCullough v. Yates, 32 So.3d 403, 412 (Miss.2010) (citations omitted). Statutes must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt to be unconstitutional. Id. Any doubt must be resolved in favor of upholding the validity of the statute. Id. (citing Univ. of Miss. Med. Ctr. v. Robinson, 876 So.2d 337, 339-340 (Miss.2004)).

¶ 42. The three-court rule is a statutory directive that governs the right to appeal from circuit court to this Court in any case that (1) originated in justice, municipal, or police court, and (2) was appealed previously to county court. Miss.Code Ann. § 11-51-81 (Rev.2002). It allows an appeal in such instances only where the case involves a constitutional question. Miss. Code Ann. § 11-51-81 (Rev.2002). By this statute, the Legislature is prescribing when a right of appeal exists and limiting this Court’s jurisdiction, both of which it may do.

¶43. The right of appeal is purely a creature of statute. E.g., Abney v. U.S., 431 U.S. 651, 656, 97 S.Ct. 2034, 2038, 52 L.Ed.2d 651 (1977). Our longstanding, well-established caselaw supports that a party has no right to appeal unless the Legislature gives such right by statute. Marshall v. State, 662 So.2d 566, 568-71 (Miss.1995) (stating that the “Legislature has plenary power over appeals where the Mississippi Constitution has not limited this power,” and pointing out that the right to appeal is subject to legislative change); Bickham v. Dep’t of Mental Health, 592 So.2d 96, 97 (Miss.1991) (stating that “[a] right of appeal is statutory”) (citing Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751, 103 S.Ct. 3308, 3312-13, 77 L.Ed.2d 987, 993 (1983)); Gill v. Miss. Dep’t of Wildlife Conservation, 574 So.2d 586, 590 (Miss.1990) (recognizing that “a party has no right of appeal, except insofar as it has been given by law”); Fleming v. State, 553 So.2d 505, 506 (Miss.1989) (stating that “[a]n appeal is a matter of statutory right and not based on any inherent common law or constitutional right”) (citing Jones, 463 U.S. at 751, 103 S.Ct. 3308); Sanford v. Bd. of Supervisors, Covington County, 421 So.2d 488, 490-91 (Miss.1982) (noting that “an appeal is not a matter of right but is subject to the statutory provisions”) (citing Bradley v. Holmes, 242 Miss. 247, 134 So.2d 494 (1961)); Miller Transporters Ltd. v. Johnson, 252 Miss. 244, 249, 172 So.2d 542, 544 (1965) (asserting that “[t]he right to appeal is a statutory privilege, granted and defined by the legislature”); McMahon v. Milam Mfg. Co., 237 Miss. 676, 679, 115 So.2d 328, 330 (1959) (stating that “[a]p-peals are regulated by statute, and only lie in cases provided by statute”) (citations omitted); State ex rel. Patterson v. Autry, 236 Miss. 316, 320, 110 So.2d 377, 378 (Miss.1959) (stating that a right to appeal must be supplied by statute) (citations omitted), overruled on other grounds; J.R. Watkins Co. v. Guess, 196 Miss. 438, 17 So.2d 795, 796 (1944) (noting that “[t]he requirements for appeals are purely statutory”) (citation omitted), overruled in part on other grounds; Jackson v. Gordon, 194 Miss. 268, 273, 11 So.2d 901, 902 (1943) (pointing out that “[ajppeals are not matters of right, and are allowable only in eases provided by statute”); Craig v. Barber Bros. Contracting Co., 190 Miss. 182, 187, 199 So. 270, 272 (1941) (stating that “[i]n this state, appeals are regulated by statute and only allowed in eases provided by statute”) (citations omitted); State v. Poplarville Sawmill Co., 119 Miss. 432, 441, 81 So. 124, 127 (1919) (stating that “[a]ppeals are regulated by statute, and only lie in cases provided by statute”) overruled in part on other grounds; Bridges v. Bd. of Supervisors of Clay County, 57 Miss. 252, 254 (1879) (stating that “[i]t has been settled from an early day in this State that appeals are not a matter of right, and are allowable only in cases provided for by statute”) (citations omitted); see also Rosson v. McFarland, 933 So.2d 969, 971 (Miss.2006) (stating that “an appeal is not a matter of right but is subject to ... statutory provisions”) (citing Bradley, 242 Miss. 247, 134 So.2d 494); Wolfe v. City of D’Iberville, 799 So.2d 142, 150 (Miss.Ct.App.2001) (Southwick, P.J., concurring) (explaining that “whether there is a right to move beyond the initial court to a higher level, i.e., whether there is a right to appeal, has traditionally been held to be a matter solely of legislative discretion”) (citing Gill, 574 So.2d at 590).

¶ 44. The three-court rule is nothing more than the Legislature exercising its authority to define the right of appeal in certain categories of cases. To suggest that this power belongs to us is to insinuate that we are the arbiters of our own appellate jurisdiction. Our Constitution makes clear that this is not the case.

¶ 45. Mississippi’s Constitution vests itself and the Legislature with the authority to establish this Court’s appellate jurisdiction. Section 146 of the Mississippi Constitution states that this Court “shall have such jurisdiction as properly belongs to a court of appeals and shall exercise no jurisdiction on matters other than those specifically provided by this Constitution or by general law.” Miss. Const, art. 6, § 146. The statement that this Court “shall have such jurisdiction as properly belongs to a court of appeals” should not be construed over broadly as giving us some type of inherent, appellate authority. This Court interpreted similar language found in Article 4, Section 4, of the Constitution of 1832, as meaning simply that the framers purposed to establish an appellate tribunal. Dismukes v. Stokes, 41 Miss. 430, 432-33, 1867 WL 2306 at *1 (Miss. Err. & App.1867). The Dismukes Court went on to explain that the determination of what matters “properly belong” to such appellate tribunal “depend[s] on general considerations of public policy, which, for the most part, must be determined by the [Legislature, subject to such restrictions on their general powers as are contained in the [Cjonstitution.” Id. at 433. Section 146 affirms and strengthens this notion. Unlike any provision within the Constitution of 1832, Section 146 expressly limits our jurisdiction to those matters specifically provided by the Constitution or by “general law.” Miss. Const, art. 6, § 146. The term “general law” undoubtedly means legislative acts, as evidenced by the very next sentence of Section 146, which states that “[t]he Legislature may by general law ...” give this Court jurisdiction over certain types of cases. Miss. Const, art. 6, § 146 (emphasis added).

¶ 46. Dismukes affirms the Legislature’s authority to limit this Court’s jurisdiction. The appellants in that case attempted to appeal the circuit court’s af-firmance of a decision by the county’s board of police. Dismukes, 41 Miss. at 432. The appellee, however, sought to dismiss the appeal because a certain statute in effect at that time made the judgment of the circuit court final, thus negating a right to appeal. Id. The appellants contested that this statute was unconstitutional because it denied them a right to appeal to this Court (then known as the High Court of Errors and Appeals). Id. This Court upheld the statute and found that, as a general rule, “the [Ljegislature has the power to deny the right of prosecuting ... an appeal in this court, in any particular case, and that a rule so enacted will be conclusive of the question of jurisdiction, unless it be in contravention of a positive right_” Id. at 434. Significantly, the Court added that nothing is “more clearly within the legislative power over matters pertaining to public policy, than the question, in what cases and to what courts shall a party be entitled to an appeal. ...” Id. at 433-34.

¶ 47. In sum, determinations concerning the right to appeal and the jurisdiction of this Court belong to our constitution and to the Legislature.

III. The Supreme Court of the United States has held that statutes like the three-court rule do not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and this Court has held specifically that the three-court rule does not deprive litigants of equal protection under the laws.

¶ 48. Although the majority strikes down the three-court rule on the grounds of separation of powers, there are equal-protection undertones in its opinion as well. Underlying this entire controversy is the idea that the three-court rule is unfair to litigants who reside in one of the twenty counties that feature a county court. Why should those litigants’ right to appeal be any different from litigants who reside in one of the sixty-two counties that do not have a county court? Yet these distinctions are legally valid under the Equal Protection Clause.

¶ 49. Back in 1931, this Court held that the three-court rule does not deprive litigants of equal protection under the law. Worley, 161 Miss. 330, 135 So. 348. Wor-ley admittedly lacks much in-depth analysis on the subject. But the Supreme Court of the United States has spoken more thoroughly and authoritatively to the issue.

¶ 50. In Lewis, the Supreme Court addressed a constitutional challenge to Missouri state law which granted its citizens the right to appeal to the state supreme court from any circuit court, but refused this right to citizens of one municipality and four counties. Lewis, 101 U.S. at 29. For those particular localities, the Missouri Constitution established a separate court of appeals. Id. An appeal was allowed from that court of appeals to the state supreme court only if the amount in controversy exceeded a certain amount and the case involved certain subject matter. Id. Appellants challenged that these laws violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution because it denied litigants in those particular localities a right to seek redress in the state’s highest court. Id. The Supreme Court found no merit in this argument. Id. at 29-33. The Court held that states have the “undoubted power” to regulate the jurisdiction of their own courts and to prescribe differences based on locale, including variations with regard to the finality of decisions. Id. at 30-33.

[The Fourteenth Amendment] contemplates persons and classes of persons. It has not respect to local and municipal regulations that do not injuriously affect or discriminate between persons or classes of persons within the places or municipalities for which such regulations are made. The amendment could never have been intended to prevent a [s]tate from arranging and parcelling out the jurisdiction of its several courts at its discretion.... It is the right of every State to establish such courts as it sees fit, and to prescribe their several jurisdictions as to territorial extent, subject-matter, and amount, and the finality and effect of their decisions, provided it does not encroach upon the proper jurisdiction of the United States, and does not abridge the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, and does not deprive any person of his rights without due process of law, nor deny to any person the equal protection of the laws, including the equal right to resort to the appropriate courts for redress. The last restriction, as to the equal protection of the laws, is not violated by any diversity in the jurisdiction of the several courts as to subject-matter, amount, or finality of decision, if all persons within the territorial limits of their respective jurisdictions have an equal right, in like cases and under like circumstances, to resort to them for redress.... As respects the administration of justice, [each state] may establish one system of courts for cities and another for rural districts, one system for one portion of its territory and another system for another portion. Convenience, if not necessity, often requires this to be done, and it would seriously interfere with the power of a [sjtate to regulate its internal affairs to deny to it this right. We think it is not denied or taken away by any thing in the Constitution of the United States, including the amendments thereto.

Lewis, 101 U.S. at 30-31.

¶ 51. Thus, according to Lewis, states may limit appellate review based on locale so long as the law applies equally to every person within that particular area. Id. at 30-33. Because the three-court rule applies equally to every person within the twenty counties that it affects, the rule does not offend the Equal Protection Clause. There is, of course, the possibility that distinctions like those made by the three-court rule could be aimed at, or have the effect of, discriminating against a certain class or race. See id. at 32. I fail to see how that could be the case here, considering that the counties with county courts have diverse demographics and that those counties are spread across different parts of the state.

¶ 52. I find no legal basis to conclude that the three-court rule deprives litigants of equal protection under the law.

IY. Because the three-court rule does not violate any constitutional rights and, because of this Court’s longstanding recognition and application of the rule, the Court should adopt the rule as its own.

¶ 53. Even if I am wrong and the three-court rule does in fact violate the separation-of-powers doctrine, I am convinced that we should nevertheless uphold the statute, because it does not violate anyone’s constitutional rights and because of this Court’s longstanding recognition of the rule.

¶ 54. Our separation-of-powers framework is not so rigid that it requires us to strike down every statute that arguably encroaches upon this Court’s rule-making turf. Hall v. State, 539 So.2d 1338, 1346 n. 20 (Miss.1989). Certainly, we are obligated to correct legislative encroachments when “the decades have evidenced a constitutional impingement, impairing justice .... ” Newell v. State, 308 So.2d 71, 78 (1975). But otherwise, we should give deference to legislative expressions not out of obligation or accession to authority, but out respect for the Legislature as “as that branch of government closest to the people whom all branches have been created to serve.” Hall, 589 So.2d at 1346 n. 20. Even Newell — the landmark case in which this Court first asserted its inherent rule-making power — recognized the need for some level of deference: “[W]e hasten to say that as long as rules of judicial procedure enacted by the legislature coincide with fair and efficient administration of justice, the Court will consider them in a cooperative spirit to further the state’s best interest....” Newell, 808 So.2d at 78.

¶ 55. We may choose to adopt legislative rules as our own where the invasion is minor, where the Legislature has acted within its authority, and where this Court has followed the rule for many years. See Haralson v. State, 308 So.2d 222, 223-224 (Miss.1975); Hall v. State, 539 So.2d 1338, 1346 n. 20 (Miss.1989). Each of those criterion are satisfied here. As already discussed, the Legislature acted within its authority to pass the three-court rule. Moreover, this Court has invoked that rule to dismiss appeals since at least 1931. Williams v. State, 160 Miss. 489, 135 So. 199 (1931). Perhaps most importantly, the three-court rule’s invasion, if there be any, is minor. The rule does not infringe upon anyone’s constitutional rights. As set forth above, the limitation prescribed by the three-court rule does not deprive anyone of equal protection under the law. Nor is the rule manifestly unjust. It permits appellate review by the circuit court, and it does not completely foreclose review by this Court. This is evidenced by the fact that we are considering this very case. The rule provides that a circuit judge or a justice may “allow” an appeal where the case involves a constitutional question. Miss.Code Ann. § 11-51-81 (Rev.2002). To that end, the rule is pragmatic and efficient. It preserves judicial resources, but at the same time, gives us discretion to apply those resources when needed to address issues of fundamental importance.

¶ 56. Just because we may have the right or the power to strike down the three-court rule as an encroachment on our rule-making authority does not mean we should do so. Indeed, “a branch of government could be commended for not insisting on exercising its full range of power.” Wolfe, 799 So.2d at 149 (Southwick, P.J., concurring). I see no harm in us adopting and continuing to follow a rule which does nothing to impair justice.

CONCLUSION

¶ 57. I would prefer that we not address the constitutionality of the three-court rule, because it was not raised at trial or on appeal. Nevertheless, I believe that the Legislature had the right to enact the rule. Even if it did not, I maintain that this Court should adopt the rule as its own.

¶ 58. For these reasons, I respectfully concur in part and in result.

RANDOLPH AND LAMAR, JJ., JOIN THIS OPINION.

      . Some of the facts surrounding the stop of Jay Jones's vehicle are in dispute. For the purpose of our discussion, we state the facts in the light most favorable to the prosecution.

      . The county-court judge conducted a bench trial.

      . Judge Hannan dismissed the charge of possession of an open container of alcohol.

      . This Court may request the parties to argue an issue not distinctly identified for review. Mississippi Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(a)(3): "No issue not distinctly identified shall be argued by counsel, except upon request of the court, but the court may, at its option, notice a plain error not identified or distinctly specified.”

      . Jones argues in his brief that the statute is unconstitutional because it deprives litigants in the twenty counties with county courts of an appeal to this Court and, as a result, violates the Equal Protection Clause. This argument was addressed in Worley v. Pappas, 161 Miss. 330, 135 So. 348 (1931), in which this Court held that the statute does not deprive litigants of equal protection of the law. The United States Supreme Court has also held that establishing one system of law within a particular territory of a state and another system within other territories of the same state does not violate the Equal Protection Clause. Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U.S. 22, 30-31, 25 L.Ed. 989 (1879). While the argument that the statute deprives certain litigants of equal access to the courts merits recognition, the general principle of separation of powers prohibits the Legislature from establishing procedural rules that permit some litigants to appeal to the Court, while prohibiting others from doing so. This is the subject of this opinion.

      . Accordingly, we expressly overrule this Court’s holding in Sumrall v. City of Jackson, 576 So.2d 1259, 1260 (Miss.1991), that the requirements of a constitutional question and the approval of a circuit judge or Supreme Court justice in Section 11-51-81 are jurisdictional.

      . The cases in which this Court and the Court of Appeals have dismissed appeals pursuant to Section 11-51-81 are now overruled as to this point. Davidson v. State, 592 So.2d 1006 (Miss.1992); Sumrall v. City of Jackson, 576 So.2d 1259 (Miss.1991); Barrett v. State, 491 So.2d 833 (Miss.1986); Alt v. City of Biloxi, 397 So.2d 897 (Miss.1981); Wells v. State, 201 Miss. 249, 29 So.2d 119 (1947); Kitchens v. State, 198 Miss. 346, 22 So.2d 493 (1945); State v. Warren, 197 Miss. 13, 19 So.2d 491 (1944); Keeton v. State, 197 Miss. 11, 19 So.2d 477 (1944); Johnson v. City of Hattiesburg, 170 Miss. 527, 155 So. 418 (1934); Gray v. Crump, 162 Miss. 251, 139 So. 463 (1932); Williams v. State, 160 Miss. 489, 135 So. 199 (1931); Williams v. Town of Flora, 13 So.3d 875 (Miss.Ct.App.2009); Wilkins v. City of Florence, 970 So.2d 260 (Miss.Ct.App.2007); Withers v. City of Pearl, 919 So.2d 1050 (Miss.Ct.App.2005); Johnson v. State, 879 So.2d 1057 (Miss.Ct.App.2004); Sasser v. City of Richland, 850 So.2d 206 (Miss.Ct.App.2003); Draper v. City of Flowood, 736 So.2d 512 (Miss.CtApp.1999).