author: PARKER, Justice.

text:
    John B. SIMMONS, Jr. v. Mike BALL.
    1090066.
    Supreme Court of Alabama.
    March 4, 2011.

      J. Knox Argo, Montgomery, for appellant.
    J. Robert Faulk of McDowell, Faulk <& McDowell, L.L.C., Prattville, for appellee.
   PARKER, Justice.

John B. Simmons, Jr., appeals from a summary judgment entered in favor of Mike Ball. The trial court’s judgment permanently enjoined Simmons from enforcing the mortgage that gave rise to this controversy by foreclosing on the mortgaged property. We reverse and remand.

Facts and Procedural History

On May 10, 2005, two brothers, Kelly Andrew Ball (“Andy”) and Mike, organized a limited-liability company known as Hard Ball, LLC (“Hard Ball”), in which they were the sole members. Article VILa. of the articles of organization placed “[a]ll affairs, business, functions, and dealings of Hard Ball, LLC ... under the managerial control of the member: Andy Ball.” Article VILb. assumed that Article VILa. appointed Andy as the manager of Hard Ball, referring to “[t]he manager named in Article VII(a).” Andy’s managerial authority was specifically extended by Article VIII.c., which stated that “Andy Ball as a Member of Hard Ball, LLC ... has been granted authority to sign any such documents, including but not limited to conveying, mortgaging, buying, selling and encumbering of real property”; however, Article VIII.c. did not refer to Andy’s status as manager of the limited-liability company.

Also on May 10, 2005, Andy and Mike executed an operating agreement. The operating agreement required the members of the limited-liability company, among other things, to “execute such documents and take such action as may be necessary to maintain the Company’s status as a limited liability company under the [Limited Liability Company] Act[, § 10-12-1 et seq., Ala.Code 1975,] ... and to carry out the business purposes of the Company.” The operating agreement also named Andy as the manager, registered agent, and organizer of Hard Ball.

Hard Ball’s sole business function was “flipping” houses; specifically, Hard Ball purchased houses with funds supplied by Mike; Andy then, after repairing and cleaning the houses, attempted to sell them for a profit. Among the houses purchased by Hard Ball was one located at 1128 Deatsville Highway, Millbrook, in El-more County (“the Deatsville property”). During the summer of 2006 there was a disagreement between Andy and Mike; Andy subsequently “disappeared for several weeks,” and Mike, acting on the advice of his lawyers, attempted to preserve Hard Ball’s assets by transferring them into his name. On August 1, 2006, Mike executed a deed on behalf of Hard Ball purporting to convey the Deatsville property to himself; he recorded that deed in the Elmore County Probate Office on August 4, 2006. He also executed and recorded deeds purporting to transfer to himself other real property owned by Hard Ball. In December 2006, Mike filed an application in the Autauga Circuit Court seeking the dissolution of Hard Ball.

In May 2007, the trial court entered the following notation on the case-action-summary sheet in the action seeking the dissolution of the limited-liability company: “Court directs that all LLC property be placed back in the LLC name — Only to be transferred by Court Order — All proceeds to be held in escrow pending order of this Court.” In response to the trial court’s order, Mike and Andy agreed that the deeds to the properties Mike had attempted to convey to himself would be signed, but not recorded, before finding a third-party buyer and obtaining authorization from the trial court to sell the properties. On July 23, 2007, Mike signed a deed conveying the Deatsville property to Hard Ball. When he signed the deed, Mike did not intend for the deed to be delivered or the property conveyed. However, a copy of that deed (stamped “COPY”) was given to Andy’s lawyer, who in turn gave it to Andy; on November 14, 2007, Andy recorded that copy as if it were the original deed.

On November 28, 2007, Simmons loaned Hard Ball $52,000 and in return received from Andy, acting as Hard Ball’s manager, a mortgage on the Deatsville property. In an affidavit attached to the mortgage, Andy assured Simmons that the property had been transferred from Mike to Hard Ball by the July 23, 2007, deed. When Hard Ball defaulted on the loan payments, Simmons attempted to foreclose on the Deatsville property. Mike learned of the mortgage on the Deatsville property on November 24, 2008, when he received a notice of that foreclosure. Mike immediately moved the trial court to join Simmons as a necessary party to the dissolution action. He also requested that the trial court stay the foreclosure proceedings. The trial court joined Simmons as a defendant and stayed the foreclosure proceedings; thereafter, Simmons, Mike, and Andy each filed a motion for a summary judgment.

On August 28, 2009, the trial court entered a summary judgment in Mike’s favor, dissolving Hard Ball, disposing of its assets, and permanently enjoining Simmons from foreclosing on the Deatsville property. The trial court found “that the deed ... with the word ‘COPY’ in bold print at the top thereof was sufficient to put [Simmons] ... on notice of further inquiry as to the location of the original deed and the reason the original deed was not recorded.” Simmons appealed.

Standard of Review

“ ‘[0]n appeal a summary judgment carries no presumption of correctness,’ Hornsby v. Sessions, 703 So.2d 932, 938 (Ala.1997). ‘ “In reviewing the disposition of a motion for summary judgment, we utilize the same standard as that of the trial court in determining whether the evidence before the court made out a genuine issue of material fact” and whether the mov-ant was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.’ Ex parte General Motors Corp., 769 So.2d 903, 906 (Ala.1999) (quoting Bussey v. John Deere Co., 531 So.2d 860, 862 (Ala.1988)). ‘Our review is further subject to the caveat that this Court must review the record in a light most favorable to the nonmovant and must resolve all reasonable doubts against the movant.’ Hobson v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 690 So.2d 341, 344 (Ala.1997).”

Harper v. Coats, 988 So.2d 501, 503 (Ala.2008).

Discussion

Several issues are raised on appeal, but we need address only one. The dispositive issue in this case is whether the deed Mike executed on August 1, 2006, transferred ownership of the Deatsville property from Hard Ball to Mike.

Simmons argues that under §§ 10-12-21 and 10-12-23, Ala.Code 1975, a part of the Alabama Limited Liability Company Act, § 10-12-1 et seq., Ala.Code 1975, Mike acted without authority when he signed the August 1, 2006, deed as a member of Hard Ball because, Simmons says, Andy, as the manager of Hard Ball, was the only person who had the authority to transfer title to any of Hard Ball’s property. Simmons argues that Mike’s lack of authority to transfer title to any of Hard Ball’s assets makes the August 1, 2006, deed void. Thus, Simmons argues, title to the Deatsville property remained in Hard Ball and was never transferred to Mike.

As this Court has previously explained, “[l]ike corporations and limited partnerships, limited liability companies are creatures of statute.” Harbison v. Strickland, 900 So.2d 385, 389 (Ala.2004). Section 10-12 — 21(b)(1) provides, in relevant part, that when a limited-liability company’s articles of organization provide that management of the company is vested in a manager, then “[n]o member, acting solely in the capacity as member, is an agent for the limited liability company.” As we noted in Clement Contracting Group, Inc. v. Coating Systems, L.L.C., 881 So.2d 971 (Ala. 2003), when the articles of organization provide for a manager, even the sole member of a limited-liability company should sign documents “in his capacity as manager rather than in his capacity as member.” 881 So.2d at 974.

The reservation of authority to the manager or managers of a limited-liability company is even more explicit when the transfer of property of the limited-liability company is involved. Section 10-12-23, Ala.Code 1975, entitled “Limited Liability Company Property,” provides in subsection (d):

“If the articles of organization provide that management of the limited liability company is vested in a manager or managers, title to property of the limited liability company that is held in the name of the limited liability company may be transferred by an instrument of transfer executed by any manager in the name of the limited liability company; but a member, acting solely as a member, shall not have that authority”

(Emphasis added.) Both §§ 10-12-21(b)(1) and 10-12-23(d) are applicable in this case.

Hard Ball’s articles of organization appointed a manager for the limited-liability company; that manager was Andy. Because Andy was the manager and Mike was only a member of Hard Ball, Mike had no authority to transfer the Deatsville property from Hard Ball to himself. The issue then is whether the August 1, 2006, deed executed by Mike without authority to do so is voidable at Hard Ball’s option but enforceable against Simmons and other third-party purchasers or simply void, having no legal effect on the title to the Deatsville property.

Simmons admits in his brief to this Court that “some deeds which were improperly executed [are] voidable rather than void,” including deeds that are “obtained through undue influence.” (Simmons’s brief, at 18.) Simmons goes on to argue, though, that “[n]o case or statutory support has been found for Mike Ball’s position which would contradict the plain meaning of the statute and the LLC organizational documents.” (Simmons’s brief, at 18.) Simmons’s assertion is correct; this is a question of first impression for this Court.

Mike compares the facts in this case to the transfer of property by a minor, noting that “[s]uch a transfer is not void, but only voidable at the instance of the minor.” (Mike Ball’s brief, at 28.) However, because he cites no authority in support of the bare analogy, we disregard that argument. “We have unequivocally stated that it is not the function of this Court to do a party’s legal research or to make and address legal arguments for a party based on undelineated general propositions not supported by sufficient authority or argument.” Dykes v. Lane Trucking, Inc., 652 So.2d 248, 251 (Ala.1994).

Mike does direct this Court’s attention to cases holding that an instrument executed by an agent of a corporation who has a personal interest in the transfer is voidable by the corporation, but not by third parties. See Mike Ball’s brief, at 26-29, citing Mobile Land Improvement Co. v. Gass, 142 Ala. 520, 39 So. 229 (1904), and National Union Life Ins. Co. v. Ingram, 275 Ala. 310, 154 So.2d 666 (1963). Mike argues that this Court should apply a similar rule by analogy in this case.

Mike’s reliance on those cases is misplaced, however. In Mobile Land Improvement Co., the secretary of the corporation, H.R. Gass, participated in the corporate meeting authorizing the transfer of corporate property to him personally. Because the sale of that property created a conflict between his personal interest and the interests of the corporation, this Court concluded that the corporation could properly void the transaction and rescind the deeds giving Gass title to the property at issue. Specifically, this Court stated:

“ ‘ “Now the purchase of property by an agent or trustee, or by any person acting in a fiduciary capacity, is not void ab origine and absolutely. It is voidable only. It is made subject to the right of the principal or beneficiary, in a reasonable time, to say that he is not satisfied with it.” ’ ”

142 Ala. at 528, 39 So. at 232 (quoting other cases). Unlike Mike, who, as a member of the limited-liability company but not the managing member, lacked authority to act on behalf of Hard Ball, Gass’s status as an agent of the corporation and his resulting authority to transfer the property on behalf of the corporation was never in question.

Mike also cites National Union Life Insurance, in which F.R. Ingram, the sole shareholder of the corporation, signed a contract between himself and the corporation both on behalf of the corporation and in his individual capacity. This Court held that such a contract was voidable, but only by the corporation; a third party like National Union could not object to the conflict. 275 Ala. at 317, 154 So.2d at 670-71. Like Gass, however, and unlike the facts before us today, Ingram had the authority to act on behalf of the corporation; as the sole shareholder, Ingram could execute documents on behalf of the corporation without formal authorization. By contrast, Mike’s one-half interest in Hard Ball did not give him such authority.

Mike argues that this Court should create a similar rule for transfers of property by non-manager members of a limited-liability company. Such a rule would permit Hard Ball to declare the deed signed by Mike to be void, if it decided to do so, but would give Simmons no opportunity to challenge the validity of the deed. Simmons’s mortgage would therefore be worthless, because “[o]ne cannot be bona fide purchaser where his grantor did not have the legal title to convey.” Hess v. Hodges, 201 Ala. 309, 310, 78 So. 85, 86 (1918).

We start with the text of the statute. The language of §§ 10-12-21(b) and 10-12-23(d), Ala.Code 1975, is unambiguous: if a manager has been appointed, the members of the limited-liability company no longer have the authority to act on the company’s behalf. Those Code sections indicate an intent not simply to protect the limited-liability company, but also to protect third parties with whom it deals. If the deeds executed by the non-managing members are voidable rather than void, however, only the limited-liability company would be protected; third parties would be bound by such transactions, even though the limited-liability company is not. Without clear indication that the legislature intended that result, this Court declines to interpret §§ 10-12-21(b) and 10 — 12—23(d), Ala.Code 1975, in such a way and therefore declines to adopt the rule advocated by Mike in this case. We hold that a transaction, such as the one at issue here, by a member of a limited-liability company in contravention of the authority vested by the company’s articles of organization in a manager of the limited-liability company is void. Thus, Mike’s attempt to transfer title to the Deatsville property to himself was ineffective, and the deed signed on August 1, 2006, was void.

The trial court’s decision relied on the notice given to Simmons by the previous deeds, and the parties’ briefs also raise the question whether Simmons had adequate notice of Mike’s interest in the Deatsville property. However, because we conclude that the conveyance of the Deatsville property to Mike was void, we need not reach the question whether Simmons was a mortgagee without notice under Alabama law.

Conclusion

As a non-manager member of Hard Ball, Mike lacked the authority to transfer title to the Deatsville property from the limited-liability company to himself; his attempt to transfer title was therefore ineffective. Simmons therefore received title to the property by the mortgage from Hard Ball, regardless of whether he had notice of previous transactions regarding the property. We therefore reverse the trial court’s order and remand this case for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

COBB, C.J., and STUART, SHAW, and WISE, JJ., concur.

      . Several other courts have considered this question, and the majority have concluded that the action of a member of a limited-liability company that is beyond that member’s authority is void. In 1230 Park Associates, LLC v. Northern Source, LLC, 48 A.D.3d 355, 355, 852 N.Y.S.2d 92, 93 (2008), the Supreme Court of New York County declared several loans from one limited-liability company to another "null and void” because the part owner "had no authority to enter into the relevant loan transactions.” Similarly, in Halstead Brooklyn, LLC v. 96-98 Baltic, LLC, 49 A.D.3d 602, 854 N.Y.S.2d 437 (2008), a brokerage agreement signed on behalf of the limited-liability company by someone other than a manager, in violation of the company’s operating agreement, was unenforceable. In Cement-Lock v. Gas Technology Institute, 618 F.Supp.2d 856 (N.D.Ill.2009), misconduct of non-manager members was not attributable to the limited-liability company when those members had no authority under the terms of the operating agreement or the applicable lili-nois statute. Most recently, in BankPlus v. Kinwood Capital Group, L.L.C., 430 B.R. 758 (2009), a bankruptcy court held that, under Mississippi’s corresponding statutory provision, a deed, executed on behalf of the limited-liability company by a member who lacked that authority, "was void ab initio.” 43 B.R. at 759. This case is currently on appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which has in turn certified this very question to the Mississippi Supreme Court. In re Northlake Dev., L.L.C., 614 F.3d 140 (5th Cir.2010). At least one court, however, has considered a similar statute and reached the opposite conclusion. In Livonia Property Holdings, L.L.C. v. 12840-12976 Farmington Road Holdings, L.L.C., 717 F.Supp.2d 724 (E.D.Mich.2010), a provision in the Massachusetts Limited Liability Company Act that made certain recordable instruments binding on the limited-liability company if the instrument was signed by someone with authority was interpreted to permit the lack of authority to be cured by "[r]atification or adoption.” 717 F.Supp.2d at 738.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: THOMAS, Judge.

license: Public Domain

text:
    John HARGETT v. BLUE CROSS BLUE SHIELD OF ALABAMA.
    2100015.
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    Feb. 11, 2011.

      John Hargett, pro se.
    Edward A. Hosp and Grace R. Murphy of Maynard, Cooper & Gale, P.C., Birmingham, for appellee.
   THOMAS, Judge.

John Hargett appeals from a summary judgment entered by the Lauderdale Circuit Court in favor of Blue Cross Blue Shield of Alabama (“BCBS”). We dismiss the appeal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

Hargett had a long-term-care insurance policy with BCBS. The policy, issued under certificate number 1116963, provided Hargett with a daily benefit of $120 and a benefit duration of 1,825 days. Hargett’s monthly premium was $112.03. In February 2006, Hargett elected to change his daily benefit to $90, while keeping his benefit duration of 1,825 days, which resulted in a new monthly premium of $84.02. In May 2006, Hargett again elected to change his long-term-care benefits. Hargett completed a new application for a lifetime-benefit long-term-care insurance policy. Because Hargett sought a lifetime-benefit duration, BCBS required Hargett to complete a health survey and conducted a full medical underwriting review of the policy application. As a result of Hargett’s answers on the health survey and a review of its underwriting guidelines, BCBS determined that Hargett was no longer eligible for a 10% preferred-health discount on his policy, which he had been receiving. Consequently, BCBS determined that Har-gett’s monthly premium for the new policy, which BCBS issued under certificate number 1117715, was $124.53.

On August 13, 2008, Hargett filed a statement of claim in the small-claims division of the Lauderdale District Court. In his statement of claim, Hargett alleged that BCBS owed him a yet-to-be-determined sum of money and requested that the district court award him a “[pjremium reduction of $12.01 per month since inception of [insurance policy] certificate number 1117715.”

Following a bench trial, the district court entered a judgment in favor of BCBS on August 20, 2009. In its judgment, the district court determined that,

“per the unambiguous provisions of the Group Enrollment Agreement, [BCBS] properly performed full medical underwriting at the time [Hargett] chose to upgrade his long-term care coverage to lifetime benefits. When a review of [Hargett’s] health history revealed that [Hargett] was not entitled to a discounted premium for this upgraded coverage, [BCBS] correctly adjusted his monthly insurance premium. Accordingly, this Court finds that [BCBS] has committed no wrongdoing in connection with calculating [Hargett’s] monthly long-term care insurance premium and [Hargett’s] Complaint is due to be dismissed.”

Hargett then appealed to the circuit court. BCBS moved the circuit court for a summary judgment. The circuit court entered a summary judgment in favor of BCBS on July 19, 2010. In its summary judgment, the circuit court determined:

“This Court determines as a matter of law that, per the unambiguous provisions of the contracts at issue, [BCBS] properly performed full medical underwriting at the time [Hargett] chose to upgrade his long-term care coverage to lifetime benefits. When a review of [Hargett’s] health history revealed that [Hargett] was not entitled to a discounted premium for this upgraded coverage, [BCBS] correctly adjusted his monthly insurance premium. This Court also finds that the clear and express provisions of the Certificate do not preclude BCBS from requiring new premiums to accompany new coverage. Accordingly, this Court finds that [BCBS] has committed no wrongdoing in connection with calculating [Hargett’s] monthly long-term care insurance premium for Certificate No. 1117715 and [Hargett’s] Complaint is due to be dismissed.”

Hargett filed a postjudgment motion, which the circuit court denied. Hargett subsequently appealed to this court.

Although neither party addresses this court’s jurisdiction over this appeal, we may take notice of a lack of jurisdiction ex mero motu. See Ruzic v. State ex rel. Thornton, 866 So.2d 564, 568-69 (Ala.Civ.App.2003), abrogated on other grounds by F.G. v. State Dep’t of Human Res., 988 So.2d 555 (Ala.Civ.App.2007). In the statement of claim that Hargett filed in the district court, Hargett sought a reduction in his premium for his long-term-care insurance policy issued by BCBS. In essence, Hargett requested that the district court interpret the terms of his insurance policy and declare the amount of his premium payment according to the provisions of the policy. Hargett also requested that the district court order BCBS to reimburse Hargett for the amount of the alleged excess in premiums that he had already paid. As such, Hargett’s action was in the nature of an action seeking a declaratory judgment.

Section 6-6-223, Ala.Code 1975, a part of the Declaratory Judgment Act, § 6-6-220 et seq., Alabama Code 1975, provides:

“Any person interested under a deed, will, written contract, or other writings constituting a contract or whose rights, status, or other legal relations are affected by a statute, municipal ordinance, contract, or franchise may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument, statute, ordinance, contract, or franchise and obtain a declaration of rights, status or other legal relations thereunder.”

In this case, Hargett sought a judicial interpretation of the insurance policy and a declaration of his rights and of BCBS’s rights under the policy regarding BCBS’s recalculation of premiums upon a change of Hargett’s benefit elections. Actions seeking an interpretation of the provisions of an insurance policy fall under the Declaratory Judgment Act. See, generally, Hartford Cas. Ins. Co. v. Merchants & Farmers Bank, 928 So.2d 1006 (Ala.2005); Tate v. Allstate Ins. Co., 692 So.2d 822 (Ala.1997); Hutchinson v. Attorneys Ins. Mut. of Alabama, Inc., 631 So.2d 975 (Ala.1994); Hicks v. American Res. Ins. Co., 544 So.2d 952 (Ala.1989); and Antram v. Stuyvesant Life Ins. Co., 291 Ala. 716, 287 So.2d 837 (1973).

Although Hargett requested a monetary award in his statement of claim, that does not preclude Hargett’s action from being a declaratory-judgment action.

“Section 6-6-230, Code of Alabama 1975, provides that further relief may be granted in declaratory judgment actions ‘whenever necessary or proper.’ This authorizes a court to grant such relief as is necessary to effectuate the declaratory judgment even though such supplementary relief may consist of the granting of a money judgment in the case.”

United Servs. Auto. Ass’n v. Pons, 383 So.2d 166, 169 (Ala.Civ.App.1979) (citing Clark v. Exchange Ins. Ass’n, 276 Ala. 334, 161 So.2d 817 (1964)). Our supreme court has also stated:

“The mere fact that pecuniary interests were involved does not deprive the declaratory judgment act of a field of operation. In most litigation involving the legal rights of the parties, some underlying economic advantage or loss will result from the determination of those legal rights.”

Broadwater v. Blue & Gray Patio Club, 403 So.2d 209, 212 (Ala.1981).

Section 12-12-30(3), Ala.Code 1975, expressly excludes “[ajctions seeking declaratory judgments” from the subject-matter jurisdiction of the district court. Therefore, the district could did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over Hargett’s action.

Because the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over Hargett’s complaint, its judgment is void. Riley v. Pate, 3 So.3d 835, 838 (Ala.2008). “A void judgment will not support an appeal, and ‘an appellate court must dismiss an attempted appeal from such a void judgment.’ ” Colburn v. Colburn, 14 So.3d 176, 179 (Ala.Civ.App.2009) (quoting Vann v. Cook, 989 So.2d 556, 559 (Ala.Civ.App.2008)). Consequently, the circuit court never acquired jurisdiction over Hargett’s appeal, and that court could take no action other than to dismiss Hargett’s appeal. See Ex parte Smith, 438 So.2d 766, 768 (Ala.1983) (opining that, “on appeal [for a trial de novo], the circuit court lack[s] subject matter jurisdiction to consider more than a final judgment over which the district court had subject matter jurisdiction”; citing State v. Pollock, 251 Ala. 603, 38 So.2d 870 (1948), and Craig v. Root, 247 Ala. 479, 25 So.2d 147 (1946)). Therefore, the circuit court’s judgment is also void. Because the circuit court’s judgment is void, this court lacks jurisdiction over Hargett’s appeal. Colburn, 14 So.3d at 179. Thus, we dismiss Hargett’s appeal, and we instruct the circuit court and the district court to vacate their respective judgments in this case.

APPEAL DISMISSED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

THOMPSON, P.J., and PITTMAN, BRYAN, and MOORE, JJ., concur.

      . BCBS informed Hargett:
      "Our decision to apply the standard rate for this policy is based on your history of hypertension which is treated with Atenolol and Lotrel. According to the established underwriting guidelines your response to Question # 8 in the Health Status section of the application disqualified you for the preferred rate. One must answer No to questions 1 through 11 in this section in order to qualify for the preferred rate.”


author: THOMAS, Judge. MOORE, Judge,

text:
    TOWN OF WESTOVER v. James BYNUM and J & F Enterprises, LLC, d/b/a the 51 Country Store.
    2100048.
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    Feb. 11, 2011.

      William R. Justice of Wallace, Ellis, Fowler & Head, Columbiana, for appellant.
   THOMAS, Judge.

The Town of Westover (“the Town”), appeals from the trial court’s judgment entered in a declaratory-judgment action filed by James Bynum and J & F Enterprises, LLC, d/b/a The 51 Country Store (“the Country Store”); Bynum is the sole member of the Country Store. We reverse and remand.

The parties submitted a joint stipulation of the relevant facts to the trial court. The Country Store is a retail business located in an unincorporated area of Shelby County; in other words, it is not within the corporate boundaries of any municipality. The Country Store is, however, located within the Town’s police jurisdiction.

Revenue Discovery Systems (“RDS”), working on behalf of the Town, conducted an audit of the Country Store. The audit revealed that the Country Store had never paid any sales taxes or business-license fees to the Town and that, pursuant to the Town’s ordinance no. 2005-10-04-061, which the Town had adopted pursuant to §§ 11-51-200 and -206, Ala.Code 1975, and the Town’s ordinance no. 2007-11-6-147, which the Town had adopted pursuant to § 11-51-91, Ala.Code 1975, the Country Store owed the Town $47,011.44 in sales taxes, business-license fees, interest, and penalties dating back to December 1, 2005.

On January 20, 2010, Bynum and the Country Store filed a complaint against the Town seeking a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief regarding the Country Store’s alleged sales-tax and business-license-fee obligation. The Town answered the complaint on February 18, 2010.

On June 24, 2010, the parties filed a joint stipulation of facts. At the request of the trial court, the Town filed a trial brief on August 4, 2010, and Bynum and the Country Store responded on August 24, 2010.

Following a hearing on August 30, 2010, at which no evidence was taken, the trial court entered a final judgment on September 20, 2010, stating, in pertinent part:

“1. Based on the facts presented to the Court, this Court determines that there was no actual or constructive notice given to [Bynum and the Country Store] concerning [their] duty to collect sales tax within the [Town’s] Police Jurisdiction, prior to December 11, 2009. Therefore, prior to this date [Bynum and the Country Store are] absolved from any previously calculated tax liability due and payable to the [Town] through the [RDS].
“2. Subsequent to the date of notice, [Bynum and the Country Store] do[] owe sales tax pursuant to the [Town’s] Ordinance No. 2005-10-04-0601. Said tax shall be computed by [Bynum], based on sales from that date going forward and the tax due from December 11, 2009 through August 31, 2010 shall be paid to [Town] within ninety (90) days of the date of this Order.
“3. Going forward, [Bynum and the Country Store] shall be subject to the municipal ordinances of the [Town] ... concerning collection of sales tax and requirement of business license within its police jurisdiction, so long as [the Country Store] remains located therein and is not a part of any other incorporated municipality, or there is no other municipality, more closely located to [the Country Store], that collects sales tax and business license fees, within its police jurisdiction.”

The Town appealed.

The trial court in this case applied the law to undisputed, stipulated facts. Our review therefore is de novo.

“‘When reviewing a case in which the trial court sat without a jury and heard evidence in the form of stipulations, briefs, and the writings of the parties, this Court sits in judgment of the evidence; there is no presumption of correctness. Old Southern Life Ins. Co. v. Williams, 544 So.2d 941, 942 (Ala.1989); Craig Constr. Co. v. Hendrix, 568 So.2d 752, 756 (Ala.1990). When this Court must determine if the trial court misapplied the law to the undisputed facts, the standard of review is de novo, and no presumption of correctness is given the decision of the trial court. State Dep’t of Revenue v. Garner, 812 So.2d 380, 382 (Ala.Civ.App.2001); see also Ex parte Graham, 702 So.2d 1215 (Ala.1997). In this case the trial court based its decision upon the stipulations, briefs, writings, and arguments of the parties’ attorneys. No testimony was presented. Therefore, we must sit in judgment of the evidence, and the trial court’s ruling carries no presumption of correctness.’ ”

American Res. Ins. Co. v. H & H Stephens Constr., Inc., 939 So.2d 868, 872-73 (Ala.2006) (quoting Bean Dredging, L.L.C. v. Alabama Dep’t of Revenue, 855 So.2d 513, 516-17 (Ala.2003)).

In its judgment, the trial court concluded that “there was no actual or constructive notice given to [Bynum and the Country Store] concerning [their] duty to collect sales tax ... prior to December 11, 2009.” As a result, the trial court held that Bynum and the Country Store’s liability under the Town’s ordinances did not accrue until December 11, 2009. However, there is no evidence in the record to support the trial court’s conclusion that Bynum and the Country Store did not have notice of the Town’s ordinances until December 11, 2009. The parties filed a joint stipulation of facts, which made no mention of whether Bynum and the Country Store had notice of the Town’s ordinances. Further, the trial court received no evidence at trial. The only mention of whether Bynum and the Country Store had notice of the Town’s ordinances was in Bynum and the Country Store’s trial brief, in which they alleged that they had “never received notice from [the Town] regarding the Ordinance upon which it relies regarding the collection of Sales Tax and License within its Police Jurisdiction.” The statement in Bynum and the Country Store’s trial brief is an unsworn statement made by counsel, which is not considered evidence. Singley v. Bentley, 782 So.2d 799, 803 (Ala.Civ.App.2000) (citing American Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. v. Long, 281 Ala. 654, 207 So.2d 129 (1968)). Therefore, because there is no evidence to support the trial court’s finding that Bynum and the Country Store had not received notice of the Town’s ordinances before December 11, 2009, we reverse the trial court’s judgment insofar as it absolves Bynum and the Country Store from liability for sales taxes and business-license fees accruing before December 11, 2009, and we remand the cause for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

THOMPSON, P.J., and PITTMAN and BRYAN, JJ., concur.

MOORE, J., concurs in the result, with writing.

MOORE, Judge,

concurring in the result.

I concur with the main opinion that the judgment should be reversed, but I do so for reasons different than those contained in the main opinion.

In its final judgment, the trial court concluded that the Town of Westover’s ordinance nos. 2005-10-64-061 and 2007-11-6-147 (“the ordinances”) applied to the 51 Country Store (“the Country Store”), a business that is owned by J & F Enterprises, LLC, and that is currently located in an unincorporated part of Shelby County but is within the overlapping police jurisdictions of the Town of Westover (“the Town”) and the City of Chelsea, the latter of which does not levy or collect sales taxes or business-license fees. J & F Enterprises and James Bynum, the sole member of J & F Enterprises (hereinafter referred to collectively as “J & F”), do not dispute that legal conclusion, which is now the law of the case. See Norandal U.S.A., Inc. v. Graben, 18 So.Sd 405, 410 (Ala.Civ. App.2009) (failure of appellee to file cross-appeal made adverse ruling of trial court law of the case). Hence, I find no need to address the correctness of that legal conclusion, other than to note that it seems consistent with our decision in Town of Kitten v. Clemmons, 963 So.2d 670 (Ala.Civ.App.2007) (construing Ala.Code 1975, § 11-51-91, as authorizing a municipality to levy and collect business-license fees from a business located in an overlapping police jurisdiction if the nearest municipality does not collect such taxes), and Ala. Code 1975, § 11-51-206 (authorizing a municipality to collect sales taxes from businesses located outside its corporate limits but within its police jurisdiction).

Despite its conclusion that the ordinances applied to the Country Store, the trial court determined that they could not be enforced against J & F as to any date before December 11, 2009, because J & F did not have actual or constructive notice of its duty to pay the fees or collect taxes before that date. On appeal, the Town primarily argues that J & F had constructive notice of the ordinances and that any alleged actual ignorance of the law does not excuse J & F’s failure to comply with the ordinances. The Town secondarily argues that no admissible evidence supports the trial court’s finding that J & F did not have actual notice of the ordinances.

As stated by the Town in its brief to this court, as a matter of law,

“the publication or posting of an ordinance as required by law serves as notice, and no further notice, including to those affected by the ordinance, is necessary. 5 MCQUILLIN MUN. CORP. § 16:75 (2010). Notice of such an ordinance is required to be taken by anyone upon whom it has a binding effect, analogous to the rule that everyone is presumed to know the law. Id. § 15:25. ‘All persons upon whom valid ordinances are binding are charged with constructive notice of those ordinances, and a defendant cannot show that he or she did not know of the existence of the ordinance.’ Id. § 27:65.”

Based on the foregoing principles, actual knowledge of an ordinance is immaterial if a citizen has constructive knowledge of the ordinance through its enactment, publication, and/or posting.

In this case, the trial court specifically found that J & F did not have constructive notice of the ordinances. Such a finding could only be based on evidence indicating that the ordinances had not been validly enacted, published, and/or posted. In that regard, under Alabama law, it is presumed that a municipality performed all acts necessary to validate an ordinance; however, that presumption may be rebutted by evidence to the contrary. Chadwick v. Town of Hammondville, 270 Ala. 618, 622, 120 So.2d 899, 902 (1960) (“It has been determined that when a city passes an ordinance, the presumption applies that the city did what was necessary to make that ordinance valid and when a city ordinance is not invalid on its face, the burden of alleging and proving facts to support the claims of invalidity, is on the party so asserting.”). J & F did not offer any evidence or enter into any stipulation disputing the validity of the ordinances or their publication or posting. In fact, the parties stipulated that the Town was relying on ordinance nos. 2005-10-04-0601 and 2007-11-6-147, which authorize the Town to collect sales taxes and business-license fees, respectively, from businesses located within the Town’s police jurisdiction, and the parties attached the ordinances to their joint stipulation for the trial court’s consideration.

The Town did not file a postjudgment motion with the trial court regarding the insufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s factual finding that J & F had not received constructive notice of the ordinances. Ordinarily, an appellate court cannot review the sufficiency of the evidence to support a judgment in the absence of an adverse ruling on a post-judgment motion directing the trial court to the issue; however, when a trial court makes specific findings of fact, an appellate court can review the sufficiency of the evidence to support those findings without the necessity of an adverse ruling on a postjudgment motion. Rule 52(b), Ala. R. Civ. P. (“When findings of fact are made in actions tried by the court without a jury, the question of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings may thereafter be raised whether or not the party raising the question has made in the court an objection to such findings or has made a motion to amend them or a motion for judgment or a motion for a new trial.”).

“The trial court’s ruling on the sufficiency of the evidence is implicit in a decree in which the trial judge is the trier of the facts. Moreover, by making written findings of fact, the trial judge has had the additional opportunity to reconsider the evidence and discover and correct any error in judgment which he or she may have made upon initial review. Thus, when written findings of fact are made, they serve the same useful purpose as does an objection to the trial court’s findings, a motion to amend them, a motion for a new trial, and a motion to dismiss ... — to permit the trial judge an opportunity to carefully review the evidence and to perfect the issues for review on appeal.”

Ex parte Vaughn, 495 So.2d 83, 87 (Ala.1986). Because the trial court specifically found that J & F did not receive constructive notice of the ordinances, we may address the Town’s argument that no evidence supports that factual determination.

Upon due consideration, I conclude that, because J & F did not present any evidence to rebut the presumption that the ordinances were validly enacted, published, and posted, the trial court had no eviden-tiary basis for finding that J & F had not received constructive notice of the ordinances.

Because J & F had constructive notice of the ordinances, its lack of actual notice of the ordinances is immaterial to their enforcement. See Center Moriches Monument Co. v. Commissioner of Taxation, 211 A.D.2d 947, 621 N.Y.S.2d 720 (1995) (ignorance of sales tax no excuse); and Alford v. Butler, 211 Tenn. 663, 367 S.W.2d 281 (1963) (same). Therefore, I find no need to address that point, although I do agree with the main opinion that no admissible evidence supported a finding of lack of actual notice.

The trial court committed reversible error in finding that J & F lacked constructive notice of the ordinances before December 11, 2009. The judgment should be reversed and the cause remanded with instructions to vacate those portions of the judgment denying enforcement of the ordinances before December 11, 2009, and to enter a new judgment finding the ordinances to be enforceable against the Country Store from the date of their adoption and awarding the Town the taxes and business-license fees due.

      . Judge Moore, in his special writing, faults the majority for failing to address whether the ordinances were validly published and/or enacted. Judge Moore appears to believe that the trial court’s holding that Bynum and the Country Store did not have constructive notice of the ordinances, coupled with the Town's argument on appeal that Bynum and the Country Store did have constructive notice of the ordinances, sufficiently demonstrates that the issue of valid publication and/or enactment was raised and tried in the trial court. However, Bynum and the Country Store never raised the issue of valid publication and/or enactment below — Bynum and the Country Store presented neither an argument nor evidence concerning the issue to the trial court — and we will not address an issue raised for the first time on appeal. See George v. George, 14 So.3d 180, 183 (Ala.Civ.App.2009) (citing Andrews v. Merritt Oil Co., 612 So.2d 409, 410 (Ala.1992)).

      . The trial court evidently concluded that constructive notice was an issue in the case and resolved that issue adversely to the Town. On appeal, the Town does not challenge the trial court's conclusion that constructive notice was an issue; it attacks only the sufficiency of the evidence to support the finding that J & F did not have constructive notice of the ordinances. Therefore, this court cannot decide that constructive notice was not raised as an issue in the trial court below, as the main opinion asserts. 68 So.3d at 843 n. 1.

      . The Town adopted ordinance no. 2005-10-04-061 on October 4, 2005; it adopted ordinance no. 2007-11-6-147 on November 6, 2007. The Town audited the Country Store's receipts for the period December 1, 2005, through September 30, 2009. That audit found that J & F owed $35,514.61 in back sales taxes, along with interest of $3,735.37 and penalties of $7,107.20. The audit also found that J & F owed $450 in business-license fees, along with $89.96 in interest and $112.50 in penalties. The record is unclear whether the Town is attempting to recover business-license fees predating November 6, 2007; however, J & F has never argued that point, so the judgment should award the Town the full audited amount.


text:
    Sharia GARRETT v. Martha Nell WILLIAMS and Johnny L. Williams.
    2091172.
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    Feb. 18, 2011.

      Lisa Wilson Jones, Rainsville, for appellant.
   THOMAS, Judge.

Sharia Garrett (“the mother”) appeals from a judgment of the DeKalb Circuit Court (“the trial court”) registering and enforcing a foreign child-custody order regarding J.W. (“the child”). We dismiss the appeal for want of subject-matter jurisdiction.

On September 1, 2010, Mary Nell Williams and Johnny L. Williams (collectively referred to as “the paternal grandparents”) filed a petition in the trial court to register and enforce a foreign child-custody order from Mississippi. The paternal grandparents attached to the petition a certified copy of the order that they sought to register and enforce. The order, which was entered by the Chancery Court of Yazoo County, Mississippi (“the Mississippi Court”), on March 14, 2010, stated, in pertinent part, that

“the [child] shall remain in the custody and guardianship of [the paternal grandparents]. Further, that the terms of the Agreed Order Continuing Guardianship entered in Cause No. 07-0319 on April 15, 2009, apply to this cause and shall remain in full force and effect. A copy of said agreed order of April 15, 2009 is attached hereto as Exhibit ‘A’ and incorporated herein by reference.”

The copy of the foreign child-custody order attached by the paternal grandparents did not include a copy of the agreed order referenced as “Exhibit A.”

On September 2, 2010, the trial court entered an order setting the paternal grandparents’ petition for a hearing and directing that the mother be served a copy of the petition. On the same day, the trial court entered an order awarding temporary custody of the child to the paternal grandparents, determining that the foreign child-custody order should be given full faith and credit, establishing the foreign child-custody order as a foreign judgment, and determining that the foreign child-custody order should be enforced.

On September 3, 2010, the mother moved the trial court to stay enforcement of its September 2, 2010, order. In her motion, the mother alleged that she had had physical custody of the child since August 2009, pursuant to an oral agreement between the mother and the paternal grandparents. The mother also argued that the paternal grandparents’ petition was improperly filed because it did not contain a copy of the previous order of the Mississippi court, which was referred to in the foreign child-custody order as “Exhibit A” and which had been incorporated by reference into the foreign child-custody order. Additionally, the mother alleged that she did not have any notice of the March 2010 proceedings that resulted in the foreign child-custody order and that Alabama was the home state of the child at the time of the commencement of the March 2010, proceedings in the Mississippi court. The mother further alleged that she had filed a petition in the DeKalb Juvenile Court seeking custody of the child before she had received notice of the paternal grandparents’ petition. The trial court granted the mother’s petition, staying enforcement of its September 2, 2010, order and setting the paternal grandparents’ petition for a hearing on September 7, 2010.

The mother then moved the trial court to vacate its September 2, 2010, order domesticating the foreign child-custody order. Among other arguments, the mother alleged that the paternal grandparents had not complied with the registration requirements of § 30-3B-305, Ala.Code 1975, a part of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (“the UC-CJEA”), § 30-3B-101 et seq., Ala.Code 1975. In her motion, the mother alternatively argued that the trial court should exercise concurrent jurisdiction with the Mississippi court because, the mother alleged, the paternal grandparents had abandoned their rights under the foreign child-custody order by not exercising their rights to custody and guardianship of the child.

Following a hearing, the trial court entered an order on September 7, 2010, granting the paternal grandparents’ petition to enforce the foreign child-support order. The mother subsequently appealed to this court.

The mother argues on appeal that the trial court improperly enforced the foreign child-custody order because, she says, the paternal grandparents did not properly register the foreign child-custody order. A party seeking to enforce a foreign child-custody order must register the foreign child-custody order according to the requirements of § 30-3B-305, which provides, in pertinent part:

“(a) A child custody determination issued by a court of another state may be registered in this state, with or without a simultaneous request for enforcement, by sending to the appropriate court in this state:
“(1) A letter or other document requesting registration;
“(2) Two copies, including one certified copy, of the determination sought to be registered, and a statement under penalty of perjury that to the best of the knowledge and belief of the person seeking registration the order has not been modified; and
“(3) Except as otherwise provided in Section 30-3B-209, [Ala.Code 1975,] the name and address of the person seeking registration and any parent or person acting as a parent who has been awarded custody or visitation in the child custody determination sought to be registered.”

The paternal grandparents’ petition to register and enforce the foreign child-custody order did not comply with the requirements of § 30-3B-305. The petition filed by the paternal grandparents was accompanied by only a single, incomplete, certified copy of the foreign child-custody order. Moreover, the paternal grandparents did not include a “statement under penalty of perjury that to the best of [their] knowledge and belief’ the foreign child-custody order had not been modified. § 30-3B-305(a)(2).

Although this court has not determined the effect of a failure to comply with the registration requirements of § 30-3B-305, we have held that a failure to comply with the registration requirements of § 30-3A-602, Ala.Code 1975, a part of the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (“the UIFSA”), § 30-3A-101 et seq., Ala. Code 1975, deprives a trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction to enforce a foreign child-support order. See Mattes v. Mattes, 60 So.3d 887, 891 (Ala.Civ.App.2010). The registration requirements of the UIFSA and the UCCJEA both serve a similar function. The Official Comment to § 30-3B-305 notes that the registration process of the UCCJEA “parallels the process in UIFSA for the registration of child support orders.” Moreover, § 30-3B-306 provides that a court of this state may enforce only a registered foreign child-custody order. Because the paternal grandparents did not comply with the statutory requirements of § 30-3B-305, the trial court did not obtain subject-matter jurisdiction over the foreign child-custody order. Thus, the trial court could not enforce the foreign child-custody order.

Because the trial court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction to enforce the foreign child-custody order, the trial court’s judgment is void. Gulf Beach Hotel, Inc. v. State ex rel. Whetstone, 935 So.2d 1177, 1183 (Ala.2006). A void judgment will not support an appeal. Id. “[A]n appellate court must dismiss an attempted appeal from ... a void judgment.” Vann v. Cook, 989 So.2d 556, 559 (Ala.Civ.App.2008). Therefore, we dismiss the mother’s appeal and instruct the trial court to vacate its September 2, 2010, order and its September 7, 2010, judgment.

APPEAL DISMISSED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

THOMPSON, P.J., and PITTMAN, BRYAN, and MOORE, JJ., concur.

      . "Exhibit A” contained the details of the Mississippi court’s custody award, which in-eluded liberal visitation for the mother.

      . Section 30-3B-306 provides:
      "(a) A court of this state may grant any relief normally available under the law of this state to enforce a registered child custody determination made by a court of another state.
      "(b) A court of this state shall recognize and enforce, but may not modify, except in accordance with Article 2, a registered child custody determination of a court of another state.”

      . Because we hold that the paternal grandparents did not properly invoke the subject-matter jurisdiction of the trial court, we pre-termit discussion of the mother's remaining arguments on appeal. See Favorite Market Store v. Waldrop, 924 So.2d 719, 723 (Ala.Civ.App.2005).


author: PITTMAN, Judge.

text:
    T.M. v. K.M.G.
    2091135.
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    Feb. 18, 2011.

      Scott F. Stewart of Stover, Stewart & Phillips, LLC, Gadsden, for appellant.
    Trenton Garmon of The Garmon Law Firm, LLC, Birmingham, for appellee.
   PITTMAN, Judge.

T.M. (“the father”) appeals from a judgment terminating his parental rights as to T.L.M. (“the child”), who was born on October 23,1997.

This appeal has its genesis in a complaint filed by K.M.G. (“the mother”) to terminate the father’s parental rights. In that complaint, the mother asserted that the father had consistently failed to pay child support, that he had just completed serving a sentence for a child-abuse conviction, and that the child’s best interests would be served by terminating the father’s parental rights. The father and the mother were married on October 3, 1997; they separated on August 8, 1998. On October 19, 1999, the mother and the father were divorced by a judgment that incorporated an agreement of the parties. That judgment awarded primary physical custody and control of the child to the mother, awarded the father standard visitation, and ordered the father to pay monthly child support in the amount of $158.

In November 1999, the mother prosecuted a criminal nonsupport action against the father, who was subsequently convicted in February 2001; at that time, the father owed an arrearage of $1,900. The father subsequently spent time in jail for a theft conviction and then began visitation with the child again in 2003. In 2004, the father was charged with felony child abuse of the child of his paramour; he was convicted and served an additional prison term from November 2006 until January 2010. In 2009, several months before his release from prison, the father wrote the mother seeking visitation with the child, but the mother responded that the child did not want a relationship with him; she asked the father to voluntarily relinquish his parental rights. The father refused, and the mother thereafter brought the action from which this appeal arises.

The juvenile court conducted an ore ten-us proceeding on July 10, 2010; at that proceeding, the mother, the father, and the child’s paternal grandmother testified. On August 16, 2010, the juvenile court terminated the father’s parental rights in a judgment containing detailed findings of fact; this timely appeal follows. In addition to asserting that the judgment does not comply with the either prong of the test set forth in Ex parte Beasley, 564 So.2d 950 (Ala.1990), the father also contends that the juvenile court erred in failing to appoint a guardian ad litem to represent the interests of the child.

Our standard of review of judgments terminating parental rights is well settled.

“A juvenile court’s factual findings, based on ore tenus evidence, in a judgment terminating parental rights are presumed to be correct and will not be disturbed unless they are plainly and palpably wrong. See, e.g., F.I. v. State Dep’t of Human Res., 975 So.2d 969, 972 (Ala.Civ.App.2007). Under express direction from our supreme court, in termination-of-parental-rights cases this court is ‘required, to apply a presumption of correctness to the trial court’s finding[s]’ when the trial court bases its decision on conflicting ore tenus evidence. Ex parte State Dep’t of Human Res., 834 So.2d 117, 122 (Ala.2002) (emphasis added). Additionally, we will reverse a juvenile court’s judgment terminating parental rights only if the record shows that the judgment is not supported by clear and convincing evidence. F.I., 975 So.2d at 972.”

J.C. v. State Dep’t of Human Res., 986 So.2d 1172, 1183 (Ala.Civ.App.2007) (footnote omitted); see also R.S. v. R.G., 995 So.2d 893, 900 (Ala.Civ.App.2008). Of course, “a trial court’s ruling on a question of law carries no presumption of correctness on appeal.” Ex parte J.E., 1 So.3d 1002, 1008 (Ala.2008); see also Waltman v. Rowell, 913 So.2d 1083, 1086 (Ala.2005).

The father first asserts that the juvenile court erred in failing to appoint a guardian ad litem to represent the interests of the child. The father cites § 12-15-304, Ala.Code 1975, as authority for his contention. We note that the Alabama Legislature recently totally revised and reorganized the statutory provisions pertinent to juvenile proceedings with the passage of the Alabama Juvenile Justice Act, § 12-15-101 et seq, Ala.Code 1975 (“the Act”), which took effect on January 1, 2009. Article 3 of the Act extensively modified the provisions relating to dependency and termination-of-parental-rights actions. See § 12-15-301 through § 12-15-324.

The pertinent statutory provision referenced by the father states: “In all dependency and termination of parental rights proceedings, the juvenile court shall appoint a guardian ad litem for a child who is a party to the proceedings and whose primary responsibility shall be to protect the best interests of the child.” Ala.Code 1975, § 12-15-304(a) (emphasis added). That language replaced the former provision that read: “The court, at any stage of a proceeding under this chapter, may appoint a guardian ad litem for a child who is a party to the proceeding if he has no parent or guardian or custodian appearing on his behalf or their interests conflict with those of the child.” Ala. Code 1975, former § 12-15-8(a) (emphasis added). The plain language of the statute now in effect mandates what was previously a discretionary appointment of a guardian ad litem whenever a child is a party to a dependency or termination-of-parental-rights action, regardless of whether that child has a “parent or guardian or custodian appearing on his behalf.”

We note, however, that the record reveals that the father failed to object to the lack of an appointment of a guardian ad litem at trial and that he failed to raise that issue in a postjudgment motion. It is well settled that an appellate court cannot reverse a judgment on the basis of an argument that was not first presented to the trial court. Blasdel v. Blasdel, 65 So.3d 428, 432 (Ala.Civ.App.2010) (citing Andrews v. Merritt Oil Co., 612 So.2d 409, 410 (Ala.1992)); see also White Sands Group, L.L.C. v. PRS II, LLC, 998 So.2d 1042, 1057 (Ala.2008) (quoting Singleton v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 928 So.2d 280, 285 (Ala.2005)) (“ ‘we cannot reverse the judgment of the trial court based on an argument not made below and urged for the first time on appeal’ ”). “[0]ur review is restricted to the evidence and arguments considered by the trial court.” Andrews, 612 So.2d at 410.

The father also contends that the test established in Ex parte Beasley, supra, was not satisfied at trial.

“Where, as here, the custodial parent petitions to terminate the parental rights of the noncustodial parent, the trial court’s analysis consists of two parts. [Ex parte Beasley,] 564 So.2d [950,] 954 [ (Ala.1990) ]. First, the trial court must determine whether grounds exist for terminating parental rights. 564 So.2d at 954. Grounds exist for terminating parental rights if the parent in question is ‘unable or unwilling to discharge [his] responsibilities to and for the child, or ... the conduct or condition of the parent[] is such as to render [him] unable to properly care for the child and ... such conduct or condition is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future.’ Ala.Code 1975, [former] § 26-18-7(a) [ (amended and renumbered as § 12-15-319(a)) ]....”

Ex parte J.E., 1 So.3d at 1006-07. In addition, a judgment terminating parental rights must be based on “clear and convincing evidence, competent, material, and relevant in nature.” Ala.Code 1975, § 12-15-319(a).

At trial, both the father and the paternal grandmother complained that the mother had interfered with their familial relationship with the child. At the time of trial, the father was living in a house he owned with the paternal grandmother, but he admitted that he was unemployed, with little prospect of locating nonseasonal employment soon. The father’s testimony centered around his various attempts over the years to “contact” the mother to effectuate visitation and his excuses for failing to pay child support for nearly six years. For her part, the mother stated that the father and his family had been helpful and supportive before the parties’ separation in 1998 but that the father and his family had essentially disappeared from the child’s life following the parties’ divorce and the father’s incarceration for child abuse. She stated that, throughout the years, the father had always known where the child’s maternal grandmother lived and that he could always contact the mother through the maternal grandmother. The mother admitted that, sometime before the father was convicted of child abuse, she had “given up” trying to enforce the child-support provision of the parties’ divorce judgment because she believed that the father would never fulfill his monetary responsibilities to and for the child.

The father relies almost exclusively on Ex parte J.E., supra, to support his contention that the juvenile court erred in terminating his parental rights as to the child; his reliance on that decision is misplaced. In J.E., the noncustodial parent had been largely absent from the children’s lives, but the court did not find that he had voluntarily abandoned the children such that his parental rights could be terminated for that reason. Ex parte J.E., 1 So.3d at 1011. This case does not concern abandonment as a ground for terminating the father’s parental rights; it appears to be more analogous to A.J.H.T. v. K.O.H., 983 So.2d 394 (Ala.Civ.App.2007), in which the termination of the parental rights of a noncustodial parent was held proper when that parent had not had any contact for four years with the pertinent children.

In this case, the record reveals that the father had been absent throughout much of the child’s life. Following the parties’ divorce in 1999, the father intermittently exercised visitation with the child until spring 2004; he rarely paid child support, and he had a $1,900 child-support arrearage by February 2001. In June 2004, the father was charged with felony child abuse regarding his paramour’s child, and he admitted at trial that he had not seen the child since the spring before his arrest on that charge. Although the father testified to the effect that the mother had deliberately disappeared and had interfered with his relationship with the child, the juvenile court specifically determined that the mother had not hidden or withheld the child from the father. Moreover, in its judgment, the juvenile court noted that, notwithstanding the father’s significant incarceration time, the father had not paid child support or consistently maintained a familial relationship with the child even during the years that the father had not been incarcerated. The juvenile court specifically determined that the father had only sporadically paid child support from March 2004 until his term of imprisonment began on November 30, 2006; moreover, the juvenile court noted that the father had not offered to support the child since his release from prison in January 2010.

In A.J.H.T., we concluded that the juvenile court could properly have determined that the noncustodial parent’s prolonged absence had been detrimental to the children who were old enough to recognize the parent’s absence and that termination of the noncustodial parent’s rights would be in the children’s best interests. A.J.H.T., 983 So.2d at 402. Likewise, in this case, the child is of an age to know that the absent parent is his biological father and that he had had no personal contact with the father for over six years. The mother’s testimony indicated that the child had developed a strong parental bond with his stepfather and that the child had no desire to visit the father. The juvenile court noted that not only had the father failed to maintain consistent contact with the child, see Ala.Code 1975, § 12-15-319(a)(10), but that he had failed to consistently pay child support both before and after his two terms of imprisonment, see Ala.Code 1975, § 12-15-319(a)(9). Moreover, the juvenile court referenced the fact that the father had been most recently in prison for a felony child-abuse conviction, and that fact alone would support a judgment terminating his parental rights. See § 12-15-319(a)(4), Ala.Code 1975.

The father asserts that the juvenile court in this case improperly concluded that he had voluntarily relinquished the child. We disagree that the juvenile court drew, or necessarily must have drawn, such a conclusion. From the findings of fact and conclusions reached by the juvenile court in its judgment, it is apparent that the father’s parental rights were terminated based upon “a withholding from the child, without good cause or excuse, ... of his ... presence, care, love, protection, maintenance, or the opportunity for the display of filial affection, or the failure to claim the rights of a parent, or failure to perform the duties of a parent.” § 12-15-301(1), Ala.Code 1975.

The father also asserts that the juvenile court failed to exhaust the viable alternative of maintaining the status quo and awarding him visitation with the child instead of terminating his parental rights. Just as in A.J.H.T., supra, the evidence demonstrating that the child did not wish to visit with the father and that the child is old enough to know that the absent parent is his biological father with whom he had had no personal contact for over six years supports the conclusion that awarding the father visitation with the child would be detrimental to the child’s best interests and, thus, was not a viable alternative to termination of the father’s parental rights. A.J.H.T., 983 So.2d at 402.

The juvenile court explicitly determined that the father had been only sporadically part of the child’s life before his imprisonment in 2006, that he had not fulfilled his duty to pay child support, and that he had failed to exercise opportunities to develop a parent-child bond, such that the child was emotionally detached from the father. Based upon the pertinent statutory provisions, the testimony of the mother and the father, and the detailed findings of the juvenile court, we conclude that that court could properly determine that the termination of the father’s parental rights was in the best interests of the child. See, e.g., Sutton v. Elrod, 724 So.2d 551, 553 (Ala. Civ.App.1998) (appellate court will affirm judgment terminating parental rights unless the factual findings are unsupported by the evidence so as to be plainly wrong).

AFFIRMED.

THOMPSON, P.J., and THOMAS, J., concur.

BRYAN and MOORE, JJ., concur in the result, without writings.


author: THOMPSON, Presiding Judge.

text:
    Tanita CAIN d/b/a Alabama First Friday, Inc. v. Theresa STRACHAN d/b/a By Any Means Entertainment and Celebrity 1st Friday et al.
    2091039.
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    Feb. 18, 2011.

      Virgil E. Hunter II, Fairfield, for appellant.
    Tiffany Johnson Cole of Law Offices of Robert Simms Thompson, PC, Tuskegee, for appellees.
   THOMPSON, Presiding Judge.

Tanita Cain, doing business as Alabama First Friday, Inc. (“Cain”), appeals from a summary judgment entered in favor of the defendants, Theresa Strachan, doing business as By Any Means Entertainment and Celebrity 1st Friday, Frank Walker, and Jemelle Cunningham (hereinafter collectively referred to as “the defendants”).

The record in this case indicates the following. On March 5, 2010, Cain filed a verified complaint for a preliminary injunction against the defendants, seeking to prevent them from using the name “Celebrity 1st Fridays” in advertisements and promotional materials and to enjoin them from holding an event scheduled for that day. In her complaint, Cain asserted that the Alabama Secretary of State’s office had granted her the exclusive right to the trade name “First Fridays” for a ten-year period and that the right did not expire until July 27, 2015. Cain contended that both she and the defendants were using local media to advertise separate events to be held in Birmingham on March 5, 2010, under the name of “1st Fridays” and that Cain would suffer damage if the defendants were allowed to proceed under the name “1st Fridays.”

The trial court held a hearing the day the complaint was filed and the events were scheduled to take place. After the hearing, the trial court denied Cain’s request for a preliminary injunction from the bench and entered a written order denying the request on March 9, 2010. In its written order, the trial court stated that Cain had failed to meet her burden, “weighing the hardship imposed on the defendants] and the existence of a remedy at law.” The trial court did, however, schedule a hearing to allow Cain to prove her damages. Cain did not appeal from the denial of her request for a preliminary injunction.

Before the hearing on damages, the parties had disputes regarding the defendants’ propounded discovery requests, which concerned the issue of damages. The discovery disputes continued until ultimately, on June 10, 2010, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for a summary judgment, arguing that Cain had not proven that she was in any way damaged by the alleged infringement of her trade name. On June 18, 2010, the trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of the defendants. In the judgment, the trial court agreed with the defendants that Cain had failed to prove damages, stating that “[t]here would be no way to calculate damages in this case without relying on pure speculation.”

After the summary judgment was entered, the parties filed numerous post-judgment motions. On June 19, 2010, Cain filed a “Motion to Strike Motion to Dismiss and Summary Judgment Arguments.” On June 21, 2010, the defendants filed both a response to Cain’s motion to strike and a motion for an award of attorney fees and costs pursuant to the Alabama Litigation Accountability Act (“the ALAA”), § 12-19-270 et seq., Ala.Code 1975. On July 1, 2010, Cain filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate the summary judgment. On July 15, 2010, the trial court entered separate orders denying Cain’s motion to alter, amend, or vacate and her motion to strike. That same day, the trial court also entered an order awarding the defendants attorney fees in the amount of $2,500, pursuant to the ALAA. Cain timely appealed.

Cain asserts that the trial court improperly entered the summary judgment in favor of the defendants because, she says, a genuine issue of material fact existed.

“This Court’s review of a summary judgment is de novo. Williams v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 886 So.2d 72, 74 (Ala.2003). We apply the same standard of review as the trial court applied. Specifically, we must determine whether the movant has made a prima facie showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c), Ala. R. Civ. P.; Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Alabama v. Hodurski, 899 So.2d 949, 952-53 (Ala.2004). In making such a determination, we must review the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Wilson v. Brown, 496 So.2d 756, 758 (Ala.1986). Once the movant makes a prima facie showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the burden then shifts to the nonmovant to produce ‘substantial evidence’ as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Bass v. SouthTrust Bank of Baldwin County, 538 So.2d 794, 797-98 (Ala.1989); Ala. Code 1975, § 12-21-12. ‘[Substantial evidence is evidence of such weight and quality that fair-minded persons in the exercise of impartial judgment can reasonably infer the existence of the fact sought to be proved.’ West v. Founders Life Assur. Co. of Fla., 547 So.2d 870, 871 (Ala.1989).”

Dow v. Alabama Democratic Party, 897 So.2d 1035, 1038-39 (Ala.2004).

In her brief on appeal, Cain argues that her complaint for injunctive relief raised the issue of what Cain called her “exclusive right” to use the trade name “First Fridays.” That issue, she says, was “undisputed and incapable of being foreclosed upon during argument therefore making said issue a genuine issue.” She states that the trial court should have recognized the factual issue raised in the complaint and, therefore, that entry of the summary judgment was improper.

The trial court denied Cain’s request for a preliminary injunction on the basis that she had failed to meet her burden with regard to “weighing the hardship imposed on [the defendants] and the existence of a remedy at law.” The order denying the request for an injunction contained no findings on the issue of infringement. Apparently, the trial court found that there was some merit to the contention that the defendants had infringed Cain’s trade name, however, because, without such a finding, there would have been no need to go forward on the issue of the damage caused by the alleged infringement.

The discovery requests the defendants propounded after the denial of the request for a preliminary injunction concerned Cain’s damages. The defendants’ motion for summary judgment was based upon their contention that Cain was unable to prove that she had been damaged by the alleged infringement. The trial court entered the summary judgment in favor of the defendants based upon Cain’s failure to prove damages, stating that Cain had provided the court with “no way to calculate damages without relying on pure speculation.” Therefore, Cain’s argument that her verified complaint raised a factual issue regarding whether the defendants’ use of the name “Celebrity 1st Friday” constituted infringement of her trade name seems misplaced. Both the defendants and the trial court appear to have moved beyond that question at the time the summary judgment was entered.

On appeal, Cain makes no argument regarding the issue of damages, and she fails to point out any evidence in the record that would be relevant to the issue of damages. Her only argument is that the verified complaint raised a genuine issue of fact as to whether there had been an infringement of her trade name that the trial court should have recognized. Accordingly, Cain has failed to demonstrate error on the part of the trial court. “The party opposing a motion for summary judgment may not merely rely upon the allegations and denials in pleadings in order to defeat a properly supported motion. Underwood v. Allstate Ins. Co., 590 So.2d 258, 259 (Ala.1991); Gallups v. Cotter, 534 So.2d 585, 588 (Ala.1988).” Lewis v. Mobil Oil Corp., 765 So.2d 629, 630 (Ala.1999).

Once the defendants made a prima facie showing that there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding the issue of damages, the burden shifted to Cain to produce “substantial evidence” that she had, in fact, incurred damages as a result of the alleged infringement. See Dow, 897 So.2d at 1038-39. However, our review of the record indicates that Cain did not produce any evidence, let alone substantial evidence, regarding her damages. We conclude, therefore, that the trial court properly entered a summary judgment in favor of the defendants.

Cain also argues that the trial court erred in awarding the defendants attorney fees pursuant to the ALAA, because, she says, her action against the defendants was not without “substantial justification.” Cain also points out that the trial court’s order awarding the defendants attorney fees violated the ALAA by failing to specifically set forth the reasons for its award, as required by § 12-19-273, Ala.Code 1975. The defendants acknowledge that the trial court’s order fails to comply with § 12-19-273 and urge this court to remand this cause for the trial court to enter an order awarding attorney fees that is in compliance with the ALAA.

Neither party has raised the issue whether this court has jurisdiction to consider this question. However, “ ‘jurisdictional matters are of such magnitude that we take notice of them at any time and do so even ex mero motu.’ Sexton v. Sexton, 42 So.3d 1280, 1282 (Ala.Civ.App.2010) (quoting Nunn v. Baker, 518 So.2d 711, 712 (Ala.1987)).

In McDorman v. Archer, 678 So.2d 112 (Ala.Civ.App.1995), this court held that, for a trial court to have jurisdiction to properly consider a motion seeking an award of attorney fees pursuant to the ALAA, the motion must be filed before there has been an adjudication of the action on the merits. In McDorman, this court, quoting Baker v. Williams Brothers, Inc., 601 So.2d 110, 112 (Ala.Civ.App.1992), stated:

“ ‘The plain language of § 12 — 19—27[2] states that the court must make its award of attorney’s fees under the [ALAA] as part of its judgment on the merits of the case, “in addition” to other costs assessed against a frivolous litigant. The statute does not create a new or separate cause of action to be brought after a case is litigated and given a final adjudication on its merits; rather, it indicates that the motion must be made during the pendency of the case.’ ”

McDorman, 678 So.2d at 112; see also Hall v. American Indem. Group, 681 So.2d 220, 221 (Ala.Civ.App.1996) (motion for attorney fees pursuant to the ALAA was filed before the entry of a final judgment, thus the trial court had jurisdiction to award attorney fees).

In this case, the defendants filed the motion for attorney fees on June 21, 2010 — three days after the trial court entered the summary judgment. Therefore, the motion was made after the final adjudication on the merits, and the trial court had no jurisdiction to award attorney fees. Because the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the issue of attorney fees, the order purportedly awarding the fees is void. Ex parte Citizens Bank, 879 So.2d 535, 540 (Ala.2003). “A void judgment will not support an appeal, and ‘an appellate court must dismiss an attempted appeal from such a void judgment.’ ” Colburn v. Colburn, 14 So.3d 176, 179 (Ala.Civ.App.2009) (quoting Vann v. Cook, 989 So.2d 556, 559 (Ala.Civ.App.2008)). Therefore, we dismiss that portion of Cain’s appeal concerning the propriety of the award of attorney fees to the defendants, and we instruct the trial court to vacate its July 15, 2010, order awarding the defendants attorney fees. The summary judgment entered on June 18, 2010, is affirmed.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF JUNE 18, 2010, AFFIRMED; APPEAL DISMISSED IN PART WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

PITTMAN, BRYAN, THOMAS, and MOORE, JJ., concur.

      . The pleadings in the trial court are styled to indicate that the plaintiff is Tanita Cain, doing business as Alabama First Friday, Inc. However, the complaint and a document from the Alabama Secretary of State’s office, which is attached as an exhibit to the complaint, indicate that First Friday, Inc., is a properly registered Alabama corporation. Moreover, the complaint indicates that Tanita Cain is the president of First Friday, Inc. The notice of appeal lists only Tanita Cain as the appellant, but the appellant’s brief on appeal has been filed on behalf of Tanita Cain, doing business as Alabama First Friday, Inc.

      . The pleadings in the trial court are styled to indicate that Frank Walker was being sued as "Frank Walker, d/b/a Celebrity 1st Friday.” The complaint asserts, "upon information and belief,” that Walker is a principal and financial backer of Celebrity 1st Friday. Jemelle Cunningham was being sued in her capacity as Strachan’s attorney. We note that Cunningham did not represent Strachan in this litigation. Finally, Sheraton Hotel Birmingham and the Birmingham Jefferson Civic Center were originally named as defendants in this case, but they were dismissed on May 14, 2010.

      . In her brief to this court, Cain asserts that the trial court granted the motion for a summary judgment without a hearing. However, in their brief, the defendants contend that a hearing was held on June 17, 2010, and the trial court’s summary judgment indicates that it was based upon arguments made at the June 17, 2010, hearing. A transcript of the hearing is not included in the record on appeal.


author: MOORE, Judge.

text:
    L.M. v. JEFFERSON COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES.
    2091011.
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    Feb. 18, 2011.
    Harry A. Drasutis, Birmingham, for appellant.
    Sharon E. Ficquette, gen. counsel, and Michael A. Nunnelley, staff atty., Department of Human Resources, for appellee.
   MOORE, Judge.

L.M. (“the mother”) appeals from a judgment of the Jefferson Juvenile Court determining that she had abandoned her children, K.M. and J.M. (“the children”), and, thus, relieving the Jefferson County Department of Human Resources (“DHR”) of making reasonable efforts to reunite her with the children. We affirm.

Relevant Procedural History

On March 16, 2007, DHR filed petitions alleging that the children were dependent. On May 31, 2007, the juvenile court entered a judgment finding the children dependent, awarding custody of the children to the mother, and ordering the mother to submit to a drug screening and a substance-abuse assessment. After the mother continued to test positive for drugs, the juvenile court held a shelter-care hearing on March 5, 2008, and entered an order that same day finding the mother in contempt of court and ordering her incarcerated for five days. On March 12, 2008, the juvenile court entered an order noting that the children had been previously determined to be dependent, awarding custody of the children to DHR, and awarding the mother supervised visitation.

On January 13, 2010, the juvenile court conducted a compliance/dispositional and permanency hearing. Thereafter, on January 19, 2010, the juvenile court entered an order noting, among other things, that DHR’s permanency plan remained to return the children to the mother; that DHR had requested that the juvenile court relieve it from making reasonable efforts to reunite the mother with the children because the mother had abandoned the children; and that, other than a brief telephone call in December 2009, the mother had had no meaningful contact with the children since June 2009. The juvenile court reserved ruling on DHR’s request and it scheduled a compliance/dispositional hearing for June 16, 2010. At the June 16, 2010, hearing, DHR again moved the juvenile court to find that the mother had abandoned the children. The juvenile court noted that it would hear that motion at a review hearing on June 30, 2010. Apparently, however, at the June 30, 2010, hearing, the mother’s attorney objected to DHR’s oral motion and requested that the court require DHR to file a written motion requesting a finding of abandonment. That same day, DHR filed a written “Motion to Adjudicate Abandonment.” A hearing was held on DHR’s motion on July 15, 2010, and a judgment was entered that same day granting DHR’s motion and relieving DHR from making further reasonable efforts at reunification. The mother filed her notice of appeal on July 21, 2010.

Discussion

Initially, we note that the juvenile court’s July 15, 2010, judgment finding that the mother had abandoned the children and relieving DHR from making further reasonable efforts at reunification is a final judgment that will support an appeal. See M.H. v. Jefferson County Dep’t of Human Res., 42 So.3d 1291, 1293 (Ala.Civ.App.2010) (“In D.P. [v. Limestone County Department of Human Resources, 28 So.3d 759, 764 (Ala.Civ.App.2009),] this court held that a permanency order relieving DHR of the duty to use reasonable efforts to reunite a parent with a dependent child constitutes a final judgment that will support an appeal.”); and D.P. v. Limestone County Dep’t of Human Res., 28 So.3d 759, 764 (Ala.Civ.App.2009) (“We hold that it is immaterial, for purposes of finality and appealability, that a juvenile court’s order emanates from the permanency-plan hearing rather than from the periodic review of a dependency determination. If the order addresses crucial issues that could result in depriving a parent of the fundamental right to the care and custody of his or her child, whether immediately or in the future, the order is an appealable order.”). Thus, we will proceed to address the merits of the mother’s appeal.

On appeal, the mother first argues that the juvenile court erred in entering its judgment relieving DHR of its duty to make reasonable efforts at reunification because, she says, DHR failed to present evidence indicating that the abandonment was voluntary and intentional. We note that the mother’s argument challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the juvenile court’s judgment; however, the juvenile court did not make any specific findings of fact in its judgment and the mother failed to file a postjudgment motion challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. In New Properties, L.L.C. v. Stewart, 905 So.2d 797, 801-02 (Ala.2004), our supreme court held: “[I]n a nonjury case in which the trial court makes no specific findings of fact, a party must move for a new trial or otherwise properly raise before the trial court the question relating to the sufficiency or weight of the evidence in order to preserve that question for appellate review.” Because the mother failed to “move for a new trial or otherwise properly raise before the [juvenile] court the question relating to the sufficiency or weight of the evidence,” we must conclude that she failed to preserve her argument for review by this court.

The mother also argues that the juvenile court erred in not requiring DHR to serve her with process regarding DHR’s motion to adjudicate abandonment, thus depriving her of procedural due process. She argues that the adjudication of abandonment is an element to be considered in a termination-of-parental-rights action and, thus, should require service of process, as is required for a petition to terminate parental rights. See Ala.Code 1975, § 12-15-318. We disagree.

Although § 12-15-318 specifically provides for service of process of termination-of-parental-rights petitions in accordance with the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure, the judgment in this case was entered as a part of an ongoing dependency proceeding. The procedure for the issuance of notices and service of summons in dependency proceedings is set forth in Rule 13, Ala. R. Juv. P. That rule provides for service of a summons on all parties with regard to the initial petition alleging dependency, see Rule 13(A)(1), Ala. R. Juv. P.; however, for subsequent hearings other than detention, shelter-care, and 72-hour hearings, only written notice of the hearing is required. See Rule 13(C), Ala. R. Juv. P. Rule 14, Ala. R. Juv. P., provides, in part, that “[cjounsel who have appeared shall receive copies of all notices required by statute or rule to be given to parties, and, in such cases, notices need not be given to the parties unless the court shall so order.”

In the present case, the mother does not dispute that her counsel was served with DHR’s motion to adjudicate abandonment or that he was notified of the hearing on that motion. In fact, the mother’s attorney was present at the hearing and presented arguments on the mother’s behalf. The mother does not argue that the juvenile court ordered that she personally be given notice. Because there is no dispute that the mother was given the notice mandated by the Alabama Rules of Juvenile Procedure, we conclude that the mother’s due-process right to notice was not violated in this case. See Stribling Equip., Inc. v. Crager, 891 So.2d 299, 304 (Ala.2004) (finding no due-process violation when service of notice was made on attorney instead of on party and service was thus made in accordance with the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure).

Based on the foregoing, we affirm the judgment of the juvenile court.

AFFIRMED.

THOMPSON, P.J., and PITTMAN, BRYAN, and THOMAS, JJ., concur.

      . Only the hearings and orders that are relevant to the issue presented on appeal are included in the procedural history.

      . We note that New Properties, supra, relies on Rule 52(b), Ala. R. Civ. P. Although this case is a juvenile-court case, pursuant to Rule 1, Ala. R. Juv. P., Rule 52(b) is applicable.