author: FERNANDEZ, J.

text:
    Roberto CUCCARINI, Appellant, v. Miguel ROSENFELD and Clarissa Rosenfeld, and Fortune International Realty, Inc., Appellees.
    No. 3D09-3470.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Oct. 26, 2011.
    Fowler White Burnett and June G. Hoffman, for appellant.
    Avila Rodriguez Hernandez Mena & Ferri and Juanearlos Sanchez and Daniel Mena, Miami, for appellees Miguel and Clarissa Rosenfeld.
    Sala & Gomez, and Daniel Mena and Cesar Gomez, Key Biscayne, for appellee Fortune International Realty, Inc.
    Before, WELLS, C.J., and SHEPHERD, and FERNANDEZ, JJ.
   FERNANDEZ, J.

This is an appeal from a final judgment on the pleadings entered in favor of the appellees Miguel Rosenfeld and Clarissa Rosenfeld, the sellers. We reverse and remand because there are factual questions that undermine the trial court’s conclusion that the sellers were entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

On August 22, 2008, Roberto Cuccarini and Miguel and Clarissa Rosenfeld executed a Residential Sale and Purchase Contract. The closing was to occur on or by March 1, 2009. The contract required that the buyer, Cuccarini, deposit $82,500 into an escrow account held by the broker, Fortune International Realty, which the buyer did. Additionally, the contract contained the following financing contingency:

Buyer will apply for new conventional ... financing ... at the prevailing interest rate and loan costs based on Buyer’s creditworthiness (the “Financing”) within 5 days from the Effective Date and provide Seller with either a written Financing commitment or approval letter (“Commitment”) or written notice that Buyer is unable to obtain a Commitment within 30 days from Effective Date ... (“Commitment Period”). Buyer will keep Seller and Broker fully informed about loan application status, progress, and commitment issues ... [I]f, after using diligence and good faith, Buyer is unable to provide the Commitment and provides Seller with written notice that Buyer is unable to obtain a Commitment within the Commitment Period either party may cancel this Contract and Buyer’s deposit will be refunded. Buyer’s failure to provide Seller with written notice that Buyer is unable to obtain a Commitment within the Commitment period will result in forfeiture of Buyer’s deposit(s). Once Buyer provides the Commitment to Seller, the financing contingency is waived and Seller will be entitled to retain the deposits if the transaction does not close by the Closing Date unless (1) the Property appraises below the purchase price and either the parties cannot agree on a new purchase price or Buyer elects not to proceed....

(emphasis added).

The buyer applied for the loan as required by the contract. On August 26, 2008, he provided the sellers with a letter from Wachovia, which indicated that “based on a review of the information [the buyer provided, including] a full credit report”, his loan application was approved. The buyer did not receive any reply from the sellers to indicate that the letter did not satisfy the financing contingency.

In February 2009, the buyer’s attorney sent a letter to the sellers’ attorney conveying the buyer’s unwillingness to go forward with the sale. In the letter, the buyer informed the sellers that Wachovia had discontinued the loan program the buyer had qualified under and further, due to the “global credit crisis,” he was unable to “obtain a reasonable financing option.” Additionally, the buyer informed the sellers that the property had appraised below the purchase price and that he therefore sought the return of his deposit. The closing date passed, and the parties failed to close as scheduled.

In May 2009, the sellers brought suit against the buyer for breach of contract and named the broker as a nominal defendant. In the complaint, the sellers admitted that they received the Wachovia letter but denied that it was an approval letter. In turn, the buyer answered, asserting several affirmative defenses. The buyer also counterclaimed. The sellers filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, which the trial court granted after a hearing. In the Final Judgment, the court made the following finding, “[t]he ‘approval letter’ from Wachovia does not represent an agreement to loan funds for the purchase and sale of this specific property, and as such, is not a ‘commitment.’” (emphasis added). The buyer filed a motion for rehearing, which the court summarily denied.

A judgment on the pleadings is correct only where, based on the pleadings, the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. See Britt v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 935 So.2d 97, 98 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006). Consequently, in cases where factual questions remain unresolved, it is improper for a court to enter a judgment on the pleadings. See Tanglewood Mobile Sales, Inc. v. Hachem, 805 So.2d 54, 55 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001). Additionally, when considering a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the trial court must accept as true all well-pled material allegations of the opposing party. See Wilcox v. Lang Equities, Inc., 588 So.2d 318, 319 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991). The court must also construe as false all allegations of the moving party which are denied. Id. Failure to adhere to this standard results in reversible error.

We conclude that the sellers were not entitled to judgment on the pleadings. A review of the pleadings reveals a glaring question of fact: namely, whether the Wa-chovia letter satisfies the financing contingency requirements. Had the pleadings from both sides indicated that no letter was ever sent or that the Wachovia letter was not meant to be an approval letter, then there would be no factual dispute and the judgment would be correct as a matter of law. But those are not the facts in this case. Here, the sellers allege that the buyer’s letter was nothing more than a pre-approval letter, and therefore the buyer forfeited his deposit. The buyer, on the other hand, claims that the letter tendered to the sellers was an approval letter.

Furthermore, the Wachovia letter contained terms sufficient to find that the buyer had obtained financing. In Mechaia Investments, LLC v. Romano, 56 So.3d 107 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011), this Court dealt

with the issue as to whether a letter satisfied contractual financing contingencies. We stated:

There is no dispute that [Buyer] failed to provide [Seller] with the commitment letter within the established commitment period. What [Buyer] received from the bank and what she provided to [Seller] was nothing more than a fax cover sheet. It lacked the necessary information one would expect in a commitment letter (e.g. loan amount, interest rate, and other terms) ... In fact in its brief, [Seller] conceded that the document [Buyer] provided was not a commitment letter, but rather it was an approval letter. This is a distinction without a difference. What the contract appears to require is written proof that the buyer has acquired the necessary financing. Whether it is called a commitment letter or an approval letter, the document should contain information that the seller can rely upon as proof that the buyer is taking the steps necessary to close on the property.

Id. at 109 (emphasis added).

The holding in Mechaia casts doubt on the trial court’s determination that the Wachovia letter was not a commitment, let alone its conclusion that the letter’s deficiencies entitled the sellers to judgment as a matter of law. On its face, the Wachovia letter contains all the requirements mentioned by this Court in Mechaia as necessary information one would expect to find in an approval letter. First, it specifies the loan amount ($417,500). Next, it establishes a maximum interest rate of 6.75%. And lastly, it contains other information one would expect to see in an approval letter. It contains information on the loan program, the loan terms, and loan to value..

In their brief, the sellers argue that the trial court did not err because it found as a matter of law that the Wachovia letter, by its express, clear and unambiguous terms, did not constitute an agreement to loan funds to the buyer to purchase the property. Thus, they argue, the letter did not satisfy the definition of the commitment as required by paragraph 3 of the contract. This argument is tenuous because the language that pertained to the commitment in paragraph 8 is ambiguous. All that is required with respect to the commitment is that the buyer “provide Seller with either a written financing commitment or approval letter.” (emphasis added). The contract, however, does not set forth what either a financing commitment or an approval letter should include.

The trial court, therefore, erred when it entered judgment on the pleadings in favor of the sellers because there is a question of fact as to whether the Wachovia letter satisfied the commitment requirement under the contract. Accordingly, we reverse and remand.

Reversed and remanded.

      . The contract price for the property was $835,000, and the buyer was to finance 50% of the remaining balance, which amounts to $417,500.

      . The letter indicated that buyer was approved for a 30-year fixed loan at a maximum interest rate of 6.750%.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: PER CURIAM.

license: Public Domain

text:
    Johnathan B. EDWARDS, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 1D11-5631.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Nov. 10, 2011.
    Rehearing Denied Jan. 4, 2012.
    Johnathan B. Edwards, pro se, Petitioner.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

HAWKES, MARSTILLER, and RAY, JJ., concur.

The petition alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is denied on the merits.


text:
    Howard C. McLEES, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 1D11-5585.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Nov. 10, 2011.
    Rehearing Denied Jan. 4, 2012.
    Howard C. McLees, pro se, Petitioner.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

The petition alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is denied on the merits.

HAWKES, MARSTILLER, and RAY, JJ., concur.


text:
    Robert J. WILSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 2D10-5810.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Nov. 16, 2011.
    Robert J. Wilson, pro se.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Ronald Napolitano, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Robert J. Wilson appeals the summary denial of his motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a), in which he alleged that he was wrongfully sentenced as a prison releasee reoffender (PRR). We reverse and remand for resentencing.

On April 16, 2002, Wilson was found guilty of burglary of a conveyance with assault or battery (count one), carjacking (count two), and felony fleeing or attempting to elude (count three). On May 10, 2002, Wilson was sentenced to life imprisonment on count one, thirty years’ imprisonment on count two, and fifteen years’ imprisonment on count three. All counts were to run concurrently, and Wilson was sentenced as a PRR on counts one and two.

In his motion, Wilson alleged that burglary of a conveyance with assault or battery does not qualify for PRR sentencing under section 775.082(9)(a)(l), Florida Statutes (2001), and as a result, his life sentence on this count is illegal. Specifically, Wilson claimed that burglary of a conveyance is not an enumerated offense under the PRR statute. See § 775.082(9)(a)(l). Furthermore, he alleged that the addition of assault or battery does not place burglary of a conveyance in the category of a “forcible felony,” which would qualify the offense for PRR sentencing under section 775.082(9)(a)(l)(o), the catch-all provision. See Gorham v. State, 988 So.2d 152 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008); Tumblin v. State, 965 So.2d 354 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007). Wilson maintained that for an offense to constitute a “forcible felony” for the purposes of PRR sentencing, “the statutory elements of the offense must include the threat or use of physical force or violence,” Tumblin, 965 So.2d at 355, and the circumstances of the underlying crime are irrelevant. Because burglary of a conveyance with assault or battery “does not necessarily include the threat or use of physical force or violence,” id. at 356, Wilson argued that he could not be sentenced as a PRR under the catch-all provision and his sentence as a PRR on this charge is illegal.

In its order denying Wilson’s claim, the postconviction court simply found that a defendant convicted of any felony that involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against another individual qualifies for sentencing as a PRR. See § 775.082(9)(a)(l)(o). The court found that assault or battery falls under this umbrella, so Wilson qualified for sentencing as a PRR.

In reality, the case law is far more complex than suggested by either Wilson or the postconviction court. The relevant line of cases begins with State v. Hearns, 961 So.2d 211, 212 (Fla.2007), in which the Florida Supreme Court held that, in determining whether a crime not specifically listed as a forcible felony constitutes — for the purposes of violent career criminal (VCC) sentencing — a forcible felony under the catch-all provision, “courts must consider only the statutory elements of the offense, regardless of the particular circumstances involved.” Using the statutory elements test, the supreme court held that battery on a law enforcement officer (BOLEO) is not a “forcible felony” for the purposes of VCC sentencing because battery could be committed with only nominal contact and, as such, it contains elements outside of those enumerated in the catchall provision. Id. at 218. Finally, the supreme court held that “whether BOLEO is a qualifying offense must be answered consistently under both the VCC statute and the PRR statute.” Id. at 217. In Walker v. State, 965 So.2d 1281, 1283-84 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007), this court applied the reasoning in Hearns and also held that PRR sentencing is inapplicable to the crime of BOLEO.

Other districts followed the Hearns opinion and extrapolated upon its reasoning in a number of cases, including both Tumblin and Gorham, upon which Wilson relied. As stated above, the Fourth District in Tumblin held that because burglary with an assault or battery, like BOLEO, “could be committed by an unlawful touching during a burglary and does not necessarily include the threat or use of physical force or violence,” it could not fall under the catch-all provision of the PRR statute. Id. at 356. In Gorham, the Fourth District applied the reasoning set forth in Tumblin to the offense of burglary of a conveyance with an assault or battery— the underlying offense for Wilson’s PRR sentence — finding that “[bjecause [the offense] does not necessarily involve the level of force or violence contemplated by the PRR statute’s catch-all provision, Gor-ham’s ... sentence as a PRR is illegal.” 988 So.2d at 154.

This analysis might conclude here in Wilson’s favor, but significant inconsistencies have recently emerged. In Slocum v. State, 7 So.3d 574, 575 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009), the First District, relying on Tum-blin, held that burglary of a conveyance with battery only was not a forcible felony and thus did not qualify a defendant for PRR sentencing. Subsequently, in Shaw v. State, 26 So.3d 51, 52 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009), the Fifth District analyzed whether burglary of an occupied conveyance with assault only qualified for PRR sentencing under the catch-all provision. First, the court noted that assault involves an “ ‘intentional, unlawful threat by word or act to do violence to the person of another, coupled with an apparent ability to do so.’ ” Id. at 53 (quoting § 748.011(1), Fla. Stat. (2007)). Because the PRR catch-all provision specifically encompasses “[a]ny felony that involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against an individual,” § 775.082(9)(a)(l)(o), the court in Shaw held that “under the statutory elements test, burglary of an occupied conveyance with an assault qualifies as an offense under the catch-all provision.” 26 So.3d at 53. The court in Shaw further recognized “the irony that a defendant who commits a battery during the commission of a felony does not qualify as a PRR under the statute, but a defendant who commits an assault does,” but saw no way around this holding, as every element of the catch-all provision is satisfied by the assault statute. Id.

Shortly after this decision, the First District in State v. Hackley, — So.3d -, 2010 WL 4273625 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010), certified conflict with the Fifth District after holding that because the greater offense of burglary of a conveyance with battery did not qualify for PRR, neither could the lesser offense of burglary of a conveyance with assault. The court noted the necessity of this holding “to avoid the absurd consequence of encouraging a defendant who has already committed burglary with an assault to put the victim in physical danger by committing a battery to avoid the possibility of PRR sentencing.” Id. at-. The supreme court has granted review in Hackley. State v. Hackley, 55 So.3d 1288 (Fla.2011) (table decision).

The inconsistency here is evident, and the heart of the issue appears to be in the wording of the PRR statute. The process began with Hearns, when the application of the statutory elements test led to the holding that BOLEO does not qualify as a forcible felony under the PRR catch-all provision. 961 So.2d at 219-20. Subsequently, other districts applied the statutory elements test to offenses that included not only battery but also assault, without specifically taking account of this additional inclusion. Only in Shaw did a court specifically address the inclusion of assault into the PRR equation, holding that any crime involving assault must be included under the catch-all because assault necessarily involves the elements required by the catch-all. 26 So.3d at 53. While Hackley, — So.3d at -, clearly illustrates why the Shaw holding is troublesome, it is also difficult to dispute the underlying reasoning.

As to Wilson’s case, in response to an order from this court, the State conceded that Wilson’s PRR enhancement for the charge of burglary of a conveyance with assault or battery is illegal and further conceded that reversal and remand with directions to strike the PRR designation from this charge is required. At the time of Wilson’s offense in 2001, burglary of a conveyance was not a specifically enumerated offense under the PRR statute. See § 775.082(9)(a)(l). Furthermore, as illustrated above, most courts currently hold that the modifier of “with assault or battery” does not qualify an offense for PRR sentencing under the catch-all provision. That includes this district, which held in Williams v. State, 2 So.3d 984, 984 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008), that “we agree, and the State concedes, that [the defendant] does not qualify for PRR sentencing under [the catch-all provision]” for the offense of burglary of a dwelling with an assault or battery.

Therefore, we reverse the postconviction court’s denial of Wilson’s motion and remand for the trial court to strike the PRR designation from Wilson’s sentence in count one.

Reversed and remanded.

KELLY, VILLANTI, and LaROSE, JJ. Concur.


author: SCHWARTZ, Senior Judge.

text:
    Charles E. WHITE, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 3D09-1403.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Nov. 16, 2011.
    Rehearing Denied Jan. 4, 2012.

      Eugene F. Zenobi, Jr. Criminal Conflict and Civil Regional Counsel, Third Region, for appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Timothy R.M. Thomas, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
    Before RAMIREZ and SHEPHERD, JJ., and SCHWARTZ, Senior Judge.
   SCHWARTZ, Senior Judge.

Charles E. White appeals his convictions for two counts of first-degree murder (Count 1 and 2), burglary with an assault or battery while armed (Count 3), robbery while armed with a firearm or deadly weapon (Count 4), two counts of kidnapping with a weapon (Count 5 and 6), use or display of a firearm in the commission of a felony (Count 7), and possession of a short-barreled rifle (Count 8). White says a number of issues mandate reversal. On the following analysis, we affirm.,

On February 22,1999, police were called to the home of Leonard Mayers. In the northeast bedroom of the home, police found the bodies of Mayers and Leon Gray. The home’s back door and door jamb were damaged. A pickax was found on the ground near the back stoop, a sawed off shotgun in a neighboring yard, and a black bandana in another backyard. The victims each died of close range gunshot wounds, their wrists and portions of their heads bound with duct tape. Mayers was a drug dealer and narcotics and drug-related paraphernalia were found in the home. On the walls inside one of the bathrooms was written “I want wartime, next time someone will die.”

On December 29, 1999, investigating the double homicide, and following a lead from a fellow officer, Detectives Chris Stroze and Steven Paar went to White’s home. White gave a detailed, innocent account of his actions some ten months earlier. This story of his activities did not include anything involving his friend Armond Davis (later to be his co-defendant) or going to Leonard Mayers’ house. To the contrary, White said that he had never been to Mayers’ home and had never worked for him. Stroze asked White if he would be willing to take a polygraph test, but White refused saying that the test proved nothing. Stroze then recounted to White certain information told to him by Davis, to which White gave the incongruous response, “You mean the person I was in the house with was a killer?” Stroze ended the forty-five-minute interview at that point, but did not arrest White.

The next day, after receiving an additional lead pointing to White’s involvement in the crimes, Stroze put a notification into police computers asking that he be alerted if any officer came into contact with White. A year later, on December 30, 2000, at 2:00 p.m., White was arrested for possession of marijuana. Rather than take him to the magistrate for a plea or bond disposition as would have been the usual course after a marijuana arrest, the officers took White to Stroze for questioning on the crimes at issue here, for which, it was admitted, there was then no probable cause to arrest. Toward the end of some thirteen hours of questioning on that subject, however, White finally admitted his participation in the crimes for which he was subsequently charged and convicted. An account of the twenty-four hours following the arrest reveals the following:

Saturday, December 30, 2000:
2:00 p.m. White is arrested on the possession charge.
2:05 p.m. Detective Stroze is called and informed of the arrest, Stroze asks that White be transported to the Homicide office immediately.
White is held approximately five hours prior to transport.
6:55 p.m. White arrives at Stroze’s office, possibly after other detainees have been dropped off at TGK.
7:05 p.m. until 9:00 p.m. White is questioned; he denies any involvement in the crimes.
9:30 p.m. until 11:30 p.m. White is questioned; he denies any involvement in the crimes.
Sunday, December 31, 2000:
12 a.m. until 1:30 a.m. White is questioned; he denies any involvement in the crimes.
2:30 until 7:50 am White is questioned; he admits his involvement in the crimes.
7:56 a.m. until 8:39 a.m. White gives a formal recorded account of the crimes.
11:07 a.m. The hired stenographer completes typing out White’s statement. White is shown the statement, he makes two corrections and signs it.
12:30 p.m. (twenty-two and one-half hours after White’s initial arrest) White is taken to TGK (which Stroze estimates to be approximately three miles from the homicide offices.) (Computer records show that White pleaded guilty to the possession charge on January 1, 2001, at his first appearance hearing.)

I

White moved to suppress his statements. Among other arguments, he contended, as he does here, that because he was questioned for an extended period time rather than taken directly before a judicial officer, Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.130 mandates suppression. The trial judge rejected this argument, as do we.

Rule 3.130, provides:

Except when previously released in a lawful manner, every arrested person shall be taken before a judicial officer, either in person or by electronic audiovisual device in the discretion of the court, within 24 hours of arrest.

On numerous occasions, our courts have concluded that suppression was not required notwithstanding the fact that a defendant was not brought before a judicial officer within twenty-four hours of the arrest. Rather, “when a defendant has been advised of his rights and makes an otherwise voluntary statement, the delay in following the strictures of [Rule 3.130] must be shown to have induced the confession.” Globe v. State, 877 So.2d 663, 671-72 (Fla.2004) (quoting Chavez v. State, 832 So.2d 730, 752 (Fla.2002); Keen v. State, 504 So.2d 396, 400 (Fla.1987), disapproved in part on other grounds by Owen v. State, 596 So.2d 985, 990 (Fla.1992)); Woods v. State, 755 So.2d 810, 813 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000).

As Conde v. State, 860 So.2d 930, 951-53 (Fla.2003), instructs, any prejudice due to the delay “must be proven on a case-by-case basis.” See Globe, 877 So.2d at 671-72 (same); Keen, 504 So.2d at 400, disapproved in part on other grounds by Owen, 596 So.2d at 990 (“[E]ach case must be examined upon its own facts to determine whether a violation of the rule has induced an otherwise voluntary confession.”). This approach is in keeping with the majority view nationwide. See Commonwealth v. Rosario, 422 Mass. 48, 661 N.E.2d 71, 76 n. 4 (1996) (“Most States that have addressed the admissibility of a confession obtained during an unlawful prearraignment delay do not have a rule of automatic exclusion. See, e.g., People v. Kendrick, 56 Cal.2d 71, 85, 14 Cal.Rptr. 13, 363 P.2d 13 (1961); State v. Franklin, 463 A.2d 749, 753 (Me.1983); People v. Cipriano, 431 Mich. 315, 333-334, 429 N.W.2d 781 (1988); State v. Mendocino, 288 Or. 231, 236, 603 P.2d 1376 (1979).”); see generally Romual-do P. Eclavea, Annotation, “Admissibility of confession or other statement made by defendant as affected by delay in arraignment-modern state cases,” 28 A.L.R.4th 1121 (1984 & Supp. 2011) (§ 5, identifying Florida and a number of other states as rejecting a per se rule, in favor of some form of a “[qualified view that delay does not render confession inadmissible unless delay induced or caused, or was used to extract confession”); but see id. (§ 3, identifying states holding “[b]road view that delay renders confession inadmissible per se”).

Acceptance of White’s position would, in effect, require the addition of language to Rule 3.130 to require that he should have been taken ‘directly’ or ‘without unnecessary delay’ to a magistrate, as required in a number of other states. However, that is not what Rule 3.130 provides and we are simply not at liberty to add language to the rule as written. See Browning v. Sarasota Alliance for Fair Elections, Inc., 968 So.2d 637, 651 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (“When the legislature has described the particular situation in which a set of procedures should apply, an inference must be drawn that what is not included by specific reference was intended to be excluded.”), rev’d on other grounds, 28 So.3d 880 (Fla.2010). Moreover, our Supreme Court has instructed that a showing of prejudice is a condition precedent to the strict enforcement of its procedural rules, again barring any per se rule for suppression. See Lachos v. State, 339 So.2d 217, 219 (Fla.1976) (“We agree that a showing of prejudice should be a condition precedent to undertaking the kind of procedural niceties envisioned by [prior decisions strictly enforcing a procedural rule].”).

As part of this analysis, it is appropriate to consider whether the claimed fact that White’s presentation to the magistrate was delayed for the quite obvious, perhaps improper purpose of obtaining information on unrelated crimes mandates a different result. Essentially because the resolution of these issues turns on whether the officers’ actions are objectively lawful and subjective motivations are irrelevant, we conclude that it does not.

We know that in the context of “pretex-tual stop” cases, “the subjective knowledge, motivation, or intention of the individual officer involved [is] wholly irrelevant [to the determination of the legality of the stop].” Dep’t of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Jones, 935 So.2d 532, 534 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (“The constitutional validity of a traffic stop depends on purely objective criteria. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996); see also Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles v. Utley, 930 So.2d 698 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (Hawkes, J., concurring).”); see Holland v. State, 696 So.2d 757, 759 (Fla.1997) (concluding that the objective test “asks only whether any probable cause for the stop existed”). This objective standard also has been applied to suppression questions where an arrest has been made for one crime, and the defendant claims that the motivation for the arrest was the investigation of entirely different crime., The same analysis applies here.

It is true that a number of state cases have in fact concluded that a confession secured as the result of a delay should be suppressed. In State v. Bennett, 176 W.Va. 1, 339 S.E.2d 213, 218 (1985), the West Virginia court concluded that “officers acted improperly, under the circumstances, in failing to present the appellant to Magistrate Michael until after the officers obtained the appellant’s written confession ... the record indicates that the officers delayed presentment for the purpose of obtaining a separate confession,” and thus decided “[t]he circuit court committed error in admitting that confession into evidence.” Again, in State v. Persinger, 169 W.Va. 121, 286 S.E.2d 261, 270 (1982), the court observed “the focus is not so much on the length of the detention but whether the police were primarily using the delay in bringing the defendant before a magistrate to obtain a confession from him.” However, West Virgina’s statute specifically requires the defendant be brought before the adjudicating authority “without unnecessary delay,” which would make the officers’ actions in these cases objectively against that state’s law. Here, the fact remains that Rule 3.130 did not require White be taken directly to the magistrate; accordingly, the reason for the stop at the homicide office did not need to be considered, and certainly standing alone, did not require suppression. It is what occurred during the delay that controls., State v. Wiberg, 296 N.W.2d 388,

393 (Minn.1980), persuasively states:

Application of the exclusionary rule exacts a great cost on societal interests by the proscription, in many cases, of con-cededly relevant and reliable evidence. Against this burden on societal interests, however, must be balanced the deterrence of improper police action that the exclusionary rule promotes. We feel that the balance is not' struck by the rigid exclusion of reliable evidence reasonably related to a violation of [that state’s presentment rule] in every case in which such a violation occurs. [Citations omitted].

In sum, as observed in Keen, a blanket rule mandating suppression is inappropriate. Here, the police acted within the law in bringing White to Stroze rather than directly to a judicial officer. White was held for some five hours awaiting transport and then questioned for some thirteen hours. Appropriate Miranda warnings were given. As in Globe, White’s incriminating statement came within twenty-four hours of his arrest. White was given breaks, rest room visits and water; he never asked for questioning to stop and never asked for anything else; rather, the uncontroverted testimony was that had White requested anything, the officers would have complied with that request.

While White cites computer records showing a first appearance hearing on January 1, 2001, nothing was said at the suppression hearing as to the availability of a magistrate that holiday weekend., Thus, White did not carry the burden of demonstrating that the delay induced his statements. See Chavez, 832 So.2d at 753 (citing Keen and observing “[ajbsent a showing that the delay induced this otherwise voluntary statement, we find that the trial court properly denied Keen’s motion to suppress”); Romanello v. State, 160 So.2d 529, 582-38 (Fla. 1st DCA 1964) (concluding that it was defendant’s obligation to demonstrate that the delay induced the confession and “it will not be presumed that such was the case”). Hence, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to suppress., Globe, 877 So.2d at 671-72; Blanco v. State, 452 So.2d 520, 523 (Fla.1984) (“A trial judge’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion.”).

For these reasons, White’s detailed account of the crimes committed, including, his admission to his prior robbery of May-ers’ home, his admission to having written on the mirror in Mayers’ home the threat “I want wartime, next time someone will die,” his admission to entering the home with co-defendant Davis for the purpose of stealing drugs and money, his possession of a shotgun in the home, his admitted confrontation with the two victims, and his claim that as he searched for drugs in another room he heard two shots and found Davis fleeing the residence with the shotgun and a duffle bag, were all properly admitted into evidence.

II

Largely on the basis of these admissions, in turn (as well as other record evidence), we find that White cannot prevail on either of the other two substantial issues raised.

1. Postell Violation Not Reversible Error

First, White complains that the prosecutor’s elicitation of evidence that the source of the investigative lead that caused the detectives to first question him was co-defendant Davis, constituted inferential hearsay that should not have been admitted. See Postell v. State, 398 So.2d 851, 854 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981). We agree, but on the facts at hand, find the error was harmless.

“An officer may say what he did pursuant to information but he may not relate the information itself for such is hearsay.” Collins v. State, 65 So.2d 61, 67 (Fla.1953). Where “the inescapable inference from testimony [concerning a tip received by police] is that a non-testifying witness has furnished the police with evidence of the defendant’s guilt, the testimony is hearsay, and the defendant’s right of confrontation is defeated, notwithstanding that the actual statements made by the non-testifying witness are not repeated.” Wilding v. State, 674 So.2d 114, 119 (Fla.1996), receded from on other grounds, De-voney v. State, 717 So.2d 501 (Fla.1998) (quoting Postell, 398 So.2d at 854). Here, the evidence was all the more damaging as it identified as the source White’s co-defendant. Indeed the legal assumption that this fact is uncommonly prejudicial and therefore must be kept from the jury is the very reason that Davis was tried separately. See Smith v. State, 699 So.2d 629, 643 (Fla.1997) (observing that severance rule provides trial court with discretion to grant severance and is designed to ensure fair determination of each defendant’s guilt or innocence by enabling presentation of evidence in such a manner that jury can distinguish evidence properly admitted against each defendant); see also Ramirez v. State, 739 So.2d 568, 579 (Fla.1999) (explaining that it is error to admit the details of a non-testifying co-defendant’s confession and that a co-defendant’s statements “are especially suspect because he has a strong motive to implicate another”). Neither the facts that, as the State points out, White was not arrested until a year later nor that Stroze testified that police were then following a number of leads, change the conclusion that the testimony should not have been admitted.

Nonetheless, considering the substantial evidence establishing White’s guilt, including his detailed admissions, we conclude that the error was harmless under the test stated in Ventura v. State, 29 So.3d 1086 (Fla.2010). See Zuluaga v. State, 915 So.2d 1251, 1254 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005) (addressing a claimed violation of Postell, “[w]hether the out-of-court statement was improperly admitted on relevancy grounds or because it was hearsay is not dispositive as either way it was error subject to a harmless error analysis”); Hernandez v. State, 547 So.2d 138, 138 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988) (“Given the vague nature of this testimony and the other evidence of guilt in this case, we are unwilling to upset this conviction on this and other technical errors.”); Barnes v. State, 470 So.2d 851, 852 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985) (“Given the substantial evidence establishing Barnes’ guilt, and the brief and abbreviated nature of the challenged hearsay, we find that the officer’s references to the anonymous phone call were harmless error.”).

2. Polygraph Evidence Rulings Not Reversible Error.

Second, while we agree that it was also error to admit evidence initially that White refused to take a polygraph, an error corrected during the course of the trial, we do not agree that this error deprived White of a fair trial. At trial lead detective Stroze accounted that over a year before White’s arrest, during the officers’ initial interview with him, after a suspicious statement by White, Stroze had asked White to take a polygraph test and he refused. Detective Paar reiterated that account. After the admission of the detectives’ testimony, the trial court recognized its error. White sought and was denied a mistrial, but a curative instruction was given that:

[T]estimony regarding the words polygraph examination were given in this ease. You are instructed to disregard any mention of this matter. It must not be part of your deliberations.

There is a “derivative prohibition against inquiry as to the willingness or reluctance of a party or witness to be the subject of a lie detector examination ... to prove consciousness of innocence or of guilt.” Johnson v. State, 166 So.2d 798, 801-02 (Fla. 2d DCA 1964); see also McFadden v. State, 540 So.2d 844, 846 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989) (“Florida cases have taken a more conservative approach to the admission of such testimony.”). However “[a] reference to a polygraph ‘is not necessarily prejudicial if no inference as to the result is raised or if any inferences that might be raised as to the result are not prejudicial.’ Hutchins v. State, 834 So.2d 112, 113-14 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976) (citation omitted); Sullivan v. State, 303 So.2d 632, 635 (Fla.1974).” Jean v. State, 789 So.2d 550, 551 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001). See McFadden, 540 So.2d at 846 (“[I]t appears the test was never taken and no results were mentioned nor inferred. Under these circumstances it appears to us that under the law in this state there were no legitimate grounds for mistrial. Certainly, there was no manifest, urgent or absolute necessity in the interests of justice existing here— and that is the test required for a mistrial.”).

In this regard the context of the statement is critical. See Charles W. Ehrhardt, 1 Fla. Prac., Evidence § 401.5, at 172 (2011 ed.) (“Although the mention of polygraph results of a criminal defendant is grounds for a mistrial, not every improper reference to polygraphs is a basis for such an order. In the latter situation, the factual setting in which the reference occurs must be examined to determine if there exists a ‘manifest, urgent or absolute necessity1 for a mistrial.” (quoting McFadden, 540 So.2d at 846)). The context of White’s refusal to take the test, combined with the overwhelming evidence of his guilt, including the admissions outlined above, demonstrate that the denial of his motion for mistrial was not an abuse of discretion.

Even if this were not so, the same kind of analysis applied to White’s Postell claim leads us to the conclusion that the polygraph evidence beyond a reasonable doubt could not have contributed to the verdict and thus was legally harmless. See Cooper v. State, 43 So.3d 42, 43 (Fla.2010) (“[T]he test is ‘whether there is a reasonable possibility that the error affected the verdict.’ ” (quoting State v. DiGuilio, 491 So.2d 1129 (Fla.1986))). Thus, any error on this issue as well was harmless.

Affirmed.

      . The trial court sentenced White to consecutive life sentences on Counts 1 and 2; on Counts 3, 4, 5, and 6, to thirty years in prison on each count to run concurrent with each other and with Count 1; and on Counts 7 and 8, to fifteen years on each count, concurrent with each other and consecutive to Count 2.

      . Because a number of White’s claims are either without merit or fail to provide a basis for relief when a harmless error analysis is appropriately applied, we address the only three claims made that we find require extended discussion.

      .DNA from the bandana matched that of co-defendant Armond Davis, who was tried separately and also convicted. See Davis v. State, 3D11-2536 (Fla. 3d DCA Nov. 9, 2011) (per curiam affirmed).

      . White’s claim that the marijuana arrest was itself invalid is incorrect. See B.C. v. State, 59 So.3d 321 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011), review denied, 2011 WL 4505964 (Fla. Sept. 28, 2011).

      . Stroze explained that while he requested that the arresting officer transport White immediately, that did not occur:
      It wasn’t immediately. They had a thing they were doing, an operation and they put everybody in a holding cell area and then eventually after so many people were rounded up then they were transported from that point on.

      . Turner Guilford Knight Correctional Center is the Pre-Trial Detention Center, a booking facility, which processes and houses all classifications of inmates.

      .At the suppression hearing on questioning of Detective Stroze, the record reflects:
      Q. [White’s counsel] Okay so you are going to see Mr. White in your office on December 30th at 6:55 p.m.?
      A. [Stroze] 6:55, yes.
      Q. 6:55?
      Q. And is that after everybody else has been dropped off at TGK?
      A. I believe so. I didn’t have anything to do with that part. This is a homicide office.
      Q. Now would you agree with me that but for your intervention Mr. White would have been dropped at TGK?
      A. Yes.
      Q. If he could have made bond he would have bonded out, whatever, correct?
      A. That is speculation I don’t know.

      . See People v. Cipriano, 431 Mich. 315, 429 N.W.2d 781, 785 (1988):
      The McNabb-Mallory rule was formulated by the United States Supreme Court "[i]n the exercise of its supervisory authority over the administration of criminal justice in the federal courts....” McNabb, supra, 318 U.S. at 341, 63 S.Ct. at 613. Because it was not constitutionally mandated, the rule was never applicable to criminal proceedings in state courts. However, as is true in Michigan, most states require by statute that an arrested person must be arraigned “without unnecessary delay.” In interpreting such statutes, the "vast majority of state courts- [like their federal counterparts] have rejected McNabb-Mallory outright, opting instead for a traditional due process voluntariness test of the admissibility of confessions.” Johnson v. State, 282 Md. 314, 324, 384 A.2d 709 (1978). Under the view adopted in most states, a confession obtained from a suspect in violation of his statutory right to prompt arraignment is not ipso facto inadmissible; rather, arraignment delay is taken into account as one relevant factor in evaluating the overall vol-untariness of the confession.

      . See also Brown v. State, 715 So.2d 241, 243 (Fla.1998) ("Our courts have long recognized that the rules of construction applicable to statutes also apply to the construction of rules.”) (citations omitted); Cason ex rel. Saferight v. Hammock, 908 So.2d 512, 516 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) ("[W]e must apply the rules of statutory construction to the rules of court promulgated by the Florida Supreme Court.”).

      . See State v. Langley, 61 So.3d 747, 774 (La.App. 3d Cir.2011); Doyle v. State, 116 Nev. 148, 995 P.2d 465, 470 (2000) ("[A]l-though Whren involved a traffic detention, its conclusion that subjective intentions play no role in ordinary probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis is equally applicable to arrests.”); Ex parte Scarbrough, 621 So.2d 1006, 1010 (Ala.1993) (tracing courts’ subjective/objective analyses when confronted with claims of pretextual arrests and adopting an objective test, concluding ”[a]s long as the police officer is doing only what is objectively authorized and legally permitted, the officer’s subjective intent in doing it is irrelevant.”); see also United States v. Jones, 377 F.3d 1313, 1314 (11th Cir.2004) (rejecting defendant’s argument that the arresting officer’s delay in serving the child-support warrant in hopes of arresting defendant while committing a drug-related offense did not support suppression); see generally Margret M. Lawton, The Road To Whren And Beyond: Does The “Would Have” Test Work?, 57 DePaul L. Rev. 917, 926 (2008) ("In the years following Whren, the Court has reaffirmed its holding that a police officer's mindset does not have any bearing upon the Fourth Amendment validity of a traffic stop or an arrest based upon objective probable cause.”).

      . In this case there is no evidence that the marijuana arrest was a subterfuge to facilitate questioning White in the murder case.

      . See generally 28 A.L.R. 4th at 1121, 1121 (§ 3, identifying states holding “[bjroad view that delay renders confession inadmissible per se”).

      . See Rosario, 661 N.E.2d at 74 (footnote omitted) (identifying as factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of any delay in arraigning a person who has been arrested "(1) whether Miranda warnings were given; (2) the circumstances, including the passage of time between the illegal arrest and the confession; and (3) the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct." [e.s.]).

      . U.S. v. Lasley 2011 WL 1630936, 3 (D.Neb. Apr. 29, 2011), explains: "The focus now is with voluntariness rather than delay.”

      . Wiberg, 296 N.W.2d at 393, went on to conclude: "Rather, the trial court should consider, among other things, how reliable the evidence is, whether the delay was intentional, whether the delay compounded the effects of other police misconduct, and the length of the delay.” However the controlling statute in Wiberg specifically required that the defendant "must be brought before a judge without unnecessary delay....” Id. at 392.

      . Keen, 504 So.2d at 400, disapproved in part on other grounds by Owen, 596 So.2d at 990 (rejecting Keen’s suggestion that an otherwise voluntary statement given after twenty-four hours was per se inadmissible).

      . Although White initially challenged the form of the Miranda warnings actually administered to him, he has abandoned that claim in light Florida v. Powell, - U.S. -, 130 S.Ct. 1195, 1204, 175 L.Ed.2d 1009 (U.S. 2010) and Rigterink v. State, 66 So.3d 866, 892 (Fla.2011).

      . See, e.g., Rowe v. Trombley, 2010 WL 2670652, *10 (July 1, 2010) ("In this case, based on a review of the record, the totality of circumstances indicate that petitioner’s confession was voluntary, in spite of the pre-arraignment delay, because there is no allegation that petitioner was not advised of his Miranda warnings, and there is no evidence of intimidating police conduct, that the police interview was coercive, or that petitioner was otherwise harassed or mistreated.”); see also United States v. Mendoza, 16 Fed.Appx. 770, 771-772 (9th Cir.2001) ("Although pre-ar-raignment delay may be considered by the trial court in determining whether to admit a confession, the "real test” of admissibility is whether the confession was voluntary.”).

      . The TGK website presently provides "If an inmate has bondable charges, he or she can bond out at anytime 24-7, 365 days.” http:// www.miamidade.gov/corrections/corrections_ faq.asp# bondable

      . A magistrate presides over "bond hearings” Monday through Friday at 9:00 a.m. and 1:30 p.m. sessions. On Saturdays and Sundays, there is one 9:00 a.m. session. After booking, an arrested person is ordinarily transported to the justice building, approximately a thirty minute ride, in time for the next session.

      . We reject White's separate claim that the confession was involuntary. See Perez v. State, 919 So.2d 347 (Fla.2005) (rejecting Perez’ assertion that twenty-five hours, per se required suppression of his statement); Conde, 860 So.2d at 951-53 (holding confession by defendant not rendered involuntary by separate interrogation periods lasting approximately twelve and thirteen hours each when defendant "was provided food, drink, access to restrooms, the opportunity to place phone calls, and at least eleven hours away from the detectives at a place where he could rest"); Chavez, 832 So.2d at 749 (rejecting Chavez’s arguments for suppression, concluding: "[a]l-though Chavez was questioned over the course of several days, he was provided with food, drink, and cigarettes (as requested) at appropriate times, and permitted to have frequent breaks”).

      . In reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress, the evidence developed at a suppression hearing must be interpreted in a manner most favorable to sustaining the ruling of the court below. Cotton v. State, 901 So.2d 241, 243 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005) (citing Connor v. State, 803 So.2d 598, 605 (Fla.2001)). The trial court's findings of fact must be accorded a presumption of correctness. Nelson v. State, 850 So.2d 514, 521 (Fla.2003).

      .During direct examination, the prosecutor asked Detective Paar whether, in December, 1999, "an investigative lead came in that took you in a different direction?” Paar answered, "Yes.” The prosecutor then asked him who the person was that gave Paar the "lead.” White objected on hearsay grounds. At a subsequent side-bar conference, White also objected on the ground that the anticipated testimony would create "the unmistakable inference” that "there is out-of-court information that is not being presented to the jury that led [the detectives] to do certain things under Postell.” The prosecutor proffered that the person Paar would say he spoke to that gave police the lead to investigate White as a suspect was Armond Davis, the co-defendant. Defense counsel argued that it would be the same as if part of Davis' statement were admitted into evidence. The prosecutor then withdrew his question of who had given police the information that led to White. White’s counsel then moved to strike Paar’s testimony concerning the "lead” and asked for a curative instruction. However, counsel also argued that White believed that a curative instruction was not sufficient and moved for a mistrial. The court overruled the objection and denied White’s motion for mistrial. Moments later in accounting what he had said at his initial visit to White, Stroze testified he had informed White that they had received information from Davis.

      . See generally Shere v. State, 579 So.2d 86, 90 (Fla.1991) (finding error in permitting introduction of inadmissible evidence but concluding "under the circumstances of this case, we find the error to be harmless. The evidence against Shere came largely from his own mouth, including his self-incriminating statements and the physical evidence which those statements helped to identify” [e.s.]); Shade v. State 400 So.2d 850, 854 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981) ("The trial court’s failure to exclude the wallet and its contents must be considered to be harmless error, however, in light of the strong evidence of guilt, not the least of which were appellant’s inculpatory statements which were properly admitted.” [e.s.]).

      . Ibid.

        . McCray v. State, 71 So.3d 848, 877 (Fla.2011) (" '[A] trial court’s ruling on a motion for mistrial [is reviewed] under an abuse of discretion standard.’ Salazar v. State, 991 So.2d 364, 371 (Fla.2008). Such a motion should be granted only 'when it is necessary to ensure that the defendant receives a fair trial,' Cole v. State, 701 So.2d 845, 853 (Fla.1997), and 'when an error is so prejudicial as to vitiate the entire trial,' England [v. State, 940 So.2d 389, 402 (Fla.2006)].”)

      . Generally, “[ajbsent consent by both the state and defendant, polygraph evidence is inadmissible in an adversary proceeding in this state.” Walsh v. State, 418 So.2d 1000, 1002 (Fla.1982). This general rule is based on the court’s conclusion that "a polygraph cannot be recognized as a sufficiently reliable or valid instrument to warrant its use.” Davis v. State, 520 So.2d 572, 573-74 (Fla. 1988).


text:
    Kevin BRANTLEY, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 3D11-2746.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Nov. 23, 2011.
    Rehearing Denied Jan. 6, 2012.
    Kevin Brantley, in proper person.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, for appellee.
    Before RAMIREZ, SHEPHERD, and SUAREZ, JJ.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. See Garcia v. State, 722 So.2d 905, 907 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998) (“The voluntary waiver of a right does not constitute an illegal sentence.”).


text:
    Robert GIELCHINSKY, et al., Appellants, v. Jeffrey SWARTZ, Appellee.
    No. 3D11-558.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Nov. 30, 2011.
    Rehearing Denied Jan. 6, 2012.
    Louis R. Gigliotti, Jr., Hollywood, for appellants; Robert Gielchinsky, in proper person.
    Jeffrey D. Swartz, in proper person; Rhonda A. Anderson, for appellee.
    Before WELLS, C.J., and SHEPHERD and EMAS, JJ.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. Applegate v. Barnett Bank of Tallahassee, 377 So.2d 1150, 1152 (Fla.1979) (“[T]he record brought forward by the appellant is inadequate to demonstrate reversible error.”); Fla. R.App. P. 9.200(e) (stating the burden to ensure the record is supplied and transmitted shall be on the appellant).


text:
    Maria Alessandra GASCUE, Appellant, v. Jose Luis GASCUE, Appellee.
    No. 3D10-3174.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Nov. 30, 2011.
    Rehearing Denied Jan. 10, 2012.
    Perez-Abreu & Martin-Lavielle and Javier Perez-Abreu and Andy W. Acosta, Coral Gables, for appellant.
    Rosenthal Rosenthal Rasco Kaplan and Liliana Loebl and Daniel Kaplan, Aventu-ra, for appellee.
    Before CORTIÑAS, ROTHENBERG, and LAGOA, JJ.
   PER CURIAM.

We reverse the trial court’s award of a monthly credit against the child support determination and remand for award to appellant of the full child support determination of $2,102.11 per month, and order that appellant reimburse appellee for previously-agreed upon travel expenses, subject to appellee’s showing of actual travel expenses incurred, in an amount not to exceed $922.54 per month. We affirm all other issues on appeal, including the denial of attorney’s fees at trial.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.


text:
    William ORTEGA, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 3D11-2698.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Dec. 7, 2011.

      William Ortega, in proper person.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, for appellee.
    Before EMAS and FERNANDEZ, JJ., and SCHWARTZ, Senior Judge.
   PER CURIAM.

Ortega seeks review of the trial court’s order denying his motion to correct illegal sentence. We affirm.

In 2004, Ortega was charged with, and pled guilty to, possession with intent to sell or deliver marijuana, in violation of section 893.13(l)(a)2., Florida Statutes (2004). He was placed on two years’ probation, which terminated in 2006.

In August of 2011, Ortega filed a motion to correct illegal sentence, pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800. In his motion, Ortega contends his guilty plea was “involuntary,” based upon the recent decision by the United States District Court in Shelton v. Secretary, Department of Corrections, 802 F.Supp.2d 1289 (M.D.Fla. 2011).

To the extent that Ortega is indeed asserting that his plea was “involuntary,” such a claim must be asserted by a motion filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. Johnson v. State, 60 So.3d 1045 (Fla.2011); Johnson v. State, 50 So.3d 77 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010).

There is no time requirement within which to file a motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Rule 3.800(a). By contrast, Rule 3.850(b) contains a two-year time limitation, which renders Ortega’s motion, on its face, untimely. Although Rule 3.850 does provide exceptions to the two-year time limitation, none of the exceptions has been alleged in Ortega’s motion, nor does any appear to exist on the record before us. But see Rule 3.850(b)(2) (providing that a motion for postconviction relief may be filed more than two years after the judgment and sentence become final if it alleges that “the fundamental constitutional right asserted was not established within the period provided for herein and has been held to apply retroactively, and the claim is made within 2 years of the date of the mandate of the decision announcing the retroactivity ”) (emphasis added)).

We therefore affirm the trial court’s denial of Ortega’s motion to correct illegal sentence without prejudice for Ortega to file a proper motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Rule 3.850, should he be able to do so within the pleading and time requirements of that rule. We express no view on the merits of any such motion.

      . In Shelton, a federal court held that ‘‘[b]e-cause Section 893.13, Florida Statutes imposes harsh penalties, gravely besmirches an individual’s reputation, and regulates and punishes otherwise innocuous conduct without proof of knowledge or other criminal intent, the Court finds it violates the due process clause and that the statute is unconstitutional on its face.” Shelton, 802 F.Supp.2d 1289, 1308. While lower court federal rulings may be persuasive, such rulings are not binding on this Court. State v. Dwyer, 332 So.2d 333 (Fla.1976). Moreover, Shelton is contrary to a prior decision of this Court upholding the facial constitutionality of section 893.13 against the same due process challenge. See Taylor v. State, 929 So.2d 665 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006). See also, Little v. State, 77 So.3d 722, 2011 WL 5554812 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011).

      . "A court may at any time correct an illegal sentence_” Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.800(a).


author: ROTHENBERG, J.

text:
    Antonio JOHNSON, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Nos. 3D10-67, 3D09-2994.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Dec. 7, 2011.
    Rehearing Denied Jan. 6, 2012.
    Antonio Johnson, in proper person.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Nicholas A. Merlin, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
    Before RAMIREZ, SUAREZ and ROTHENBERG, JJ.
   ROTHENBERG, J.

On Rule to Show Cause

On August 1, 2011, in reference to appellate case number 3D09-2994, and then again on September 28, 2011, in reference to appellate case number 3D10-67, this Court ordered Antonio Johnson, who is serving a life sentence and has filed at least forty-eight postconviction motions and/or appeals with this Court concerning lower tribunal case number 97-32329, to show cause within thirty days why: (1) he should not be prohibited from filing further pro se pleadings with this Court regarding case number 97-32329; and (2) this Court should not sanction him pursuant to sections 944.279 and 944.28(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2010). Finding no good cause has been shown, we direct the Clerk of the Third District Court of Appeal to: (1) refuse to accept for filing any further appeals, pleading, motions, petitions, or other papers relating to Johnson’s conviction and sentence in case number 97-32329 unless they are filed by a Florida Bar member in good standing; and (2) forward a certified copy of this opinion to the Department of Corrections for consideration by that institution of disciplinary measures against Johnson pursuant to sections 944.279(1) and 944.28(2)(a), for the filing of a frivolous appeal.


text:
    Sharrod RODGERS a/k/a Sherrod Rodgers, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 3D11-83.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Dec. 14, 2011.
    Sharrod Rodgers a/k/a Sherrod Rodgers, in proper person.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Nicholas A. Merlin, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
    Before WELLS, C.J., and CORTINAS and ROTHENBERG, JJ.
   ROTHENBERG, J.

The defendant, Sharrod Rodgers a/k/a Sherrod Rodgers, appeals the summary denial of his motion for postconviction relief filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. We reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

In his postconviction motion, Rodgers alleges that he pled guilty to several offenses in lower tribunal case numbers 09-1982 and 09-17112, and during the sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced him to three years in prison, agreeing that the state sentence would run concurrent to a longer federal sentence, and that he would serve the three-year state sentence in federal prison. Following the sentencing, Rodgers began to serve his sentence in state prison, not federal prison. Thereafter, Rodgers filed a “Nunc Pro Tunc Designation,” requesting that the Federal Bureau of Prison transfer him from state prison to a federal prison to serve his concurrent federal and state sentences, but the Federal Bureau of Prison did not respond. Rodgers requested the following relief in his postconviction motion: (1) transfer to federal prison to allow him to concurrently serve the state and federal sentences; (2) modify his state sentence to time served or suspend his state sentence, and then release him to federal authorities; or (3) any other relief this Court deems just and proper.

This Court ordered the State to file a response as to why the relief sought by Rodgers should not be granted. In response, the State conceded that the allegations in Rodgers’ motion for postconviction relief are facially sufficient, and therefore, the trial court erred by summarily denying the motion. See Glenn v. State. 776 So.2d 330, 331 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (“Where a condition of a guilty plea is that the defendant will serve the agreed-upon state sentence in federal prison concurrently with a longer federal sentence, the defendant is entitled to post conviction relief if the terms of agreement are not met.”) (citing Taylor v. State, 710 So.2d 636, 637 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998)).

Following the State’s response, this Court ordered the clerk of the Miami-Dade circuit court to supplement the record with the sentencing transcript and clerk’s minutes. Although the clerk’s minutes were submitted to this Court, the transcript of the sentencing hearing is unavailable because the court reporter’s notes cannot be retrieved “due to a malfunction.” Based on our review of the clerk’s minutes, we find that Rodgers accurately alleged that the trial court agreed that he would serve his state sentence in federal prison concurrent with his longer federal sentence. Accordingly, we reverse the denial of his motion for postconviction relief, and remand for further proceedings as set forth in Taylor:

Because ... the trial court cannot order the Department of Corrections to allow the defendant to serve his state time in federal custody, we conclude it is appropriate that the trial court forthwith vacate the sentence already imposed and provide instead either that the sentence be suspended under the rule that this may be permitted in extraordinary circumstances like these, or, at the appellant’s option, to enter a sentence of “time served” or simply permit him to withdraw his plea.

Taylor, 710 So.2d at 637 (citations omitted) (footnotes omitted).

Reversed and remanded with instructions.


text:
    Kenya BROCKINGTON, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 3D11-2849.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Dec. 14, 2011.
    Kenya Brockington, in proper person.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, for appellee.

      Before EMAS and FERNANDEZ, JJ., and SCHWARTZ, Senior Judge.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. See Little v. State, 77 So.3d 722, 2011 WL 5554812 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011), and cases cited therein; see also Lanier v. State, 74 So.3d 1130 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011); Young v. State, 75 So.3d 351 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011).


text:
    Cameron DIXON, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 3D11-2783.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Dec. 14, 2011.
    Cameron Dixon, in proper person.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, for appellee.
    Before EMAS and FERNANDEZ, JJ., and SCHWARTZ, Senior Judge.
   PER CURIAM.

This is an appeal from the following order denying postconviction relief:

THIS CAUSE comes upon Defendant’s Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence filed on August 26th, 2011. This Court, having reviewed the motion, court files and records in this case, and being otherwise fully advised in the premises therein, hereby orders that the motion is DENIED for the following reasons.
On December 20th, 2010, the defendant entered into a guilty plea on case number F08-17372 to one count of attempted felony murder with a deadly weapon or firearm or aggravated battery, a life felony; and one count of armed robbery using a deadly weapon or firearm, a first degree felony punishable by life. The defendant was sentenced to a term of ten (10) years imprisonment with a ten (10) year mandatory minimum on each count, to run concurrently. In the instant motion, the defendant claims that the ten (10) year mandatory minimum imposed in accordance with § 775.087(2), Fla. Stat. was improper because the record fails to reflect that the defendant stipulated to having actual possession of a firearm, resulting in a violation of the rule set forth in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004) and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000).
The Blakely line of cases stand for the proposition that “when a defendant pleads guilty the State is free to seek judicial sentence enhancements so long as the defendant either stipulates to the relevant facts or consents to judicial factfinding.” Blakely, 542 U.S. at 310, 124 S.Ct. 2531 (citing Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000)). It is apparent on the face of the record that the defendant’s counsel stipulated that the information filed by the prosecution, as well as the arrest form, established a prima facie case for purposes of the plea. See attached copy of plea colloquy transcript at 37, lines 11-19. Accordingly, this court finds that such a stipulation supports the imposition of the ten (10) year mandatory minimum sentence required for a sentence enhancement under § 775.087(2), Fla. Stat., just as my predecessor did in determining a factual basis for the plea. See attached copy of plea colloquy transcript at 38, lines 1^4.
The court’s finding in the instant case is supported by the reasoning set forth in Bradley v. State, 971 So.2d 957 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007) and Sanchez v. State, 979 So.2d 1004 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008). In Bradley, the Fifth District Court of Appeals held that a stipulation to the facts alleged in the complaint affidavit when entering a plea was sufficient to support the imposition of a twenty-year minimum mandatory required for the discharge of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Bradley, 971 So.2d at 961. Like-wise, both the arrest form and the information in the case at bar, which are attached hereto, state that the defendant actually discharged a firearm during the commission of the crimes charged. In Sanchez, the Third District held that the defendant’s stipulation to both the factual basis of the plea and to the imposition of a specific sentence rendered an alleged Apprendi violation un-meritorious. The defendant’s stipulation in the instant case has rendered the same.
Based on the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the motion is DENIED.

We entirely agree.

Affirmed.

      . The defendant also pleaded to the charges filed in case number F10-12319, i.e., one count of criminal mischief over one thousand dollars, a third degree felony; and grand theft in the third degree, as part of the negotiated plea. He was sentenced on these charges to five (5) years in state prison to run concurrently with the ten (10) year mandatory minimum. These charges, however, are not placed in dispute by the defendant’s motion.

      . Section 775.087(2) states: "Any person who is convicted of a felony or an attempt to commit a felony, regardless of whether the use of a weapon is an element of the felony, and the conviction was for murder [or] robbery ... and during the commission of the offense, such person actually possessed a "firearm” or "destructive device” as those terms are defined in s. 790.001, shall be sentenced to a minimum term of imprisonment of 10 years.”

      . The court is aware that Bradley focused on the defendant’s assertion that his sentence was illegal due to the elements alleged in the information, and not necessarily due to a Blakely violation. The court, however, included a final observation pertaining to the holding in Blakely, which this court deems appropriate to the situation at bar.

      . The complaint affidavit stated that the defendant had discharged a firearm during the crime with which he was charged. Bradley, 971 So.2d at 959.


text:
    Emmett T. COX, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 3D11-2781.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Dec. 14, 2011.
    Rehearing Denied Jan. 5, 2012.
    Emmett T. Cox, in proper person.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, for appellee.
    Before EMAS and FERNANDEZ, JJ., and SCHWARTZ, Senior Judge.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. See Stanley v. State, 947 So.2d 627 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) (holding for crimes committed on or after October 1, 1988, the sentencing guidelines do not apply to habitual offender sentences); Parrish v. State, 780 So.2d 287 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001) (same); Studnicka v. State, 679 So.2d 819 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996) (same).


author: KELLY, Judge.

text:
    Otis Eugene HARRELL, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 2D10-5736.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Dec. 14, 2011.
    James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, and Kevin Briggs, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Ronald Napolitano, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.
   KELLY, Judge.

Otis Eugene Harrell challenges his convictions and sentences for attempted robbery with a firearm and aggravated battery with great bodily harm. We affirm his convictions and sentences without comment. However, we remand for the trial court to correct scrivener’s errors which appear on the face of the written judgment.

The written judgment erroneously reflects that Harrell entered a guilty plea and was convicted of robbery with a firearm, rather than attempted robbery with a firearm. Additionally, while the transcript reflects that Harrell was convicted of aggravated battery with great bodily harm, this conviction is not reflected in the written judgment. Accordingly, we remand for the trial court to enter a written judgment that correctly reflects Harrell’s convictions. See Mann v. State, 62 So.3d 1240 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011); Willingham v. State, 48 So.3d 173 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010).

Affirmed; remanded with instructions.

LaROSE and KHOUZAM, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Derrick D. COLSON, Appellant, v. FLORIDA UNEMPLOYMENT APPEALS COMMISSION, Appellee.
    No. 1D11-1294.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Dec. 15, 2011.
    Derrick D. Colson, pro se, Appellant.
    Louis A. Gutierrez, Senior Attorney, Florida Unemployment Appeals Commission, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Derrick Colson appeals the final agency action by the Florida Unemployment Appeals Commission (“UAC”) dismissing his untimely appeal to the Commission. For the reasons expressed in Colson v. Florida Unemployment Appeals Commission, et al., 76 So.3d 1042, 2011 WL 6224593 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011), the Commission’s final order is AFFIRMED.

HAWKES, CLARK, and SWANSON, JJ., concur.


text:
    Sherman Andrew COMBS, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 1D11-6364.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Dec. 15, 2011.
    Sherman Andrew Combs, pro se, Petitioner.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

The petition alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is denied on the merits.

WETHERELL, MARSTILLER, and SWANSON, JJ., concur.


text:
    Tony GARY, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 1D11-6389.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Dec. 15, 2011.
    Tony Gary, pro se, Petitioner.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

DENIED. See Fla. R.App. P. 9.141(d)(5).

WETHERELL, MARSTILLER, and SWANSON, JJ., concur.


text:
    Tywann O. CARTER, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 1D11-6324.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Dec. 15, 2011.
    Tywann 0. Carter, pro se, Petitioner.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

The petition alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is denied on the merits.

WETHERELL, MARSTILLER, and SWANSON, JJ., concur.


author: SILBERMAN, Chief Judge.

text:
    Mohamed EL GOHARY, Appellant, v. Meghan EL GOHARY, Appellee.
    No. 2D10-5553.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Dec. 16, 2011.

      Leslie Telford of Leslie Telford, P.A., Sarasota, for Appellant.
    Meghan El Gohary, pro se.
   SILBERMAN, Chief Judge.

Mohamed El Gohary, the Husband, seeks review of a “Final Judgment of Dissolution” that dissolves the parties’ marriage, establishes the minor child’s primary physical residence, and sets forth a temporary timesharing plan. Because the final judgment was, in fact, not a final order, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction based on the Husband’s failure to file the notice of appeal within thirty days of rendition of the order.

The parties were married in Tampa in January 2004 and eventually settled in Oklahoma. In August 2008, four months after the minor child was born, the Wife left the Husband and returned to Florida with the child. Upon establishing residency, the Wife filed a petition for dissolution of marriage in Florida. Because the Husband and the marital property are in Oklahoma, the Wife did not request equitable distribution, alimony, or child support.

In addition to dissolving the parties’ marriage, the trial court’s order establishes the child’s primary physical residence with the Wife and sets forth a timesharing plan. The court specified that because the Husband had minimal contact with the child, a six-month trial period for visitation would be implemented. The court ordered supervised visitation in Florida once a month and weekly video calls. The court structured the plan as a temporary plan that the court would revisit after six months with the goal of eventually implementing a long-distance parenting plan. By so providing, the court intended to save the parties from having to file a petition to modify which would entail paying a filing fee and proving a substantial change in material circumstances.

The court’s order was filed on July 7, 2010. Apparently unhappy with the temporary timesharing plan, the Husband filed a motion for rehearing. The court entered an order denying the motion on October 19, 2010, and the Husband filed a notice of appeal on November 16, 2010.

The Wife argues that the notice of appeal was untimely because it was filed beyond the thirty-day period for filing a notice of appeal of nonfinal orders set forth in Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(b). The Husband acknowledges that he was required to file a notice of appeal within thirty days of rendition of the order, but he relies on the thirty-day time period for filing a notice of appeal of final orders set forth in Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.110(b). He argues that, under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.020(h), rendition of the “final judgment” was tolled by his motion for rehearing. Rule 9.020(h) provides for the tolling of rendition when “a final order has been entered and there has been filed in the lower tribunal an authorized and timely motion ... for rehearing.” (Emphasis added.)

The crux of the issue regarding the timeliness of the Husband’s notice of appeal is whether the “Final Judgment of Dissolution” is a final order or a nonfinal order. Final appealable orders include partial final judgments that fall within two categories: (1) those which dispose of a separate and distinct part of the litigation, and (2) those which dispose of an entire case as to a party. Shepardson v. Shepardson, 820 So.2d 360, 361 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002). However, an order that purports to be a final judgment of dissolution but fails to dispose of integrally related issues is nonfinal. See id. at 362; Hoffman v. O’Connor, 802 So.2d 1197, 1197 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002).

We conclude that the Final Judgment of Dissolution in this case is not a final order because it fails to dispose of the integrally related issue of visitation. See Moore v. Moore, 50 So.3d 110, 110 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (holding that a final judgment of dissolution that dissolved the parties’ marriage and resolved most of the issues but reserved jurisdiction to enter a parenting plan for one of three minor children was nonfinal); Ward v. Bragg, 957 So.2d 670, 670-71 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (holding that an order modifying a child custody award was “nonfinal because it reserved jurisdiction to consider the integrally related issue of visitation”).

Because the Final Judgment of Dissolution was not a final order, the Husband’s motion for rehearing did not toll its rendition. Thus, the notice of appeal was not timely filed, and we must dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Of course, the Husband will be able to seek appellate review once the trial court enters the final order for which it reserved jurisdiction or such nonfinal orders that are appealable under rule 9.130.

Appeal dismissed.

CASANUEVA and MORRIS, JJ., Concur.


author: DAVIS, Judge.

text:
    Joseph Edward KUCZKO, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 2D10-5003.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Dec. 16, 2011.
    James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, and Richard J. Sanders, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Helene S. Parnés, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.
   DAVIS, Judge.

Joseph Edward Kuczko challenges the revocation of his probation based on his having committed a new law violation. We affirm both the revocation and the resulting sentence without further comment. However, the written order of revocation reflects that Kuczko violated two conditions of his probation, while the transcript of the revocation hearing shows that his probation was revoked based on the violation of only one condition. We therefore remand for the limited purpose of the entry of a corrected written order of revocation which conforms with the oral pronouncement. See Harvester v. State, 62 So.3d 1235, 1235 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011); McNeil v. State, 908 So.2d 556, 557 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005).

Affirmed and remanded for entry of a corrected order.

VILLANTI and CRENSHAW, JJ., Concur.


text:
    D.S., Appellant, v. N.D.R., Appellee.
    No. 2D10-5287.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Dec. 16, 2011.
    D.S., pro se.
    Lisa P. Kirby of Cavanaugh, Kirby & Cavanaugh, P.A., Naples, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Dismissed for lack of jurisdiction as a nonfinal, nonappealable order. See Wilson v. Wilson, 906 So.2d 356 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005).

CASANUEVA, WALLACE, and LaROSE, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Anthony DIXON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D10-4213.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Dec. 19, 2011.
    Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and Paula S. Saunders, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Dixie Daimwood, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED. See Rowland v. State, 680 So.2d 502, 503 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) (rejecting Rowland’s argument that his right to present a defense was unduly hampered when the trial court excluded evidence of an instance of sexual activity on the part of the child witness with another child, stating: “We do not disturb the trial judge’s ruling that the evidence was irrelevant.”).

BENTON, C.J., ROWE, and RAY, JJ., concur.


text:
    Curtis E. McNEALY, Petitioner, v. Kenneth S. TUCKER, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, Respondent.
    No. 1D11-3790.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Dec. 19, 2011.
    Curtis E. McNealy, pro se, Petitioner.
    No appearance for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

DISMISSED. See Baker v. State, 878 So.2d 1236 (Fla.2004).

VAN NORTWICK, THOMAS, and RAY, JJ., concur.


text:
    Daniel M. COULLIETTE, Petitioner, v. Kenneth S. TUCKER, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, Respondent.
    No. 1D11-6086.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Dec. 19, 2011.
    Daniel M. Coulliette, pro se, Petitioner.
    No appearance for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

DISMISSED. See Baker v. State, 878 So.2d 1236 (Fla.2004).

VAN NORTWICK, THOMAS, and RAY, JJ., concur.


text:
    Reinaldo BELCHER, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 1D11-6106.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Dec. 19, 2011.

      Reinaldo Belcher, pro se, Petitioner.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

The petition alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is denied on the merits.

VAN NORTWICK, THOMAS, and RAY, JJ., concur.


text:
    Cleave Adam THOMAS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D10-6395.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Dec. 20, 2011.
    Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and Paula S. Saunders, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

In this Anders appeal, Cleave Thomas, Appellant, challenges his judgments and sentences for robbery and aggravated battery. We affirm Appellant’s judgments and sentences. However, we agree with Appellant’s contention, in his timely motion to correct sentence filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b)(2), that the trial court erred in imposing certain costs under section 938.05(l)(a), Florida Statutes (2009). Section 938.05(l)(a) provides that a trial court must impose court costs of $225 if a person is found guilty of a felony or felonies under Florida law. While the trial court sentenced Appellant for two felonies, the trial court mistakenly imposed court costs pursuant to section 938.05(l)(a) in two sections of the judgment. In one section of the judgment, the trial imposed costs of $250.00; in the other section, it imposed costs of $25. The trial court therefore imposed $50 more in costs than statutorily allowed as provided by section 938.05(l)(a). Accordingly, we affirm Appellant’s judgments and sentences, but we remand for the trial court to enter a corrected order reflecting $225 in costs pursuant to section 938.05(l)(a).

AFFIRMED and REMANDED.

WOLF, LEWIS, and WETHERELL, JJ., concur.

      . Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967).