author: SHAW, Justice.

text:
    Anthony RADETIC v. Michael MURPHY, Sr., Brenda Murphy, and the Eufaula Agency, Inc.
    1091462.
    Supreme Court of Alabama.
    April 15, 2011.

      Robert I. Hinson and Spencer W. Dan-zey of Ludlum & Gil, LLC, Dothan, for appellant.
    Jim S. Calton, Jr., of Calton Legal Services, SP, Eufaula, for appellee Michael Murphy, Sr.; and Richard A. Harrison, Eufaula, for appellee Brenda Shiver (Murphy).
   SHAW, Justice.

Anthony Radetic appeals from a judgment in favor of Michael (Mike) Murphy, Sr., Brenda Murphy, and The Eufaula Agency, Inc. For the reasons discussed below, we reverse and remand.

Facts and Procedural History

Pursuant to a divorce judgment, Mike Murphy and Brenda Murphy were ordered to sell their marital home in Eufaula and to divide the proceeds. The Murphys hired the' Eufaula Agency, a real-estate agency, to assist with the court-ordered sale. Initially, the Murphys entered into a $600,000 contingency-sales contract with individuals who are not parties to the present action. However, based upon Radetic’s offer to purchase the house at the same price, purportedly without contingencies, and upon Radetic’s receiving from Quicken Loans (“Quicken”) a “Home Loan Pre-Qualification Certificate” evidencing Radetic’s prequalification for a $540,000 mortgage, the Murphys canceled the initial contingency-sales contract and, on April 11, 2006, entered into a real-estate-sales contract with Radetic. On that same date, pursuant to the terms of the contract, Radetic remitted to the Eufaula Agency $20,000 in earnest money, which was to be held in escrow by the Eufaula Agency pending closing.

According to the terms of the sales contract between Radetic and the Murphys, closing was scheduled to occur within 30 days. In order to obtain financing, in addition to his previous application to Quicken, Radetic also applied for a loan with Countrywide Home Loans (“Countrywide”). On April 18, 2006, Countrywide informed the Eufaula Agency that Radetic had failed to qualify for the loan. On the following day, Quicken likewise informed Radetic that it was denying his mortgage request. As a result of the foregoing denials, Radetic immediately contacted the Eu-faula Agency to cancel the contract and to request the return of his earnest money.

On May 11, 2006, as permitted by the terms of the real-estate-sales contract, the Eufaula Agency filed a complaint seeking to interplead the $20,000 earnest money, which, according to the Eufaula Agency, had been claimed both by the Murphys and by Radetic. The parties thereafter engaged in various counter- and cross-pleadings. Notably, with regard to the present appeal, the Murphys filed a cross-claim against Radetic seeking damages resulting from the alleged breach of the sales contract by Radetic and Radetic filed a cross-claim against the Murphys asserting fraud and misrepresentation claims based on the Murphys’ alleged failure to disclose defects in the house.

In February 2007, the Murphys’ residence was purchased by another party for $425,000. On March 1, 2007, the Eufaula Agency amended its initial interpleader complaint to add a claim asserting that, if the trial court determined that Radetic breached his contract with the Murphys, then the Eufaula Agency was “entitled to ... the amount of commission it would have made on the sale of the home less the commission earned on the sale of the home in February 2007, to a third party for the sum of $425,000.” Similarly, both Mike Murphy and Brenda Murphy amended their cross-complaints to assert a claim that, assuming the trial court determined that Radetic breached the sales contract, they were “entitled to an award of $175,000.00, which is the amount of the loss in property sale, plus additional award of $30,000 in expenses paid as a result from the February 2007 sale to a third party for the sum of $425,000.00.”

On July 26, 2007, Mike Murphy filed a motion seeking a summary judgment as to Radetic’s cross-claim against the Murphys in which Radetic asserted fraud and misrepresentation claims based on allegations that the Murphys had failed to disclose information regarding purported defects in the residence. On September 20, 2007, the trial court entered an order holding that the Eufaula Agency had discharged all responsibility with regard to the inter-pleaded funds and dismissing the Eufaula Agency as a party to the initial interpleader action. In that same order, the trial court granted the summary-judgment motion filed by Mike Murphy, indicating that only the following remaining issues would proceed to a nonjury trial: “[T]he competing claims to the escrow fund, the claims against Radetic for breach of contract and the claim of The Eufaula Agency for loss of commissions.”

Subsequently, Mike Murphy moved for sanctions against Radetic pursuant to Rule 37, Ala. R. Civ. P., asserting that, based on Radetic’s failure to comply with outstanding discovery requests, Murphy was entitled to have “establish[ed] as facts the allegations of breach of contract” asserted against Radetic and to be awarded a default judgment against Radetic. On July 28, 2008, following a hearing, the trial court entered an order granting Mike Murphy’s motion, in which it noted that it was “established as fact ... that ... Ra-detic had the financial ability to close on the residential sales contract made the basis of this action, and further that he breached said contract by failing to close on same.” As a result, the trial court “ordered ... that ... Michael Murphy and Brenda Murphy, and the Eufaula Agency, have and recover against ... Ra-detic, a judgment by default in the amount [sic] as to all remaining claims in this action.” In its order, the trial court scheduled a hearing on damages for September 10, 2008.

Thereafter, in August 2008 Radetic filed a motion seeking to set aside the default judgment, in which he contended that Mike Murphy had failed to meet the requirements entitling him to sanctions under Rule 37. Nothing in the record before us suggests that the trial court ever ruled on Radetic’s motion to set aside the default judgment.

In March 2009, in accordance with a request by the Eufaula Agency and with the purported agreement of the Murphys, the trial court entered an order distributing the majority of the interpleaded funds to the prevailing parties and rescheduling the damages hearing. On February 17, 2010, following that rescheduled hearing, the trial court entered an order containing the following findings:

“By virtue of the Court’s previous default judgment against Radetic, which was effective as to all claims, liability is no longer an issue. The sole issue before the Court is the amount of damages to be assessed against Radetic and in favor of the Murphy Defendants and Eufaula Agency.
“At the hearing, the Court heard testimony from Michael Murphy, Brenda Murphy, and Robert Powers, a real estate broker with Eufaula Agency, Inc. The evidence shows that the Real Estate Purchase Agreement between Anthony Radetic and Brenda and Michael Murphy was in the amount $600,000.00, and Radetic failed to close on the home. Mr. Powers testified that following the breach of the agreement by Mr. Radetic, the Murphys’ continued efforts to market and sell the home for approximately one year. Mr. Powers testified that during that time the local real estate market declined, and they received no offers on the home. On or about January 17, 2007, almost a year after Radetic failed to close on the home, the Murphy Defendants finally received an offer and entered into a contract ... to sell the home at a price of $425,000.00. The parties closed on the sale of this home on February 2, 2007. Therefore, the Murphy Defendants were damaged in the amount of $175,000 by virtue of Ra-detic’s breach. Eufaula Agency was paid a commission of $20,500.00. The evidence showed that had Radetic closed on the home, Eufaula Agency would have earned a commission of $36,000.
“Thus, the evidence presented indicates that because of the market conditions, the Murphy Defendants received no other offers on the home subsequent to Radetic’s breach of contract until they entered into the [January 2007] contract ... despite the fact that they [made] continuing efforts to market and sell the home. They made a good faith effort to mitigate their damages.
“The sales contract between the Murphy Defendants and Radetic was admitted into evidence. Paragraph 16 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
“ ‘If Buyer/s default by wrongfully refusing to purchase, or by breaching this agreement, and the property does not close, Buyer/s agree (i) to pay said full brokerage fee due broker/s had sale been consummated and (ii) Seller/s may pursue all remedies available to Seller at law and equity including but not limited to Specific Perform-anee and may elect that the earnest money be forfeited by Buyer/s as liquidated damages which shall be divided equally between (1) Seller/s and (2) listing broker (the sum to listing broker not to exceed the full commission) .... In the event of a default by either Seller/s or Buyer/s, all reasonable attorney fees and court costs may be recovered against the defaulting party.’ (Emphasis added.)
“The contract provides that the Murphy Defendants may claim damages on the loss of the sale — that is, the difference in what Radetic should have paid them and what they ultimately sold the home for — plus half of the earnest money. The non-breaching parties are also entitled to attorneys fees. The Court has previously awarded and distributed to the Murphy Defendants part of their share of the earnest money, net of attor-' ney fees, in the total amount of $7,250. Thus, the Murphy Defendants are entitled to a judgment in the amount of (1) $175,000, which is the difference in the price Radetic had agreed to pay for the home and the amount that [a subsequent purchaser] ultimately paid, plus (2) $2,750 (the balance of the earnest money, previously interpled and distributed to pay one-half of the interpleader attorneys’ fees, such that their total liquidated damages award is $10,000), for a total judgment of $177,750.”

The trial court further awarded the Eufau-la Agency a judgment for its lost commission on the Radetic sales contract less the amount of the earnest money previously distributed to the Eufaula Agency.

On March 11, 2010, Radetic timely moved to alter, amend, or vacate the trial court’s damages award or, in the alternative, for a new trial, in which he argued that the Murphys and the Eufaula Agency had failed to present any evidence reflecting the fair market value of the residence at the time he breached the real-estate-sales contract, which, he argued, was the correct date for measuring damages under Alabama law. Radetic filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court on July 20, 2010.

Standard of Review
“Because the trial court heard ore tenus evidence during the bench trial, the ore tenus standard of review applies. Our ore tenus standard of review is well settled. ‘ “When a judge in a nonjury case hears oral testimony, a judgment based on findings of fact based on that testimony will be presumed correct and will not be disturbed on appeal except for a plain and palpable error.” ’ Smith v. Muchia, 854 So.2d 85, 92 (Ala.2003) (quoting Allstate Ins. Co. v. Skelton, 675 So.2d 377, 379 (Ala.1996)).
“ ‘ “The ore tenus rule is grounded upon the principle that when the trial court hears oral testimony it has an opportunity to evaluate the demeanor and credibility of witnesses.” Hall v. Mazzone, 486 So.2d 408, 410 (Ala.1986). The rule applies to “disputed issues of fact,” whether the dispute is based entirely upon oral testimony or upon a combination of oral testimony and documentary evidence. Born v. Clark, 662 So.2d 669, 672 (Ala.1995). The ore tenus standard of review, succinctly stated, is as follows:
“ ‘ “[W]here the evidence has been [presented] ore tenus, a presumption of correctness attends the trial court’s conclusion on issues of fact, and this Court will not disturb the trial court’s conclusion unless it is clearly erroneous and against the great weight of the evidence, but will affirm the judgment if, under any reasonable aspect, it is supported by credible evidence.” ’
“Reed v. Board of Trs. for Alabama State Univ., 778 So.2d 791, 795 (Ala.2000) (quoting Raidt v. Crane, 342 So.2d 358, 360 (Ala.1977)). However, ‘that presumption [of correctness] has no application when the trial court is shown to have improperly applied the law to the facts.’ Ex parte Board of Zoning Adjustment of Mobile, 636 So.2d 415, 417 (Ala.1994).
“ ‘The ore tenus standard of review extends to the trial court’s assessment of damages.’ Edwards v. Valentine, 926 So.2d 315, 325 (Ala.2005). Thus, the trial court’s damages award based on ore tenus evidence will be reversed ‘only if clearly and palpably erroneous.’ Robinson v. Morse, 352 So.2d 1355, 1357 (Ala.1977).”

Kennedy v. Boles Inv., Inc., 53 So.3d 60, 67-68 (Ala.2010).

Discussion

I.

Initially, we note that the Mur-phys devote their entire brief to this Court to the contention that Radetic’s notice of appeal was untimely. More specifically, they argue that, because it was not subsequently modified, the trial court’s July 28, 2008, order constituted a final judgment and that the denial by operation of law of Radetic’s August 2008 motion seeking relief from that judgment caused the 42-day period for filing an appeal, see Rule 4(a)(1), Ala. R.App. P., to expire prior to Radetic’s filing of a notice of appeal on July 20, 2010. We disagree.

“ ‘An appeal ordinarily lies only from a final judgment.’ Tomlinson v. Tomlinson, 816 So.2d 57, 58 (Ala.Civ.App.2001). ‘For a judgment to be final, it must be issued by a court of competent jurisdiction and reflect a complete resolution of each and every matter in controversy.’ Potter v. Owens, 535 So.2d 173, 174 (Ala.Civ.App.1988).”

Alvira v. Campbell, 909 So.2d 847, 849 (Ala.Civ.App.2005). Here, the trial court’s July 28, 2008, order, although determining Radetic’s liability, clearly did not dispose of the issue of the accompanying damages award. Therefore, it was not a final, ap-pealable order.

“It is well established that a final judgment is a ‘terminal decision which demonstrates there has been a complete adjudication of all matters in controversy between the litigants.’ Tidwell v. Tidwell, 496 So.2d 91, 92 (Ala.Civ.App.1986). Further, the judgment must be conclusive and certain with all matters decided, including the assessment of damages with specificity for a sum certain determinable without resorting to extraneous facts, Jewell v. Jackson & Whitsitt Cotton Co., 331 So.2d 623 (Ala.1976).”

Dees v. State, 563 So.2d 1059, 1061 (Ala.Civ.App.1990) (emphasis added). In Dees, the Court of Civil Appeals concluded, based on a finding that there had been both a determination of liability and a stipulation as to the amount of damages, that “the judicial labor ended and nothing unfinished or inconclusive remained.” Id. In the present case, however, there remained “judicial labor” to perform, namely, the assessment of damages based on the trial court’s previous liability determination. Therefore, contrary to the Mur-phys’ argument, the February 17, 2010, order did not simply acknowledge the July 2008 judgment but constituted a final, ap-pealable order because it conclusively determined all remaining issues in the case. See Jetton v. Jetton, 502 So.2d 756, 758 (Ala.1987) (“It is a well established rule that, with limited exceptions, an appeal will lie only from a final judgment which determines the issues before the court and ascertains and declares the rights of the parties involved.” (citations omitted)); Jewell v. Jackson & Whitsitt Cotton Co., 831 So.2d 628, 625 (Ala.1976) (“A final judgment is a terminative decision by a court of competent jurisdiction which demonstrates there has been complete adjudication of all matters in controversy between the litigants within the cognizance of that court. That is, it must be conclusive and certain in itself.” (citations omitted)).

As discussed in note 9, supra, Radetic’s postjudgment motion challenging the February 2010 order was denied by operation of law on June 9, 2010 — 90 days following its filing date of March 11, 2010. That postjudgment motion, which was filed within 30 days of the trial court’s entry of its damages order, was filed pursuant to Rule 59, Ala. R. Civ. P., and, thus, while pending, tolled the time for filing a notice of appeal. See Rule 4(a)(3), Ala. RApp. P. (“If such post-judgment motion is deemed denied under the provisions of Rule 59.1 of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure, then the time for filing a notice of appeal shall be computed from the date of denial of such motion by operation of law, as provided for in Rule 59.1.”). Radetic filed his notice of appeal to this Court on July 20, 2010, the 41st day following the denial of his postjudgment motion; his appeal was thus timely. See Rule 4(a)(1), Ala. RApp. P.

II.

We now address the substantive issue raised by Radetic on appeal. Although conceding liability, Radetic argues that the trial court incorrectly calculated the damages due the Murphys on their breach-of-contract claim. He specifically contends that, in calculating that damages award, the trial court erroneously considered the fair market value of the Murphy residence at the time of its sale for $475,000 in February 2007, rather than the fair market value in April 2006, when the breach actually occurred. We agree.

It is well settled that “[t]he measure of damages for the breach of a contract for the sale of land is the difference between the contract price and the market value at the time of the breach.” Wilkens v. Kaufman, 615 So.2d 613, 614 (Ala.Civ.App.1992). See also Duncan v. Rossuck, 621 So.2d 1313, 1315-16 (Ala.1993) (“The measure of damages for the breach of a contract involving the sale of land is the difference between the contract price and the market value of the land on the date of the breach.”); Brett v. Wall, 530 So.2d 797, 798 (Ala.1988) (“Of course, the measure of damages for the breach of a contract for the sale of land is the difference between the contract price and the market value at the date of the breach.”); Woodham v. Singletary, 545 So.2d 78, 78 (Ala.Civ.App.1989) (“The measure of damages for the breach of a contract involving the sale of land is the difference between the contract price and the market value at the date of the breach.”); and Cook v. Brown, 428 So.2d 59, 62 (Ala.Civ.App.1982) (“We readily agree that the measure of damages for the breach of a land sale contract is the difference between the contract price and the market value at the date of the breach.”).

Here, the sales contract between the Murphys and Radetic provides that the proposed sale was due to close within 30 days of April 8, 2006; therefore, the last possible closing date available to Radetic was May 8, 2006. Consequently, as evidenced by the Murphys’ prelitigation demand for the earnest money held by the Eufaula Agency, the breach at issue occurred in early 2006. In determining the value of the residence, however, the trial court admittedly used the sales price from a closing that occurred over eight months later. The trial court’s February 2010 order clearly indicates that, in calculating the Murphys’ damages, it relied on evidence that “[o]n or about January 17, 2007, almost a year after Radetic failed to close on the home, the Murphy Defendants finally received an offer and entered into a contract ... to sell the home at a price of $425,000.00.” Based on that evidence, the trial court then computed the Murphys’ damages by awarding “the difference in what Radetic should have paid them and what they ultimately sold the home for....”

As noted above, the trial court relied on the following language from the sales contract as support for its method of calculating the damages:

“ ‘If Buyer/s default by wrongfully refusing to purchase, or by breaching this agreement, and the property does not close, Buyer/s agree (i) to pay said full brokerage fee due broker/s had sale been consummated and (ii) Seller/s may pursue all remedies available to Seller/s at law and equity including but not limited to Specific Performance and may elect that the earnest money be forfeited by Buyer/s as liquidated damages which shall be divided equally between (1) Seller/s and (2) listing broker (the sum to listing broker not to exceed the full commission) .... In the event of a default by either Seller/s or Buyer/s, all reasonable attorney fees and court costs may be recovered against the defaulting party.’ (Emphasis added [by trial court].)”

The trial court interpreted the foregoing provision to mean “that the Murphy Defendants may claim damages on the loss of the sale — that is, the difference in what Radetic should have paid them and what they ultimately sold the home for — plus half of the earnest money.” We disagree. In fact, we see nothing in the record before us to support the trial court’s deviation from our well established damages formula applicable to a breach of a contract involving the sale of land, and the Murphys have failed to present any authority justifying that deviation. Because the trial court improperly applied the law to the facts, the ore tenus rule does not apply. See Kennedy, supra.

As a final matter, we note that in its order purporting to deny Radetic’s post-judgment motion challenging the February 2010 order, the trial court stated that “Ra-detic offered no evidence of the fair market value of the home in response to ... [the Murphys’] damages claims.” Contrary to that assertion, however, the transcript of the damages hearing reflects that Radetic did elicit testimony both from the Murphys and from a representative of the Eufaula Agency as to the value of the residence in or around April 2006. Specifically, when questioned about the value of the residence at the time they entered into the sales contract with Radetic, although unable to assign an exact figure, Brenda Murphy testified that they had obtained an appraisal that was “well over six [hundred thousand].” She further indicated that, at the time Radetic first expressed interest in the residence, the property was listed for either $625,000 or $650,000, which amount, she said, represented “what [she] wanted for the house.” See, e.g., Wilkens, 615 So.2d at 615 (“A person may testify to the value of his or her land, even if that person is not an expert.”).

Additionally, the broker employed by the Eufaula Agency, who performed the market analysis on the Murphy residence at the time it was listed for sale, confirmed that the asking price for the residence, which was based upon a competitive market analysis and an appraisal, was $625,000. The broker later admitted, however, that the $600,000 price both the previous potential purchasers and Radetic had been willing to pay for the residence was the fair market value of the property in that it represented what the sellers were willing to accept and potential buyers were willing to pay at that time. Mike Murphy, too, represented to the trial court that, although he had invested in excess of $700,000 in the residence, it was, in his opinion, worth only what a buyer such as Radetic was willing to pay. Therefore, there was evidence of the value of the residence at the time of the breach, which would have permitted the trial court to assess damages pursuant to the above-stated rule of law; however, it is clear that the trial court did not consider that evidence in computing its award of damages.

Because the trial court erred in basing its damages award “on evidence of the residence’s value after the breach,” we reverse the trial court’s damages award and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Woodham, swpra. See also Brett, 530 So.2d at 799 (holding that “the trial court erred in concluding that, because the testimony established ‘that the lot has a value, a fair market value, today of $90- to $95,000, it would appear the difference in value as of the time of this contract and the time of this judgment would be the sum of $15,-000.00’ ”).

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

COBB, C.J., and STUART, PARKER, and WISE, JJ., concur.

      . Although the Eufaula Agency is listed as an appellee on the notice of appeal and on the briefs submitted to this Court, it does not appear that Radetic challenged the damages award as to it.

      . At various locations in the record, Brenda Murphy is also referred to as "Brenda J. Shiver.”

      . As reported by all parties, the initial sales contract was made contingent upon the sale of the prospective purchasers' residence in Florida.

      . The prequalification certificate prepared for Radetic by Quicken was based on Radetic’s "quick application” for a loan via telephone. On its face, the document stated both that "[p]re-qualification was contingent upon [Quicken's] receipt of” further documentation and that it was not a "final commitment,” but was "contingent upon final underwriting review.”

      . Although the written agreement is dated April 8, 2006, a subsequent notation on page 4 of the document evidences the "date of acceptance by all parties” as April 11, 2006.

      . The fraud claim filed by Brenda Murphy was dismissed by the trial court.

      . According to the testimony of Brenda Murphy, the residence remained on the market following Radetic's alleged breach of the April 2006 contract; however, she indicated that, during the interim, they received only offers which were "far under" the $600,000 sales price they had previously negotiated with Ra-detic. Pursuant to the terms of the Murphys' divorce judgment, $425,000 represented "[t]he minimum bid to be accepted for [the] property.”

      . It is unclear from the record when or if Brenda Murphy and the Eufaula Agency joined Mike Murphy's motion for a default judgment; notwithstanding that uncertainty, the trial court entered a default judgment against Radetic in favor of all three.

      . On July 26, 2010, the trial court entered an order purporting to deny Radetic’s post-judgment motion; however, pursuant to Rule 59.1, Ala. R. Civ. P., that motion was actually denied by operation of law on June 9, 2010. See Smith v. Smith, 4 So.3d 1178, 1181 (Ala. Civ.App.2008) ("Rule 59.1, Ala. R. Civ. P„ provides that a postjudgment motion that remains pending for 90 days is deemed denied by operation of law, and the trial court loses jurisdiction to rule on that motion.”). Rule 59.1 provides, in pertinent part, that "[n]o postjudgment motion filed pursuant to Rules 50, 52, 55, or 59 shall remain pending in the trial court for more than ninety (90) days, unless with the express consent of all the parties,” and that the trial court’s failure to dispose of such a pending postjudgment motion "shall constitute a denial of such motion as of the date of the expiration of the period.”

      . The fact that there was a period when this action was stayed as a result of Radetic’s bankruptcy filing has no effect here on our analysis of the timeliness of Radetic's appeal.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: THOMAS, Judge.

license: Public Domain

text:
    Joseph P. LaROSE III, Ann LaRose, and Kelly Hill v. Royce LaROSE.
    2100045.
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    April 8, 2011.

      Lana K. Hawkins, Arab, for appellants.
    Michael F. Robertson, Huntsville, for appellee.
   THOMAS, Judge.

On April 18, 2010, Ann LaRose (“the paternal grandmother”) and Kelly Hill (“the paternal aunt”) came to Alabama to exercise visitation with Vanessa LaRose (“the child”) pursuant to a South Carolina consent judgment awarding the paternal grandmother and Joseph P. LaRose III (“the paternal grandfather”) unsupervised visitation with the child every third weekend and for two nonconsecutive two-week periods each summer. Royce LaRose (“the mother”) refused to permit the paternal grandmother and the paternal aunt to visit with the child. In fact, the following day, on April 19, 2010, the mother filed a petition in the Cullman Circuit Court seeking a protection-from-abuse (“PFA”) order pursuant to Ala.Code 1975, § 30-5-1 et seq., against both the paternal grandmother and the paternal aunt. The mother’s petition was assigned case number DR-10-243. The court entered two ex parte PFA orders restraining both the paternal grandmother and the paternal aunt front contact with the mother, as permitted by Ala.Code 1975, § 30-5-7(a)(l) and (b)(1) — (3).

On May 25, 2010, the paternal grandmother and the paternal grandfather (referred to collectively at times as “the paternal grandparents”) filed a “Notice of Registration of Child Custody Determination” pursuant to Ala.Code 1975, § 30-3B-305, a portion of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (“UCCJEA”), codified at Ala.Code 1975, § 30-3B-101 et seq. That action was assigned case number DR-10-243.01. The paternal grandparents also requested expedited enforcement of the custody determination under Ala.Code 1975, § 30-3B-308; in their enforcement petition, as required by § 30-3B-308(b)(3), the paternal grandparents apprised the court of the PFA restricting the paternal grandmother from contact with the mother. The mother was served with the notice and the enforcement petition on June 15, 2010. The trial court set the paternal grandparents’ enforcement petition for a hearing on August 4, 2010. The paternal grandparents objected to the setting of the hearing on the enforcement petition at such a late date and requested the trial court to set an earlier hearing; however, the trial court did not reconsider its order setting the hearing, and the petition was not considered until August 4, 2010.

On July 15, the paternal grandmother filed what she entitled a “Motion for Emergency Order Dissolving Ex Parte Protection Order” in case number DR-10-243. The trial court set the paternal grandmother’s motion for a hearing on August 4, 2010.

On or about July 16, 2010, the paternal grandfather, who was not the subject of the ex parte PFA orders in existence at the time, attempted to exercise visitation with the child. The mother refused to allow the paternal grandfather to exercise his visitation. On July 21, 2010, the mother filed a petition seeking a PFA order against the paternal grandfather; that action was assigned case number DR-10-481. The trial court set a hearing on the mother’s PFA petition on August 4, 2010, and consolidated case number DR-10-481 with case numbers DR-10-243 and DR-10-243.01. We note that, despite the consolidation of the actions, “the actions retain[ed] their separate identity and the parties and pleadings in one action d[id] not automatically become parties and pleadings in the other action[s].” Rule 42, Committee Comments on 1973 Adoption; see also Ex parte Flexible Prods. Co., 915 So.2d 34, 50 (Ala.2005); and H.J.T. v. State ex rel. M.S.M., 34 So.3d 1276, 1278 (Ala.Civ.App.2009).

After the trial on the consolidated actions, the trial court entered a judgment in each action on August 10, 2010. In those judgments, the trial court found that the paternal grandparents and the paternal aunt had “engaged in a pattern of abusive conduct designed to harass, intimidate and threaten the [mother] and that she is fearful for her life and that of her child.” As a result, the trial court prohibited the paternal grandparents and the paternal aunt

“from contacting the [mother], her children, husband or anyone in their extended families, in any manner whatsoever, in person, through a third (3rd) party, directly or indirectly, by mail, phone, or any other electronic means and shall maintain a distance away from the aforementioned persons of at least two thousand (2,000) feet at all times.”

In addition, the trial court specifically addressed the paternal grandparents’ request for enforcement of the visitation rights awarded in the South Carolina judgment, stating:

“Further, the [paternal grandparents’] rights of visitation with the [mother’s] minor daughter are hereby suspended in the State of Alabama until the same can be reviewed by the South Carolina court, with a view toward modification thereof allowing for strict supervision of same for the safety and safe return of the child to her mother.”

The paternal grandmother and the paternal aunt filed a motion to certify the August 10, 2010, “order” as a final judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., in case number DR-10-243. The paternal grandfather filed an identical motion in case number DR-10^481. The trial court denied both motions as moot, stating in its order denying the requested certifications that the August 10, 2010, judgments were already final judgments. On October 12, 2010, the paternal grandmother and the paternal aunt filed a notice of appeal in case number DR-10-243 and the paternal grandfather filed a notice of appeal in case number DR-10-481.

On September 9, 2010, the paternal grandparents filed what they styled as a “Motion to Vacate and Motion for Stay” directed toward the August 10, 2010, judgment in case number DR-10-243.01. In that motion, the paternal grandparents argued, among other things, that the August 10, 2010, judgment was void because the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction under the UCCJEA to amend, modify, or suspend the South Carolina judgment and the trial court’s judgment failed to afford full faith and credit to the duly registered South Carolina judgment. The trial court denied the paternal grandparents’ motion on September 10, 2010, and the paternal grandparents filed a notice of appeal in case number DR-10-248.01 on October 8, 2010.

Although no party has challenged our jurisdiction over any aspect of this appeal from the three consolidated actions, this court is bound to recognize a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction ex mero motu. R.J.G. v. S.S.W., 42 So.Sd 747, 751 (Ala.Civ.App.2009). As noted above, the three actions, although consolidated below, maintained their separate identities. Rule 42, Committee Comments on 1973 Adoption. The trial court properly entered a judgment in all three actions. An examination of the postjudgment filings by the paternal grandparents and the paternal aunt after the entry of the judgments in the three cases, however, requires us to determine that the appeal, insofar as it is taken from the judgments in case number DR-10-243 and case number DR-10-481, must be dismissed.

The appeal, insofar as it is taken from case number DR-10-243 and case number DR-10-481, was filed more than 42 days after entry of the August 10, 2010, judgment in each of those two actions and was therefore not timely filed. See Rule 4(a)(1), Ala. R.App. P. (stating that an appeal shall be filed within 42 days of the entry of judgment). This is the case despite the fact that all three actions were consolidated. See R.J.G., 42 So.3d at 752-53 (determining that a father’s appeal in one of two consolidated actions was untimely but that his appeal in the other action was timely in light of the timing of the entry of the judgments in the two separate yet consolidated cases and the postjudgment practice in each case). The motions seeking to have the August 10, 2010, judgments in case number DR-10-243 and case number DR-10-481 certified as final judgments pursuant to Rule 54(b) were not motions that would toll the time for taking an appeal. See Rule 4(a)(3), Ala. R.App. P. (“The filing of a post-judgment motion pursuant to Rules 50, 52, 55 or 59 of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure ... shall suspend the running of the time for filing a notice of appeal.”). No post-judgment motions that would have tolled the time for an appeal were filed in either case number DR-10-243 or case number DR-10^481. Thus, the time for appeal of the judgments in both case number DR-10-243 and case number DR-10-481 expired on September 21, 2010. The timely filing of a notice of appeal is a jurisdictional act. R.J.G., 42 So.3d at 753. The appeal, insofar as it is taken from the trial court’s judgments in case number DR-10-243 and case number DR-10-481, which involved the PFA orders restraining each of the paternal grandparents and the paternal aunt, is hereby dismissed. Therefore, we will not discuss any arguments raised on appeal relating to the propriety of or the procedure concerning the entry of the PFA orders in case number DR-10-243 and case number DR-10-481.

However, the appeal, insofar as it is taken from the judgment entered in case number DR-10-243.01, is timely. The paternal grandparents filed a postjudgment motion seeking to vacate the August 10, 2010, judgment on September 9, 2010. That motion, having been filed within 30 days of the entry of the judgment and pursuant to Rule 59, Ala. R. Civ. P., did serve to toll the time for filing the notice of appeal in case number DR-10-243.01. See Rule 4(a)(3); R.J.G., 42 So.3d at 753. Accordingly, we will address the paternal grandparents’ appeal from the judgment entered in DR-10-243.01, and we will consider the arguments on appeal relating to the trial court’s judgment insofar as it addresses the registration and enforcement of the South Carolina visitation judgment pursuant to Ala.Code 1975, §§ 30-3B-305, -308, and -310.

The paternal grandparents argue on appeal that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to modify or “suspend” the visitation rights granted to them in the South Carolina judgment and, thus, that its judgment violates the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution. U.S. Const., Art. I, § 1. Alabama law has long accorded the custody judgments of our sister states full faith and credit. See Ashwood v. Ashwood, 371 So.2d 924, 928 (Ala.Civ.App.1979). The UCCJEA also acknowledges the duty of an Alabama court to recognize and enforce a custody judgment entered by a sister state, provided that that state exercised jurisdiction in conformity with the UCCJEA. Ala.Code 1975, § 30-3B-303; see also G.P. v. A.A.K., 841 So.2d 1252, 1255 (Ala.Civ.App.2002).

The mother argues that the trial court, based upon the allegations in the PFA petitions, had temporary emergency jurisdiction over the child pursuant to Ala.Code 1975, § 30-3B-204(c), a portion of the UC-CJEA. That section does provide a court that would not otherwise have jurisdiction to modify a custody judgment of another state the power to enter a temporary judgment if the child is present in the state and the child has been abandoned “or it is necessary in an emergency to protect the child because the child, or a sibling or parent of the child, is subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse.” § 30-3B-204(a). Thus, the mother argues, the trial court had jurisdiction to “suspend” the paternal grandparents’ visitation rights pursuant to its temporary emergency jurisdiction.

To fully analyze whether the trial court’s August 10, 201Ó, judgment “suspending” the paternal grandparents’ visitation rights was entered in accordance with the UC-CJEA, we must delve into the procedures governing the registration and enforcement of child-custody judgments of another state in an Alabama court. As explained above, the paternal grandparents initiated this action by filing a petition seeking the registration of the South Carolina judgment pursuant to § 30-3B-305. Because the mother did not seek to contest the registration of the South Carolina judgment within 30 days of being served with the petition to register and enforce that judgment, see § 30-3B-305(d), the registration of the South Carolina judgment was confirmed as a matter of law. See § 30-3B-305(e).

The paternal grandparents also sought expedited enforcement of the South Carolina judgment pursuant to § 30-3B-308; their enforcement petition should have been set for an expedited hearing pursuant to § 30-3B-308(c). Generally, at a hearing on an enforcement petition, the respondent seeking to avoid enforcement of another state’s custody judgment should establish a defense to the enforcement of that judgment; the available defenses to enforcement are lack of jurisdiction in the issuing court, lack of required notice in the issuing court, or that the judgment sought to be enforced has been vacated, stayed, or modified by either the issuing court or a court with jurisdiction to do so. See § 30-3B-308(d). If no defense to the enforcement action is established, the Alabama trial court must enforce the other state’s custody judgment unless the Alabama trial court has issued a temporary emergency order pursuant to § 30-3B-204. See Ala. Code 1975, § 30-3B-310(a).

Because the mother did not present or establish any defense to the enforcement of the South Carolina judgment under § 30-3B-308(d), the only possible basis for the trial court’s failure to enforce that judgment would have had to have arisen from its assumption of temporary emergency jurisdiction under § 30-3B-204. As explained in the comment to § 30-3B-310:

“There are no ... defenses [other than those enumerated in § 30-3B-308(d) ] to an enforcement action. If the child would be endangered by the enforcement of a custody or visitation order, there may be a basis for the assumption of emergency jurisdiction under Section 204 of this Act. Upon the finding of an emergency, the court issues a temporary order and directs the parties to proceed either in the court that is exercising continuing jurisdiction over the custody proceeding under Section 202, or the court that would have jurisdiction to modify the custody determination under Section 203.”

§ 30-3B-310, Official Comment. Thus, although the mother did not present any defenses to the enforcement of the South Carolina judgment, we agree with the mother that the trial court’s determination that PFA orders protecting the mother and the child were warranted served as a basis for the trial court’s exercise of temporary emergency jurisdiction pursuant to § 30-3B-204(a) and therefore as a basis for its decision to decline enforcement of the South Carolina judgment.

This conclusion is bolstered by the comment to § 30-3B-204:

“Relationship to Protective Order Proceedings. The [Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, a predecessor to the UCCJEA] and the [Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act] were enacted long before the advent of state procedures on the use of protective orders to alleviate problems of domestic violence. Issues of custody and visitation often arise within the context of protective order proceedings since the protective order is often invoked to keep one parent away from the other parent and the children when there is a threat of violence. This Act recognizes that a protective order proceeding will often be the procedural vehicle for invoking jurisdiction by authorizing a court to assume temporary emergency jurisdiction when the child’s parent or sibling has been subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse.”

§ 30-3B-204, Official Comment (emphasis added).

However, despite our conclusion that the trial court had temporary emergency jurisdiction under § 30-3B-204(a), our analysis is not at an end. Section 30-3B-204 does not merely provide for temporary emergency jurisdiction, it prescribes the manner in which that jurisdiction must be exercised. Because the trial court in the present case was concerned with the enforcement of an existing custody determination of another state, § 30-3B-204(c) governed the exercise of the trial court’s temporary emergency jurisdiction.

Subsection (c) of § 30-3B-204 provides:

“If there is a previous child custody determination that is entitled to be enforced under this chapter, or a child custody proceeding has been commenced in a court of a state having jurisdiction under Sections 30-3B-201 through 30-3B-203, any order issued by a court of this state under this section must specify in the order a period that the court considers adequate to allow the person seeking an order to obtain an order from the state having jurisdiction under Sections 30-3B-201 through 30-3B-203. The order issued in this state remains in effect until an order is obtained from the other state within the period specified or the period expires.”

Further, the trial court was required to communicate with the South Carolina court as it exercised its temporary emergency jurisdiction. § 30-3B-204(d). Subsection (d) of § 30-3B-204 provides:

“A court of this state which has been asked to make a child custody determination under this section, upon being informed that a child custody proceeding has been commenced in, or a child custody determination has been made by, a court of a state having jurisdiction under Sections 30-3B-201 through 30-3B-203, shall immediately communicate with the other court. A court of this state which is exercising jurisdiction pursuant to Sections 30-3B-201 through 30-3B-203, upon being informed that a child custody proceeding has been commenced in, or a child custody determination has been made by, a court of another state under a statute similar to this section shall immediately communicate with the court of that state to resolve the emergency, protect the safety of the parties and the child, and determine a period for the duration of the temporary order.”

We conclude that, although the trial court did have temporary emergency jurisdiction pursuant to § 30-3B-204(a), the trial court’s judgment fails to comply with the requirements of § 30-3B-204(c) because it contains no time limit within which the mother must obtain an order modifying the South Carolina judgment from the South Carolina court. Without such a limitation, the trial court’s judgment “suspending” visitation is potentially a permanent judgment terminating visitation, which would effect a modification of the South Carolina judgment despite the fact that the trial court would have lacked jurisdiction under the UCCJEA to do so at the time of the August 10, 2010, judgment. Further, the record is devoid of any indication that the trial court followed the requirements of § 30-3B-204(d), which mandated that the trial court communicate with the South Carolina court as part of the trial court’s exercise of temporary emergency jurisdiction.

Thus, we cannot conclude that the trial court’s judgment in case number DR-10-243.01, as presently worded, complies with § 30-3B-204 or with the UCCJEA. We must, therefore, reverse the trial court’s August 10, 2010, judgment in case number DR-10-243.01 insofar as it “suspended” the paternal grandparents’ visitation with the child, and we remand the cause for the trial court to communicate with the South Carolina court as required by § 30-3B-204(d) and to correct the wording of the provision effecting the “suspension” of the paternal grandparents’ visitation rights to comply with the limitations required by § 30-3B-204(b).

APPEAL AS TO CASE NUMBER DR-10-243 AND CASE NUMBER DR-10-481 DISMISSED; JUDGMENT IN CASE NUMBER DR-10-243.01 REVERSED; AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

THOMPSON, P.J., and PITTMAN, BRYAN, and MOORE, JJ., concur.

      . We note that § 30-3B-308 governs expedited enforcement of a custody judgment of another state. The hearing on the paternal grandparents’ enforcement petition was set for a date well after the "next judicial day after service of the order” directing the respondent to appear, which order, according to § 30-3B-308(c), should have been issued at the time the enforcement petition was filed. The paternal grandparents argue that the failure of the trial court to set an expedited hearing violated their due-process rights. Although the paternal grandparents have cited the Due Process Clause of the Alabama Constitution, Art. I., § 13, they have not developed an argument on the issue by providing authority applying the Due Process Clause in similar circumstances. Therefore, we conclude that they have failed to make an argument sufficient for our review under Rule 28(a)(10), Ala. R.App. P. As our supreme court has explained, "Rule 28(a)(10) requires that arguments in briefs contain discussions of facts and relevant legal authorities that support the party's position. If they do not, the arguments are waived.” White Sands Group, L.L.C. v. PRS II, LLC, 998 So.2d 1042, 1058 (Ala.2008).

      . The three notices of appeal were assigned one case number on appeal (2100045).

      . The mother does not assert that the trial court would have had jurisdiction to modify the South Carolina judgment under Ala.Code 1975, § 30-3B-203, so we assume, for purposes of this opinion, that the trial court would not have had such jurisdiction.


author: PER CURIAM. MOORE, Judge,

text:
    Terry Van SLATON v. STATE of Alabama.
    2091154.
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    April 8, 2011.
    Carl E. Chamblee, Jr., of Chamblee & Malone, LLC, Birmingham, for appellant.
    Troy King, atty. gen., and G. Ward Bee-son III, asst. atty. gen., for appellee.
    Brandon K. Falls, dist. atty., and Teresa L. McClendon, dep. dist. atty., Birmingham, for amicus curiae Jefferson County District Attorney, in support of the appel-lee.
   PER CURIAM.

Terry Van Slaton appeals from an order denying his amended motion to expunge his arrest record and to order the Alabama Criminal Justice Information Center (“the ACJIC”) and the National Crime Information Center (“the NCIC”) to expunge Sla-ton’s record. We affirm.

As a result of an investigation by the Alabama Department of Human Resources, a grand jury in Jefferson County indicted Slaton on a charge of first-degree sodomy in 1985. Slaton was subsequently arrested on December 10, 1985. On March 4, 1986, a jury found Slaton not guilty of first-degree sodomy.

On February 6, 2009, Slaton moved the Jefferson Circuit Court to expunge his arrest record. On February 17, 2009, the State objected to Slaton’s motion on the ground that Alabama law did not authorize a circuit court to expunge a criminal record. On June 3, 2010, Slaton amended his motion to expunge his arrest record. The Jefferson Circuit Court denied Slaton’s amended motion on July 20, 2010.

On July 27, 2010, Slaton appealed to the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals. On September 13, 2010, that court, citing Ex parte Teasley, 967 So.2d 732 (Ala.Crim.App.2007), for the proposition that this court has jurisdiction over appeals from orders denying the expungement of criminal records, transferred Slaton’s appeal to this court.

The facts material to this appeal are not in dispute, and we are presented with a pure question of law. Therefore, our review is de novo. See Boutwell v. State, 988 So.2d 1015, 1020 (Ala.2007).

Slaton concedes that § 41-9-646, Ala. Code 1975, does not authorize the ex-pungement of his arrest record. See State v. Blane, 985 So.2d 384, 387-88 (Ala.2007) (holding that § 41-9-646 authorizes a circuit court to make criminal records accurate if they are inaccurate but does not authorize a circuit court to expunge them); see also Jackson v. State, 993 So.2d 491, 492 (Ala.Civ.App.2008). However, Slaton argues that, because his arrest resulted from an investigation by the Alabama Department of Human Resources and he was found not guilty of the charge for which he was arrested, § 26-14-3(e), Ala.Code 1975, authorizes the circuit court to order the expungement of the record of his arrest.

Section 26-14-3(a), Ala.Code 1975, provides:

“All hospitals, clinics, sanitariums, doctors, physicians, surgeons, medical examiners, coroners, dentists, osteopaths, optometrists, chiropractors, podiatrists, nurses, school teachers and officials, peace officers, law enforcement officials, pharmacists, social workers, day care workers or employees, mental health professionals, members of the clergy as defined in Rule 505 of the Alabama Rules of Evidence, or any other person called upon to render aid or medical assistance to any child, when the child is known or suspected to be a victim of child abuse or neglect, shall be required to report, or cause a report to be made of the same, orally, either by telephone or direct communication immediately, followed by a written report, to a duly constituted authority.”

(Emphasis added.) Section 26-14-1(4) defines a “duly constituted authority” as:

“The chief of police of a municipality or municipality and county; or the sheriff, if the observation of child abuse or neglect is made in an unincorporated territory; or the Department of Human Resources; or any person, organization, corporation, group, or agency authorized and designated by the Department of Human Resources to receive reports of child abuse and neglect; provided, that a ‘duly constituted authority’ shall not include an agency involved in the acts or omissions of the reported child abuse or neglect.”

Section 26-14-3(e) provides:

“Any provision of this section to the contrary notwithstanding, if any agency or authority investigates any report pursuant to this section and the report does not result in a conviction, the agency or authority shall expunge any record of the information or report and any data developed from the record.”

(Emphasis added.)

Subsections of a statute are in pan materia and “should be construed together to ascertain the meaning and intent of each.” McCausland v. Tide-Mayflower Moving & Storage, 499 So.2d 1378, 1382 (Ala.1986).

“The fundamental rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give ef-feet to the intent of the legislature in enacting the statute. Words used in a statute must be given their natural, plain, ordinary, and commonly understood meaning, and where plain language is used a court is bound to interpret that language to mean exactly what it says. If the language of the statute is unambiguous, then there is no room for judicial construction and the clearly expressed intent of the legislature must be given effect.”

IMED Corp. v. Systems Eng’g Assocs. Corp., 602 So.2d 344, 346 (Ala.1992).

Construing the subsections of § 26-14-3 together, see McCausland, we conclude that that statute is not ambiguous and, therefore, that the language of that statute must be interpreted to mean exactly what it says. See IMED. The language of § 26-14-3(e) requires that an agency or authority that investigates a report of child abuse or neglect must expunge “any record of the information or report and any data developed” as a result of the report if the report does not result in a conviction. In the case now before us, Slaton’s arrest record is not a record of the Alabama Department of Human Resources, which is the agency or authority that investigated the allegation that he had committed first-degree sodomy. Therefore, § 26 — 14—3(e) did not authorize the circuit court to expunge Slaton’s arrest record, and, accordingly, we affirm the circuit court’s denial of Slaton’s amended motion to expunge his arrest record.

AFFIRMED.

THOMPSON, P.J., and PITTMAN and BRYAN, JJ., concur.

THOMAS, J., concurs in the result, without writing.

MOORE, J., concurs in the result, with writing.

MOORE, Judge,

concurring in the result.

Based on the record in this case, I find no reason to address the question whether § 26-14-3(e), Ala.Code 1975, authorizes a circuit court to expunge the arrest record of Terry Van Slaton.

Section 26-14-3 provides, in pertinent part:

“(a) All hospitals, clinics, sanitariums, doctors, physicians, surgeons, medical examiners, coroners, dentists, osteopaths, optometrists, chiropractors, podiatrists, nurses, school teachers and officials, peace officers, law enforcement officials, pharmacists, social workers, day care workers or employees, mental health professionals, members of the clergy as defined in Rule 505 of the Alabama Rules of Evidence, or any other person called upon to render aid or medical assistance to any child, when the child is known or suspected to be a victim of child abuse or neglect, shall be required to report, or cause a report to be made of the same, orally, either by telephone or direct communication immediately, followed by a written report, to a duly constituted authority.
“(e) Any provision of this section to the contrary notwithstanding, if any agency or authority investigates any report pursuant to this section and the report does not result in a conviction, the agency or authority shall expunge any record of the information or report and any data developed from the record.”

By its plain wording, § 26-14-3(e) applies only to records based on a “report pursuant to [§ 26-14-3(a) that] ... does not result in a conviction.” At the trial-court level, the parties stipulated that the Alabama Department of Human Resources (“DHR”) had investigated Slaton and that DHR’s investigation led to his arrest. The record also discloses that, in 1985, a grand jury indicted Slaton on a charge of first-degree sodomy for having “engage[d] in deviate sexual intercourse” with a minor under the age of 12 years; Slaton was acquitted following a trial by jury in 1986. The record does not, however, contain any evidence indicating that Slaton’s arrest resulted from a report made pursuant to § 26-14-3(a). Without evidence indicating that DHR initiated its investigation based on a report of known or suspected child abuse or neglect made by one of the “mandatory reporters” listed in § 26-14-3(a), the expungement provisions of § 26-14-3(e) cannot possibly apply.

Because I would affirm the trial court’s judgment based on the lack of any evidence indicating that the arrest record Sla-ton was seeking to have expunged was produced as a result of a report made pursuant to § 26-14-3(a), I concur in the result reached by the majority. I do not, however, express any opinion as to the correctness of the reasoning employed by the majority to reach that result.

      . Section 41-9-646 provides:
      "Should the [criminal] record in question be found to be inaccurate, incomplete or misleading, the court shall order it to be appropriately purged, modified or supplemented by an explanatory notation. Each agency or individual in the state with custody, possession or control of any such record shall promptly cause each and every copy thereof in his custody, possession or control to be altered in accordance with a court order. Notification of each such deletion, amendment and supplementary notation shall be promptly disseminated to any individuals or agencies to which the records in question have been communicated, including the ACJIC, as well as to the individual whose records have been ordered so altered.”

      . I note that § 26-14-3 was worded differently in 1985 at the time of Slaton’s arrest, but that difference is not material to the outcome of this case.

      . I recognize that the trial court could have taken judicial notice of the entirety of the prior criminal proceedings, see Garrett v. Gil-ley, 488 So.2d 1360 (Ala.1986), but nothing in the record indicates that the trial court did so or that such notice would have supplied the missing evidence as to the identity of the reporter.


text:
    A.S. v. C.M.
    2091107.
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    April 8, 2011.

      G. Allen Howell of Pinkston & Courtney, LLP, Wetumpka, for appellant.
    G. Houston Howard II of Law Office of Keith A. Howard, LLC, Wetumpka, for appellee.
   THOMAS, Judge.

A.S. (“the mother”) appeals the judgment of the Elmore Circuit Court (“the circuit court”) reversing the judgment of the Elmore Juvenile Court (“the juvenile court”) and granting C.M. (“the father”) custody of the parties’ minor child (“the child”). We dismiss the appeal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

Facts and Procedural History

The parties became romantically involved at a young age, and, although the parties never married, the child was born to the parties on March 15, 2006. After the child was born, the parties moved into a home together. The parties separated in March or April 2008, and the child has lived with the mother since that time.

The record on appeal is scant concerning the procedural history of this case. In its final judgment, the circuit court recognized that, on November 18, 2008, the juvenile court had ordered the father to pay child support in the amount of $357 to the mother; that judgment is not in the record.

On July 9, 2009, the father filed in the circuit court a pleading titled “petition to determine paternity, custody, and the award of child support.” As the title of the motion would suggest, the father requested the circuit court to determine that the father is the “natural father” of the child, to “enter an order granting the father the care, custody, and control” of the child, and to order the mother to pay child support. The mother filed an answer and counterpetition on August 21, 2009. In her pleading, the mother stated that “[p]a-ternity of the father has never been established. A paternity test has never been performed.” The mother requested the circuit court to determine that the father is, in fact, the natural father of the child, to “enter an order granting the mother the care, custody and control of the minor child,” and to order the father pay child support. Although both parties requested a judicial determination that the father is, in fact, the natural father of the child, both parties also recognized the father as the natural father of the child in their respective pleadings. In their pleadings, neither party mentioned the juvenile court’s November 18, 2008, order.

On October 26, 2009, without a request from either party, the circuit court transferred the case to the juvenile court “for further proceedings pursuant to the Uniform Parentage Act.”

The case was tried in the juvenile court on February 25, 2010, and the juvenile court entered a judgment on March 16, 2010, awarding custody of the child to the mother. Neither the transcript of the February 25, 2010, proceedings nor the juvenile court’s March 16, 2010, judgment appears in the record. On March 24, 2010, the father appealed the juvenile court’s judgment to the circuit court pursuant to Rule 28(B), Ala. R. Juv. P.

The circuit court held an ore tenus trial de novo on July 15, 2010, and, on July 28, 2010, entered its judgment, which the circuit court titled “order modifying physical custody,” reversing the juvenile court’s March 16, 2010, judgment. The circuit court held, in pertinent part:

“The Alabama Court of Civil Appeals has held that an award of child support to one party is an award of custody to that party. See T.B. v. C.D.L, 910 So.2d 794 (Ala.Civ.App.2005), and M.R.J. v. D.R.B., 17 So.3d 683 (Ala.Civ.App.2009). On November [18], 2008, Referee Paul Hiebel awarded child support of $357.00 per month to [the mother] for the benefit of [the child]. There is no indication in that order nor in the file that the Referee intended to award either party custody. Furthermore, the petition filed in that case did not request that either party be granted custody. Section 30-3-150 Code of Alabama, 1975, states that joint custody is the policy of this state. Section 30-3-151 Code of Alabama, 1975, defines joint custody as ‘joint legal custody and joint physical custody.’ Section 30-3-155 Code of Alabama, 1975, establishes that Rule 32[, Ala. R. Jud. Admin.,] should be used to establish child support. Thus, it would seem that the Juvenile Court’s child support order of November 18, 2008, should not be used to infer that the Juvenile Court awarded anything other than joint custody to the parties. However, based on the mandates of the Court of Civil Appeals, this Court will apply and does apply the [Ex parte ] McLendon[, 455 So.2d 863 (Ala.1984),] standard to [the father’s] petition for custody.”

The circuit court went on to hold that “there has been a substantial and material change in circumstances since the [entry of the juvenile court’s November 18, 2008, order] awarding child support in this case” and that “the change of custody would materially promote the child’s best interest.”

The mother filed a postjudgment motion pursuant to Rule 59(e), Ala. R. Civ. P., on August 6, 2010, which the circuit court denied on August 10, 2010. The mother timely filed her appeal to this court.

Discussion

First, the mother argues on appeal that, pursuant to § 12-15-114(a), Ala.Code 1975, the juvenile court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to enter its March 16, 2010, judgment determining custody of the child and, thus, that this appeal must be dismissed. We agree.

Although the juvenile court’s November 18, 2008, judgment is not in the record, our supreme court has held that an order requiring a man to pay child support is an implicit judicial determination of paternity. See Ex parte State ex rel. G.M.F., 623 So.2d 722, 723 (Ala.1993) (holding that an order requiring a man to pay child support was an implicit “judicial determination of paternity qualifying for res judi-cata finality”). Therefore, we treat the juvenile court’s November 18, 2008, judgment as a judicial determination of the father’s paternity as to the child. Further, it is clear from the circuit court’s July 28, 2010, order that the circuit court treated the father’s July 9, 2009, pleading as a petition to modify the juvenile court’s November 18, 2008, judgment. In Ex parte T.C., 63 So.3d 627, 630 (Ala.Civ.App.2010), we explained the recent change in the law regarding a juvenile court’s exercise of retained jurisdiction over child-custody determinations when a child has not been found to be dependent, delinquent, or in need of supervision:

“Under former law, ‘once a juvenile court obtained] jurisdiction in any case involving a child,’ ... ‘that court retained] jurisdiction over that case until the child reaehe[d] the age of 21 years or until the court, by its own order, terminate^] that jurisdiction.’ W.B.G.M. v. P.S.T., 999 So.2d 971, 973 (Ala.Civ.App.2008) (citing former §§ 12-15-32(a) & 26-17-10(e), Ala.Code 1975). Thus, under former law, ‘[w]hen a juvenile court ha[d] jurisdiction to make an initial child-custody determination, it retained] jurisdiction over a petition to modify that custody judgment to the exclusion of any other state court until the child reache[d] 21 years of age or the juvenile court terminated] its jurisdiction.’ Id. at 974....
“However, as the special concurrence in W.B.G.M. noted, the Legislature has mandated a contrary rule as to custody cases filed after January 1, 2009:
‘“Act No. 2008-277, Ala. Acts 2008, replaces ... § 12-15-32[ ] with a new Code section, Ala.Code 1975, § 12-15-117, that limits a juvenile court’s retained jurisdiction to cases in which “a child has been adjudicated dependent, delinquent, or in need of supervision ” (emphasis added [in W.B.G.M.])....’
999 So.2d at 975 (Pittman, J., concurring specially). To like effect is § 12-15-114(a), which provides that although a juvenile court has original jurisdiction to decide an action alleging that a child is dependent, ‘[a] dependency action shall not include a custody dispute between parents.’ The clear intent of the Legislature was to provide that the juvenile courts of this state should no longer be deciding custody disputes except insofar as their resolution is directly incidental to core juvenile-court jurisdiction (such as in original paternity actions, see Ala.Code 1975, § 26-17-104)....
“... To the extent that a juvenile court has properly made an initial custody award, or has properly modified a custody judgment under the statutory framework set forth in the main opinion in W.B.G.M., those judgments remain valid and enforceable notwithstanding [Ala.Code 1975, §§ 12-15-114 and 12-15-117]. Any such judgments would, however, be prospectively modifiable in Alabama only by the circuit courts, which are constitutionally constituted as ‘trial eourt[s] of general jurisdiction.’ Ala. Const.1901, § 139(a) (Off.Re-comp.).”

Ex parte T.C., 63 So.3d at 630-31.

In the present case, the father properly filed his modification petition in the circuit court on July 9, 2009. As this court explained in T.C., the circuit court had jurisdiction over the modification proceedings. The circuit court then, sua sponte, transferred the modification proceedings to the juvenile court, thereby divesting the circuit court of jurisdiction over the case. See In re T.T.W., 899 So.2d 1018, 1020 (Ala.Civ.App.2004) (holding that the juvenile court had lost jurisdiction over a case once it had transferred it to the circuit court). However, pursuant to § 12-15-117, Ala.Code 1975, the juvenile court did not have jurisdiction to consider the father’s petition to modify the juvenile court’s November 18, 2008, judgment.

In Hilgers v. Jefferson County, 70 So.3d 357 (Ala.Civ.App.2010), this court dismissed an appeal because the district court that entered the judgment from which the appeal arose did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over the case. This court held, in pertinent part, as follows:

“Because the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over [the] complaint, its judgment is void. Riley v. Pate, 3 So.3d 835, 838 (Ala.2008). ‘A void judgment will not support an appeal, and “an appellate court must dismiss an attempted appeal from such a void judgment.”’ Colburn v. Colburn, 14 So.3d 176, 179 (Ala.Civ.App.2009) (quoting Vann v. Cook, 989 So.2d 556, 559 (Ala.Civ.App.2008)). Consequently, the circuit court never acquired jurisdiction over the ... appeal, and that court could take no action other than to dismiss the ... appeal. See Ex parte Smith, 438 So.2d 766, 768 (Ala.1983) (opining that ‘on appeal [for a trial de novo], the circuit court lack[s] subject matter jurisdiction to consider more than a final judgment over which the district court had subject matter jurisdiction’; citing State v. Pollock, 251 Ala. 603, 38 So.2d 870 (1948), and Craig v. Root, 247 Ala. 479, 25 So.2d 147 (1946)). Therefore, the circuit court’s judgment is also void. Because the circuit court’s judgment is void, this court lacks jurisdiction over the ... appeal. Colburn, 14 So.3d at 179. Thus, we dismiss the ... appeal, and we instruct the circuit court and the district court to vacate their respective judgments in this case.”

Hilgers, 70 So.3d at 361.

This case presents the same situation as in Hilgers. In the present case, the juvenile court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over the father’s petition. Thus, the circuit court did not have jurisdiction over the appeal from the juvenile court’s judgment, and, consequently, this court does not have jurisdiction over the appeal from the circuit court’s judgment. As we stated in Hilgers, “ ‘[a] void judgment will not support an appeal, and “an appellate court must dismiss an attempted appeal from such a void judgment.” ’ ” 70 So.3d at 361 (quoting Colburn v. Colburn, 14 So.3d 176, 179 (Ala.Civ.App.2009) (quoting in turn Vann v. Cook, 989 So.2d 556, 559 (Ala.Civ.App.2008))). Therefore, we dismiss the mother’s appeal, and we instruct the circuit court and the juvenile court to vacate their respective judgments in this case.

APPEAL DISMISSED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

THOMPSON, P.J., and PITTMAN and BRYAN, JJ., concur.

MOORE, J., concurs in the result, without writing.

      . We note that the parties' respective requests that the circuit court determine the father’s paternity as to the child were inconsequential because the issue had apparently previously been decided by the juvenile court in its November 18, 2008, judgment. Additionally, as stated above, both parties have acknowledged that the father is the natural father of the child.


author: MOORE, Judge.

text:
    B.A.N. v. G.T.B.
    2091086.
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    April 8, 2011.

      William J. Moore, Enterprise, for appellant.
    Debbie Lindsey Jared of Jared & Brun-son, Elba, for appellee.
   MOORE, Judge.

B.A.N. (“the mother”) appeals from a judgment of the Coffee Juvenile Court transferring custody of T.N.B. “(the child”) to G.T.B. (“the father”). We dismiss.

On February 5, 2010, the father filed a petition in the juvenile court requesting that he be awarded pendente lite custody of the child and that, upon a final hearing, he be awarded custody of the child. The father asserted:

“1. This Honorable Court issued an Order in this matter on or about the 14th day of October 2003 wherein the [father] was adjudicated to [be] the father of the [child].
“2. [The father] was granted visitation [and was] ordered to pay child support. “3. Since said Order there has been a material change of circumstances that warrants a change in custody.
“4. The ... child has been removed from [the mother’s custody] by [the Department of Human Resources (‘DHR’) ] due to various conditions that have put the ... child at risk. DHR has implemented a safety plan and the mother has delegated parental authority and placed the minor child with [the mother’s] mother.
“5. [The father] avers that it will be in the best interest of the ... child for him to have temporary custody pending a final hearing and permanent custody thereafter.
“6. [The father] avers that without the intervention of this Honorable Court irreparable harm will occur to the ... child, in that, there is nothing to prevent [the mother] from now coming and taking the ... child with her because there is no court order stating otherwise.
“7. The ... child is living in the home of her grandmother and grandfather. The grandfather is very ill with cancer. [The father] is a fit and proper person to have custody and the ... child desires to live with [the] father and [the father] is ready, willing and able to take care of the ... child.”

On February 6, 2010, the juvenile court entered an ex parte order stating, in pertinent part:

“Based upon the pleadings filed, the Court finds as follows:
“1. As the Department of Human Resources has implemented a safety plan, neither the mother ... nor the father ... shall remove the ... child from the current placement pending further ORDER of the Court or absent exigent circumstances.
“2. If exigent circumstances exist[ ] that would warrant immediate removal of the child, then the Department of Human Resources may remove the child and shall immediately file a dependency petition.”

The juvenile court also set the matter for a hearing on March 2, 2010.

Following ore tenus proceedings on March 2, 2010, the juvenile court entered an order March 30, 2010, that, among other things, awarded the mother and the father pendente lite custody of the child, with the father having physical custody of the child for alternating seven-day periods beginning on the first and third Mondays of each month and the mother having physical custody of the child for alternating seven-day periods beginning on the second and fourth Mondays of each month. The juvenile court also ordered the mother and the father to report to “court referral” for random and frequent drug screens and to undergo any drug or alcohol treatment recommended by the “court referral officer.” The mother filed a “motion to vacate” requesting that the juvenile court vacate the pendente lite custody order and issue a final judgment; that motion was denied.

Thereafter, following ore tenus proceedings on August 2, 2010, the juvenile court entered a final judgment that same day that, among other things, awarded the mother and the father joint legal custody of the child, awarded the father primary physical custody of the child, and awarded the mother reasonable rights of visitation. That judgment stated, in pertinent part:

“1) Material circumstances have changed since the previous Order of July 27, 2004, [in] case number CS-2003-2.02 was entered.
“2) The Court further finds due to the mother’s prolonged and continued drug use, and her refusal to abide by the previous court order, the positive good brought about by a modification of custody would more than offset the disruptive effect in uprooting the ... child.”

Also on August 2, 2010, the father filed a “motion for credit for child support arrears” requesting that the juvenile court award him a credit in the amount of $865.84 for all child-support arrears that had accumulated since March 30, 2010, the date the juvenile court entered the pen-dente lite order awarding the father joint physical custody of the child. The juvenile court entered an order granting that motion on August 5, 2010. On August 12, 2010, the mother filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate the August 2, 2010, judgment; the juvenile court denied that motion the same day. The mother filed her notice of appeal to this court on August 13, 2010.

On appeal, the mother raises three issues; we, however, find the dispositive issue to be whether the juvenile court had subject-matter jurisdiction to enter its August 2, 2010, judgment.

“ ‘[A] lack of subject-matter jurisdiction is not subject to waiver by the parties, and it is our duty to consider a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction ex mero motu.’ Ex parte T.C., 63 So.3d 627, 630 (Ala.Civ.App.2010) (citing Ex parte Progressive Specialty Ins. Co., 31 So.3d 661, 662 n. 1 (Ala.2009)). In Ex parte T.C., supra, we explained the recent change in the law regarding the juvenile court’s exercise of retained jurisdiction over child-custody determinations when a child has not been found to be dependent, delinquent, or in need of supervision:

“ ‘Under former law, “once a juvenile court obtain[ed] jurisdiction in any case involving a child,” ... “that court retained] jurisdiction over that case until the child reache[d] the age of 21 years or until the court, by its own order, terminate[d] that jurisdiction.” W.B.G.M. v. P.S.T., 999 So.2d 971, 973 (Ala.Civ.App.2008) (citing former §§ 12-15-32(a) & 26-17-10(e), Ala.Code 1975). Thus, under former law, “[w]hen a juvenile court ha[d] jurisdiction to make an initial child-custody determination, it retain[ed] jurisdiction over a petition to modify that custody judgment to the exclusion of any other state court until the child reache[d] 21 years of age or the juvenile court terminate[d] its jurisdiction.” Id. at 974....
“ ‘However, ... the Legislature has mandated a contrary rule as to custody cases filed after January 1, 2009:
““‘Act No. 2008-277, Ala. Acts 2008, replaces ... § 12 — 15—32[ ] with a new Code section, Ala. Code 1975, § 12-15-117, that limits a juvenile court’s retained jurisdiction to cases in which ‘a child has been adjudicated dependent, delinquent, or in need of supem sion ’ (emphasis added [in W.B.G.M.])....”
“ ‘999 So.2d at 975 (Pittman, J., concurring specially). To like effect is § 12-15-114(a), which provides that although a juvenile court has original jurisdiction to decide an action alleging that a child is dependent, “[a] dependency action shall not include a custody dispute between parents.” The clear intent of the Legislature was to provide that the juvenile courts of this state should no longer be deciding custody disputes except insofar as their resolution is directly incidental to core juvenile-court jurisdiction (such as in original paternity actions, see Ala.Code 1975, § 26-17-104)....
“ ‘... To the extent that a juvenile court has properly made an initial custody award, or has properly modified a custody judgment under the statutory framework set forth in the main opinion in W.B.G.M., those judgments remain valid and enforceable notwithstanding [Ala.Code 1975, §§ 12-15-114 and 12-15-117]. Any such judgments would, however, be prospectively modifiable in Alabama only by the circuit courts, which are constitutionally constituted as “trial courts of general jurisdiction.” Ala. Const.1901, § 139(a) (Off.Recomp.).’ ”

K.C. v. R.L.P., 67 So.3d 94, 95-96 (Ala.Civ.App.2011) (quoting Ex parte T.C., 63 So.3d 627, 630-31 (Ala.Civ.App.2010)). See also B.L.R. v. N.M.N., 69 So.3d 868, 869-70 (Ala.Civ.App.2010).

The record in this case indicates that the parties and the juvenile court treated the father’s February 5, 2010, petition as a request to modify a prior custody determination. As explained above, pursuant to § 12-15-117, Ala.Code 1975, juvenile courts now retain jurisdiction to modify a previous custody determination only in cases in which a child has previously been found dependent, delinquent, or in need of supervision, which is not the case here. The “CS” designation from the previous custody judgment in 2004 shows that the custody of the child was determined as part of a child-support action. Accordingly, the juvenile court acted without jurisdiction in modifying the custody of the child. K.C., 67 So.3d at 95.

Because the juvenile court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the father’s custody-modification petition, the judgment from which the mother appeals is void. R.T. v. B.N.H., 66 So.3d 807, 812 (Ala.Civ.App.2011). “ ‘This court is required to dismiss an appeal from a void judgment.’ ” R. T., 66 So.3d at 812 (quoting Owens v. Owens, 51 So.3d 364, 367 (Ala.Civ.App.2010)). Thus, we dismiss the mother’s appeal, albeit with instructions to the juvenile court to vacate its void judgment. R.T., 66 So.3d at 812.

APPEAL DISMISSED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

PITTMAN and BRYAN, JJ., concur.

THOMPSON, P.J., and THOMAS, J., concur in the result, without writings.


text:
    ARVIN NORTH AMERICAN AUTOMOTIVE, INC. v. Nadine RODGERS.
    2090970.
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    April 8, 2011.

      James A. Patton, Jr., of Ogletree, Dea-kins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C., Birmingham, for appellant.
    Neil Taylor, Jr., Russellville, for appel-lee.
   MOORE, Judge.

Arvin North American Automotive, Inc. (“the employer”), appeals from a judgment of the Fayette Circuit Court (“the trial court”) finding the employer in contempt for violating a judgment in which the employer was ordered to pay, among other things, medical benefits pursuant to the Alabama Workers’ Compensation Act, Ala. Code 1975, § 25-5-1 et seq. We dismiss.

Background

In August 2002, the trial court entered a judgment (“the 2002 judgment”) finding, among other things, that Nadine Rodgers (“the employee”) had sustained injuries within the line and scope of her employment with the employer, that the employee had been diagnosed with severe depression and anxiety, and that the work-related injuries were a contributing cause of the employee’s mental disorders. The trial court also ordered the employer to pay, among other things, “the cost of reasonable and necessary medical care for the injuries sustained by the [employee] in the accident as found by the Court in this Judgment, as provided by § 25-5-77 of the Code of Alabama.” The employer did not appeal from the 2002 judgment.

After the entry of the 2002 judgment, the employee continued to receive care from her authorized treating physician, Dr. Gary Newsom, for her mental-health issues. Until 2007, the employer paid, without dispute, the costs associated with Dr. Newsom’s treatment and the costs of the medications prescribed by him for the employee.

On January 7, 2008, the employee filed a petition for contempt alleging that the employer had “contemptuously and willfully failed to provide the necessary care and medicines as prescribed” for her by Dr. Newsom. The employee sought to recover, among other things, the amounts she had paid or had incurred for Dr. Newsom’s services and the amounts she had paid or had incurred for medications that had been prescribed by Dr. Newsom to treat her mental-health illnesses that, she claimed, the employer had refused to pay. The employee also sought to recover the mileage expenses associated with obtaining her medical care as authorized by the terms of the 2002 judgment.

The employer answered the petition, asserting that the employee was seeking payment for services that were not related to her workplace injuries and not within the scope of the 2002 judgment; that the employer had revoked Dr. Newsom’s authority to treat the employee; that Dr. Newsom’s requests for payment from the employer had not been timely submitted; that the employee’s mental-health issues had begun before her employment with the employer; that the employee had suffered numerous stressors unrelated to her employment after the entry of the 2002 judgment; and that the employee was not entitled to reimbursement for medications that had been prescribed to treat any mental disorders other than depression.

The trial court conducted a hearing on the employee’s contempt petition on April 13, 2010. At that hearing, counsel for the employee and counsel for the employer discussed on the record whether they were in agreement as to the amount of the medical and mileage benefits in controversy. At that hearing, the following colloquy occurred:

“[EMPLOYER’S COUNSEL]: ... So, really, we’re here, I guess, kind of in a liability mode first; and then we’d have to figure out—
“[EMPLOYEE’S COUNSEL]: Well, I don’t think they are going to quarrel with us about nickels and dimes. She would be owed the mileage; she would be owed what she paid on the medicine. We’re not asking you to do that. We just need a decree as to whether they correctly terminated what they were providing through—
“THE COURT: Well, let’s say that I grant it ... then y’all are going to agree on how much money?
“[EMPLOYEE’S COUNSEL]: Oh yes.
“[EMPLOYER’S COUNSEL]: Well, I think there’s a chance we can. It’s just treatment. It’s just the number of visits. I won’t say we’re going to agree. I would say the mileage is going to be problematic. I don’t have any idea how we do that.
“[EMPLOYEE’S COUNSEL]: You just count how many times she’s down there and multiply it by the distance from here to Tuscaloosa.
“[EMPLOYER’S COUNSEL]: I’m not saying that. I think it’s impossible to get into the dollars today because we don’t have enough information.
“THE COURT: Okay.
“[EMPLOYER’S COUNSEL]: I think we can, at least ... you know, if you find yourself there, you could rule that way, and then say, ‘go agree.’ And then, if we can’t—
“THE COURT: I gotcha. All right. That’s what I needed to know. All right. Go ahead.”

The hearing then proceeded on the issue of compensability. No further evidence was offered as to the amount of the medical and mileage benefits in controversy, and the record does not indicate that the parties ever reached an agreement or entered a stipulation as to the amounts at issue.

On May 27, 2010, the trial court entered a judgment finding that the employer had violated the 2002 judgment and ordered the following:

“1. That [the employer] pay, or reimburse [the employee] for payments she has made, all costs and bills submitted by Dr. Gary Newsom for services rendered to [the employee] as well as the cost of reasonable and necessary psychiatric services and care as may be or become necessary in the future.
“2. That [the employer] pay, or reimburse [the employee] for payments she has made, all bills and costs for medications prescribed by Dr. Gary Newsom as well as the costs of medications prescribed by Dr. Newsom as may be or become necessary in the future.
“3. That [the employer] pay for the mileage claimed by [the employee] for travel to Dr. Gary Newsom, as well as mileage claimed by the [employee] as may be or become necessary in the future.
“4. That [the employee’s] counsel is entitled to an attorney’s fee in the amount of $3,000.00 and that the [employer] is Ordered to pay said attorney fees of $3,000.00.
“5. That [the employee] is entitled to reimbursement in the amount of $700.00 for the cost of the deposition of Dr. Gary Newsom and the Court Reporter’s cost in the amount of $295.00 and [the employer] is Ordered to pay those sums.”

Other than the amounts identified in its May 27, 2010, judgment relating to attorney fees and costs, the trial court did not identify the amounts the employer was to pay. On July 7, 2010, the employer appealed.

Analysis

“ ‘[J]urisdictional matters are of such magnitude that we take notice of them at any time and do so even ex mero motu.’” Singleton v. Graham, 716 So.2d 224, 225 (Ala.Civ.App.1998) (quoting Wallace v. Tee Jays Mfg. Co., 689 So.2d 210, 211 (Ala.Civ.App.1997), quoting in turn Nunn v. Baker, 518 So.2d 711, 712 (Ala.1987)). “ ‘ “[S]ubject-matter jurisdiction may not be waived; a court’s lack of subject-matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time by any party and may even be raised by a court ex mero motu.” ’ ” M.B.L. v. G.G.L., 1 So.3d 1048, 1050 (Ala. Civ.App.2008) (quoting S.B.U. v. D.G.B., 913 So.2d 452, 455 (Ala.Civ.App.2005), quoting in turn C.J.L. v. M.W.B., 868 So.2d 451, 453 (Ala.Civ.App.2003)).

In its May 27, 2010, judgment, the trial court found that the employer had violated the 2002 judgment and it ordered the employer to pay some unspecified amount to the employee or to Dr. Newsom on the employee’s behalf. Ordinarily, an appeal can be brought only from a final judgment. Ala.Code 1975, § 12-22-2. In Dzwonkowski v. Sonitrol of Mobile, Inc., 892 So.2d 354, 361-62 (Ala.2004), our supreme court stated:

“ ‘Where the amount of damages is an issue, ... the recognized rule of law in Alabama is that no appeal will lie from a judgment which does not adjudicate that issue by ascertainment of the amount of those damages.’ Moody v. State ex rel. Payne, 351 So.2d 547, 551 (Ala.1977). ‘That a judgment is not final when the amount of damages has not been fixed by it is unquestionable.’ ‘Automatic’ Sprinkler Corp. of America v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 351 So.2d 555, 557 (Ala.1977) (recitation of the Rule 54(b)[, Ala. R. Civ. P.,] formula was ineffective to render appealable a judgment that resolved liability, but reserved the issue of damages for future resolution).”

In Williams Power, Inc. v. Johnson, 880 So.2d 459 (Ala.Civ.App.2003), in applying the foregoing rule, this court dismissed an appeal from a judgment awarding a worker medical benefits but failing to specify the amount of those medical benefits. Despite some criticism of the reasoning in Johnson, see SCI Alabama Funeral Servs., Inc. v. Hester, 984 So.2d 1207, 1215-16 (Ala.Civ.App.2007) (Moore, J., concurring in the result, joined by Thomas, J.), this court has consistently applied its holding by dismissing appeals from judgments awarding unspecified medical benefits to injured workers on the ground that those judgments did not fully and finally ascertain and declare the rights of the parties so as to constitute a final judgment. See Fort James Holding Co. v. Morgan, 54 So.3d 897, 898 (Ala.Civ.App.2010); Ex parte C & D Logging, 3 So.3d 930, 935 (Ala.Civ.App.2008); and Avondale Mills, Inc. v. Gallups, 949 So.2d 946, 947-48 (Ala.Civ.App.2006).

Because the trial court failed to ascertain or fix in its judgment the amounts of medical and mileage benefits the employer was ordered to pay to or on behalf of the employee, the judgment appealed from is nonfinal. We, therefore, must dismiss the appeal. See Tatum v. Freeman, 858 So.2d 979, 980 (Ala.Civ.App.2003) (“‘When it is determined that an order appealed from is not a final judgment, it is the duty of the Court to dismiss the appeal ex mero motu.’ ” (quoting Powell v. Republic Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 293 Ala. 101, 102, 300 So.2d 359, 360 (1974))).

The employee’s request for the award of attorney fees on appeal is denied.

APPEAL DISMISSED.

THOMPSON, P.J., and PITTMAN and BRYAN, JJ., concur.

THOMAS, J., concurs in the result, without writing.

      . The trial court did not purport to certify its judgment as final, pursuant to Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., although, as recognized in Dzwonkowski v. Sonitrol of Mobile, Inc., supra, such a certification would have been ineffective. See SCI Alabama Funeral Servs., Inc. v. Hester, 984 So.2d 1207, 1210-11 (Ala.Civ.App.2007).