author: MARC E. JOHNSON, Judge.

text:
    Brandi Andress HOFFMAN v. JEFFERSON PARISH HOSPITAL SERVICES DISTRICT NO. 2, Parish Of Jefferson, State of Louisiana, d/b/a East Jefferson General Hospital and East Jefferson General Hospital Foundation.
    No. 11-CA-776.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fifth Circuit.
    April 10, 2012.
    Rehearing Denied May 14, 2012.

      Robert H. Murphy, Jeffrey A. Raines, Attorneys at Law, New Orleans, LA, for PlaintifflAppellant.
    Julian R. Murray, Jr., Brandon M. Bennett, Attorneys at Law, Metairie, LA, for Defendant/Appellee.
    Panel composed of Judges MARION F. EDWARDS, MARC E. JOHNSON, and ROBERT A. CHAISSON.
   MARC E. JOHNSON, Judge.

12This appeal arises from a judgment in favor of Defendant/Appellee, Jefferson Parish Hospital Services District No. 2 d/b/a East Jefferson General Hospital (hereinafter referred to as “EJGH”), and against Plaintiff/Appellant, Brandi Andress Hoffman (hereinafter referred to as “Hoffman”), involving a slip and fall on the premises of the hospital. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On February 22, 2004, Hoffman was visiting her twins in EJGH’s neonatal intensive care unit. During her visit, Hoffman entered the 4-East Patient Break Room, also known as the nourishment room, to obtain a cup of coffee. The nourishment room is a small room that has a refrigerator, ice machine, sink, coffee machine, microwave and countertop used by nurses, nursing assistants, patients, visitors, and doctors. While there, Hoffman slipped on a wet substance on the floor near the refrigerator. Hoffman injured her left knee as a result of the fall and underwent four left knee surgeries.

IsHofftnan filed a petition for damages against EJGH and the East Jefferson General Hospital Foundation alleging her accident was due to negligence, fault, and/or strict liability of the defendants. A bench trial took place on March 21, 2011. After taking the matter under advisement, the trial court rendered a ruling on May 5, 2011 in favor of EJGH and dismissed Hoffman’s claims with prejudice. In its reasons for judgment, the trial court found that EJGH exculpated itself from any presumption of negligence by exercising reasonable care through its formal procedures and personnel policies, and it did not receive the required notice of a defect. The trial court further found that no evidence was submitted showing that the spill existed for a period of time sufficient to reasonably permit its discovery to show EJGH’s constructive knowledge, and EJGH’s policies could not include Hoffman’s slip on the spill as a foreseeable risk because it may have occurred only moments before the accident by a non-hospital employee. Ultimately, the trial court concluded that EJGH was not liable to Hoffman for the injuries she sustained from the fall. The instant appeal followed.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

In her assignments of error, Hoffman alleges the trial court was erroneous in finding: 1) Hoffman was required to prove EJGH had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition in its kitchen because that standard is inapplicable to a hospital slip and fall caused by the temporary presence of a foreign substance, and 2) EJGH acted reasonably to discover and correct the dangerous conditions reasonably anticipated in its kitchen.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

General Law

It is well-settled law that a Court of Appeal may not set aside a trial court’s |4or a jui’y’s finding of fact in the absence of “manifest error” or unless it is “clearly wrong.” Florreich v. Entergy Corp., 09-411 (La.App. 5 Cir. 2/23/10); 32 So.3d 965, 968, writ denied, 10-1057 (La.9/3/10); 44 So.3d 691. However, where one or more trial court legal errors interdict the fact finding process, the manifest error standard is no longer applicable, and if the record is otherwise complete, the appellate court should make its own independent de novo review of the record and determine a preponderance of the evidence. Id. A legal error occurs when a trial court applies incorrect principles of law and such errors are prejudicial. Id. Legal errors are prejudicial when they materially affect the outcome and deprive a party of substantial rights. Id.

Assignment of Error Number 1

Hoffman alleges the trial court committed a legal error in finding that EJGH needed actual or constructive notice of the liquid substance on its kitchen floor because the Merchant Statute, LSA-R.S. 9:2800.6, does not apply to hospitals and nursing homes because that statute only applies to claims arising under LSA-C.C. art. 2317. Consequently, Hoffman avers none of the hospital or nursing home cases decided after the enactment of the Merchant Statute impose the requirement that the plaintiff prove actual or constructive notice of the foreign substance prior to the accident. Also, Hoffman alleges that the foreign substance was not a defect for the purposes of Article 2317. Hoffman further asserts the decision rendered by this Court in Blount v. East Jefferson General Hospital, 04-407 (La.App. 5 Cir. 10/12/04); 887 So.2d 535, erroneously applied LSA-R.S. 9:2800 to slip and fall cases occurring in a hospital, is contrary to the decisions in Millet v. Evangeline Health Care, 839 So.2d 357 (La.App. 5th Cir.2003) and Le-Blanc v. Alton Ochsner Medical Foundation, 563 So.2d 312 (La.App. 5th Cir.1990), and is not good authority to apply to this matter.

|fiIn opposition, EJGH argues that it is a subdivision of the State of Louisiana and is subject to the provisions of LSA-R.S. 9:2800. Additionally, EJGH avers Blount is controlling law, and Hoffman had the burden of proving it had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition of the break room.

LSA-R.S. 9:2800 provides, in pertinent part,

A. A public entity is responsible under Civil Code Article 2317 for damages caused by the condition of buildings within its care and custody.
C. Except as provided for in Subsections A and B of this Section, no person shall have a cause of action based solely upon liability imposed under Civil Code Article 2317 against a public entity for damages caused by the condition of things within its care and custody unless the public entity had actual or constructive notice of the particular vice or defect which caused the damage prior to the occurrence, and the public entity has had a reasonable opportunity to remedy the defect and has failed to do so.
D. Constructive notice shall mean the existence of facts which infer actual knowledge.
G. (1) “Public entity” means and includes the state and any of its branches, departments, offices, agencies, boards, commissions, instrumentalities, officers, officials, employees, and political subdivisions and the departments, offices, agencies, boards, commissions, instrumentalities, officers, officials, and employees of such political subdivisions. Public entity also includes housing authorities, as defined in R.S. 40:384(15), and their commissioners and other officers and employees and sewerage and water boards and their employees, servants, agents, or subcontractors.
[Emphasis added].

In order to consider the validity of Hoffman’s assignment of error, we will now review our previous decisions concerning the legal standard for a slip and fall in a hospital setting.

In LeBlanc v. Alton Ochsner Medical Foundation, supra, the plaintiff filed suit after she slipped and fell on a piece of cucumber on the floor of the hallway 1 ijCorridor as she was walking and sustained injuries. After a trial on the merits, the trial court ruled in the plaintiffs favor by finding Alton Ochsner Medical Foundation liable for her injuries and awarding her damages. On review, this Court held that a prima facie case is established when the “plaintiff shows that a foreign substance was on the floor, that he slipped and fell on the foreign substance and that he suffered injury as a result.” This Court further stated, “[t]o prove freedom from fault the business establishment must show that it exercised reasonable care for the safety of its patrons. This showing includes evidence of the enforcement of reasonable protective measures, including periodic inspections, to keep the floors free of foreign substances and debris.” This Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment in favor of the plaintiff.

In a similar slip and fall case, Millet v. Evangeline Health Care, Inc., supra, the plaintiff sustained injuries after she slipped and fell on the wet floor of the hallway corridor as she exited her brother’s room at the nursing home. The trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, found the defendant nursing home liable, and awarded her damages. On appeal, this Court, in affirming the trial court’s judgment, found that the proper burden of proof in a claim for injuries caused by a condition in a hospital was set forth in Neyrey v. Touro Infirmary, 94-0078 (La.App. 4 Cir. 6/30/94); 639 So.2d 1214, and adopted the Louisiana Fourth Circuit’s rationale that “[T]he burden of proof that LSA-R.S. 9:2800.6 establishes ... should not have been used in this case where the accident occurred on a hospital’s premises, instead of a merchant’s premises.”

In Blount v. East Jefferson General Hospital, supra, the plaintiff, a visitor to EJGH, slipped and fell in a slippery substance on the floor of the hospital cafeteria as she was exiting to return to her mother’s hospital room. The plaintiff filed a petition for damages under theories of both negligence and strict liability. EJGH Iffiled a motion for summary judgment contending that the plaintiff failed to produce any factual support for her allegations of fault on the part of the hospital. The trial court granted EJGH’s motion for summary judgment, and the plaintiff appealed the decision. On appeal, this Court affirmed the trial court’s ruling and held that the plaintiff had the burden to prove EJGH’s actual or constructive notice of the hazard under both of the theories of liability because it is a public entity under LSA-R.S. 9:2800.

After review, we find the arguments of Hoffman that the trial court erred in finding she had to prove EJGH had actual or constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition in the nourishment room are unpersuasive. While acknowledging the holdings set forth in LeBlanc and Millet, we find those cases are distinguishable from Blount and the instant matter because of the common defendant, a public entity. Unlike the defendants in LeBlanc and Millet, EJGH is a political subdivision. The other hospitals were privately owned facilities; as such, LSA-R.S. 9:2800 would not apply to them. However, LSA-R.S. 9:2800 does apply to EJGH pursuant to paragraphs (A) and (G)(1) of that statute. Additionally, Blount and the trial court in this matter applied LSA-R.S. 9:2800, not LSA-R.S. 9:2800.6 (a statute specifically addressing claims against merchants), as argued by Hoffman.

Accordingly, we hold that Blount is the controlling law for this matter and do not find the trial court committed a legal error in requiring Hoffman to prove EJGH’s actual or constructive notice of the liquid substance found on the nourishment room’s floor.

Assignment ofEiror Number 2

Hoffman alleges the trial court erred in finding EJGH acted reasonably to discover and correct the dangerous conditions reasonably anticipated in its kitchen. | sHoffman asserts she established that she slipped in a foreign substance. However, Hoffman avers EJGH failed to rebut the presumption of negligence in the following ways: 1) there were no scheduled cleanings or inspections of the break room on the weekends; 2) even if the weekday inspection schedule applied on weekends, the number of inspections was inadequate considering the presence of liquids and the use of the break room by the public; 3) there is no evidence that the break room was actually cleaned or inspected on the day of the accident; 4) random inspections of the break room by nurses, when time permitted, were inadequate considering the presence of liquids and the use by the public, and 5) there is no evidence the break room was, in fact, inspected by nurses or other hospital staff of the day of the accident.

EJGH argues the evidence presented at trial exculpated it from any presumption of negligence. EJGH avers that it had an adequate procedure to guard against spills and was not negligent in its actions.

In Blount, this Court set forth the following analysis of the theories of negligence and strict liability for a slip and fall case against EJGH by stating,

Under the negligence standard, a hospital owes a duty to its visitors to exercise reasonable care to keep the premises in a safe condition commensurate with the particular circumstances involved; but the duty owed is less than that owed by a merchant. In order to be successful in a negligence claim, plaintiff must also prove that the owner or custodian knew or should have known of the unreasonable risk of harm posed by the property. Under a theory of strict liability, the hospital is liable for defective things in its custody only upon a showing that it knew or, in the exercise of reasonable care, should have known of the defect which caused the damage and failed to correct it with reasonable diligence. Thus, under either theory of liability, plaintiff has the burden to prove actual or constructive notice of defendant. In order to maintain a claim for damages caused by the condition of things within the care and custody of a public entity, the complainant has the burden of proving that the public body had actual or constructive notice of the hazard and had a reasonable opportunity to remedy the condition, but failed to do so. Constructive notice is defined as “the existence of facts which infer actual knowledge.” Constructive notice can be found if the conditions which caused the |ninjury existed for such a period of time that those responsible, by the exercise of ordinary care and diligence, must have known of their existence in general and could have guarded the public from injury. The plaintiff bears the burden at trial of proving actual or constructive notice. [Citations omitted].
887 So.2d at 537-38.

During the trial, it was admitted by Hoffman’s attorney that no evidence was presented that EJGH had actual notice of the liquid substance on the floor of the nourishment room.

The charge nurse on duty at the time of the accident, Holly Williams, provided live testimony. Ms. Williams stated that she was assigned to the 4-East section of the hospital on the day of Hoffman’s accident. Although she had no specific recollection of the day in question, Ms. Williams testified that she regularly looked in the nourishment room as she passed by it in order to remain aware of the surroundings of the entire unit. In addition, Ms. Williams stated that, in the event of a spill in the nourishment room, the procedure was that the nursing staff would attend to it right away. She further testified that the nursing staff would occasionally enter the nourishment room to fulfill a need of a patient and could look though the rectangular glass panel of the nourishment room’s door to see if anything was on the floor without having to enter the room.

Yvonne Labostrie, the Environment Services Sectional Supervisor, also testified at the trial. Ms. Labostrie stated that she supervises EST-ls and EST-2s, which are team members that clean areas of the hospital, e.g., patient rooms, public areas, restrooms, etc. Ms. Labostrie stated that she was on duty the day of the accident; however, she had no recollection of that day. Ms. Labostrie testified she had never seen a weekend assignment sheet, which designates the number of times a particular area is supposed to be cleaned and/or inspected, for the nourishment room. However, Ms. Labostrie testified that there is usually an assignment sheet | mcompleted for the weekdays. She further testified that the policy for the ESTs on duty was to “police” or inspect an area for cleaning, at least, twice during a shift. In the event of a spill, Ms. Labostrie stated a hospital employee was .to contact an EST or clean it him or herself, if the spill could be taken care of by that employee.

After review of the evidence presented to the trial court, we find Hoffman did not prove EJGH had actual or constructive notice of the liquid on the floor of the nourishment room. Hoffman failed to present any evidence that EJGH had actual notice of the spill. Additionally, EJGH presented sufficient evidence concerning its cleaning procedures to rebut the claim that it had constructive notice of the spill. Accordingly, we do not find the trial court manifestly erroneous in finding that EJGH was not negligent or strictly liable for Hoffman’s fall and injuries.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court in favor of Jefferson Parish Hospital Service District No. 2 and against Brandi Andress Hoffman is affirmed.

AFFIRMED

      . East Jefferson General Hospital Foundation was later dismissed from the action.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: GREMILLION, Judge.

license: Public Domain

text:
    Chadwick F. MONTGOMERY v. Russell Lee MONTGOMERY, III, et al.
    No. 11-1223.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.
    April 11, 2012.

      Edward 0. Taulbee, IV, Taulbee & Associates, Lafayette, LA, for Defendant/Ap-pellee, Louisiana Farm Bureau Mutual Ins. Co.
    Steven J. Bienvenu, Falgoust, Caviness & Bienvenu, Opelousas, LA, for Defendant/Appellee, Russell Lee Montgomery, III.
    Nora M. Stelly, Charles M. Kreamer, Allen & Gooch, Lafayette, LA, for Defendants/Appellants, Lawrence B. Sandoz, III, Continental Casualty Company.
    J. Bradley Duhe, Ottinger Hebert, L.L.C., Lafayette, LA, for Plaintiff/Appellant, Chadwick F. Montgomery.
    Court composed of J. DAVID PAINTER, SHANNON J. GREMILLION, and PHYLLIS M. KEATY, Judges.
   GREMILLION, Judge.

| plaintiff-appellant, Chadwick Montgomery (Chad), and defendant-appellant, Lawrence B. Sandoz, appeal the trial court’s judgment granting summary judgment in favor of defendant-appellee, Farm Bureau, dismissing it from the case. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In October 2004, Chad was standing in the bucket of a front-end loader of a 1991 Ford Model 5900 tractor using it as a work platform to trim branches from a felled tree on his father’s property. Chad’s father, Russell Lee Montgomery (“R.L.”), was operating the tractor and, inadvertently, pushed the quick release lever for the bucket causing Chad to be dumped to the ground. R.L. owned the property where the accident occurred, although it was being leased to his son, Russell Montgomery. The facts surrounding the accident are not in dispute.

Farm Bureau provided several insurance policies to R.L., including a homeowners policy (H0358178), and a farm liability policy (GF100370). American Reliable Insurance Company provided a policy of insurance to Russell for a mobile home and surrounding property located at 1648 Montgomery Road.

Following the accident, Chad contacted family friend and attorney, Sandoz, to pursue his claim for injuries. Sandoz inquired of R.L. what policies were available. San-doz claims that he came to understand, after conversations with Farm Bureau agent, David Richard, that the Farm Bureau policy would only provide $1,000 in med-pay coverage.

In November 2004, Chad accepted a $1,000 check from Farm Bureau and signed a release of claims. In June 2005, Chad settled with American Reliable for its full policy limits of $100,000. Thereafter, Chad began to feel that his injuries 12were worse than he originally thought and he and Sandoz also came to believe that Farm Bureau provided additional coverage for Chad’s injuries.

Subsequently, Sandoz began negotiating settlement amounts with Farm Bureau, but was ultimately unsuccessful. In October 2005, Chad filed a petition for damages against several defendants including Farm Bureau and Sandoz. Chad alleged that Farm Bureau “fraudulently, intentionally, and/or negligently made material misrepresentations and/or omissions regarding the coverage and terms of certain policies of insurance” and, in the alternative, that “as a result of the information and advice negligently given to Plaintiff by Defendant Lawrence B. Sandoz, III, Plaintiff, relying on same, agreed to the accept the limited coverage and sign the Release.” Thus, Chad alternatively argued that Sandoz was liable to him for legal malpractice.

In March 2011, Farm Bureau moved for summary judgment arguing that the 2004 and 2005 settlement agreements barred any claims against it. Sandoz moved for summary judgment in April 2011, arguing that Farm Bureau’s policies did not cover Chad’s claims. Following a hearing, the trial court granted summary judgment in Farm Bureau’s favor, but denied Sandoz’s motion finding that material issues of fact existed regarding the claim of malpractice against Sandoz.

The trial court rendered written reason for judgment in June 2011 and a judgment in August 2011. Chad and Sandoz now appeal now appeal the grant of summary judgment in favor of Farm Bureau.

ISSUES

Chad assigns as error:

1. The district court erred in failing to recognize that Farm Bureau’s fraudulent misrepresentations of its coverage to Plaintiff and his attorney resulted in Plaintiff executing both releases, not just the 2004 Farm Bureau release, but also the 2005 American Reliable release, detrimentally relying on Farm Bureau’s misrepresentations, |3such that genuine issues of material fact regarding such fraudulent misrepresentations preclude summary judgment based on either release.
2. The district court erred by dismissing Plaintiffs claims against Farm Bureau for is misrepresentations of its policy coverages, pursuant to La. R.S. 11:1973 (formerly 22:1220), despite those claims being a separate and distinct right of action and not being included in the two releases at issue.
3. The district court erred by dismissing Plaintiffs claims for a hernia and neck injury that were not contemplated, and therefore constituted future claims, and were not expressly included in the compromise, when the Plaintiff executed the two releases relied upon by Farm Bureau.
4. The district court erred by granting Farm Bureau’s summary judgment and not finding that the 2004 Farm Bureau release executed by Plaintiff was invalid for reason of (a) lack or failure of consideration, (b) procurement by fraud, (c) consent vitiated by error or mistake in the cause, and/or (d) lack of meeting of the minds over the scope and intent of what was to be released.

Sandoz assigns as error:

1. The trial court failed to recognize that Farm Bureau’s alleged fraudulent misrepresentations of its coverage to plaintiff resulted in plaintiff executing both releases, not just the 2004 release, such that issues of fact regarding such fraudulent misrepresentations preclude summary judgment based on either release.
2. The trial court dismissed plaintiffs claims against Farm Bureau for its alleged misrepresentations of its policy coverages despite those claims not being included in the two releases at issue.
3. The trial court dismissed claims for an alleged hernia and neck injury that were not contemplated, and therefore constituted future claims, when the plaintiff executed the two releases relied upon by Farm Bureau.

DISCUSSION

Summary Judgment

On appeal, summary judgments are reviewed de novo. Magnon v. Collins, 98-2822 (La.7/7/99), 739 So.2d 191. Thus, the appellate court asks the same questions the trial court asks to determine whether summary judgment is ^appropriate. Id. This inquiry seeks to determine whether any genuine issues of material fact exist and whether the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. La.Code Civ.P. art. 966(B) and (C). This means that judgment should be rendered in favor of the movant if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, and affidavits show a lack of factual support for an essential element of the opposing party’s claim. Id. If the opposing party cannot produce any evidence to suggest that he will be able to meet his evidentiary burden at trial, no genuine issues of material fact exist. Id.

Material facts are those that determine the outcome of the legal dispute. Soileau v. D & J Tire, Inc., 97-318 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/8/97), 702 So.2d 818, writ denied, 97-2737 (La.1/16/98), 706 So.2d 979. In deciding whether certain facts are material to an action, we look to the applicable substantive law. Id. Finally, summary judgment procedure is favored and designed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action. La.Code Civ.P. art. 966(A)(2).

The trial court, in its written reasons for judgment found in part:

Once the American Reliance release was signed on June 6, 2005, R.L. Montgomery, the Farm Bureau insured, was released, acquitted and forever discharged from any and all actions, causes of action, claims, demands, damages, costs, loss of services, expenses and compensation on account of or in any way growing out of any and all known and unknown personal injuries and property damage resulting or to result from the accident that occurred on or about the 11th day of October in the year 2004 at or near 1648 Montgomery Road, Opelousas, Louisiana. The release did not reserve any rights either against R.L. Montgomery up to the limits of his available insurance or against his insurance companies.
This Court finds that the release of June 6, 2005 released R.L. Montgomery and also released Farm Bureau from having to pay any sums under the terms of its policy.
It is on this basis that the Court grants the motion for summary judgment filed by Louisiana Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Company and Louisiana Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company. Because of the Court’s ruling that the American Reliable release of Russell Montgomery also released Farm Bureau, the Court is of the | ¿opinion the issue of the validity of the Farm Bureau release dated November 30, 2004 is mooted.

Having reviewed the record de novo, we agree with the trial court’s findings. In Randall v. Martin, 03-1311, p. 4-6 (La.App. 5 Cir. 2/23/04), 868 So.2d 913, 915-916, the court summarized the law pertaining to compromises:

A transaction or compromise is an agreement between two or more persons, who, for preventing or putting an end to a lawsuit, adjust their differences by mutual consent, in the manner which they agree on, and which every one of them prefers to the hope of gaining, balanced by the danger of losing. La. C.C. art. 3071. Dumas v. Angus Chem ical Co., 31,969 (La.App. 2 Cir. 8/20/99), 742 So.2d 655. A release executed in exchange for consideration is a compromise. Brown v. Drillers Inc., 93-1019 (La.1/14/94), 630 So.2d 741. A compromise regulates only the differences which appear clearly to be comprehended therein by the intention of the parties, “whether it be explained in a general or particular manner,” and does not extend to differences which the parties never intended to include. La. C.C. art. 3073; Ortego v. State, 96-1322 (La.2/25/97), 689 So.2d 1358. Further, a general release will not necessarily bar recovery for those aspects of the claim not intended to be covered by the release. Dimitri v. Dimitri, 00-2641 (La. App. 4 Cir. 6/30/02), 809 So.2d 481, 485, citing Moak v. American Automobile Insurance Company, 242 La. 160, 134 So.2d 911 (1961).
A compromise therefore carries the authority of things adjudged, and cannot be attacked for error of law or lesion. La. C.C. art. 3078. A compromise may be rescinded whenever there exists an error in the person or on the matter in dispute. It may likewise be rescinded where there exists fraud or violence. La. C.C. art. 3079. Public policy favors compromise agreements and the finality of settlements. Brown v. Drillers, Inc., supra at 757; Rivett v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 508 So.2d 1356 (La.1987). The party seeking recision of a settlement agreement bears the burden of proving its invalidity. Hoover v. Boucvalt, 747 So.2d 1227 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1999), writ denied, 754 So.2d 969 (La.2000).
The parties’ intent in executing a compromise is normally discerned from the four corners of the document; extrinsic evidence is normally inadmissible to explain, expand or contradict the terms of the instrument. Brown v. Drillers, Inc., supra. Nevertheless, when the parties to a compromise dispute its scope, they are permitted to raise factual issues regarding whether the unequivocal language of the instrument was intended to be truly unequivocal. Id. However, such latitude is granted only in the presence of some “substantiating evidence” of mistaken intent. Dimitri v. Dimitri, supra, 809 So.2d at 485; Duet v. Lucky, 621 So.2d 168 (La.App. 4 Cir.1993). In Brown v. 6Drillers Inc., supra, the Supreme Court held that “substantiating evidence” must establish:
either (1) that the releaser was mistaken as to what he or she was signing, even though fraud was not present; or (2) that the releaser did not fully understand the nature of the rights being released or that the re-leaser did not intend to release certain aspects of his or her claim.
630 So.2d at 749.
In the absence of such evidence, the compromise is subject to the normal rules of contract analysis and enforced precisely as written. Duet v. Lucky, supra; Brown v. Drillers Inc., supra.

In Brown, 630 So.2d at 749-50, the supreme court stated that when the factual circumstances do not fall within one of the categories above noted:

Louisiana courts, applying LSA-C.C. Art. 2046’s general rule of construction, have not hesitated to confine their analysis to the four corners of the instrument. When as in that instance, a contract can be construed from the four corners of the instrument without looking to extrinsic evidence, the question of contractual interpretation is answered as a matter of law and thus summary judgment is appropriate. Wilson v. Cost + Plus of Vivian, Inc., 375 So.2d 683, 685 (La.App. 2 Cir.1979); Horton v. Mobley, 578 So.2d 977, 982 (La.App. 2 Cir.1991).

Louisiana Revised Statute 22:1973 imposes a good faith duty upon an insurer:

A. An insurer ... owes to his insured a duty of good faith and fair dealing. The insurer has an affirmative duty to adjust claims fairly and promptly and to make a reasonable effort to settle claims with the insured or the claimant, or both. Any insurer who breaches these duties shall be liable for any damages sustained as a result of the breach.
B. Any one of the following acts, if knowingly committed or performed by an insurer, constitutes a breach of the insurer’s duties imposed in Subsection A:
(1) Misrepresenting pertinent facts or insurance policy provisions relating to any coverages at issue.

|7The releases at issue include the Farm Bureau release executed in November 2004. The face of the Farm Bureau check states “In Full Payment For: ANY AND ALL CLAIMS.” The release agreement itself, signed by Chad, states in part:

I, Chadwick Montgomery, ... (hereafter releasor) being of lawful age, do hereby release, acquit and forever discharge the said payor(s), their agents and employees, officers, directors, and all other persons, firms or corporations who are or might by liable, form any and all actions, causes of actions, claims, demands, damages, costs, loss of services, loss of consortium, expenses, punitive and/or exemplary damages, attorney fees, statutory penalties, interest and compensation on account of or in any way growing out of any and all known and unknown death or deaths, personal injuries and property damage, resulting or to result from an accident that occurred on or about the 11th day of October 2001 by reason of Fall including any other claims that I/we may have which arose at the time of or prior to such accident, or arising out of the manner that the company handled, settled or defended the relea-sor’s claims or resulting from any obligation arising out of any penalty statute, and do hereby for myself (or ourselves) heirs, executors, administrators, successors and assigns, covenant with the said payor(s), their agents and employees, officers, directors and all other persons, firms or corporations which are or may be liable to indemnify and save them harmless from all claims and demands, costs, loss of services, loss of consortium, expenses and compensation on account of or in any way growing out of said accident or its results, known and unknown, or prior claims, both to persons and property.
I/we know and understand that the injuries sustained may be permanent and progressive and recovery therefrom is uncertain and indefinite and there may be injuries or results of injuries not yet evident, recognized or known and making this release, I/we rely wholly upon my/our judgment, knowledge and belief as to the nature, extent and duration of said injuries and as to the questions of liability involved and have not been influenced by any representations regarding the same; that the claims are doubtful and disputed and the above consideration is accepted in full compromise, accord and satisfaction thereof, and the payment of said consideration is not an admission of liability.

The American Reliable release of June 2005 signed by Chad and notarized by Sandoz, states in part:

RELEASE OF ALL CLAIMS

FOR AND IN CONSIDERATION of the payment to CHAD MONTGOMERY at this time of the sum ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND AND 00/100 Dollars ($100,000), the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, I/we, being of lawful age, do hereby release, |sacquit and forever discharge R L MONTGOMERY, RUSSELL MONTGOMERY IV, AMERICAN RELIABLE INSURANCE COMPANY AND ASSURANT SOLUTIONS, INC. and all other persons, firms and corporations who might be liable or from any and all actions, cause of action, claims, demands, damages, costs, loss of services, expenses and compensation, on account of, or in any way growing out of, any and all known and unknown personal injui'ies and property damage resulting or to result from the accident that occurred on or about the 11th day of OCTOBER in the year of 2004 at or near 1648 MONTGOMERY RD., OPELOUSAS, LA 70579.
I/we hereby declare and represent that the injuries sustained are permanent and progressive and that recovery therefrom is uncertain and indefinite, and in making this release and agreement it is understood and agreed that I/we rely wholly upon my/our judgment, belief and knowledge of the nature extent and duration of said injuries, and that I/we have not been influenced to any extent whatever in making this release by any representations or statements regarding said injuries, or regarding any other matters, made by the persons, firms, or corporations who are hereby released, or by any person or persons representing him or them, or by any physician or surgeon by him or them employed.
It is further understood and agreed that this settlement is the compromise of a doubtful and disputed claim, and that the payment is not to be construed as an admission of liability on the part of R L MONTGOMERY, RUSSELL MONTGOMERY IV, AMERICAN RELIABLE INSURANCE COMPANY AND ASSURANT SOLUTIONS, INC. by whom liability is expressly denied.
I/we further agree that this release shall not be pleaded by me/us as a bar to any claim or suit.
This release contains the ENTIRE AGREEMENT between the parties hereto, and the terms of this release are contractual and not mere recital.
I/we further state that we I/we have carefully read the foregoing release and know the contents thereof, and I/we sign the same as my/our own free act.

Deposition testimony was submitted in support of the motions for summary judgment. Richard testified that he was very friendly with the Montgomery family, having known them all of his life; he worked with R.L. at the State Police; was a member of a masonic lodge with him; and, he and R.L. belonged to the same ^hunting club. Richard stated that he watched Chad “grow up.” Richard testified that Sandoz inquired in late October 2004 as to whether any medical coverage existed for Chad’s claims. Richard said that Sandoz did not ask about any other coverage other than the med-pay. He admitted that if med-pay coverage exists there must be some underlying liability coverage however, since Sandoz did not ask about it, Richard did not further discuss any other available coverage.

Richard further stated that R.L. attended a social function at his house and that he specifically asked R.L. if he was planning to file a claim against Farm Bureau to which R.L. responded “We’re not going to go after Farm Bureau,” instead indicating that the mobile home insurer would be pursued. Richard denied ever telling R.L. that his various Farm Bureau policies only provided $1,000 in med-pay coverage. Richard stated that he informed R.L. that his homeowner’s policy extended to Russell and Chad’s residences and that his farm liability policy was inapplicable to any claims relating to this injury. Richard described his relationship with Chad as close friends, speaking on the phone every two to three days. He stated he did not tell R.L. that there was no coverage, but that if there was coverage it would have been under the homeowner policy, not the farm policy. However, Richard opined that there was no coverage under the homeowner policy because of an exclusion for the use of a vehicle with horsepower in excess of forty. The tractor in question had a horsepower of seventy-two. Richard described the med-pay as essentially a “gift.”

Rhett Guillory, an adjuster with Farm Bureau since 1996, testified that he also knew the Montgomerys, mostly because of their relationship with Richard. Guillory testified that he only discussed med-pay coverage with Sandoz. He could not recall if Sandoz had asked him whether any other coverage was available. Guillory said pertaining to his discussion with Sandoz:

| i0We figured it was worth approximately $40,000, well within the $100,00 limits the other carrier had. So, for a waiver of subrogation and the full and final release of any and all claims, I paid the $1,000 and agreed to forego any subro-gation. So it is a general release.

He opined that if there had not been a release, there would not have been coverage under the homeowner’s policy because of the horsepower exclusion, and that the exclusion did not apply to the med-pay coverage. He said the farm liability policy was inapplicable.

Sandoz testified he has known R.L. for many years and knew of Chad as R.L.’s son. He also testified that he represented Chad once before in an accident case. Sandoz said that he has known Richard since first grade and that Richard is his insurance agent. Sandoz stated that prior to Chad coming into his office, R.L. had contacted him and informed him that he had contacted American Reliable and initiated a claims process. Sandoz stated that Chad brought the claim number with him when he came into his office. Sandoz said that he told R.L. to ask Richard what kind of coverage might be available under the Farm Bureau policy and to let him know what he found out. Sandoz said that R.L. told him that only med-pay coverage was available. Sandoz admitted:

I sent R.L. to talk to David to see if there was any coverage. R.L. was informed, no, there was no coverage.
Now, R.L. comes back to me. I did not check with David. I relied on R.L. to accurately report what David said. I relied on David to answer truthfully. When the information gets back to me from R.L., who I — he then says, according to David we got no coverage. That’s when I say, well let’s see if we can get something out of them. Apparently they don’t cover this.

When questioned as to whose responsibility it was to find out what coverage was available for his client, Sandoz responded:

In this instance R.L. did the investigation on the homeowner’s policy that we ultimately collected policy limits on. I also sent R.L., who is an extremely capable investigator, to go find out. We were all on the same team. We were looking for money.
| nNow, if there was any coverage, I relied completely on David telling the truth and R.L. repeating what he learned from David to me, and I had no reason to doubt or dispute anything either of those guys ever said.
Did I follow up and write a letter to Farm Bureau, no.

Chad testified that he was told by his father, Sandoz, and Richard that the Farm Bureau homeowner’s policy would only pay med-pay. Chad said that he and Richard were friends and were around each other all the time. He said that Richard, himself, and his dad had been friends his entire life. Chad said that he relied on Sandoz, his father, and Richard to find out what insurances might apply to this accident. He stated that before he signed the Farm Bureau release, but after he hired Sandoz, he had multiple phone and in-person conversations with Richard in which he expressed his disbelief that the policy would only pay $1,000 for his injuries, and that Richard told him that was all the coverage that was available.

Chad testified he did not believe Sandoz explained the ramifications of either the Farm Bureau $1,000 med-pay release or the $100,000 release from American Reliable. However, he did state that he would have signed the latter anyway even if San-doz had explained that he was releasing his father and American Reliable.

R.L. testified that Sandoz was his lawyer also and that Richard procured insurance for them all. He said Sandoz asked him to talk to Richard about his policies to see if any coverage was available for the accident. R.L. testified that Sandoz still did work for him. He said that Richard and Sandoz were like brothers.

In opposition to both Farm Bureau and Sandoz’s motions for summary judgment, Chad filed the affidavit of Mark B. Landry, an insurance and risk advisor with over thirty-four years of experience, who attested that there would be coverage under either R.L. homeowner’s or farm liability policy for the accident. |12He stated the horsepower exception did not apply because an exception to an exclusion — the tractor was being used to service the residence — applied. However, even if it did apply, he opined that the farm liability policy provided coverage in that none of the exclusions apply and the accident took place at an “insured location” as defined in the policy.

Chad’s Assignments of Error One, Two, and Four; Sandoz’s Assignments of Error One and Two

Chad’s assignments of error one, two, and four and Sandoz’s assignments of error one and two all center around the same basic issue, i.e., whether Farm Bureau’s agent, Richard, fraudulently misrepresented that no coverage was available for the accident at issue. “Fraud is a misrepresentation or a suppression of the truth made with the intention either to obtain an unjust advantage for one party or to cause a loss or inconvenience to the other. Fraud may also result from silence or inaction.” La.Civ.Code art. 1953.

Obviously, Chad was represented by counsel when he signed both the Farm Bureau release and the American Reliable release. While Chad strenuously argues that he was fraudulently induced to sign the Farm Bureau release based on a misrepresentation of coverage, he makes no such argument regarding the American Reliable release, which clearly removes his father and any of his insurers from the equation. Chad argues in brief that he executed both releases as a result of Farm Bureau’s misrepresentations regarding coverage. However, Chad admitted in deposition testimony that he would have signed the American Reliable release knowing that he was fully releasing his father. There is no allegation that this release, with its clearly enunciated terms and broad scope of the four corners of the document, was induced by fraud or error of any kind.

| is As the party seeking recision of the compromise agreement, Chad bears the burden of proving it was invalid. Randall, 868 So.2d 913. The law limits rescinding a valid compromise to errors pertaining to the person or the matter in dispute or if fraud or violence was present. Id. Thus, summary judgment is appropriate here if the record before us contains no evidence that would create a genuine issue as to the necessary fraud. We find that it does not. We agree with Farm Bureau that in analyzing the facts and circumstances surrounding the Farm Bureau release, there would be no genuine issue of fact that Chad would be unable to prove fraud on the part of Farm Bureau. As noted, the plain language of the Farm Bureau release reveals the intent of the parties to the compromise agreement. In consideration for the $1,000 Farm Bureau payment, Chad agreed to release Farm Bureau for any liability “on account of or in any way growing out of any and all known or unknown death or deaths, personal injuries and property damage, resulting from” the fall from the front-end loader. Pursuant to the normal rules of contract interpretation, the settlement terms are clear and explicit and encompass any injuries arising from the accident at issue.

Moreover, Chad failed to produce evidence that he would be able to meet his burden of proving that Farm Bureau fraudulently misrepresented the coverage available to him. The evidence establishes that Sandoz, the attorney responsible for handling Chad’s claims, never requested in writing or otherwise any Farm Bureau policies, was never told by either Richard or Guillory that there was no coverage under the Farm Bureau policies, and was never misled by Richard or Guillory regarding R.L.’s Farm Bureau policies. There simply is insufficient evidence in the record to raise a genuine issue as to fraud on part of Farm Bureau.

| uChad’s Assignment of Error Three; Sandoz’s Assignment of Error Three

Chad and Sandoz also argue that after the releases were signed, Chad discovered that he was suffering from other injuries that were not contemplated at the time he signed the release. Both the Farm Bureau and the American Reliable releases clearly contemplate any injury whatsoever, whether known or unknown, arising out of the October 2004 accident. Chad’s argument that the releases are inapplicable to his hernia and neck injuries because the releases fail to expressly state them fails. If this qualified as a valid dispute over the scope of a compromise settlement, compromise settlements would have to be the length of novels in order to cover every possible injury that might arise out of any given accident. The terms “any and all known or unknown personal injury” clearly contemplates any bodily injury arising from the accident at issue. These terms are unambiguous and leave nothing to be misunderstood. See Brown v. Simoneaux, 593 So.2d 939 (La.App. 4 Cir.1992); Barnhill v. Consol. Med., Disability & Life Trust, 569 So.2d 1115 (La.App. 3d Cir.1990), writ denied, 572 So.2d 93 (La.1991). This assignment of error is without merit.

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the trial court granting summary judgment in favor of Louisiana Farm Bureau Mutual insurance Company is affirmed. Costs of this appeal are to split equally between plaintiff-appellant, Chadwick F. Montgomery and defendant-appellant, Lawrence B. Sandoz, III.

AFFIRMED.


author: GENOVESE, Judge.

text:
    Laney Ray BARLOW, Jr. v. Sandra Guillot BARLOW.
    No. 11-1286.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.
    April 11, 2012.

      S. Douglas Busari, S. Douglas Busari & Associates, LLC, Tallulah, LA, for Plaintiff/Appellant, Laney Ray Barlow, Jr.
    John Scott Sartin, Winnsboro, LA, for Appellee/Defendant, Sandra Guillot Barlow.
    Court composed of ULYSSES GENE THIBODEAUX, Chief Judge, JAMES T. GENOVESE, and SHANNON J. GREMILLION, Judges.
   GENOVESE, Judge.

| ,In this domestic case, Plaintiff, Laney Ray Barlow, Jr., appeals the trial court’s judgment relative to child support, final periodic spousal support, and contempt of court. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This dispute is extremely and exceptionally contentious. Due to the discordance of the parties, it is necessary to chronicle the procedural history of this case in order to effectuate a proper legal review of the case on appeal.

On December 7, 2006, Laney Ray Barlow, Jr. (Ray) filed a Petition for Divorce and Ancillary Matters against Sandra Guil-lot Barlow (Sandra). Though two children were born of their marriage, only one, Ashley, was a minor when the petition was filed. Also on December 7, 2006, Ray and Sandra signed a Consent Judgment of Temporary Custody which addressed custody of Ashley, use and possession of vehicles and the marital home, and stipulated that Ray would “deposit $500[.00] after each pay day into the checking account of Sandra ... until further order of this court.” It further provided that “a hearing on the issues of custody, support[,] and possession of the marital home shall be held on the 1st day of February, 2007.” The Consent Judgment of Temporary Custody was signed by Ray; his counsel at the time, Ann Siddall; Sandra; and, the presiding judge at the time, Judge Kathy Johnson.

On December 29, 2006, Sandra filed an Answer and Reconvention seeking joint custody, child support, to be named domiciliary parent, exclusive use of the | ¡.marital home, and both interim and final periodic spousal support. An Order signed by Judge Johnson set a hearing on these issues on February 5, 2007; however, the record does not contain evidence that a hearing was held.

On April 9, 2007, Sandra filed a Motion for Contempt for Violation of Custody and Support Orders, Modification of Custody and Support Provisions, and Protective Orders. Sandra alleged that Ray violated several provisions of the December 7, 2006 Consent Judgment of Temporary Custody and that “the periods of physical custody exercised by [Ray] have been detrimental to the health and well[-]being of the minor child.” Sandra requested Ray’s custody of Ashley be suspended until a hearing could be held. Judge Johnson set Sandra’s motion for hearing on April 19, 2007, suspended Ray’s custody of Ashley until said hearing, and appointed an attorney, Anna Ferguson, to represent Ashley.

On April 10, 2007, Ray filed a Motion and Order to Revise Ex Parte Order, asserting that prior to the filing of Sandra’s motion the previous day, a hearing in this matter was already scheduled for May 1, 2007, for which Ray had already subpoenaed witnesses. Further, Ray complained that Sandra’s ex parte request to have his custody of Ashley suspended violated the “very narrow limitations that permit the issues of an ex[ jparte order of temporary custody” as set forth in La. Code Civ.P. art. 3945. Judge Johnson signed an Order wherein the suspension |sof Ray’s physical custody was rescinded and reverted the date of the next hearing from April 19, 2007, back to May 1, 2007.

On April 20, 2007, Ray filed a Petition for Rule to Show Cause seeking to have the community property that he and Sandra shared listed for sale. Judge Johnson signed an Order also setting this issue for hearing on May 1, 2007; however, the record does not contain evidence that a hearing was held on May 1, 2007.

On July 24, 2007, a Consent Judgment, signed on July 16, 2007, by Judge Johnson and Anna Ferguson, was filed into the record. The July 16, 2007 Consent Judgment stated that a “[c]ourt mediation and an in camera conference [were] held on May 1st, 2007,” wherein Ray and Sandra agreed to: (1) a joint custody visitation schedule; (2) a therapist with whom Ashley would receive counseling; (3) submission to an MMPI-2 test; and, (4) other issues relative to visitation. The July 16, 2007 Consent Judgment also provided that Sandra would remove Ashley’s picture from her website advertising her photography business.

On September 5, 2007, an Order was filed into the record detailing that “[a] Status Conference was held on August 23, 2007[,] to address several issues relating to custody and visitation in this matter.” The Order provided a visitation schedule for the remainder of August and for September and was signed by counsel for Ray and Sandra.

On October 3, 2007, Ray filed a Motion for Visitation Schedule, seeking to 14extend the visitation schedule the parties previously agreed to at the status conference held on August 23, 2007. Judge Johnson signed an Order which set forth a visitation schedule for the remainder of the year and which scheduled a pretrial hearing for October 19, 2007. On October 15, 2007, the pretrial hearing was reset for October 29, 2007, pursuant to Ray’s request for a continuance.

On March 18, 2008, an Order was signed by Judge Johnson requiring that Ray and Sandra each pay one-half of Ashley’s attorney fees. The Order stated that “the case shall not proceed to the custody litigation until this sum is paid.”

On June 5, 2008, Sandra filed a Petition to Alter Visitation Schedule for Recital of the Glory Bound Cloggers. Judge Johnson signed an Order granting Sandra custody of Ashley on June 7, 2008, for the purpose of allowing Ashley to participate in this event.

On May 16, 2008, Ray filed a Motion and Order to Fix asserting “this matter is ripe for trial on the merits; therefore, [he requested] that this matter be set for trial on all issues relating to custody, visitation, child support[,] and spousal support.”

On January 80, 2009, Ray filed a Motion and Order to Fix Trial Date referencing the December 7, 2006 Consent Judgment of Temporary Custody, asserting that he “wish[ed] to have this matter scheduled for a permanent custody hearing and all incidental matters thereto.”

On March 13, 2009, Sandra filed a Rule for Contempt, to Make Past Due Child Support Plus Legal Interest Executory, for Suspension of Driver’s, Occupational and Recreational Licenses, for Attorney Fees and Costs, for Income Assignment Order, Income Tax Exemption and Income Tax Refunds. Specifically, | ¡¡Sandra alleged that Ray “consented to his depositing directly into [her] bank account five hundred dollars ($500.00) from each of his bi-weekly paychecks in child support[;]” however, he “has failed to honor the Court’s December [7], 2006 [Consent] Judgment [of Temporary Custody] and is delinquent despite repeated amicable demands that he comply....” According to Sandra, Ray was “in arrearage for child support payments!,] as of March 1, 2009[,] in the amount of $16,519.92, which sum includes the judicial interest owed of $1,168.92 on the underlying unpaid support payments of $15,350.00.” Judge Johnson signed an Order scheduling a hearing for May 4, 2009.

On May 14, 2009, Ray filed a Rule for Contempt and Modification of Existing Custody Order. Ray also sought to be awarded sole custody of Ashley based on allegations that Sandra violated the terms of both the December 7, 2006 Consent Judgment of Temporary Custody and the July 16, 2007 Consent Judgment “[o]n several occasions!.]” Judge Johnson signed an Order scheduling a hearing for June 2, 2009.

On May 14, 2009, Sandra filed a Dilatory Exception of Vagueness and Ambiguity, Motion for Production of Mental Health Records and Contested Motion for Continuance. Sandra sought a continuance of the trial court’s fixing of Ray’s “rule for sole custody for June 2, 2009, ... due to the need for production by the court appointed medical health professionals and their depositions, which can not be scheduled prior to the hearing date fixed for the contempt rules.” In response to Ray’s allegations that she should be held in contempt for violating the | (¡court order, Sandra contested the efficacy of the July 16, 2007 Consent Judgment on the basis that she did not enter into “any oral stipulations whatsoever” and that said document did “not bear the signatures of either party to this litigation nor the signatures of either of their respective attorneys at the time.” Sandra also requested “that the existing custody regime ... be modified [making] her the sole custodian and limiting [Ray’s] visitation in accordance with the minor child’s best interests.” Judge Johnson signed an Order scheduling a hearing for June 2, 2009.

On May 26, 2009, Ray filed an Answer to Rule for Contempt, in which he denied failing to pay court-ordered child support. Ray argued that the December 7, 2006 Consent Judgment of Temporary Custody did not “designate! ] any amount of payment ordered by the court ... as child support.”

On June 1, 2009, Judge Johnson filed an Order of Recusal into the record wherein she removed herself from the instant litigation on the basis that she “is and can not be fair and impartial!.]” On June 2, 2009, Judge Leo Boothe also filed an Order of Recusal citing “prior ex parte communications about facts of this case” for his abstention from hearing this matter. The supreme court appointed Judge F. Rae Swent to preside over this matter on July 16, 2009.

On August 10, 2009, Ray filed a Petition for Nullity of Judgment. Ray asserted that Judge Johnson “rendered a [C]onsent Judgment of [Temporary [C]ustody” on December 7, 2006, which “contained a handwritten provision that [he] deposit!] $500.00 into the checking account of [Sandra] ... without stating the purpose for which it was intended nor did it state the means by which the figure was determined.” According to Ray, “all Judgments rendered thus far by Judge Johnson were not impartial nor were they fair to [him,]” and he requested “that all Judgments rendered thus far by Judge Johnson be annulled for vices of substance.”

17Following a three-day hearing held on October 27-28, 2009, and January 29, 2010, the trial court issued written Reasons for Judgment on June 7, 2010. Ray and Sandra were awarded joint custody, with Sandra being designated as the domiciliary parent. Ray was ordered to pay $690.81 in monthly child support. The trial court found Sandra free from fault and in need of support. The trial court also found that Ray had the ability to pay, and he was thus ordered to pay Sandra $200.00 per month as final periodic spousal support. The trial court considered the issue of Ray’s alleged child support arrearage “[t]he most difficult aspect of this case[,]” stating:

The first problem with [Ray’s] argument is that [Sandra] filed a [Motion for Contempt for Violation of Custody and Support Orders, Modification of Custody and Support Provisions, and Protective Orders] in March [] 2007, when the parties did not have a hearing as scheduled for February 1 or February 5, 2007. [Sandra] made a specific complaint that he had not paid the $500.00 due every payday and alleged an arrears of $2,147.30. There can be no way that [Ray] did not know or understand that [Sandra] contended the payments to her were for support, not just house payments. Besides, it does appear that [Ray] filed federal income tax returns that identified the money he paid as spousal support. Further, neither party testified to any agreement to deviate from the $500.00 every payday.
The second problem with the argument made by both parties is that the amount of payment to [Sandra] was set before she made any demand; that is, she had not yet asked for any child support, interim spousal support or permanent spousal support. Obviously, each of these various types of support have a different standard for calculation, as well as a different time period for imposition and duration. This court cannot guess what the parties intended at any particular time. The court can only look to the party who should bear the burden of proof as to what was meant by a consent judgment.
Despite the plethora of pleadings filed by both parties in this case, [Ray] never complained of being ordered to pay the $500.00 each payday. He did file a specific pleading that alleged [Sandra] was not helping him pay community debts[,] and he proposed that the property she and the child lived in be sold; but, he never once filed |8anything that referenced any misunderstanding or inequity about support or house payments. In particular, he never complained that he could not pay the $500.00, every payday^] and pay the house note or community debts, also. Instead, after a few initial payments, he just didn’t pay [Sandra] anything. He just decided on his own to pay the house notes. Now, he can get credit in the Partition for one half of what he paid, which [Sandra] agrees was $18,039.00, but that is another matter. In this matter of custody and support, he must be found in contempt and stand in judgment for the failure to either pay her as ordered or get the judgment changed. Here, [Ray] never filed any pleading to change, clarify or even reduce the amount he was ordered to pay to [Sandra] in the December 2006 consent judgment.

The trial court found Ray in contempt and calculated the amount he owed pursuant to the December 7, 2006 Consent Judgment of Temporary Custody to be $29,330.62. The trial court also ordered Ray “to pay one-fourth of the attorney fees incurred by [Sandra] as the amount attributable to prosecution of the claim for arrears.” The Judgment, signed by the trial court on April 5, 2011, specified that Ray pay Sandra “$5,649.18 in attorney fees plus legal interest on same until paid (one[-]fourth of the $22,596.75 in attorney fees incurred and paid by or on behalf of [Sandra]) as the amount attributable to prosecution of [Sandra’s] arrearage claim.” From this judgment, Ray appeals.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

On appeal, Ray asserts four assignments of error. He contends that the trial court erred in: (1) denying his petition to annul the December 6, 2007 Consent Judgment of Temporary Custody and ordering him to pay child support arrearages in the amount of $29,330.62; (2) awarding Sandra final periodic spousal support; (3) calculating the amount of Sandra’s final periodic spousal support award; and, (4) finding him in contempt and ordering that he pay one-fourth of Sandra’s attorney fees, which the trial court deemed attributed to her arrearage claim.

| .STANDARD OF REVIEW

An appellate court cannot set aside a trial court’s findings of fact in the absence of manifest error or unless those findings are clearly wrong. Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So.2d 840 (La.1989). If the findings are reasonable in light of the record reviewed in its entirety, an appellate court may not reverse those findings even though convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it would have weighed the evidence differently. Id.
The standard of review in child custody matters has been clearly stated by this court:
The trial court is in a better position to evaluate the best interest of the child from its observance of the parties and witnesses; thus, a trial court’s determination in a child custody case is entitled to great weight on appeal and will not be disturbed unless there is a clear abuse of discretion.
Hawthorne v. Hawthorne, 96-89, p. 12 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/22/96), 676 So.2d 619, 625, writ denied, 96-1650 (La.10/25/96), 681 So.2d 865.
Gremillion v. Gremillion, 07-492, p. 4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/3/07), 966 So.2d 1228, 1231-32.

Westbrook v. Weibel, 11-910, p. 2 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/7/11), 80 So.3d 683, 686.

DISCUSSION

In his first assignment of error, Ray submits that the trial court “committed manifest error in failing to annul the Judgment rendered by Judge Johnson on December 7, 2006 and awarding arrears of [$29,330.62] therefrom.” Ray sought to annul the December 7, 2006 Consent Judgment of Temporary Custody for vices of substance pursuant to La.Code Civ.P. art. 2004.

[A] final judgment obtained by fraud or ill practices may be annulled, |1f)La.Code Civ. Proc. art. 2004(A), and trial courts are permitted discretion in deciding when a judgment should be annulled because of fraud or ill practices, to which discretion reviewing courts will defer. Kem Search, Inc. v. Sheffield, 434 So.2d 1067, 1070 (La.1983).

Power Mktg. Direct, Inc. v. Foster, 05-2023, p. 11 (La.9/6/06), 938 So.2d 662, 670.

The sole basis for Ray’s argument that the December 7, 2006 Consent Judgment of Temporary Custody was prejudicial and detrimental to him is that Judge Johnson recused herself in July 2009, citing an inability to be fair and impartial. Ray complains that Judge Johnson made handwritten inscriptions — one of which is the provision that Ray pay Sandra $500.00 — on the December 7, 2006 Consent Judgment of Temporary Custody. Ray asserts that “[i]f knowing she could not be impartial, Judge Johnson should have re-cused herself from the onset of the case rather than rendering a Judgment that is prejudicial and detrimental to him.”

Sandra counters that “absolutely no evidence was presented during the pendency of this matter to support [Ray’s] contention that Judge Johnson was not fair and impartial when the December 7, 2006 [Consent Judgment of Temporary Custody] was rendered by her.” Further, Judge Johnson “made no decisions regarding the December 7, 2006 [Consent Judgment of Temporary Custody] other than taking the stipulation of the parties.”

The inference from Ray’s references to Judge Johnson’s handwritten inscriptions on the December 7, 2006 Consent Judgment of Temporary Custody is judicial misconduct, i.e., fraud or ill practice; however, the record reveals that the handwritten inscriptions are consistent with the oral stipulations made in court. Ray does not allege that falsehoods and misrepresentations made by Sandra caused him to enter into the December 7, 2006 Consent Judgment of Temporary Custody. | n Instead, he alleges that Judge Johnson rendered said judgment against him and that said judgment was prejudicial and detrimental to him. There is no evidence to support Ray’s allegation that Judge Johnson could not be fair and impartial to him when she signed the stipulation he entered into and which was contained in the December 7, 2006 Consent Judgment of Temporary Custody. We note that Ray was present in court with his attorney. In fact, the signature of Ray’s counsel appears on the consent judgment while the signature of Sandra’s counsel does not. Though he asserts he was misled into signing the December 7, 2006 Consent Judgment of Temporary Custody by his understanding that it would be temporary, we find this allegation, without more, is insufficient to support a claim to annul the judgment for vice of substance on the bases of fraud or ill practice. Therefore, we find no merit in this contention.

Having found no abuse of the trial court’s discretion in denying Ray’s Petition for Nullity of Judgment, we find no merit in his contention that the trial court erred by awarding arrears of $29,330.62 therefrom to Sandra. Ray admittedly stopped making payments to Sandra as ordered by the December 7, 2006 Consent Judgment of Temporary Custody. We find no manifest error in the trial court’s ruling ordering him to pay the $29,330.62 arrearage pursuant to the December 7, 2006 Consent Judgment of Temporary Custody. This assignment of error is without merit.

In his second assignment of error, Ray argues that the trial court “erred in failing to find that [Sandra] was free from fault in the dissolution of the marriage and awarding her permanent spousal support.” Ray asserted that Sandra was at fault in the dissolution of their marriage due to an alleged extramarital relationship with Jeff Goeggle.

| ^Louisiana Civil Code Article 111 provides:

In a proceeding for divorce or thereafter, the court may award interim periodic support to a party or may award final periodic support to a party who is in need of support and who is free from fault prior to the filing of a proceeding to terminate the marriage in accordance with the following Articles.

Louisiana Civil Code Article 112 requires that Sandra, seeking final periodic spousal support, prove that she was free from fault in the dissolution of the marriage. See Terry v. Terry, 06-1406 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/28/07), 954 So.2d 790. Louisiana Civil Code Article 112 provides, in pertinent part, “When a spouse has not been at fault and is in need of support, based on the needs of that party and the ability of the other party to pay, that spouse may be awarded final periodic support....”

“It is well settled that a trial court’s factual findings in the area of domestic relationships are given great deference on review. If the trial court’s findings are reasonable, i.e. not manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong, then they will not be disturbed.” [Terry, 954 So.2d] at 793 (citing Coleman v. Coleman, 541 So.2d 1003 (La.App. 3 Cir.1989)).

Henry v. Henry, 08-692, p. 2 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/10/08), 999 So.2d 255, 256-57.

Sandra denied being at fault in the dissolution of the marriage and testified that Ray’s temper and threats of violence were an ongoing problem during the marriage. She alleged Ray demanded that she leave the marital home and threatened violence if she returned. Sandra denied having a relationship with Mr. Goeggle prior to Ray’s filing of the petition to terminate the marriage. She further contends that the evidence relied upon by the trial court to make its determination was sufficient to serve as a basis for granting her request for final periodic spousal support.

Ray wants this court to assume and accept his contention that because a romantic relationship between Sandra and Mr. Goeggle now exists, one existed 1 isprior to the dissolution of his marriage to Sandra. However, that is not the standard by which this issue is determined. To refute Sandra’s assertion that she is free from fault by proving she was guilty of having an extramarital relationship, thereby causing the dissolution of the marriage, Ray must have evidence, not conjecture and innuendo. The trial court found that Sandra met her burden of proof and that Ray did not meet his burden of proof. In fact, the trial court stated that while Ray “proved what he thinks happened, he did not prove that is what actually did happen.”

Based on our review of the record, we find the evidence supports the finding that Sandra was free from fault prior to the filing of the proceeding to terminate the marriage as required by La.Civ.Code art. 111. Hence, we likewise find no error in the trial court’s ruling on that issue.

In his third assignment of error, Ray asserts that the trial court “committed manifest error in failing to consider [Sandra’s] income potential and resources and ordering [him] to pay $690.81 as child support.” Ray argues that Sandra receives recurring monetary gifts and is voluntarily underemployed.

For the purpose of determining child support, La.R.S. 9:315(C)(3)(a) (emphasis added) defines “gross income” as:

The income from any source, including but not limited to salaries, wages, commissions, bonuses, dividends, severance pay, pensions, interest, trust income, recurring monetary gifts, annuities, capital gains, social security benefits, workers’ compensation benefits, basic and variable allowances for housing and subsistence from military pay and benefits, unemployment insurance benefits, disaster unemployment assistance received from the United States Department of Labor, disability insurance benefits, and spousal support received from a preexisting spousal support obligation^]

Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:315(C)(5) defines “income” as:

(a) Actual gross income of a party, if the party is employed to full capacity; or
| i4(b) Potential income of a party, if the party is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed. A party shall not be deemed voluntarily unemployed or underemployed if he or she is absolutely unemployable or incapable of being employed, or if the unemployment or underemployment results through no fault or neglect of the party.
(c) The court may also consider as income the benefits a party derives from expense-sharing or other sources; however, in determining the benefits of expense-sharing, the court shall not consider the income of another spouse, regardless of the legal regime under which the remarriage exists, except to the extent that such income is used directly to reduce the cost of a party’s actual expenses.

Ray alleges that Sandra received “generous monetary assistance” and that she possessed the ability to earn income from several different sources, i.e., driving a medical transport vehicle, cleaning houses, bookkeeping, and photography. Ray contends that Sandra “was a skilled photographer with about $10,000.00 worth of photographic equipment and that she does wedding photography for income.”

Sandra testified that she had not earned money working for a medical transport company for nearly eighteen years and that she owned only two cameras. According to Sandra, by the conclusion of the trial, she had obtained employment, was earning more than she had at any time during her marriage to Ray, and the worksheet of her income and expenses that she presented to the trial court reflected these facts. Sandra denied the allegation that she received recurring monetary gifts. Sandra contends that “[a]bsolutely no evidence was presented that demonstrated that [her] mother, brother or Jeff Goeggle made any consistent monetary gifts to her on a recurring basis; rather, Sandra’s family and friends would simply step up and assist her as the need arose.”

This issue before the court is whether the trial court was manifestly erroneous in its judgment. See State, Dep’t of Social Services v. Swords, 08-580 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/5/08), 996 So.2d 1267 (citing McDaniel v. McDaniel, 03-1763 15(La.App. 3 Cir. 5/19/04), 878 So.2d 686). Considering the record before us, we find sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s determination. Ray offered only his testimony, without documentary or other corroborating evidence, to support his allegations that Sandra was receiving recurring monetary gifts and that she was voluntarily underemployed. Considering this was a factual determination and a credibility call, we find no manifest error in the trial court’s ruling. Therefore, this assignment of error is without merit.

In his final assignment of error, Ray contends that the trial court manifestly erred in finding him “in contempt of court and [ordering] him to pay the sum of $5,649.18 as attorney[] fees to [Sandra].”

Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 221 defines contempt of court as “any act or omission tending to obstruct or interfere with the orderly administration of justice, or to impair in the dignity of the court or respect for its authority. Contempts of court are two kinds, direct and constructive.” Pursuant to La. Code Civ.P. art. 224(2), constructive contempt is “[w]ilful disobedience of any lawful judgment, order, mandate, writ, or process of the court[.]” Constructive contempt “must be based on a finding that the accused violated an order of the court ‘intentionally, knowingly, and purposefully, without justifiable excuse.’ ” Lang v. Asten, Inc., 05-1119, p. 1 (La.1/13/06), 918 So.2d 453, 454 (quoting Brunet v. Magnolia Quarterboats, Inc., 97-187, p. 10 (La.App. 5 Cir. 3/11/98), 711 So.2d 308, 313, writ denied, 98-990 (La.5/29/98), 720 So.2d 343). “A trial court is vested with great discretion to determine whether a party should be held in contempt for wilfully disobeying a trial court judgment.” Barnes v. Barnes, 07-27, p. 9 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/2/07), 957 So.2d 251, 257 (citing Fink v. Bryant, 01-987 (La.11/28/01), 801 So.2d 346).

|ir,As we discussed in Ray’s first assignment of error relative to the consent judgment, he admitted that he stopped making payments to Sandra as ordered by the December 7, 2006 Consent Judgment of Temporary Custody. As a result thereby, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of Sandra making Ray’s past-due payments executory. Pursuant to this finding, Ray was found to be in contempt and ordered to pay Sandra $5,649.18 in attorney fees.

Ray argues that “[attorney fees are not allowed unless authorized by statute. Maggio v. Robinson, 31,913 (La.App. 2 Cir. 5/5/99), 741 So.2d 103.” Sandra contends that La.R.S. 9:375(A) grants the trial court the authority to award her attorney fees. We agree with Sandra.

Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:375(A) provides:

When the court renders judgment in an action to make executory past-due payments under a spousal or child support award, or to make executory past-due installments under an award for contributions made by a spouse to the other spouse’s education or training, it shall, except for good cause shown, award attorney’s fees and costs to the prevailing party.

In the present case, the trial court made the child support executory. The trial court’s written reasons did not set forth any specific finding of “good cause shown.” Therefore, the trial court found La.R.S. 9:375 to be applicable herein. We find no manifest error in the trial court’s factual determinations and no abuse of its discretion in awarding $5,649.18 in attorney fees to Sandra.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed in its entirety. Costs of this appeal are assessed against Plaintiff/Appellant, Laney Ray Barlow, Jr.

AFFIRMED.

      . Not included in this history are the filings of pleadings which are not relevant to the present appeal, i.e., substitution of counsel.

      . Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 3945(B) specifies:
      An ex parte order of temporary custody of a minor child shall not be granted unless:
      (1) It clearly appears from specific facts shown by a verified petition or by supporting affidavit that immediate and irreparable injury will result to the child before the adverse party or his attorney can be heard in opposition.
      (2) The applicant’s attorney certifies to the court, in writing, either:
      (a) The efforts which have been made to give the adverse party reasonable notice of the date and time such order is being presented to the court.
      (b) The reasons supporting his claim that notice should not be required.

      . A dance group to whom Ashley belonged.

      . On May 19, 2009, an Order was filed into the record evidencing that a telephone conference was held in late-April, and, due to a scheduling conflict with Ray's counsel, the hearing on Sandra’s rule was rescheduled for June 2, 2009.

      .On May 29, 2009, Ray filed an Opposition to Defendant’s Exception of Vagueness and Ambiguity and Motion to Continue.

      . This pleading was actually filed on April 9, 2007.

      . In brief, Ray erroneously states that the trial court awarded arrears of $22,596.75; however, the trial court awarded arrears of $29,330.62 and calculated the attorney fees Sandra incurred to prosecute the arrearage claim as $22,596.75.

        . Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 2004(A) provides: "A final judgment obtained by fraud or ill practices may be annulled.”


text:
    Stephen DAVIS, et al. v. STATE of LA, through the DOTD.
    No. 11-1386.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.
    April 11, 2012.
    James D. “Buddy” Caldwell, Attorney General, Ronald J. Fiorenza, Special Assistant Attorney General, Provosty, Sadler, DeLaunay, Fiorenza & Sobel, Alexandria, LA, for Defendant/Appellant, State of Louisiana, Through the Department of Transportation and Development.
    Clinton Andrew Magoun, Esq., Attorney at Law, Ferriday, LA, for Plaintiff/Appel-lee, Christina Wiley.
    Brandy McClure, Smith, Taliaferro, Pur-vis & Boothe, Jonesville, LA, for Plaintiff/Appellee, Amanda Townsend.
    Paul A. Lemke, III, Owens & Lemke, Inc., Harrisonburg, LA, for Plaintiffs/Ap-pellees, Lori Davis, Stephen Davis.
    Court composed of ULYSSES GENE THIBODEAUX, Chief Judge, JAMES T. GENOVESE and SHANNON J. GREMILLION, Judges.
   GREMILLION, Judge.

hlf a party is cast in judgment and assessed only 25% fault in causing the plaintiffs’ injuries, should it be cast with 100% of the court costs? The defendant/appellant, State of Louisiana through the Department of Transportation and Development (DOTD), appeals a judgment and asks that we answer that question in the negative.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The underlying case-in-chief arises from a single-vehicle accident in Catahoula Parish. The record before us reveals little about the facts of that accident.

The current controversy arises from cross-motions to tax parties with expert witness fees and other costs related to a jury trial that was held June 13-21, 2011, in the three consolidated cases. The jury found that DOTD was 25% at fault. Plaintiffs/appellees, Stephen Davis and Lori Davis (in the captioned matter), Christina Wiley, and Amanda Townsend, individually and on behalf of her minor child, Landon Townsend, filed a motion to have 100% of their costs of trial assessed to DOTD. DOTD filed a motion of its own seeking to have plaintiffs assessed with 75% of its costs. The trial court gave oral reasons that reflect its considerations in assessing DOTD with all costs:

First of all, we had three consolidated lawsuits involved in this one trial. The plaintiffs in one suit were the parents of the guest passenger. So I don’t see how any fault could be allocated to the guest passenger. And the other plaintiffs were the surviving children of the driver of the vehicle. And the court is going to decline to cast costs for them. So I’m going to cast all costs on the state and they can pay their expert fees as court costs or otherwise. And that’s what we’ll do with this case.

A judgment was prepared and signed that taxed DOTD with $20,433.79 in expert fees and clerk’s costs. DOTD appeals from this judgment. Its sole assignment of 12error asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in taxing DOTD with all costs of court.

ANALYSIS

The assessment of costs of court after judgment is governed by Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1920. The default rule is that the party cast in judgment is liable for all costs. Le v. Nitetown, Inc., 10-1239 (La.App. 3 Cir. 7/20/11), 72 So.3d 374, writ denied, 11-1826 (La.11/4/11), 75 So.3d 924 (citing Berzins v. Betts, 457 So.2d 282 (La.App. 3 Cir.1984)). The article provides that, except as provided by other law, the court may render judgment for costs or any part thereof against any party as it considers “equitable.”

Article 1920 vests the trial court with vast, but not unbounded, discretion in assessing costs. This discretion sometimes creates tension when juxtaposed to the default rule. In comparative fault cases in particular, deciding who was the prevailing party can prove challenging. The present case demonstrates that tension. DOTD could argue that it prevailed because it was cast with such a small percentage of fault. The appellees, on the other hand, are justified in maintaining that they succeeded at trial in obtaining a judgment against DOTD and, thus, prevailed.

There are cases that have assessed costs in accordance with the juries’ allocations of fault. DOTD cites in its favor the case of Broussard v. Delchamps, Inc., 571 So.2d 855 (La.App. 3 Cir.1990), writ denied, 575 So.2d 370 (1991), a slip-and-fall case in which the plaintiff was found by a jury to have been 85% at fault. The trial court assessed Delchamps, Inc., with 100% of the plaintiffs court costs. We amended the judgment to reapportion costs in accordance with the jury’s allocation of fault.

¡¡¡Broussard quoted with approval our earlier case of Joeffroy v. Succession of Arceneaux, 507 So.2d 1281 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1987). That was a suit between the naked owner of immovable property against a usufructuary to recover ad valorem taxes. The naked owner’s case was held prescribed, and the naked owner was taxed with all costs. We reversed the trial court on the prescription issue and on the issue of costs.

DOTD also cites Donavan v. Jones, 26,-883 (La.App. 2 Cir. 6/21/95), 658 So.2d 755, writs denied, 95-1786, 95-1891 (La.11/3/95), 661 So.2d 1379. In that case, in which DOTD was also a defendant, three defendants, each of whom had been assessed with different percentages of fault, were equally assessed the costs of court. Our colleagues on the second circuit found that because the trial court provided no explanation for assessing the costs disproportionately to the allocation of fault, it could fínd no reason to deviate from article 1920’s default apportionment of costs.

There are cases that have gone the other direction. Recently, our colleagues on the second circuit decided the case of Starr v. State ex rel. Department of Transportation and Development, 46,226 (La.App. 2 Cir. 6/17/11), 70 So.3d 128, writs denied, 11-1835, 11-1952, 11-1625 (La.10/21/11), 73 So.3d 386, 387, 388. Starr involved a one-car accident in which the driver was killed along with one passenger, and the other three passengers were injured. The estate of the deceased passenger and another passenger filed suit against DOTD, alleging that there was no warning of the sharp left-hand turn the driver had failed to negotiate. A jury decided that the driver was 76% at fault and DOTD was 24% at fault. The trial court cast DOTD with all costs. DOTD appealed several issues, including the assessment of costs. The second circuit affirmed the assessment of court costs.

|4The Starr case is almost directly on point. The second circuit noted, “[W]e do not find that the trial court abused its discretion by allocating 100% of the costs to DOTD. DOTD was the sole defendant, and while there were multiple plaintiffs only Byrd [the driver] was apportioned any percentage of the liability.” Id. at 145. Stan' cited with approval our decision in Davis v. State, Department of Transportation and Development, 94-308 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/7/94), 647 So.2d 552, writ denied, 95-0034 (La.1/27/95), 649 So.2d 382.

In Davis, plaintiffs were involved in a two-vehicle, head-on, collision in Rapides Parish. The other driver was attempting to pass a third vehicle at the time. In the course of litigation, plaintiffs settled with the oncoming motorist, leaving DOTD as the only defendant. A bifurcated trial resulted in a finding that DOTD was 40% at fault and the oncoming motorist 60%. The trial court assessed 100% of the costs to DOTD. On appeal, we held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding all costs against DOTD, as it was the sole remaining defendant.

We can synthesize these cases to arrive at some guidelines for determining when a trial court abuses its discretion or exceeds its bounds in awarding court costs. In Broussard, it was an abuse of discretion to award the sole plaintiffs costs against the lone defendant that was minimally at fault. In Donovan, the trial court abused its discretion in assessing equal shares of the lone plaintiffs costs against defendants who were not assessed equal fault. In Starr, only one of several occupants of the vehicle was found at fault, and that driver was killed in the accident; thus, his heirs were the parties to the suit. And in Davis, the lone defendant was properly assessed 100% of the costs when the plaintiffs were free from fault.

| -,Applying these principles to the controversy, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in assessing all costs to DOTD. DOTD was the lone, minimally-liable, defendant. Only one occupant of the vehicle was assessed fault in the accident, and that driver was killed, as in Starr. The trial court gave a reasoned explanation for its deviation from the default apportionment.

CONCLUSION

The trial court provided a well-reasoned explanation for its decision to deviate from the default method of apportioning court costs provided in Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1920. Those reasons comport with methods of apportionment that have been approved in the jurisprudence. Under these circumstances, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in taxing all costs to DOTD. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Costs of this appeal in the amount of $336.97 are assessed to defendant/appellant, State of Louisiana through the Department of Transportation and Development.

AFFIRMED.