text:
    STATE ex rel. Darien P. HINKEL v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-2415.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 1, 2012.
   In re Hinkel, Darien P.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 460-590; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011-KW-1412.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930, 8; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172; see also State v. Parker, 98-0256 (La.5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694; State v. Cotton, 09-2397 (La.10/15/10), 45 So.3d 1030.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    STATE ex rel. Bruce A. SIMS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-2417.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 1, 2012.
   In re Sims, Bruce A.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. D, No. 493-278; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2010-KA-1227.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Jerry CLABORN v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-2420.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 1, 2012.
   In re Claborn, Jerry; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. P, No. 01-0005; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 11-KH-815.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; State v. Parker, 98-0256 (La.5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Melvin JOHNSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-2474.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 1, 2012.
   In re Johnson, Melvin; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. F, No. 371-122; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-K-1268.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Joshua Edward WEBB v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-2479.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 1, 2012.
   In re Webb, Joshua Edward; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 484418; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011 KW 1684.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Daminco BOZEMAN.
    No. 2011-KP-2691.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 1, 2012.
   In re Bozeman, Daminco; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Assumption, 23rd Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 06-32; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011 KW 1596.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Lon ADAMS.
    No. 2012-K-0434.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 1, 2012.
   In re Adams, Lon; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 09-0049; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 10-KA-855.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Terry G. DAY.
    No. 2012-KO-0441.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 1, 2012.
   In re Day, Terry G.; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Avoyelles, 12th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 154,963; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 11-0734.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Sims JACOBS.
    No. 2012-KO-0475.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 1, 2012.
   In re Jacobs, Sims; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. F, No. 479-608; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-KA-0296.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Timothy Wayne MURRAY.
    No. 2012-K-0493.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 1, 2012.
   In re Murray, Timothy Wayne; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 432816-1; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011 KA 0658.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Christopher HAWKINS.
    No. 2012-KO-0495.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 1, 2012.
   In re Hawkins, Christopher; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. K, No. 05-09-0424; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011 KA 1219.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Rodger HARRISON, Jr.
    No. 2012-KO-0520.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 1, 2012.
   In re Harrison Jr., Rodger; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Iberia, 16th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 07-1833; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 11-835.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Isaac Jerome KING.
    No. 2012-KO-0521.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 1, 2012.
   In re King, Isaac Jerome; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Rapides, 9th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 300,968; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 11-772.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Michael D. PATTERSON.
    No. 2012-KO-0526.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 1, 2012.
   In re Patterson, Michael D.; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Lasalle, 28th Judicial District Court Div. O, No. 89656; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 11-892.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Rafael MATEO.
    No. 2012-KP-0535.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 1, 2012.
   In re Mateo, Rafael; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 99-282; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 11-KH-1165.

Denied.


text:
    Robert THOMASSIE v. Burl CAIN, Warden Louisiana State Penitentiary.
    No. 2012-KP-0536.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 1, 2012.
   In re Thomassie, Robert; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedíal Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. N, No. 98-2474; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 00-KH-1.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Kentdell E. LANDRY.
    No. 2012-KO-0548.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 1, 2012.
   In re Landry, Kentdell E.; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 04-09-0083; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011 KA 0688.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Andrew E. HORNE.
    No. 2012-KO-0556.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 1, 2012.
   In re Horne, Andrew E.; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. P, No. 08^1194; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, Nos. 11-KA-204, 11-KA-205.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Randy ROSE.
    No. 2012-KP-0564.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 1, 2012.
   In re Rose, Randy; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. I, No. 445-176; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-K-1693.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Levance WILLIAMS.
    No. 2012-KO-0574.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 1, 2012.
   In re Williams, Levance; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 11-KA-427.

Denied.


text:
    Effie Mae LAFARGUE v. William J. BARRON, Maureen M. Barron and Sean S. Barron.
    No. 2012-C-0593.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 1, 2012.
   In re Barron, Maureen M.; Barron, Sean S.; Barron, William J. et al.; — Defendants); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. N, No. 592385; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011 CA 1221.

Denied.


text:
    Christie Leigh SHAFFER v. Ravish V. PATWARDHAN, M.D.
    No. 2012-CC-0641.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 1, 2012.
   In re Patwardhan M.D., Ravish V.;— Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 549,424; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 47,272-CW.

Denied.

VICTORY and GUIDRY, JJ., would grant.


text:
    Kevin WINDHAM and Brenda Windham v. WILLIS-KNIGHTON MEDICAL CENTER, a/k/a Willis-Knighton Health System d/b/a Willis-Knighton Pierremont Health Center. Laranza Bearyman and Freddy Bearyman v. Willis-Knighton Medical Center, a/k/a Willis-Knighton Health System d/b/a Willis-Knighton Pierremont Health Center. Barbara Cobb and William Cobb v. Willis-Knighton Medical Center, a/k/a Willis-Knighton Health System d/b/a Willis-Knighton Pierremont Medical Center. Curtis Brown and Heather Brown v. Willis-Knighton Medical Center, a/k/a Willis-Knighton Health System d/b/a Willis-Knighton Pierremont Medical Center.
    No. 2012-CC-0672.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 1, 2012.
   In re Willis-Knighton Health System d/b/a Willis-Knighton Pierremont Health Center; Willis-Knighton Medical Center, et al.; — Defendant(s); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. 1, No. 551,066; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 47270-CW.

Denied.

VICTORY and GUIDRY, JJ., would grant.


text:
    Kevin WINDHAM and Brenda Windham v. WILLIS-KNIGHTON MEDICAL CENTER, a/k/a Willis-Knighton Health System d/b/a Willis-Knighton Pierremont Health Center. Laranza Bearyman and Freddy Bearyman v. Willis-Knighton Medical Center, a/k/a Willis-Knighton Health System d/b/a Willis-Knighton Pierremont Health Center. Barbara Cobb and William Cobb v. Willis-Knighton Medical Center, a/k/a Willis-Knighton Health System d/b/a Willis-Knighton Pierremont Medical Center. Curtis Brown and Heather Brown v. Willis-Knighton Medical Center, a/k/a Willis-Knighton Health System d/b/a Willis-Knighton Pierremont Medical Center.
    No. 2012-CC-0673.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 1, 2012.
   In re Willis-Knighton Health System d/b/a Willis-Knighton Pierremont Health Center; Willis-Knighton Medical Center, et al.; — Defendant(s); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. 1, No. 551,076; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 47629-CW.

Denied.

VICTORY and GUIDRY, JJ., would grant.


text:
    Kevin WINDHAM and Brenda Windham v. WILLIS-KNIGHTON MEDICAL CENTER, a/k/a Willis-Knighton Health System d/b/a Willis-Knighton Pierremont Health Center. Laranza Bearyman and Freddy Bearyman v. Willis-Knighton Medical Center, a/k/a Willis-Knighton Health System d/b/a Willis-Knighton Pierremont Health Center. Barbara Cobb and William Cobb v. Willis-Knighton Medical Center, a/k/a Willis-Knighton Health System d/b/a Willis-Knighton Pierremont Medical Center. Curtis Brown and Heather Brown v. Willis-Knighton Medical Center, a/k/a Willis-Knighton Health System d/b/a Willis-Knighton Pierremont Medical Center.
    No. 2012-CC-0674.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 1, 2012.
   In re Willis-Knighton Health System d/b/a Willis-Knighton Pierremont Health Center; Willis-Knighton Medical Center, et al.; — Defendant(s); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. 1, No. 551,021; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 47265-CW.

Denied.

VICTORY and GUIDRY, JJ., would grant.


text:
    Kevin WINDHAM and Brenda Windham v. WILLIS-KNIGHTON MEDICAL CENTER, a/k/a Willis-Knighton Health System d/b/a Willis-Knighton Pierremont Health Center. Laranza Bearyman and Freddy Bearyman v. Willis-Knighton Medical Center, a/k/a Willis-Knighton Health System d/b/a Willis-Knighton Pierremont Health Center. Barbara Cobb and William Cobb v. Willis-Knighton Medical Center, a/k/a Willis-Knighton Health System d/b/a Willis-Knighton Pierremont Medical Center. Curtis Brown and Heather Brown v. Willis-Knighton Medical Center, a/k/a Willis-Knighton Health System d/b/a Willis-Knighton Pierremont Medical Center.
    No. 2012-CC-0675.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 1, 2012.
   In re Willis-Knighton Health System d/b/a Willis-Knighton Pierremont Health Center; Willis-Knighton Medical Center, et al.; — Defendant(s); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. 1, No. 549,513; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 47266-CW.

Denied.

VICTORY and GUIDRY, JJ., would grant.


text:
    Chantrell L. SWAN, Individually and on Behalf of Her Minor Son, Kai Swan v. BAYOU PEDIATRIC ASSOCIATES, APMC and Nurse Pamela Breaux.
    No. 2012-CC-0734.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 1, 2012.
   In re Swan, Chantrell L.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Terrebonne, 32nd Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 139,964; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011 CW 2171.

Denied.

KNOLL and WEIMER, JJ., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Elizabeth RASSOULI.
    No. 2012-KK-0838.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 1, 2012.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 10-4188; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 12-K-150.

Denied.


text:
    Stephanie LEBLANC, et ux. v. Samantha LAVERGNE, et al.
    No. 2012-C-0846.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 1, 2012.
   In re Leblanc, Randy; Leblanc, Stephanie et ux.; — Plaintiff(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 2008-1985-F; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 11-1112.

Denied.


text:
    Robert CASKEY and Kathy Caskey v. MERRICK CONSTRUCTION CO., INC. and the State of Louisiana through the Department of Transportation and Development.
    No. 2012-C-0847.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 1, 2012.
   In re Gray Insurance Company; Merrick Construction Co., Inc.; — Defendant(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jackson, 2nd Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 29694; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 46,-886-CA.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant.


text:
    Michael MATHERNE and Carrie Matherne v. Mayhew BARNUM and Barnum Construction, L.L.C.
    No. 2012-C-0865.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 1, 2012.
   In re Mayhew Barnum; Mayhew Barnum Construction, L.L.C.; — Defendant(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Livingston, 21st Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 123,447; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011 CA 0827.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. John CUNNINGHAM.
    No. 2012-KK-0870.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 1, 2012.
   In re Cunningham, John; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. B, No. 499-077; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-K-0886.

Denied.


text:
    William KASS v. T.M.T. CONSTRUCTION, L.L.C.
    No. 2012-CC-0873.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 1, 2012.
   In re T.M.T. Construction, LLC; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. I, No. 2010-5435; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2012-C-0157.

Denied.


text:
    Albert MONTALBANO, Joseph Montalbano, Jr. and Linda Montalbano v. BUFFMAN INC. d/b/a St. Rita’s Nursing Home, Mabel Mangano, Salvadore Mangano, Sr., Anthony Buffone, ABC Insurance Company and XYZ Insurance Company and All Other Consolidated Cases.
    No. 2012-C-0880.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 1, 2012.
   In re Emmons, Cheryl Ann Gallodoro; Gallodoro Sr., Joseph L.; Gallodoro, Steven; Lott, Margaret; — Plaintiff(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Bernard, 34th Judicial District Court Div. D, Nos. 106-017 C/W 105-461 C/W 105-433 G/W 105-406 C/W 105-473 C/W 106-324 C/W 105-410 C/W 106-254,106-535 C/W 107-688; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, Nos. 2011-CA-753 C/W 2011-CA-754 C/W 2011-CA-917 C/W 2011-CA-918 C/W 2011-CA-1064, 2011-CA-1065 C/W 2011-CA-1127 C/W 2011-CA-1194 C/W 2011-CA-1195 C/W 2011-CA-1196.

Denied.


text:
    LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION & DEVELOPMENT v. CONOCOPHILLIPS COMPANY.
    No. 2012-CC-0885.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 1, 2012.
   In re ConocoPhillips Company; Sasol North America, Inc.; — Defendant(s); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 2008-2684; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW 11-01373.

Denied.


text:
    TOMORROW’S INVESTORS, LLC through its CEO/President, Chester J. JONES v. STATE of Louisiana through the LOUISIANA GAMING CONTROL BOARD and the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections Office of the State Police, Bureau Of Investigations, Gaming Enforcement Division.
    No. 2012-0886.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 1, 2012.
   In re Tomorrow’s Investors LLC;— Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 596,444; to the Court of Appeal; First Circuit, No. 2011 CA 1616.

Denied.


text:
    Albert MONTALBANO, Joseph Montalbano, Jr. and Linda Montalbano v. BUFFMAN INC. d/b/a St. Rita’s Nursing Home, Mabel Mangano, Salvadore Mangano, Sr., Anthony Buffone, ABC Insurance Company and XYZ Insurance Company and All Other Consolidated Cases.
    No. 2012-C-0894.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 1, 2012.
   In re Agnelly, Patricia Poissenot; Cousins, Adele; Cousins, Raymond; Darsam Jr., John M.; Dorand, Jane D.; Frisch-hertz, Linda; Frischhertz, Nancy; Montal-bano, Albert; Poissenot, Emile R.; Vidr-ios, James M.; — Plaintiff(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Bernard, 34th Judicial District Court Div. D, Nos. 106-535 C/W 107-688, 106-017 C/W 105-461 C/W 105-433 C/W 105-406 C/W 105-473 C/W 106-324 C/W 105-410 C/W 106-254; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, Nos. 2011-CA-1065C/W 2011-CA-1127 C/W 2011-CA-1194 C/W 2011-CA-1195 C/W 2011-CA-1196, 2011-CA-753 C/W 2011-CA-754 C/W 2011-CA-917 C/W 2011-CA-918 C/W 2011-CA-1064.

Denied.


text:
    1205 ST. CHARLES CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION INC. v. ST. CHARLES CONDOMINIUM DEVELOPMENT, LLC., et al.
    No. 2012-CC-0895.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 1, 2012.
   In re USF Insurance Company; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. F, No. 2006-14354; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2012-C-0259.

Denied.


text:
    Kelle COWARD, Individually and on Behalf of Her Minor Child, Thomas Bolduc v. Guy G. CRESSON, D.D.S. and J. Skelly Kreller, D.D.S.
    No. 2012-CC-0896.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 1, 2012.
   In re Kreller D.D.S., J. Skelly; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 629-678; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 12-C-218.

Denied.

CLARK, J., would grant.


text:
    James W. LEDBETTER and Vanessa H. Ledbetter v. HOMES BY PAIGE, L.L.C. and ABC Insurance Company.
    No. 2012-C-0899.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 1, 2012.
   In re Ledbetter, James W. et al.; Led-better, Vanessa H.; — Plaintiff(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Ascension, 23rd Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 83705; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011 CA 0005.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Jabari WILLIAMS.
    No. 2012-KK-1366.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 15, 2012.
   In re Williams, Jabari; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. E, No. 508-064; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2012-K-0855.

Stay Denied; Writ Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Micah SHORT.
    No. 2012-KK-1384.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 18, 2012.
   In re Short, Micah; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. 3, No. M532665; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2012-K-0882.

Stay denied. Writ denied.


text:
    Dionysia F. Huval PREJEAN v. Ronald Joseph PREJEAN, Jr.
    No. 2012-CJ-1243.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 20, 2012.
   In re Prejean, Dionysia Huval; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Acadia, 15th Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 200910001; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 11-1571.

Denied.


text:
    In re Gilmer Paul HINGLE.
    No. 2012-OB-1109.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 22, 2012.
   In re Disciplinary Counsel; — Other; Applying For Findings and Recommendations (Readmission) Office of Disciplinary Board, No. 06-DB-056.

Readmission denied. Petitioner may not reapply for readmission until at least three years have passed from the date of this judgment. Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 24(1).


text:
    In re Appeal of the Decision of the DISCIPLINARY BOARD NO. 2012-ADMIN-0530.
    No. 2012-OB-1046.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 22, 2012.
   In re Kelly, Russel; — Plaintiff; Applying For Appeal of the Decision of the Disciplinary Board Office of the Disciplinary Board, No. 2012-ADMIN-0530.

Granted for the sole purpose of transferring the matter to the Office of the Disciplinary Counsel for review by the Chief Disciplinary Counsel. See Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 11(A).


text:
    In re Appeal of the Decision of the DISCIPLINARY BOARD 11-PDB-116.
    No. 2012-OB-1036.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 22, 2012.
   In re Brown, Alfred; — Plaintiff; Applying For Appeal of the Decision of the Disciplinary Board Office of Disciplinary Board, No. 11-PDB-116.

Leave to appeal denied.


text:
    Patrick E. PHILLIPS, Jr., et al. v. G & H SEED CO., et al.
    No. 2012-C-0775.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 22, 2012.
   In re Allianz Global Risks US Insurance Company; Bayer CropScience LP; Redlich, Michael G.; — Defendant(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Landry, 27th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 00-C-2220-D; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 10-1405.

Granted.

KNOLL, J., recused.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Darren Dewayne KING v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-2346.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 22, 2012.
   In re King, Darren Dewayne; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Bossier, 26th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 152,056; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 43,-575-KA.

Granted for the sole purpose of transferring the application to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, for its consideration on the merits.


text:
    M & R DRYWALL, INC. v. MAPP CONSTRUCTION, L.L.C., Southgate Towers, L.L.C. and R.W. Day and Associates, Inc. Southgate Residential Towers, LLC, Southgate Penthouses, LLC v. Mapp Construction, Inc., et al.
    No. 2012-CC-792.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 22, 2012.
   In re Southgate Penthouses, LLC, Southgate Residential Towers, LLC;— Plaintiffs; Applying for Reconsideration of this Court’s Order dated May 18, 2012; Parish of E. Baton Rouge; to the Court of Appeal First Circuit No. 2011 CW 2188; 19th Judicial District Court Div. O, No. 529,351 C/W 550,534.

Not considered. See Supreme Court Rule DC, § 6.


text:
    Dwayne HALEY v. Cheryl G. LEARY.
    No. 2012-OC-0795.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 22, 2012.
   In re Dwayne Haley;: — Plaintiff; Applying for Reconsideration of this Court’s Order dated May 4, 2012; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit No. 2011-CA-1144; Parish of Orleans; Civil District Court Div. J, No. 02-17470.

Not considered. Not timely filed. See Supreme Court Rule DC, § 1. The judgment of the court of appeal is definitive. See La.Code Civ. P. art. 2166(E). Accordingly, no further filings in this matter shall be accepted.


text:
    Ashton MILLER, Jr., et al. v. SATTLER SUPPLY COMPANY, INC., et al.
    No. 2012-CC-0987.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 22, 2012.
   In re Sattler Supply Company, Inc., et al.; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Landry, 27th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 10-C-0058-C; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW 11-01478.

Not considered. Not timely filed. See Supreme Court Rule X, § 5.


text:
    L.E. PERKINS v. SKYCO CORPORATION, et al.
    No. 2012-CC-1026.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 22, 2012.
   In re Cappaert Manufactured Housing, Inc.; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Beauregard, 36th Judicial District Court No. C-2007-0526-B; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW 11-00684.

Not considered. Not timely filed. See Supreme Court Rule X, § 5. Defendant’s “Motion to File Original Application of Supervisory Writ and/or Certiorari Outside of Deadline” is denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Gregory J. REAUX.
    No. 2011-KO-2597.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 22, 2012.
   In re Reaux, Gregory J.; — Defendant; Applying for Reconsideration of this Court’s action dated April 9, 2012, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 471010; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011 KA 0443.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Felton D. BUTLER.
    No. 2011-KO-2686.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 22, 2012.
   In re Butler, Felton D.; — Defendant; Applying for Reconsideration of this Court’s action dated April 9, 2012, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 493046; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011 KA 0595.

Denied.


text:
    Judith Clare Leblanc CANDLER, et al. v. GRAND BLUFF CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC., et al. David Lynn Matthew, et al. v. Grand Bluff Construction Co., et al.
    No. 2012-CC-1207.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 22, 2012.
   In re Grand Bluff Construction Services D/B/A Grand Bluff Construction Company; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Vermilion, 15th Judicial District Court Divs. E, D, Nos. 92439, 92472; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW 11-01475.

Stay denied. Writ denied.


text:
    William ODDO, Jr. v. ASBESTOS CORPORATION LTD., et al.
    No. 2012-CC-1338.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 22, 2012.
   In re B & B Engineering and Supply Company of Louisiana, Inc.; Bituminous Fire and Marine Insurance Company; Executive offices of B & B Engineering; Liberty Mutual Insurance Company; The Travelers Insurance Company, solely as insurers of B & B Engineering and Supply Company, Inc.; — Defendant(s); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. I, No, 2011-05883; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2012-C-0738.

Stay denied; writ denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Jimmy James MACK v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-2032.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 22, 2012.
   In re Mack, Jimmy James; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Rapides, 9th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 286,906; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 10-01207.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Derrick Dewayne DAVIS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-2033.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 22, 2012.
   In re Davis, Derrick Dewayne; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Rapides, 9th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 277,943; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 10-00927.

Denied. La.CCr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Donald Ray JOHNSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-2039.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 22, 2012.
   In re Johnson, Donald Ray; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 347895; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011 KH 1207.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; La.C.Cr.P. art. 351.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Donald Ray JOHNSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-2040.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 22, 2012.
   In re Johnson, Donald Ray; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 347895; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011 KH 1206.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Lundy HARRIS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-2050.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 22, 2012.
   In re Harris, Lundy; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Lincoln, 3rd Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 55061; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 46,873-KH.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Tyrone YOUNG v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-2068.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 22, 2012.
   In re Young, Tyrone; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. C, No. 351-026; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-K-1063.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Melvin MANNING v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-2096.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 22, 2012.
   In re Manning, Melvin; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 277114; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011 KW 1274.

Denied.

WEIMER, J., recused.


text:
    STATE ex rel. King George MURRAY, III v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-2104.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 22, 2012.
   In re Murray III, King George; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Ouachita, 4th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 94-F0167; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 46,830-KH.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Steven HONORE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-2117.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 22, 2012.
   In re Honore, Steven; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 05-2079; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 11-KH-755.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Francis BROWN v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-2118.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 22, 2012.
   In re Brown, Francis; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Landry, 27th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 06-K-2644; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 11-00848.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Jermane JONES v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-2136.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 22, 2012.
   In re Jones, Jermane; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. O, No. 08-6355; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 11-KH-730.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Robert JOHNSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-2170.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 22, 2012.
   In re Johnson, Robert; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 08-2145; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 11-KH-650.

Denied.

GUIDRY, J., recused.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Brandon STEVENSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-2171.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 22, 2012.
   In re Stevenson, Brandon; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. P, No. 01-1062; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, Nos. 09-WR-555, 10-KH-1088, 10-KH-691, 11-KH-641.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Vincent STEWART v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-2194.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 22, 2012.
   In re Stewart, Vincent; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. P, No. 02-554; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 11-KH-855.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Graylyn JACKSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-2197.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 22, 2012.
   In re Jackson, Graylyn; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Charles, 29th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 98-614; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 10-WR-138.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Castadel RUFFIN v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-2297.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 22, 2012.
   In re Ruffin, Castadel; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 00-5965; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, Nos. 08-WR-1124, 08-WR-1124, 09-WR-74, 11-KH-269.

Denied.

GUIDRY, J., recused.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Ryan DOZIER v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-2374.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 22, 2012.
   In re Dozier, Ryan; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. L, No. 816-704; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 11-K-1162.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Emmanuel SCOTT v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-2421.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 22, 2012.
   In re Scott, Emmanuel; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. 8, No. 254,302; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 46,-957-KH.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. James Leonard MOORE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-2476.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 22, 2012.
   In re Moore, James Leonard; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. L, No. 04-08-0878; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011 KA 0422.

Denied. Moot.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Jonathan JOHNSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-2480.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 22, 2012.
   In re Johnson, Jonathan; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. L, No. 02-3243; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 11-KH-838.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. James R. BRADLEY v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-2502.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 22, 2012.
   In re Bradley, James R.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Vernon, 30th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 58737; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 10-01064.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; State v. Parker, 98-0256 (La.5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694; La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Antoinette HOLMES v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-2508.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 22, 2012.
   In re Holmes, Antoinette; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 97-6759; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 11-KH-963.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Keith STEWART v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-2513.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 22, 2012.
   In re Stewart, Keith; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 80-2360; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 11-KH-965.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Egerald E. EVERY v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-2515.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 22, 2012.
   In re Every, Egerald E.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. F, No. 477-091; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-K-1411.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Ronald A. TORREGANO, Jr. v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-2516.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 22, 2012.
   In re Torregano Jr., Ronald A.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 478916; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011 KW 1326.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Arnold Bennett CURTIS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-2525.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 22, 2012.
   In re Curtis, Arnold Bennett; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Ouachita, 4th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 08-F23942; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 46,969-KH.

Denied.


author: SUSAN M. CHEHARDY, Judge.

text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Jose CORNEJO-GARCIA.
    No. 11-KA-619.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fifth Circuit.
    Jan. 24, 2012.

      Paul D. Connick, Jr., District Attorney, Terry M. Boudreaux, Desirée M. Valenti, Appellate Counsel, Assistant District Attorneys, Gretna, LA, for Appellee, State of Louisiana.
    Margaret S. Sollars, Louisiana Appellate Project, Thibodaux, LA, for Appellant, Jose Cornejo-Garcia.
    Panel composed of Judges SUSAN M. CHEHARDY, FREDERICKA HOMBERG WICKER, and MARC E. JOHNSON.
   SUSAN M. CHEHARDY, Judge.

|2On February 26, 2009, a Jefferson Parish Grand Jury indicted defendant, Jose Cornejo-Garcia, and four co-defendants on four counts of second degree murder, in violation of La. R.S. 14:30.1, for the homicides of Wallace Gomez, Beauford Gomez, Jeffrey Carmadelle, and Wayne Hebert. On March 22, 2010, the State agreed to sever the trials of the five defendants. That day, the trial court also granted defendants’ motions to quash count two of the indictment with respect to the homicide of Beauford Gomez.

On November 16, 2010, trial commenced. The next day, a twelve-person jury returned a unanimous verdict of guilty as charged on all counts. On November 23, 2010, the trial court sentenced defendant to three consecutive sentences of life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. On November 30, 2010, the trial court denied defendant’s motion to reconsider sentence and granted his motion for appeal.

Facts

IsAround 2:00 p.m. on Thursday, October 30, 2008, five Hispanic males entered Gomez’s Bar on Fourth Street in Marrero, Louisiana. They ordered drinks from the bar then moved towards the pool tables. Moments later, however, these men, brandishing firearms, corralled the bar patrons near the back of the barroom and told everyone to empty their pockets. As Wallace Gomez, one of the bar’s owners, came out from the back room of the bar in response to the commotion, one of the gunmen, later identified as Renel Esco-bar-Rivera, grabbed him, put a .357 magnum to his head, and forced him back into the office.

Stanley Gomez, Wallace’s brother and the bar’s co-owner, who had been behind the bar before the men entered, tried to go into a rear storeroom but was quickly forced back into the bar by one of the gunman. Stanley watched as the gunman, later identified as Mario Funes, opened the bar’s cash register and dropped the cash drawer on the floor. The other three men were busy pilfering the bar patrons’ wallets, currency, cellular phones, and other property.

A few minutes later, Escobar-Rivera came running out with a bag in his hand shouting in Spanish. In response to his shouts, all of the robbers except Mario Funes fled the bar.

Wallace, now armed, emerged from the back room in pursuit of the robbers. One of the patrons alerted Wallace that one of the men was still behind the bar. When Funes emerged, Wallace confronted him, asking, “Are you one of them?” The armed man did not respond.

Although there is conflicting testimony as to who fired first, it is uncontroverted that, at that point, Wallace and Funes exchanged gunfire. During |4this exchange, seventy-six-year-old Wallace and seventy-year-old Beauford Gomez, a third Gomez brother, who had been seated at the bar, were shot and mortally wounded. Funes also sustained a gunshot wound.

When they heard the gunfire, two of the robbers, who had already exited the bar, ran back in firing their weapons and dragged their wounded accomplice outside. During this exchange, two bar patrons— Jeffrey Carmadelle and Wayne Hebert— were shot.

Just as the three robbers made it to the parking lot, Detective Rhonda Goff of the Jefferson Parish Sheriffs Office drove by in her marked patrol car on her way to work. As she passed Gomez’s, she saw three Hispanic men covered in blood standing right outside of the front door of the bar. Two of the men, later identified as defendant herein and Rigoberto Funes, were carrying a third man, Mario Funes, who was injured. When she first spotted the men, they were facing east towards her but they abruptly turned to cut across a field away from her.

Detective Goff testified that she immediately thought that the situation was odd when the men did not attempt to signal her — a police officer — for help. After she stopped the men to investigate, several bar patrons approached to inform her that the men had just killed four people. Detective Goff quickly handcuffed the two uninjured men and called for backup. At trial, Detective Goff identified defendant herein as one of the men who was carrying his wounded accomplice.

In the meantime, two of the gunmen, later identified as Pedro Navarette-Duran and Renel Escobar-Rivera, fled the , scene in their vehicle. However, Charles Hen-ning, who had just pulled into the parking lot as the robbers were |sfleeing the bar, wrote down the vehicle’s license plate number and gave it to Detective Goff.

Deputies and paramedics testified that, when they entered the bar, “there was blood and money everywhere.” Wallace and Beauford Gomez were pronounced dead at the scene by the authorities. The two bar patrons, Jeffrey Carmadelle and Wayne Hebert, were transported to a hospital where they were pronounced dead on arrival. The injured suspect was transported for medical treatment then arrested upon release from the hospital.

After hearing the testimony and evidence, the twelve-person jury found this defendant guilty as charged on all three counts. This appeal follows.

ANALYSIS:

On appeal, defendant raises two assignments of error: first, the trial court erroneously denied his request for special jury instructions and, second, his consecutive sentences are excessive.

With respect to his first assigned error, defendant contends that the trial judge erred in denying two special jury instructions. The first instruction was an exception to the rule that an aggressor cannot claim the right of self-defense, which provides that an aggressor may claim self-defense if “he withdraws from the conflict in good faith and in such a manner that his adversary knows or should know that he desires to withdraw and discontinue the conflict.” La. R.S. 14:21. The second instruction addresses the permissibility of the use of deadly force to prevent the commission of a crime:

Two things must concur in order to justify us in killing another to prevent him from committing some act: first, it must reasonably appear necessary in order to prevent him from committing a crime; and second, the crime to be prevented must be a great crime, and not a petty offense from which no great injury would result to us or others, 16in body or property. Therefore, if it reasonably appears that the crime can be prevented by any other available means, as by a warning, by a show of force, or by the use of any force short of killing, the killing would not be justified.

State v. Plumlee, 177 La. 687, 149 So. 425, 428-29 (1933).

In its reply, the State asserts that the trial court was correct in its determination that the facts did not support the requested instructions.

La.C.Cr.P. art. 802 mandates that the trial court instruct the jury on the law applicable to each case. State v. Batiste, 06-824, p. 14 (La.App. 5 Cir. 3/13/07), 956 So.2d 626, 636, unit denied, 07-0892 (La.1/25/08), 973 So.2d 751. The trial court is required to charge the jury on the law applicable to any theory of defense, when properly requested, which the jurors could reasonably infer from the evidence. Id.

La.C.Cr.P. art. 807 mandates that a requested special charge shall be given by the court if it does not require qualification, limitation, or explanation, and if it is wholly pertinent and correct. Id. The evidence presented at trial must support the requested special charge. Id. Failure to give a requested jury instruction constitutes reversible error only when there is a miscarriage of justice, prejudice to the substantial rights of the accused, or a substantial violation of a constitutional or statutory right. State v. Lawson, 08-123, p. 15 (La.App. 5 Cir. 11/12/08), 1 So.3d 516, 527.

Turning to the first jury instruction, La. R.S. 14:21 provides: “A person who is the aggressor or who brings on a difficulty cannot claim the right of self-defense unless he withdraws from the conflict in good faith and in such a manner that his adversary knows or should know that he desires to withdraw and discontinue the conflict.” See State v. Patterson, 10-415, p. 12 (La.App. 5 Cir. 1/11/11), 63 So.3d 140, 149, writ denied, 11-0338 (La.6/17/11), 63 So.3d 1037. In cases where the |7defendant is engaged in an armed robbery and claims self-defense, Louisiana courts have found La. R.S. 14:21 inapplicable. For instance, in State v. Scales, 93-2003 (La.5/22/95), 655 So.2d 1326, 1336, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1050, 116 S.Ct. 716, 133 L.Ed.2d 670 (1996), the Louisiana Supreme Court found that because the defendant brought on the difficulty by engaging in an armed robbery at the time of the shooting, he could not claim the right of self-defense. Similarly, the Second Circuit found that regardless of conflicting testimony regarding who fired the first shot, because the defendant was engaged in an armed robbery at the time of the shooting, he was unquestionably the aggressor and had no right to claim self-defense. State v. Hopkins, 34,119, pp. 7-8 (La.App. 2 Cir. 12/20/00), 774 So.2d 1178, 1183.

In the instant case, defendant contends that he retreated from the barroom, which signaled his desire to withdraw from the conflict. He contends that he only reentered the bar after Wallace Gomez fired his weapon in order to defend his friend, Mario Funes. We find no merit in defendant’s argument.

Defendant’s argument ignores his actions that led to Wallace Gomez arming himself. Defendant and his four armed accomplices entered Gomez’s Bar on October 30, 2008 intending to rob the bar and patrons; as such, they were the initial aggressors and, pursuant to Scales and Hopkins, have no right to claim self-defense. Further, defendant was not even in the bar when Wallace fired his weapon so the facts do not suggest that he was in imminent danger of losing his life or receiving great bodily harm. La. R.S. 14:20. Upon review, we find that the trial court did not commit reversible error in declining the requested jury instruction.

Turning to the second jury instruction, defendant contends that Wallace Gomez was not justified in defending his bar with deadly force. Defendant relies |8on State v. Plumlee, 177 La. 687, 149 So. 425, 429 (1933), in which the Louisiana Supreme Court recognized that one does not have the right to take human life directly or indirectly to prevent trespass or other petty crime. Again, we find no merit in defendant’s argument.

First, defendant was not present for, not involved in, nor a witness to any use of force by Wallace Gomez. Thus, the determination of whether Wallace was justified in his use of force is not relevant to defendant’s case.

Second, even if defendant had the right to question the use of force by Wallace Gomez, Louisiana law permits the use of deadly force to prevent the commission of a violent or forcible felony carrying the risk of death or of great bodily harm directed against the person. State v. Deshotel, 96-0778 (La.5/31/96), 674 So.2d 260 (per curiam) (citations omitted); La. R.S. 14:20. Here, Wallace and his customers were robbed at gunpoint by multiple gunmen, which created a substantial risk of death or great bodily harm to each of them. We find that the trial court did not commit reversible error in declining to allow this special jury charge. Defendant’s first assignment of error lacks merit.

In his second assignment of error, defendant argues that his consecutive sentences are excessive because imposition of a sentence for a term beyond natural life makes no contribution to the acceptable goals of punishment and constitutes a purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering. Defendant also claims that the trial court failed to specify reasons for the consecutive nature of the sentences. In response, the State points out that, before his sentencing, defendant did not seek a Dorthey deviation of his legislatively-mandated minimum | sentences, nor has he shown that said deviation is warranted in this case so this issue is moot. Notwithstanding this claim of mootness, the State still argues that the trial judge’s specified reasons for imposing the three consecutive sentences make clear that he did not abuse his discretion.

The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 20 of the Louisiana Constitution prohibit the imposition of excessive punishment. A sentence is considered excessive if it is grossly disproportionate to the offense or imposes needless and purposeless pain and suffering. State v. Smith, 01-2574, p. 6 (La.1/14/03), 839 So.2d 1, 4. A sentence is grossly disproportionate if, when the crime and punishment are considered in light of the harm done to society, it shocks the sense of justice. State v. Lawson, 04-334, p. 6 (La.App. 5 Cir. 9/28/04), 885 So.2d 618, 622.

A sentence can be reviewed for constitutional excessiveness even if it is within statutory limits. Smith, supra. Second degree murder carries a mandatory life sentence. La. R.S. 14:30.1. A mandatory minimum sentence is presumed constitutional. State v. Royal, 03-439, p. 12 (La.App. 5 Cir. 9/30/03), 857 So.2d 1167, 1174, writ denied, 03-3172 (La.3/19/04), 869 So.2d 849. Further, Louisiana courts have consistently held that a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment for second degree murder does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. See State v. Lovick, 00-1833, p. 15 (La.App. 5 Cir. 5/16/01), 788 So.2d 565, 573, writ denied, 01-1836 (La. 5/10/02), 815 So.2d 833; State v. Hill, 98-1087, p. 15 (La.App. 5 Cir. 8/31/99), 742 So.2d 690, 698-99, writ denied, 99-2848 (La.3/24/00),\10758 So.2d 147(mandatory life sentence for second-degree murder not excessive even when the offender is a juvenile).

When imposing a sentence, a trial judge has broad discretion and a reviewing court may not set a sentence aside absent a manifest abuse of discretion. The issue on appeal is whether the trial court abused its discretion, not whether another sentence might have been more appropriate. State v. Dorsey, 07-67, p. 5 (La.App. 5 Cir. 5/29/07), 960 So.2d 1127, 1130. Plus, if the record supports the sentence imposed, the appellate court shall not set it aside for excessiveness. State v. Pearson, 07-332, p. 15 (La.App. 5 Cir. 12/27/07), 975 So.2d 646, 656. In reviewing a trial court’s sentencing discretion, three factors are considered: 1) the nature of the crime; 2) the nature and background of the offender; and 3) the sentence imposed for similar crimes by the same court and other courts. Id., 07-332 at 15-16, 975 So.2d at 656.

Louisiana law favors concurrent sentences for crimes committed as part of a single transaction. La.C.Cr.P. art. 883; State v. Underwood, 353 So.2d 1013, 1019 (La.1977). A trial judge, however, retains discretion to impose consecutive penalties on the basis of other factors, including the offender’s past criminality, violence in the charged crimes, or the risk he or she poses to the general safety of the community. State v. Thomas, 91-1144 (La.10/9/98), 719 So.2d 49 (per curiam) (citations omitted).

Additionally, if the trial court elects to impose consecutive sentences for crimes arising from a single course of conduct, it must articulate the reasons it feels the sentence is necessary. State v. Blanchard, 03-0612 (La.App. 5 Cir. 11/12/03), 861 So.2d 657, 664. The failure to articulate specific reasons for imposing consecutive sentences does not, however, require remand if the record provides an adequate factual basis to support the consecutive sentences. Id.

Inin the instant case, when the trial judge sentenced the defendant, he articulated the following reasons for imposing consecutive terms:

Mr. Garcia, I sat through your trial, sir. And the testimony that I focus on today is your very own statement wherein you cooperated with law enforcement authorities. And in that statement it was abundantly clear to the Court that you came to the metro New Orleans area for the purpose of not only participating in a band, or playing a musical instrument, or entertainment of some sort, but, also, for the purpose of committing an armed robbery. That was the discussion that occurred in the car. And those are from your own words.
The crime for which you have been convicted is three counts of second degree murder. And, as I’ve told your previous [cojdefendants at their sentencing hearings, and I will say to you, that the value of human life is precious. And three lives were lost that day for which you were tried.
My only discretion is whether to run these sentences concurrent or consecutive with one another. And, from my point of view, running them concurrent would do an injustice to the lives that were lost that day.
As Mr. Wilner and Mr. Wallace argued to the jury — and I listened with a keen ear — in for a penny in for a pound is what I heard repeatedly in argument. And everyone had a role, you in particular. Without the driver, you folks would not have been able to get to the bar; without the weapons, you would not have been able to commit the armed robbery. And, from your participation, you actually removed personal items, whether they be watches, wallets, keys, cell phones from the victims. You gathered those. You were critical. You were part of a team. And from my perspective, you’re as culpable as all the rest.
For those reason[s], on each count of second degree murder, I sentence you to life imprisonment at hard labor in the custody of the Department of Corrections without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.
Those three sentences are to run consecutive to one another.

Here, the trial judge imposed consecutive sentences based upon the facts that defendant and his four accomplices premeditated an armed robbery using firearms, which resulted in four deaths. Furthermore, the record reflects that defendant’s actions were particularly heinous because he had retreated from the bar without inflicting any serious injury then re-entered the bar and discharged his weapon in defense of his cohort. The testimony reflects that only defendant and his accomplice, Rigoberto Funes, fired weapons during this second volley of gunfire. | ^More importantly, the evidence reflects that Jeffrey Carmadelle and Wayne Hebert were both killed during this onslaught. If defendant had not reentered the bar, two deaths might have been avoided.

Finally, Louisiana jurisprudence supports the trial judge’s decision to impose consecutive sentences. See, State v. Bibb, 626 So.2d 913, 940 (La.App. 5 Cir.1993), writ denied, 642 So.2d 188 (La.l994)(two consecutive life sentences for two counts of first degree murder not constitutionally excessive for defendant that murdered his five-year-old son and his two-year-old daughter); State v. Wood, 08-1511, pp. 18-24 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/3/09), 11 So.3d 701, 711-16 (three consecutive life sentences for three counts of second degree murder not constitutionally excessive); and State v. Smith, 44,998, pp. 17-19 (La.App. 2 Cir. 3/31/10), 34 So.3d 386, 396-97, writ denied, 10-0980 (La.12/10/10), 51 So.3d 722 (two consecutive life sentences for two counts of second degree murder not constitutionally excessive for recidivist defendant convicted of ambush murder of two police officers).

In the instant case, given the gravity of defendant’s offense, the articulated reasons by the trial judge, and the supporting jurisprudence, we find no abuse of the trial court’s discretion in imposing three consecutive life sentences. This assignment of error has no merit.

Finally, pursuant to our routine practice, we have reviewed the record for errors patent, according to La.C.Cr.P. art. 920. We note that defendant received an incomplete advisal of the time period within which he is allowed to apply for post-conviction relief. By way of this opinion, we advise defendant that, under La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.8, no application for post-conviction relief, including applications which seek an out-of-time appeal, shall be considered if it is filed more than two years after the judgment of conviction and sentence has become final under the |13provisions of La.C.Cr.P. arts. 914 or 922. See State v. Ramsey, 10-333, p. 10 (La. App. 5 Cir. 1/25/11), 60 So.3d 36, 42; State v. Davenport, 08-463, p. 10-11 (La.App. 5 Cir. 11/25/08), 2 So.3d 445, 451, writ denied, 09-0158 (La.10/16/09), 10 So.3d 473. In all respects, defendant’s convictions and sentences are affirmed.

AFFIRMED

      . The four co-defendants are Mario A. Funes, Rigoberto Funes, Pedro A. Navarette-Duran, and Renel D. Escobar-Rivera.

      . The trial judge quashed the indictment against the co-defendants for Beauford Gomez's murder after ballistics determined that Beauford Gomez was killed by a bullet fired from Wallace Gomez’s gun.

      . Gomez's Bar cashed checks often for regular patrons of the bar. The money was kept in three safes in the back room of the bar, referred to as the office.

      . Stanley Gomez testified: ‘T don’t know who shot first, but that's when the shooting started.” One eyewitness, Keith Cummings, testified: "Mr. Wallace shot him and the dude shot Mr. Wallace, and they kept shooting each other multiple times, toe to toe.” Another eyewitness, Earl Scioneaux, testified: "And then when Wallace asked him that, he turned, lifted his pistol. When he lifted his pistol, that's when Wallace shot him.” On cross-examination, Mr. Scioneaux conceded that his statement to the police did not include an assertion that the gunman raised his weapon first.

      .Mario and Rigoberto Funes are brothers.

      . These two individuals, Pedro Navarette-Du-ran and Renel Escobar-Rivera, were apprehended a week later in Houston and San Antonio, Texas, respectively.

      . Prior to trial, on November 15, 2010, the defense sought special jury instructions. On November 17, 2010, the trial court denied defense counsel’s request for the special jury instructions.

      . In Plumlee, the victim was killed by means of a spring gun set by the defendant to protect his chicken coop. Id., 149 So. at 427.

      . In his motion to reconsider sentence, defendant argued his consecutive sentences were excessive because all counts occurred during a single episode, but the trial court denied that motion.

      . At a defendant’s request, a trial court may reduce a presumptively constitutional sentence if it determines the sentence makes no "measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment” or that the sentence amounts to nothing more than "the purposeful imposition of pain and suffering” and is "grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime” as applied to a particular defendant. State v. Dorthey, 623 So.2d 1276, 1280-81 (La. 1993).

      .When a defendant seeks a downward deviation from the mandatory sentence, he has the burden to rebut the presumption of constitutionality by showing by clear and convincing evidence that he is exceptional, namely that he is a victim of the legislature’s failure to assign sentences that are meaningfully tailored to the gravity of the offense, the culpability of the offender, and the circumstances of the case. State v. Berniard, 03-484, p. 13 (La.App. 5 Cir. 10/15/03), 860 So.2d 66, 75, writ denied, 03-3210 (La.3/26/04), 871 So.2d 345.


author: MAX N. TOBIAS, JR., Judge.

text:
    BICKHAM, et al. v. LAMMICO, et al.
    No. 2011-CA-0900.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.
    Feb. 1, 2012.
    Rehearing Denied March 7, 2012.

      Marie Riccio Wisner, Law Offices of Marie Riccio Wisner, New Orleans, LA, for Plaintiff/Appellant.
    Franklin D. Beahm, Jacob Best, Beahm & Green, New Orleans, LA, for Defendant/Appellee.

      (Court composed of Judge TERRI F. LOVE, Judge MAX N. TOBIAS, JR., Judge DANIEL L. DYSART).
   MAX N. TOBIAS, JR., Judge.

Bln this medical malpractice action, the plaintiffs, Jerry and Ella Bickham, appeal from a motion for summary judgment granted in favor of the defendant, the Estate of John D. Jackson, M.D. (“Dr. Jackson”), wherein the court determined: (1) Dr. Jackson was a qualified healthcare provider under the Louisiana Medical Malpractice Act, La. R.S. 40:1299.41, et seq. (the “Act”), at the time of the alleged malpractice, and (2) Dr. Jackson was entitled to summary judgment by virtue of a settlement entered into by the Bickhams and a co-defendant, Delta Radiology, L.L.C. (“Delta”). For the following reasons, we affirm.

On 30 November 1997, Jerry Bickham (“Mr. Bickham”) was injured in an automobile accident and taken by ambulance to the emergency room at Riverside Medical Center (“Riverside”) in Franklinton, Louisiana. While at Riverside, Mr. Bickham was evaluated and treated by Dr. Basem Yacoub. At his request, Mr. Bickham was transferred that same day to East Jefferson General Hospital (“EJGH”) for further treatment. The following day, 1 December 1997, Mr. Bickham was evaluated by defendant, Dr. Jackson. While at EJGH, Mr. Bickham was diagnosed with a spinal cord compression injury rendering him a quadriplegic.

1 ¡^Following a medical review panel finding that none of the healthcare providers breached the applicable standard of care, the Bickhams filed two suits against various medical providers involved in his treatment. The first suit was filed in the Twenty-Second Judicial District Court for the Parish of Washington against Riverside and certain members on staff at that facility. The instant suit was filed in the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans naming as defendants: Louisiana Medical Mutual Insurance Company (“LAMMICO”); Delta; Dr. Richard Tu-pler and Dr. Josh Patel (both radiologist employed by Delta); Dr. Rene deBois-blanc, a general surgeon; nurse Mize; and Dr. Jackson, a neurosurgeon working at EJGH. The Bickhams subsequently entered into a settlement agreement with Delta and its insurer, LAMMICO, for $100,000.00, and released Delta and its employees, Drs. Tupler and Patel. The Bick-hams also settled with the Louisiana Patient’s Compensation Fund (“PCF”), for $700,000.00, plus future medicals as defined by Louisiana Statute and regulated by the Louisiana Patient’s Compensation Fund. The Bickhams, however, reserved all rights against all other defendants, including the right to “pre-judgment interest from in solido obligors.”

On 24 September 2010, Dr. Jackson again filed a motion for summary judgment on the basis that he was a qualified healthcare provider eligible for participation in the PCF on the date he treated Mr. Bickham and that the plaintiffs have recovered the maximum amount under the damages cap provided by the Act, in accordance with this court’s previous ruling in Bickham v. Inphynet, 07-0356, |3unpublished (La.App. 4 Cir. 7/13/07), unit denied, 07-1863 (La.11/16/07), 967 So.2d 524, wherein we held that “[Mr.] Bickham had exhausted the statutory limit of general damages and, therefore, cannot proceed against another health care provider” and that Bickham’s “remedy under the statute is to make a claim with the PCF for future medical expenses as they are incurred.” Following a hearing on the motion, the trial judge, without assigning reasons, signed a judgment on 29 December 2010, granting Dr. Jackson’s motion for summary judgment and dismissing the Bick-hams’ claims against Dr. Jackson and the Estate of John D. Jackson, M.D., with prejudice. The Bickhams now appeal from this judgment.

DISCUSSION

Appellate courts review summary judgment de novo, using the same criteria that govern the trial court’s consideration of whether summary judgment is appropriate. La. C.C.P. art. 966; Hutchinson v. Knights of Columbus, Council No. 5747, 03-1533, p. 5 (La.2/20/04), 866 So.2d 228, 232; Harris v. Sternberg, 01-1827, p. 4 (La.App. 4 Cir. 5/22/02), 819 So.2d 1134, 1137.

The Bickhams’ appeal raises two issues for review: (1) whether the trial court erred in determining that the summary judgment evidence presented on behalf of Dr. Jackson established that he satisfied the requirements of a qualified healthcare provider pursuant to La. R.S. 40:1299.41, et seq., and (2) whether the |4trial court erred in dismissing the claim for interest and costs on the grounds that the Bick-hams have already received the maximum recovery under the Act. Finding no error in the trial court’s determination of these issues, we affirm the judgment below in its entirety.

Dr. Jackson’s Status as a Qualified Healthcare Provider

In the instant case, the Bickhams attack the qualification of Dr. Jackson as a qualified healthcare provider entitled to the benefits and protections afforded by the Act. The purpose of the Act is to limit the liability of healthcare providers who qualify by maintaining specified malpractice insurance and by paying a surcharge to the PCF. A qualified healthcare provider is liable for malpractice only to the extent provided in the Act; namely, a qualified healthcare provider has no liability for any amount in excess of $100,000.00, plus interest. La. R.S. 40:1299.41 B(2); La. R.S. 40:1299.45 A; Sewell v. Doctors Hospital, 600 So.2d 577 (La.1992). A defendant healthcare provider bears the burden of proving that he comes within the protections afforded by the Act. Remet v. Martin, 97-0895, p. 4 (La.App. 4 Cir. 12/10/97), 705 So.2d 1132, 1134.

To obtain the benefit of the limitation of liability, a healthcare provider must become qualified by fulfilling the requirements of La. R.S. 40:1299.42 A as follows:

To be qualified under the provisions of this Part, a health care provider shall:
(1) Cause to be filed with the board proof of financial responsibility as provided in Subsection E of this Section.
1 s(2) Pay the surcharge assessed by this Part on all health care providers according to La. R.S. 40:1299.44.
(3) For self-insureds, qualification shall be effective upon acceptance of proof of financial responsibility by and payment of the surcharge to the board. Qualification shall be effective for all others at the time the malpractice insurer accepts payment of the surcharge.

The requirement of proof of financial responsibility is further explained in La. R.S. 40:1299.42 E(l), which states, in pertinent part:

Financial responsibility of a health care provider under this Section may be established only by filing with the board proof that the health care provider is insured by a policy of malpractice insurance in the amount of at least one hundred thousand dollars per claim with qualification under this Section taking effect and following the same form as the policy of malpractice liability insurance of the health care provider, or in the event the health care provider is self-insured, proof of financial responsibility by depositing with the board one hundred twenty-five thousand dollars in money or represented by irrevocable letters of credit, federally insured certificates of deposit, bonds, securities, cash values of insurance, or any other security approved by the board.

These same requirements are reiterated in the Louisiana Administrative Code at La. Admin. Code 37:III.501, et seq., which governs the qualifications, conditions, and procedures required for PCF enrollment. The basic qualifications for enrollment are set forth in La. Admin. Code 37:III.503, which requires that a healthcare provider as defined by the Act (a) demonstrate and maintain financial responsibility, (b) make an application for enrollment, and (c) pay the applicable surcharges. Of particular relevance is La. Admin. Code 37:III.515, which provides as follows:

A. Upon receipt and approval of a completed application (including evidence of financial responsibility pursuant to § 505, § 507 or § 509) Rand payment of the applicable surcharge by or on behalf of the applicant health care provider, the executive director shall issue and deliver to the health care provider a certificate of enrollment with the fund, identifying the qualified health care provider and specifying the effective date and term of such enrollment and the scope of the fund’s coverage for that health care provider.
B. Duplicate or additional certificates of enrollment shall be made available by the executive director to and upon the request of an enrolled health care provider or his or its attorney, or professional liability insurance underwriter when such certification is required to evidence enrollment with the fund in connection with an actual or proposed malpractice claim against the health care provider.

These provisions demonstrate that a healthcare provider becomes enrolled in the PCF, and thus qualified, upon approval of an application, demonstration of financial responsibility to the satisfaction of the PCF, and payment of the applicable surcharge to the PCF. Upon satisfaction of these three basic requirements, a certifí-cate of enrollment is issued, and this certificate establishes the healthcare provider to be a qualified healthcare provider under the Act.

La. R.S. 40:1299.47 makes reference to the “certifícate of enrollment” issued by the PCF as follows:

A. (l)(a)(i) No action against a health care provider covered by this Part, or his insurer may be commenced in any court before the claimant’s proposed complaint has been presented to a medical review panel established pursuant to this Section.
17(ii) A certificate of enrollment issued by the board shall be admitted into evidence.

This is the only reference to the “certificate of enrollment” contained in the Act. Per this statutory authority providing for the “certificate of enrollment” as evidence, the jurisprudence holds the certificate is competent evidence to establish a prima, facie case for the applicability of the medical malpractice law regarding claims against the party identified on the certificate. La. R.S. 13:3711, 3712; Goins v. Texas State Optical, Inc., 463 So.2d 743, 745 (La.App. 4th Cir.1985).

Additionally, a separate surcharge is not required to be paid to the PCF on behalf of a qualified healthcare provider for each malpractice insurance policy covering the provider. The Act does not mandate a healthcare provider pay multiple surcharges in order to achieve qualified status. Moreover, qualification is a status granted to healthcare providers, not insurance companies. Only the healthcare provider can take steps to qualify under the Act and avail himself of the Act’s benefits. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v. Eusea, 99-2117, pp. 7-8 (La.App. 1 Cir. 9/22/00), 775 So.2d 32, 37.

Our review of the record, in the instant case evidences that Dr. Jackson presented a prima facie case establishing that he satisfied all of the necessary requirements for participation in the PCF for the year 1997, including the time he treated Mr. Bickham as a self-insured physician who was being paid as an employee of Columbia Jefferson Medical Center (“Columbia Jefferson”). Once Dr. Jackson fulfilled the requirements of becoming qualified under the Act, he was deemed as entitled to receive every benefit of the Act. To show that he was qualified, Dr. Jackson submitted Proof of Financial Responsibility, a Physician Application and Request for Quotation, and evidence of a premium payment for |sthe year 1997 that was made on his behalf for the period during which he treated Mr. Bickham.

Specifically, the sworn statements of Lorraine LeBlanc, executive director of the PCF, demonstrate that proof of financial responsibility and an enrollment form were submitted for Dr. Jackson and the applicable surcharges were paid on his behalf. In her affidavit submitted in support of Dr. Jackson’s motion for summary judgment, Ms. LeBlanc attests to the authenticity of the Proof of Financial Responsibility tendered to the PCF on Dr. Jackson’s behalf, and to the authenticity of the check issued by Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corporation to the PCF on or about 11 December 1996, for premium payments for the enrollment of Columbia Jefferson and Dr. Jackson in the PCF for the 1997 calendar year. The Bickhams argue that Dr. Jackson is unqualified for participation in the PCF because the proof of financial responsibility and surcharge submitted on his behalf were submitted by Columbia Jefferson. We find no caselaw, statutory authority, or language contained within La. Admin Code 37:111.501, et seq., which prevents an employer from submitting the required proof of financial responsibility on behalf of an employee to qualify that employee, independently and individually, for participation in the PCF.

Ms. LeBlanc further attests that “Dr. Jackson was and is a qualified healthcare provider properly enrolled in the Louisiana Patient’s Compensation Fund with respect to any alleged act of malpractice which may have occurred during the calendar years of 1997 and 1998.” Based upon her review of the PCF’s records concerning Dr. Jackson, she concluded that he was and is “entitled to all privileges, immunities, limitations, and/or protections provided to qualified | ^healthcare providers by the Louisiana Medical Malpractice Act, La. R.S. 40:1299.41, et seq., for the calendar years of 1997 and 1998.”

Once Dr. Jackson presented a prim,a facie ease of his status as a qualified healthcare provider entitled to the protections and benefits afforded by the Act at the time of the alleged malpractice, the burden shifted to the Bickhams to come forward with competent evidence rebutting that status and creating a genuine issue of material fact so as to defeat Dr. Jackson’s motion for summary judgment. We find that the Bickhams have failed to do so.

In an effort to create a genuine issue of material fact, the Bickhams argue that Ms. LeBlanc’s deposition testimony conflicts with her subsequent affidavit regarding the status of Dr. Jackson as a qualified healthcare provider. Contrary to the Bickhams’ assertions, we find no conflict exists in the deposition testimony given by Ms. LeBlanc and her later executed affidavit that creates a genuine issue of fact which would warrant reversal of the trial court’s judgment. In her deposition, Ms. LeBlanc was asked to produce documentation substantiating that Dr. Jackson filed the requisite physician self-insurance application and that he provided the appropriate proof of financial responsibility to the PCF in support of his application to be enrolled in the PCF as a self-insured provider. At the time of her deposition, Ms. LeBlanc was unable to locate the requested documentation. Thereafter, however, according to her affidavit, a copy of the Physician Application and Request for Quotation for physicians with underlying self-insurance, which was submitted on behalf of Dr. Jackson in support of his application for PCF qualification, was found. Ms. LeBlanc attested that the reason she was unable to locate the proof of financial responsibility during her deposition was because the premium tendered on behalf of Dr. Jackson had been tendered by | inColumbia/HCA Healthcare Corporation and was not maintained in the PCF’s files under Dr. Jackson’s name. Ms. LeBlanc stated the requisite paperwork filed on Dr. Jackson’s behalf unequivocally demonstrated to her that Dr. Jackson was, in fact, enrolled in the PCF and was a qualified healthcare provider with the PCF for any alleged acts of medical malpractice which may have occurred during the 1997 calendar year.

The Bickhams also argue that Dr. Jackson’s qualification for participation in the PCF was limited solely to the treatment he rendered while acting within the course and scope of his employment with Columbia Jefferson. The Bickhams contend that because Mr. Bickham was treated by Dr. Jackson at EJGH, the treatment rendered was not within Dr. Jackson’s employment with Columbia Jefferson, and thus, Dr. Jackson was not qualified for participation in the PCF with respect to his treatment of Mr. Bickham. We have found no jurisprudence or statutory authority, and the Bickhams cite none, suggesting that an employee of a facility that is qualified for participation in the PCF is only qualified under the Act when providing healthcare services and/or treatment within the course and scope of his or her employment at that specific facility.

Dr. Jackson’s employment contract expressly refutes the Bickhams’ position. Specifically, Section 19(i) of Dr. Jackson’s employment contract provides that “Employee shall have the right to admit and treat patients at hospitals other than that of the Employer.” This contract was authenticated, and Dr. Jackson’s employment with Columbia Jefferson verified, through the affidavit of Robert Lagesse, the Physician Operations Vice President for the Delta Division of HCA, Inc. Additionally, Ms. LeBlanc’s affidavit states that proof of financial responsibility submitted by an employer on behalf of a physician employee is | n permissible and does not affect the extent or scope of that physician’s enrollment in the PCF or status as a qualified healthcare provider in the PCF. Accordingly, we hold that Dr. Jackson, having established through proper documentation that proof of financial responsibility, surcharge, and application were submitted on his behalf, was qualified for participation in the PCF regardless of whether he was providing medical care at the facility with which he had an employment relationship or at any other facility, such as EJGH, where he might have privileges to render medical treatment.

In conclusion, we find the Bickhams have produced no competent evidence establishing that there existed any limitation on the scope of the proof of financial responsibility or premiums paid to the PCF on Dr. Jackson’s behalf. Moreover, the Bickhams have failed to submit evidence refuting the certified documentation and sworn statements submitted by Dr. Jackson establishing that at the time he treated Mr. Bickham, he was a qualified healthcare provider eligible for participation in the PCF. Accordingly, we find the trial judge properly granted the motion for summary judgment on the issue.

Recovery of Interest and Cost

In their second assignment of error, the Bickhams assert that, despite settlement with Delta, LAMMICO, and the PCF, the recovery of $800,000.00 does not preclude proceeding against other non-settling healthcare provider defendants found to be comparatively at fault for uncapped damages, specifically, interest and costs, up to their individual $100,000.00 limitation on liability. According to the 11?Bickhams, while the Act requires that future medical expenses and related benefits are to be paid by the PCF, no provision in the Act or in the Louisiana jurisprudence exists which would relieve the co-defendant qualified healthcare providers from the obligation of paying their proportionate share of interest on $100,000.00, plus costs, based on their percentage of comparative fault following a settlement with a co-provider.

In essence, the Bickhams ask this court to determine res nova whether a plaintiff can pursue a claim against a non-settling qualified healthcare provider, who has not been voluntarily dismissed from the suit, for interest (on an amount based upon his/her/its percentage of fault not to exceed his/her/its individual limitation of liability of $100,000.00), and costs where the plaintiff, having reserved his rights against the non-settling defendants for pre-judgment interest, has previously received in settlement with one health care provider and the PCF the entire $500,000.00 statutory cap allowed for medical malpractice damages under the Act. We hold that a plaintiff cannot.

At the time of the alleged malpractice at issue, La. R.S. 40:1299.42 B provided, in pertinent part:

(1) The total amount recoverable for all malpractice claims for injuries to or death of a patient, exclusive of future medical care and related benefits as provided in R.S. 40:1299.43, shall not exceed five hundred thousand dollars plus interest and cost.
(2) A health care provider qualified under this Part is not liable for an amount in excess of one hundred thousand dollars plus interest thereon accruing after April 1,1991, | ,ofor all malpractice claims because of injuries to or death of any one patient.
(3)(a) Any amount due from a judgment or settlement or from a final award in an arbitration proceeding which is in excess of the total liability of all liable health care providers, as provided in Paragraph (2) of this Subsection, shall be paid from the patient’s compensation fund pursuant to the provisions of R.S. 40:1299.44(C).
(b) The total amounts paid in accordance with Paragraphs (2) and (3) of this Subsection shall not exceed the limitation as provided in Paragraph (1) of this Subsection.

Under the Act, an injured party has the option of pursuing his/her claim for malpractice against either (1) one or more solidarily liable qualified health care providers up to $100,000.00 each, plus judicial interest, subject to the statutory maximum of $500,000.00, or (2) against one qualified health care provider for $100,000.00, plus judicial interest, and the balance over $100,000.00, from the PCF subject to the statutory maximum.

In the instant case, the Bickhams opted to settle their claim against one of the qualified health care providers, Delta, for $100,000.00 and with the PCF for the remaining balance. While the Bickhams were entitled under the Act to seek judicial interest from Delta on the $100,000.00 they received in settlement from Delta, it appears the Bickhams waived this right in settlement. In doing so, the Bickhams were operating under the mistaken belief that by specifically reserving their rights against the non-settling healthcare providers to pursue pre-judgment interest, they could recover interest on the $100,000.00 received from Delta in settlement from the non-settling health care providers in proportion to each 114provider’s respective percentage of liability, not to exceed his/her individual $100,000.00 cap. We hold that when a plaintiff in a medical malpractice action opts to settle his/her claim with one qualified healthcare provider for $100,000.00 and to proceed against the PCF for the balance up to the statutory cap, judicial interest on the $100,000.00 tendered in settlement by the healthcare provider is the responsibility of the settling healthcare provider and judicial interest on the $400,000.00 tendered in settlement by the PCF is the responsibility of the PCF. As to the payment of costs, we hold that under the statute in effect at the time of Mr. Bickham’s injury, this is the responsibility of the PCF.

CONCLUSION

For the forgoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

AFFIRMED.

LOVE, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with reasons.

LOVE, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with reasons.

hi concur in the majority’s affirmation of the trial court’s determination that Dr. Jackson established that he satisfied the requirements of a qualified healthcare provider under the Louisiana Medical Malpractice Act (“the Act”). However, I respectfully dissent from the dismissal of the Bickhams’ claim for interest and costs on the grounds that they have already received the maximum recovery under the Act.

In accordance with the Louisiana Supreme Court’s interpretation of Miller v. LAMMICO, 07-1352 (La.1/16/08), 973 So.2d 693, and comparative fault provisions, qualified health care providers are responsible for their share of apportioned fault, up to the statutory limit provided by La. R.S. 40:1299.42(B)(2). In Miller, the Court opined that “[pjroviders already receive the benefits intended by the legislature, the primary benefit being that the amount of their liability is limited to $100,000 pursuant to La. R.S. 40:1299.42(B)(2).” Id. Providing the possibility of an additional benefit does not conform with the purposes of either the Medical Malpractice Act or the comparative fault scheme.

I therefore find that not allowing a plaintiff to recover interest and costs from a non-settling, qualified health care provider would provide the “additional benefit” that the Supreme Court interprets that the statute seeks to avoid. Also, this [ 2Court has ruled that “nothing in the malpractice act ... states that once the victim settles with one health care provider, the victim is precluded from seeking a determination of liability against remaining health care providers.” Remet v. Martin, 98-2751 (La. App. 4th Cir.3/31/99), 737 So.2d 124, 132. Therefore, I would allow the plaintiffs to recover interest and costs from a non-settling, qualified health care provider such as Dr. Jackson.

ON APPLICATION FOR REHEARING

The appellant’s application for rehearing is denied. The Patient’s Compensation Fund confessed that Dr. Jackson was a covered health care provider. Under our jurisprudence that ends the inquiry.

REHEARING DENIED.

      . In January 2010, following the death of Dr. Jackson, the Administrator/Executor of the Succession of Dr. John Jackson was substituted as a defendant.

      . Dr. Jackson previously filed the same motion for summary judgment in 2006 seeking dismissal on the grounds that he was a qualified healthcare provider through his employment with the self-insured hospital, Columbia Jefferson Medical Center, an affiliate of Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corporation (now known as HCA, Inc.), at the time of the alleged malpractice. Dr. Jackson's motion was denied at that time on the basis that Dr. Jackson failed to establish the filing of a self-insurance application or that the requisite $125,000.00 surcharge had been paid demonstrating that he was a qualified healthcare provider at the time he treated Mr. Bickham.

      . In Bickham v. Louisiana Emergency Med. Consultants, Inc., 10-0535 (La.App. 1 Cir. 11/1/10), 52 So.3d 162, the First Circuit reached the same conclusion in the Bick-hams' first suit brought in Washington Parish, holding "[b]ased on the record before the court, we conclude that Mr. Bickham suffered a single, indivisible injury from which all plaintiffs’ damages flow. Because the plaintiffs have recovered the statutory maximum permitted under La. R.S. 40:1299.42(B)(1) for Mr. Bickham’s injury, plaintiffs cannot recover any additional amount from Lifeline for the damages Mr. Bickham may have suffered as a result of Lifelines [sic] medical treatment and care of him.” Bickham, p. 9, 52 So.3d at 167.

      . The judgment from which the Bickhams appeal was designated by the trial court as a final judgment for purposes of appeal and included an express determination that there was no just reason for delaying any appeal.

      . For all statutory references in this opinion, we refer to the versions applicable at the time the alleged malpractice occurred on 30 November 1997.

      . If a healthcare provider posts the required bond to be self-insured and pays the surcharge required by the PCF, the healthcare provider becomes a qualified healthcare provider having all of the benefits of the Act. Evans v. Louisiana Patient's Compensation Fund, 02-0538, pp. 7-8 (La.App. 4 Cir. 2/25/04), 869 So.2d 234, 240. Once the bond is posted and the surcharge is paid, coverage occurs. Id.

      . The Bickhams settled with Delta and LAM-MICO for $100,000.00. They also settled with the PCF for $700,000.00; however, no breakdown or designation of the amounts paid is provided in order to definitively determine whether interests and costs were included and/or considered. Given that the PCF paid $300,000.00 over and above its statutory cap of $400,000.00, arguably this additional $300,000.00 paid included payment of interest and costs on the $400,000.00.

      . The record indicates that judicial interest, which accrued from 1 May 1998, the date of judicial demand, until 15 August 2006, the date of settlement, and costs exceeded the $100,000.00 limit of liability paid by the settling healthcare provider, Delta.

      . A copy of the settlement agreement reached between the Bickhams and Delta, LAMMICO, and the PCF is not contained in the record on appeal.


author: SAUNDERS, Judge. AMY, J.,

text:
    Dionysia PREJEAN v. Robert T. BAROUSSE, Acadia Parish Clerk of Court.
    No. 11-1368.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.
    March 7, 2012.
    Rehearing Denied April 25, 2012.

      Dionysia F. Huval Prejean, In Proper Person, Egan, LA, for Plaintiff Appellant, Dionysia F. Huval Prejean.
    Robert T. Barousse, Acadia Parish Clerk of Court, In Proper Person, Crowley, LA, for Defendant Appellee, Robert T. Barousse, Acadia Parish Clerk of Court.
    Court composed of JOHN D. SAUNDERS, OSWALD A. DECUIR, and MARC T. AMY, Judges.
   SAUNDERS, Judge.

| jThis case involves a litigant who requested a trial court to issue two writs of mandamus after the statutorily allowed delay in judgment for her case was exceeded according to La.R.S. 13:4207 and La.R.S. 13:4210. The trial court denied these writs. We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY:

Dionysia Huval Prejean (Prejean) petitioned the trial court to issue two writs of mandamus on July 13, 2011. Both writs were requested pursuant to La.R.S. 13:4210. The first was that the Acadia Parish Clerk of Court notify the auditor that a district judge failed to render a judgment within the time prescribed by La.R.S. 13:4207. The second was that the auditor withhold one quarter’s salary from the judge and pay those funds into the general school fund.

The trial court denied these writs. Pre-jean timely filed this appeal.

DISCUSSION OF THE MERITS:

Prejean contends in her sole issue presented for review that the trial court erred in denying her writ of mandamus when the law and the facts are clear that La.R.S. 13:4210 required the clerk of court to notify the auditor that the judge failed to render a decision within the time prescribed by La.R.S. 13:4207 and required the auditor to withhold one quarter’s salary from the judge and pay those funds into the general school fund. We find no merit to Prejean’s contentions.

The sole issue in this case requires this court to determine whether two statutes were interpreted and applied correctly. Whether a statute is properly interpreted and applied posits a question of law whose applicable standard of review is de novo. Stanford v. Town of Ball, 08-800 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/10/08), 999 So.2d 304, writ denied, 09-55 (La.3/6/09), 3 So.3d 488.

Louisiana Revised Statutes 13:4207 states:

|2If oral reasons for judgment are not rendered in open court and the matter taken under advisement, the district judges and judges of the city courts shall render a written judgment within thirty days from the time the cases are submitted for their decision. All motions or applications for a new trial and all orders of appeal shall be passed upon by judges of the city court within three days from the time such motions or applications for new trial or orders of appeal are submitted to them for their decision and by district court judges within seven days from the time such motions or applications for a new trial or orders of appeal are submitted to them for their decision; but by the written consent of the attorneys representing both sides, filed in the records or spread upon the minutes, the time herein granted may be extended for a further period of ten days, but no longer.

Louisiana Revised Statutes 13:4210 states:

All judges mentioned in R.S. 13:4207 through 13:4209 who shall violate those provisions or requirements, relative to the time within which they shall render decisions as aforesaid, shall forfeit one quarter’s salary for each violation. The clerk of court shall notify the auditor of any failure on the part of the judge to render a decision within the time prescribed herein. The auditor, upon receiving such notification from the clerk of the court, shall withhold from such judge the payment of one quarter’s salary, which amounts shall be paid by the auditor into the general school fund.

The Louisiana Supreme Court, in Board of Commissioners v. Connick, 94-3161, p. 6 (La.3/9/95), 654 So.2d 1073, 1076, stated (emphasis added):

As a general rule, courts should not reach the question of a statute’s constitutionality when its unconstitutionality has not been placed at issue by one of the litigants. See Vallo v. Gayle Oil Co. Inc., et al, 94-CA-1238, 646 So.2d 859 (La.1994). Unless a statute as drawn is clearly unconstitutional on its face

“A statute which is unconstitutional on its face cannot be constitutionally enforced.” Gulf States Theatres of La., Inc. v. Richardson, 287 So.2d 480, 487 (La.1974).

In the case before us, no party has challenged the constitutionality of La.R.S. 13:4210. However, we raise this issue sua sponte because this statute is “clearly unconstitutional on its face.” Bd. of Comm’rs v. Connick, 654 So.2d at 1076.

Regulation of judicial conduct by Louisiana judges is within the exclusive realm of the Louisiana Supreme Court. La. Const. Art. V, § 5(A); In re: Freeman, |308 — 1820 (La.12/2/08), 995 So.2d 1197; In re: Ellender, 04-2123 (La.12/13/04), 889 So.2d 225. The Louisiana Legislature has acknowledged our supreme court’s exclusive authority to regulate judicial conduct in La. R.S. 42:1167, which provides, “[a]ll judges, as defined by the Code of Judicial Conduct, shall be governed exclusively by the provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which shall be administered by the Judiciary Commission provided for in Article V, Section 25 of the Constitution of Louisiana.”

In the case before us, Prejean requests that we order the trial court to issue writs of mandamus that invoke regulation of judicial conduct under La.R.S. 13:4210. This court, and the trial court below, lack the power or authority to grant Prejean’s requests.

Further, we note that even if La. R.S. 13:4210 were not unconstitutional on its face, it is subject to other constitutional attacks. U.S. Const. Am. XIV, § 1 provides, in pertinent part, that “[n]o State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” Likewise, La. Const. art. 1, § 2 provides, “[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, except by due process of law.”

Louisiana Attorney General Opinion Number 77-358 (3/7/77), states, “[La.]R.S. 13:4210 providing that judges salary be withheld for quarter if he fails to render judgment timely is deprivation of property without due process for failure to provide hearing before or after withholding.” We agree with the opinion expressed by the attorney general and note that there is no requirement by La.R.S. 13:4210 that a hearing must take place prior to the auditor withholding the judge’s salary.

Moreover, there is no indication in the record that the district judge whose salary is put at risk by this statute has received notice that these proceedings are 1 transpiring. As such, he has not made an appearance in the record, nor does this court even have knowledge that he was given the opportunity to do so. Again, La.R.S. 13:4210 has no requirement that such notice is necessary. Thus, given the lack of notice and hearing requirements, the statute clearly has procedural due process deficiencies.

Additionally, we note that the language of La.R.S. 13:4210 directing the auditor to “withhold from such judge the payment of one quarter’s salary” is extremely vague. A judge penalized by this statute has no notice whether the one quarter salary at risk is from one pay period, one year, or the entire remaining term of service. There is no jurisprudence interpreting what amount “one quarter’s salary” entails. Therefore, to this court, this statute has constitutional vagueness concerns.

Given the above, we find, sua sponte, that La.R.S. 13:4210 is unconstitutional on its face. Accordingly, the trial court was legally correct to deny Prejean’s requested writs of mandamus, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment in its entirety.

DISPOSITION:

Prejean asks this court to review whether the denial of her two writs of mandamus was legally correct. We find, sua sponte, that La.R.S. 13:4210 is unconstitutional on its face. As such, we affirm the trial court’s denial of Prejean’s requested writs. We assess all costs of these proceedings to Dionysia Huval Prejean.

AFFIRMED.

AMY, J., concurs in the result and assigns separate reasons.

AMY, J.,

concurring in the result with separate reasons.

_JjI agree with the majority that an affirmation is required in this case. However, I do not reach the constitutional question as it was not raised nor addressed below. See State v. Mercadel, 03-3015, p. 8 (La.5/25/04), 874 So.2d 829, 834 (wherein the supreme court explained that “a court should avoid constitutional questions whenever the case can be disposed of on non-constitutional grounds”) and State v. Hatton, 07-2377, p. 18 (La.7/1/08), 985 So.2d 709, 721 (wherein the supreme court noted that “[a] judge’s sua sponte declaration of unconstitutionality is a derogation of the strong presumption of constitutionality accorded legislative enactments”). See also La.R.S. 13:4448.

In my opinion, this case is better and more simply resolved on the merits. As cited by the plaintiff, La.R.S. 13:4207 contains certain time delays associated with the rendering of a trial court’s judgment. The Supreme Court of Louisiana recognizes these time limits in its General Administrative Rules, Part G, § 2. Therein, the supreme court anticipates that, in fact, there will be cases in which the delays of La.R.S. 13:4207 will not be met. By this rule, the supreme court provides for the trial court to report to it, through the Judicial Administrator, “an explanation of the reasons for any delay and an expected date of decision.” La. Sup.Ct. Rule G, § 2(b).

|aThe record in this case contains the trial court’s reports to the Judicial Administrator apprising the supreme court of the reasons for delay and the anticipated date(s) of the forthcoming judgment. The “Reasons for Delay” portions of those reports list work-load related explanations. Under these circumstances, I find no error in the trial court’s denial of the writ of mandamus. I reach this finding, however, notwithstanding the question of whether the statute is constitutional.

For these reasons, I concur in the resulted reached by the majority.