text:
    Anthony RIGGINS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 2D06-4868.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    April 29, 2009.
    James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, and Sean K. Ahmed, Special Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
    Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Tonja Rene Vickers, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed without prejudice to any right Mr. Riggins may have to seek appropriate postconviction relief.

ALTENBERND, LaROSE, and CRENSHAW, JJ., Concur.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: KHOUZAM, Judge.

license: Public Domain

text:
    In the Interest of R.B. and T.C., children. R.C., Appellant, v. Department of Children and Family Services and Guardian Ad Litem Program, Appellees.
    No. 2D08-2457.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    May 6, 2009.

      David Maldonado of The Maldonado Law Firm, Lakeland, for Appellant.
    Douglas B. Sherman, Bartow, for Appel-lee Department of Children and Family Services.
    Wendy Michelle Cooper, Orlando, for Appellee Guardian ad Litem Program.
   KHOUZAM, Judge.

R.C. appeals an order placing his two daughters, T.C. and R.B., in a permanent guardianship and terminating the supervision of the Department of Children and Family Services. The Department correctly concedes error because the order failed to contain written findings as required by section 39.6221(2), Florida Statutes (2007).

The Department also concedes that, even if the trial court’s order complied ■with section 39.6221(2), the evidence was insufficient to support the placement of the children in a permanent guardianship. We agree. See C.A. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 988 So.2d 1247, 1249 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (holding that trial court’s finding must be supported by competent substantial evidence). Accordingly, we reverse the order placing the children in a permanent guardianship and remand for further proceedings.

Reversed and remanded.

ALTENBERND and CRENSHAW, JJ., Concur.

      . Although R.C. characterizes the order appealed as terminating his parental rights, his parental rights were not terminated.


author: TRAYLOR, Justice. WEIMER, J.

text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Shannon McBride BERTRAND. State of Louisiana v. Wilford Frederick Chretien, Jr.
    Nos. 2008-KA-2215, 2008-KA-2311.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 17, 2009.
    James D. Caldwell, Attorney General, John F. DeRosier, District Attorney, Cynthia Skerrett Killingsworth, Carla Sue Si-gler, Assistant District Attorneys, for appellant.
    Eugene Bouquet, Lake Charles, for ap-pellee in No. 2008-KA-2215.
    Jack W. Caskey, for appellee in No. 2008-KA-2311.
   TRAYLOR, Justice.

11 These consolidated matters arise from the defendants’ separate constitutional challenges to Article 782 of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure, a legislative enactment which enumerates the number of jurors who must concur to reach a verdict in a felony case in which the punishment is necessarily confinement at hard labor. The cases are before us on direct appeal pursuant to Article V, Section 5(D)(1) of the Louisiana Constitution, as the district court judge declared in both cases that Article 782 violated the United States Constitution. After reviewing the constitutional provisions and case law of this State and of the United States, we find that the district court erred in finding Article 782 unconstitutional. Accordingly, we reverse the judgments of the district court, and remand these matters to the district court for further proceedings consistent with the views expressed herein.

| ¿FACTS and PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Defendants Shannon McBride Bertrand and Wilford Frederick Chretien, Jr., were each indicted, at separate times and for separate offenses, with felonies punishable by confinement at hard labor. On the same day, May 19, 2008, the defendants’ attorneys filed motions in district court to declare Article 782 unconstitutional. The trial judge granted both motions that same day, stating that the statute violated the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The State appealed both decisions directly to this Court, and asked that the cases be consolidated. This Court consolidated the two cases for oral argument and opinion on November 12, 2008.

DISCUSSION

This Court recently discussed the procedure by which a party may challenge a statute’s constitutionality:

It is well-settled that a constitutional challenge may not be considered by an appellate court unless it was properly pleaded and raised in the trial court below. Although this court generally possesses the power and authority to decide the constitutionality of the provisions challenged in a defendant’s motion to quash, it is not required to decide a constitutional issue unless the procedural posture demands that it do so.
Moreover, this Court has consistently held that legislative enactments are presumed valid and then.’ constitutionality should be upheld when possible. Accordingly, as a result of this presumption, if a party wishes to challenge the constitutionality of a statute, the party must do so properly.
While there is no single procedure for attacking the constitutionality of a statute, it has long been held that the unconstitutionally of a statute must be ' specially pleaded and the grounds for the claim particularized.
| ¿This Court has expressed the challenger’s burden as a three step analysis. First, a party must raise the unconstitutionality in the trial court; second, the unconstitutionality of a statute must be specially pleaded; and third, the grounds outlining the basis of uneonsti-tutionality must be particularized. The purpose of these procedural rules is to afford interested parties sufficient time to brief and prepare arguments defending the constitutionality of the challenged statute. The opportunity to fully brief and argue the constitutional issues provides the trial court with thoughtful and complete arguments relating to the issue of constitutionality and furnishes reviewing courts with an adequate record upon which to consider the constitutionality of the statute.
The final step of the analysis articulated above requires that the grounds outlining the basis of the unconstitutionality be particularized. This Court has thoroughly considered the standard for particularizing the constitutional grounds. The purpose of particularizing the constitutional grounds is so that the adjudicating court can analyze and interpret the language of the constitutional provision specified by the challenger. This basic principle dictates that the party challenging the constitutionality of a statute must cite to the specific provisions of the constitution which prohibits the action.
In addition to the three step analysis for challenging the constitutionality of a statute, the specific plea of unconstitutionality and the grounds therefor must be raised in a pleading.
Thus, in light of the foregoing jurisprudential rules, in order to properly con-fect a constitutional challenge, a party must raise the constitutional issue in the trial court by raising the unconstitutionality and the grounds outlining the basis of the alleged unconstitutionality in a pleading
Raising the constitutional issue in a motion has been deemed sufficient to satisfy the purpose of the three step analysis required to properly assert a constitutional challenge. Moreover, we recently recognized that a motion raising the constitutionality and the grounds therefor are sufficient to satisfy the three step analysis for raising a constitutional challenge.
The final step of the analysis is that the party challenging the constitutionality of a statute particularize the grounds outlining the basis of the unconstitutionality-
Although the issue of raising constitutional grounds npt particularized in the trial court generally arises under circumstances in which a party raises a new or additional constitutional ground before an appellate court, this Court has consistently found that the purpose of the three step analysis for challenging the constitutionality of a statute is to give the |4parties an opportunity to brief and argue the constitutional grounds and to prepare an adequate record for review. Clearly, these purposes are not satisfied if the trial court is permitted to rule on grounds not properly raised by the party challenging the constitutionality of a statute. Further, we note that this situation is similar to those instances in which a trial court sua sponte declares a statute unconstitutional when its unconstitutionality has not been placed at issue by one of the parties in a pleading. A judge’s sua sponte declaration of unconstitutionality is a derogation of the strong presumption of constitutionality accorded legislative enactments.

State v. Hatton, 07-2377 (La.7/1/08), 985 So.2d 709, 718-20 (citations omitted).

Here, each defendant raised the issue of the unconstitutionality of Article 782 in the trial court by means of motions to declare the statute unconstitutional. Further, in the motions, each defendant specified that the statute violated the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The defendants, while arguing a Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment violation, neither argued a Fifth Amendment violation in the trial court, nor briefed a Fifth Amendment violation here. As such, defendants have waived any discussion as to whether Article 782 violates the Fifth Amendment.

The trial court’s reasoning for declaring the statute unconstitutional is rather insubstantial. In fact, other than to state that Article 782 violated the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments, the court’s reasoning is nonexistent in the record of these two cases. The court did state, however, that the basis for its ruling was the same as for its ruling in the case of State v. Robert Wilkins, filed in this Court as docket number 2008-KA-0887. This Court was able to review those reasons, which were filed here with the Wilkins record. Those reasons consisted of a rambling diatribe with no discernable legal analysis, and were only slightly more expansive than those contained in the record in these consolidated cases.

In its ruling in Wilkins, the trial court first attacked the United States Supreme 1BCourt’s decision in Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 92 S.Ct. 1628, 32 L.Ed.2d 184 (1972), then discussed equal protection, and finished by declaring that Article 782 violated the Sixth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court notably failed to discuss this Court’s prior and controlling jurisprudence which has consistently upheld the constitutionality of Article 782 against precisely the same constitutional challenges raised here.

As neither defendant specified, briefed, or argued that the statute violated the Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection under the law, any reliance by the trial court in its ruling on such grounds was based on constitutional grounds not properly raised, and was, therefore, improper.

The statute in question, Article 782 of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure, provides as follows:

Art. 782. Number of jurors composing jury; number which must concur; waiver
A. Cases in which punishment may be capital shall be tried by a jury of twelve jurors, all of whom must concur to render a verdict. Cases in which punishment is necessarily confinement at hard labor shall be tried by a jury composed of twelve jurors, ten of whom must concur to render a verdict. Cases in which the punishment may be confinement at hard labor shall be tried by a jury composed of six jurors, all of whom must concur to render a verdict.
B. Trial by jury may be knowingly and intelligently waived by the defendant except in capital cases.

In Apodaca, the United States Supreme Court examined an Oregon statute similar to Article 782, in that the Oregon statute did not require unanimous jury verdicts in noncapital cases. In a plurality decision, the Court determined that the United States Constitution did not mandate unanimous jury verdicts in state court felony criminal trials, with four Justices holding that the Sixth Amendment guarantee of a jury trial, made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, does not | ¿require that a jury’s vote be unanimous. Justice Powell concurred in the judgment of the Court for reasons different than those expressed by the author of the opinion. Four Justices, disagreed, finding that the Sixth Amendment guarantee of a jury trial was made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, and does require a unanimous jury.

The defendants argue here that, because no single rationale for the non-unanimity position prevailed in Apodaca and in light of more recent Supreme Court Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, the validity of .the Apodaca decision is questionable. Defendants further argue that the Apodaca decision is diametrically opposed to the approach taken by the U.S. Supreme Court in recent Sixth Amendment cases involving Federal criminal jury trials, in that, rather than looking at the text of the Amendment and the Framers’ understanding of the right at the time of adoption, the decision relied on the function served by the jury in contemporary society. Finally, defendants argue that the use of non-unanimous verdicts have an insidious racial component, allow minority viewpoints to be ignored, and is likely to chill participation by the precise groups whose exclusion the Constitution has proscribed.

This Court has previously discussed and affirmed the constitutionality of Article 782 on at least three occasions. In State v. Jones, 381 So.2d 416 (La.1980), we ruled that Article 782 did not violate the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. Later, in State v. Simmons, 414 So.2d 705 (La.1982), we found that Article 782 did not violate either the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments. Finally, in State v. Edwards, 420 So.2d 663 (La.1982), we again affirmed the statute’s constitutionality.

Despite defendants’ arguments to the contrary, the case law of the United States Supreme Court also supports the validity of these decisions. Although the Apodaca decision was, indeed, a plurality decision rather than a majority one, the 17Court has cited or discussed the opinion not less than sixteen times since its issuance. On each of these occasions, it is apparent that the Court considered that Apodaca’s holding as to non-unanimous jury verdicts represents well-settled law. For instance, in Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130, 99 S.Ct. 1623, 1626-27, 60 L.Ed.2d 96 (1979), the Court matter-of-factly recognized the reasoning behind the Apodaca holding as support for its overturning of a jury conviction by a 5-1 margin. Further, in Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 110 S.Ct. 803, 823, 107 L.Ed.2d 905 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting), Justice Stevens stated that it was the fair cross section principle underlying the Sixth Amendment’s right to a jury trial that permitted non-unanimous juries. Justice Scalia, a noted originalist on the Court, explicitly rejected a unanimity requirement in his dissent McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 110 S.Ct. 1227, 108 L.Ed.2d 369(1990), saying:

Of course the Court’s holding today— and its underlying thesis that each individual juror must be empowered to “give effect” to his own view — invalidates not just a requirement of unanimity for the defendant to benefit from a mitigating factor, but a requirement for any number of jurors more than one. This it is also in tension with Leland v. Oregon (citation omitted), which upheld, in a capital case, a requirement that the defense of insanity be proved (beyond a reasonable doubt) to the satisfaction of at least 10 of the 12-member jury. Even with respect to proof of the substantive offense, as opposed to an affirmative defense, we have approved verdicts by less than a unanimous jury. See Apodaca v. Oregon (citation omitted) (upholding state statute providing for conviction by a 10-to-2 vote).

McKoy, 110 S.Ct. at 1246-47, (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). Likewise, in United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 115 S.Ct. 2310, 2314, 132 L.Ed.2d 444 (1995), the Court, in a unanimous opinion, recognized the reasoning behind the Apodaca decision. Finally, Justice Souter, dissenting in Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 2484, 168 L.Ed.2d 203, (2007) (Souter, J., dissenting), again recognized the Apodaca holding as well-settled law.

We note that defendants last argument — that the use of non-unanimous -verdicts have an insidious racial component, allow minority viewpoints to be ignored, and is | sIikely to chill participation by the precise groups whose exclusion the Constitution has proscribed-was also argued in Apodaca. With regard to this assignment of error, a majority, rather than a plurality, of the Court determined that the argument was without merit.

CONCLUSION

Due to this Court’s prior determinations that Article 782 withstands constitutional scrutiny, and because we are not presumptuous enough to suppose, upon mere speculation, that the United States Supreme Court’s still valid determination that non-unanimous 12 person jury verdicts are constitutional may someday be overturned, we find that the trial court erred in ruling that Article 782 violated the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments. With respect to that ruling, it should go without saying that a trial judge is not at liberty to ignore the controlling jurisprudence of superior courts.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the district court’s ruling on the constitutionality of Article 782 and remand these consolidated cases to the district court for further proceedings consistent with the views expressed in this opinion.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

WEIMER, J. concurs with reasons.

WEIMER, J.

concurring.

|TI concur in the majority’s decision to reverse the district court’s ruling finding LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 782(A) unconstitutional, but write separately to suggest it is unnecessary to reach the merits of the constitutional issue. Given the procedural posture of these cases, I believe that the question of the constitutionality of Article 782 is not ripe for adjudication because defendants have failed to demonstrate that they have standing to assert the constitutional claim.

As we have repeatedly and consistently recognized, while this court has the power and authority to address the constitutionality of state laws, we are not required to do so unless the procedural posture of the case and the relief sought by the appellant demand that we do so. State v. Matron, 07-2377, p. 13 (La.7/1/08), 985 So.2d 709, 718; State v. Mercadel, 03-3015, p. 7 (La.5/25/04), 874 So.2d 829, 834; Ring v. State, Department of Transportation and Development, 02-1367, pp. 6-7 (La.1/14/03), 835 So.2d 423, 428. One of the threshold issues that must be decided by a court before it may consider a constitutional challenge is whether the |2person challenging the provision has standing to assert the challenge. Mercadel, 03-3015 at pp. 7-8, 874 So.2d at 834. A person has standing to challenge the constitutionality of a legal provision only if he or she has rights in controversy, or more specifically, only if the provision seriously affects his or her rights. State v. Turner, 05-2425, p. 17 (La.7/10/06), 936 So.2d 89, 101; Mercadel, 03-3015 at p. 8, 874 So.2d at 834.

In this case, the defendants challenging the constitutionality of LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 782(A) on grounds that conviction by a non-unanimous jury violates the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution have not been convicted by a jury, either unanimously or non-unanimously. Therefore, they have not suffered any real harm, or been seriously adversely affected by the criminal code article challenged. Indeed, these defendants may be acquitted of the charges against them or unanimously convicted, in either of which events, the defendants will not benefit from a judgment declaring LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 782(A) unconstitutional, and thus will have no rights in controversy-sufficient to give them standing to bring this challenge. If these defendants have no ultimate interest in, and will not benefit by, a decision declaring LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 782(A) unconstitutional, then any declaration of constitutionality at this juncture amounts to an impermissible advisory opinion. Ring, 02-1367 at pp. 8-9, 835 So.2d at 429.

Because I believe that the district court acted precipitously in ruling on the constitutionality of LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 782(A), I concur in the majority decision to the extent it reverses the district court’s ruling on the constitutionality of LSA.C.Cr.P. art. 782(A). I would not reach the merits of the constitutional question.

      . Louisiana Constitution, Article V, Section 5(D) provides: In addition to other appeals provided by this constitution, a case shall be appealable to the supreme court if (1) a law or ordinance has been declared unconstitutional or (2) the defendant has been convicted of a capital offense and a penalty of death actually has been imposed.

      . Bertrand is charged with one count of second degree murder, a violation of R.S. 14:30.1. Chretien is charged with one count of second degree murder, one count of armed robbery, and one count of attempted second degree murder, violations of R.S. 14:30.1, 14:64.3 and 14:27/14:30.1. The punishment for each of these crimes is necessarily confinement at hard labor.

      . That case, likewise a second degree murder matter, was dismissed on July 10, 2008 as moot when the defendant opted for a bench trial.


text:
    In re Ashton R. O'DWYER, Jr.
    No. 2009-B-0670.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 30, 2009.
   ORDER

Considering the Petition for Interim Suspension for Threat of Harm filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel,

IT IS ORDERED that Ashton R. O’Dwyer, Louisiana Bar Roll number 10166, be and he hereby is suspended from the practice of law on an interim basis pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 19.2. Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 26(E), this order is effective immediately.

KIMBALL, C.J., recused.

/s/ Bernette J. Johnson Justice, Supreme Court of Louisiana


text:
    In re W. William HODES.
    No. 2009-OB-0475.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 31, 2009.
   ORDER

Considering the Petition for Resignation from the Practice of Law Filed by W. William Hodes,

IT IS ORDERED that the petition of W. William Hodes, Louisiana Bar Roll number 14551, seeking to voluntarily resign from the practice of law in the State of Louisiana pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XVIII, § 5 be and is hereby granted.

/s/ Chet D. Traylor Justice, Supreme Court of Louisiana


text:
    In re William Eldren BRADLEY.
    No. 2009-B-0583.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 1, 2009.
   ORDER

Considering the Petition for Interim Suspension filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel,

IT IS ORDERED that William E. Bradley, Louisiana Bar Roll number 22266, be and he hereby is suspended from the practice of law on an interim basis pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 19, pending further orders of this court.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that necessary disciplinary proceedings be instituted in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, §§ 11 and 19.

/s/ Jeannette Theriot Knoll Justice, Supreme Court of Louisiana


author: PER CURIAM.

text:
    In re John Holt GAHARAN.
    No. 2008-B-2829.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 2, 2009.
   | ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

PER CURIAM.

This disciplinary matter arises from formal charges filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) against respondent, John Holt Gaharan, an attorney licensed to practice law in Louisiana but currently inactive.

UNDERLYING FACTS

In November 2003, Lloyd Plummer retained respondent to handle his Chapter 13 bankruptcy. Respondent charged Mr. Plummer $1,500, which was paid through the Chapter 13 plan.

In 2004, respondent advised the Louisiana State Bar Association (“LSBA”) that he wished to assume inactive status. On June 15, 2004, the LSBA placed respondent on inactive status. As a result, respondent was no longer eligible to | ^practice law. However, he did not advise Mr. Plummer of this fact, nor did he file a motion to withdraw from Mr. Plum-mer’s bankruptcy case.

Thereafter, several of Mr. Plummer’s creditors, including the mortgage holder for Mr. Plummer’s home, began attempting to collect debts. Mr. Plummer tried to contact respondent numerous times regarding the matter, without success. According to the bankruptcy court, Mr. Plummer’s case was ultimately dismissed on March 14, 2006.

In February 2006, Mr. Plummer filed a complaint against respondent with the ODC. In a written response to the complaint, respondent admitted that he did not file a motion to withdraw from Mr. Plum-mer’s case, and that he did not communicate with Mr. Plummer “in such a way that he completely understood that I would be unavailable to represent him after June 15, 2004.” The ODC then issued subpoenas to take respondent’s sworn statement; however, respondent informed the ODC that he did not wish to cooperate any further.

DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

In June 2007, the ODC filed formal charges against respondent, alleging that his conduct as set forth above violated Rules 1.4 (failure to communicate with a client), 1.16(c) (failure to properly terminate the representation of a client), and 8.1(c) (failure to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

Respondent was served with the formal charges via certified mail but failed to answer. Accordingly, the factual allegations contained therein were deemed admitted and proven by clear and convincing evidence pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 11(E)(3). No formal hearing was held, but the parties were given an opportunity to file with the hearing committee written arguments and documentary evidence on the issue of sanctions. Respondent filed nothing for the committee’s consideration.

Hearing Committee Repent

After considering the ODC’s deemed admitted submission, the hearing committee adopted as its factual findings the facts set forth in the formal charges. Based on these findings, the committee determined that respondent violated the Rules of Professional Conduct as alleged in the formal charges. Additionally, the committee found that respondent violated Rule 1.16(d) (obligations upon termination of the representation) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

Specifically, the committee found that respondent was not diligent in representing his client. When respondent went on inactive status with the LSBA, he abandoned his law practice. He failed to properly communicate his status change to his client and did not allow his client time to obtain other legal representation in the bankruptcy proceeding. As a result, the client’s bankruptcy case was dismissed. This harm was directly attributable to respondent’s misconduct. Respondent left his client completely unaware that he had no legal representation and caused him harm. Furthermore, respondent failed to ' cooperate with the ODC in its investigation.

The committee determined that respondent knowingly violated duties owed to his client and the legal profession, causing harm to his client. Relying on the ABA’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, the committee determined that the applicable baseline sanction is suspension.

The committee recognized the aggravating factors of bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by intentionally failing to comply with the rules or orders |4of the disciplinary agency and vulnerability of the victim. In mitigation, the committee acknowledged that respondent has no prior disciplinary record.

Under these circumstances, the committee recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two years. The committee also recommended that respondent be required to make restitution to his client for the harm caused by his failure to properly withdraw from the representation.

Neither respondent nor the ODC filed an objection to the hearing committee’s recommendation.

Disciplinary Board Recommendation

After reviewing this matter, the disciplinary board found that the hearing committee’s factual findings are supported by the factual allegations asserted by the ODC within the formal charges and/or by the documentary evidence submitted in support of the allegations. The board also found that the factual allegations have been deemed admitted and proven by clear and convincing evidence. The board then determined that respondent violated the Rules of Professional Conduct as found by the committee.

The board, however, disagreed with the committee’s finding that respondent’s neglect caused his client’s bankruptcy case to be dismissed. Instead, the board found that, from the record, it appears the client’s bankruptcy case was dismissed because he failed to make his Chapter 13 repayments. Nonetheless, the board found that respondent’s neglect exposed his client to harm when the client could not obtain timely relief from debt collection efforts because respondent failed to properly withdraw from the representation and properly notify the client of his withdrawal.

lr,The board found that respondent violated duties owed to his client and the legal profession. He knowingly failed to ensure that his client knew he would no longer be able to represent him and knowingly failed to withdraw from the bankruptcy case. Respondent also intentionally failed to cooperate with the ODC. His client suffered potential, if not actual, harm by being subjected to debt collection efforts. The applicable baseline sanction is suspension.

The board agreed with the aggravating and mitigating factors found by the committee. The board also found the additional mitigating factor of inexperience in the practice of law.

Relying upon In re: Bergeron, 00-1386 (La.9/15/00), 768 So.2d 595, the board recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one year and one day.

Neither respondent nor the ODC filed an objection to the disciplinary board’s recommendation.

DISCUSSION

Bar disciplinary matters fall within the original jurisdiction of this court. La. Const. art. V, § 5(B). Consequently, we act as triers of fact and conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether the alleged misconduct has been proven by clear and convincing evidence. In re: Quaid, 94-1316 (La.11/30/94), 646 So.2d 348; Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Boutall, 597 So.2d 444 (La.1992).

In cases in which the lawyer does not answer the formal charges, the factual allegations of those charges are deemed admitted. Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 11(E)(3). Thus, the ODC bears no additional burden to prove the factual allegations contained in the formal charges after those charges have been deemed admitted. However, the language of § 11(E)(3) does not encompass legal conclusions that flow from the factual allegations. If the legal conclusion the ODC seeks to prove (i.e., a violation of a specific rule) is not readily apparent from the deemed admitted facts, additional evidence may need to be submitted in order to prove the legal conclusions that flow from the admitted factual allegations. In re: Donnan, 01-3058 (La.1/10/03), 838 So.2d 715.

The deemed admitted facts and documentary evidence in this matter support a finding that respondent withdrew from the representation of Mr. Plummer when he assumed inactive status but failed to communicate that fact to his client. He also failed to file a motion to withdraw with the bankruptcy court. As a result, Mr. Plummer was unaware that he was without counsel while his creditors were attempting to collect their debts and foreclose on his home. When Mr. Plummer complained to the ODC about respondent’s conduct, respondent failed to cooperate with the ODC’s investigation, going so far as to inform the ODC he did not want to be bothered by them again. These facts support a finding that respondent violated the Rules of Professional Conduct as alleged in the formal charges.

Having found evidence of professional misconduct, we now turn to a determination of the appropriate sanction for respondent’s actions. In determining a sanction, we are mindful that disciplinary proceedings are designed to maintain high standards of conduct, protect the public, preserve the integrity of the profession, and deter future misconduct. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Reis, 513 So.2d 1173 (La.1987). The discipline to be imposed depends upon the facts of each case and the seriousness of the offenses involved considered in light of any aggravating and 17mitigating circumstances. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Whittington, 459 So.2d 520 (La.1984).

Respondent acted knowingly and intentionally in violating duties owed to his client and the legal profession. He caused harm to his client and the disciplinary system. The baseline sanction for respondent’s misconduct is a period of suspension.

The record supports the aggravating factors of bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by intentionally failing to comply with the rules or orders of the disciplinary agency and vulnerability of the victim. The sole mitigating factor present is the absence of a prior disciplinary record.

Considering these circumstances, we find that a one year and one day suspension from the practice of law is an appropriate sanction. Accordingly, we will suspend respondent for one year and one day.

DECREE

Upon review of the findings and recommendations of the hearing committee and disciplinary board, and considering the record, it is ordered that John Holt Gallar-an, Louisiana Bar Roll number 27471, be and he hereby is suspended from the practice of law for one year and one day, to commence from the finality of this judgment. All costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.

      . See Supreme Court Rule XVIII, which provides in pertinent part as follows:
      Section 3. Application for Transfer to Inactive Status. A lawyer in good standing who has not retired or is not engaged in practice shall advise the Louisiana State Bar Association in writing that the lawyer desires to assume inactive status and discontinue the practice of law. Upon the filing of the notice, the Louisiana State Bar Association shall inform the Court and the lawyer shall no longer be eligible to practice law. A lawyer who is retired or on inactive status shall not be obligated to pay the annual fee imposed by Rule XIX upon active practitioners. A lawyer on inactive status shall be removed from the roll of those classified as active until and unless the lawyer requests and is granted reinstatement to the active rolls.

      . To date, respondent has not requested reinstatement to the active rolls.

      . In Bergeron, this court suspended an attorney for one year and one day for knowingly and intentionally neglecting a client's case, failing to communicate with the client, failing to return the client’s file, and failing to cooperate with ODC.

      . In its recommendation to this court, the board suggested that the suspension not take effect until respondent returns to active status. However, we see no authority to hold the suspension in abeyance pending such an uncertain event. Rather, as in other disciplinary cases, we will make respondent’s suspension effective upon finality of this court’s judgment. While we recognize a suspension of an inactive lawyer is an unusual procedure, the practical effect of this suspension will be to prevent respondent from returning to the active practice of law until he has served his suspension and has satisfied the grounds for reinstatement from this suspension.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Debbie PALMER.
    No. 2008-KP-0517.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 2, 2009.
   PER CURIAM.

h Granted in part; otherwise not considered. This case is remanded to the court of appeal for consideration as a writ application for supervisory review. It appears from the transcript of trial that defendant fully acquiesced to the consolidation of the misdemeanor charges filed against her in a single proceeding as if the state had filed a superceding bill of information joining all of the offenses under the provisions of La.C.Cr.P. art. 493. Cf. State v. Crochet, 05-0123, p. 5 (La.6/23/06), 931 So.2d 1083, 1086 (“Assuming that the crimes are otherwise properly joined in a single prosecution .... the state may effect consolidation without the approval of the defendant or the court by filing a superceding indictment.”). It further appears that at resen-tencing defendant expressly waived any claim that she had been entitled to a jury trial on the charged violation of La.R.S. 3:2096 because the offense is a one-year misdemeanor as to which she had the right to a jury if tried separately. Defendant’s overall sentencing exposure was therefore capped at six months imprisonment as a matter of La.C.Cr.P. art. 493.1 and her case was not triable by a jury. See La.C.Cr.P. art. 779 (misdemeanor 12offenses punishable by fines in excess of $1000 or imprisonment for more than six months triable before a jury of six persons; all other misdemeanor offenses tried before the court alone); cf. Blanton v. City of Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 109 S.Ct. 1289, 103 L.Ed.2d 550 (1989). Accordingly, whether defendant seeks review of only her convictions on two counts of simple cruelty to animals or of all of her convictions under bills of information number 06-1055, 1056, and 1057, that review is by writ to the court of appeal and not by way of appeal. La. Const. art. 5, § 10(A)(courts of appeal have appellate jurisdiction “in all criminal cases triable by a jury [except capital cases]” and supervisory jurisdiction “over cases which arise within its circuit.”).


text:
    In re Scott Eason MEECE.
    No. 2008-B-2980.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 13, 2009.
   | ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

PER CURIAM.

This disciplinary matter arises from formal charges filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) against respondent, Scott Eason Meece, an attorney licensed to practice law in Louisiana but currently on interim suspension for threat of harm to the public. In re: Meece, 07-0913 (La.5/9/07), 956 So.2d 574.

UNDERLYING FACTS

In April 2007, respondent was arrested by federal authorities and charged with robbing the Trustmark National Bank in Wesson, Mississippi. In October 2007, respondent pled guilty in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi to one count of armed bank robbery and one count of brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence. In February 2008, respondent was sentenced to serve a total of 121 months in federal prison. He was also ordered to pay $37,600 in restitution to Trustmark National Bank.

1 .¿DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

In November 2007, the ODC filed one count of formal charges against respondent, alleging that his conduct as set forth above violated the following provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct: 8.4(a) (violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct), 8.4(b) (commission of a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer), and 8.4(c) (engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation).

Respondent was served with the formal charges via certified mail but failed to answer. Accordingly, the factual allegations contained therein were deemed admitted and proven by clear and convincing evidence pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 11(E)(3). No formal hearing was held, but the parties were given an opportunity to file with the hearing committee written arguments and documentary evidence on the issue of sanctions. Respondent filed nothing for the committee’s consideration.

Hearing Committee Report

After considering the ODC’s deemed admitted submission, the hearing committee made the following factual findings:

On March 27, 2007, respondent robbed the Trustmark National Bank by force, taking $37,600. On April 19, 2007, respondent was taken into custody, and a two-count bill of information was filed with the clerk of court of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi on May 18, 2007. Respondent was charged with robbing a bank using a dangerous weapon and using a handgun during and in relation to a crime. On October 30, 2007, respondent pled guilty to both counts, and on February 20, 2008, he was sentenced to 121 months in prison and ordered to pay $37,600 in restitution. On May 9, 2007, this court placed respondent | ;-.on interim suspension. Thereafter, respondent informed the ODC he would be willing to voluntarily surrender his law license. However, he never did so despite the fact that the ODC provided him with the appropriate paperwork to perform such a surrender.

The committee also determined that the allegations against respondent have been deemed admitted and proven. Thus, the committee found that respondent violated the Rules of Professional Conduct as alleged in the formal charges. The committee also determined that respondent intentionally violated a duty owed to the public. He caused harm and potentially could have caused greater harm had someone been hurt or killed during his commission of the armed bank robbery. Citing the ABA’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, the committee determined that the baseline sanction is disbarment.

The committee recognized the aggravating factors of a dishonest or selfish motive, a pattern of misconduct, and multiple offenses. The only mitigating factor the committee found was the absence of a prior disciplinary record.

The committee further determined that Guideline 5 (conviction of a felony involving physical coercion or substantial damage to person or property including, but not limited to, armed robbery, arson, or kidnapping) of the permanent disbarment guidelines set forth in Supreme Court Rule XIX, Appendix E is applicable. Accordingly, the committee recommended that respondent be permanently disbarred.

Neither respondent nor the ODC filed an objection to the hearing committee’s recommendation.

14Disciplinary Board Recommendation

After review, the disciplinary board determined that the hearing committee’s factual findings do not appear to be manifestly erroneous. Furthermore, the board determined that the committee properly applied the Rules of Professional Conduct.

Based on these findings, the board determined that respondent intentionally violated a duty owed to the public. He caused serious actual injury to the property of others and endangered the lives of those around Mm. The board agreed with the committee that the baseline sanction is disbarment.

As aggravating factors, the board found a dishonest or selfish motive and vulnerability of the victim. The board rejected the committee’s finding of the aggravating factors of a pattern of misconduct and multiple offenses, reasoning that although “the record suggests that Respondent robbed other banks, the charges and the record in the present matter only concern the incident that occurred on March 27, 2007.” The board agreed with the committee that the only mitigating factor is the absence of a prior disciplinary record.

The board also agreed with the committee’s finding that respondent’s conduct falls within the scope of Guideline 5 of the permanent disbarment guidelines. In further support of permanent disbarment, the board cited the case of In re: Stephens, 07-0180 (La.4/27/07), 955 So.2d 140, wherein an attorney was permanently disbarred for, among other things, his conviction of armed robbery of a bank.

Accordingly, the board recommended that respondent be permanently disbarred.

Neither respondent nor the ODC filed an objection to the disciplinary board’s recommendation.

^DISCUSSION

Bar disciplinary matters come within the original jurisdiction of this court. La. Const. art. V, § 5(B). When the disciplinary proceedings involve an attorney who has been convicted of a crime, the conviction is conclusive evidence of guilt and the sole issue presented is whether respondent’s crimes warrant discipline, and if so, the extent thereof. Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 19(E); In re: Boudreau, 02-0007 (La.4/12/02), 815 So.2d 76; Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Wilkinson, 562 So.2d 902 (La.1990). The discipline to be imposed depends on the seriousness of the offense and the extent of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Perez, 550 So.2d 188 (La.1989).

In the instant case, respondent pled guilty to armed bank robbery and brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence. These crimes are felonies under federal law and clearly warrant serious discipline. The only issue to be resolved by this court is the appropriate sanction for respondent’s misconduct.

The documentary evidence submitted by the ODC in this case demonstrates that respondent intentionally placed others in harm’s way for his own selfish motives. He brandished a handgun during a bank robbery and thereby placed bank employees, customers, and others in grave danger. Under these circumstances, disbarment is clearly appropriate. However, in their respective reports, the hearing committee and the disciplinary board have concluded that respondent’s offenses are so egregious that he should be permanently prohibited from applying for readmission to the bar.

We agree. In Appendix E to Supreme Court Rule XIX, we set forth guidelines illustrating the types of conduct which might result in permanent disbarment. Respondent’s conduct falls squarely within the scope of Guideline 5 (conviction of a felony involving physical coercion or substantial damage to person or property, | (¡including but not limited to armed robbery, arson, or kidnapping). We would be remiss in our constitutional duty to regulate the practice of law if we did not impose that sanction here.

Accordingly, we will accept the disciplinary board’s recommendation and impose permanent disbarment.

DECREE

Upon review of the findings and recommendations of the hearing committee and disciplinary board, and considering the record, it is ordered that the name of Scott Eason Meece, Louisiana Bar Roll number 29627, be stricken from the roll of attorneys and that his license to practice law in the State of Louisiana be revoked. Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 24(A), it is further ordered that respondent be permanently prohibited from being readmitted to the practice of law in this state. All costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.

      . On March 27, 2007, respondent entered the bank and requested to open a new account and rent a safety deposit box. After respondent waited a few moments for assistance, a bank employee took him into the vault to see the safety deposit boxes. Once in the vault, respondent revealed a handgun in a holster under his suit jacket and ordered the employee to open the bank’s safe. He then removed the currency from the safe and fled the bank.

      . Newspaper articles in the record indicate that respondent has confessed to committing "a string of bank robberies” in Alabama and elsewhere in Mississippi. Nevertheless, the formal charges pertain only to respondent's conviction arising out of the March 27, 2007 robbery of the Trustmark National Bank in Wesson, Mississippi.


text:
    Loleta H. ANZALONE v. Joseph E. ANZALONE, Jr.
    Nos. 2008-C-2981, 2008-C-2988.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 18, 2009.
   PER CURIAM.

|,In this community property case, plaintiff, Loleta Anzalone, has filed a writ application in 08-C-2981, claiming that the court of appeal erred in two regards: (1) in awarding her one-half of her ex-husband’s retirement from the date of his 70th birthday, but only in that portion attributable to the six years he actually worked as a district court judge prior to becoming disabled; and (2) in ruling that, as an ex-spouse, she was not entitled to any surviv- or benefits that might become payable should her ex-husband pre-decease her. A'ter reviewing the applicable law, we grant this writ application and order that (1) as to the first issue, the ruling of the court of appeal is reversed and the judgment of the trial court is reinstated, which granted plaintiff one-half of the total amount of retirement benefits defendant began receiving on his 70th birthday; and (2) as to the second issue, the judgment of the court of appeal is reversed and the matter remanded to the trial court for reconsideration of this issue in light of our opinion in LASERS v. McWilliams, 06-2191 c/w 06-2204 (La.12/2/08), 996 So.2d 1036 (on rehearing).

Defendant has filed a writ application in 08-2988 claiming various assignments of error. After reviewing the applicable law, we deny this writ application.

|,DECREE

For the reasons stated herein, the wi'it application in 08-C-2981 is granted. The court of appeal’s judgment that Loleta An-zalone is only entitled her community property share of Joseph Anzalone Jr.’s retirement benefits from the date of his 70th birthday attributable to the six years he actually served as a district court judge is reversed and the trial court judgment on this issue is reinstated. The court of appeal’s judgment that Loleta Anzalone is not entitled to any survivor benefits should Joseph Anzalone Jr. predecease her is reversed and the issue is remanded to the trial court for reconsideration in light of this Court’s decision in LASERS, supra. The writ application in 08-C-2988 is denied.


text:
    Loleta H. ANZALONE v. Joseph E. ANZALONE, Jr.
    Nos. 2008-C-2981, 2008-C-2988.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 13, 2009.
   PER CURIAM.

Iiln this community property case, plaintiff, Loleta Anzalone, has filed a writ application in 08-C-2981, claiming that the court of appeal erred in two regards: (1) in awarding her one-half of her ex-husband’s retirement from the date of his 70th birthday, but only in that portion attributable to the six years he actually worked as a district court judge prior to becoming-disabled; and (2) in ruling that, as an ex-spouse, she was not entitled to any surviv- or benefits that might become payable should her ex-husband pre-decease her. After reviewing the applicable law, we grant this writ application and order that (1) as to the first issue, the ruling of the court of appeal is reversed and the judgment of the trial court is reinstated, which granted plaintiff one-half of the total amount of retirement benefits defendant began receiving on his 70th birthday; and (2) as to the second issue, the judgment of the court of appeal is reversed and the matter remanded to the trial court for reconsideration of this issue in light of our opinion in LASERS v. McWilliams, 06-2191 c/w 06-2204 (La.12/2/08), 996 So.2d 1036 (on rehearing).

Defendant has filed a writ application in 08-2988 claiming various assignments of error. After reviewing the applicable law, we deny this writ application.

|,DECREE

For the reasons stated herein, the writ application in 08-C-2981 is granted. The court of appeal’s judgment that Loleta An-zalone is only entitled her community property share of Joseph Anzalone Jr.’s retirement benefits from the date of his 70th birthday attributable to the six years he actually served as a district court judge is reversed and the trial court judgment on this issue is reinstated. The court of appeal’s judgment that Loleta Anzalone is not entitled to any survivor benefits should Joseph Anzalone Jr. predecease her is reversed and the issue is remanded to the trial court for reconsideration in light of this Court’s decision in LASERS, supra. The writ application in 08-C-2988 is denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Reginald P. FONTANA v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2009-KH-0326.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 30, 2009.
   In re Fontana, Reginald P.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Ouachita, 4th Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 00-F0851; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 43,257-KH.

Denied. Result is correct.


text:
    Kenneth WHITTINGTON, et al. v. PCS NITROGEN FERTILIZER, Zurich American Insurance Company, et al. Christopher D. Hall, et al. v. PCS Nitrogen Fertilizer, et al.
    No. 2009-CC-0722.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 30, 2009.
   In re PCS Nitrogen Fertilizer L.P.;— Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Ascension, 23rd Judicial District Court Div. A, Nos. 85,261, 85,322; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2009 CW 0570.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant.


text:
    Kenneth WHITTINGTON, et al. v. PCS NITROGEN FERTILIZER, Zurich American Insurance Company, et al. Christopher D. Hall, et al. v. PCS Nitrogen Fertilizer, et al.
    No. 2009-CC-0723.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 30, 2009.
   In re Zurich American Insurance Company; — Defendant; ■ Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Ascension, 23rd Judicial District Court Div. A, Nos. 85,261, 85,322; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, Nos. 2009 CW 0570, 2009 CW 0569.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Norris VESSELL.
    No. 2009-KK-0412.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 1, 2009.
   In re Vessell, Norris; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. J, No. 452749; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2009-K-0048.

Writ granted in part. The matter is remanded to the district court to conduct an in camera review of the counseling records of K.M. and her mother, and the Social Security records of Ms. Robinson, for exculpatory or impeachment evidence. In all other respects, the application is denied.

VICTORY, J., would deny.

WEIMER, J., would deny.


text:
    Margaret MCKINLEY, et al. v. Ray CHRISTOFFEL, et al.
    No. 2009-CC-0713.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 1, 2009.
   In re Christoffel, Ray et al.; State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company;— Defendant(s); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Avo-yelles, 12th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 2007-653-A; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW 08-01520.

Not considered. Not timely filed.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Norris VESSELL.
    No. 2009-KK-0413.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 1, 2009.
   In re Vessell, Norris; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. J, No. 452-749; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2008-K-1489.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Alvin JEFFERSON.
    No. 2009-KK-0740.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 2, 2009.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. 1, No. M498900; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2009-K-0367.

Granted. The Commissioner’s order allowing defendant to review the police report is Reversed. Defendant has not been indicted or charged by bill of information with an offense, thus any request for production of the police report is premature. La.C.Cr.P. art. 729.6. Furthermore, the record does not support a finding that the Detective reviewed the report to refresh her memory while testifying, thus defendant is not entitled to production of the report pursuant to La.C.E. art. 612(B). See also: State v. Payton, 294 So.2d 211 (La.1974); State v. Prudholm, 446 So.2d 729 (La.1984).

KNOLL, J., would deny.


text:
    In re JUDGE ABC.
    No. 2009-O-0743.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 2, 2009.
   In re Confidential Party; — Plaintiff; Applying For Motion to Seal Anticipated Filing of the Louisiana Judiciary Commission Under Rule XXIII.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Craig BROWN.
    No. 2009-KK-0334.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 3, 2009.
   In re Brown, Craig; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. A, No. 474-522; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2008-K-1381.

Granted — trial judge is ordered recused in this capital case.


text:
    Tina LADNER v. GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES' INSURANCE COMPANY and Robin Alphonso.
    No. 2008-C-2864.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 3, 2009.
   In re Ladner, Tina applying for Reconsideration this Court’s order dated February 6, 2009; Parish of St. Bernard, 34th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 93-985; to Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2008-CA-0323.

Reconsideration not considered. See La. S.Ct. Rule IX, Section 6.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Rodney Wayne MACON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2009-KH-0593.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 3, 2009.
   In re Macon, Rodney Wayne; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 112,549.

Relator represents that the district court has failed to act timely on an application filed on or about June 12, 2008. If relator’s representation is correct, the district court is ordered to consider and act on the application. The district court is ordered to provide this Court with a copy of its judgment.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Ruben J. ANDERSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2009-KH-0675.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 3, 2009.
   In re Anderson, Ruben J.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. G, No. 443-293.

Relator represents that the district court has failed to act timely on a notice for intent/motion for extension to seek writs filed on or about September 16, 2008 and to obtain a copy of a judgment issued August 26, 2008 on a motion to reopen post-conviction relief proceedings and motion to recuse the Hon. Judge Raymond Bigelow. If relator’s representation is correct, the district court is ordered to consider and act on the application. If relator’s representation is incorrect, the district court is ordered to accept, file and act upon the pleading which is herewith transferred to the district court. The district court is ordered to provide this court with a copy of its judgment.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Robert MONROE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2009-KH-0683.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 3, 2009.
   In re Monroe, Robert; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. I, No. 262-739.

Relator represents that the district court has failed to act timely on a motion for production of documents filed on or about August 29, 2008. If relator’s representation is correct, the district court is ordered to consider and act on the motion. If relator’s representation is incorrect, the district court is ordered to accept, file and act upon the pleading which is herewith transferred to the district court. The district court is ordered to provide this Court with a copy of its judgment.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Damon SMITH v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2008-KH-2057.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 3, 2009.
   In re Smith, Damon; Plaintiff; Applying for Reconsideration of this Court’s order dated January 30, 2009; Parish of St. John, 40th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 02-304; to Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 08-KH-267.

Denied.


text:
    John Andrea CEASAR v. Erica DANTLEY.
    No. 2009-CC-0290.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 3, 2009.
   In re — Dantley, Erica; Defendant; Applying for Reconsideration of this Court’s order dated February 20, 2009; Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 2008-3145; to Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW 08-01422.

Reconsideration denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Johnny JONES.
    No. 2008-KP-1109.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 3, 2009.
   In re Jones, Johnny; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. D, No. 401-183; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2008-K-0011.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Jonathan Earl ADKINS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2008-KH-1430.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 3, 2009.
   In re Adkins, Jonathan Earl; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 228,131; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 43640-KH.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Bryan K. WILLIAMS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2008-KH-1432.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 3, 2009.
   In re Williams, Bryan K; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Beauregard, 36th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. CR-867-05; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 07-1224.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Ronnie O. DORSEY, Sr. v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2008-KH-1433.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 3, 2009.
   In re Dorsey, Ronnie O. Sr.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Ouachita, 4th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 99F1214; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 43428-KH.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Joseph D. SAMPY, Jr. v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2008-KH-1434.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 3, 2009.
   In re Sampy, Joseph D. Jr.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Mary, 16th Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 03-163712; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2007 KW 2532.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Emile ROBINSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2008-KH-1441.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 3, 2009.
   In re Robinson, Emile; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Vernon, 30th Judicial District Court Div. C, Nos. 69427, 69451; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 08-00194.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Richard L. KING v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2008-KH-1449.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 3, 2009.
   In re King, Richard L.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 387036; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2008 KW 0642.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Victor VERDUN, Jr. v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2008-KH-1450.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 3, 2009.
   In re Verdun, Victor Jr.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 313477; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2008 KW 0278.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Dennis W. BAKER v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2008-KH-1451.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 3, 2009.
   In re Baker, Dennis W.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Rapides, 9th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 278670; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 08-00362.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Jimmy W. MAGEE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2008-KH-1452.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 3, 2009.
   In re Magee, Jimmy W.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Washington, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 04-CR6-090545; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2008-KW-0611.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Alvin Paul VICTORIAN v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2008-KH-1453.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 3, 2009.
   In re Victorian, Alvin Paul; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Pointe Coupee, 18th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 61898; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2008 KW 0527.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; State v. Parker, 98-0256 (La.5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694; La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Drew M. PIZZO v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2008-KH-1454.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 3, 2009.
   In re Pizzo, Drew M.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Iberville, 18th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 63866; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2008 KW 0541.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; La.C.Cr.P. art. 351.


text:
    STATE ex rel. David LANDOR v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2008-KH-1455.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 3, 2009.
   In re Landor, David; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 55245; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 07-01398.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Al Patrick GLYNN Jr. v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2008-KH-1456.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 3, 2009.
   In re Glynn, A1 Patrick; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Terrebonne, 32nd Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 229917; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2008 KW 0328.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Derrick LLOYD v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2008-KH-1481.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 3, 2009.
   In re Llyod, Derrick; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. John, 40th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 97-131; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 08-KH-263.

Denied. Repetitive. Cf. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4(D).


text:
    STATE ex rel. Jonathan ROSE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2008-KH-1486.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 3, 2009.
   In re Rose, Jonathan; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. O, No. 02-4422; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 08-KH-434.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Claude ROBINSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2008-KH-1519.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 3, 2009.
   In re Robinson, Claude; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 89-2278; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 08-KH-212.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.

GUIDRY, J., recused.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Darryl D. PARKER v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2008-KH-1521.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 3, 2009.
   In re Parker, Darryl D.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. O, No. 99-7171; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 08-KH-427.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; State v. Parker, 98-0256 (La.5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694; La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172, Cf. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4(D).


text:
    STATE ex rel. Andre RANDOLPH v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2008-KH-1536.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 3, 2009.
   In re Randolph, Andre; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 96-7456; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 08-KH-286.

Denied. Untimely, not cognizable on collateral review, and repetitive. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172; cf. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4(D).


text:
    STATE ex rel. Eddie W. VIREE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2008-KH-1561.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 3, 2009.
   In re Viree, Eddie W.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Rapides, 9th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 236,737; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 08-00244.

Denied.

KNOLL, J., recused.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Roger R. MITCHELL v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2008-KH-1584.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 3, 2009.
   In re Mitchell, Roger R.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Lincoln, 3rd Judicial District Court Div. B, Nos. 50878, 50879; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 43,666-KH.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Broderick Donnell HOWARD.
    No. 2008-KO-1608.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 3, 2009.
   In re Howard, Broderick Donnell; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 252017; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 43,227-KA.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Reginald BERRY.
    No. 2008-KO-1660.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 3, 2009.
   In re Berry, Reginald; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. N, No. 06-4887; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 08-KA-151.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Regina R. WALDROP.
    No. 2008-KO-1682.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 3, 2009.
   In re Waldrop, Regina R.; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Plaquemines, 25th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 2006-7338-I; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2007-KA-1605.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Anthony T. DONACHRICHA.
    No. 2008-K-1686.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 3, 2009.
   In re Donachricha, Anthony T.; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Livingston, 21st Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 18611; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2007 KA 2226.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Terrence JAMES.
    No. 2008-KO-1702.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 3, 2009.
   In re James, Terrence; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. J, No. 457-041; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2007-KA-1578.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Harold HAYES.
    No. 2008-K-1744.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 3, 2009.
   In re Hayes, Harold; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. L, No. 463-653; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2007-KA-1280.

Denied.

JOHNSON, J., would grant.

WEIMER, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Hilario G. TREVINO.
    No. 2008-K-1900.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 3, 2009.
   In re Trevino, Hilario G.; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 04-4055; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 07-KA-870.

Denied.

GUIDRY, J., recused.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Terrence JAMES.
    No. 2008-KO-1961.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 3, 2009.
   In re James, Terrance; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. J, No. 457-041; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2007-KA-1578.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Malcolm WINN.
    No. 2008-KO-1963.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 3, 2009.
   In re Winn, Malcolm; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. F, No. 456-755; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2007-KA-1389.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Robert JACOBS.
    No. 2008-KO-2000.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 3, 2009.
   In re Jacobs, Robert; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 107,623; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 07-1370.

Denied.


text:
    Elvist J. TABOR, Sr. and Doris G. Tabor v. ANCO INSULATIONS, INC., et al.
    No. 2009-C-0082.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 3, 2009.
   In re Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Insurance Co.; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Martin, 16th Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 66929; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 08-694.

Denied.

TRAYLOR, J., would grant.


text:
    Elvist J. TABOR, Sr. and Doris G. Tabor v. ANCO INSULATIONS, INC., et al.
    No. 2009-C-0145.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 3, 2009.
   In re Levert-St. John Inc.; — Third Party; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Martin, 16th Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 66929; to the Coui’t of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 08-694.

Denied.

TRAYLOR, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Jarvis E. BLACKBURN.
    No. 2009-KK-0255.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 3, 2009.
   In re Blackburn, Jams E.; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Pointe Coupee, 18th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 72,363; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2008 KW 2317.

Denied.


text:
    WOODLANDS DEVELOPMENT, LLC, et al. v. CRC INSURANCE SERVICE, INC., et al.
    No. 2009-CC-0256.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 3, 2009.
   In re Certain Underwriters of Lloyds of London; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. J, No. 2006-9689; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2008-C-1308.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Gregory A. GREEN.
    No. 2009-KK-0268.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 3, 2009.
   In re Green Jr., Gregory; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. E, No. 479,936; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2008-K-1538.

Denied.


text:
    Lorena Belsome LAJAUNIE, Barbara Lajaunie, and Ritchie Lajaunie, Individually and on Behalf of Decedent, Henry P. Lajaunie, Jr. v. CSR, Ltd., et al.
    No. 2009-CC-0270.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 3, 2009.
   In re Beach, Robert R.; Carroll, Joseph Ray; Conagra Grocery Products Co.; Hess Jr., Edward W.; Sitts, Charles B.; Smallwood, Norman; — Defendant(s); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 621-836; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 08-C-1248.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant.

TRAYLOR, J., would grant.


text:
    Willie BENARD v. EAGLE, INC., et al.
    No. 2009-C-0280.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 3, 2009.
   In re Benard, Willie; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. H, No. 2004-12356; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2008-CA-0262.

Denied.

KNOLL, J., would grant.


text:
    Renee' BREAUX, and Renee' Breaux, Derivatively on Behalf of Vieux Carre' Mortgage, L.L.C. v. VIEUX CARRE' MORTGAGE, L.L.C., Kirk J. Locicero and Kim L. Autin.
    No. 2009-C-0281.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 3, 2009.
   In re Breaux, Renee’; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. J, No. 02-10189; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2007-CA-1443.

Denied.


text:
    Gayle PICATACI v. CLARENDON INSURANCE COMPANY, et al.
    No. 2009-CC-0283.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 3, 2009.
   In re Burlington Insurance Company; Helen Brett Enterprises Inc.; — -Defendants); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. L, No. 2007-1437; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2008-C-1271.

Denied.


text:
    Nora PASSARO v. WAL-MART STORES, INC. and ABC Insurance Company.
    No. 2009-C-0284.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 3, 2009.
   In re Sam’s East Inc.; Wal-Mart Stores Inc. et al.; — Defendant(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. D, No. 04-15111; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2008-CA-991.

Denied.

GUIDRY, J., would grant.


text:
    Brenda PITTS v. LOUISIANA CITIZENS PROPERTY INSURANCE CORPORATION.
    No. 2009-C-0286.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 3, 2009.
   In re Louisiana Citizens Property Insurance Corporation; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. L, No. 2008-1891; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2008-CA-1024.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant.

TRAYLOR, J., would grant.


text:
    Bennie MIMS on Behalf of the UNOPENED SUCCESSION OF Howard MIMS v. LIFECARE HOSPITALS, LLC, d/b/a Lifecare Hospitals, Inc.
    No. 2009-C-0289.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 3, 2009.
   In re Mims, Bennie et al.; Mims, Howard Succ. of; — Plaintiff(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 516,980-C; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 43,770-CA.

Denied.


text:
    Walter E. JOHNSON, Jr. v. N. Burl CAIN, Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary and John L. Calvert, Director, Classification Department.
    No. 2009-CP-0295.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 3, 2009.
   In re Johnson Jr., Walter E.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. O, No. 519-403; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2008 CA 0936.

Denied.


text:
    Lovenda Janice Allen SONNIER v. Andrea Sonnier CONNER, Thomas Sonnier and Diamond McCattle Company LLC.
    No. 2009-C-0309.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 3, 2009.
   In re Conner, Andrea Sonnier et al.; Diamond McCattle Company, LLC; Son-nier, Thomas; — Defendant(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jackson, 2nd Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 30.726; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 43,811-CA.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Robert ELZY.
    No. 2009-KK-0312.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 3, 2009.
   In re Elzy, Robert; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Tangipahoa, 21st Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 106,864; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2008 KW 2641.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Theodore JOPES.
    No. 2009-KK-0313.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 3, 2009.
   In re Jopes, Theodore; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 10-06-368; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2008 KW 2421.

Denied.

JOHNSON, J., would grant.


text:
    LOUISIANA ENVIRONMENTAL ACTION NETWORK v. LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY.
    No. 2009-CC-0314.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 3, 2009.
   In re Waste Management of Louisiana L.L.C.; — Other; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 560,711; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2008 CW 1970.

Denied.

TRAYLOR, J., would grant.


text:
    CREAMER BROTHER'S INC. and Robert N. Creamer v. Lisa Annette Whitney HICKS a/k/a Lisa Whitney and Nelson W. Cameron.
    No. 2009-C-0315.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 3, 2009.
   In re Creamer Brother’s Inc.; Creamer, Robert N.; — Plaintiff(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Caddo, None Div. A, No. 484,149-C; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 43,808-CA.

Denied.


text:
    Johnny M. GILES v. GENERAL MOTORS ASSEMBLY DIVISION.
    No. 2009-C-0318.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 3, 2009.
   In re General Motors Corporation; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. K, No. 294,710-A; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 43,941-WCA.

Denied.


text:
    Rock P. KAMPMANN v. Dr. Helen MASON and Josephine Hambacher.
    No. 2009-C-0319.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 3, 2009.
   In re Kampmann, Rock P.; — Plaintiff; Applying For, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 592-233; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 08-CA-508.

Denied.

GUIDRY, J., recused.


text:
    Trudy CORTEZ v. EAST JEFFERSON GENERAL HOSPITAL.
    No. 2009-C-0320.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 3, 2009.
   In re East Jefferson General Hospital;— Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certio-rari and/or Review Office of Workers’ Compensation District 7, No. 04-4668; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 08-CA-653.

Denied.

GUIDRY, J., recused.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Robert HULITT.
    No. 2009-KK-0322.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 3, 2009.
   In re Hulitt, Robert; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. E, No. 477-224; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2008-K-1471.

Denied.

JOHNSON, J., would grant.


text:
    Ann Wood BARNES v. Stephen G. BARNES, Walter S. Barnes, Edward E. Moore, Jr., Commercial Management, Inc., and Treks Enterprises, Inc.
    No. 2009-C-0327.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 3, 2009.
   In re Barnes et al., Stephen G.; Barnes, Walter S.; Commercial Management Inc.; Moore Jr., Edward E.; Treks Enterprises Inc.; — Defendant(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 652-156; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 08-CA-492.

Denied.


text:
    SUCCESSION OF Chalin O. PEREZ v. Chalin O. PEREZ, Jr.
    No. 2009-CC-0332.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 3, 2009.
   In re Perez Administratrix, Lynn Perkins; — Other; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Plaque-mines, 25th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 50-116; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2008-C-1331.

Denied.


text:
    Peter TURNER v. MARINE INLAND TRANSPORTATION CO. and Maryland Marine, Inc.
    No. 2009-C-0335.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 3, 2009.
   In re Turner, Peter; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 532-254; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 08-CA-594.

Denied.

GUIDRY, J., recused.


text:
    SUCCESSION OF Marie Panfield FARWELL.
    No. 2009-C-0337.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 3, 2009.
   In re Collins, Marie Dennette-Far-well; — Other; Applying For Writ of Cer-tiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. N, No. 05-12596; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2008-CA-0832.

Denied.

WEIMER, J., would grant.

GUIDRY, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Fred REED.
    No. 2009-CJ-0379.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 3, 2009.
   In re Reed, Fred; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of East Carroll, 6th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. J-EC-5537; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 44,-119-JAC.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Ronald DUPONT and Kayla Dupont.
    No. 2009-KK-0380.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 3, 2009.
   In re Dupont, Ronald; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Allen, 33th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. CR2008-572; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KW 08-01513.

Denied.

WEIMER, J., would grant.


text:
    Betty White MEDLIN and Dwain D. Medlin v. WILSON LOUISIANA ASSOCIATES, L.P. and Tri-W Development, Inc. d/b/a the Mall of Louisiana ABC Insurance Company; McRae’s Inc. d/b/a McRae’s Department Store, et al.
    No. 2009-C-0381.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 3, 2009.
   In re Medlin, Betty White et al.; Med-lin, Dwain D.; — Plaintiffs); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 517,789; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2008-CA-381.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. James THREETON.
    No. 2009-KK-0436.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 3, 2009.
   In re Threeton, James; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Livingston, 21st Judicial District Court Div. G, Nos. 22878, 22936, 90959; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2008 KW 2508.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Tony GAINES.
    No. 2009-K-0535.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 3, 2009.
   In re Gaines, Tony; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. K, No. 469-362; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2008-KA-0967.

Denied.


text:
    Douglas M. SCHMIDT v. Irina V. Danvilova SCHMIDT.
    No. 2009-C-0566.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 3, 2009.
   In re Schmidt, Irina V. Danvilova;— Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certio-rari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. M, Nos. 2003-13671, 2003-13671; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2008-CA-0263.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Errick (Erick) Jermaine ARCENEAUX v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2009-KH-0591.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 3, 2009.
   In re Arceneaux, Errick (Erick) Jermaine; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of East Feliciana, 20th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 08-CR-424; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2008 KW 2203.

Denied.


text:
    Charles C. FOTI, Jr., Attorney General for the State of Louisiana v. Sarah HOLLIDAY.
    No. 2009-C-0093.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 3, 2009.
   In re James D. Caldwell, Attorney General; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Cer-tiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 541,990; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2008 CA 0055.

Granted.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Barry FERGUSON.
    No. 2009-KK-0818.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 13, 2009.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. B, No. 440-908; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2009-K-0430.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Barry FERGUSON.
    No. 2009-KK-0819.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 13, 2009.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. B, No. 440-908; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2009-K-0436.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Kenneth JOHNSON.
    No. 2009-KK-0825.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 15, 2009.
   In re Johnson, Kenneth; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. B, No. 480-900; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2009-K-0390.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Keera ALEXANDER.
    No. 2009-KK-0834.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 15, 2009.
   In re Alexander, Keera; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. 1, No. 500-560; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2009-K-0452.

Denied.

KIMBALL, C.J., would grant.

TRAYLOR, J., would grant.

WEIMER, J., would grant.


text:
    Doris SYKES, et al. v. Robert C. LOWTHER, Jr., et al.
    No. 2009-CC-0429.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 17, 2009.
   In re Sykes, Arthur A.; Sykes, Doris et al.; — Plaintiff(s); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. I, No. 2006-25; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2008-C-0852.

Granted. There are genuine issues of material fact in this matter which preclude summary judgment at this time. Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeal is reversed and the judgment of the trial court denying summary judgment is reinstated. Case remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

VICTORY, J., would deny.

TRAYLOR, J., would deny.

WEIMER, J., would deny.


text:
    Lucy BROOKS v. LOUISIANA CITIZENS FAIR PLAN AND STATE NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY.
    No. 2009-C-0526.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 17, 2009.
   In re Brooks, Lucy; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. L, No. 2006-9120; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2008-CA-0908.

Not considered, not timely filed.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Derrick JOHNSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2009-KH-0803.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 17, 2009.
   In re Johnson, Derrick; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Terrebonne, 32nd Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 483407; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 08 KW 2473.

The pleading is transferred to the district court with instructions to the district judge to act on relator’s motion and order for contradictory hearing or rule to show cause for production of documents as relator shows by Inmates’ Request for Legal/Indigent Mail receipt that the application was submitted. The distinct court is ordered to provide this Court with a copy of its judgment. A copy of the application is attached.


text:
    In re APPEAL OF DECISION OF the DISCIPLINARY BOARD NO. 08-PDB-050.
    No. 2009-OB-0101.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 17, 2009.
   In re Shaw, Honey Ms.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Appeal of Decision of the Disciplinary Board Office of the Disciplinary Board, No. 08-PDB-050.

Leave to appeal denied.


text:
    ST. PAUL FIRE AND MARINE INSURANCE COMPANY v. GAB ROBINS NORTH AMERICA, INC., Galloway, Johnson, Thompkins, Burr and Smith, APLC, and Thomas J. Smith, et al.
    No. 2008-C-2982.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 17, 2009.
   In re — Smith, Thomas J., Galloway, Johnson, Tompkins, Burr & Smith, APLC; — Plaintiffis); Applying for Rehearing of this Court’s order dated March 13, 2009; Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. L, No. 2004-3490; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2008-CA-0331.

Rehearing denied.

KIMBALL, Chief Justice, would grant.

KNOLL, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Charles CARTER v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2007-KH-0872.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 17, 2009.
   In re Carter, Charles; — Plaintiff; Applying for Reconsideration of this Courts action dated February 1, 2008; Parish of Pointe Coupee, 18th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 59,370, to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2007 KW 0136.

Reconsideration denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Charles CARTER v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2007-KH-1133.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 17, 2009.
   In re Carter, Charles; — Plaintiff; Applying for Reconsideration of this Courts action dated March 7, 2008; Parish of Pointe Coupee, 18th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 59370-F, to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2007 KW 0729.

Reconsideration denied.


text:
    Charles CARTER v. Burl CAIN, et al.
    No. 2007-CI-1367.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 17, 2009.
   In re Carter, Charles; — Plaintiff(s); Applying for Reconsideration of this Courts order dated March 28, 2008; Parish of West Feliciana, 20th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 19385; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2006 CW 2359.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. James SELDERS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2008-KH-988.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 17, 2009.
   In re Selders, James; — Plaintiff; Applying for Reconsideration of this Court’s action dated January 30, 2009; Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 8-03-0735; to the Court of ■Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2008 KW 0234.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Stephen A. TWEEDLE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2008-KH-1331.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 17, 2009.
   In re Tweedle, Stephen A.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Reconsideration of this Courts action dated March 6, 2009; Parish of Vernon, 30th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 61626, to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 07-01594.

Reconsideration denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Mark GRASSO.
    No. 20008-KP-1245.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 17, 2009.
   In re Grasso, Mark; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 345596; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2008 KW 0492.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Herbert CHARLES, Jr.
    No. 2008-KP-1246.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 17, 2009.
   In re Charles, Herbert Jr.; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Iberia, 16th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 94-667G; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KW 08-00208.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Gerald STOVES v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2008-KH-1589.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 17, 2009.
   In re Stoves, Gerald; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Terrebonne, 32nd Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 332640; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2008 KW 0484.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Mickell A. CALVERT v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2008-KH-1602.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 17, 2009.
   In re Calvert, Mickell A.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Washington, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. J, No. 05-CR10-92582; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2007 KA 1910.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Jerry LEWIS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2008-KH-1604.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 17, 2009.
   In re Lewis, Jerry; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. K, No. 08-83-0151; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2008 KW 0434.

Denied.

WEIMER, J., recused.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Keith BARROW v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2008-KH-1605.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 17, 2009.
   In re Barrow, Keith; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. N, No. 01-6237; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 08-KH-362.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; State v. Parker, 98-0256 (La.5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694; La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.

GUIDRY, J., recused.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Regan GATTI v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2008-KH-1607.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 17, 2009.
   In re Gatti, Regan;- — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Bossier, 26th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 120,143; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 43667-KH.

Denied.


text:
    Richard LAY v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2008-CI-1612.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 17, 2009.
   In re Lay, Richard; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 2000-10532; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2008 CW 1002.

Denied.

WEIMER, J., recused.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Lawrence JONES v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2008-KH-1645.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 17, 2009.
   In re Jones, Lawrence; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 02-06-0159; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2008 KW 0279.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Donald STELLY v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2008-KH-1647.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 17, 2009.
   In re Stelly, Donald; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Pointe Coupee, 18th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 40,516; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2008 CW 0894.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Kevin BOWMAN v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2008-KH-1648.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 17, 2009.
   In re Bowman, Kevin; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 242,336; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 42,-533-KA.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Stanley DORSEY v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2008-KH-1649.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 17, 2009.
   In re Dorsey, Stanley; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 04-7986; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 08-KH-481.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Ronnell ANDERSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2008-KH-1650.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 17, 2009.
   In re Anderson, Ronnell; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. O, No. 04 — 4828; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 06-KA-372.

Denied. Petitioner fails to show that he filed an application for post-conviction relief that was denied in an order that did not conform to the requirements of La. Const. art. V Section 8(B). La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.2; cf. State v. Cordero, 08-1717 (La.10/03/08), 993 So.2d 203.

WEIMER, J., concurs.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Simon MONTGOMERY v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2008-KH-1655.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 17, 2009.
   In re Montgomery, Simon; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 95-5903; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 08-KH-488.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3.


text:
    STATE ex rel. John B. WILSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2008-KH-1656.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 17, 2009.
   In re Wilson, John B.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. G, No. 379-003; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2008-K-0699.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; State v. Parker, 98-0256 (La.5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694; La.C.Cr. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.