text:
    In re Clifton John SPEARS, Jr.
    No. 2011-B-1135.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 2, 2011.
   ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

PER CURIAM.

11 This disciplinary matter arises from formal charges filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) against respondent, Clifton John Spears, Jr., an attorney licensed to practice law in Louisiana.

UNDERLYING FACTS

On January 20, 2009, respondent’s trust account did not have a sufficient balance to cover a $470 cheek. Accordingly, the bank returned the check unpaid. On February 4, 2009, the check was presented a second time and paid, resulting in an overdraft in the trust account of $444.75. The ODC subsequently opened an investigation and learned that the $470 check was written to the East Baton Rouge Parish Clerk of Court for filing fees. Consequently, the ODC audited respondent’s trust account for the time period of August 1, 2008 through February 28, 2009. The audit indicated the following:

On fifty-seven occasions, respondent wire transferred funds between his trust account and his operating account or personal account without proper documentation. He also had no documentation to explain the $9,941.43 balance in his trust account on August 1, 2008 or various deposits into the trust account during this time period. Between November 5, 2008 and February 5, 2009, respondent transferred a total of $3,117 from his operating or personal account to |2his trust account. On several occasions, respondent also left his personal funds and/or his attorney’s fees from various settlements in his trust account. The non-client funds in respondent’s trust account exceeded the amount necessary to pay bank service charges, and respondent occasionally used these funds to pay his office’s operating expenses directly from the trust account. Additionally, in November 2008, respondent’s trust account had insufficient funds to cover $1,176.35 due to a third-party medical provider; thus, the processing of two checks made payable to the third-party medical provider created a $1,160.62 deficit in the account. On November 19, 2008, respondent transferred funds from his operating and personal accounts into his trust account to eliminate the deficit.

DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

In June 2010, the ODC filed formal charges against respondent, alleging that by his conduct as set forth above he violated Rule 1.15(a) — (f) (safekeeping property of clients or third persons) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. The ODC also alleged respondent violated Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 28(A)(2). Respondent answered the formal charges, denying any misconduct. The matter then proceeded to a formal hearing on the merits.

IsHearing Committee Report

After considering the testimony and evidence presented at the hearing, the hearing committee made the following factual findings:

On January 20, 2009, respondent’s bank notified the ODC of a $404.81 overdraft in respondent’s trust account. On February 4, 2009, respondent’s bank notified the ODC of a $444.75 overdraft in respondent’s trust account. Thereafter, an audit of respondent’s trust account established that respondent (1) failed to maintain the required financial records; (2) commingled funds; and (8) converted approximately $1,160.62 for a very short period of time before replacing the funds.

Respondent does not dispute the auditor’s findings and conclusions; thus, the committee accepted those findings and conclusions as fact. However, respondent testified that Hurricane Gustav damaged his office, having a devastating effect on his files and machinery. Respondent also stated that most, but not all, of his financial records were destroyed. Thereafter, respondent believed electronic banking would assist him in continuing his practice. However, the evidence revealed that electronic banking provides minuscule and inadequate financial records. This fact alone does not exonerate respondent, but it reflects that he did not act knowingly or intentionally. Furthermore, respondent indicated that the overdrafts occurred because of his failure to properly record various drafts. Respondent quickly remedied the problem as soon as it was called to his attention.

|4Based on these facts, the committee determined respondent violated Rule 1.15(a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct and Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 28(A)(2) by failing to maintain the required financial records for his client trust account. The committee also determined respondent violated Rule 1.15(a)-(f) by commingling his funds with the funds of his clients and/or third parties and by misappropriating or converting approximately $1,160.62.

The committee found respondent negligently violated duties owed to the legal profession. The committee determined no aggravating factors are present. However, in mitigation, the committee noted several factors: absence of a dishonest or selfish motive, timely good faith effort to make restitution or to rectify the consequences of the misconduct, full and free disclosure to the disciplinary board and a cooperative attitude toward the proceedings, character or reputation, remorse, and remoteness of prior disciplinary offenses.

In light of the numerous mitigating factors present, the absence of aggravating factors, and the prior jurisprudence involving similar misconduct, the committee recommended respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one year and one day, fully deferred, subject to two years of probation.

The ODC filed an objection to the hearing committee’s report, specifically objecting to the committee’s failure to give appropriate weight to respondent’s prior discipline in formulating a recommended sanction.

\¿Pisciplinary Board Recommendation

After review, the disciplinary board determined that the hearing committee’s factual findings do not appear to be manifestly erroneous. Based on those facts, the board determined respondent violated Rules 1.15(a) and 1.15(b) of the Rules of Professional Conduct and Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 28(A)(2). The board indicated that respondent violated Rule 1.15(a) because he commingled funds by leaving his attorney’s fees in his trust account and withdrawing them incrementally over a long period of time and because he converted $1,160.62 in third-party funds for a very short period of time in November 2008. Respondent also failed to maintain and/or create supporting documentation when he switched to electronic banking. The board further indicated that respondent violated Rule 1.15(b) because he transferred various amounts of money from his personal and operating accounts to his trust account on several occasions. In most of these instances, he transferred the funds to replace overdrafted funds. Furthermore, as stated above, respondent left his attorney’s fees in his trust account for an extended period of time. Finally, the board indicated that respondent violated Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 28(A)(2) by failing to maintain and/or create supporting documentation when he switched to electronic banking.

The board, however, found that respondent did not violate Rules 1.15(e)-(f). Specifically, the board determined respondent did not violate Rule 1.15(c) because the formal charges did not allege that he failed to place advance payments for fees or expenses in his trust account, nor did they allege that he withdrew advance payments for fees or expenses prior to earning or incurring them. He did not violate Rule 1.15(d) because there was no delay in transmitting funds to the third-party medical provider even though processing the checks created overdrafts in his trust account. He did not violate Rule 1.15(e) because the formal charges did not allege that a dispute existed concerning property in his possession. Finally, he did Rnot violate Rule 1.15(f) because the formal charges did not allege that he failed to personally sign checks drawn on his trust account or failed to personally authorize electronic transfers to and from his trust account.

The board further determined respondent negligently violated duties owed to his clients and third parties, causing them potential harm. Relying on the ABA’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, the board determined the baseline sanction is a public reprimand.

In aggravation, the board found prior disciplinary offenses and substantial experience in the practice of law (admitted 1993). In mitigation, the board found the absence of a dishonest or selfish motive, timely good faith effort to make restitution or to rectify the consequences of the misconduct, full and free disclosure to the disciplinary board and a cooperative attitude toward the proceedings, character or reputation, remorse, and remoteness of prior offenses. The board also noted that respondent’s misconduct was caused, in part, by his switch to electronic banking after his office and files were damaged by Hurricane Gustav.

Turning to the issue of an appropriate sanction, the board noted that Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Hinrichs, 486 So.2d 116 (La.1986), departs from the ABA Standards for matters involving negligent conversion of client and/or third-party funds and, instead, establishes suspension as the baseline sanction:

A suspension from practice of one year or less will typically result where the negligence in withdrawing or retaining client funds is not gross or of a high degree. No other fraudulent acts are committed in connection with the violation of the disciplinary rule. There is no serious harm or threat of harm to the client. Full restitution is made promptly, usually before any legal proceeding or disciplinary complaint is made.

After considering this court’s other cases involving similar misconduct and in light of respondent’s prior disciplinary history, despite its remoteness, the board recommended respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one year and 17one day, fully deferred, subject to two years of supervised probation with the following conditions:

1. Respondent shall attend the Louisiana State Bar Association’s Trust Accounting School;

2. Respondent shall retain the services of a CPA, at his expense and subject to the ODC’s approval, to review his trust account every six months and file a report with the ODC; and

3. Respondent shall refrain from any additional violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

Neither respondent nor the ODC filed an objection to the disciplinary board’s recommendation.

DISCUSSION

Bar disciplinary matters fall within the original jurisdiction of this court. La. Const, art. V, § 5(B). Consequently, we act as triers of fact and conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether the alleged misconduct has been proven by clear and convincing evidence. In re: Banks, 09-1212 (La.10/2/09), 18 So.3d 57. While we are not bound in any way by the findings and recommendations of the hearing committee and disciplinary board, we have held the manifest error standard is applicable to the committee’s factual findings. See In re: Caulfield, 96-1401 (La.11/25/96), 683 So.2d 714; In re: Pardue, 93-2865 (La.3/11/94), 633 So.2d 150.

The record in this matter establishes that, for several months, respondent failed to maintain adequate records of his trust account. He also commingled his funds with those of his clients by leaving his attorney’s fees in his trust account for extended periods of time and by transferring funds to his trust account from his personal and operating accounts. Finally, respondent converted client and/or third-[partys funds when he allowed his trust account to become overdrawn. Based on these facts, respondent violated the Rules of Professional Conduct and Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 28(A)(2), as found by the disciplinary board.

Having found evidence of professional misconduct, we now turn to a determination of the appropriate sanction for respondent’s actions. In determining a sanction, we are mindful that disciplinary proceedings are designed to maintain high standards of conduct, protect the public, preserve the integrity of the profession, and deter future misconduct. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Reis, 513 So.2d 1173 (La.1987). The discipline to be imposed depends upon the facts of each case and the seriousness of the offenses involved considered in light of any aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Whittington, 459 So.2d 520 (La.1984).

Respondent negligently violated duties owed to his clients, the public, and the legal profession. Although his conduct caused no actual harm, the potential for serious harm to his clients and third parties existed. We agree with the board that Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Hinrichs, 486 So.2d 116 (La.1986), establishes a one-year suspension or less as the baseline sanction for negligent conversion of client funds. We also agree with the aggravating and mitigating factors found by the board. Additionally, the aggravating factor of multiple offenses is present in that respondent’s improper use of his trust account occurred on numerous occasions. Furthermore, although we recognize respondent’s past disciplinary history as an aggravating factor, we give the factor little weight because those offenses are remote in time and involve misconduct that is dissimilar to the instant misconduct. Under these circumstances, the board’s recommended sanction is reasonable.

Accordingly, we will adopt the board’s recommendation and suspend respondent from the practice of law for one year and one day, fully deferred, |nsubject to two years of supervised probation with the conditions set forth in the board’s report.

DECREE

Upon review of the findings and recommendations of the hearing committee and disciplinary board, and considering the record, it is ordered that Clifton John Spears, Jr., Louisiana Bar Roll number 22159, be and he hereby is suspended from the practice of law for one year and one day. This suspension shall be deferred in its entirety, subject to respondent’s successful completion of a two-year period of supervised probation governed by the conditions set forth in the disciplinary board’s report. The probationary period shall commence from the date respondent, the ODC, and the probation monitor execute a formal probation plan. Any failure of respondent to comply with the conditions of probation, or any misconduct during the probationary period, may be grounds for making the deferred suspension executory, or imposing additional discipline, as appropriate. All costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10. 1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.

       Chief Justice Kimball not participating in the opinion.

      . Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 28(A)(2) provides:
      Every lawyer engaged in the practice of law in Louisiana shall maintain and preserve for a period of at least five years, after final disposition of the underlying matter, the records, check stubs, vouchers, ledgers, journals, closing statements, accounts or other statements of disbursements rendered to clients or other parties with regard to trust funds or similar equivalent records clearly and expressly reflecting the date, amount, source, and explanation for all receipts, withdrawals, deliveries and disbursements of the funds or other property of a client.

      . In fact, respondent’s trust account was not overdrawn on January 20, 2009. As stated in the underlying facts section above, the account had insufficient funds to cover a $470 check. At that time, the bank did not process the check, but did charge the account a $35 NSF fee, which resulted in a balance in the account on that date of $30.16.

      . In February 2000, this court considered a petition for consent discipline involving respondent's misconduct in allowing a client’s case to prescribe and then attempting to mislead the client into believing the case had settled. This court accepted the consent discipline and suspended respondent for one year and thirty-one days, with all but thirty days deferred, followed by two years of probation with conditions. In re: Spears, 00-0028 (La.2/4/00), 753 So.2d 204.
      In October 2002, respondent was admonished for failing to complete a representation in which he received a $4,000 fee. Respondent conceded that he owed the client a refund and submitted the matter to the Louisiana State Bar Association’s Fee Dispute Resolution Program for arbitration; however, the client declined to participate in fee arbitration.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: PER CURIAM.

license: Public Domain

text:
    In re Philip J. SHAHEEN, Jr.
    No. 2011-B-1329.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 7, 2011.
   ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

PER CURIAM.

pThe Office of Disciplinary Counsel seeks review of a recommendation of the disciplinary board that the formal charges against respondent, Philip J. Shaheen, Jr., be dismissed. Having reviewed the record and the briefs of the parties, we find the disciplinary board reached the correct result in dismissing the formal charges.

Accordingly, it is the judgment of this court that the formal charges against respondent be dismissed.

       Chief Justice Kimball not participating in the opinion.


text:
    In re Flitcher R. BELL.
    No. 2011-B-1330.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 7, 2011.
   ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

PER CURIAM.

] ,This disciplinary matter arises from formal charges filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) against respondent, Flitcher R. Bell, an attorney licensed to practice law in Louisiana but currently on interim suspension based upon his conviction of a serious crime. In re: Bell, 09-2457 (La.11/18/09), 21 So.3d 932.

FORMAL CHARGES

In October 2009, respondent pleaded guilty to federal charges that he accepted bribes in exchange for “fixing” criminal and traffic matters pending in the Baton Rouge City Court. According to the factual basis for the guilty plea, between 2006 and 2009, respondent, a senior prosecutor at the Baton Rouge City Court, conspired with others to engage in bribery by soliciting and accepting payments from individuals with matters pending before that court with the promise that the charges would be dismissed or otherwise “fixed.” On one occasion in May 2009, respondent received cash to dismiss a criminal charge against an undercover FBI agent.

| ¿DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

In April 2010, the ODC filed one count of formal charges against respondent, alleging that his conduct as set forth above violated Rules 8.4(a) (violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct), 8.4(b) (commission of a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer), 8.4(c) (engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation), and 8.4(d) (engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

Respondent was personally served with the formal charges but failed to answer. Accordingly, the factual allegations contained therein were deemed admitted and proven by clear and convincing evidence pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 11(E)(3). No formal hearing was held, but the parties were given an opportunity to file with the hearing committee written arguments and documentary evidence on the issue of sanctions. Respondent filed nothing for the hearing committee’s consideration.

Hearing Committee Report

After considering the ODC’s deemed admitted submission, the hearing committee determined the factual allegations of the formal charges were admitted and proven by clear and convincing evidence, and that respondent violated the Rules of Professional Conduct as alleged in the formal charges.

The committee found respondent violated a duty owed to the public. His conduct was intentional and caused substantial harm to the legal profession and to the system of justice. The committee further determined that under the ABA’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, the applicable baseline sanction is disbarment.

| aThe committee did not discuss whether any aggravating factors are present in this case. It found no mitigating factors.

Considering respondent’s misconduct in light of the permanent disbarment guidelines and the prior jurisprudence of this court, the committee recommended he be permanently disbarred.

Neither respondent nor the ODC filed an objection to the hearing committee’s report and recommendation.

Disciplinary Board Recommendation

After review, the disciplinary board determined the hearing committee’s factual findings in this deemed admitted matter are supported by the factual allegations in the formal charges and/or by the evidence submitted in support of those allegations. The board also found respondent violated the Rules of Professional Conduct as alleged in the formal charges.

The board adopted the committee’s findings with respect to duties violated, respondent’s mental state, the harm caused, and the applicable baseline sanction. In aggravation, the board found the following factors: prior disciplinary offenses, a dishonest or selfish motive, a pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses, and substantial experience in the practice of law (admitted 1999). The board agreed no mitigating factors are present.

Considering respondent’s misconduct in light of the permanent disbarment guidelines and the prior jurisprudence of this court, the board recommended he be permanently disbarred.

Neither respondent nor the ODC filed an objection to the disciplinary board’s recommendation.

^DISCUSSION

Bar disciplinary matters come within the original jurisdiction of this court. La. Const, art. V, § 5(B). When the disciplinary proceedings involve an attorney who has been convicted of a crime, the conviction is conclusive evidence of guilt and the sole issue presented is whether respondent’s crimes warrant discipline, and if so, the extent thereof. Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 19(E); In re: Boudreau, 02-0007 (La.4/12/02), 815 So.2d 76; Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Wilkinson, 562 So.2d 902 (La.1990). The discipline to be imposed in a given case depends upon the seriousness of the offense, the circumstances of the offense, and the extent of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Perez, 550 So.2d 188 (La.1989).

Here, respondent stands convicted of accepting bribes in exchange for “fixing” criminal and traffic matters pending in the Baton Rouge City Court, where he worked as a senior prosecutor. This crime is a felony under federal law and clearly warrants serious discipline. Indeed, in their respective reports, the hearing committee and the disciplinary board have concluded that respondent’s offenses are so egregious that he should be permanently prohibited from applying for readmission to the bar.

We agree. In Appendix E to Supreme Court Rule XIX, we set forth guidelines illustrating the types of conduct which might warrant permanent disbarment. While these guidelines are not intended to bind this court in its decision-making process, they present useful information concerning the types of conduct which might be considered worthy of permanent disbarment. For purposes of the instant case, Guidelines 2 and 7 are relevant. Those guidelines provide:

GUIDELINE 2. Intentional corruption of the judicial process, including but not limited to bribery, perjury, and subornation of perjury.
IsGUIDELINE 7. Malfeasance in office which results in a felony conviction, and which involves fraud.

In this case, respondent accepted the payment of bribes to dismiss, reduce, or otherwise “fix” criminal and traffic matters pending in the court in which he was a prosecutor. This was not a one-time occurrence; rather, respondent and his co-conspirators participated in the illicit bribery scheme over a period of at least three years. This sort of pervasive public corruption interferes with the administration of justice and undermines the principle that all are equal before the law. Respondent’s conduct clearly amounts to intentional corruption of the judicial process under Guideline 2. Moreover, Guideline 7 is implicated because respondent’s conduct led to his felony criminal conviction on conspiracy and bribery charges.

Based on this reasoning, we find permanent disbarment is the appropriate sanction in this case. Accordingly, we will accept the disciplinary board’s recommendation and permanently disbar respondent.

DECREE

Upon review of the findings and recommendations of the hearing committee and disciplinary board, and considering the record, it is ordered that the name of Flitcher R. Bell, Louisiana Bar Roll number 26193, be stricken from the roll of attorneys and that his license to practice law in the State of Louisiana be revoked. Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 24(A), it is further ordered that respondent be permanently prohibited from being readmitted to the practice of law in this state. All costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in |Baccordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.

       Chief Justice Kimball not participating in the opinion.

      . According to the board, respondent received a "formal private reprimand" in 2005.

      . The case of In re: Burks, 07-0637 (La.8/31/07), 964 So.2d 298, involves similar misconduct. In Burks, an Assistant City Attorney for the City of New Orleans assigned to prosecute cases in traffic court accepted $1,000 to nolle prosequi several traffic citations for an undercover FBI agent posing as a taxi driver. The attorney eventually pled guilty to a felony in federal court, and he was permanently disbarred under Guidelines 2 and 7.


text:
    In re Kenneth R. BOWEN.
    No. 2011-B-2015.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 12, 2011.
   ORDER

| j Considering the Petition for Interim Suspension filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel,

IT IS ORDERED that Kenneth R. Bowen, Louisiana Bar Roll number 29773, be and he hereby is suspended from the practice of law on an interim basis pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 19, pending further orders of this court. Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 26(E), this order is effective immediately-

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that necessary disciplinary proceedings be instituted in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, §§ 11 and 19.

/s/ Marcus R. Clark /s/ JUSTICE, SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA


text:
    In re Seth CORTIGENE.
    No. 2011-B-1564.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 14, 2011.
   ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

PER CURIAM.

11 Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 21, the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) has filed a petition seeking the imposition of reciprocal discipline against respondent, Seth Cortigene, an attorney licensed to practice law in the States of Louisiana and Texas, based upon discipline imposed in Texas.

UNDERLYING FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On October 22, 2009, respondent was suspended from the practice of law in Texas for three years, fully probated with specific conditions. Commission for Lawyer Discipline v. Cortigene, No. 2009-14053 on the docket of the 157th District Court of Harris County, Texas. The specific misconduct forming the basis of respondent’s disciplinary proceeding is not discussed in the court’s opinion; however, the court found he “committed professional misconduct ... in violation of Rules 1.02(a)(2) [a lawyer shall abide by a client’s decisions regarding whether to accept an offer of settlement of a matter]; 1.03(a) [a lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information]; and 8.04(a)(3) [a lawyer shall not engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation], of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct; Article X, Section 9, of the State Bar Rules.”

| gAfter receiving notice of the Texas order of discipline, the ODC filed a motion to initiate reciprocal discipline proceedings in Louisiana, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 21. A certified copy of the decision and order of the Texas court was attached to the motion. On July 15, 2011, this court rendered an order giving respondent thirty days to demonstrate why the imposition of identical discipline in this state would be unwarranted. Respondent failed to file any response in this court.

DISCUSSION

The standard for imposition of discipline on a reciprocal basis is set forth in Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 21(D), which provides:

Upon the expiration of thirty days from service of the notice pursuant to the provisions of paragraph B, this court shall impose the identical discipline or disability inactive status unless disciplinary counsel or the lawyer demonstrates, or this court finds that it clearly appears upon the face of the record from which the discipline is predicated, that
(1) The procedure was so lacking in notice or opportunity to be heard as to constitute a deprivation of due process; or
(2) Based on the record created by the jurisdiction that imposed the discipline, there was such infirmity of proof establishing the misconduct as to give rise to the clear conviction that the court could not, consistent with its duty, accept as final the conclusion on that subject; or
(3) The imposition of the same discipline by the court would result in grave injustice or be offensive to the public policy of the jurisdiction; or
(4) The misconduct established warrants substantially different discipline in this state; or
(5) The reason for the original transfer to disability inactive status no longer exists.

|aIn determining the appropriate measure of reciprocal discipline, we are not required to impose the same sanction as that imposed by the state in which the misconduct occurred. Nevertheless, only under extraordinary circumstances should there be a significant variance from the sanction imposed by the other jurisdiction. In re: Aulston, 05-1546 (La.1/13/06), 918 So.2d 461. See also In re Zdravkovich, 831 A.2d 964, 968-69 (D.C.2003) (“there is merit in according defei’ence, for its own sake, to the actions of other jurisdictions with respect to the attorneys over whom we share supervisory authority”).

Applying the factors set forth in Rule XIX, § 21(D), we see no reason to deviate from the sanction imposed by our sister state. There is little doubt that respondent’s conduct would warrant discipline in Louisiana, given that he failed to communicate with a client, settled a legal matter without the knowledge or consent of the client, and engaged in dishonest or deceitful conduct. Under these circumstances, we agree that a suspension is warranted.

Accordingly, we will impose the same discipline against respondent as was imposed in Texas.

DECREE

Considering the Petition to Initiate Reciprocal Discipline Proceedings filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel and the record filed herein, it is ordered that Seth Cortigene, Louisiana Bar Roll number 19528, be and he hereby is suspended from the practice of law for a period of three years. It is further ordered that this suspension shall be deferred in its entirety, subject to the terms of probation set forth by the court in Commission for Lawyer Discipline v. Cortigene, No. 2009-14053 on the docket of the 157th District Court of Harris County, Texas. Any violation of the terms of probation may result in the deferred suspension becoming executory, or imposition of different discipline, as appropriate.

       Chief Justice Kimball not participating in the opinion.


text:
    In re Gregory Patrick NICHOLS.
    No. 2011-B-1538.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 14, 2011.
   ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

PER CURIAM.

[ ,This disciplinary matter arises from formal charges filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) against respondent, Gregory Patrick Nichols, an attorney licensed to practice law in Louisiana.

UNDERLYING FACTS

Count I — The Singleton Matter

In early 2005, Lester Singleton hired respondent to represent him in divorce proceedings against his wife, who resided in California with the couple’s children. Mr. Singleton paid respondent $650 in costs and attorney’s fees. On February 10, 2005, respondent filed the petition for divorce in Jefferson Parish.

Upon being served with the petition for divorce, Mr. Singleton’s wife, through her Louisiana counsel, filed exceptions of prematurity and lack of jurisdiction. A hearing on the exceptions was scheduled for April 27, 2005. Respondent failed to file a pre-hearing brief and did not appear in court for the hearing. The judge granted the exception of prematurity and dismissed Mr. Singleton’s petition for divorce. The judge also ordered Mr. Singleton to pay $1,500 in attorney’s fees to his wife as sanctions for his failure to appear and failure to file a brief. In an effort to get the judgment for sanctions reversed, 12respondent filed a notice of intention to file for supervisory writs; however, he subsequently failed to file the writ application.

During his August 21, 2008 sworn statement to the ODC, respondent indicated he advised Mr. Singleton that exceptions were filed and that a hearing was scheduled. He acknowledged that he should have attended the hearing and should have been more diligent in representing Mr. Singleton. He also indicated he told Mr. Singleton that he would pay the $1,500 fine himself if the judgment for sanctions was enforced.

Count II — The Watkins Matter

In July 2000, Sherman Watkins hired respondent to draft a petition in a civil lawsuit against St. John the Baptist Parish Sheriffs Office for a civil rights violation after he was mistakenly arrested and charged with armed robbery and forced to spend the night a jail. Respondent drafted the petition for a flat fee, which Mr. Watkins paid. Mr. Watkins then filed the petition in proper person. When Mr. Watkins could not find another attorney to represent him, respondent agreed to assume the representation on a contingency fee basis.

In 2003, the defendant deposed Mr. Watkins, and his substantial arrest record for petty crimes and drugs was revealed. At this point, respondent began to question Mr. Watkins’ credibility. Since the basis of Mr. Watkins’ case was that his reputation in the community had been damaged because of his arrest, respondent felt he would never be able to prove Mr. Watkins had been injured by the defendant’s actions. Mr. Watkins also would not allow respondent to settle the case for less than $250,000.

When Hurricane Katrina struck in August 2005, Mr. Watkins’ case had been inactive for two years. Mr. Watkins’ physical file was destroyed when Katrina | ¡¡destroyed respondent’s home office. As such, respondent continued to do nothing on the case.

In December 2006, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the suit on the grounds of abandonment, and the suit was dismissed on December 20, 2006. Despite receiving notice of the dismissal, respondent did not inform Mr. Watkins of same.

During his August 21, 2008 sworn statement to the ODC, respondent acknowledged that he should have filed a motion to withdraw as Mr. Watkins’ attorney when he knew the case was not progressing. He also acknowledged that his error caused the case to be abandoned. Seven days after his sworn statement, respondent wrote to Mr. Watkins, informing him that the case was abandoned. He also informed Mr. Watkins that he may have committed malpractice.

DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

In February 2010, the ODC filed formal charges against respondent. While the ODC failed to allege any rule violations in the formal charges, the ODC’s later filings alleged that, by his conduct as set forth above, respondent violated the following provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 1.3 (failure to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client) and 1.4 (failure to communicate with a client).

Respondent filed an answer to the formal charges, essentially admitting the misconduct but also noting several mitigating factors he believes are present. This matter then proceeded to a formal hearing on the merits, conducted by the hearing committee in January 2011.

_|¿Hearing Committee Report

After considering the testimony and evidence presented at the hearing, the hearing committee determined that all witnesses were credible and that they all testified truthfully as they understood the facts and the questions posed to them. The committee then made the following factual findings:

Respondent agreed to represent Mr. Singleton in filing for a divorce. Mr. Singleton had recently moved to Louisiana from California, where his wife and children still resided. Mr. Singleton understood that custody and alimony issues would have to be addressed in California. He also understood that he could obtain a divorce in either Louisiana or California. After the petition for divorce was filed in Louisiana, Mr. Singleton’s wife hired a Louisiana attorney, who filed exceptions of prematurity and lack of jurisdiction. She also presented evidence that Mr. Singleton continued to be domiciled in California. Based on this evidence, which respondent apparently accepted without question, he advised Mr. Singleton to dismiss the Louisiana case and litigate all issues in California. Respondent did not file an opposition to the exceptions and did not appear at the related hearing. The court granted one of the exceptions and assessed attorney’s fees against Mr. Singleton because of his failure, through counsel, to file an opposition or to appear. Those fees have never been collected, nor has any attempt been made to collect them. Respondent acknowledged that the assessment of fees, while unusual, was attributable to his inaction. He agreed to pay the fees if an effort was made to collect them. Respondent apparently believed he had obtained Mr. Singleton’s consent to dismiss the matter. However, he never filed a motion to dismiss, and Mr. Singleton denied that he authorized a dismissal. Respondent acknowledges that he should have appeared for the hearing and should have filed an opposition to the exceptions or a motion to dismiss.

|fiMr. Watkins had been mistakenly arrested and charged with armed robbery and was forced to spend a night in jail. He retained respondent to draft a petition for him to avoid expiration of the prescriptive period. Respondent drafted the petition, and Mr. Watkins filed it in proper person. Later, Mr. Watkins was unable to find another attorney to represent him, and respondent agreed to represent him on a contingency fee basis. During discovery, respondent learned that Mr. Watkins had a series of prior arrests and believed Mr. Watkins’ case could never be proven. Respondent received a settlement offer from the primary defendant and discussed the offer with Mr. Watkins. However, Mr. Watkins indicated he would settle for no less than approximately ten times the amount of the proposed settlement amount. Rather than continue to litigate the case or formally withdraw, respondent failed to take any action. Two years later, Hurricane Katrina destroyed respondent’s home office and the entirety of the physical file on Mr. Watkins and his lawsuit. Respondent lost track of the suit in the aftermath of Katrina and his own personal family problems. The suit was dismissed on the grounds of abandonment near the end of 2006. Respondent acknowledges his error in permitting the case to be abandoned. He also acknowledges that, prior to learning of Mr. Watkins’ disciplinary complaint, he did not inform Mr. Watkins that his suit had been abandoned or that a malpractice claim against him might exist. Respondent attributes his failure to an inability to reach Mr. Watkins, especially after Katrina. Upon learning of the complaint and receiving Mr. Watkins’ address from the ODC, respondent did so notify him.

Based on these facts, the committee determined respondent violated Rules 1.3 and 1.4 of the Rules of Professional Conduct. The committee further determined respondent negligently violated duties owed to his clients. However, the harm he caused was not overwhelmingly great. Although Mr. Singleton was deprived of a quick divorce in Louisiana, he may still obtain a divorce in either | ^California or Louisiana. Although Mr. Watkins was deprived of his day in court, his claim likely would not have resulted in a substantial judgment in his favor. After considering the ABA’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, the committee determined the baseline sanction is suspension.

In aggravation, the committee found multiple offenses and vulnerability of the victim. In mitigation, the committee found the following factors: absence of a prior disciplinary record, absence of a dishonest or selfish motive, personal or emotional problems, full and free disclosure to the disciplinary board and a cooperative attitude toward the proceedings, and remorse.

After considering this court’s prior jurisprudence involving similar misconduct, the committee recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six months, with all but two days deferred. The committee further recommended that, during the period of suspension, respondent attend a one-hour continuing legal education (“CLE”) course on ethics that includes a discussion of attorney responsibilities regarding termination of client relations.

Neither respondent nor the ODC filed an objection to the hearing committee’s report and recommendation. However, respondent did file an objection to the assessment of costs and expenses against him. After considering respondent’s objection and the ODC’s opposition, the committee chair issued an order denying respondent’s objection.

Disciplinary Board Recommendation

After review, the disciplinary board determined the hearing committee’s factual findings are not manifestly erroneous. Based on these facts, the board | determined respondent violated Rule 1.3 of the Rules of Professional Conduct by failing to attend the April 27, 2005 hearing on Mr. Singleton’s behalf and by allowing Mr. Watkins’ claim to become abandoned. The board also determined respondent violated Rule 1.4 by failing to notify Mr. Watkins that his claim was abandoned and by failing to reasonably consult and communicate with Mr. Singleton regarding his attendance at the April 27, 2005 hearing.

The board determined respondent negligently violated duties owed to his clients. The board agreed with the committee that the harm caused by respondent’s misconduct was not overwhelmingly great. After considering the ABA’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, the board determined the baseline sanction is suspension. The board also adopted the aggravating and mitigating factors found by the committee.

After considering this court’s prior jurisprudence involving similar misconduct, the board recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six months, fully deferred, subject to a six-month period of unsupervised probation, with the condition that he obtain an extra hour of ethics CLE this calendar year. The board also recommended that respondent be assessed with all costs and expenses of these disciplinary proceedings.

Neither respondent nor the ODC filed an objection to the disciplinary board’s recommendation.

DISCUSSION

Bar disciplinary matters fall within the original jurisdiction of this court. La. Const, art. V, § 5(B). Consequently, we act as triers of fact and conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether the alleged misconduct has been proven by clear and convincing evidence. In re: Banks, 09-1212 (La.10/2/09), 18 So.3d 57. While we are not bound in any way by the findings and | ¡^recommendations of the hearing committee and disciplinary board, we have held the manifest error standard is applicable to the committee’s factual findings. See In re: Caulfield, 96-1401 (La.11/25/96), 683 So.2d 714; In re: Pardue, 93-2865 (La.3/11/94), 633 So.2d 150.

The record in this matter supports a finding that respondent neglected his clients’ legal matters and failed to adequately communicate with his clients. Based on these facts, respondent has violated the Rules of Professional Conduct as found by the disciplinary board.

Having found evidence of professional misconduct, we now turn to a determination of the appropriate sanction for respondent’s actions. In determining a sanction, we are mindful that disciplinary proceedings are designed to maintain high standards of conduct, protect the public, preserve the integrity of the profession, and deter future misconduct. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Reis, 513 So.2d 1173 (La.1987). The discipline to be imposed depends upon the facts of each case and the seriousness of the offenses involved considered in light of any aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Whittington, 459 So.2d 520 (La.1984).

Respondent negligently violated duties owed to his clients, causing harm to them both. The baseline sanction for this type of misconduct is suspension.

The record supports the following aggravating factors: a pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses, vulnerability of the victim, and substantial experience in the practice of law (admitted 1995). The record also supports the mitigating factors found by the committee and adopted by the board.

Turning to the issue of an appropriate sanction, this court’s prior jurisprudence suggests a fully deferred six-month suspension is appropriate for respondent’s misconduct. For example, in In re: Scott, 09-1886 (La.2/5/10), 31 So.3d 978, an attorney neglected a legal matter and failed to adequately 19communicate with two clients. For this misconduct, we imposed upon the attorney a fully deferred six-month suspension.

Considering the above, and in particular respondent’s lack of a prior disciplinary record and the negligent nature of his misconduct, we will adopt the board’s recommendation and suspend respondent from the practice of law for six months, fully deferred, subject to a six-month period of unsupervised probation with the condition that he obtain an extra hour of ethics CLE this calendar year.

DECREE

Upon review of the findings and recommendations of the hearing committee and disciplinary board, and considering the record, it is ordered that Gregory Patrick Nichols, Louisiana Bar Roll number 23883, be and he hereby is suspended from the practice of law for six months. This suspension shall be deferred in its entirety, subject to respondent’s successful completion of a six-month period of unsupervised probation governed by the conditions set forth in this opinion. The probationary period shall commence from the date respondent and the ODC execute a formal probation plan. Any failure of respondent to comply with the conditions of probation, or any misconduct during the probationary period, may be grounds for making the deferred suspension executory, or imposing additional discipline, as appropriate. All costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.

       Chief Justice Kimball not participating in the opinion.

      . The committee recommended a one-day suspension for each of the client matters handled by respondent. However, we caution the hearing committees that there will seldom be good reason to recommend such an abbreviated period of actual suspension. See, e.g., In re: Hall, 11-1025, fn. 6 (La.9/2/11), 69 So.3d 417.


text:
    In re Mazen Younes ABDALLAH.
    No. 2011-B-1631.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 14, 2011.
   ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

PER CURIAM.

| t This disciplinary matter arises from formal charges filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) against respondent, Mazen Younes Abdallah, an attorney licensed to practice law in Louisiana but currently on interim suspension based upon his conviction of a serious crime. In re: Abdallah, 08-2018 (La.9/9/08), 990 So.2d 18.

UNDERLYING FACTS

In October 2007, respondent was indicted by a federal grand jury in the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division, on numerous counts of conspiracy to commit health care fraud, conspiracy to commit money laundering, and violations of the federal anti-kickback statute. According to the indictment, beginning in June 2006, respondent was an owner and operator of Americare Medical Service (“Americare”), a Houston company that transported Medicare and Medicaid dialysis patients to and from them dialysis treatments. From 2002 to 2007, Ameri-care falsely and fraudulently represented the medical conditions of these patients in order to bill Medicare and Medicaid for ambulance transports to regularly-scheduled non-emergency dialysis treatments, when in fact Americare well knew that the patients did not qualify for these transports under federal ^guidelines. All told, Americare falsely billed Medicare and Medicaid more than $20 million and was paid more than $7 million for regularly scheduled non-emergency ambulance transports to dialysis treatments. Respondent was also charged with offering to pay remuneration to a dialysis patient, identified in the indictment as R.D., in order to induce R.D. to use Americare for transportation to and from dialysis treatment, and with conspiring with other defendants to launder the proceeds of the Americare scheme.

Some of the counts against respondent were dismissed prior to his trial, including the count alleging a violation of the federal anti-kickback statute and one of the money laundering charges. Respondent’s trial commenced on April 14, 2008, and on May 22, 2008, the jury found him guilty of one count of conspiracy to defraud and falsely bill Medicare and Medicaid. The jury found him not guilty of the remaining counts, which included the substantive health care fraud counts and the second money laundering charge.

On May 12, 2009, respondent was sentenced to serve thirty months in federal prison. He was also ordered to make restitution to Medicare and Medicaid in the total amount of $637,425.79. On June 17, 2010, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed respondent’s conviction.

| «DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

In September 2008, the ODC filed formal charges against respondent, alleging that his conduct, as set forth above, violated the following provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 8.4(b) (commission of a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer) and 8.4(c) (engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation).

Respondent filed an answer to the formal charges, denying any misconduct and indicating he was in the process of attempting to have his conviction overturned. The disciplinary proceedings were stayed until respondent’s conviction became final. This matter then proceeded to a formal hearing in mitigation, conducted by the hearing committee in November 2010.

Hearing Committee Report

After considering the testimony and evidence presented at the hearing, the hearing committee made the following factual findings:

In the spring of 2006, respondent and a friend formed a company named Abdallah and Smith, LLC. The company’s first and primary acquisition was Americare. Shortly thereafter, respondent was indicted in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas on charges of conspiracy to defraud the Medicare/Medicaid programs and falsely bill Medicare/Medicaid. The crux of the indictments was that respondent was filing claims with Medicare and Medicaid for reimbursement of the transportation of dialysis patients who did not qualify for said transportation under the Medicare/Medicaid guidelines. Respondent went to trial on these counts and, on May 22, 2008, the jury found him |4guilty of conspiracy to commit health care fraud. Respondent was sentenced to serve thirty months in federal prison and was required to make restitution in the amount of $637,000. In furtherance of the restitution order, Americare forfeited $42,000. Upon his release, respondent was also required to serve three years of supervised probation. Respondent appealed his conviction to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, which affirmed the decision of the United States District Court.

Based on these facts, the committee determined respondent’s underlying crime violated Rules 8.4(b) and 8.4(c) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. In making this determination, the committee gave great weight to the April 29, 2009 memorandum and opinion of United States District Judge Lee Rosenthal, which was issued after respondent sought a review of the jury’s decision. The district judge indicated that respondent knowingly and willingly conspired to defraud Medicare and Medicaid by recruiting and paying individuals to utilize Americare’s services even though these individuals were not qualified to do so under federal law. Despite respondent’s argument that he could not be convicted of any crime because he was not involved in the day-to-day operations and was unaware of Americare’s actions, the district judge pointed out that respondent knowingly recruited ineligible clients before and after purchasing Ameri-care, citing specific evidence seized from respondent’s home and an audio tape of respondent. The district judge also pointed out that respondent obtained false orders from physicians certifying that medical necessity requirements were met for the medical transportation of patients under Medicare/Medicaid before and after the purchase of Americare. Respondent’s testimony at the formal hearing was solely centered on his naiveté and unawareness of the actions of Americare, which is inconsistent with the vast amount of testimony and evidence presented at his criminal trial. In summary, the committee found there was clear, unequivocal evidence that 1 ¿¡respondent knew of, acquiesced in, and participated in illegal activity perpetrated by Americare both before and after he purchased the company.

After considering the ABA’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, the committee determined that the baseline sanction for respondent’s misconduct is disbarment. In aggravation, the committee found that (1) respondent knowingly engaged in obvious and intentional acts to defraud the federal government and (2) he failed to acknowledge or take responsibility for his actions that led to his conviction. In mitigation, the committee found the following factors: absence of a prior disciplinary record, absence of a pattern of misconduct, and character or reputation.

Under these circumstances, the committee recommended respondent be disbarred. The committee’s public member dissented, stating that in light of respondent’s “serious, criminal transgressions and apparent lack of remorse, I steadfastly remain with my recommendation of permanent disbarment.”

The ODC filed an objection to the hearing committee’s recommendation and agreed with the dissenting member that permanent disbarment is appropriate.

Disciplinary Board Recommendation

After review, the disciplinary board determined that the hearing committee’s factual findings do not appear to be manifestly erroneous. The board also determined the committee correctly applied the Rules of Professional Conduct to the facts of this matter.

The board further determined respondent knowingly and intentionally violated a duty owed to the public by engaging in a criminal act designed to defraud a government agency for the benefit of his company. His conduct caused factual serious injury of more than $600,000. After considering the ABA’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, the board determined the baseline sanction is disbarment.

In aggravation, the board found a dishonest or selfish motive, refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the conduct, and illegal conduct. In mitigation, the board found the following factors: absence of a prior disciplinary record, inexperience in the practice of law (admitted 2004), character or reputation, and imposition of other penalties or sanctions.

After considering respondent’s conduct in light of the permanent disbarment guidelines set forth in Supreme Court Rule XIX, Appendix E, the board determined that respondent’s conduct falls within Guideline 6, which states that permanent disbarment may be warranted in instances of “[insurance fraud, including but not limited to staged accidents or widespread runner-based solicitation.” The board reasoned that this guideline applies because respondent’s company knowingly submitted reimbursement requests to Medicare for clients who were not qualified for the service and because respondent solicited unqualified clients to switch to Americare in exchange for compensation. Noting respondent argued that Guideline 6 does not apply because he was found not guilty of the fraud charges, the board countered that, in In re: Kirchberg, 03-0957 (La.9/26/03), 856 So.2d 1162, this court held that

the guidelines are illustrative in nature and do not constitute an exclusive list of conduct for which an attorney may be permanently disbarred. Moreover, in assessing discipline in the case of an attorney who has been convicted of a crime, we have often looked beyond the title of the offense to the facts of the conviction to determine the appropriate sanction.

Concluding that respondent’s conduct is strikingly similar to “runner-based solicitation,” the board recommended respondent be permanently disbarred. The |7board further recommended respondent be ordered to make restitution in accordance with his criminal sentence.

Neither respondent nor the ODC filed an objection to the disciplinary board’s recommendation.

DISCUSSION

Bar disciplinary matters come within the original jurisdiction of this court. La. Const, art. V, § 5(B). When the disciplinary proceedings involve an attorney who has been convicted of a crime, the conviction is conclusive evidence of guilt and the sole issue presented is whether respondent’s crimes warrant discipline, and if so, the extent thereof. Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 19(E); In re: Boudreau, 02-0007 (La.4/12/02), 815 So.2d 76; Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Wilkinson, 562 So.2d 902 (La.1990). The discipline to be imposed in a given case depends upon the seriousness of the offense, the circumstances of the offense, and the extent of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Perez, 550 So.2d 188 (La.1989).

In May 2008, respondent was found guilty of one count of conspiracy to defraud and falsely bill Medicare and Medicaid. Based on this conviction, respondent has violated the Rules of Professional Conduct as alleged in the formal charges.

The record supports a finding that respondent acted knowingly and intentionally. He violated a duty owed to the public, and he caused significant harm to the Medieare/Medicaid system. The record further supports the aggravating and mitigating factors found by the disciplinary board. Additionally, |sin aggravation, respondent engaged in a pattern of misconduct. The baseline sanction for this misconduct is disbarment.

Having determined that disbarment is the baseline sanction in this matter, we now consider whether respondent’s misconduct is so egregious as to warrant the imposition of permanent disbarment. As noted by the board, in In re: Kirchberg, 03-0957 (La.9/26/03), 856 So.2d 1162, we established that when an attorney has been convicted of a crime, we often look beyond the title of the offense to the facts of the conviction to determine the appropriate sanction. Here, the evidence introduced at respondent’s criminal trial, as presented in the district judge’s April 29, 2009 memorandum and opinion, has established by clear and convincing evidence that he was involved in defrauding and falsely billing Medicare and Medicaid, despite the fact that he was convicted only of conspiracy. Given that Medicare and Medicaid are health insurance programs administered by the federal and/or state governments, clearly respondent was engaged in insurance fraud.

Supreme Court Rule XIX, Appendix E, sets forth guidelines depicting conduct that might warrant permanent disbarment. Respondent’s conduct falls squarely within Guideline 6, which indicates that permanent disbarment may be warranted for instances of “[insurance fraud, including but not limited to staged accidents or widespread runner-based solicitation.” Case law also establishes that Medicare/Medicaid fraud amounts to insurance fraud, for which permanent disbarment is warranted. For example, in In re: Sheffield, 07-0288 (La.6/15/07), 958 So.2d 661, we stated that “submission of fraudulent Medicaid claims is clearly encompassed by Guideline 6, which pertains to insurance fraud.” Furthermore, in In re: Bates, 09-2780 (La.1/29/10), 26 So.3d 746, we accepted a petition for consent discipline imposing permanent disbarment upon an attorney |i,who was convicted of two counts of health care fraud and two counts of paying illegal remuneration to Medicare beneficiaries.

Under these circumstances, we will adopt the board’s recommendation and permanently disbar respondent. We will also order respondent to make restitution in accordance with his criminal sentence.

DECREE

Upon review of the findings and recommendations of the hearing committee and disciplinary board, and considering the record, it is ordered that the name of Mazen Younes Abdallah, Louisiana Bar Roll number 29059, be stricken from the roll of attorneys and that his license to practice law in the State of Louisiana be revoked. Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 24(A), it is further ordered that respondent be permanently prohibited from being readmitted to the practice of law in this state. It is further ordered that respondent make restitution in accordance with his criminal sentence. All costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.

       Chief Justice Kimball not participating in the opinion.

      .Ambulance services are paid for by Medicare and Medicaid only when the patient's condition contraindicates use of other transportation, as when, for example, the patient is confined to bed and must be moved by stretcher only. If the patient can sit, stand, or walk, Medicare and Medicaid will not pay for the trip by ambulance. In Americare's case, many of the patients were ambulatory at the time of transport, but Medicare and Medicaid were billed as if they were not. In some claims, according to the indictment, Ameri-care falsely alleged that the patient was found unconscious, in shock, and bleeding. The indictment also alleged that some patients rode to and from dialysis in personal cars, driven by Americare personnel, but Medicare and Medicaid were billed as if the trip were an ambulance transport.

      . The federal government seized $44,200.72 from respondent’s bank account and applied the funds as a credit towards the restitution amount.

      . Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 19(E), respondent was allowed to present “evidence only of mitigating circumstances not inconsistent with the essential elements of the crime for which he ... was convicted as determined by the statute defining the crime.”

      . Three attorneys submitted character letters on respondent's behalf.

      . Respondent solicited ineligible patients for Americare's services both before and after purchasing the company.


text:
    In re Ingrid Janell JAMES.
    No. 2011-B-1968.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 14, 2011.
   ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

PER CURIAM.

_JjThe Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) commenced an investigation into allegations that respondent improperly shared fees with the suspended lawyer for whom she worked. Prior to the filing of formal charges, respondent and the ODC submitted a joint petition for consent discipline. Having reviewed the petition,

IT IS ORDERED that the Petition for Consent Discipline be accepted and that Ingrid Janell James, Louisiana Bar Roll number 32513, be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year and one day, fully deferred, subject to a two-year period of unsupervised probation governed by the conditions set forth in the Petition for Consent Discipline. The probationary period shall commence from the date respondent and the ODC execute a formal probation plan. Any failure of respondent to comply with the conditions of probation, or any misconduct during the probationary period, may be grounds for making the deferred suspension executory, or imposing additional discipline, as appropriate.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.

       Chief Justice Kimball not participating in the opinion.


text:
    In re Steven B. LONGO.
    No. 2011-B-1928.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 14, 2011.
   ORDER

|, Considering the Petition for Interim Suspension for Threat of Harm filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel, the response thereto filed by respondent, and the ODC’s reply to the response,

IT IS ORDERED that respondent, Steven B. Longo, Louisiana Bar Roll number 30919, be and he hereby is suspended from the practice of law on an interim basis pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 19.2, pending further orders of this court.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Office of Disciplinary Counsel may seek the appointment of a trustee(s) to protect the interests of respondent’s clients pursuant to the provisions of Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 27, if appropriate.

Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 26(E), this order is effective immediately-

KNOll, J., would deny.

WEIMER, J., dissents and assigns reasons.

/s/ Greg G. Guidry /s/ JUSTICE, SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA

WEIMER, J.,

dissenting.

_JjIn a matter in which no client harm has been alleged or established, I would not suspend this attorney on an interim basis on this record. I would order a hearing be held prior to considering whether an interim suspension is appropriate.


text:
    In re Victor A. DORSEY, Jr.
    No. 2011-B-2009.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 14, 2011.
   ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

PER CURIAM.

| ,The Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) commenced an investigation into allegations that respondent practiced law while ineligible to do so. Following the filing of formal charges, respondent and the ODC submitted a joint petition for consent discipline. Having reviewed the petition,

IT IS ORDERED that the Petition for Consent Discipline be accepted and that Victor A. Dorsey, Jr., Louisiana Bar Roll number 28340, be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year and one day.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.

       Chief Justice Kimball not participating in the opinion.


text:
    In re Paul J. TANNER.
    No. 2011-OB-1343.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 18, 2011.
   ON APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO THE BAR

PER CURIAM.

| ¶ After reviewing the evidence and considering the law, we conclude petitioner, Paul J. Tanner, is eligible to be admitted to the practice of law in Louisiana.

ADMISSION GRANTED.

VICTORY and GUIDRY, JJ., would conditionally admit.

       Chief Justice Kimball not participating in the opinion.


text:
    In re John Benjamin AVIN.
    No. 2011-OB-2206.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 18, 2011.
   ON APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO THE BAR

PER CURIAM.

| ¶After reviewing the evidence and considering the law, we conclude petitioner, John Benjamin Avin, is immediately eligible to be conditionally admitted to the practice of law in Louisiana, subject to a probationary period of five years. The probationary period shall commence from the date petitioner, the Office of Disciplinary Counsel, and the probation monitor execute a formal probation plan. During the probationary period, petitioner shall comply with all of the terms and conditions of the consent agreement executed by him with the Louisiana Supreme Court Committee on Bar Admissions, and such other conditions as may be imposed upon him by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel. Should petitioner fail to make a good faith effort to satisfy these conditions, or should he commit any misconduct during the period of probation, his conditional right to practice may be terminated or he may be subjected to other discipline pursuant to the Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement.

CONDITIONAL * ADMISSION GRANTED.

       Chief Justice Kimball not participating in the opinion.


text:
    In re Mark EL-AMM.
    No. 2011-OB-2207.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 18, 2011.
   ON APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO THE BAR

PER CURIAM.

| ]After reviewing the evidence and considering the law, we conclude petitioner, Mark El-Amm, is immediately eligible to be conditionally admitted to the practice of law in Louisiana, subject to a probationary period of five years. The probationary period shall commence from the date petitioner, the Office of Disciplinary Counsel, and the probation monitor execute a formal probation plan. During the probationary period, petitioner shall comply with all of the terms and conditions of the consent agreement executed by him with the Louisiana Supreme Court Committee on Bar Admissions, and such other conditions as may be imposed upon him by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel. Should petitioner fail to make a good faith effort to satisfy these conditions, or should he commit any misconduct during the period of probation, his conditional right to practice may be terminated or he may be subjected to other discipline pursuant to the Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement.

CONDITIONAL ADMISSION GRANTED.

       Chief Justice Kimball not participating in the opinion.


text:
    In re Megan E. REAUX.
    No. 2011-OB-2220.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 18, 2011.
   ON APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO THE BAR

PER CURIAM.

| lAfter reviewing the evidence and considering the law, we conclude petitioner, Megan E. Reaux, is immediately eligible to be conditionally admitted to the practice of law in Louisiana, subject to a probationary-period of five years. The probationary period shall commence from the date petitioner, the Office of Disciplinary Counsel, and the probation monitor execute a formal probation plan. During the probationary period, petitioner shall comply with all of the terms and conditions of the consent agreement executed by her with the Louisiana Supreme Court Committee on Bar Admissions, and such other conditions as may be imposed upon her by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel. Should petitioner fail to make a good faith effort to satisfy these conditions, or should she commit any misconduct during the period of probation, her conditional right to practice may be terminated or she may be subjected to other discipline pursuant to the Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement.

CONDITIONAL ADMISSION GRANTED.

       Chief Justice Kimball not participating in the opinion.


text:
    In re Duncan S. KEMP.
    No. 2011-OB-2221.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 18, 2011.
   ON APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO THE BAR

PER CURIAM.

11 After reviewing the evidence and considering the law, we conclude petitioner, Duncan S. Kemp, is immediately eligible to be conditionally admitted to the practice of law in Louisiana, subject to a probationary period of two years. The probationary period shall commence from the date petitioner, the Office of Disciplinary Counsel, and the probation monitor execute a formal probation plan. During the probationary period, petitioner shall comply with all of the terms and conditions of the consent agreement executed by him with the Louisiana Supreme Court Committee on Bar Admissions, and such other conditions as may be imposed upon him by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel. Should petitioner fail to make a good faith effort to satisfy these conditions, or should he commit any misconduct during the period of probation, his conditional right to practice may be terminated or he may be subjected to other discipline pursuant to the Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement.

CONDITIONAL ADMISSION GRANTED.

       Chief Justice Kimball not participating in the opinion.


text:
    In re Jeff D. EASLEY.
    No. 2011-OB-2241.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 18, 2011.
   ON APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO THE BAR

PER CURIAM.

|, After reviewing the evidence and considering the law, we conclude petitioner, Jeff D. Easley, is immediately eligible to be conditionally admitted to the practice of law in Louisiana, subject to a probationary period of two years. The probationary period shall commence from the date petitioner, the Office of Disciplinary Counsel, and the probation monitor execute a formal probation plan. During the probationary period, petitioner shall comply with all of the terms and conditions of the consent agreement executed by him with the Louisiana Supreme Court Committee on Bar Admissions, and such other conditions as may be imposed upon him by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel. Should petitioner fail to make a good faith effort to satisfy these conditions, or should he commit any misconduct during the period of probation, his conditional right to practice may be terminated or he may be subjected to other discipline pursuant to the Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement.

CONDITIONAL ADMISSION GRANTED.

       Chief Justice Kimball not participating in the opinion.


author:
PER CURIAM.
     VICTORY, J.,

text:
    In re Benjamin A. OWENS.
    No. 2011-OB-2219.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 18, 2011.
   ON APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO THE BAR

PER CURIAM.

11 After reviewing the evidence and considering the law, we conclude petitioner, Benjamin A. Owens, is immediately eligible to be conditionally admitted to the practice of law in Louisiana, subject to a probationary period of five years. The probationary period shall commence from the date petitioner, the Office of Disciplinary Counsel, and the probation monitor execute a formal probation plan. During the probationary period, petitioner shall comply with all of the terms and conditions of the consent agreement executed by him with the Louisiana Supreme Court Committee on Bar Admissions, and such other conditions as may be imposed upon him by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel. Should petitioner fail to make a good faith effort to satisfy these conditions, or should he commit any misconduct during the period of probation, his conditional right to practice may be terminated or he may be subjected to other discipline pursuant to the Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement.

CONDITIONAL ADMISSION GRANTED.

JOHNSON and KNOLL, JJ„ would seal medical records.

VICTORY, J., concurs and assigns reasons.

VICTORY, J.,

concurs with reasons.

_JjThe Court has not sealed petitioner’s medical records because he has not filed the required motion for protective order. See Louisiana Supreme Court Rule XVII, § 5(M)(3). Motions for protective order regarding medical records are routinely granted by this Court and if petitioner files such a motion it will certainly be considered.

       Chief Justice Kimball not participating in the opinion.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Erik TRACZYK.
    No. 2011-KK-2149.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 19, 2011.
   PER CURIAM.

|,In this pending prosecution for first degree murder in violation of La.R.S. 14:30, the state has filed notice, pursuant to State v. Bernard, 608 So.2d 966 (La.1992) and La.C.Cr.P. art. 905.2, of its intent to introduce victim impact evidence during the trial’s penalty phase, if any. The state’s notice identifies the prospective witnesses by name and provides their familial relationships to the victim. The notice further details that the state will present evidence at the penalty phase “demonstrating the unique human nature of and the personal characteristics and/or traits of the victim(s), including ... family history and background, school and educational achievements, career and professional accomplishments and goals, individual relationships with family, friends and associates,” and “evidence regarding the emotional, physical and/or economic impact and/or trauma of this crime on the surviving family members.”

As detailed in a Per Curiam issued in response to a request by this Court, the trial judge has found the state’s notice inadequate and ordered the prosecution to 12disclose to the defense written statements detailing the content of the victim impact testimony. The court has clarified that the statements need not be handwritten by the witnesses but must recite “precisely what the witnesses are going to say.” The court of appeal found no abuse of discretion by the trial court. State v. Traczyk, 11-1352 (La.App. 4th Cir.9/30/11).

The courts below erred. In Bernard, this Court acknowledged that “some evidence of the murder victim’s character and of the impact of the murder on the victim’s survivors is admissible as relevant to the circumstances of the offense or to the character and propensities of the offender.” Bernard, 608 So.2d at 972. However, we also cautioned that “introduction of detailed descriptions of the good qualities of the victim or particularized narrations of the emotional, psychological and economic sufferings of the victim’s survivors, which go beyond the purpose of showing the victim’s individual identity and verifying the existence of survivors reasonably expected to grieve and suffer because of the murder, treads dangerously on the possibility of reversal because of the influence of arbitrary factors on the jury’s sentencing decision.” Id. Given these competing concerns, this Court held in Bernard that, “[a]s in the use of other crimes evidence, the defense, upon request, is entitled to notice of the particular victim impact evidence sought to be introduced by the prosecutor and to a pretrial determination of the admissibility of the particular evidence.” Bernard, 608 So.2d at 972-73.

However, this Court subsequently held that Bernard’s requirement of notice and a pretrial determination of admissibility “does not encompass an evidentiary hearing at which victim impact witnesses are called to testify.” State v. Miller, 99-0192, p. 27 (La.9/6/00), 776 So.2d 396, 412. We relied in part on the Court’s prior writ grant in State v. Bannister, 96-0188 (La.3/29/96), 670 So.2d 1223, 1224, which set aside a court of appeal order directing the trial court to conduct a hearing |sat which the state would particularize its victim impact evidence because we found that the requirements of Bernard had been met by the state’s notice. Miller, 99-0192, p. 26, n. 19, 776 So.2d at 411. Miller thereby clarified that Bernard’s requirement of notice with respect to the “particular evidence” the state intends to introduce refers to the “[t]wo broad categories of victim evidence that may be admitted: information revealing the individuality of the victim and information revealing the impact of the crime on the victim’s survivors.” Miller, 99-0192 at 27, n. 20, 776 So.2d at 412 (citing Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991)).

In the present case, the state’s Bernard, notice clearly informs the defense that it must prepare to meet this kind of evidence if trial reaches the penalty phase. The notice also affords the trial court an adequate basis for determining in advance of trial whether the evidence falls into the two broad categories of permissible victim impact testimony and whether some or all of the evidence may nevertheless present an undue and impermissible risk of “descend[ing] into detailed descriptions of the good qualities of the victim, particularized narratives of the sufferings of the survivors, or the opinions held by the survivors with respect to the crime of the murderer.” Miller, 99-0192 at 27, n. 20, 776 So.2d at 412. The state’s notice thereby fully complies with the requirements of Bernard even broadly read. To the extent that the decisions in State v. Gardner, 02-1506 (La.App. 3rd Cir.4/30/03), 844 So.2d 1097, and State v. Higgins, 01-0117 (La.App. 5th Cir.3/28/01), 802 So.2d 685, are inconsistent with the views expressed herein, they are expressly disapproved.

Accordingly, the ruling of the trial court on the state’s notice filed pursuant to Bernard and La.C.Cr.P. art. 905.2 is hereby reversed.

       Kimball, C.J., not participating.

      . The state's notice in Bannister named the witnesses, provided their familial relationships to the victim, and indicated that the testimony would address: "Identity of the victim and general evidence demonstrating harm to victim's survivors ... and personal characteristics of the victim.”


text:
    In re Sean Daniel ALFORTISH.
    No. 2011-B-2190.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 19, 2011.
   ORDER

11 Considering the Petition for Interim Suspension filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel, the response thereto filed by respondent, and the ODC’s reply,

IT IS ORDERED that Sean Daniel Al-fortish, Louisiana Bar Roll number 22227, be and he hereby is suspended from the practice of law on an interim basis pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 19, pending further orders of this court. Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 26(E), this order is effective immediately-

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that necessary disciplinary proceedings be instituted in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, §§ 11 and 19.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the relief requested by respondent in his “Cross-Petition for Relief’ be and hereby is denied. Should respondent wish to avail himself of consent discipline in the future, he must comply with the provisions of Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 20.

FOR THE COURT:

/s/ Marcus R. Clark /s/ JUSTICE, SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA


text:
    In re Willie J. NUNNERY.
    No. 2011-B-1309.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 21, 2011.
   ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

PER CURIAM.

| pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 21, the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) has filed a petition seeking the imposition of reciprocal discipline against respondent, Willie J. Nunnery, an attorney licensed to practice law in the States of Louisiana and Wisconsin, based upon discipline imposed by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

UNDERLYING FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On June 7, 2011, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin disbarred respondent for his misconduct in seventeen counts of formal charges filed by the Office of Lawyer Regulation. Respondent was found to have repeatedly failed to diligently pursue his clients’ cases, failed to keep clients informed, and ignored their repeated requests for information on their eases. Respondent also failed to cooperate with the Office of Lawyer Regulation in its investigation of these matters. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin determined that respondent’s misconduct was aggravated by a |2number of factors, most notably his lengthy prior disciplinary record. Based upon these findings, the court concluded that it was required to impose “the severest level of discipline” available, namely the revocation of respondent’s license to practice law in Wisconsin. On September 1, 2011, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin denied respondent’s motion for reconsideration of the June 7, 2011 decision.

After receiving notice of the Wisconsin order of discipline, the ODC filed a motion to initiate reciprocal discipline proceedings in Louisiana, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 21. A certified copy of the decision and order of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin was attached to the motion, and subsequently, the entire record of the Wisconsin disciplinary proceeding was lodged with this court. On June 24, 2011, we rendered an order giving respondent thirty days to demonstrate why the imposition of identical discipline in this state would be unwarranted. Respondent timely filed a response in this court, in which he asserted that he was denied due process in the Wisconsin disciplinary proceedings.

DISCUSSION

The standard for imposition of discipline on a reciprocal basis is set forth in Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 21(D), which provides:

Upon the expiration of thirty days from service of the notice pursuant to the provisions of paragraph B, this court shall impose the identical discipline or disability inactive status unless disciplinary counsel or the lawyer demonstrates, or this court finds that it clearly appears upon the face of the record from which the discipline is predicated, that
(1) The procedure was so lacking in notice or opportunity to be heard as to constitute a deprivation of due process; or
(2) Based on the record created by the jurisdiction that imposed the discipline, there was such infirmity of proof ^establishing the misconduct as to give rise to the clear conviction that the court could not, consistent with its duty, accept as final the conclusion on that subject; or
(3) The imposition of the same discipline by the court would result in grave injustice or be offensive to the public policy of the jurisdiction; or
(4) The misconduct established warrants substantially different discipline in this state; or
(5) The reason for the original transfer to disability inactive status no longer exists.

In the instant case, respondent has made no showing of infirmities in the Wisconsin proceeding, nor do we discern any from our review of the record. Furthermore, we find no reason to deviate from the sanction imposed by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin. Although we are not required to impose the same sanction as that imposed by the state in which the misconduct occurred, nevertheless, only under extraordinary circumstances should there be a significant variance from the sanction imposed by the other jurisdiction. In re: Aulston, 05-1546 (La.1/18/06), 918 So.2d 461. See also In re Zdravkovich, 831 A.2d 964, 968-69 (D.C.2003) (“there is merit in according deference, for its own sake, to the actions of other jurisdictions with respect to the attorneys over whom we share supervisory authority”).

Here, there is little doubt that respondent’s conduct would warrant discipline in Louisiana, given that it involves multiple counts of failure to communicate with clients, neglect of legal matters, and failure to cooperate with the disciplinary agency, among other serious misconduct. Moreover, respondent has demonstrated a pattern of this type of misconduct, resulting in suspensions of his law license in 2007 and 2009. Under these circumstances, we agree that disbarment is warranted. ^Accordingly, we will impose the same discipline against respondent as was imposed in Wisconsin.

DECREE

Considering the Petition to Initiate Reciprocal Discipline Proceedings filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel and the record filed herein, it is ordered that Willie James Nunnery, Louisiana Bar Roll number 15027, be and he hereby is disbarred. His name shall be stricken from the roll of attorneys, and his license to practice law in the State of Louisiana shall be revoked.

       Chief Justice Kimball not participating in the opinion.

      . Respondent has been the subject of two prior reciprocal discipline proceedings based upon discipline imposed by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin. In 2009, this court suspended respondent from the practice of law for three years based upon evidence of his misconduct in seven different client matters, including conversion of estate funds; misrepresentations to clients, a tribunal, and the Wisconsin Office of Lawyer Regulation; failure to act with diligence; improper advances of funds to clients; and multiple instances of failure to properly communicate with clients. In re: Nunnery, 09-1937 (La.11/6/09), 21 So.3d 265. In 2007, this court suspended respondent from the practice of law for two months, stemming from his failure to reduce a contingent fee to writing, neglect of legal matters, failure to communicate with clients, and failure to provide competent representation to clients. In re: Nunnery, 07-0175 (La.3/23/07), 951 So.2d 1085.


text:
    In re Anselm Nnaemeka NWOKORIE.
    No. 2011-B-2047.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 21, 2011.
   ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

PER CURIAM.

hThe Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) commenced an investigation into allegations that respondent commingled client funds with personal funds. Respondent and the ODC submitted a joint petition for consent discipline, in which the parties stipulated respondent has violated Rules 1.15(a) and 1.15(c) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. Having reviewed the petition,

IT IS ORDERED that the Petition for Consent Discipline be accepted and that Anselm Nnaemeka Nwokorie, Louisiana Bar Roll number 23541, be suspended from the practice of law for a period of six months, fully deferred, followed by a two-year period of unsupervised probation governed by the terms and conditions set forth in the Petition for Consent Discipline. The probationary period shall commence from the date respondent and the ODC execute a formal probation plan. Any failure of respondent to comply with the conditions of probation, or any misconduct during the probationary period, may be grounds for making the deferred suspension executory, or imposing additional discipline, as appropriate.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.

       Chief Justice Kimball not participating in the opinion.