author: WISE, Justice.

text:
    Leroy BANDY and David Russell v. CITY OF BIRMINGHAM.
    1091412.
    Supreme Court of Alabama.
    June 17, 2011.

      George N. Davies of Quinn, Walls, Weaver & Davies LLP, Birmingham; and Jeffrey J. Toney and Jonathan K. Waldrop of Sutherland Asbill & Brennan, Atlanta, Georgia, for appellants.
    Thomas Bentley III, Julie P. Barnard, and Nicole E. King of City of Birmingham Law Department, for appellee.
   WISE, Justice.

The plaintiffs, Leroy Bandy and David Russell, appeal from a summary judgment entered by the Jefferson Circuit Court in favor of the City of Birmingham (“the City”). We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

In 2009, the Birmingham City Council adopted Ordinance No. 09-36, which changed the dates of the general and runoff elections for the mayor, the city council, and the city board of education from the second Tuesday in October and the third Tuesday thereafter to the fourth Tuesday in August and the sixth Tuesday thereafter. Bandy and Russell were candidates in the first general election held after the adoption of Ordinance No. 09-36. Bandy was in a runoff against incumbent Roderick Royal for a city council seat and lost to Royal in the runoff election.

On November 24, 2009, Bandy and Russell (“the plaintiffs”) filed in the Jefferson Circuit Court a “Verified Complaint for Injunctive Relief,” challenging the results of the 2009 Birmingham City Council and Birmingham Board of Education elections on the basis that, by adopting Ordinance No. 09-36, the City allegedly had unilaterally changed the Mayor-Council Act of 1955, Act. No. 452, Ala. Acts 1955, without petitioning the Alabama Legislature to amend the Mayor-Council Act. The plaintiffs also sought injunctive relief to prevent the swearing in of the newly elected Birmingham City Council members. The trial court ordered a hearing on the request for a preliminary injunction on December 11, 2009. The City then filed a motion to dismiss or for a summary judgment; the parties submitted a joint stipulation of facts; and the plaintiffs filed a motion for a summary judgment.

The parties agreed that the facts were not in dispute and that the only question for the trial court was the application of the law to the facts. Counsel for the plaintiffs prepared the following “Plaintiffs’ Statement of Undisputed Material Facts” for the trial court:

“(1) The Alabama Mayor-Council Act, Act No. 55-452, was approved by the Alabama legislature on September 9, 1955....
“(2) On September 6, 1961, the Alabama legislature adopted Act No. 61-663.... This Act sets forth the requirements for municipal election laws.... These provisions are now codified in Article 2, Chapter 46 of Title 11, Ala.Code, 1975. Class 1 municipalities are excluded from the provisions of that Act. (See § 11-46-20, Ala.Code, 1975).
“(3) As of 1963, the citizens of Birmingham adopted the Mayor-Council form of government.... The first city council and mayor are elected thereafter. ...
“(4) The City of Birmingham has more than 300,000 inhabitants as of the 1970 Federal decennial census. Birmingham therefore is classified as a Class 1 municipality. Birmingham remains a Class 1 municipality today....
“(5) In March 1980, the Alabama legislature approves Act No. 80-94.... This Act amends various provisions of the Code of Alabama ‘so as to change and set new dates for municipal elections conducted under the provisions of Article 2, Chapter 46 of Title 11, Code of Alabama, 1975.... ’ ....
“(6) On April 18, 1980, the Alabama legislature approved Act No. 80-243.... Act. No. 80-243 is codified at § 11-46-5, in Article 1, Chapter 46 of Title 11, Ala.Code, 1975....
“(7) In 1982, the Alabama legislature approved Act No. 82-458.... Act No. 82-458 amended Ala.Code § 11-46-20_ Act No. 82-458 provided ‘General and special elections in cities and towns of this state, in all municipalities except Class 1 municipalities and except cities and towns organized under a commission form of government, shall be held and conducted at the times and in the manner prescribed in this article.... ’ ....
“(8) In 1985, the Alabama legislature approved Act No. 85-919 amending the Mayor-Council Act, Act No. 55-452 including Sections 3.01 and 4.01 pertaining to times of elections and date of taking office for council and mayor. Specifically, Section 3.01 was amended to provide that the regular election of council members be held on the second Tuesday in October with any runoff election to be on the third Tuesday thereafter....
“(9) On June 16, 1987, the Alabama legislature approved Act No. 87-191. This Act allowed for a change to single-member districts. The Act did not amend Title 11 of the Alabama Code 1975....
“(10) On May 25, 1993, the Alabama legislature adopted Act No. 93-760. This Act amended § 11-46-5 to allow other municipalities, other than Class 3 municipalities, to change their elections dates to the dates provided in Article 2 Chapter 46 of Title 11, Ala.Code, 1975.... This Act did not remove the exclusion of Class 1 municipalities in § 11-46-20.
“(11) On April 13, 2006, the Alabama legislature approved Act No. 2006-354, amending various sections of Title 11 and of Title 17, Ala. Code, 1975, pertaining to elections. Specifically, this Act amended § 11-46-21, providing for regular municipal elections on the fourth Tuesday in August 1984, and quadrennially thereafter, and runoff elections on the sixth Tuesday thereafter.... This Act did not remove the exclusion of Class 1 municipalities in § 11-46-20.
“(13) On February 17, 2009, the Birmingham City Council discussed the proposed election date change during Mayor’s report to Council at the regular Birmingham City Council meeting....
“(14) On February 19, 2009, the proposed election date change discussed at City Council Committee of the whole meeting....
“(15) On February 24, 2009, the Birmingham City Council adopted Ord. No. 09-36, changing the time of holding regular and runoff municipal elections for mayor, council and school board to August 25 and October 6, respectively....
“(16) On March 3, 2009, the Mayor of Birmingham signed Ord. No. 09-36 into law....
“(17) On March 10, 2009, Ord. No. 09-36 was published....
“(18) On June 23, 2009, the City of Birmingham Election Commission met and called for the Birmingham City Council and Board of Education elections to be held on August 25, 2009, with any runoff to be held on October 6, 2009, pursuant to Ord. No. 09-36....
“(19) On June 25, 2009, the Notice of Election published in The Birmingham News....
“(20) On August 5, 2009, the Jefferson County Probate Judge certified names of duly qualified candidates for City of Birmingham City Council and Board of Education elections to Birmingham City Clerk; Leroy Bandy and David Russell included as qualified candidates for the District Nine Birmingham City Council seat....
“(21) On August 25, 2009, the City of Birmingham conducted the general elections for the Birmingham City Council and Board of Education. When no candidate received a majority of the votes cast in the District Nine Birmingham City Council race, a runoff election was declared between Plaintiff Leroy Bandy (‘Bandy1) and the incumbent councilor, Roderick Royal (‘Royal’). Runoff elections were also required in certain other council districts....
“(22) On October 6, 2009, the City of Birmingham held runoff elections, including the runoff for the District Nine Birmingham City Council seat involving Bandy and Royal. Royal was declared the winner of the October 6, 2009 runoff election....
“(28) On November 24, 2009, the City of Birmingham swore in the winners of the October 6, 2009 election on the fourth Tuesday in November following the election, as provided by the Mayor-Council Act and Ordinances No. 89-46 and [No.] 09-86_
“(24) On November 24, 2009, Bandy and Royal filed their Verified Complaint and Motion for Temporary Restraining Order seeking preliminary and permanent injunctive relief to prevent the swearing-in of the elected Birmingham City Council members....
“(25) On November 24, 2009, the Court found the motion for temporary restraining order moot, but ordered a preliminary injunction hearing on December 11, 2009....
“(26) On December 9, 2009, the City of Birmingham filed its Motion to Dismiss/Motion for Summary Judgment. ...
“(27) On January 12, 2010, the Alabama Legislative Reference opined that § 11-46-5 does not apply to the City of Birmingham as a Class 1 municipality. Specifically, the Alabama Legislative Reference stated that § 11-46-21 expressly excludes Class 1 municipalities from the election provisions, such as § 11-46-5, of Article 2, Chapter 46 of Title 11 of the Code of Alabama 1975....
“(28) On February 5, 2010, the Court orders a status conference....
“(29) On February 26, 2010, the Court held a Status Conference between the parties, wherein it was agreed that the only issue presented is a matter of law. The Court set forth the following dates: March 12, 2010 the parties must submit stipulations of fact; March 19, 2010 the Plaintiffs must submit their response to Motion to Dismiss and/or Motion for Summary Judgment; and March 29, 2010 the City of Birmingham must Reply and Respond to Plaintiffs’ Response and/or Motion....
“(30) From its adoption of the Mayor-Council form of government, for at least the past twenty-five years and in all elections held before 2009, Defendant conducted its City Council elections on the Second Tuesday in October.”
Ordinance No. 09-36 provides as follows: “WHEREAS, times for holding regular and runoff elections and for taking office for the offices of mayor and city council for the City of Birmingham are provided in the Mayor-Council Act, Ala. Acts, 1955, Act No. 452, as amended, Sections 3.01 and 4.01, as amended; and,
“WHEREAS, times for holding regular and runoff elections and for taking office by city council members elected by single-member district are further provided by City of Birmingham Ordinance No. 89-416, codified at Sec. 2-2-51, et seq. of the General City Code of the City of Birmingham, 1980, pursuant to Ala. Code, 1975, § 11-43-63; and,
“WHEREAS, Ordinance No. 02-14 provides that the regular elections for the city board of education shall be elected at the regular municipal general election and any subsequent run-off election and assume office at the same time as the city council; and
“WHEREAS, provisions of Alabama Acts No. 2006-354 and No. 2006-570 were enacted to comply with the Help America Vote Act of 2002, Public Law 107-252, including mandated provisional voting in federal, state and local elections; and,
“WHEREAS, Alabama Act No. 2006-354 adopted new requirements for absentee balloting and provisional ballots, including a new schedule for elections providing for six weeks between a regular election and any necessary runoff election for municipalities other than Class 1 municipalities, and providing that provisional ballots be tabulated seven days after an election; and
“WHEREAS, the times for holding elections for Defendant, a Class 1 municipality, pursuant to the Mayor-Council Act and Sec. 2-2-52 of the General City Code provide only a three-week period between a regular election and any necessary runoff election and was not changed by the enactment of Alabama No. 2006-354; and
“WHEREAS, three weeks between regular and run-off elections allows insufficient time for absentee balloting according to the new laws, due to an additional week between an election and the tabulation of provisional ballots; and,
“WHEREAS, Ala.Code, 1975, Section 11-46-5 provides that a municipality having election dates required by general or local act at a time different from the dates now or hereafter provided by Article 2, Chapter 46 of Title 11, may elect by ordinance to have the election at the same time required by Article 2, provided that the election made by ordinance does not have the effect of changing the beginning of a term or the time for taking office;
“WHEREAS, it is imperative that the City of Birmingham have sufficient time between a regular election and any necessary runoff election to comply with state and federal requirements for provisional and absentee voting and provide ample time for the full consideration of all legally cast votes.
“NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT ORDAINED, that the dates for elections for the offices of mayor, city council and board of education shall be changed by adopting the dates now or hereafter provided by the Code of Alabama, 1975, Article 2, Chapter 46 of Title 11, to provide for greater time between a regular election and any following runoff election to comply with state and federal requirements regarding absentee and provisional balloting and provide adequate time for absentee voters in run-off elections as follows:
“Section 1.
“Commencing with the city council election in 2009, the regular election for members of the city council shall be held on the fourth Tuesday in August, and quadrennially thereafter, and, when necessary as provided by the General City Code of the City of Birmingham, 1980 (GCC), Sec. 2-2-52, a second or runoff election shall be held on the sixth Tuesday next thereafter following the regular election. The term of office for the council members so elected shall commence on the fourth Tuesday in November following their election, as provided by GCC Sec. 2-2-53 and Sec. 3.01, Ala. Acts, 1955, Act No. 452, as amended. “Section 2.
“Commencing with the mayoral election in 2011, the regular election for mayor shall be held on the fourth Tuesday in August, and quadrennially thereafter, and, when necessary as provided by Sec. 4.01, Ala. Acts, 1955, Act No. 452, as amended, a second or runoff election shall be held on the sixth Tuesday next thereafter following the regular election. The mayor so elected shall, on or before the fourth Tuesday of November of the year of such election, qualify by making oath that he is eligible for said office and will execute the duties of same according to the best of his knowledge and ability.
“Section 3.
“Commencing with the 2009 regular general municipal election, this ordinance shall also apply to elections for school board members elected by district pursuant to Ordinance No. 02-14. Such school board members shall be elected at the regular general municipal election and any subsequent run-off election, if necessary as provided in Ordinance No. 02-14, § 1, in the same manner, assume office at the same time, and serve the same term of office as the members of the Birmingham City Council as provided by § 1 of this ordinance. “Section 4. All ordinances or parts of ordinances heretofore adopted by the Council of the City of Birmingham regarding the times at which elections are to be held which are inconsistent with the provisions of this ordinance are hereby repealed.
“Section 5. If any section, sentence, clause or phrase of this ordinance is for any reason held to be invalid or unconstitutional by declaration of any court of competent jurisdiction, such declaration shall not affect the validity of the remaining portions of this ordinance.
“Section 6. This ordinance shall become effective upon publication as required by law. This ordinance shall not be enforced until it is precleared pursuant to Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c.”

On April 23, 2010, the trial court conducted a hearing on the parties’ summary-judgment motions. After the hearing, the trial court entered the following order:

“This action commenced when the plaintiffs filed suit seeking to enjoin the individuals chosen as members of the Birmingham City Council in the election occurring on August 25, 2009 (and the subsequent run-off on October 6, 2009) from assuming office. Their bid for a preliminary injunction failed when the new council was sworn in before their motion could be considered. The action then turned to whether the election is to be voided as contrary to state law.
“This matter is before the Court on the parties’ cross motions for summary judgment. The question presented by these motions is whether the City of Birmingham had the authority under Ala.Code 1975, §§ 11-46-5 and 11-46-21, to adopt an ordinance changing the date of its city council election. Because no material facts are in dispute, the issue is purely one of statutory interpretation and summary judgment may therefore be properly considered.
“The plaintiffs contend that any change in the municipal election date must come from legislation to amend the Mayor-Council Act — an ordinance passed by the City Council in February 2009 cannot legally effectuate such a change. In response, the defendant argues that Ala.Code 1975, § 11-46-5, provides the Council with the authority to do so.
“This Court recognizes that ‘[i]n determining the meaning of a statute this Court looks to the plain meaning of the words as written by the legislature.’ Tolar Constr., LLC v. Kean Elec. Co., 944 So.2d 138, 149 (Ala.2006). Further,
multiple statutes ‘should be construed in harmony with other statutes in effect, so far as is practical.’ Siegelmcm v. Folmar, 432 So.2d 1246, 1249 (Ala.1983).
“Ala.Code 1975, § 11-46-5(a), provides the following:
“ ‘The governing body of a municipality having a general municipal election or runoff election required by general or local act at a time different from the dates now or hereafter provided by Article 2, Chapter 46 of Title 11, may elect by ordinance to have the election at the same time required by Article 2.... ’
“Elections in the City of Birmingham have historically been governed by the Mayor-Council Act.
“The analysis then turns to Ala.Code 1975, § 11-46-21. Found in Article 2 of Title 11, chapter 46, this statute specifies the time for municipal elections:
“‘(a) The regular municipal elections in cities and towns shall be held on the fourth Tuesday in August 1984, and quadrennially thereafter, and, when necessary as provided in subsection (d) of Section 11-46-55, a second or runoff election shall be held on the sixth Tuesday next thereafter following the regular election.’
“If the analysis were limited to these two statutes, there would clearly be no problem with changing the date of Birmingham council elections by local ordinance.
“The plaintiffs, however, base their case on Ala.Code 1975, § 11-46-20, which has historically carved out Birmingham (a Class 1 municipality) from the scope of Article 2’s requirements:
“ ‘General and special elections in cities and towns of this state, in all municipalities except Class 1 municipalities and except cities and towns organized under a commission form of government, shall be held and conducted at the times and in the manner prescribed in this article, and the expenses and costs incident to the conduct of all such elections shall be paid out of the treasury of the city or town holding the election.’
“(Emphasis added).
“Considering the interplay of these statutes requires some review of statutory history. Ala.Code 1975, § 11-46-5, originally applied to only Class 3 municipalities. The statute was amended in 1993 to delete this qualifying language. Now, the statute contains no explicit limitation of its applicability. The plaintiffs would have this Court fashion an implicit exclusion pertaining to the City of Birmingham.
“Ala.Code 1975, § 11-46-20, had been law for several years when the Legislature amended § 11-46-5 to delete its applicability to only Class 3 municipalities. It must be presumed that in amending § 11-46-5, and thereby broadening its scope, the Legislature knew of § 11^46-20, so that § 11-46-5 does serve to amend the effect of § 11-46-20 with specific regard to the timing of elections. There is still a wide field of operation for § 11-46-20, however. It deals with not only the timing of elections but also the manner in which such elections are held. Indeed, a review of Article 2 shows that most of the statutes therein address election procedures. It may be said that such statutes still do not apply to the City of Birmingham under § 11-46-20.
“Under plaintiffs’ interpretation of § 11-46-20, Ala.Code 1975, § 11-46-5(a), would apply to municipalities other than Birmingham and any municipalities under a commission form of government (which municipalities are governed by Article 3 of Title 11, chapter 46). In other words, it would apply only to municipalities already covered by Article 2. The problem is that Ala.Code 1975, 11-46-74, enacted in 1987, already gives to Article 2 municipalities the authority to switch over to the timetable dictated by Ala.Code 1975, § 11-46-21.
“This Court must presume that the Legislature ‘intended a just and reasonable construction and did not enact a statute that has no practical meaning,’ Weathers v. City of Oxford, 895 So.2d 305, 309 (Ala.Civ.App.2004), citing Ex parte Watley, 708 So.2d 890 (Ala.1997), and Ex parte Meeks, 682 So.2d 423 (Ala.1996). Given § 11-46-74, there would be no reason for amending § 11-46-5 in 1993 other than to broaden its effect beyond Article 2 municipalities.
“The plaintiffs also insist that if the City of Birmingham changes its election dates as authorized by § 11-46-5, it must also change the year of the election to comport with § 11-46-21, which would result in a violation of the language in § 11^6-5 providing that ‘the election made by ordinance shall not have the effect of changing the beginning of a term of office or the time for taking office.’ This Court disagrees based on Siegelman v. Folmar, 432 So.2d 1246, 1250 (Ala.1983).
“The Alabama Supreme Court has before said that ‘[o]nce a general election has taken place and the people have cast their votes, there must be a compelling reason before the courts will void that election.’ Godfrey v. Oswalt, 428 So.2d 40, 43 (Ala.1983). The plaintiffs have failed to make such a showing; to the contrary, the above analysis leads to the conclusion that the Birmingham City Council had the authority to change the election date in 2009.
“The plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment is denied, and the defendant’s motion is granted.”

This appeal followed.

Standard of Review

The question in this case is whether the City had the authority to change the dates for the general municipal election and any runoff election by ordinance rather than by petitioning the legislature to amend the Mayor-Council Act. The determinative facts in this case are essentially undisputed.

“An order granting or denying a summary judgment is reviewed de novo, applying the same standard as the trial court applied. American Gen. Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Underwood, 886 So.2d 807, 811 (Ala.2004). In addition, ‘[t]his court reviews de novo a trial court’s interpretation of a statute, because only a question of law is presented.’ Scott Bridge Co. v. Wright, 883 So.2d 1221, 1223 (Ala.2003). Where, as here, the facts of a case are essentially undisputed, this Court must determine whether the trial court misapplied the law to the undisputed facts, applying a de novo standard of review. Carter v. City of Haleyville, 669 So.2d 812, 815 (Ala.1995). Here, in reviewing the [entry] of a summary judgment when the facts are undisputed, we review de novo the trial court’s interpretation of statutory language and our previous caselaw on a controlling question of law.”

Continental Nat’l Indem. Co. v. Fields, 926 So.2d 1033, 1034-35 (Ala.2005). “Because the facts are not in dispute and because we are presented with pure questions of law, the trial court’s judgment is accorded no presumption of correctness.” Lyons v. Norris, 829 So.2d 748, 750 (Ala.2002).

Discussion

The plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred when it concluded that the City, a Class 1 municipality, had the authority, pursuant to § 11^16-5, Ala.Code 1975, to change by ordinance its general- and runoff-election dates from the dates set in the Mayor-Council Act to the dates set forth in § 11-46-21, Ala.Code 1975.

“All legislative powers and other powers granted to cities and towns shall be exercised by the council, except those powers conferred on some officers by law or ordinance. The council shall perform the duties required by this title and other applicable provisions of law.”

§ 11-43-43, Ala.Code 1975. Also, § 11-45-1, Ala.Code 1975, provides that

“[m]unicipal corporations may from time to time adopt ordinances and resolutions not inconsistent with the laws of the state to carry into effect or discharge the powers and duties conferred by the applicable provisions of this title and any other applicable provisions of law and to provide for the safety, preserve the health, promote the prosperity, and improve the morals, order, comfort, and convenience of the inhabitants of the municipality, and may enforce obedience to such ordinances.”

Thus, a city council is free to adopt ordinances to the extent that those ordinances are not inconsistent with existing law.

As is set forth above, the most recent amendment to the Mayor-Council Act in 1985 provided that the general elections of municipal council members would be held on the second Tuesday in October and that any runoff elections would be held on the third Tuesday thereafter. With regard to municipal elections, § 11-46-5, Ala.Code 1975, which was last amended in 1993, provides:

“The governing body of a municipality having a general municipal election or runoff election required by general or local act at a time different from the dates now or hereafter provided by Article 2, Chapter 46 of Title 11, may elect by ordinance to have the election at the same time required by Article 2 and the election made by ordinance shall not have the effect of changing the beginning of a term of office or the time for taking office.”

Therefore, we must determine whether the City was bound by the Mayor-Council Act or by § 11-46-5 with regard to the dates for holding its municipal elections.

“[W]e are guided by well-established principles of statutory construction. First and foremost, ‘[m]atters of policy are for the Legislature and, whether wise or unwise, legislative policies are of no concern to the courts.’ Marsh v. Green, 782 So.2d 223, 231 (Ala.2000). ‘[I]t is not the duty of this Court to question the wisdom, or the lack thereof, used by the Legislature in enacting the laws of this State.’ Ex parte T.D.T., 745 So.2d 899, 904 (Ala.1999). ‘[T]his Court is not at liberty to rewrite [a] statute or to substitute its judgment for that of the legislature.’ Gowens v. Tys. S., 948 So.2d 513, 522 n. 1 (Ala.2006); see also Ex parte Carlton, 867 So.2d 332, 338 (Ala.2003).
“ ‘[Statutes must be construed in pari materia in light of their application to the same general subject matter.... Our obligation is to construe [the] provisions “in favor of each other to form one harmonious plan,” if it is possible to do so.’ Opinion of the Justices No. 334, 599 So.2d 1166, 1168 (Ala.1992) (quoting Ex parte Coffee County Comm’n, 583 So.2d 985, 988 (Ala.1991)). Because our review turns on statutory construction, that review is de novo. Scott Bridge Co. v. Wright, 883 So.2d 1221, 1223 (Ala.2003).”

Willis v. Kincaid, 983 So.2d 1100, 1102-03 (Ala.2007).

This Court addressed a similar factual situation and legal question in City of Birmingham v. Graffeo, 551 So.2d 357 (Ala.1989). In Graffeo, the City of Birmingham had, before 1989, elected city council members according to the provisions of the Mayor-Council Act, which “established a system for election of nine at-large city council members with a staggered election system.” Graffeo, 551 So.2d at 358. In 1987, the Alabama Legislature adopted § 11-43-63, Ala.Code 1975, “which authorized municipalities to establish single-member districts for the election of council members.” Id. In March 1989, pursuant to § 11-43-63, the mayor of the City proposed Ordinance No. 89-46, which provided for single-member districts for the election of city council members. The city council adopted Ordinance No. 89-46, the City obtained preclearance from the United States Justice Department, and the City prepared to implement the new system for the election of city council members.

Before the elections were held, Graffeo filed a complaint seeking, among other things, injunctive relief. After a trial on the merits, the trial court granted the relief Graffeo requested, and the City appealed. This Court reversed the trial court’s judgment, reasoning as follows:

“The City argues that the trial court erred when it held that § ll-43-63[, Ala.Code 1975,] did not amend the May- or-Council Act, and that the trial court erred when it held that the provisions of the Mayor-Council Act were specific provisions that controlled the general provisions of § 11-43-63. If, as the City argues, § 11-43-63 amended the May- or-Council Act, then the trial court’s ruling concerning whether the provisions of the two acts were specific or general was error, because those provisions that the trial court relied on will have been amended.
“The Mayor-Council Act, Ala. Acts 1955, No. 452 authorized the City to establish the office of at-large council members. That office was not established until the City voted to change the form of government. Connor v. State, 275 Ala. 230, 153 So.2d 787 (1963); Reid v. City of Birmingham, 274 Ala. 629, 150 So.2d 735 (1963). The office of at-large council members resulted, accordingly, from the City’s exercise of the option given the City by the legislature to create the office.
“Thirty-two years after the Legislature passed the Mayor-Council Act, it passed § 11-43-63, which authorizes municipalities to establish single member districts for the election of council members. The legislature has the inherent power to prescribe, alter and change the form of municipal governments. Siegelman v. Folmar, 432 So.2d 1246 (Ala.1983); Opinion of the Justices [No. 181 ], 277 Ala. 630, 173 So.2d 793 (Ala.1965). A municipality may exercise those powers that are explicitly granted to it by the legislature, as well as those powers that are necessarily implied from an express grant of power. Spear v. Ward, 199 Ala. 105, 74 So. 27 (1917). Section 11-43-63 grants municipalities the power to divide the municipality into single member districts upon a vote of the city council. Accordingly, § 11-43-63, on its face, allows the City to pass an ordinance such as Ordinance No. 89-46, which changes the office of the city council from being elected at-large to being elected in single member districts.
“The trial court’s holding was to the effect that § 3.10 of the Mayor-Council Act was not amended by § 11-43-63 and that § 3.10 prohibits the City from using § 11-43-63 to enable it to sustain Ordinance No. 8£M6. Section 8.10 of the Mayor-Council Act provides:
“ ‘Sec. 3.10. Creation of new departments or offices; change of duties. “‘The council by ordinance may create, change, and abolish offices, departments or agencies, other than the offices, departments and agencies established by this act. The council by ordinance may assign additional functions or duties to offices, departments or agencies established by this act, but may not discontinue or assign to any other office, department or agency any function or duty assigned by this act to a particular office, department or agency.’
“Section 11-43-63 explicitly allows a city, by the vote of its city council, to change from the at-large election of city council members to election in single-member districts. That provision was enacted thirty-two years after § 3.10 of the Mayor-Council Act was enacted, which, to some extent, indicates that § 11 — 43-63 was intended to modify the provisions of § 3.10. Moreover, the trial court’s holding that 11-43-63 did not amend the Mayor-Council Act and, accordingly did not amend § 3.10, destroys, at a practical level, any possible effectiveness of § 11 — 43-63.
“Using the trial court’s analysis, § 3.10 would forever be a bar to the City passing an ordinance pursuant to § 11-43-63. Why would the Legislature enact § 11-43-63, if it did not mean for the provision to have any effect? Even Graffeo himself concedes that if Ordinance No. 89-46 had been made effective for the 1991 city council elections, then he would have no basis to sustain an action to enjoin the effects of the ordinance. Accordingly, considering our entire discussion, we hold that the trial court erred when it held that § 11 — 43— 63 did not amend the Mayor-Council Act.”

City of Birmingham v. Graffeo, 551 So.2d at 360-61.

Similarly, § 11 — 46-5 explicitly allows a municipality, by a vote of its governing body, to change the dates on which its general municipal elections and runoff elections are held, so long as the beginning of a term of office and the time for taking office are not changed. See Siegelman v. Folmar, 432 So.2d 1246, 1250 (Ala.1983) (noting that, “[b]y its express terms, [the previous version of] § 11-46-5 allows any class 3 municipality having a mayor-council form of government and an election date different from the date specified by § 11-46-21 to elect by ordinance to advance its election date to the second Tuesday in July”). Section 11-46-5 was passed in 1980 and was amended in 1993, after the most recent amendment to the Mayor-Council Act pertaining to the City’s elections, to remove language that limited its application to Class 3 municipalities having a mayor-council form of government. Therefore, it appears that, by enacting and later amending § 11 — 46-5, the legislature gave municipalities the authority, pursuant to § 11-46-5, to choose to vary from the election dates established in the Mayor-Council Act.

Before 2009, the City held its general municipal and runoff elections at a time different from the dates provided in Article 2, Chapter 46 of Title 11 — specifically, it held those elections on the dates set forth in the Mayor-Council Act. In 2009, the governing body of the City — the city council — elected, by adopting Ordinance No. 09-36, to hold the elections at the same time — the fourth Tuesday in August and the sixth Tuesday thereafter — required by Article 2. The ordinance did not change the beginning of a term of office or the time for taking office. Thus, it appears that the City complied with the plain language of § 11-46-5 when, in 2009, it changed the dates for its general municipal elections and runoff elections.

The plaintiffs note that § 11-46-20, Ala. Code 1975, specifically provides that the election dates set forth in Article 2 do not apply to Class 1 municipalities. Therefore, they argue that, because § 11-46-20 is a specific provision directly related to Class 1 municipalities, it takes precedence over § 11-46-5, which is a general provision related to “a municipality.” They also contend that § 11-46-5 originally applied only to Class 3 municipalities having a mayor-council form of government and that those restrictions were removed in 1993. However, the plaintiffs assert that, when it removed the phrase “any Class 3 municipality” from § 11-46-5, the legislature did not intend to remove its previous exclusion of Class 1 municipalities from the election-date provisions set forth in Article 2. Therefore, they conclude that the legislature intended to exclude Class 1 municipalities from the operation of § 11-46-5.

The City argues that the language in § 11-46-5 is plain and unambiguous; that § 11-46-5 authorized it to change the dates of its general municipal elections and runoff elections to the dates provided in § 11-46-21, Ala.Code 1975; and that the only restriction in § 11-46-5 was that the City not change the term of office or the time of taking office. It also argues that, although § 11^46-5 originally applied only to Class 3 municipalities having a mayor-council form of government, it now applies to all municipalities, regardless of class or form of government. Finally, it argues:

“[T]he title to Act No. 93-760 manifests clear intent:
“ ‘To amend Sections 11-46-5, ... of the Code of Alabama, 1975, to authorize all municipalities having a general municipal election or run-off election required by general or local act at a time different from the dates now or hereafter provided by Article 2, Chapter 46, Title 11 of the Code of Alabama 1975, to elect by ordinance to have the election at the same time as required by Article 2.... ’ ”

(City’s brief, at p. 26.)

Title 11, Chapter 46 of the Code is divided into three Articles. Article 1 sets forth “General Provisions.” Article 2 addresses “Elections in Certain Cities or Towns Having Mayor-Council Form of Government.” Article 3 addresses “Elections in Certain Cities or Towns Having Commission Form of Government.” Section 11^46-5 is included in Article 1 of Title 11, Chapter 46; §§ 11^46-20 and 11-46-21 are included in Article 2. Section 11^46-21(a), Ala.Code 1975, provides:

“The regular municipal elections in cities and towns shall be held on the fourth Tuesday in August 1984, and quadrennially thereafter, and, when necessary as provided in subsection (d) of Section 11-46-55, a second or runoff election shall be held on the sixth Tuesday next thereafter following the regular election.”

Section ll-46-20(a), Ala.Code 1975, provides:

“General and special elections in cities and towns of this state, in all municipalities except Class 1 municipalities and except cities and towns organized under a commission form of government, shall be held and conducted at the times and in the manner prescribed in this article, and the expenses and costs incident to the conduct of all such elections shall be paid out of the treasury of the city or town holding the election.”

(Emphasis added.)

The plaintiffs correctly argue that § 11^=6 — 20(a) generally excludes Class 1 municipalities from the requirements of Article 2, including the requirements of § 11-46-21. Based on that exclusion, the plaintiffs would have this Court hold that § 11-46-20 is a specific provision that is directly related to Class 1 municipalities and that it therefore takes precedence over § 11-46-5, a general provision related to “a municipality.” However,

“[t]he fundamental rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature in enacting the statute. Words used in a statute must be given them natural, plain, ordinary, and commonly understood meaning, and where plain language is used a court is bound to interpret that language to mean exactly what it says. If the language of the statute is unambiguous, then there is no room for judicial construction and the clearly expressed intent of the legislature must be given effect.”

IMED Corp. v. Systems Eng’g Assocs. Corp., 602 So.2d 344, 846 (Ala.1992).

Section 11-46-20 is written in mandatory language, but it excepts from its provisions “Class 1 municipalities and ... cities and towns organized under a commission form of government.” More particularly, it requires that general and special elections in cities and towns other than those excepted shall be conducted in accordance with the terms set forth in Article 2. Although § 11-46-20 does not require that Class 1 municipalities such as the City conduct their elections in accordance with Article 2, it also does not prohibit Class 1 municipalities from choosing, if so authorized, to schedule elections in accordance with the dates set forth in Article 2.

Furthermore, the plain language of § 11-46-5 provides that, if the general municipal elections and runoff elections of a municipality, without an exception for Class 1 municipalities, are required by a general or local act to be held at a different time than the time set forth in Article 2, the governing body of the municipality may elect, by ordinance, to have the elections at the time required by Article 2, so long as the ordinance does “not have the effect of changing the beginning of a term of office or the time for taking office.” As the City argues, the language used in § 11-46-5 is clear and unambiguous, and it does not specifically exclude Class 1 municipalities from its provisions. “ ‘[W]here plain language is used a court is bound to interpret that language to mean exactly what it says,’ and ... ‘[i]f the language of the statute is unambiguous, then there is no room for judicial construction and the clearly expressed intent of the legislature must be given effect.’ ” Ex parte Alabama Great Southern R.R., 788 So.2d 886, 889 (Ala.2000) (quoting Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Nielsen, 714 So.2d 293, 296 (Ala.1998)).

Section 11-46-5 authorizes municipalities, without an exception for Class 1 municipalities, to choose to conduct their general municipal elections and runoff elections at the times set forth in Article 2. Also, although § 11-46-20 does not require Class 1 municipalities to conduct elections in accordance with Article 2, it does not prohibit them from choosing to do so in accordance with § 11-46-5. Therefore, we reject the plaintiffs’ argument that § 11^16-20, with its exclusion of Class 1 municipalities, is a more specific statute that takes precedence over the more general § 11-46-5.

The plaintiffs next argue that, even if § 11-46-5 applies, the City did not comply with the requirements of Article 2. Specifically, they contend that the fourth Tuesday in August 2009 was “not ‘qua-drennially1 after 1984,” as is required by § ll-46-21(a), Ala.Code 1975. Therefore, the plaintiffs argue:

“[T]he elections provided by ... Ordinance No. 09-86 could not be at the same time as provided in Article 2 without affecting the term of the officeholders — to fully comply with the § 11-46-5 requirement that the change not affect the beginning of the terms of the officeholders, the terms of the city council members would have been cut short by over one year if the election had been held in 2008 and extended by three years if the election had been held in 2012.”

(Plaintiffs’ brief, at p. 29.) They further argue that § 11 — 46—21(c), Ala.Code 1975, requires that municipal officers take office on the first Monday in November following their election, but that Ordinance No. 09-36 provides that the officers would take office on the fourth Tuesday in November, which was the date provided by the May- or-Council Act. For these reasons, the plaintiffs conclude that the City did not comply with the requirements of § 11 — 46— 5.

Following the enactment of Ordinance No. 89-46, which is discussed in detail in Graffeo, supra, and starting in 1989, the City elected council members from single-member districts every four years. Pursuant to the Mayor-Council Act, the council members so elected have taken office on the fourth Tuesday in November following their election. Ordinance No. 09-36, in compliance with the plain language of § 11-46-5, did not change either the quadrennial year of the elections, and therefore the beginning of the term of office, or the time for taking office.

The plaintiffs apparently read the phrase “the election made by ordinance shall not have the effect of changing the beginning of a term of office or the time for taking office” in § 11-46-5 to require that the elections be held in quadrennial years calculated from 1984 and that the time for taking office be the time set forth in § 11-46-21 (c), rather than the time set forth in the Mayor-Council Act. In contrast, the City argues that § 11-46-5 provides for the adoption of the days of the elections — the fourth Tuesday in August and the sixth Tuesday thereafter — set forth in § ll-46-21(a) but not the year— 1984 and quadrennially thereafter — set forth in § ll-46-21(a).

“In interpreting statutes, the underlying consideration is to understand and effectuate the intent of the Legislature as expressed in the statutes. Employees’ Retirement System of Alabama v. Head, 369 So.2d 1227 (Ala.1979); Champion v. McLean, 266 Ala. 103, 95 So.2d 82 (1957).
“... [I]f possible, the legislative intent must be derived from the expression in the statute. Town of Loxley v. Rosinton Water, Sewer and Fire Protection Authority, Inc., 376 So.2d 705 (Ala.1979); Employees’ Retirement System of Alabama v. Head, 369 So.2d 1227 (Ala.1979). Where more than one statute is involved, however, they should be construed in harmony with other statutes in effect, so far as is practical. Waters v. City of Birmingham, 282 Ala. 104, 209 So.2d 388 (1968); State ex rel. Richardson v. Morrow, 276 Ala. 385, 162 So.2d 480 (1964); Gulf States Steel Co. v. Justice, 204 Ala. 577, 87 So. 211 (1920); B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Butler, 56 Ala.App. 635, 324 So.2d 776, cert. quashed, 295 Ala. 401, 324 So.2d 788 ([Ala.]1975). In construing a statute, the court must look not only to the language of the statute, however, but also to the purpose and object of the enactment, and its relation to other laws and conditions which may arise under its provisions. State ex rel. Richardson v. Morrow, supra.

Siegelman v. Folmar, 432 So.2d at 1248-49.

We agree with the City’s interpretation of § 11^46-5. Rather than requiring that the terms and times of taking office comply with § 11-46-21, it is more logical to conclude that the legislature intended to allow cities and towns to change the days of the general municipal elections and runoff elections, but to leave in place the years the elections would occur and the times the council members would take office. See Siegelman, 432 So.2d at 1250 (“By its express terms, § 11-46-5 allows any ... municipality having a mayor-council form of government and an election date different from the date specified by § 11-46-21 to elect by ordinance to advance its election date to the second Tuesday in July. The Legislature, in passing [§ 11-46-5], apparently recognized that some municipalities have continued to conduct their elections at a date different from the date provided by § 11-46-21.”). Any other interpretation would run afoul of the plain-language qualification in § 11-46-5 that “the election made by ordinance shall not have the effect of changing the beginning of a term of office or the time for taking office.” See Siegelman, supra. Therefore, we reject the plaintiffs’ argument that the City did not comply with the requirements of § 11-46-5.

Because we conclude that the August 25, 2009, and October 6, 2009, elections were not void, we need not address the plaintiffs’ argument that the trial court erred in not ordering new elections.

Conclusion

On February 24, 2009, pursuant to § 11-46-5, Ala.Code 1975, a majority of the city council voted to adopt Ordinance No. 09-36. After the United States Justice Department precleared the ordinance, the City implemented the new election dates. Elections were held pursuant to Ordinance No. 09-36 on August 25, 2009, and October 6, 2009. For the reasons set forth herein, we conclude that the City had the authority under § 11-46-5, Ala.Code 1975, to change by ordinance the days of the general municipal elections and runoff elections from the second Tuesday in October and the third Tuesday thereafter to the fourth Tuesday in August and the sixth Tuesday thereafter. Accordingly, the trial court properly entered a summary judgment for the City, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

AFFIRMED.

COBB, C.J., and WOODALL, STUART, BOLIN, PARKER, MURDOCK, SHAW, and MAIN, JJ., concur.

      . This case was originally assigned to another Justice on this Court. It was reassigned to Justice Wise on January 26, 2011.

      . Counsel for the City also prepared "Joint Stipulated Facts.” The "Joint Stipulated Facts” prepared by the City does not differ in any material respects from the "Plaintiffs' Statement of Undisputed Material Facts.”


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: PARKER, Justice.

license: Public Domain

text:
    NATIONWIDE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY v. J-MAR MACHINE & PUMP, INC.
    1090685.
    Supreme Court of Alabama.
    June 17, 2011.

      Kori L. Clement of Hare, Clement & Duck, P.C., Birmingham, for appellant.

      Stephen D. Heninger of Heninger Garrison & Davis, LLC, Birmingham, for appel-lee.
   PARKER, Justice.

Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company (“Nationwide”) appeals from the trial court’s judgment denying its “renewed motion for a judgment as a matter of law or, in the alternative, motion for [a] judgment notwithstanding the verdict.” We reverse and render a judgment for Nationwide.

Facts and Procedural Histo'ry

In 1997, J-Mar Machine & Pump, Inc. (“J-Mar”), a vacuum and centrifugal-pump repair shop located in Birmingham, procured a commercial liability and property insurance policy (“the insurance policy”) from Nationwide that afforded $100,000 in personal-property coverage. At issue in this case is the cancellation of the insurance policy by Nationwide. The pertinent portion of the insurance policy stated:

“A. Cancellation
“1. The first Named Insured shown in the Declarations [J-Mar] may cancel this policy by mailing or delivering to [Nationwide] advance written notice of cancellation.
“2. [Nationwide] may cancel this policy by mailing or delivering to [J-Mar] written notice of cancellation at least:
“a. 10 days before the effective date of cancellation if [Nationwide] cancel[s] for nonpayment of premium; or
“b. 80 days before the effective date of cancellation if [Nationwide] cancels] for any other reason.
“3. [Nationwide] will mail or deliver [its] notice to [J-Mar’s] last mailing address known to [Nationwide].
“4. Notice of cancellation will state the effective date of cancellation. The policy period will end on that date.
“5. If this policy is cancelled, [Nationwide] will send [J-Mar] any premium refund due. If [Nationwide] can-celts], the refund will be pro rata. If [J-Mar] cancels, the refund may be less than pro rata. The cancellation will be effective even if [Nationwide has] not made or offered a refund.
“6. If notice is mailed, proof of mailing will be sufficient proof of notice.”

In early 2004, Nationwide’s underwriter ordered an inspection of J-Mar’s facilities in anticipation of its yearly renewal of the insurance policy, which was up for renewal on March 29, 2004. The inspection was conducted by an independent surveyor in March 2004, and the inspection report was sent to Nationwide, which received it on March 23, 2004. The report indicated the following problems with J-Mar’s facilities: “aluminum wiring”; “[s]pace heaters that are not properly vented”; “[f]ire extinguishers that have not been serviced”; and “[hjousekeeping is poor, with large pump and machine parts through the floor area and on the outside grounds.” The insurance policy was renewed on March 29, 2004.

On September 30, 2004, Nationwide mailed J-Mar a notice of cancellation that stated, in pertinent part: “This is required notice ... that your policy is terminated at 12:01 a.m. on [November 1, 2004].” The notice of cancellation stated that the insurance policy was being terminated based on the “unfavorable ... report” prepared by the independent surveyor. J-Mar’s president, Gerald Jones, testified that he received the notice of cancellation and that he knew that Nationwide was going to cancel the insurance policy effective November 1, 2004. Jones then telephoned his local Nationwide agent, John Allen Lowe, who had sold J-Mar the insurance policy and had serviced it for the duration of the policy, and asked Lowe about the notice of cancellation. Jones testified that “[Lowe] wasn’t aware of the [notice of cancellation] and [Lowe] said that ... he’s got to find out about it and he’d take care of it, don’t worry about it, so I didn’t.” In his deposition testimony, Jones testified that J-Mar never received any document from Nationwide indicating that the insurance policy had been reinstated:

“[Nationwide’s trial counsel:] Did you ever receive any letters from Nationwide after the [notice of cancellation] ... that ever said that your policy was reinstated?
“[Jones:] No, ma’am.
“Q. Did you ever get another copy of a policy from Nationwide showing that the policy was put back into effect?
“A. No, ma’am.
“Q. Did you ever get a document from Mr. Lowe, and I’m talking about a written document, that ever said that your policy had been reinstated?
“A. No, ma’am.”

Jones’s deposition testimony also indicates that Lowe had informed him that Nationwide would not reinstate the insurance policy:

“[Nationwide’s trial counsel:] Do you remember ever being told by Mr. Lowe that he had talked to the underwriters and they were not willing to reinstate it?
“[Jones:] Yes.”

On or about December 19, 2004, property belonging to J-Mar, which had been covered by the insurance policy, was stolen from J-Mar’s premises. On December 20, 2004, Jones telephoned Lowe to notify him of the theft and to inquire about the state of the insurance policy and whether it had been reinstated; Lowe informed Jones that it had not been reinstated. Jones also testified that that was not the first time Lowe told him the insurance policy had not been reinstated but that Lowe had informed him of this sometime near “the end of October.”

On December 24, 2004, Jones attempted to pay the quarterly premium for the canceled insurance policy by sending Lowe a check in the amount of $313, which Lowe deposited. J-Mar had not received a billing statement from Nationwide indicating that the premium was due. Rather, Jones had paid the premium based on a billing statement J-Mar had received on May 13, 2004, before the insurance policy was canceled, notifying J-Mar that its next premium payment would be due on December 29, 2004. Nationwide refunded $111 of the $313 to J-Mar, noting that the cancellation date of the insurance policy was November 1, 2004, and indicating as the reason for the refunded amount: “payment more than required on a cancelled policy.”

Despite Jones’s knowledge that the insurance policy had been canceled, J-Mar filed a claim with Nationwide under the insurance policy for the stolen property. On June 10, 2005, Nationwide denied J-Mar’s claim because, Nationwide stated, “the [insurance] policy was not active for this date of loss.”

On December 2, 2005, J-Mar sued Nationwide and Lowe. J-Mar alleged claims of breach of contract and bad-faith failure to pay an insurance claim against Nationwide and alleged that Lowe had “negligently caused or negligently allowed a purported cancellation of the [insurance] policy ... to go uncorrected.... ” On December 14, 2006, Nationwide and Lowe filed motions for a summary judgment, which the trial court denied on May 18, 2009. On September 22, 2009, Nationwide and Lowe filed a “joint motion to reconsider” the trial court’s judgment denying their summary-judgment motions. The trial court denied Nationwide and Lowe’s motion to reconsider on November 5, 2009.

The trial court conducted a jury trial, which began on November 30, 2009. At the close of J-Mar’s case, Nationwide filed a written motion for a judgment as a matter of law, which the trial court denied. Nationwide also made an oral motion for a judgment as a matter of law at the close of all the evidence, which the trial court also denied. Also at the close of all the evidence, J-Mar orally moved to dismiss its claim against Lowe, with prejudice. However, the trial court did not enter an actual order, oral or written, dismissing Lowe. On December 4, 2009, the trial court entered a judgment on the jury’s verdict in favor of J-Mar and against Nationwide for $416,466.87. Nationwide appealed.

On August 3, 2010, this Court entered an order remanding the cause to the trial court, stating that the judgment appealed from was not a final judgment because the claims against Lowe had not been adjudicated and giving the trial court options, one of which was to dismiss the claims against Lowe. On August 10, 2010, the trial court entered an order dismissing, with prejudice, “every claim alleged by [J-Mar] against [Lowe].” This Court then reinstated the appeal.

Standard of Review

In A.T. Stephens Enterprises, Inc. v. Johns, 757 So.2d 416, 419 (Ala.2000), we held:

“In reviewing a ruling on a motion for a judgment as a matter of law, this Court is bound by the same standard as the trial court:
“ “We must determine whether the party with the burden of proof has produced sufficient evidence of a conflict warranting a jury’s consideration. Macon County Comm’n v. Sanders, 555 So.2d 1054, 1056 (Ala.1990); Bussey v. John Deere Co., 531 So.2d 860, 862 (Ala.1988). The evidence must be viewed in a light most favorable to ... the nonmoving party. Twilley v. Daubert Coated Products, Inc., 536 So.2d 1364, 1367 (Ala.1988); Wadsworth v. Yancey Bros. Co., 423 So.2d 1343, 1345 (Ala.1982).’
“Continental Eagle Corp. v. Mokrzycki, 611 So.2d 313, 319 (Ala.1992).”

Discussion

Nationwide argues that the trial court erred in denying its motion for a judgment as a matter of law based on its contention that the undisputed evidence shows that the insurance policy had been canceled under the terms of the policy before J-Mar’s claim arose. We agree.

This Court recently set forth the law concerning an insurer’s right to cancel an insurance policy in Hartford Underwriters Insurance Co. v. Reed, 57 So.3d 742 (Ala.2010):

“The law concerning an insurer’s right to cancel a policy is well settled: ‘[T]he right vel non of cancellation is a matter of contract.... The question of the motive of the parties or company in that behalf is immaterial when there is a cancellation under the terms of the contract.’ Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. of California v. Strange, 226 Ala. 98, 100, 145 So. 425, 426 (1932). Further,
“ ‘[i]t is well settled in Alabama that “in an action on an insurance policy when the insurer sets up cancellation as a defense, the insurer has the burden of proving the policy was can-
celed.” Mid-State Homes, Inc. v. Cherokee Ins. Co., 51 Ala.App. 247, 248, 284 So.2d 274, 275 (1973). However, it is “equally true that in- the absence of a restrictive statutory provision, the parties to an insurance contract may specify the method by which it may be canceled and the parties are thereby bound. Put another way, an insurance policy may be canceled according to its terms.” 51 Ala.App. at 249, 284 So.2d at 276. (Citation omitted).’
“American Interstate Ins. Co. v. Kelley, 797 So.2d 479, 482 (Ala.Civ.App.2000). See also Green v. Standard Fire Ins. Co. of Alabama, 398 So.2d 671, 675 (Ala.1981) (holding that ‘[i]t is well settled in Alabama law that the right of the insurer to cancel an insurance policy is strictly construed and the condition imposed upon it with respect to giving notice of cancellation must be strictly performed’).”

Hartford, 57 So.3d at 748.

Regardless of its motives or reasons, Nationwide undisputedly canceled the insurance policy according to the terms of the policy. It is undisputed that Nationwide sent J-Mar a cancellation notice 30 days before the insurance policy was to be canceled and that J-Mar received the notice. Therefore, the insurance policy was canceled pursuant to its terms effective November 1, 2004. Further, Jones testified that at the time the theft occurred and at the time he filed his claim with Nationwide he knew that the insurance policy had been canceled and that it had not been reinstated. Accordingly, the trial court’s judgment denying Nation-wide’s judgment as a matter of law on the basis that J-Mar had presented sufficient evidence of a conflict warranting a jury’s consideration concerning its claims of breach of contract and bad faith was in error and thus is due to be reversed.

We note that, in its appellate brief before this Court, J-Mar appears to argue that Nationwide had waived its prior cancellation of the insurance policy by accepting J-Mar’s check paying the premiums for the canceled insurance policy. However, it is undisputed that Nationwide refunded a pro rata amount of the premium payment consistent with the terms of the insurance policy. J-Mar does not make an argument on appeal that the refunded amount was insufficient. Therefore, there is no merit to this argument. J-Mar also appears to argue that its “reasonable expectations” barred Nationwide’s cancellation of the insurance policy. However, J-Mar fails to cite any applicable legal authority; thus, we need not consider this claim. See Rule 28(a)(10), Ala. R.App. P. Moreover, the rule of reasonable expectations is a rule of construction that applies to interpret ambiguous insurance policies and has no application to this case. See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Slade, 747 So.2d 293, 311 (Ala.1999).

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, this Court reverses the trial court’s judgment denying Nationwide’s motion for a judgment as a matter of law and renders a judgment in favor of Nationwide.

REVERSED AND JUDGMENT RENDERED.

COBB, C.J., and STUART, SHAW, and WISE, JJ., concur.

      . Effective October 1, 1995, Rule 50, Ala. R. Civ. P., was amended to rename a "motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict” as a renewed "motion for a judgment as a matter of law.”


author: MOORE, Judge.

text:
    R.S. v. STATE of Alabama ex rel. C.L.S.
    2100266.
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    June 17, 2011.
    Ed Crackel of Abies, Baxter, Parker, Avant & Smith, Huntsville, for appellant.
    Sharon E. Fiequette, chief legal counsel, and Jennifer M. Bush, asst. atty. gen., Department of Human Resources, for ap-pellee.
   MOORE, Judge.

On October 28, 2009, the State of Alabama, on behalf of C.L.S. (“the mother”), filed a contempt petition against R.S. (“the father) in the Madison Juvenile Court (“the juvenile court”). The petition alleged that the father was in arrears on his child-support obligation under a December 21, 1996, judgment, that the principal amount of the child-support arrearage was $20,850.73, and that the accumulated interest was $22,120.26. The petition requested, among other things, that the juvenile court schedule a hearing on the petition, that the father be required to appear at said hearing and show cause why he should not be held in contempt of court, and that the juvenile court “reduce the arrearage! ] amount to a judgment with interest and order payments thereon” and award such other relief to which the mother might be entitled. The juvenile-court referee entered an order setting the contempt petition for a hearing on January 20, 2010. The petition and the order setting the hearing were served on the father by certified mail on November 2, 2009. The January 20, 2010, hearing was continued by the juvenile-court referee to March 3, 2010. The March 3, 2010, hearing was subsequently continued by the juvenile-court referee to March 24, 2010.

On March 1, 2010, the father filed a “motion for determination of paternity, or in the alternative, motion to establish visitation,” in which he asserted that “[n]o prior custody determination had been performed in this matter.” The father requested that the juvenile court make a paternity determination or, alternatively, if the court declined his request for a paternity determination, that the juvenile court order regular visitation between him and the child. On March 16, 2010, the juvenile-court judge set the father’s motion for a hearing on April 2, 2010. On March 18, 2010, a “genetic test report” was filed with the juvenile court.

On March 22, 2010, the State filed a motion requesting that the March 24, 2010, hearing scheduled before the referee be continued until the juvenile-court judge ruled on the father’s “motion for determination of paternity, or in the alternative, motion to establish visitation.” The referee granted the motion to continue and reset the hearing for April 28, 2010.

On March 23, 2010, the State filed a response to the father’s “motion for determination of paternity, or in the alternative, motion to establish visitation.” The State attached to its response payment records from the State of Alabama’s Child Support Enforcement Division and a spreadsheet setting out its interest calculations.

On July 15, 2010, the juvenile-court judge entered an order denying the father’s “motion for determination of paternity” and setting the “motion to establish visitation” and all other pending matters for trial on August 9, 2010. Thereafter, on December 2, 2010, the juvenile-court referee filed her “report, findings and recommendations ... regarding arrearage/con-tempt for non-payment of child support,” which states, in pertinent part:

“This cause came to be heard on August 9, 2010, upon the [mother’s] Petition for Contempt and rule nisi issued incident thereto....
“The cause was submitted upon the pleadings and upon the agreement of the parties. Based upon the agreement presented, the Referee makes the following findings and recommendations:
“1. The [father] was ordered by the Juvenile Court of Madison County, Alabama, on December 21, 1996, to pay child support in specified periodic payments.
“2. The [father] has failed on 75 separate occasions to comply with the previous order of support and is delinquent in arrears and interest totaling $46,707.16 as of June 30, 2010.
“3. The [father’s] failure to make the said child support payments is due to [the father’s] willful neglect and is not due to an inability to pay.
“It is, therefore, the recommendation of the Referee as follows:
“1. Judgment should be rendered in favor of the [mother] and against the [father] in the amount of $46,707.16 for the child support ar-rearage and interest determined due as of June 30, 2010. This judgment subsumes all prior judgments for child support in this cause.
“2. The [father] should be found to be in contempt of court 75 separate times because of the [father’s] willful failure to pay support as previously ordered. Accordingly, [the father] should be sentenced to 5 days for each separate act of contempt to run consecutively for a total of 375 days in the Madison County Jail. Said sentences should each be suspended for a period of 2 years, with each term of probation running consecutively.
“3. The [father] should pay $100.00 per month toward child support ar-rearage totaling $22,430.73 in addition to the $158.00 per month he was previously ordered to pay. The [father] should pay interest on the above arrearage totaling $24,276.43. Said child support arrearage payments shall commence on December 21, 1996, and shall continue every month thereafter. Current support payments shall continue as previously ordered. Should an arrear-age exist when the minor child emancipates, the [father] should be required to continue paying both the current support and arrears payment amounts until all arrears and interest is paid in full.
“4. Said sums should be reduced to a judgment for which execution may issue. Interest should continue to accrue on said child support arrear-age until the judgment has been satisfied in full as provided in Ala. Code [1975,] § 8-8-10(1975).
“7. All other provisions of the Court’s previous Orders not affected herein should remain in full force and effect.”

On December 7, 2010, the juvenile-court judge entered an order ratifying the findings and recommendations of the referee, making said findings and recommendations the order of the court. See Rule 2(G), Ala. R. Juv. P. Neither the referee’s findings and recommendations nor the juvenile court’s order ratifying the same disposed of the father’s motion to establish visitation. The father filed his notice of appeal to this court on December 17, 2010.

“Although neither party has questioned this court’s jurisdiction, we must

consider whether we have jurisdiction over this appeal, because ‘“jurisdictional matters are of such magnitude that we take notice of them at any time and do so even ex mero motu.’”” Kelley v. Thomas, 878 So.2d 1168, 1171 (Ala.Civ.App.2003) (quoting Wallace v. Tee Jays Mfg. Co., 689 So.2d 210, 211 (Ala.Civ.App.1997), quoting in turn Nunn v. Baker, 518 So.2d 711, 712 (Ala.1987)). “The question whether a judgment is final is a jurisdictional question, and the reviewing court, on a determination that the judgment is not final, has a duty to dismiss the case.” Hubbard v. Hubbard, 935 So.2d 1191, 1192 (Ala.Civ.App.2006). Our supreme court has defined a “final judgment” as “a terminative decision by a court of competent jurisdiction which demonstrates there has been complete adjudication of all matters in controversy between the litigants within the cognizance of that court. That is, it must be conclusive and certain in itself.” Jewell v. Jackson & Whitsitt Cotton Co., 331 So.2d 623, 625 (Ala.1976).

In the present case, there has not been a complete adjudication of all the matters in controversy between the parties because the father’s motion to establish visitation remains unadjudicated. Because the juvenile court’s December 7, 2010, order ratifying the findings and recommendations of the referee was not a final judgment, this court does not have jurisdiction over the father’s appeal. We, therefore, dismiss the father’s appeal as being from a nonfinal judgment. See Hubbard, 935 So.2d at 1192.

APPEAL DISMISSED.

THOMPSON, P. J„ and PITTMAN, BRYAN, and THOMAS, JJ., concur.