author: WOODALL, Justice.

text:
    FORD MOTOR COMPANY v. Latoya DUCKETT. Ford Motor Company v. Latoya Duckett.
    1090833 and 1091043.
    Supreme Court of Alabama.
    Feb. 11, 2011.
    Rehearing Applications Denied April 8, 2011.

      Harlan I. Prater IV, J. Gorman Houston, Jr., and Madeline H. Haikala of Lightfoot, Franklin & White, LLC, Birmingham; and Gregory L. Schuck and M. Jeremy Dotson of Huie, Fernambucq & Stewart, LLP, Birmingham, for appellant.
    Gregory S. Cusimano and Jason Knowles of Cusimano, Keener, Roberts, Knowles & Raley, LLC, Gadsden; Joel S. Rosen of Cohen, Placitella & Roth, P.C., Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; and Willie Gary of The Law Firm Gary, Williams, Finney, Lewis, Watson & Sperando, PL, Stuart, Florida, for appellee.
   WOODALL, Justice.

Latoya Duckett sued Ford Motor Company (“Ford”) and others, alleging strict-liability design-defect and negligence claims under Georgia law and seeking damages for injuries she suffered in an accident involving a Mercury Mountaineer sport-utility vehicle. The case went to the jury against Ford only, and the jury returned a verdict in Duckett’s favor on her strict-liability claim and in Ford’s favor on Duckett’s negligence claim. The jury awarded Duckett $8.5 million in damages. The trial court entered a judgment consistent with that verdict. We reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand the case for a new trial.

Facts and Procedural History

The accident at issue in this case occurred on Interstate 20 in Douglasville, Georgia. Patricia Simon, who was driving the Mountaineer, swerved to her left, allegedly to avoid another vehicle that was merging into Simon’s lane. According to Duckett’s accident-reconstruction expert, the Mountaineer traveled across at least one lane of traffic and partially entered the rumble strips on the shoulder of the highway before Simon turned the steering wheel sharply to her right, sending the Mountaineer into a 92-foot clockwise yaw. The Mountaineer eventually began to roll over at a speed close to 58 miles per hour. The vehicle rolled several times, finally coming to a stop on its roof.

As the Mountaineer was rolling, Duck-ett, who was in the backseat, was ejected from the Mountaineer onto the ground. The vehicle rolled over her right leg and her left foot, causing severe injuries. Duckett’s right leg was subsequently amputated above the knee. Duckett argues that she suffered other serious injuries from the accident, including

“a fracture to her left arm which required surgery to stabilize the injury, and now, her left arm hangs uselessly at her side. She broke her left ankle and fractured her cervical spine and her ribs. Her left lung was collapsed. Her skin was ripped off her leg. Between her leg and arm injuries, Ms. Duckett has a 65% impairment to her whole person.
“Ms. Duckett fractured her skull and severely and permanently damaged her brain. She was in a coma for twelve days after the accident. For three to eight months after the incident, she suffered from post-traumatic amnesia. Ms. Duckett sustained permanent cognitive impairment. Both her long and short term memory are severely impaired. Her speech is also impaired.”

Duckett’s brief, at 10-11.

In August 2005, Duckett sued Ford in the Etowah Circuit Court. Pursuant to the doctrine of lex loci delicti, she alleged negligence and strict-liability claims under Georgia law based on an alleged design defect in the Mountaineer.

On the first day of trial, the trial judge stated that “the trial ... could take anywhere from two to four weeks” and that he was “going to go down and talk to the jurors to make sure that we have jurors that can stay that long. And then we’re going to bring ... about thirty-five to forty jurors up here with the understanding that they can stay at least three weeks.” Counsel for Ford objected, arguing:

“I believe we are entitled to a random selection of jurors from the entire veni-re. The idea that we can only strike from persons who have that much free time is, in my opinion, prejudicial to the defendant. We will get people who are unemployed, housewives, and otherwise have more time on their hands than the average juror might, and I don’t think that is fair to the defendant.”

(Emphasis added.) The trial court acknowledged Ford’s objection and stated for the record that “no one on behalf of the plaintiff or defendant has agreed to anything in regard to how this Court is going to strike the jury.... That is the Court.” The following exchange occurred shortly thereafter:

“MR. SCHUCK [counsel for Ford]: Can we come down and just observe the process?
“THE COURT: Yes.
“MR. SCHUCK: ... [I]s there a standard by which the Court is going to apply for people not getting on there?
“In other words, if somebody says well, you know, I’ve got this excuse, are you going to hear any of that or is it strictly a matter of taking volunteers and show of hands?
“THE COURT: Depends if I get enough.
“MR. SCHUCK: Okay.
“THE COURT: And if I don’t get enough, we’ll bring a reporter down there and we’ll start putting stuff on the record about that. It just depends.
“MR. SCHUCK: But if you get enough volunteers, it will just be a volunteer basis?
“THE COURT: Yes. But, certainly, if I only get twenty — We’ve got to have, in my opinion, at least thirty-two. Preferably, I’d like to have forty. But I’ll have to — No. If we get to a situation where we do not have enough, then the Court will put that on the record.”

According to an affidavit from Duckett’s counsel, the trial court then

“addressed the full group of prospective jurors and explained nothing of the details of the case, but only told them that the case could take three or four weeks to try (in fact, this case took longer than four weeks to try to verdict). I do not recall the Court telling the prospective jurors that this was a ‘big case’ or a case ‘bigger’ than most in Etowah County. Nor do I recall the Court using the word ‘volunteers’ when addressing the prospective jurors. The Court asked that jurors who were able to serve on a case that lasted for that period of time raise their hands.
“6. A group of jurors raised their hands and the clerk was charged with taking their names so they could be brought up to the courtroom for further jury selection.
“7. This group of jurors was later brought into the courtroom for further jury selection.
“8. No further questions were asked of this group of potential jurors concerning hardship.
“9. A jury was selected from this group that was brought up into the courtroom.”

The case proceeded to trial. Ford moved the trial court for a judgment as a matter of law at the close of Duckett’s case-in-chief and again at the close of all the evidence. The trial court denied those motions. The jury ultimately returned a verdict in favor of Duckett on her strict-liability claim, finding that Ford had placed the Mountaineer on the market with a defective design. On the other hand, the jury returned a verdict in Ford’s favor on Duckett’s negligence claim, finding that Ford had not been negligent in designing the Mountaineer. The jury awarded Duckett $8.5 million in compensatory damages, including $1,521,410 in economic damages. The remaining damages were awarded for pain and suffering. The trial court entered a judgment consistent with the verdict.

Ford renewed its motion for a judgment as a matter of law and, alternatively, sought a new trial or a remittitur. After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion, and Ford appealed. That appeal was assigned case no. 1090833. Subsequently, the trial court awarded Duckett $54,865.76 in costs. Ford then filed another notice of appeal, and that appeal was assigned case no. 1091043. This Court consolidated the appeals for the purpose of writing one opinion.

Issues

Ford argues, among other things, that it is entitled to a new trial on the ground that the trial court violated the statutory requirement of random jury selection by asking for volunteers to serve on the jury. Because our resolution of this issue is dis-positive, we do not reach the other issues raised by Ford in its appellate brief.

Standard of Review

“With regard to review of a trial court’s ruling on a motion for a new trial, this Court has stated:
“ ‘ “It is well established that a ruling on a motion for a new trial rests within the sound discretion of the trial judge. The exercise of that discretion carries with it a presumption of correctness, which will not be disturbed by this Court unless some legal right is abused and the record plainly and palpably shows the trial judge to be in error.” ’ ”

Cottrell v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 975 So.2d 306, 332 (Ala.2007) (quoting Curtis v. Faulkner Univ., 575 So.2d 1064, 1066 (Ala.1991), quoting in turn Kane v. Edward J. Woerner & Sons, Inc., 543 So.2d 693, 694 (Ala.1989)).

Analysis

Section 12-16-55, Ala.Code 1975, provides, in pertinent part, that “[i]t is the policy of this state that all persons selected for jury service be selected at random from a fair cross section of the population of the area served by the court.” It is undisputed that the original jury pool in this case was randomly selected in accordance "with this statute. However, the trial court reduced the original jury pool by asking for a show of hands of those jurors who could serve on a jury in a case that might last three to four weeks. Ford argues that, “[b]y asking jurors to volunteer for service in this case, the trial court violated the statutory requirement that the jury be selected at random, and improperly introduced a subjective criterion for jury service not authorized by statute.” Ford’s brief, at 28.

There does not appear to be any Alabama caselaw directly on point. However, Ford cites two federal cases that have addressed this issue: United States v. Kennedy, 548 F.2d 608 (5th Cir.1977), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Singleterry, 683 F.2d 122 (5th Cir.1982); and United States v. Brans come, 682 F.2d 484 (4th Cir.1982). In Kennedy, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit addressed whether allowing volunteer jurors to serve on a jury violates the random-selection requirement of the Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-1869 (“the Jury Selection Act”). The procedural history of Kennedy is as follows:

“On June 11, 1975, [Z.T. Kennedy] was brought to trial ... on both the robbery charge involved in this appeal and a charge of making a false statement regarding [his] prior criminal record while purchasing a firearm. On [Kennedy’s] motion the judge granted a mistrial to allow severance of the two counts. Trial on the bank robbery charge commenced ... on July 9, 1975. That trial resulted in the guilty verdict from which this appeal is taken.
“Among the prospective jurors for the second trial were several who had served as jurors at the prior term of the district court, during which [Kennedy’s] abortive first trial had taken place. In order to satisfy a deficiency in the number of July prospects available from the qualified jury wheel, the jury clerk, pursuant to standing authorization from the chief judge of the district, had sought volunteers from the list of persons serving during the June term just completed.
“No one has provided us any indication how the jury clerk selected from the list of names of prospective volunteers. Once she selected a name, however, the jury clerk’s practice was the following, as best discerned from the record: she contacted the former jurors by telephone and asked them if they would perform additional service. She made clear that such service was not mandatory, that she was simply seeking volunteers. She told the volunteers when to report to court; they were not subpoenaed.”

Kennedy, 548 F.2d at 609-10 (footnote omitted).

Three of the volunteers were on the panel from which Kennedy’s jury would be selected. Kennedy’s counsel objected to their presence, arguing that their presence violated the random-selection rule. The district court overruled that objection, stating:

“ ‘The court believes that they were randomly selected by reason of their prior summons for service in June and the court does not believe at this time that the service for an extra period of time by jurors who are willing to do so constitutes a violation of the requirement that jurors are to be randomly selected....’”

Kennedy, 548 F.2d at 610. The three volunteer jurors served on the jury that returned the guilty verdict against Kennedy.

Section 1866(f) of the Jury Selection Act “authorize[s] a court to deal with ... unanticipated shortages of petit jurors drawn from the qualified jury wheel,” Kennedy, 548 F.2d at 611, by selecting individuals “ ‘at random from the voter registration lists, lists of actual voters, or other lists specified in the plan, in a manner ordered by the court consistent with [the Jury Selection Act].”’ Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1866(f)). The Fifth Circuit stated:

“It is on § 1866(f) that the Government must and does rest its argument that the employment of volunteers to meet a shortage was not a violation of the [Jury Selection] Act. Even this argument, however, proves inadequate.
“Even assuming that the list of last month’s jurors was an acceptable list from which to select emergency jurors under § 1866(f), we would still confront the telling contradiction between the use of volunteers and the random selection mandated as explicitly by the emergency provision as by the remainder of the [Jury Selection] Act. Whatever list a court uses as the source of emergency jurors, § 1866(f) requires random selection from that list. It seems self-evident that allowing people to decide whether they wish to perform a particular task is quite the opposite of randomly selecting those who, unless within narrow and objectively determined categories of exemptions and excuses, must perform the task. A volunteer is not a random selec-tee.”

Kennedy, 548 F.2d at 611 (footnotes omitted).

The Fifth Circuit then addressed whether the district court’s failure to comply with the Jury Selection Act was a “ ‘substantial,’ sufficient ground” on which to dismiss the indictment. Kennedy, 548 F.2d at 611. The Fifth Circuit stated:

“Otherwise technical violations of the statute constitute ‘substantial failure to comply1 when they affect the random nature or objectivity of the selection process.
“That the introduction of personal predilections of prospective jurors affects the random nature of the selection process cannot be gainsaid....
“We need not speculate as to what sort of biases will be reflected in a jury chosen on the basis of its members’ willingness to depart from their daily business and serve as jurors. It is enough to recognize that a substantial variable, not contemplated by the [Jury Selection] Act’s few, narrow categories of qualifications, exemptions, and excuses, has confounded the selection process.”

Kennedy, 548 F.2d at 612 (emphasis added). The Fifth Circuit concluded that “[providing prospective jurors with complete discretion whether or not to serve negates the statutory mandate of random selection. The practice of the district court amounted to a ‘substantial failure to comply" with the [Jury Selection] Act.” Kennedy, 548 F.2d at 612.

In Branscome, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit addressed whether allowing volunteers to serve on a grand jury violates the random-selection requirement of the Jury Selection Act. In that case, the district court had dismissed two indictments returned by a grand jury that included individuals who had been asked to “volunteer[ ] to serve on the grand jury from the pool of prospective jurors who had been randomly selected.” Branscome, 682 F.2d at 485. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, stating “that (1) selection of volunteers introduces a subjective criterion for grand jury service not authorized by the [Jury Selection] Act, and (2) the selection of volunteers results in a non-random selection process in violation of the Congressional intent that random selection be preserved throughout the entire selection process.” Id.

We find the rationales in Kennedy and Branscome persuasive in this case. Like the Jury Selection Act, § 12-16-55, Ala.Code 1975, requires the random selection of jurors. Here, the trial court’s request for a show of hands by those members of the jury pool who could sit on a case that might last three or four weeks was, in essence, a request for volunteers. The trial court acknowledged this when Ford’s counsel asked the trial court whether the court was going to hear any excuses from the members of the jury pool or whether it was “strictly a matter of taking volunteers and show of hands.” The trial court responded, “Depends if I get enough.” Ford’s counsel then asked: “But if you get enough volunteers, it will just be a voluntary basis?” The trial court responded, “Yes.”

Also, one of the potential jurors indicated during voir dire that she had understood the trial court’s request for a show of hands to be a request for volunteers to serve on the jury. The potential juror, expressing some reservations about serving on the jury, stated: “Again, I just don’t really feel like that I can do this. And you know, again about the teaching— I really didn’t think that through when I volunteered yesterday.”

As the Fifth Circuit noted in Kennedy, “allowing people to decide whether they wish to perform a particular task is quite the opposite of randomly selecting those who, unless within narrow and objectively determined categories of exemptions and excuses, must perform the task. A volunteer is not a random selectee.” Kennedy, 548 F.2d at 611.

Moreover, as was the case in Kennedy, the manner in which the trial court asked for volunteers introduced into the jury-selection process “a substantial variable, not contemplated by the [Alabama jury statutes’] few, narrow categories of qualifications, exemptions, and excuses.” 548 F.2d at 612. Section 12-16-60(a), Ala. Code 1975, provides the qualifications for jury service:

“(a) A prospective juror is qualified to serve on a jury if the juror is generally reputed to be honest and intelligent and is esteemed in the community for integrity, good character and sound judgment and also:
“(1) Is a citizen of the United States, has been a resident of the country for more than 12 months and is over the age of 19 years;
“(2) Is able to read, speak, understand and follow instructions given by a judge in the English language;
“(3) Is capable by reason of physical and mental ability to render satisfactory jury service, and is not afflicted with any permanent disease or physical weakness whereby the juror is unfit to discharge the duties of a juror;
“(4) Has not lost the right to vote by conviction for any offense involving moral turpitude.”

Section 12 — 16—63(b), Ala.Code 1975, which sets forth the reasons for which a potential juror may be excused from jury service, provides, in pertinent part:

“(b) A person who is not disqualified for jury service may apply to be excused from jury service by the court only upon a showing of undue or extreme physical or financial hardship, a mental or physical condition that incapacitates the person, or public necessity....
“(2) For purposes of this article, undue or extreme physical or financial hardship is limited to any of the following circumstances in which an individual would:
“a. Be required to abandon a person under his or her personal care or supervision due to the impossibility of obtaining an appropriate substitute caregiver during the period of participation in the jury pool or on the jury.
“b. Incur costs that would have a substantial adverse impact on the payment of the individual’s necessary daily living expenses or those for whom he or she provides the principal means of support.
“c. Suffer physical hardship that would result in illness or disease.”

None of these statutory provisions permits juror self-selection based upon the juror’s willingness to serve over an extended period of time. Indeed, only judges and other properly designated court officials have the authority to excuse jurors. See Windsor v. State, 688 So.2d 1021, 1026 (Ala.1994) (noting that § 12-16-145, Ala. Code 1975, “specifically provides that the presiding judge may delegate to other court officials the judge’s authority to excuse jurors”). Therefore, we agree that the use of volunteer jurors “introduces a subjective criterion for ... service not authorized by the [Alabama jury statutes],” Branscome, 682 F.2d at 485, and “introduces a significant element of nonrandomi-zation into the selection process that not only technically violates, but substantially departs from, [§ 12-16-55’s] requirements.” Kennedy, 548 F.2d at 610.

Duckett argues that “[t]he Alabama Code is clear that for Ford to prevail on a claim that the jury venire was not chosen randomly, Ford has the burden of proving fraud in the drawing or summoning of jurors.” Duckett’s brief, at 32. Section 12-16-80, Ala.Code 1975, provides that “[n]o objection can be taken to any venire of jurors except for fraud in drawing or summoning the jurors.” Duckett argues that “[t]here is no proof of fraud in the selection process” in this case and, thus, that Ford cannot object to the composition of the jury. Duckett’s brief, at 37.

This Court has stated:

“The purpose of [§ 12-16-80] is to accomplish the salut[a]ry purpose of preventing the quashing of venires for mere irregularities and to obviate the resulting delays in the administration of justice. The ‘irregularities’ spoken of refer to trivial administrative errors. They do not refer to such radical departures from the statutory scheme as to constitute usurpation of legislative authority.
“The activating word ‘fraud’ as used in the statute, has been construed as encompassing more than criminal wiles; instead, it is a relative term which ‘includes all acts and omissions which involve a breach of legal duty injurious to others.’ Thus, a legal fraud is all that is required by the statute for a venire to be quashed.
“The jury statutes, as to each precise provision, are not themselves mandatory; substantial compliance with them is required.... ”

Kittle v. State, 362 So.2d 1271, 1273-74 (Ala.1978) (citations and footnote omitted).

As noted previously, the trial court’s request for volunteers was a violation of § 12-16-55 that affected Ford’s right to a randomly selected jury. As the Fifth Circuit noted in Kennedy, “[a] departure from the statutory scheme that directly affects the random nature of selection establishes a substantial violation independently of the departure’s consequences in a particular case.” Kennedy, 548 F.2d at 612 (emphasis added). Thus, the trial court’s act was more than a “mere irregularit[y]” or a “trivial administrative error.” Kittle, 362 So.2d at 1273. It was a substantial violation of the random-selection requirement of § 12-16-55, a requirement that the legislature has declared to be “the policy of this state.” Section 12-16-80 does not prevent Ford from insisting upon its right to a randomly selected jury.

For these reasons, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand the case for a new trial. Because we are reversing the trial court’s judgment and remanding for a new trial, we must also reverse its order awarding court costs to Duckett.

1090833 — REVERSED AND REMANDED.

1091043 — REVERSED AND REMANDED.

COBB, C.J., and BOLIN, MURDOCK, and MAIN, JJ., concur.

      . "Yaw” has been defined as "the action of yawing,” i.e., "turn[ing] by angular motion about a vertical axis.” Metriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 1461 (11th ed.2003).

      . There is some dispute as to whether the rollover was triggered by a wheel rim gouging the pavement during the yaw or, instead, was the result of Simon's avoidance maneuvers. This issue is not relevant to our resolution of the appeal, and we need not address this dispute.

      . Under the doctrine of lex loci delicti, a court " ‘determinefs] the substantive rights of an injured party according to the law of the state where the injury occurred.’ ... Although lex loci delicti governs substantive law, lex fori— the law of the forum — governs procedural matters.” Middleton v. Caterpillar Indus., Inc., 979 So.2d 53, 57 (Ala.2007) (quoting Fitts v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 581 So.2d 819, 820 (Ala.1991)). The accident in this case occurred in Georgia. Therefore, Georgia law governs Duckett’s substantive legal rights.

      . Ford also argues (1) that it is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law or, in the alternative, a new trial because, it argues, the jury’s verdict is irreconcilably inconsistent under Georgia law; (2) that it is entitled to a new trial because the trial court exceeded its discretion in allowing allegedly improper evidence; (3) that it is entitled to a new trial or a remittitur of the damages award because, Ford argues, the trial court made the award of damages for pain and suffering dependant upon a finding of willful or wanton misconduct and the jury made no such finding; (4) that it is entitled to a new trial or a remittitur because, it says, the damages award is excessive and was the result of inflammatory arguments by Duckett’s counsel; and (5) that the court costs awarded are excessive.

      . Duckett argues that
      "Ford has failed to meet its burden of proving any element of its claim — that it suffered any prejudice as a result of the jury selection process; that the jury panel was not randomly selected; that there was a systematic exclusion of a specific group of people; or that fraud was somehow involved. Absent any such proof, Ford is left only with its unsupported complaints which, under the law of Alabama, are inadequate to support an order for a new trial.”
      Duckett’s brief, at 31. She cites a few Alabama cases in support of this argument. However, none of the cited cases addresses the issue of volunteer jurors or the random-selection requirement of § 12-16-55. Instead, they set forth the proof required to prevail on a claim alleging that the jury does not represent a fair cross section of the community, as required by § 12-16-55. Ford does not argue that the jury in this case did not represent a fair cross section of the community. Therefore, the cited cases are inap-posite, and Duckett's reliance on them is misplaced.

      . Duckett attempts to distinguish Kennedy and Branscome by arguing that the alleged error in those cases occurred during an earlier stage of the jury-selection process than did the alleged error in this case. However, this is a distinction without a difference. The random-selection requirement of § 12-16-55, Ala.Code 1975, must necessarily apply to all stages of the jury-selection process. A request for volunteers, whether it occurs earlier or later in the process, affects the random nature of the jury. As the Fifth Circuit stated in Kennedy: "Nonrandom selection of a subgroup from a randomly selected group does not make for a randomly selected subgroup. Former purity cannot randomize what has become unrandom.” 548 F.2d at 612.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    WATER WORKS BOARD OF the TOWN OF BEAR CREEK v. TOWN OF BEAR CREEK.
    1091555.
    Supreme Court of Alabama.
    Feb. 11, 2011.
    Rehearing Denied April 8, 2011.

      J. Ken Thompson of Hand Arendall LLC, Birmingham, for appellant.
    Mark E. Hammitte and Scott Hunt of Hammitte & Hunt, LLC, Hamilton, for appellee.
   WOODALL, Justice.

The Water Works Board of the Town of Bear Creek (“the Board”) appeals from a summary judgment for the Town of Bear Creek (“the Town”) declaring the Board to be dissolved and its assets vested in the Town. We affirm.

The operative facts are undisputed. The Board was incorporated on June 28, 1954, pursuant to Act No. 175, Ala. Acts 1951, codified at Ala.Code 1975, § 11-50-310 et seq. The objects of the Board were to “acquire, construct, operate, maintain, improve and extend a water works plant ... and system ... in the Town of Bear Creek.”

Later, in 1970, the Upper Bear Creek Water, Sewer and Fire Protection District (“the District”) was incorporated, pursuant to Ala.Code 1975, § 11-89-1 et seq. The purpose of the incorporation was to provide, among other things, water to areas within the counties of Franklin, Marion, and Winston.

Still later, in 1975, the Board issued a Water Revenue Bond, Series 1975, in the amount of $160,000, payable in annual installments through 2015. On March 20, 1981, the Board issued an additional Water Revenue Bond, Series 1981, in the amount of $141,000, payable in annual installments through 2019. The Board paid all its outstanding bonded indebtedness on the Series 1975 and the Series 1981 bonds in full on, or about, November 26, 2004. Subsequently, the Board issued no more bonds.

Meanwhile, in 2002, the District entered into “water-purchase agreements” with three entities operating water-distribution systems within the District’s service area, namely, the Board, the Water Works and Sewer Board of the Town of Phil Campbell, and the Water Works and Sewer Board of the City of Haleyville (hereinafter collectively referred to as “the purchasers”). Concomitantly with the agreements, the District issued its Water Revenue Bonds, Series 2002, in a principal amount exceeding $7,000,000.

The water-purchase agreement between the Board and the District provided, in pertinent part:

“The District and the [Board] are entering into this Agreement ... in order to make provision for the payment of debt service on the Series 2002 Bonds and to make other revisions to the terms under which the District sells water to the [Board], The District has represented to the [Board] that the District will, contemporaneously with the execution and delivery of this Agreement, enter into wholesale water contracts with the other Purchasers providing for the sale of water to such customers at rates identical to those established in this Agreement.
“NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the premises and the mutual covenants herein contained, it is hereby agreed as follows:
“Section 1. Supply of Water. The District agrees to sell and supply to the [Board], and the [Board] agrees to take and purchase from the District, such quantity of water as the [Board] may require for resale through the [Board’s] System to customers of the [Board], provided that the District shall not be obligated to supply water to the [Board] in a greater quantity than 1,252,200 gallons per month (the ‘Maximum Water Quantity’). The [Board] will not purchase water from any other source unless its requirements for water exceed the Maximum Water Quantity, and at the time the [Board] shall be purchasing from the District the Maximum Water Quantity and the District shall have refused, after six months’ written notice, the [Board’s] written request for additional water above the Maximum Water Quantity.”

(Emphasis added.)

On November 19, 2009, the Town filed a complaint for a declaratory judgment, seeking a determination that “title to the Board [had] vested in the Town on or about November 26, 2004,” pursuant to Ala.Code 1975, § ll-50-316(b), that is, upon the retirement of the Board’s Series 1975 and Series 1981 bonds. Section 11-50-316(b) provides, in pertinent part:

“When the principal of and the interest on all bonds of such corporation payable from the revenues of any system owned by such corporation shall have been paid in full, then title to such system from the revenue of which the bonds are payable shall thereupon immediately vest in the municipality which authorized the incorporation of such corporation, and such system shall become the property of such municipality, except as otherwise provided in Section 11-50-820. When title to all property owned by any corporation organized or the certifícate of incorporation of which is amended under this article shall have vested in the appropriate municipality which shall be entitled thereto under this section ..., then such corporation shall thereupon stand dissolved; provided, that, if at any time any such corporation does not have any bonds outstanding (regardless of whether it has ever issued any bonds), its board of directors may adopt a resolution, which shall be duly entered on its minutes, declaring that such corporation shall be dissolved; and, upon the filing for record of a certified copy of such resolution in the office of the judge of probate of the county wherein the certificate of incorporation of such corporation was filed, such corporation shall stand dissolved, whereupon title to any property and assets then owned by such corporation shall, except as otherwise provided in Section 11-50-320, vest in the municipality which authorized the incorporation of such corporation.”

(Emphasis added.)

On August 11, 2010, the trial court entered a judgment containing the following conclusions of law:

“1. That pursuant to [§ ll-50-316(b) ], all assets of the [Board], including distribution lines, water tanks, rights of way, equipment,, bank accounts, water revenues, and every kind of asset, real or personal, became the property of the [Town,] and the [Board] stood dissolved with no further authority on November 26, 2004, when the bond indebtedness was retired.
“2. That since that time, the [Board] has not existed as a corporation or any legal entity and the [Board] and its employees only acted as individuals or as agents, servants and employees of the [Town] in conducting the operations of the ... water system.”

The trial court held that the Town had “the authority to take immediate control of all the assets of the water system.” From that judgment, the Board has appealed.

On appeal, the Board concedes that, “strictly speaking,” it “has not issued any bonds since 2004,” when it paid its bonded indebtedness in full. Board’s brief, at 8 (emphasis added). However, it contends that, under its water-purchase agreement with the District, it is “obligated for [the] bonded indebtedness of [the District],” which makes it “tantamount” to a “bonded indebtedness” of the Board itself. Board’s reply brief, at 5. It insists that the trial court improperly “dissolve[d] the Board in light of the Board’s continuing legal and contractual indebtedness that was incurred for the benefit of the Town and the surrounding communities,” Board’s brief, at 6 (emphasis added), and that its dissolution “could only be based on an absurdly literal construction of the statutory language.” Board’s reply brief, at 4 (emphasis added). According to the Board, this construction fails to recognize that “sophisticated financial arrangements,” such as the agreements between the District and the purchasers, which allow “neighboring water boards ... [to] partner together,” are necessitated by “today’s world of decreasing natural resources.” Board’s brief, at 23.

The Town replies that the water-purchase agreement between the Board and the District is not analogous — or tantamount — to bonded indebtedness and that the judiciary is required to apply § 11-50-316(b) in accord with its plain meaning. We agree.

Although the water-purchase agreement recited that its purpose was to facilitate the District’s payment of its own bond issue, it merely required the Board to buy each month “such quantity of water” as it needed “for resale through [its] System to [its] customers.” There was no minimum purchase requirement. It was in the nature of a standard “requirements contract” in which “the buyer expressly agrees to buy all of his requirements of a stated item from the seller,” John D. Calamari & Joseph M. Perillo, The Law of Contracts § 4-13, at 239 (3d ed.1987), rather than an issuance of a bond. In deed, requirements contracts have, in the past, encountered judicial disfavor on the theory that they were “illusory,” that is, that “the buyer might refrain from having requirements.” Id. at 240 (emphasis added). The water-purchase agreement between the Board and the District was clearly not tantamount to bonded indebtedness.

“In determining the meaning of a statute, this Court looks to the plain meaning of the words as written by the legislature. As we have said:
“1 “Words used in a statute must be given their natural, plain, ordinary, and commonly understood meaning, and where plain language is used a court is bound to interpret that language to mean exactly what it says. If the language of the statute is unambiguous, then there is no room for judicial construction and the clearly expressed intent of the legislature must be given effect.” ’
“Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Nielsen, 714 So.2d 293, 296 (Ala.1998) (quoting IMED Corp. v. Systems Eng’g Assocs. Corp., 602 So.2d 344, 346 (Ala.1992)); see also Tuscaloosa County Comm’n v. Deputy Sheriffs’ Ass’n, 589 So.2d 687, 689 (Ala.1991); Coastal States Gas Transmission Co. v. Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 524 So.2d 357, 360 (Ala.1988); Alabama Farm Bureau Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. City of Hartselle, 460 So.2d 1219, 1223 (Ala.1984); Dumas Bros. Mfg. Co. v. Southern Guar. Ins. Co., 431 So.2d 534, 536 (Ala.1983); Town of Loxley v. Rosinton Water, Sewer, & Fire Protection Auth, Inc., 376 So.2d 705, 708 (Ala.1979). It is true that when looking at a statute we might sometimes think that the ramifications of the words are inefficient or unusual. However, it is our job to say what the law is, not to say what it should be.... To apply a different policy would turn this Court into a legislative body, and doing that, of course, would be utterly inconsistent with the doctrine of separation of powers.”

DeKalb County LP Gas Co. v. Suburban Gas, Inc., 729 So.2d 270, 275-76 (Ala.1998).

The meaning of § ll-50-316(b) is clear and unambiguous: “When the principal of and the interest on all bonds of such corporation payable from the revenues of any system owned by such corporation shall have been paid in full, then title to such system ... shall thereupon immediately vest in the municipality which authorized the incorporation of such corporation,” and “such corporation shall thereupon stand dissolved,” or, failing the issuance of any bonds, it may be dissolved by a resolution of its board of directors. (Emphasis added.) In other words, where a public corporation organized for the purpose of operating a water system has issued bonds, that corporation is dissolved by operation of law upon the retirement of the bonds. It is the existence of an issuing corporation’s own bonded indebtedness, not the amorphous obligations of those with whom the corporation has 0⅛ er contractual relationships, that holds in abeyance the dissolution trigger of the statute. Although the Board essentially concedes that the trial court’s judgment is in accord with the plain language of the statute, it invites us to expand the scope of the statute by judicial construction. This we may not do.

“[Cjourts may not ‘amend statutes so as to make them express what [the courts] conceive the legislature would have done or should have done.’ ... Neither is it the role of the courts to ‘usurp the role of the legislature and correct defective legislation or amend statutes under the guise of [judicial] construction.’ ”

Siegelman v. Chase Manhattan Bank (USA), Nat’l Ass’n, 575 So.2d 1041, 1046 (Ala.1991) (quoting Town of Loxley v. Rosinton Water, Sewer & Fire Prot. Auth., Inc., 376 So.2d 705, 708 (Ala.1979)). It may be, as the Board asserts, that the result in this case fails to accommodate the “sophisticated financial arrangements” that “today’s world of decreasing natural resources” requires. If that is so, however, the remedy must come from the legislature, not from this Court by way of judicial fiat.

In short, the trial court did not err in holding that the Town had “the authority to take immediate control of all the assets of the water system.” Its judgment is, therefore, affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

COBB, C.J., and BOLIN, MURDOCK, and MAIN, JJ., concur.


author: COBB, Chief Justice.

text:
    Rose INGRAM v. Edwin M. VAN DALL.
    1091563.
    Supreme Court of Alabama.
    April 8, 2011.

      Adedapo T. Agboola and Anthony Ifedi-ba of the Ifediba Law Group, Birmingham, for appellant.
    Edwin M. Van Dali, Pell City, for appel-lee.
   COBB, Chief Justice.

This is an appeal from an April 12, 2010, order of the St. Clair Circuit Court holding that letters of administration issued to Edwin M. Van Dali by the St. Clair County probate court were valid, holding that letters of administration issued to Rose Ingram by the Jefferson County probate court were invalid, and holding that the St. Clair Circuit Court has jurisdiction over this action. Because we conclude that the St. Clair Circuit Court does not have jurisdiction, we vacate the April 12, 2010, order of the St. Clair Circuit Court, dismiss the action without prejudice, and dismiss the appeal.

Facts and Procedural History

On August 20, 2009, Jackie Ingram, a resident of Jefferson County, died in a three-car automobile accident on Interstate 59 in St. Clair County. James Mark Kesler, the driver of one of the other two vehicles involved in the accident, also died in the accident. Norma Hazelwood, the driver of the remaining vehicle, was injured as a result of the accident.

For 29 years before his death in August 2009, Jackie Ingram lived in Jefferson County with his wife, Rose Ingram. At the time of his death, Jackie Ingram was employed and worked in Jefferson County and Jackie Ingram’s property and other assets were located exclusively in Jefferson County. Jackie Ingram’s only known connection to St. Clair County is that that is where the accident in which he lost his life occurred.

On October 8, 2009, Rose Ingram filed a petition in the probate court of Jefferson County seeking to be appointed administrator ad litem of Jackie Ingram’s estate. On the same day, the Jefferson County probate court granted Rose Ingram’s petition.

At some point during the fall of 2009, Hazelwood retained an attorney and obtained a settlement of claims she asserted against Kesler’s estate arising out of the August 20, 2009, automobile accident. According to Van Dali, Hazelwood also “attempted] to pursue claims against [Jackie] Ingram,” Van Dali’s brief, at 5, “and requested information concerning any liability insurance or an estate but received no co-operation.” Van Dali’s brief, at 1. According to Van Dali, Hazelwood’s attorney then “contacted an attorney who handles estates in St. Clair County,” Van Dali’s brief, at 6, and, on November 10, 2009, Van Dali, an attorney, filed for and received general letters of administration for the estate of Jackie Ingram in the probate court of St. Clair County. See also Van Dali’s brief, at 10 (“[N]either Rose Ingram ... nor her attorney co-operated with Ms. Hazelwood’s attorney to allow a claim to be made against Jackie Ingram. As a result Van Dali then moved to open a general administration in St. Clair County.”). Van Dali is neither a creditor nor an heir of Jackie Ingram’s; his only connection to Ingram’s estate is by virtue of the letters of administration issued to him by the St. Clair County probate court. Rose Ingram did not at any time request Van Dali’s assistance in the matter of Jackie Ingram’s estate, and Van Dali did not contact Rose Ingram or the heirs of Jackie Ingram at any time before obtaining general letters of administration for Ingram’s estate in St. Clair County.

In November 2009, Van Dali engaged the services of Erskine R. Funderburg to defend Jackie Ingram’s estate against the claims Hazelwood was asserting against the estate (which claims had not yet been filed) and to pursue claims against Hazel-wood on behalf of the estate. By letter dated November 11, 2009, Funderburg wrote Kesler’s insurer stating that he had been retained by Jackie Ingram’s estate to pursue a wrongful-death claim against Kesler’s estate and demanding “one million dollars or the policy limits” to settle the wrongful-death claim. In the same letter, Funderburg indicated that he was also making a claim for underinsured-mo-torist benefits with Jackie Ingram’s automobile-insurance carrier.

Subsequently, on November 17, 2009, Funderburg wrote the following letter to Rose Ingram:

“My name is Erskine Funderburg, an attorney in St. Clair County. Last week I was hired by another attorney in St. Clair County who was granted Letters of Administration in the Estate of Jackie Ingram. Soon after being hired I contacted the liability insurance carrier of Mr. [Kesler] who caused the accident on August 20, 2009. The carrier indicated that they were ready to settle Mr. Ingram’s claim but had received notice where you had been appointed Administrator ad Litem of the Estate of Jackie Ingram.
“A day or two later I also received a claim by a Ms. Hazelwood against the Estate of Jackie Ingram. Ms. Hazel-wood was in a third vehicle involved in the accident.
“Now as it stands, I believe everyone is unsure of how to proceed. The following is what I consider to be the status of the situation:
“1. Mr. [Kesler’s] liability carrier is ready to pay the Estate of Jackie Ingram the full limits of liability which I believe is $100,000.00. This amount would be reduced by any applicable attorney fees due.
“2. A claim has been filed[] against the Estate of Jackie Ingram which must be defended. If Mr. Ingram or the car in which he was driving had any liability insurance the carrier should be immediately notified. The money received in number one above is not subject to this claim.
“3. A general estate has been opened in St. Clam County, the Letters of Administration, and a special estate called an administrator ad litem has been opened in Jefferson County [sic]. It is not clear as to which if either has priority over the estate of Mr. Ingram.
“For your assistance I have enclosed copies of what I have relative to the information above. If you have been using an attorney relative to Mr. Ingram’s estate you may wish to contact him as soon as possible about the contents of this letter. I would think you would be ready to resolve both Mr. Ingram’s claims against Mr. [Kesler] and the claims by Ms. Hazelwood against Mr. Ingram. If you do not wish to continue with your previous attorney you may wish to contact Ted Van [Dali] who was appointed to represent the Estate of Jackie Ingram in St. Clair County.... Hopefully steps can be taken this week to resolve these issues.”

On December 3, 2009, Hazelwood filed a complaint in the St. Clair Circuit Court, asserting claims against the estate of Jackie Ingram, and she served the complaint on Van Dali. In her complaint, Hazelwood alleged that she was injured as a result of Jackie Ingram’s negligent operation of his automobile.

Also on December 3, 2009, Rose Ingram filed a motion in the St. Clair County probate court requesting that Van Dali’s letters of administration be revoked. On December 21, 2009, Van Dali filed a petition to remove the St. Clair County probate court action concerning the administration of Jackie Ingram’s estate to the St. Clair Circuit Court. On December 22, 2009, Van Dali’s petition was granted. In December 2009, Van Dali also sought and obtained removal of the action in Jefferson County pertaining to Rose Ingram’s appointment as administrator ad litem from the probate court to the circuit court in that county.

On January 13, 2010, Van Dali filed a motion in the Jefferson Circuit Court seeking to revoke Rose Ingram’s appointment as administrator ad litem for Jackie Ingram’s estate. In his brief filed in this Court, Van Dali states that the Jefferson Circuit Court has issued no ruling on that motion.

On January 27, 2010, Rose Ingram petitioned the probate court of Jefferson County for and was granted letters of general administration for Jackie Ingram’s estate. On February 4, 2010, Rose Ingram filed in the St. Clair Circuit Court a renewed motion to revoke Van Dali’s letters of administration issued by the St. Clair County probate court. On April 12, 2010, the St. Clair Circuit Court denied Rose Ingram’s motion to revoke Van Dali’s letters of general administration.

On May 11, 2010, Rose Ingram filed a Rule 59(e), Ala. R. Civ. P., motion in the St. Clair Circuit Court, requesting that that court alter, amend, or vacate its order denying her motion to revoke Van Dali’s letters of general administration. On July 8, 2010, the St. Clair Circuit Court denied Rose Ingram’s Rule 59(e) motion.

On August 18, 2010, Rose Ingram filed in this Court a petition for a writ of mandamus challenging the St. Clair Circuit Court’s denial of her motion to revoke Van Dali’s letters of general administration. On September 13, 2010, this Court entered an order stating that the petition for the writ of mandamus was filed from an order appealable under Rule 4(a)(1), Ala. R.App. P., see Ala.Code 1975, § 12-22-21(2), and that the petition would therefore be treated as a timely filed notice of appeal.

Analysis

Rose Ingram argues that the St. Clair County probate court lacked jurisdiction over Van Dali’s petition for letters of general administration for Jackie Ingram’s estate because, at the time of his death, Jackie Ingram was a resident of Jefferson County and had no assets in St. Clair County. See Meriwether v. Reynolds, 289 Ala. 361, 364, 267 So.2d 434, 436-37 (1972) (holding _ that, when letters of administration are granted even though “the material fact of inhabitancy does not exist,” the probate court’s subject-matter jurisdiction may be directly attacked and the letters of administration revoked). Rose Ingram further argues that because the St. Clair County probate court lacked jurisdiction, the St. Clair Circuit Court, to which the administration of Jackie Ingram’s estate was removed, likewise lacked jurisdiction. We note that,

“ ‘[o]n questions of subject-matter jurisdiction, this Court is not limited by the parties’ arguments or by the legal conclusions of the trial ... eourt[ ] regarding the existence of jurisdiction.’ Exparte Alabama Dep’t of Human Res., 999 So.2d [891] at 894-95 [ (Ala.2008) ] (citing Ex parte Smith, 438 So.2d 766, 768 (Ala.1983)). ‘A court is obligated to vigilantly protect against deciding cases over which it has no jurisdiction because “[i]t would amount to usurpation and oppression for a court to interfere in a matter over which it has no jurisdiction, and its pronouncements in respect thereto would, be without force, and its decrees and judgments would be wholly void. This is a universal principle, as old as the law itself.” ’ Crutcher v. Williams, 12 So.3d 631, 635 (Ala.2008) (quoting Wilkinson v. Henry, 221 Ala. 254, 256, 128 So. 362, 364 (1930)).”

Ex parte Synovus Trust Co., 41 So.3d 70, 73-74 (Ala.2009).

Jackie Ingram died intestate. Alabama Code 1975, § 43-2^0, provides:

“Courts of probate, within their respective counties, have authority to grant letters of administration on the estates of persons dying intestate, as follows:
“(1) Where the intestate, at the time of his death, was an inhabitant of the county.
“(2) Where the intestate, not being an inhabitant of the state, dies in the county, leaving assets therein.
“(3) Where the intestate, not being an inhabitant of the state, dies out of the county, leaving assets therein.
“(4) Where the intestate, not being an inhabitant of the state, dies, leaving no assets therein, and assets are afterwards brought into the county.
“(5) Where the intestate, being an inhabitant of the state, dies, leaving no assets subject to administration in the county of his residence, and no administration has been granted in such county within three months after the death of the intestate, then administration may be granted in any county where the intestate leaves assets.”

When a court construes a statute, “‘[wjords used in [the] statute must be given their natural, plain, ordinary, and commonly understood meaning, and where plain language is used a court is bound to interpret that language to mean exactly what it says.”’ Ex parte Berryhill, 801 So.2d 7, 10 (Ala.2001) (quoting IMED Corp. v. Systems Eng’g Assocs. Corp., 602 So.2d 344, 346 (Ala.1992)). Further, “[a] court is bound to interpret [the plain language of a statute] to mean exactly what it says. If the language of the statute is unambiguous, then there is no room for judicial construction and the clearly expressed intent of the legislature must be given effect.” IMED, 602 So.2d at 346. See also Ex parte Children’s Hosp. of Ala bama, 721 So.2d 184, 191 (Ala.1998) (holding that, in construing the language of a statute, a court will presume that every word, sentence, or provision of a statute has meaning and effect).

The St. Clair County probate court did not have the authority to grant Van Dali letters of administration for Jackie Ingram’s estate under any of the subsections of § 43-2-40. Subsection (1) provides that the probate court has the authority to issue letters of administration as to a decedent who resides in the county. Jackie Ingram clearly was not a resident of St. Clair County at the time of his death; therefore, the St. Clair County probate court does not derive the authority to issue letters of administration for Jackie Ingram’s estate from § 43-2-40(1).

Subsections (2), (3), and (4) of § 43-2-40 address the issuance of letters of administration when the decedent is “not ... an inhabitant of the state.” Ala.Code 1975, § 43-2-40(2)-(4). At the time of his death, Jackie Ingram was a resident of Alabama; accordingly, the St. Clair County probate court does not derive the authority to issue letters of administration from § 43-2-40(2), (3), or (4), which are clearly inapplicable.

Van Dali argues that the St. Clair County probate court derived its authority to issue letters of administration for Jackie Ingram’s estate from subsection (5) of § 43-2-410 because, according to Van Dali, Jackie Ingram left one asset in St. Clair County. Specifically, in his brief to this Court, Van Dali argues:

“What asset did [Jackie] Ingram leave in St. Clair County one may ask. Alabama Code 1975[,] § 6-3-2[ (b) ](4)[,] deals with proceedings against individuals and states: ‘In the case of non-residents, actions must be commenced in the County where the subject of the action or any portion of the same was when the claim arose or the act on which the action is founded was to be performed.’ In the present case, this is clearly St. Clair [Cjounty. Ingram was killed by acts of [Kesler] a non resident [sic] in St. Clair [Cjounty.
“IV. WRONGFUL DEATH ASSET OF ESTATE
“ ‘A cause of action for wrongful death which a personal representative is charged with enforcing is an asset requiring appointment of an Executor or Administrator of the person killed. Whether the proceeds of such an action go to particular person or persons is not material.’ [31] Am.Jur. 2nd. [Executors and Administrators ] Section 108[,] Claim or right of action-wrongful death claim.
“Considering this principal [sic] of law, [Van Dali] respectfully disagrees with [Rose Ingram’s] contention that the Decedent’s estate herein did not possess any assets in St. Clair [Cjounty and submits that it is flatly, incorrect. While it is correct that by statute, the proceeds of a wrongful death case in Alabama are not subject to the debts of the estate, it is clearly an asset thereof requiring distribution through an administrator. Ala.Code 1975, § 6-5-410(e).”

Van Dali’s brief, at 19-20 (emphasis omitted).

We need not address the merits of Van Dali’s contention that a wrongful-death cause of action is an asset Jackie Ingram “left” in St. Clair County for purposes of § 43-2-40(5). Pursuant to § 43-2-40(5), “administration may be granted in any county where the intestate leaves assets” only when “the intestate ... dies, leaving no assets subject to administration in the county of his residence.” According to the undisputed evidence, at the time of Jackie Ingram’s death, he indeed had assets, and those assets were located in Jefferson County, where he resided. Therefore, the St. Clair County probate court does not derive the authority to issue letters of administration from subsection (5) of § 43-2-40.

Accordingly, the St. Clair County probate court did not have jurisdiction to issue letters of administration to Van Dali. See Meriwether, 289 Ala. at 364, 267 So.2d at 436-37 (holding that a probate court’s subject-matter jurisdiction may be directly attacked when the probate court is not authorized to issue letters of administration because of the residency of the deceased). Because the St. Clair County probate court lacked jurisdiction to issue the letters of administration, the St. Clair Circuit Court, to which the administration of Jackie Ingram’s estate was removed, never acquired subject-matter jurisdiction, and any orders issued by it are void. Therefore, the April 12, 2010, order of the St. Clair Circuit Court appealed from, which denied Rose Ingram’s motion to revoke the letters of administration issued to Van Dali by the St. Clair County probate court, is due to be vacated and this case due to be dismissed, without prejudice, for lack of jurisdiction. Ex parte Alabama Dep’t of Human Res., 999 So.2d 891, 898 (Ala.2008) (“Our remedy ... when we find no subject-matter jurisdiction in the trial eourt[ ] is to dismiss the appeal and vacate the trial court’s judgment.”). Because the order appealed from is void, we also dismiss the appeal.

ORDER VACATED; CASE DISMISSED; APPEAL DISMISSED.

STUART, PARKER, SHAW, and WISE, JJ., concur.

      . Throughout the record, the appellee’s name is alternately spelled "Van Dali,” "Vandall,” and "VanDall.” He is also sometimes referred to as "Edward” and "Ted.” In this opinion, we have chosen to use the spelling most often used by Van Dali himself, which is also the spelling reflected in the records of the Alabama State Bar.

      . Throughout the record, this person’s name is spelled various ways, including "Kesler”, "Kessler,” and "Keesler.” It is not clear from the record which spelling is correct.

      . Van Dali "asserts a dispute” as to whether Rose Ingram is in fact the widow of Jackie Ingram. In support of his assertion that a factual dispute as to this matter exists, Van Dali argues that “no date of marriage nor marriage certificate has been presented.” Van Dali’s brief, at 9. Despite the fact that the record does not reflect the date of the marriage and does not contain a marriage certificate, the record is replete with evidence indicating that Jackie and Rose Ingram were married to each other for at least 29 years until Jackie Ingram’s death. The record contains no evidence that contradicts the existence of the Ingrams’ marriage. Therefore, Van Dali’s "assertion of] a dispute” regarding the matter is unsubstantiated, and the existence of the Ingrams’ marriage is an undisputed fact in this case. Cf. Donald v. City Nat’l Bank of Dothan, 295 Ala. 320, 323, 329 So.2d 92, 94 (1976) ("[T]he failure of the party opposing the [summary-judgment] motion to offer any affidavits or other testimony to contradict the evidence presented by the movant ... leaves the court no alternative but to consider that evidence uncontraverted.”).

      . Hazelwood did not initiate her action against Jackie Ingram’s estate until December 3, 2009.

      . When Funderburg wrote this letter, Hazel-wood’s complaint had not yet been filed. See supra note 4.


author: SHAW, Justice.

text:
    Ex parte JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., J.P. Morgan Securities, Inc., and Charles E. LeCroy. (In re Jefferson County, Alabama v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., et al.). Ex parte Douglas W. MacFaddin. (In re Jefferson County, Alabama v. J.P. Morgan Securities, Inc., et al.).
    1091224 and 1091288.
    Supreme Court of Alabama.
    April 15, 2011.
    Don B. Long, Jr., Clark R. Hammond, Alan D. Mathis, and Joseph W. Carlisle of Johnston Barton Proctor & Rose, LLP, Birmingham; and Thomas C. Rice, Mary Beth Forshaw, and Ian R. Dattner of Simpson, Thacher & Bartlette LLP, New York, New York, for petitioners J.P. Morgan Securities, Inc., and JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.
    William N. Clark of Redden, Mills & Clark, LLP, Birmingham; and Lisa A. Mathewson, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, for petitioner Charles E. LeCroy.
    Joseph B. Mays, Jr., Dylan C. Black, and J. Thomas Richie of Bradley Arant Boult Cummings, LLP, Birmingham, for respondent.
    W. Percy Badham III of Badham & Buck, LLC, Birmingham; and Richard F. Lawler of Winston & Strawn, LLP, New York, New York, for petitioner, Douglas W. MacFaddin.

       Retired Associate Justices Hugh Maddox and Patricia Smith were appointed on March 31, 2011, to be Special Justices in regard to these petitions.

   SHAW, Justice.

This case involves a legal action by Jefferson County (“the County”) against several defendants seeking damages stemming from financial transactions involving the County’s sewer system. J.P. Morgan Securities, Inc. (“J.P. Morgan”), JPMor-gan Chase Bank, N.A. (“JPMorgan Chase”), Charles E. LeCroy, and Douglas W. MacFaddin (hereinafter referred to collectively as “the petitioners”), all defendants below, petition this Court for writs of mandamus directing the trial court to dismiss this action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. We deny the petitions.

Facts and Procedural History

The underlying facts of this case involve numerous complex financial transactions, the details of which are not necessary for an understanding of the issues presented in these petitions. Briefly stated, according to the complaint, in 1996 the County, as a result of unrelated litigation, was required to make certain improvements to the County’s sewer system. From 1997 until October 2002, the County issued several series of revenue warrants to raise the funds necessary for the improvements. The vast majority of those warrants carried fixed interest rates.

In late 2002 and in 2003, the County engaged in several transactions to convert the fixed-rate warrants into warrants with either variable interest rates or rates set by an auction process. J.P. Morgan was the “lead underwriter” for the majority of the refinanced warrants. In connection with these transactions, the County also engaged in numerous interest-rate-swap transactions with JPMorgan Chase. The complaint contends that the then president of the county commission, Larry Langford, insisted that the County employ Blount Parrish & Company (“Blount Parrish”), an underwriting firm, in these transactions.

According to the complaint, the effect of these transactions was to transform the County’s debt issued to fund the sewer-system improvements from the fixed-rate debt to a more risky debt that was more subject to acceleration and that carried higher interest rates. Additionally, the County paid large fees to J.P. Morgan, JPMorgan Chase, and Blount Parrish to underwrite the transactions. Those fees were “artificially inflated,” the complaint alleged, in part because of various “bribes, kickbacks, and pay-offs.” The County also asserts that J.P. Morgan paid fees to Blount Parrish although Blount Parrish performed little work on the transactions and that Blount Parrish, through its owner William B. Blount and its agent or employee Albert W. LaPierre, essentially bribed Langford to have the County employ Blount Parrish, J.P. Morgan, JPMorgan Chase, and others in the transactions.

In November 2009, the County filed an action against J.P. Morgan, JPMorgan Chase, Blount Parrish, Blount, LaPierre, and Langford, as well as LeCroy and MacFaddin, two former employees of J.P. Morgan. The complaint sought damages against the defendants based on theories of fraud, suppression, conspiracy, and unjust enrichment. The petitioners filed motions to dismiss the case. Those motions, which were supported by evidentiary exhibits, alleged that the County lacked standing as a plaintiff by virtue of Ala. Code 1975, § 6-5-4. After a hearing, the trial court denied the motions.

In case no. 1091224, J.P. Morgan, JPMorgan Chase, and LeCroy petition this Court for mandamus review of the trial court’s order denying their motion to dismiss; in case no. 1091288, MacFaddin similarly petitions for review. This Court ordered answers and briefs and consolidated the petitions for the purpose of writing one opinion.

Standard of Review

“A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy, and is appropriate when the petitioner can show (1) a clear legal right to the order sought; (2) an imperative duty upon the respondent to perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so; (3) the lack of another adequate remedy; and (4) the properly invoked jurisdiction of the court. Ex parte In-verness Constr. Co., 775 So.2d 153, 156 (Ala.2000).”

Ex parte BOC Group, Inc., 823 So.2d 1270, 1272 (Ala.2001).

Discussion

Alabama law provides that every county has the “power to sue or be sued in any court of record.” Ala.Code 1975, § 11-1-2. The petitioners contend, however, that Ala.Code 1975, § 6-5-4, grants the governor the sole authority to maintain an action like the underlying action and that the County has no standing to pursue the action. Section § 6-5-4(a) states:

“The Governor may cause actions to be commenced for the recovery of any pub-lie moneys, funds or property of the state or of any county which have been lost by the neglect or default of any public officer, which have been wrongfully expended or disbursed by such officer, which have been wrongfully used by such officer or which have been wrongfully received from him.”

In determining the meaning of a statute, this Court looks to the plain meaning of the text:

“ ‘ “Words used in a statute must be given their natural, plain, ordinary, and commonly understood meaning, and where plain language is used a court is bound to interpret that language to mean exactly what it says. If the language of the statute is unambiguous, then there is no room for judicial construction and the clearly expressed intent of the legislature must be given effect.” ’
“Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Nielsen, 714 So.2d 293, 296 (Ala.1998) (quoting IMED Corp. v. Systems Eng’g Assocs. Corp., 602 So.2d 344, 346 (Ala.1992))....”

DeKalb County LP Gas Co. v. Suburban Gas, Inc., 729 So.2d 270, 275-76 (Ala.1998).

The unambiguous text of § 6-5-4(a), specifically, the word “may,” indicates that it was the intent of the legislature to confer on the governor the nonexclusive authority to commence an action to recover, among other things, funds wrongfully expended by public officials. Nothing in § 6-5-4 indicates that the governor has the sole power, exclusive of the County and despite § 11-1-2, to file an action to recover such funds. However, the petitioners contend that this Court, in Walker County v. White, 248 Ala. 58, 26 So.2d 253 (1946), has construed the predecessor statute to § 6-5-4 in such manner.

In Walker County, the attorney general, in the name of the State and “for the use and benefit of’ Walker County, filed a suit pursuant to Title 7, § 73, Code of Alabama 1940, the predecessor to § 6-5-4(a), and Title 55, § 169, Code of Alabama 1940, seeking to recover certain funds illegally expended by a former Walker County official. This Court noted that the predecessors to those two sections of the 1940 Code had previously been harmonized in Montgomery v. Sparks, 225 Ala. 343, 142 So. 769 (1932), and noted that the statutes allowed both the governor and the attorney general “to cause suit to be instituted for recovery of county funds wrongfully disbursed.” 248 Ala. at 54, 26 So.2d at 255.

Walker County petitioned for permission to intervene in the matter, to which the State demurred. The trial court sustained the demurrer and dismissed Walker County’s petition. Walker County then appealed. On appeal, this Court noted that, at one time, “the state could not sue to recover funds of the county illegally disbursed, because there was no statute corresponding with” Title 7, § 73, and that previous versions of Title 55, § 169, allowed “the solicitor,” but not the attorney general, to institute such suits. 248 Ala. at 54, 26 So.2d at 255. Those Code sections, the Court held, were

“intended to confer authority on the governor and on the attorney general to cause actions to be instituted in the name of the state or county as the case might be, to recover funds illegally withdrawn, so that such suits might not be prevented or handicapped by local influence or embarrassment. In other words, the foregoing statutes provide a plan for central law enforcement, removed as much as possible from local feeling and interference.”

Id. This Court further noted that the “intention of the Legislature” in enacting those Code sections was “to place suits of this character solely in the hands of the central authorities.” 248 Ala. at 55, 26 So.2d at 255.

The petitioners contend that this Court in Walker County construed the predecessor to § 6-5-4(a) to give the governor the sole power under that Code section to file an action to recover public funds lost by the neglect or default of, or wrongful expenditure by, a public officer; thus, they maintain, the County lacks “standing” to pursue the instant action. However, the petitioners read too much into this Court’s decision in Walker County. This Court’s opinion in that case does not state that counties lack standing to file actions to recover funds lost because of the wrongdoing of county officials.

Instead, the Walker County Court noted only that, although the State once did not have the ability to file an action “to recover funds of the county illegally disbursed,” after the enactment of a predecessor to § 6-5-4(a), the governor (as well as the attorney general under Title 55, § 169) was authorized to file such an action. Caselaw predating Walker County, we note, acknowledged that counties had filed such actions. See, e.g., Covington County v. O’Neal, 239 Ala. 322, 195 So. 234 (1939) (in which a county sued the surety of a former county treasurer to recover money lost to the county by the alleged devastavit of the treasurer), and Mobile County v. Williams, 180 Ala. 639, 649, 61 So. 963, 967 (1913) (holding that “when a public officer collects money from a county, as fees or compensation for services rendered by him, and to which fees or compensation he is not legally entitled, such county can maintain a suit for the recovery of the money so illegally obtained by him and recover the same”). Nothing in Walker County indicates that that practice was to be altered.

Furthermore, the language in Walker County must be viewed in the context of the facts and the holding of that case: that the trial court did not err in denying Walker County permission to intervene. This point is illustrated by this Court’s rejection of one ground of the State’s demurrer, in which the State argued that because Walker County would receive the benefits of any recovery Walker County was already essentially a party to the suit. This Court disagreed, stating that “the mere fact that the suit is brought by the state for the benefit of Walker County, will not preclude Walker County in its own right from also being made a party.” 248 Ala. at 54, 26 So.2d at 254. Instead, this Court affirmed the trial court’s refusal to grant permission to intervene because Title 7, § 73, and Title 55, § 169, isolated such suits “from local influence or embarrassment.” Those Code sections “providefd] a plan for central law enforcement” and removed the suits from “local feeling and interference.” 248 Ala. at 54, 26 So.2d at 254. Although it was argued that Walker County should be allowed to intervene because its presence would not interfere in the action, this Court held that the purpose of this statutory system was “to get away from local influence or interference” and to prevent the action from being “jeopardized by allowing the county to intervene.” 248 Ala. at 54-55, 26 So.2d at 255. Allowing Walker County to intervene would thus have been contrary to the legislature’s intent to “place suits of this character solely in the hands of the central authorities.” 248 Ala. at 55, 26 So.2d at 255. In other words, the trial court’s decision to deny Walker County leave to participate in the action was supported by the policy of the Code sections: to give the governor or attorney general the authority to file such actions and to remove the actions from local interference. This Court did not hold that those Code sections denied counties standing to pursue such actions.

To broadly read Walker County to hold as the petitioners suggest — that § 6-5-4(a) places the power to file an action like the underlying action exclusively in the hands of the governor — would be inconsistent with both the plain language of § 6-5-4(a) and the specific factual and legal basis for the decision in Walker County. Indeed, no authority is cited indicating that Walker County has ever been interpreted in the fashion advanced by the petitioners. Although § 6-5-4(a) may have conferred on the governor the authority to file the instant action, the governor has not done so, and nothing in the text of § 6-5-4(a) suggests that the County has been stripped of its own authority under § 11— 1-2 to file an action. Because the petitioners have failed to demonstrate a clear legal right to the relief sought, the petitions are due to be denied.

1091224 — PETITION DENIED.

1091288 — PETITION DENIED.

COBB, C.J., and STUART and PARKER, JJ., and MADDOX and SMITH, Special Justices, concur.

WOODALL, BOLIN, MURDOCK, MAIN, and WISE, JJ., recuse themselves.

      . There is some dispute in the arguments submitted to this Court with these petitions as to whether § 6-5-4 actually applies in this case; however, for purposes of this opinion, we assume that it does.

      . Indeed, § 6 — 5—4(f), which states that a trial court "shall have full power to make any and all such orders in reference to any other action which may be pending on the same claim or demand against any one or more of the defendants as justice may require,” appears to anticipate that other actions on the same claim may exist.

      . The language of Title 55, § 169, Code of Alabama 1940, was similar to what is now codified at Ala.Code 1975, § 41-5-22. It stated:
      "If the defaulting officer fails to settle or to show just cause why the amount should not be collected, the examiner must certify such facts to the department of finance, who shall notify the attorney general of the amount due the state, and the attorney general shall bring suit in the name of the State of Alabama against said officer and his bondsmen. If the amount due by said officer is in favor of the county, then the examiner shall certify to the solicitor of the circuit, or other court having jurisdiction, the amount or amounts so due, and such solicitor shall proceed to collect the same by suit against the officer and his bondsmen. For this additional service solicitors shall receive ten percent of the amounts collected, to be paid out of the county treasury immediately.”