author: WEIMER, Justice. KIMBALL, C.J., CLARK, Justice,

text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Gerald CHINN.
    No. 2011-KK-2043.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 10, 2012.

      Mark David Plaisance, for Applicant.
    James D. Caldwell, Atty. Gen., Hillar Clement Moore, III, Dist. Atty., David Gardner deBlieux, Dylan Christopher Alge, Asst. Dist. Atty., for Respondent.
   WEIMER, Justice.

|1 We granted certiorari to resolve a dispute as to the proper application of La. Const, art. I, § 17 in the factual setting of this case. Article I, § 17 was amended in 2010 to provide that “[ejxcept in capital cases, a defendant may knowingly and intelligently waive his right to a trial by jury but no later than forty-five days prior to the trial date and the waiver shall be irrevocable.” Specifically, we granted certio-rari to determine whether, consistent with this constitutional provision, a defendant loses the right to waive a trial by jury when the initial trial date was set within forty-five days of a pretrial proceeding and the district court indicated to the defendant a waiver was permissible. Finding that the court of appeal erred in ruling the defendant should not be allowed to waive his right to trial by jury under the unique facts of this case, we reverse the decision of the court of appeal and reinstate the ruling of the district court permitting the defendant to waive his right to trial by jury.

|2 FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On September 29, 2009, defendant Gerald Chinn was charged by bill of information with three counts of attempted first degree murder and one count of aggravated criminal damage to property, offenses allegedly committed on July 80, 2009. Following a series of preliminary motions, a status conference was convened on August 29, 2011. At that time, the State requested that the trial be set for October 11, 2011, a date forty-three days away. This trial date was the initial trial fixing. Defense counsel agreed to the trial date with the caveat that her client be allowed to waive his right to trial by jury. Following a brief colloquy with the defendant, the district court accepted the defendant’s jury-trial waiver, but the State objected, stating:

Your Honor, let me make something clear. The date that we have selected is inside the 45 days as required by the constitution. That date will be a jury trial date.

The State candidly explained: ‘Your Honor, the State’s rushing this trial date in order to get a jury trial.” Implicitly overruling the State’s objection, the district court ordered that a bench trial, as requested by the defendant, be held on October 11, 2011.

The State sought supervisory review of the district court’s ruling. The court of appeal granted the State’s application and reversed the district court. Citing La. Const, art. I, § 17(A), the appellate court ruled that the district court erred in allowing the defendant to waive his right to a jury trial less than forty-five days prior to the scheduled trial date. State v. Chinn, 11-1632 (La.App. 1 Cir. 9/15/11) (unpub’d). One member of the panel concurred to explain further:

The Louisiana Constitution provides that trial in a felony “shall” be by jury. La. Const, art. I, § 17(A). Under certain circumstances the defendant may waive that right: “Except in capital cases, a defendant |3 may knowingly and intelligently waive his right to a trial by jury but no later than forty-five days prior to the trial date and the waiver shall be irrevocable.” La. Const, art. I, § 17(A). The time limit was added to this provision by amendment in 2010. Defendant’s request to waive trial by jury in this case occurred after the effective date of the amendment, forty-three days before the scheduled trial date, and almost two years after the bill of information was filed. Although the trial court prior to the constitutional amendment had discretion to allow waiver at any time prior to the commencement of trial (see La.Code Crim. P. art. 780(B)), the amended provision in the constitution no longer allows such discretion for waivers taking place less than forty-five days prior to the trial date. The constitution is the supreme law of this state, to which all legislative acts must yield. When a statute conflicts with a constitutional provision, the statute must fall. M.J. Farms, Ltd. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 2007-2371 (La.7/1/08), 998 So.2d 16, 32. Accordingly, as to the trial date scheduled for October 11, defendant’s waiver of a jury trial came too late.

Id., (Kuhn, J., concurring).

The defendant applied for supervisory review to this court. We granted that application to consider whether, under the unique facts of this case, the provisions of La. Const, art. I, § 17(A) were properly applied by the appellate court. State v. Chinn, 11-2043 (La.10/5/11), 73 So.3d 368.

DISCUSSION

Before its 2010 amendment, La. Const, art. I, § 17(A) provided in pertinent part:

Except in capital cases, a defendant may knowingly and intelligently waive his right to a trial by jury.

The time for effectuating this waiver was fixed by La.C.Cr.P. art. 780(B) as follows:

The defendant shall exercise his right to waive trial by jury in accordance with the time limits set forth in Article 521. However, with the permission of the court, he may exercise his right to waive trial by jury at any time prior to the commencement of trial.

L4 Louisiana C.Cr.P. art. 521 set forth time limits as follows:

Pretrial motions shall be made or filed within fifteen days after arraignment, unless a different time is provided by law or fixed by the court at arraignment upon a showing of good cause why fifteen days is inadequate.
Upon written motion at any time and a showing of good cause, the court shall allow additional time to file pretrial motions.

The constitutional provision bestowed a right upon defendants to waive the right to a trial by jury. That right was statutorily subject to two relevant time periods: (1) the fifteen-day period following arraignment, during which the right to waive a jury trial is essentially unrestricted; and (2) the period commencing at the sixteenth day post-arraignment and extending to any time prior to the commencement of trial, during which period the right to waive a jury trial is subject to court approval.

With the 2010 amendment of La. Const, art. I, § 17(A), a third time period was imposed. That period commences forty-five days prior to trial. During this period, a defendant is prohibited from waiving the right to a trial by jury, and the district court’s ability under La.C.Cr.P. art. 780(B) to approve a waiver is similarly restricted. See La. Const, art. I, § 17(A) (“Except in capital cases, a defendant may knowingly and intelligently waive his right to a trial by jury but no later than forty-five days prior to the trial date and the waiver shall be irrevocable.”). It is this third time period that is at issue here.

The defendant frames the unique and fact-based issue posed in this case as whether it is within the district court’s inherent authority to allow a defendant to waive the right to a jury trial — although the waiver occurs inside the forty-five-day period imposed by La. Const, art. I, § 17(A) as amended in 2010 — when the State, as it admitted in the district court, requests an early trial date in an attempt to prevent |Bthat waiver. The defendant argues that while the district attorney has the right under La.C.Cr.P. art. 61 to determine whom and when to prosecute, and the district court is mandated by La. C.Cr.P. art. 702 to set a case for trial on motion of the State, the district attorney’s authority to select a trial date is tempered by, and must be considered in conjunction with, the inherent power of the district court to control its docket as conferred by La.C.Cr.P. art. 17. Otherwise, the defendant argues, the State could render the constitutional right to waive a jury trial meaningless, as it attempted to do in this case, simply by selecting a trial date less than forty-five days away.

The State counters that a plain reading of La.C.Cr.P. arts. 61 and 702 establishes that the State is the party possessing the right to control the prosecution of a criminal offense and to determine who, when and how to prosecute. However, the State submits that the narrow question of who actually controls the setting of trial dates — whether it is the district court that has ultimate control over the scheduling of criminal cases for trial or the State that controls the setting of trial dates — is an | (¡argument in semantics, because regardless of who “sets” the trial date, the actual fixing of that date has, is, and should be a collaborative effort. In any event, the State insists the issue of who has the right to control the setting of a trial date is not the ultimate issue in this case because although the State requested a trial date only forty-three days away, the defendant agreed to that date, and by doing so, the defendant forfeited his right to waive a trial by jury.

As an initial matter, it must be pointed out that the transcript in this case establishes that counsel for defendant expressly conditioned agreement to the October 11, 2011, trial date upon her client’s ability to waive his right to a trial by jury. Therefore, the State’s argument that the defendant forfeited his right to waive a trial by jury by agreeing to the October 11 trial date is without merit.

Therefore, the question that remains for resolution is that posed by the defendant: whether, by moving for a trial date less than forty-five days in advance, the State can take advantage of the provisions of La. Const, art. I, § 17(A) to prevent a defendant from waiving his right to a trial by jury. The answer to this question requires an interpretation of the 2010 amendment to La. Const, art. I, § 17(A).

As explained in Radiofone, Inc. v. City of New Orleans, 93-0962, p. 7 (La.1/14/94), 630 So.2d 694, 698, the role of the court in construing a constitutional 17provision is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the people who adopted the provision. In seeking to discover that intent, the court is generally guided by the same rules followed in interpreting laws and written instruments. Id. Therefore,

[w]hen a constitutional provision is clear and unambiguous, and its application does not lead to absurd consequences, it must be applied as written without further interpretation in search of its intent. Every provision must be interpreted in light of the purpose of the provision and the interests it furthers and resolves. When the provision is susceptible of different meanings, it is interpreted by examining the context and the text in which it occurs as a whole and by giving it the meaning that best conforms to its purpose.

Radiofone, 93-0962 at 7, 630 So.2d at 698.

In this case, the court of appeal relied on a literal application of La. Const, art. I, § 17(A) to hold that the district court erred in allowing the defendant to waive his right to trial by jury less than forty-five days prior to the scheduled trial date. However, as the defendant points out, such a literal application of the constitutional provision produces a result clearly unintended by the redactors of the provision: it allows the State, as it admittedly attempted in this case, to deprive a defendant in a non-capital proceeding of the constitutionally guaranteed right to waive a trial by jury simply by moving for a trial setting within the forty-five-day period en-grafted onto the original constitutional provision by the 2010 amendment. A literal application here produces a result demonstrably at odds with the intent of the redactors of the constitutional amendment, who, had they desired to deprive the defendant of the right to waive a trial by jury, and not just limit the time period in which that right might be exercised, could have simply deleted the right to waive a trial by jury altogether. That they did not do so is most telling and dispositive of the issue presented in this case.

An examination of the relevant legislative history confirms this conclusion. See Ocean Energy, Inc. v. Plaquemines Parish Government, 04-0066, p. 7 (La.7/6/04),8 880 So.2d 1, 7 (“In construing a constitutional provision, the courts may consider the object sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and the evils sought to be prevented or remedied, in light of the history of the times and the conditions and circumstances under which the provision was framed.”); State v. Johnson, 03-2993, p. 12 (La.10/19/04), 884 So.2d 568, 575 (“[I]n many cases, the legislative history of an act and contemporaneous circumstances may be helpful guides in ascertaining legislative intent.”); La. R.S. 24:177(B)(2)(a) (“The occasion and necessity for the law, the circumstances under which it was enacted, concepts of reasonableness, and contemporaneous legislative history may also be considered in determining legislative intent.”).

The 2010 amendment to La. Const, art. I, § 17(A) originally appeared as H.B. 940, Reg. Sess., 2010. As originally introduced, the proposed amendment hinged a criminal defendant’s right to waive a jury trial on the prosecution’s consent and court approval:

Except in capital cases, a defendant may knowingly and intelligently waive his right to a trial by jury, with the approval of the court and the consent of the prosecuting attorney.

H.B. 940, Reg. Sess., 2010. The bill was passed by the House of Representatives; however, in debates on the Senate floor, an amendment was proposed which would delete the provision that required the defendant’s waiver to be with the consent of the prosecuting attorney and court approval and substitute in its stead the following language, which reflects the current wording of the constitutional provision:

Except in capital cases, a defendant may knowingly and intelligently waive his right to a trial by jury but no later than forty-five days prior to the trial date and the waiver shall be irrevocable.

Senate Floor Amendment 4948 to Engrossed H.B. 940, Reg. Sess., 2010.

|flThe amendment was debated at length and initially failed to pass. However, after additional debate, the amendment was called for a vote again. See Senate Floor Amendment 5261 to Engrossed H.B. 940, Reg. Sess., 2010. On the second attempt, it passed, and the House concurred in the amendment. On November 2, 2010, 2010 La. Acts 1053, amending La. Const. art. I, § 17, was ratified in a statewide election. The governor proclaimed the adoption of the amendment on November 10, 2010, and it became effective 20 days later, pursuant to La. Const, art. XIII, § 1(C), on November 30, 2010. See 2010 La. Acts 1053.

Given the legislature’s refusal to approve the bill as originally drafted, which would have granted prosecutors unbridled discretion to veto a criminal defendant’s waiver of his right to a jury trial, it appears that the court of appeal erred in this case in applying the provisions of La. Const, art. I, § 17(A) to accomplish precisely that result. The defendant’s claim that the setting of a trial date less than forty-five days in the future constitutes a prosecutorial veto, like the one rejected by the legislature, has merit in the unique factual situation of this ease.

The clear intention of the redactors of La. Const, art. I, § 17(A) was to prevent last minute waivers by criminal defendants of the right to a jury trial. Consistent with that intent, La. Const, art. I, § 17(A) was enacted to limit the time period in which a criminal defendant charged with a non-capital offense may exercise his or her constitutional right to waive a jury trial. However, the constitutional provision was not enacted to deprive a defendant of the right to waive a jury trial entirely, nor was it enacted to allow the fixing of trial dates in such a manner as to deprive a defendant of the opportunity to knowingly and intelligently waive the right to a trial by jury.

In this case, proper application of La. Const. art. I, § 17(A) required the district court to take into account two considerations. First, as the district court properly | inrecognized, the defendant has a constitutional right to request a waiver of a jury trial. Second, because La. Const. art. I, § 17(A) prescribes a time limit for exercising that right, the district court could not accept a waiver and simultaneously set a trial date within the forty-five-day time limit of the constitutional provision. Such was required by the posture of this case, where even though the defendant agreed to a trial date less than forty-five days in advance if he could also waive the jury, the State objected to the waiver. The legislative history of the 2010 amendment demonstrates that La. Const, art. I, § 17(A) was not intended to give the district attorney unfettered control over a defendant’s ability to waive a jury trial. Where, as here, the State did not agree to allow a waiver within the forty-five-day period, the sole course of action available to the district court that did not cause the defendant’s right to waive the jury trial to conflict with the forty-five-day period of La. Const, art. I, § 17(A) was to consider the waiver, and if the waiver was accepted, to set a trial date beyond the forty-five-day period.

As indicated by the actions of the district court in permitting the defendant to waive the right to a trial by jury, the court intended to exercise its discretion to allow the defendant to waive his right to a jury trial. However, as noted above, the district court could not set a trial date within forty-five days and simultaneously allow the defendant to waive his right to a jury trial over the State’s objection. To protect the defendant’s constitutional right to waive a jury trial in this matter, the trial date could not be set within forty-five days such that the right to waive the jury trial would be lost. Under the unique facts of this case, the district court erred, not in allowing the lnwaiver, as the court of appeal ruled, but in setting the initial trial date less than forty-five days away.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons assigned, the ruling of the court of appeal is reversed and the ruling of the district court permitting defendant to waive his right to a trial by jury is reinstated. The case is remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

KIMBALL, C.J., concurs and assigns reasons.

JOHNSON, J., concurs in result.

CLARK, J., dissents and assigns reasons.

KIMBALL, C.J.,

concurs and assigns reasons.

hi respectfully concur in the result. While I agree with the majority’s decision to reverse the court of appeal and reinstate the ruling of the trial court permitting the defendant to waive his right to a trial by jury, I disagree with the portion of the majority’s reasoning finding the district court erred in failing to set a trial date more than forty-five days from the initial setting of the trial.

The majority’s analysis of the legislative history of La. Const, art. I, § 17 is fundamental to the ultimate outcome in this case. The role of the court in construing a constitutional provision is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the people who adopted the provision. Radiofone, Inc. v. City of New Orleans, 93-0962, p.7 (La.1/14/94), 630 So.2d 694, 698. The starting point in the interpretation of a constitutional provision is the language of the constitution itself. East Baton Rouge Parish School Bd. v. Foster, 02-2799, p.16 (La.6/6/03), 851 So.2d 985, 996 (citations omitted). When a constitutional provision is plain and unambiguous, and its application does not lead to absurd consequences, its language must be given effect. Id. In a case like this, where a literal interpretation of the article would lead to absurd consequences, this Court must search the legislative history to | ¡.ascertain and give effect to the intent of the redactors who adopted the provision. See State v. Johnson, 03-2993, p.12 (La.10/19/04), 884 So.2d 568, 575. (“[I]n many cases, the legislative history of an act and contemporaneous circumstances may be helpful guides in ascertaining legislative intent.”); La. R.S. 24:177(B)(2)(a) (“The occasion and necessity for the law, the circumstances under which it was enacted, concepts of reasonableness, and contemporaneous legislative history may also be considered in determining legislative intent.”).

Juxtaposing the initial proposed amendment to La. Const, art. I, § 17 with the enacted version, it is readily apparent the redactors did not intend to provide unbridled discretion to the prosecutor and trial court to prevent a defendant from exercising his or her constitutionally granted right to waive a trial by jury. The amendment represents a compromise, whereby the redactors added the forty-five day period to protect the State from last minute waivers by a defendant and removed the clause requiring the prosecution’s consent and court approval. The compromise clearly indicates the redactors intended to back away from the unilateral waiver initially proposed. To allow the State to set the trial date within the ■ forty-five day period would run afoul of the spirit of the constitutional amendment. See La.C.Cr.P. art. 3. The language of the constitutional amendment, as supported by its legislative history, clearly was not written envisioning a situation where the State set a trial date purposely within the forty-five day period. Where a procedure is not specifically prescribed the court may proceed in a manner consistent with the spirit of the constitutional provision. Id.

[sin a case such as this, where the State uses its power granted by La.C.Cr.P. art. 61 to set the trial date within the forty-five day period, the defendant’s constitutional right to waive a trial by jury must be preserved. The facts demonstrate the defendant’s attorney expressly conditioned the agreement to set the trial date within the forty-five day period upon her client’s ability to waive his right to a trial by jury. The State even readily admits part of the rationale for setting the trial date within the forty-five day period was to take away the defendant’s constitutionally granted right to waive a trial by jury. This amounts to a clear prosecutorial veto, which was rejected by the redactors as indicated by the legislative history.

Under the majority’s approach the constitutional amendment would be interpreted as rigidly against the State as against the defendant. This would essentially mean the State would never be able to set the case for trial pursuant to its power granted by La.C.Cr.P. art. 61 less than forty-five days before trial. The majority’s interpretation would also impair the ability of both the State and the defendant to agree on a trial date less than forty-five days before trial. Pursuant to my interpretation, both the State and defendant would have more flexibility in setting the trial date, and the State’s power to determine when it will prosecute pursuant to La.C.Cr.P. art. 61 would be preserved. Therefore, in my opinion, if the State sets the trial date within the forty-five day period, for the defendant’s right to be preserved, the defendant must be allowed to exercise his or her right of waiver notwithstanding such forty-five day period.

CLARK, Justice,

dissents and assigns reasons.

|! Courts exercising criminal jurisdiction in every parish have different, historical ways of deciding when trial is set. Some courts set an initial trial date at arraignment. If a case is not ready for trial, if the defendant pleads guilty, or if a case that has more priority must be heard, the court will reset the trial. Other courts wait to set an initial trial date until the parties are ready to commence trial.

Before the 2010 constitutional amendment to La. Const, art. 1, § 17(A), La. C.Cr.P. art. 780(B) and La.C.Cr.P. art. 521 operated together to mandate that the defendant waive his constitutional right to a trial by jury within fifteen days of arraignment. Under further provisions of La. C.Cr.P. art. 780(B), however, the defendant was permitted to waive trial by jury at any time prior to the commencement of trial with the condition he obtain permission of the trial court.

After the 2010 amendment, the statutes continue to mandate that the defendant make his decision to waive his constitutional right to a trial by jury within fifteen days of arraignment. The further provisions of La.C.Cr.P. art. 780(B) remain, as well. The difference wrought by the constitutional amendment is the restriction on the trial court’s discretion in allowing for a waiver of the constitutional right to trial by jury for the time period of 45 days before trial.

The issue here is not whether the defendant was faced with an initial trial setting within 45 days of arraignment and the elimination of his constitutional right to waive a jury trial. I believe the majority opinion ignores the fact the initial setting | gof the trial occurred almost two years after the bill of information was filed in 2009 and well after the defendant’s arraignment.

This defendant’s case straddles the time period before and after the effective date of the constitutional amendment. After the effective date of the constitutional amendment, the defendant’s arraignment had long passed. The only time limitation remaining for this defendant was the constitutional restriction placed on the trial court’s discretion to allow the defendant to exercise his right to waive a jury trial within 45 days of trial. In effect, the defendant could have waived his right to trial by jury at any time after charges were brought against him, including the nearly two years he waited without exercising this right. Instead, the defendant gambled his initial trial setting would be set for a future time period longer than 45 days hence. He lost that bet.

I agree with the court of appeal concurrence that the amended provision in the constitution no longer allows discretion for waivers taking place less than 45 days before the trial date. As to the trial date scheduled for October 11, the defendant’s waiver of a jury trial came too late, but I believe he had years in which to exercise that constitutional right.

      . See 2010 La. Acts 1053, § 1.

      2. We note, as did Judge Kuhn, that this statutory provision was not amended following adoption of the 2010 amendment to La. Const, art. I, § 17.

      . See 2010 La. Acts 1053.

      . La.C.Cr.P. art. 61 provides:
      Subject to the supervision of the attorney general, as provided in Article 62, the district attorney has entire charge and control of every criminal prosecution instituted or pending in his district, and determines whom, when, and how he shall prosecute.

      . La.C.Cr.P. art. 702 provides:
      Cases shall be set for trial by the court on motion of the state, and may be set for trial on motion of the defendant.
      Courts shall adopt rules governing the procedure for setting cases for trial and giving notice thereof. The defendant shall be given notice of trial sufficiently in advance thereof so that he may summon his witnesses.

      . La.C.Cr.P. art. 17 provides:
      A court possesses inherently all powers necessary for the exercise of its jurisdiction and the enforcement of its lawful orders, including authority to issue such writs and orders as may be necessary or proper in aid of its jurisdiction. It has the duty to require that criminal proceedings shall be conducted with dignity and in an orderly and expeditious manner and to so control the proceedings that justice is done. A court has the power to punish for contempt.

      . In this regard, the State acknowledges that while under La.C.Cr.P. art. 702, the district court must set a trial date upon the State’s motion, the article does not require the district court to set the specific date offered by the State. Such an acknowledgment is consistent with this court's ruling in State v. Simpson, 551 So.2d 1303 (La.1989), in which the court explained that "[u]nder the court's inherent power, the trial judge of the division to which the case is assigned has ultimate control over the scheduling of criminal cases for trial, although the district attorney has the primary responsibility to move to set criminal cases for trial.” Simpson, 551 So.2d at 1304-05 (footnotes omitted). Indeed, La.C.Cr.P. art. 702 charges the district court with adopting rules governing the procedure for setting cases for trial and providing adequate notice thereof, to which the State must adhere. This language suggests that the district attorney’s right to control the criminal docket is not unfettered. At any rate, the State acknowledges that, in the final analysis, it is the district court that retains ultimate control of the trial date, as it has the power to grant continuances pursuant to La.C.Cr.P. arts. 707-715. Obviously, a trial date should be chosen with the input of the parties and the court.

      . As noted, La.C.Cr.P. art. 780(B), quoted infra, was not changed following the amendment of La. Const, art. I, § 17 and affords the district court the discretion to allow a waiver.

      . La.C.Cr.P. art. 3 provides: "Where no procedure is specifically prescribed by this Code or by statute, the court may proceed in a manner consistent with the spirit of the provisions of this Code and other applicable statutory and constitutional provisions.”

      . La.C.Cr.P. art. 61 provides: "Subject to the supervision of the attorney general, as provided in Article 62, the district attorney has entire charge and control of every criminal prosecution instituted or pending in his district, and determines whom, when, and how he shall prosecute.” (Emphasis added).

      . Fifteen days after arraignment, the defendant could only waive trial by jury with the trial judge’s permission.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: PER CURIAM.

license: Public Domain

text:
    In re Justice of the Peace David E. COOK, Ward 1, Parish of Bienville, State of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-O-0715.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 22, 2012.
   PER CURIAM.

_jjln an opinion rendered on October 25, 2011, we held that respondent, Bienville Parish Justice of the Peace David E. Cook, failed to comply with the financial reporting requirements for justices of the peace and imposed a $200 civil penalty against him. In re: Cook, 11-0715 (La.10/25/11), 74 So.3d 667. We ordered that the penalty be paid no later than thirty days from the finality of judgment.

No application for rehearing was filed in this matter. Consequently, our judgment became final on November 8, 2011, and the $200 penalty was due and payable no later than December 8, 2011. Despite repeated efforts by the Judiciary Commission of Louisiana (“Commission”) to communicate with respondent regarding the penalty, he has never paid it.

On May 4, 2012, the Commission filed in this court a pleading captioned “The Judiciary Commission of Louisiana’s Certification of Facts Believed to Constitute Contempt of the Authority of the Louisiana Supreme Court Pursuant to Louisiana Supreme Court Rule XXIII, Section 20.” On May 16, 2012, we issued a “Rule to Show Cause” ordering respondent to “show cause by written brief why he should not be found guilty of contempt for failure to comply with this court’s order to pay a $200 civil penalty, and be punished accordingly. Pursuant to La.Code |aCiv. P. art 225, said brief shall be filed not less than forty-eight hours from the date Justice of the Peace Cook receives this notice.”

The Bienville Parish Sheriffs Office personally served respondent with the rule to show cause on May 21, 2012. No response has been received from respondent.

We hold that Justice of the Peace David E. Cook willfully disobeyed a lawful order of this court by failing to pay a $200 civil penalty to the State of Louisiana, Judicial Branch, no later than thirty days from the finality of our October 25, 2011 judgment, and, thus, hold him in contempt. Accordingly, we fine him $250 and a copy of this opinion will be forwarded to the Judiciary Commission.

       Chief Justice Kimball not participating in the opinion.

      . The Commission sent letters to respondent on November 30, 2011; January 17, 2012; and March 21, 2012. These letters were sent by regular and certified mail; respondent s secretary signed for the first letter and respondent personally signed for the last letter. In addition, Assistant Counsel for the Commission spoke to respondent by telephone on January 6, 2012 regarding the delinquent penalty payment.


text:
    In re Justice of the Peace Kevin J. HOFFMAN Ward A, Parish of St. Bernard, State of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-O-0417.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 22, 2012.
   PER CURIAM.

hln an opinion rendered on July 1, 2011, we held that respondent, St. Bernard Parish Justice of the Peace Kevin J. Hoffman, failed to comply with the financial reporting requirements for justices of the peace and imposed a $200 civil penalty against him. In re: Hoffman, 11-0417 (La.7/1/11), 66 So.3d 455. We ordered that the penalty be paid no later than thirty days from the finality of judgment.

No application for rehearing was filed in this matter. Consequently, our judgment became final on July 15, 2011, and the $200 penalty was due and payable no later than August 15, 2011. Despite repeated efforts by the Judiciary Commission of Louisiana (“Commission”) to communicate with respondent regarding the penalty, he has never paid it.

On May 4, 2012, the Commission filed in this court a pleading captioned “The Judiciary Commission of Louisiana’s Certification of Facts Believed to Constitute Contempt of the Authority of the Louisiana Supreme Court Pursuant to Louisiana Supreme Court Rule XXIII, Section 20.” On May 10, 2012, we issued a “Rule to Show Cause” ordering respondent to “show cause by written brief why he should not be found guilty of contempt for failure to comply with this court’s order to pay a $200 civil penalty, and be punished accordingly. Pursuant to La.Code |2Civ. P. art 225, said brief shall be filed not less than forty-eight hours from the date Justice of the Peace Hoffman receives this notice.”

The St. Bernard Parish Sheriffs Office personally served respondent with the rule to show cause on May 18, 2012. No response has been received from respondent.

We hold that Justice of the Peace Kevin J. Hoffman willfully disobeyed a lawful order of this court by failing to pay a $200 civil penalty to the State of Louisiana, Judicial Branch, no later than thirty days from the finality of our July 1, 2011 judgment, and, thus, hold him in contempt. Accordingly, we fíne him $250 and a copy of this opinion will be forwarded to the Judiciary Commission.

       Chief Justice Kimball not participating in the opinion.

      . The Commission sent letters to respondent on August 4, 2011; August 10, 2011; September 29, 2011; December 14, 2011; and February 7, 2012. The last two letters were sent by certified mail and both were signed for by Kellie Brust. The Commission received no response to any of its letters, and received no contact from respondent at any time regarding payment of the penalty cast against him by the court.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Frank James CELESTINE, Jr.
    No. 2012-K-0241.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 2, 2012.
   PER CURIAM.

|, Granted, the decision of the court of appeal is reversed in part and defendant’s sentence is reinstated for the reasons that follow.

The trial court and the court of appeal agreed that a sentence less than the mandatory minimum term of 10 years’ imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence for the crime of armed robbery in violation of La. R.S. 14:64 appeared appropriate in defendant’s case. The courts below considered the same factors. At the time of the offense, defendant was an 18-year-old first offender, a recent high school honors graduate, and a member of the National Honor Society. He had also been the school drum major and vice president of the school’s band. Defendant did not physically harm either the victim or her companion (defendant’s fiancée) during the offense and his mother testified on his behalf at trial that her son suffered from, and had been treated for, mental illness and placed on medication he discontinued shortly before the offense, and had once before attempted to commit suicide by hanging. This instability was reflected in defendant’s own testimony that he had been deeply depressed and committed the robbery with the hope he would be caught and killed but then changed his mind after the offense and gave the police a false exculpatory statement. Given these circumstances, the trial court informed defendant that if it 12had the authority, the court would have imposed a lesser sentence and would also have considered suspending the sentence and placing him on probation.

However, the courts below disagreed as to whether the means existed for surmounting the constitutional barrier protecting legislative prerogative to define crimes and fix punishments across a broad spectrum of cases. State v. Kelly, 95-2335, p. 1 (La.2/2/96), 666 So.2d 1082, 1083 (Calogero, C.J., concurring) (“The substantive power to define crimes and prescribe punishments lies in the legislative branch of government.”) (citing Jones v. Thomas, 491 U.S. 376, 109 S.Ct. 2522, 105 L.Ed.2d 322 (1989)). The trial judge concluded that the minimum 10-year term of imprisonment was not excessive as applied to defendant and that he was therefore constrained by law to impose that sentence. On the other hand, a majority on the court of appeal panel, taking into account that defendant admitted committing the offense but that he was otherwise an “exemplary citizen,” who suffered from “bouts of deep depression,” and further considering the standard established by this Court’s decisions in State v. Johnson, 97-1906 (La.3/4/98), 709 So.2d 672 and State v. Dorthey, 623 So.2d 1276 (La.1993), for determining when a trial court may depart from the mandatory minimum sentence specified by the legislature for an offense, concluded that defendant “has clearly and convincingly shown exceptional circumstances demonstrating that he is a victim of the legislature’s failure to assign a sentence meaningfully tailored to his culpability, the gravity of the offense, and the circumstances of the case.” State v. Celestine, 11-0752, p. 8 (La.12/21/11), — So.3d —, — (Carter, C.J., Parro, J.) (unpub’d). The majority thus deemed that a “downward departure from the mandatory minimum sentence was warranted in this case,” id., although it provided no guidance for the trial court in resentencing defendant on remand of the case. Cf. La. C.Cr.P. art. 881.4(A) (If an appellate court finds a sentence excessive, it “may give direction to the trial court concerning the proper sentence to impose.”). .

Dissenting, Judge Higginbotham observed that, given defendant’s failure to provide a “compelling reason or excuse for choosing to commit a violent crime,” and given also “the trial judge’s well-articulated reasons that he considered prior to imposing the mandatory minimum sentence, which took into consideration all of the mitigating factors outlined by the defendant in his brief,” no abuse of the trial court’s broad sentencing discretion had occurred. Celestine, 11-0752, p. 1 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).

We agree with Judge Higginbotham that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by sentencing defendant at, but not below, the statutory minimum for his crime. The trial court was fully cognizant that this Court’s decision in Dorthey “did not purport to grant a district court the power to usurp ... legislative prerogative or to impose what the court believes is the most appropriate sentence for a particular offender in a particular case.” Kelly, 95-2335 at 1, 666 So.2d at 1083 (Calogero, C.J., concurring). Our jurisprudence has further recognized that sentences from 25 to 50 years imprisonment at hard labor, roughly the midpoint of a 99-year range, are generally not excessive for the offense of armed robbery even when imposed on first offenders. See, e.g., State v. Square, 433 So.2d 104, 110 (La.1983) (25 years); State v. Huntsberry, 409 So.2d 555 (La.1982), appeal after remand, 439 So.2d 432 (La.1983) (50 years); State v. Dunns, 404 So.2d 1235 (La.1981), appeal after remand, 441 So.2d 745 (La.1983) (40 years). We have thus recognized that the crime of armed robbery “is a pernicious offense” which “creates a great risk of emotional and physical harm to the victim, to witnesses, and, at times, even to the offender.” State ex rel. Sullivan v. Maggio, 432 So.2d 854, 856 (La.1983).

|4In the present case, the trial court imposed a sentence well below our jurisprudential baseline and thereby gave considerable weight to the mitigating circumstances in defendant’s background which militated for a much lesser penalty. However, this Court’s jurisprudential baseline provides objective support for the trial court’s determination it had no constitutional mandate to go below the mandatory minimum sentence because nothing in the circumstances of the offense gave the trial court reason for treating defendant’s crime as anything less than the pernicious offense the legislature has punished so severely. Defendant did not physically harm the victim and her companion but he lay in wait for them in an empty parking lot and then rushed toward the women with a mask over his face while holding a pointed object in his hand, almost certainly the six-inch knife found in his possession when arrested only a short time later. Defendant had thereby created a highly charged atmosphere in which physical harm was distinctly possible but circumvented when the women panicked and fled, but not before the victim dropped a night deposit bag in her hand, which defendant then grabbed before he also fled the scene. Cf. State v. Bonier, 367 So.2d 824, 826 (La.1979) (In making the determination whether defendant used a dangerous instrumentality to commit a robbery, “the jury may find that there was an actual likely danger of serious bodily harm, to anyone present in the highly charged atmosphere of the scene of a robbery, taking into consideration the great possibility of violence in the interaction between the offender and the victim thereby put in fear for his life.”). In addition to the mask he put over his face, defendant apparently had also worn two sets of clothing, discarding the outer layer after fleeing the scene. It thus appears that defendant planned the robbery and took steps to conceal his identity as a hedge against arrest and identification, conduct wholly inconsistent with the explanation he offered later that the robbery was in effect another suicide attempt, 15and inconsistent with a finding that the mitigating factors in his background constituted the full measure of his potential for rehabilitation.

This Court’s jurisprudence fully supports the trial court’s resolve not to substitute its view of the most appropriate punishment for legislative prerogative in determining the minimum punishment necessary to address the legislature’s “great concern for the crime of armed robbery in this state.” Sullivan, 432 So.2d at 857. Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeal’s decision to the extent that it upheld defendant’s conviction but reverse to the extent that the court vacated his sentence and remanded for resen-tencing. Defendant’s sentence is reinstated and this case is remanded to the trial court solely for purposes of execution of the sentence imposed.

COURT OF APPEAL DECISION REVERSED IN PART; SENTENCE REINSTATED; CASE REMANDED.

JOHNSON and KNOLL, JJ., would deny.

WEIMER, J., would grant and docket.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Darryl E. PATTERSON.
    No. 2012-K-0464.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 2, 2012.
   PER CURIAM.

|, Granted. The decision of the court of appeal is reversed and this case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with the views expressed herein.

We agree with the court of appeal that in its entirety, the prosecutor’s cross-examination of defendant violated Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976), by focusing on his post-arrest as well as his pre-arrest failure to provide the police with the exculpatory account he offered jurors at trial. State v. Patterson, 10-1791, p. 17 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1/25/12), 81 So.3d 1019, — (““[T]he questions posed by the prosecutor, while used for impeachment, fell within the purview of Doyle. The trial court denied Mr. Patterson’s motion for mistrial and even refused to believe defense counsel’s argument that the questioning was error, finding that the questions were proper.”). However, we do not find defendant’s exculpatory account so implausible that the state carried its burden of proving that the Doyle violation did not contribute to the jury’s verdict and was therefore |2harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in a case which essentially pitted the victim’s word against defendant’s with little or no corroboration on either side. Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 2081, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993) (“The inquiry, in other words, is not whether, in a trial that occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would surely have been rendered, but whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error.”); of. United States v. Edwards, 576 F.2d 1152, 1155 (5th Cir.1978)(“[C]omment upon silence of the accused is a crooked knife and one likely to turn in the prosecutor’s hand. The circumstances under which it will not occasion a reversal are few and discrete.”). The trial court’s error in permitting the state to impeach defendant with his post-arrest silence thus requires reversal of defendant’s conviction and sentence.

JOHNSON, KNOLL and GUIDRY, JJ., would deny.


text:
    In re Lynn Perkins PEREZ.
    No. 2012-OB-1527.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 10, 2012.
   ORDER

11 Considering the Joint Petition for Transfer to Disability Inactive Status,

IT IS ORDERED that Lynn Perkins Perez, Louisiana Bar Roll number 15085, be and she hereby is transferred to disability inactive status pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 22(B). Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 26(E), this order shall be effective immediately.

FOR THE COURT:

/s/ Marcus R. Clark Justice, Supreme Court of Louisiana


text:
    In re Bradley David MEYER.
    No. 2012-B-1131.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 11, 2012.
   ORDER

b Considering the “Motion to Remand” filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel,

IT IS ORDERED that this matter be remanded to the disciplinary board for consolidation with the proceedings numbered ll-DB-114. After appropriate consideration of the consolidated matters, the board is directed to issue a single recommendation of discipline to this court encompassing all disciplinary matters involving respondent.

FOR THE COURT:

/s/ Jeannette Theriot Knoll Justice, Supreme Court of Louisiana


text:
    Peggy ROSS, the Plaintiff and Court-Appointed Curatrix for Whitley Lacey, and the Tutrix for Ms. Lacey’s Minor Children, Z’Kyriah and Aaliyaha v. Michael AVERETTE, Acadian Ambulance Service, Inc., and Acadian Companies.
    No. 2012-CC-1344.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 29, 2001.
   In re Acadian Ambulance Service, Inc.; Averette, Michael;—Defendant(s); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Iberville, 18th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 70,538; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, Nos. 2012 CW 0110, 2012 CA 0801, 2012 CA 0801.

Stay denied. Writ denied.

GUIDRY, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Bernard ALLEN.
    No. 2012-KK-1341.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 13, 2012.
   In re Allen, Bernard;—Defendant; Applying For Writ of Mandamus and/or Writ of Prohibition, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. F, No. 506-037; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2012-K-0880.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana and the Vermilion Parish School Board v. The LOUISIANA LAND AND EXPLORATION COMPANY, et al. State of Louisiana v. Louisiana Land and Exploration, et al. State of Louisiana, et al. v. Louisiana Land and Exploration, et al.
    No. 2012-C-0884.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 15, 2012.
   In re Carrollton Resources, LLC., et al.; Chevron Midcontinent LP; Chevron U.S.A. Inc.; Union Exploration Partners; Union Oil Company of California;—Defendants); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Vermilion, 15th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 82162; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 10-1341 C/W 11-843 C/W 11-1016.

Granted.

KNOLL, J., recused.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Juan SMITH.
    No. 2012-KD-1311.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 22, 2012.
   In re State of Louisiana;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. D, No. 378-343; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2012-K-0865.

Stay Denied; Writ Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Juan SMITH.
    No. 2012-KK-1420.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 22, 2012.
   In re Smith, Juan;—Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. D, No. 378-343; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2012-K-0865.

Writ granted. Based on this court’s ruling in the state’s writ application in State v. Smith, 2012-1311 (La.6/22/12), 92 So.3d 341, 2012 WL 2877234, this date, we find there is no sentence under which the Louisiana Department of Corrections would have custody of the defendant. The trial court’s order that the defendant be maintained at the Orleans Parish Prison until his retrial and/or new penalty phase hearing is reinstated.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Vincent JORDAN.
    No. 2012-KD-1458.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 25, 2012.
   In re State of Louisiana;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. J, No. 510-507.

Stay denied; writ denied.


text:
    Carmen SWAIN and Charles Swain v. CUSTARD INSURANCE ADJUSTERS, INC. CTL Distribution, Inc. and Michael Dwayne Jacobs.
    No. 2012-CC-1400.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 27, 2012.
   In re CTL Distribution, Inc.; Jacobs, Michael Dwayne;—Defendant(s); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 556438; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 CW 0980.

Stay denied. Writ denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE in the Interest of A.S.
    No. 2012-CJ-1467.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 27, 2012.
   In re State In the Interest of A.S.;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, New Orleans Juvenile Court, No. 2012-132-08-FS-E; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2012-C-0939.

Stay denied. Writ denied.


text:
    In re Andrew YEATES.
    No. 2012-OB-1444.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 28, 2012.
   In re Yeates, Andrew;—Plaintiff; Applying For Permission to Take Bar Examination.

Granted. Petitioner is allowed to take the Louisiana State Bar Examination. However, petitioner shall not be considered for admission to the bar until he can demonstrate that he has complied with the requirements imposed upon him by the Committee on Bar Admissions and the Director of the Lawyers Assistance Program, including, but not limited to, execution of the recommended Recovery Agreement and demonstration of a one-year period of sobriety.

KIMBALL, C.J., recused.


text:
    In re Christopher MINIAS.
    No. 2012-OB-1459.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 28, 2012.
   In re Minias, Christopher;—Plaintiff; Applying For Permission to Take Bar Examination.

Application to sit for the bar exam denied, remanded for further investigation and a hearing. See order.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. $144,320.00 Tina Beers 132 Woody Lane, Silver City, NC 27344, et al.
    No. 2012-K-0466.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 29, 2012.
   In re State of Louisiana;—Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Martin, 16th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 74400-E; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CA-11-1137.

Granted.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Kenneth R. WILLIAMS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2009-KH-2011.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 29, 2012.
   In re Williams, Kenneth R.;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Ascension, 23rd Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 17249; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2009 KW 0868.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Chiquita MASSEY.
    No. 2012-KK-1106.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 29, 2012.
   In re Massey, Chiquita;—Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. E, No. 499-076; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2012-K-0418.

Denied.

WEIMER, J., would grant and remand to the court of appeal for opinion.


text:
    Daniel QUAINOO v. Carla MORELON-QUAINOO.
    No. 2012-C-1298.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 29, 2012.
   In re Quainoo, Daniel;—Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. J, No. 695-860; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 11-CA-766.

Denied.


text:
    Richard A. RYAN v. ESIF/RYAN CONSTRUCTION.
    No. 2012-C-1023.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 29, 2012.
   In re Employer’s Self Insurers Fund;—Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certio-rari and/or Review Office of Workers’ Compensation District 1W, No. 0701033; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 46,916-WCA.

Denied.


text:
    Dan S. COLLINS, CPL & Associates, Inc., et al. v. Frank A. GODCHAUX, III, et al.
    No. 2012-C-0835.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 2, 2012.
   In re Charles R. Godchaux Live Oak Plantation Trust; Frank A. Godchaux III Live Oak Plantation Trust; Godchaux III, Frank A. et al.; Godchaux, Agnes K.; Godchaux, Charles R.; Godchaux, Leslie K.;—Defendant(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Vermilion, 15th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 84618; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 11-996.

Denied.

KNOLL and CLARK, JJ„ would grant.


text:
    MALONEY CINQUE, L.L.C., Maloney Sept, L.L.C., and Stan’s L.L.C. v. PACIFIC INSURANCE COMPANY, LTD., E.B. Ducasse Insurance Agency, Inc. and XYZ Insurance Company.
    No. 2012-C-0950.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 2, 2012.
   In re Maloney Cinque, L.L.C.; Maloney Sept, L.L.C.;—Plaintiff(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. N, No. 2006-7842; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-CA-0787.

Denied.


text:
    MALONEY CINQUE, L.L.C., Maloney Sept, L.L.C., and Stan’s L.L.C. v. PACIFIC INSURANCE COMPANY, LTD., E.B. Ducasse Insurance Agency, Inc. and XYZ Insurance Company.
    No. 2012-C-0973.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 2, 2012.
   In re Pacific Insurance Company, LTD.;—Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. N, No. 2006-7842; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-CA-0787.

Denied.

VICTORY, GUIDRY and CLARK, JJ., would grant.


text:
    Geraldine OUBRE and Linda Gentry on their Behalf, as well as Others Similarly Situated v. LOUISIANA CITIZENS FAIR PLAN.
    No. 2012-CC-1491.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 2, 2012.
   In re Louisiana Citizens Property Insurance Corporation;—Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. M, No. 625-567; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 12-C-0360.

Denied.

WEIMER, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Kenrard BROUSSARD.
    No. 2012-OK-1486.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 3, 2012.
   In re Broussard, Kenrard;—Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Iberia, 16th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 10-CR-1536; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KW 12-00571.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Samuel JORDAN.
    No. 2012-KK-1523.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 6, 2012.
   In re Jordan, Samuel;—Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. 3, No. 274,251; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. KW 12-47584.

Not considered. Not timely filed. Supreme Court Rule X, Section 5. See


text:
    L WEBB PROPERTIES and Gerald Galdington v. Clyefer BASS and Occupants.
    No. 2012-CC-1506.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 6, 2012.
   In re Bass, Clyefer;—Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Ouachita, 4th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. C-20113253; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 47546-CW.

Denied.


text:
    In re Bernadette Rocco LEE.
    No. 2012-OB-0862.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 6, 2012.
   In re Louisiana Attorney Disciplinary Board;—Other; Applying for Rehearing of this court’s action dated June 15, 2012; Disciplinary Board, No. 11-DB-065.

Rehearing denied.


text:
    Sherry WATTERS, et al. v. DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, et al.
    No. 2012-CC-1587.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 10, 2012.
   In re Department of Health and Hospitals; Department of Social Services; Division of Administration;—Defendant(s); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. M, Nos. 2001-17775, 2002-14043; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2012-C-1000.

Stay denied. Writ denied.


text:
    STATE in the Interest of D.B.
    No. 2012-CK-1609.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 11, 2012.
   In re D.B.;—Other; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Orleans Parish Juvenile Court, No. 2012-349-01-DQ-E; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2012-C-0940.

Denied.


text:
    John E. SETTLE, Jr., Bike, L.L.C. and Kathy Condon v. BOSSIER PARISH SCHOOL BOARD, Honorable Tom Schedler, Louisiana Secretary of State and Angie Rogers, Commissioner of Elections & Registration.
    No. 2012-C-1569.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 11, 2012.
   In re Bike, L.L.C.; Condon, Kathy; Settle Jr., John E.;—Plaintiff(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Bossier, 26th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 139,290; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 47,644-CA.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana in the Interest of F.M.
    No. 2012-CK-1550.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 11, 2012.
   In re F.M.;—Other; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Orleans Parish Juvenile Court, No. 2012-115-01-DQ-F; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2012-C-0981.

Denied.


text:
    STATE in the Interest of R.J.J. and M.L.J.
    No. 2012-CJ-1589.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 12, 2012.
   In re A.C.;—Other; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. I, No. JC2009-0293-A-B; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 11-1180.

Denied.


text:
    STATE in the Interest of R.J.J. and M.L.J.
    No. 2012-CJ-1537.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 12, 2012.
   In re J., R.J.; R.J.J., Sr.;—Other(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. I, No. JC-2009-0293; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 11-1180.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Jonathan DELHOMMER.
    No. 2012-KK-1507.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 13, 2012.
   In re Delhommer, Jonathan;—Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Vermilion, 15th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 2011-CR-54050; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KW 12-00319.

Denied.


text:
    STATE in the Interest of B.J.G.B., et al.
    No. 2012-CJ-1539.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 13, 2012.
   In re B. Sr., J.J.;—Other; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 13761; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, Nos. 12-172,12-171.

Denied.


text:
    In re 98 UNNAMED DEFENDANTS.
    No. 2012-OK-1647.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 18, 2012.
   In re 98 Unnamed Defendants;—Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Mandamus and/or Writ of Prohibition, Parish of Orleans.

Not considered; premature. Application is transferred to District Court for its consideration.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Marion Dale JONES.
    No. 2012-KP-1637.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 19, 2012.
   In re State of Louisiana;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Bossier, 26th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 165,309; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 47493-KW.

Denied.


text:
    Peggy ROSS, et al. v. Michael AVERETTE, et al.
    No. 2012-CC-1666.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 19, 2012.
   In re RSUI Indemnity Company; West-chester Surplus Lines Insurance Company;—Defendant(s); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Iberville, 18th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 70538; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 CW 0979.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Shane M. GATES.
    No. 2012-KK-1691.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 20, 2012.
   In re Gates, Shane M.;—Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 423508; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 KW 1224.

Stay denied; writ denied on showing made.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Shane M. GATES.
    No. 2012-KK-1382.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 20, 2012.
   In re Gates, Shane M.;—Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 423508; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 KW 0555.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Davonte THIRSTY.
    No. 2012-KK-1706.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 23, 2012.
   In re Thirsty, Davonte;—Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. F, No. 509-338; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 20125-K-1075.

Stay denied. Writ denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Shane GATES.
    No. 2012-KK-1744.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 27, 2012.
   In re Gates, Shane;—Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 423508; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 KW 1260.

Stay denied. Writ denied.


text:
    Jamie POURCIAU, Individually and on Behalf of Jaelyn Michelle Pourciau v. Glenn M. HALL, New Hampshire Indemnity Company, and Lexington Insurance Company.
    No. 2012-CC-1752.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 30, 2012.
   In re Hall, Glenn M.; Lexington Insurance Company; New Hampshire Indemnity Company;—Defendant(s); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Livingston, 21st Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 125,241; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 CW 1246.

Stay denied. Writ denied.

JOHNSON and GUIDRY, JJ„ would grant writs and reverse the trial court’s grant of partial summary judgment, reserving liability for trial.


text:
    Doug Anthony TRAHAN v. Elizabeth Donald KINGREY.
    No. 2012-CJ-1586.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 1, 2012.
   In re Kingrey, Elizabeth Donald;—Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Terrebonne, 32nd Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 144504; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011 CU 1900.

Denied.

JOHNSON, KNOLL and GUIDRY, JJ., would grant.


text:
    Bryan LAMPARD v. Regina LAMPARD.
    No. 2012-CC-1737.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Aug. 1, 2012.
   In re Lampard, Bryan;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. F, No. 08-10729; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2012-C-0927.

Denied.


author: PETTIGREW, J.

text:
    STATE of Louisiana in the Interest of E.C., A.H., S.G. & A.G.
    No. 2010 CJ 1505.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.
    Dec. 22, 2010.
    Camille A. Morvant, II, District Attorney, Anthony P. Lewis, Assistant District Attorney, Thibodaux, LA, for State of Louisiana.
    Linda A. Mitchell, Houma, LA, for Plaintiff-Appellee, Department of Social Services.
    Andrea C. Stentz, Thibodaux, LA, for Plaintiff-Appellee, S.G.
    Christopher J. Boudreaux, Thibodaux, LA, for Defendant-Appellant, J.G.
    Before KUHN, PETTIGREW, JJ., and KLINE, J. pro tempore.

      . Judge William F. Kline, Jr., retired, is serving as judge pro tempore by special appointment of the Louisiana Supreme Court.

   PETTIGREW, J.

| ¡Appellant, J.G., seeks review of the trial court’s judgment terminating his parental rights as to the minor child, S.G., based on abandonment. The sole issue for our review is whether the failure by the State of Louisiana, Department of Social Services, Office of Community Services (“State”), to comply with the express language of La. Ch.Code art. 1036.2 prohibited the State from terminating J.G.’s parental rights during his term of incarceration. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

According to the record, S.G. was originally taken into custody by the State on March 23, 2006, and was adjudicated a child in need of care on June 28, 2006. J.G., who was incarcerated at the time, received written notice from the State via certified mail on August 80, 2006, that S.G. had been taken into custody and that his parental rights may be terminated unless he took certain steps as outlined in the notice. J.G. acknowledged receipt of same on September 18, 2006. A petition for termination of parental rights was subsequently filed on February 2, 2010, based on allegations that J.G. had failed to provide significant contributions to S.G.’s care and support for six consecutive months and had failed to maintain significant contact with S.G. for six consecutive months.

The matter proceeded to a hearing on April 15, 2010, at which time the trial court heard testimony from various witnesses including J.G. After considering the testimony and evidence in the record, the trial court found that J.G. had abandoned S.G. pursuant to La. Ch.Code art. 1015(4) for a period in excess of six consecutive months; that J.G. failed to provide significant financial contributions for S.G.’s care and support; and that J.G. failed to have significant contact with S.G. The trial court ruled that the State had proven by clear and convincing evidence that J.G. failed to comply with the court-approved case plan and that his parental rights should be terminated pursuant to La. Ch.Code art. 1015(5). The trial court further found that J.G. had received actual notice of the child in need of care proceedings and his rights as evidenced by the “OCS FORM TPR-2” signed by J.G. Based on this notice, the trial court concluded that J.G. was not prejudiced by the lack of strict compliance with Article 1036.2. The trial court signed a judgment ^terminating J.G.’s parental rights and freeing S.G. for adoption on June 15, 2010. This appeal by J.G. followed.

On appeal, J.G. argues that the evidence presented at the hearing below clearly established that the State did not comply with the provisions of Article 1086.2. Thus, J.G. maintains, the State’s petition to terminate his parental rights should have been denied. In response, the State argues that Article 1036.2, added to the Children’s Code by 2006 La. Acts, No. 272, § 1 and signed into law on June 8, 2006, became effective on August 15, 2006, and thus does not apply to the facts of this case because S.G. was taken into custody by the State on March 23, 2006.

Louisiana Civil Code article 6 provides that “[i]n the absence of contrary legislative expression, substantive laws apply prospectively” and that “[procedural and interpretative laws apply both prospectively and retroactively, unless there is a legislative expression to the contrary.” Substantive laws either establish new rules, rights, and duties or change existing ones. Procedural laws, on the other hand, describe methods for enforcing, processing, administering, or determining rights, liabilities, or status. Davis v. St. Francisville Country Manor, LLC, 2005-0072, p. 9 (La.App. 1 Cir. 2/10/06), 928 So.2d 549, 555, writs denied, 2006-0604 (La.5/26/06), 930 So.2d 25 and 2007-0481 (La.4/27/07/), 955 So.2d 699.

Article 1036.2 provides as follows:

A. An incarcerated parent of a child in the custody of the department shall provide a reasonable plan for the appropriate care of his child other than foster care. Failure by the incarcerated parent to provide an appropriate plan may result in an action to terminate his parental rights.
B. Within thirty days of notification that a parent of a child in foster care is incarcerated in this state, a representative of the department shall visit the incarcerated parent and give written notification to the incarcerated parent of his duty to provide a reasonable plan for the appropriate care of the child. The department, at that time, shall obtain information regarding the plan, including the names, addresses, cellular numbers, telephone numbers, and other contact information of every potential suitable alternative caregiver.
C. The incarcerated parent shall provide the department with the required information in writing within sixty days of receipt of the notification form. During that period, a parent may submit additional information or names of other caregivers using the form attached to the |4notice. The department shall provide the parent with a stamped, self-addressed envelope for this purpose. No additional caregiver names will be accepted after the expiration of the sixty-day period, as evidenced by a postmark.
D. The department shall conduct an assessment of the persons named as caregivers by the incarcerated parent and shall notify the parent within ten days of completion of the assessment whether the persons named are willing and able to offer a wholesome and stable environment for the child.
E. The notification form given to the incarcerated parent shall be substantially as follows:
NOTICE OF DUTY TO PROVIDE A REASONABLE PLAN FOR THE APPROPRIATE CARE OF YOUR CHILD AND TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS LAW
NOTICE TO PARENT: YOUR CHILD(REN),_HAS/HAVE BEEN PLACED IN THE CUSTODY OF THE LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES BY ORDER OF THE _ Parish juvenile court _on_
PLEASE BE ADVISED OF THE FOLLOWING:
Louisiana law provides that you may name a person who is willing and able to serve as the custodian of your children) and to offer a wholesome and stable environment for your child(ren). Failure to furnish a reasonable plan for the appropriate care of your child(ren) may result in the termination of your parental rights.
Please refer to Louisiana Children’s Code, Title X, Articles 1001 to 1043, especially Articles 1015(6) and 1036(E), for the details of Louisiana law regarding the termination of parental rights. A copy of the law is attached to this notice.
You are hereby notified that Louisiana law requires that you provide a reasonable plan for the appropriate care of your child(ren), other than continued foster care, within sixty (60) days of your receipt of this notice, which date is _Your plan shall include the names, addresses, cellular numbers, telephone numbers, and other contact information of every suitable alternative caregiver. You may provide additional information by filling out this form and mailing it in the stamped, self-addressed envelope given to you by the department before_If you fail or refuse to do so, you may lose all rights to your child(ren). Your plan will be examined to determine if it is reasonable and appropriate. Please provide your plan in detail no later than _to the following person:
NAME: _
ADDRESS: _
CITY/STATE/ZIP: _
TELEPHONE: _
NOTE: IF YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS OR NEED ANY ASSISTANCE, CONTACT THE ABOVE PERSON OR YOUR ATTORNEY IMMEDIATELY.
|sCopy of the law, La. Ch.C. Arts. 1001-1043, Attached. PLEASE READ.
I, _, hereby certify that a copy of this notice with La. Ch.C. Arts. 1001-1043 attached, was delivered to _ on_by personal delivery at the following location
DATE:
Signature of caseworker
I, _, have received a copy of this notice, together with the attached laws (La.Ch.C.Arts.1001-1043), and acknowledge that I understand fully that my rights may be terminated and my child(ren) adopted by others if I do not provide a reasonable plan of appropriate care while I am incarcerated, other than continued foster care, within sixty (60) days of my receipt of this notice on
Signature of parent
Witness: _
Date: _

We agree with the State that Article 1036.2 does not apply to the facts of this case. In March 2006, when S.G. was taken into custody, the notice requirements and specific duties set forth in Article 1036.2 as they apply to the State were not yet in effect. Article 1036.2 is clearly a substantive law that established new rules and duties with regard to the State’s obligations to an incarcerated parent of a child in the State’s custody. Thus, it can only be applied prospectively and not to the instant case. J.G.’s argument to the contrary is without merit.

We have thoroughly reviewed the record in this matter and the lengthy history leading up to the State’s petition for termination of J.G.’s parental rights. The record clearly and convincingly demonstrates that it was in the best interest of S.G. that J.G.’s parental rights be terminated and she be cleared for adoption. The trial court’s conclusion is supported by the evidence and, therefore, not manifestly erroneous.

For the above and foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. All costs associated with this appeal are assessed against appellant, J.G. We issue this memorandum opinion in accordance with Uniform Rules-Courts of Appeal, Rule 2-16.1B.

AFFIRMED.


author: GUIDRY, J.

text:
    WASHINGTON PARISH GOVERNMENT v. Honorable Walter P. REED, St. Tammany District Attorney’s Office and State of Louisiana, Division of Administration, Office of Human Resources.
    No. 2011 CA 1144.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.
    March 23, 2012.

      Richard L. Seelman, New Orleans, LA, for PlaintiffAppellee Washington Parish Government.
    E.B. Dittmer, II, Mandeville, LA, for PlaintiffAppellee Denise Gatewood, individually and on behalf of her minor children.
    Gilbert R. Buras, Jr., New Orleans, LA, for Defendant/Appellant Walter R. Reed, District Attorney, 22nd Judicial District.
    Before WHIPPLE, KUHN, and GUIDRY, JJ.
   GUIDRY, J.

|2In this workers’ compensation proceeding, a local district attorney appeals a judgment of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Administration finding the district attorney liable for payment of workers’ compensation benefits to the legal dependents of a deceased employee.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On September 30, 2008, while traveling home from a Louisiana District Attorney Association seminar, Millard Gatewood, an assistant district attorney serving in the Twenty-Second Judicial District, was killed in a one-car accident. Following his death, workers’ compensation death benefits were paid to his widow by the Parish Government Risk Management Agency Group Self-Insured Fund (PGRMA) on behalf of the Washington Parish Government.

At the time of his death, three separate governmental entities were contributing to the payment of Mr. Gatewood’s salary in the following listed percentages: 4.15% by the Washington Parish Government, 45.85% by the Twenty-Second Judicial District Attorney’s Office, and 50% by the State of Louisiana. On September 28, 2009, the Washington Parish Government filed a disputed claim for compensation against the State of Louisiana and the Honorable Walter P. Reed, as district attorney of the Twenty-Second Judicial District (“District Attorney”), seeking reimbursement for workers’ compensation death benefits paid to Mr. Gatewood’s legal dependents — his widow and minor children — but it later dismissed its claim, without prejudice, against the State of Louisiana.

laOn June 4, 2010, the Washington Parish Government filed an amended disputed claim for compensation to name Denise Gatewood as a party defendant, individually as the widow of Millard Gatewood and on behalf of her minor children. It also added its workers’ compensation insurer, PGRMA, as a party to the claim. In the amended claim, the Washington Parish Government asserted that the basis for the amended disputed claim was to decide “[cjoverage of deceased employee under the Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Act, the entitlement of the deceased employee’s widow and minor children to death benefits and the respective contributions owed by each payroll employer for any death benefits, past and future, that are owed.”

In conjunction with the amended disputed claim, the Washington Parish Government also filed a petition for declaratory judgment, wherein it also sought to have Mr. Gatewood’s legal dependents added as party defendants to its pending workers’ compensation claim. In the petition, the Washington Parish Government and PGRMA sought a declaratory judgment regarding whether Mr. Gatewood’s “legal dependents are entitled to Louisiana workers’ compensation death benefits, and, if such benefits are owed” and whether the Washington Parish Government and PGRMA are entitled to contribution from the district attorney’s office for the Twenty-Second Judicial District for all workers’ compensation death benefits paid and to be paid. In answer to the petition for declaratory judgment, Ms. Gatewood asserted that the Washington Parish Government and PGRMA are liable for payment of workers’ compensation death benefits by virtue of the Washington Parish Government exercising its discretion “to provide workers’ compensation coverage for its officials” in accordance with La. R.S. 23:1034(C).

The matter then proceeded to trial, following which the workers’ compensation judge (WCJ) rendéred judgment in favor of the Washington Parish | .government and Ms. Gatewood, individually and on behalf of her minor children, and against the District Attorney, holding that Mr. Gate-wood was the joint employee of the Washington Parish Government and the District Attorney, such that Mr. Gatewood was covered under the provisions of the Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Act. The WCJ therefore held the Washington Parish Government and the District Attorney solidarity liable for payment of workers’ compensation death benefits, and accordingly, ordered the District Attorney to reimburse the Washington Parish Government for 91.7 percent of the indemnity benefits paid to the legal dependents of Mr. Gatewood and funeral expenses in the amount of $6,877.50. The WCJ also ordered the District Attorney to continue to pay its proportionate share of the workers’ compensation death benefits owed to Ms. Gatewood and her minor children. Following the denial of his motion for new trial, the District Attorney suspensively appealed the judgment of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Administration.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

On appeal, the District Attorney contends that the following errors committed by the WCJ led to her improperly finding the District Attorney liable for payment of workers’ compensation death benefits to the legal dependents of Mr. Gatewood:

1. In failing to find Millard Gatewood an “official” within the meaning and intent of [La.] R.S. 23:1034;
2. In failing to address the exclusion of “officials[,”] and Millard Gatewood in particular, from workers^] compensation coverage under [La.] R.S. 23:1034;
3. In finding Millard Gatewood to be a “joint employee” of Washington Parish Government and Walter P. Reed, District Attorney, 22nd Judicial District;
4. In casting the office of Walter P. Reed, District Attorney, 22nd Judicial District, in judgment for a portion of the workers[’] compensation death benefits being paid to Millard Gatewood’s survivors by Washington Parish Government[;]
|55. In failing to find that Millard Gate-wood was outside the course and scope of his employment at the time of the accident.

DISCUSSION

The first and most critical issue raised in this appeal is the WCJ’s classification of Mr. Gatewood as a public employee rather than an “official.” This determination is critical because La. R.S. 23:1034 provides, in pertinent part:

A. The provisions of this Chapter shall apply to every person in the service of the state or a political subdivision thereof, or of any incorporated public board or commission authorized to hold property and to sue and be sued, under any appointment or contract of hire, express or implied, oral or written, except an official of the state or a political subdivision thereof or of any such incorporated public board or commission; and for such employee and employer the payment of compensation according to and under the terms, conditions, and provisions set out in this Chapter shall be exclusive, compulsory, and obligatory;....
B. Except as expressly and specifically provided to the contrary in Subsection A hereof, the officials excepted from coverage under the provisions of this Chapter, in Subsection A of this Section, include all public officers as defined by R.S. 42:1.... [Emphasis added.]

A public officer is defined simply as “any person holding a public office in this state,” according to La. R.S. 42:1. The statute then goes on to define “public office” as “any state, district, parish or municipal office, elective or appointive, or any position as member on a board or commission, elective or appointive, when the office or position is established by the constitution or laws of this state.”

The position of assistant district attorney is established in both the constitution and laws of this state. See La. Const. art. V, § 26 and La. R.S. 16:51. Thus, under a plain reading of La. R.S. 42:1, an assistant district attorney would qualify as a public officer, and thereby an “official” for purposes of La. R.S. 23:1034, since the position of assistant district attorney is established in both the constitution and laws of this state.

Notably, however, both the WCJ and the parties to this litigation have relied on jurisprudential tests to debate whether Mr. Gatewood, who held the position of assistant district attorney, was an official for purposes of La. R.S. 23:1034. The two primary cases considered are a decision of this court in Steece v. State, Department of Agriculture, 504 So.2d 984 (La.App. 1st Cir.1987), and the third circuit’s decision in Cloud v. State, 420 So.2d 1259 (La.App. 3d Cir.), writs denied, 423 So.2d 1166 and 1167 (La.1982).

In Steece, the plaintiff claimed that he was a “public officer” for the purpose of showing that his claim for unpaid compensatory time was not prescribed. Yet, in considering whether the plaintiff was a public officer, the court did not once refer to La. R.S. 42:1 in its analysis. See Steece, 504 So.2d at 986-87. The earlier opinion of Cloud, however, expressly dealt with both La. R.S. 42:1 and La. R.S. 23:1034. In its analysis, the third circuit found that the plaintiff in that case, a deputy coroner, was a “public official” under the plain construction of La. R.S. 23:1034 and La. R.S. 42:1. Cloud, 420 So.2d at 1262. Nevertheless, the court went on to analyze whether the plaintiff could be deemed a “public officer” under the existing jurisprudential tests, presumably because the plaintiffs claim arose in 1979, three years before the Louisiana Legislature amended La. R.S. 23:1034 to expressly define “officials” in the statute in accordance to La. R.S. 42:1. Cloud, 420 So.2d at 1262-63.

We believe that even under the jurisprudential tests outlined in Steece and Cloud, Mr. Gatewood was an “official”; but as the legislature, in the solemn |7expression of its will, clearly provided that any person satisfying the definition of “public officer” under La. R.S. 42:1 constitutes an “official” for purposes of La. R.S. 23:1034, we will simply rely on that statutory authority to support our determination. See La. C.C. arts. 2 and 9; see also Fontenet v. Cypress Bayou Casino, 06-0300 (La.App. 1st Cir. 6/8/07), 964 So.2d 1035, 1040-1041.

Thus, as • assistant district attorneys clearly are “public officers” as defined under La. R.S. 42:1, we find that the WCJ legally erred in finding Mr. Gatewood was not an official for purposes of La. R.S. 23:1034.

Furthermore, as Mr. Gatewood is an official, La. R.S. 23:1034(B) exempts the district attorney' from the obligation to provide the ‘exclusive, compulsory, and obligatory’ coverage otherwise required of employers under the Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Act. However, despite this exemption, La. R.S. 23:1034(0 does allow any political subdivision, “in its own discretion and by using its own funds available for same, [to] provide workers’ compensation coverage for its officials, in addition to having to provide such coverage for its employees.” The record before us reveals that the Washington Parish Government so elected to provide workers’ compensation coverage for Mr. Gatewood, but there is no evidence establishing that the District Attorney so acted. Accordingly, we find the WCJ erred in casting the District Attorney in judgment for the payment of such benefits. We, therefore, reverse the judgment of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Administration, insofar as it holds the District Attorney liable for reimbursement and payment of workers’ compensation benefits to the legal dependents of Mr. Gatewood.

^CONCLUSION

Based on the plain construction of La. R.S. 23:1034, in accordance with La. R.S. 42:1, we find that the WCJ erred in holding the Office of the District Attorney for the Twenty-Second Judicial District solidarity liable for the payment of workers’ compensation benefits to the legal dependents of Millard Gatewood. We therefore reverse those portions of the judgment: holding the Office of the District Attorney for the Twenty-Second Judicial District solidarily liable for the payment of workers’ compensation benefits; ordering the Office of the District Attorney for the Twenty-Second Judicial District to reimburse the Washington Parish Government for payment of workers’ compensation and funeral benefits; and ordering it to pay a proportionate share of future workers’ compensation benefits to the legal dependents of Millard Gatewood. All costs of this appeal, in the amount of $333.43, are cast to the Washington Parish Government.

REVERSED IN PART.

      . In the written trial stipulations submitted at the hearing, the percentage of contribution listed for the Washington Parish Government is incorrectly listed as 5.15%.

        . See La. R.S. 23:1034(D).

      . At trial, Ms. Gatewood testified that her full name is Susan Denise Gatewood.

      . The preamble to 1981 La. Acts Ex.Sess., No. 25 states:
      To amend and reenact Section 1034 of Title 23 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes of 1950, relative to workmen's compensation coverage for public employees and the exceptions and exemptions thereto and to their exclusive remedies, to interpret and clarify by definition the "officials” excepted from the coverage provided therein, to provide that any political subdivision may, in its own discretion and by using its own funds available for same, provide such coverage for its own officials, and otherwise to provide with respect thereto.
      As the pertinent portion of La. R.S. 23:1034 that was amended by Act 25 constituted interpretive legislation, the amendment could be given retroactive effect. See La. C.C. art. 6. Hence, the additional analysis of the deputy coroner’s classification under the existing jurisprudential tests was not necessary.

      . In so finding, we pretermit consideration of whether Mr. Gatewood was the joint employee of the District Attorney and the Washington Parish Government. We also pretermit discussion of the District Attorney’s final assignment of error in light of our discussion and resolution of the other assignments of error.