author: GRIFFIS, J.,

text:
    TIMBER LAKE FOODS, INC., Appellant v. Stephanie ESTESS, Appellee.
    No. 2009-CA-00980-COA.
    Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
    March 8, 2011.
    Rehearing Denied Oct. 18, 2011.

      Berkley N. Huskison, Columbus, J. Douglas Ford, Tupelo, attorney for appellant.
    John A. Ferrell, Booneville, attorney for appellee.
   GRIFFIS, J.,

for the Court:

¶ 1. Timber Lake Foods, Inc. (Timber Lake) filed suit seeking a preliminary injunction and damages against its former employee, Stephanie Estess, based on her alleged violation of a covenant not to compete. The Lee County Circuit Court found that the geographic scope of the covenant not to compete was unreasonable. Timber Lake’s motion for a preliminary injunction was denied. On appeal, Timber Lake argues that Stephanie entered into a valid and enforceable covenant not to compete, and its restrictions should be enforced. We find that the covenant not to compete is reasonable; therefore, the judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and this case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

FACTS

¶ 2. On January 13, 2003, Stephanie was hired by Timber Lake, a Mississippi corporation operating in Tupelo, Mississippi. She was nineteen years old, and she had only minimal prior work experience as a waitress. Stephanie’s job at Timber Lake required her to broker meat and poultry products between buyers and sellers nationwide.

¶ 3. Stephanie signed an employment agreement when she began work at Timber Lake. The agreement included the following covenant not to compete:

Employee agrees that, except with written permission from Employer, he will not, during his employment by Employer and for a period of two (2) years after the end of his employment by Employer, perform any services regarding the brokerage of meat and/or poultry products (or the transportation thereof), directly or indirectly, either as owner, partner, joint venturer, shareholder, employee, or consultant, for any person or business entity (or a subsidiary thereof) within a two hundred fifty (250) mile radius of Tupelo, Mississippi.
Employee acknowledges that such period is a reasonable period of time and that the geographical area set forth in the foregoing paragraph is reasonable. Employee represents and admits that in the event of the termination of his employment, for any reason whatsoever, his experience and capabilities are such that the enforcement of a remedy by way of injunction will not prevent him from earning a livelihood.

¶ 4. On October 8, 2005, Stephanie married Brian Estess, the son of Timber Lake’s owner, Joe Estess. On March 30, 2008, Brian required a kidney transplant. Brian’s friend, Ashley Perkins, volunteered to donate a kidney to Brian. Perkins worked for Vector Transportation, a truck-brokerage business owned by Joe and operated out of the same building as Timber Lake.

¶ 5. Stephanie testified that she began an affair with Perkins at some point prior to the kidney transplant. Brian learned of the affair and confronted Stephanie about it in the days following his kidney transplant. Despite the strain on the family caused by the affair, Stephanie continued to report to work at Timber Lake. Joe testified that news of the affair caused tension at Timber Lake. As a result of that tension, Joe terminated Stephanie’s employment on April 4, 2008. Stephanie and Brian have since divorced.

¶ 6. On April 24, 2008, Stephanie was hired by Lawrence Wholesale (Lawrence), a direct competitor of Timber Lake. Stephanie performed the same job at Lawrence that she had performed at Timber Lake. Because of the nature of the job, Stephanie could work from any location where she had access to a telephone and computer. She testified that she had worked out of Lawrence’s main office in California and from her home located in Baldwyn, Mississippi, which is within 250 miles of Tupelo.

¶ 7. Timber Lake filed suit in the Lee County Chancery Court seeking a permanent injunction enforcing the covenant not to compete, compensatory damages for breach of contract, and attorney’s fees. The chancellor found that jurisdiction was proper in the circuit court, and the case was transferred to the Lee County Circuit Court.

¶ 8. The complaint specifically alleged that Stephanie was in violation of the covenant not to compete. Additionally, the complaint stated Stephanie was using confidential and proprietary information in violation of her employment agreement. The employment agreement, which was attached as Exhibit A to the complaint, contains the following clause entitled “Nondisclosure”:

Employee agrees not to disclose to any unauthorized person, firm, corporation or other entity, and Employee further agrees not to use for his own benefit or for the benefit of any unauthorized person, firm, corporation or other entity any of Employer’s trade secrets or any other information which is proprietary and confidential. Trade secrets or confidential proprietary information shall mean all such information and shall not be limited to information which has not been made available by Employer to the public. Trade secrets or confidential proprietary information shall include, but shall not be limited to the following: customer account information; credit histories; customer lists; supplier lists; supplier account information; price schedules; job descriptions; cost data; vendor lists; contracts; carrier lists; and all operational forms created by or for Employer.
Employee acknowledges that the unauthorized disclosure and/or use of Employer’s trade secrets or other confidential proprietary information, either during Employee’s tenure of employment or following his termination, would constitute a clear threat to the business of Employer. The provisions of this paragraph shall be enforceable by Employer and shall without limitation survive the termination of this Employment Agreement.

¶ 9. Following a hearing on Timber Lake’s request for an injunction, the circuit court entered an order on April 21, 2009, holding that the covenant not to compete was unenforceable. The court concluded:

Considering the telephonic nature of the business, enforcement of the covenant would be unreasonable and ineffective. If Ms. Estess were required to conduct business 250 miles from Tupelo, Mississippi, she could continue to contact the same buyers and suppliers she is currently doing business with at Lawrence Wholesale as well as those she contacted while working for Timber Lake Foods. Therefore, this Court finds that the geographic scope of the covenant is unreasonable. Furthermore, enforcement of the covenant would prove ineffective in preventing injury to the business interests Timber Lake Foods seeks to protect.

The order denied Timber Lake’s request for a permanent injunction. The circuit court’s order did not address Timber Lake’s allegation that Stephanie was using confidential and proprietary information to compete with Timber Lake. The order also failed to address Timber Lake’s claims for compensatory damages and attorney’s fees.

¶ 10. Timber Lake filed a notice of appeal on May 21, 2009. On May 27, 2009, the circuit court entered a judgment of dismissal as to the claims against Stephanie. The order stated: “This Court’s Order on the preliminary injunction and holding that Timber Lake’s non-eompete agreement is unenforceable effectively ends all remaining claims included in the Complaint!,] and there is no need for further consideration of this case by the Court.” Timber Lake’s complaint was dismissed with prejudice. Timber Lake then filed an amended notice of appeal, on June 2, 2009, which stated that its appeal was from both the circuit court’s orders of April 21, 2009, and May 27, 2009.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 11. The Mississippi Supreme Court has provided the following standard of review for appeals concerning covenants not to compete:

When considering the enforceability of restrictive employment agreements, we review the entire record and “the evidence which supports or reasonably tends to support the findings of fact made below, together with all reasonable inferences which may be drawn therefrom and which favor the lower court’s findings of fact, must be accepted.” Sta-Home Health Agency v. Umphers, 562 So.2d 1258, 1263 (Miss.1990)[ (]quoting Culbreath v. Johnson, 427 So.2d 705, 707 (Miss.1983)[) ]. We will not disturb the findings of the lower court when they are supported by substantial evidence unless the Chancellor has abused his discretion, was manifestly wrong, clearly erroneous or an erroneous legal standard was applied. Bowers Window and Door Co. v. Dearman, 549 So.2d 1309 (Miss.1989)[ ([citing Culbreath, 427 So.2d at 707-708[) ]; Bullard v. Morris, 547 So.2d 789, 791 (Miss.1989).

Empiregas, Inc. of Kosciusko v. Bain, 599 So.2d 971, 975 (Miss.1992).

ANALYSIS

¶ 12. “[Restrictive covenants are not favored in law; the employer has the burden of proving their reasonableness; and the reasonableness as to time and space limitations must be determined from the facts of each case.” Texas Rd. Boring Co. of La.-Miss. v. Parker, 194 So.2d 885, 889 (Miss.1967). “But they are valid unless unreasonable, and when reasonable, the courts will not hesitate to hold the parties to their contracts.” Frierson v. Sheppard Bldg. Supply Co., 247 Miss. 157, 172, 154 So.2d 151, 156 (1963). When considering the enforcement of a covenant not to compete, this Court must weigh the rights of the employer, the rights of the employee, and the rights of the public. Texas Rd. Boring Co., 194 So.2d at 888.

¶ 13. There has been no allegation of harm to the public in this case because there are many other buyers, sellers, and brokers of poultry who are in competition with Timber Lake and Stephanie. In Em-piregas, the supreme court stated “that non-competition agreements are only valid ‘within such territory and during such time as may be reasonably necessary for the protection of the employer or principal, without imposing undue hardship on the employee or agent....’” Empiregas, 599 So.2d at 975 (quoting Wilson v. Gamble, 180 Miss. 499, 177 So. 363, 365 (1937)). Thus, we must look to whether the scope of the agreement was reasonably necessary to protect Timber Lake without imposing an undue hardship on Stephanie.

¶ 14. The covenant not to compete restricted Stephanie from brokering meat within 250 miles of Tupelo for a period of two years after her termination from Timber Lake. Joe testified that Timber Lake’s customers were located throughout the United States. As a broker, Stephanie could buy from and sell to these nationwide customers from any location with a computer and a telephone. Stephanie argued, and the circuit court agreed, that the 250-mile geographic scope was an arbitrary restriction considering that the nature of Stephanie’s job allowed her to work from any location. The circuit court found that the 250-mile restriction was arbitrary because Stephanie could contact the same customers and conduct the same transactions in competition with Timber Lake outside that radius..

¶ 15. In essence, the circuit court’s finding is that, in order to protect its interests, Timber Lake would have had to impose a nationwide geographic restriction on competition by its former employees. We understand the reluctance of Timber Lake to draft a covenant not to compete containing a nationwide restriction. While other jurisdictions have acknowledged that advancements in technology have created a need for such a broad geographic scope in covenants not to compete, Mississippi law has yet to address the issue.

¶ 16. In an effort to make the agreement reasonable to Stephanie, and thereby enforceable, Timber Lake chose to limit the geographic restriction to 250 miles instead of a nationwide restriction. On cross-examination, Joe was asked the reasoning behind the 250-mile limit when it had no connection to Timber Lake’s customers. He testified: “There is not a magic to the 250, but it keeps us from saying that [the employee] cannot earn a living.”

¶ 17. The circuit court was correct that the 250-mile limit was an arbitrary number that would not keep Stephanie from competing with Timber Lake outside that limit. However, such finding does not establish the unreasonableness of the geographic limit. The 250-mile limit provided some protection to Timber Lake by preventing her from competing in the Tupelo area. Joe testified that the covenant not to compete was designed to prevent employees who were provided extensive training at Timber Lake from moving across the street and competing against Timber Lake. At the same time, the covenant did nothing to prevent Stephanie from competing with Timber Lake on a nationwide level anywhere outside the 250-mile radius, thereby balancing her interest in finding employment with a Timber Lake competitor.

¶ 18. Since we find that a nationwide geographic restriction would have reasonably protected Timber Lake’s interests, we cannot say that Timber Lake’s effort to balance Stephanie’s interest by reducing that restriction to within a 250-mile radius of Tupelo was unreasonable. The circuit court’s finding of unreasonableness based solely on the arbitrariness of the 250-mile limit was clearly erroneous. Accordingly, the judgment of the circuit court is reversed.

¶ 19. We recognize that the two-year time limitation of the covenant not to compete has expired during the pendency of this appeal. As such, the issuance of an injunction would be improper; therefore, we remand this case for a determination of Timber Lake’s claim for damages.

¶ 20. We further note that Timber Lake also stated a claim for compensatory damages for Stephanie’s alleged violation of the nondisclosure clause of the employment agreement. Joe testified that Stephanie had access to Timber Lake’s customer lists, supply lists, actual costs, selling price, and negotiation strategies. He further stated that Stephanie had gained inside knowledge of the business when she became a member of the Estess family. This claim is independent of Timber Lake’s request for a preliminary injunction, and it should be addressed by the circuit court on remand.

¶ 21. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF LEE COUNTY IS REVERSED, AND THIS CASE IS REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE APPELLEE.

LEE, C.J., IRVING, P.J., MYERS, ISHEE, ROBERTS, CARLTON AND MAXWELL, JJ„ CONCUR. BARNES, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.

      . See, e.g., Victaulic Co. v. Tieman, 499 F.3d 227, 237 (3rd Cir.2007) ("In this Information Age, a per se rule against broad geographic restrictions would seem hopelessly antiquated, and, indeed, Pennsylvania courts (and federal district courts applying Pennsylvania law) have found broad geographic restrictions reasonable so long as they are roughly consonant with the scope of the employee’s duties.’’); National Reprographics, Inc. v. Strom, 621 F.Supp.2d 204, 225 (D.N.J.2009) ("It should be noted that all parties have acknowledged that technology in the industry is becoming more advanced, and the Court notes that technological advances are a factor that could increasingly affect the reasonableness of geographic limitations.”)

      . On appeal, Stephanie argues that Timber Lake has no legitimate business interest to protect because its potential customers are nonexclusive and the price of the chicken that Stephanie brokered is listed in a national market report. We disagree. "The primary right of the employer is that of 'protecting the business from loss of customers by the activities of the former employees who have peculiar knowledge of and relationships with the employer’s customers.' " Herring Gas Co., Inc. v. Magee, 813 F.Supp. 1239, 1245 (S.D.Miss.1993) (quoting Redd Pest Control Co. v. Heatherly, 248 Miss. 34, 43, 157 So.2d 133, 136 (1963)). The record shows that Timber Lake provided extensive training to Stephanie. She had no prior sales experience before her employment with Timber Lake. Timber Lake provided the training and opportunities for Stephanie to establish relationships with Timber Lake customers. Joe testified that a customer’s relationship with the broker will often cause a customer to pay a higher price to that broker as opposed to paying a lower price to an unfamiliar broker. The record shows that the overwhelming majority of Stephanie's sales during her employment at Lawrence were to former customers of Timber Lake with whom she had formed a relationship.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: LEE, C.J.,

license: Public Domain

text:
    Curtis PHILPOT, Appellant v. STATE of Mississippi, Appellee.
    No. 2009-KA-01986-COA.
    Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
    May 24, 2011.
    Rehearing Denied Oct. 18, 2011.

      Boty McDonald, Jackson, attorney for appellant.
    Office of the Attorney General by Lisa Lynn Blount, attorney for appellee.
    Before LEE, C.J., ISHEE and ROBERTS, JJ.
   LEE, C.J.,

for the Court:

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 1. Curtis Philpot was indicted in the Circuit Court of Madison County on charges of sexual battery, kidnapping, and aggravated assault. The jury found Phil-pot guilty of aggravated assault. He was sentenced to twenty years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections with the last four years suspended and five years’ supervised probation.

¶ 2. Philpot now appeals, asserting that the verdict was against the overwhelming weight and sufficiency of the evidence. Finding no error, we affirm.

FACTS

¶ 3. After spending the afternoon at a bar in Jackson, Mississippi, Philpot returned home to watch the 2005 Superbowl with his girlfriend, Dawn Campbell. The couple lived in Campbell’s home in Madison, Mississippi. Philpot and Campbell were both drinking, and they began to argue. Campbell eventually fell asleep, and Philpot hid her car keys and alcohol. He then fell asleep.

¶ 4. Philpot testified that when he woke up, Campbell was yelling at him and pointing his gun at him. Philpot testified that he kept a gun with him because he was in the business of debt collection. According to Philpot, he tried to take the gun from Campbell after she had threatened to shoot him. A struggle ensued for the gun, and Philpot hit Campbell multiple times. Philpot testified that this was the end of the altercation.

¶ 5. Campbell’s version of events differed significantly from Philpot’s version. Campbell testified that the altercation continued after Philpot had retrieved the gun. She alleged that Philpot had beaten her on the head with the gun, locked her in a bathroom, kicked her on her side, forced her to engage in sexual activities with him, and led her around with a belt like she was a dog.

¶ 6. The next morning, Philpot and Campbell left the house together to get a prescription filled for Campbell. After getting the prescription filled, they stopped at a gas station to get beer. Phil-pot went inside the gas station, while Campbell stayed in the car. Campbell fled in the car, while Philpot was in the gas station. She drove to a neighborhood to find help. The Madison Police Department was called, and officers went to Campbell’s house. They encountered Phil-pot, who had walked home after buying the beer. Philpot admitted to hitting Campbell, and he was arrested. Campbell was taken to the emergency room, treated, and released that same day.

DISCUSSION

¶ 7. Philpot argues that the evidence does not support a conviction of aggravated assault. He asserts that, at the most, the evidence supports a conviction of simple assault because the State failed to prove he had inflicted “serious bodily injury” on Campbell.

¶ 8. Mississippi Code Annotated section 97-3-7(1) (Supp.2010) defines simple assault as follows:

A person is guilty of simple assault if he (a) attempts to cause or purposely, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to another; or (b) negligently causes bodily injury to another with a deadly weapon or other means likely to produce death or serious bodily harm; or (c) attempts by physical menace to put another in fear of imminent serious bodily harm....

¶ 9. Section 97-3-7(2) (Supp.2010) defines aggravated assault as follows:

A person is guilty of aggravated assault if he (a) attempts to cause serious bodily injury to another, or causes such injury purposely, knowingly or recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life; or (b) attempts to cause or purposely or knowingly causes bodily injury to another with a deadly weapon or other means likely to produce death or serious bodily harm....

The jury was instructed on both simple and aggravated assault.

Weight of the Evidence

¶ 10. The Mississippi Supreme Court has stated the standard of review regarding the weight of the evidence as follows:

When reviewing a denial of a motion for a new trial based on an objection to the weight of the evidence, we will only disturb a verdict when it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence that to allow it to stand would sanction an unconscionable injustice.... However, the evidence should be weighed in the light most favorable to the verdict. A reversal on the grounds that the verdict was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence, unlike a reversal based on insufficient evidence, does not mean that acquittal was the only proper verdict. Rather ... the court simply disagrees with the jury’s resolution of the conflicting testimony. This difference of opinion does not signify acquittal any more than a disagreement among the jurors themselves. Instead, the proper remedy is to grant a new trial.

Bush v. State, 895 So.2d 836, 844 (¶ 18) (Miss.2005) (internal citations and quotations omitted).

¶ 11. Philpot admitted he had hit Campbell with his fists, but he denied he had hit Campbell with a gun. Dr. Richard Scott Johnson, the emergency-room doctor who treated Campbell, testified that Campbell’s injuries were consistent with being beaten on the head with an object like a gun. Dr. Johnson testified that Campbell had two black eyes and had been “beat[en] up pretty good.” Further, Dr. Bo Scales, a forensic scientist, performed a DNA analysis of the gun. Dr. Scales found Philpot’s DNA on the grip of the gun and Campbell’s DNA on the metal barrel at the end of the gun. Whether Philpot had hit Campbell with the gun and whether the gun was a deadly weapon in the way it was used were questions for the jury to decide. Davis v. State, 866 So.2d 1107, 1112 (¶ 17) (Miss.Ct.App.2003).

¶ 12. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we find that the guilty verdict is not against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. This issue is without merit.

Sufficiency of the Evidence

¶ 13. When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, “the critical inquiry is whether the evidence shows ‘beyond a reasonable doubt that accused committed the act charged, and that he did so under such circumstances that every element of the offense existed[.]’ ” Bush, 895 So.2d at 843 (¶ 16) (citation omitted). If, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the essential elements of the crime existed, this Court will affirm the conviction. Id. However, it is well-settled law that the jury determines the credibility of witnesses and resolves conflicts in the evidence. Davis, 866 So.2d at 1112 (¶ 17).

¶ 14. The jury was instructed to find Philpot guilty of aggravated assault if it found beyond a reasonable doubt that Philpot had “caused or attempted to cause bodily injury” to Campbell “with a deadly weapon, a firearm.” This instruction tracks the language of section 97-3-7(2)(b). A finding of “serious bodily injury” is not required by this subsection. We find Philpot’s argument that the jury was required to find that Campbell had suffered “serious bodily injury” is without merit.

¶ 15. THE JUDGMENT OF THE MADISON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT OF CONVICTION OF AGGRAVATED ASSAULT AND SENTENCE OF TWENTY YEARS IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, WITH FOUR YEARS SUSPENDED AND FIVE YEARS OF SUPERVISED PROBATION, IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO MADISON COUNTY.

IRVING AND GRIFFIS, P JJ., BARNES, ISHEE, ROBERTS, CARLTON AND MAXWELL, JJ., CONCUR. MYERS AND RUSSELL, JJ., NOT PARTICIPATING.


author: IRVING, P.J.,

text:
    Jimmy TRAYLOR, Appellant v. STATE of Mississippi, Appellee.
    No. 2010-CP-01139-COA.
    Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
    June 28, 2011.
    Rehearing Denied Oct. 18, 2011.
    Jimmy Traylor, appellant, pro se.
    Office of the Attorney General by Ladonna C. Holland, attorney for appellee.
    Before IRVING, P.J., ISHEE and CARLTON, JJ.
   IRVING, P.J.,

for the Court:

¶ 1. On February 19, 2008, Jimmy Tray-lor pleaded guilty to culpable-negligence manslaughter and felonious child abuse. Following his plea, the Lee County Circuit Court sentenced Traylor to twenty years for the culpable-negligence-manslaughter charge and forty years for the felonious-child-abuse charge, with five years of post-release supervision, to be served concurrently in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. On March 10, 2010, Traylor filed a motion for post-conviction relief (PCR), which the circuit court denied. Feeling aggrieved, Traylor appeals and argues that he was subjected to double jeopardy and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.

¶ 2. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.

FACTS

¶ 3. On July 20, 2007, a Lee County grand jury indicted Traylor for depraved-heart murder. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the circuit court granted the State’s motion to reduce the charge from depraved-heart murder to culpable-negligence manslaughter. On February 19, 2008, Traylor was charged, by criminal information, with felonious child abuse. On the same day, Traylor signed a waiver of indictment for the felonious-child-abuse charge and pleaded guilty to both felonious child abuse and culpable-negligence manslaughter.

¶4. Additional facts, as necessary, will be related during our analysis and discussion of the issues.

ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUES

¶ 5. When reviewing a circuit court’s denial of a motion for post-conviction relief, factual findings will not be disturbed unless they are clearly erroneous. Moore v. State, 986 So.2d 928, 932 (¶ 13) (Miss.2008). However, questions of law are reviewed de novo. Id.

1. Double Jeopardy

¶ 6. Traylor contends that his plea upon criminal information to felonious child abuse constitutes double jeopardy. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution states: “No person shall ... be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” The Mississippi Constitution contains a similar prohibition: “No person’s life or liberty shall be twice placed in jeopardy for the same offense.... ” Miss. Const, art. 3, § 22. “The double-jeopardy clause affords ... protection from multiple punishments for the same offense.” Foreman v. State, 51 So.3d 957, 960 (¶8) (Miss.2011) (quoting Graves v. State, 969 So.2d 845, 847 (¶ 7) (Miss.2007)). In determining whether a defendant has been subjected to double jeopardy, an appellate court applies the test announced in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932). The Blockburger test requires that “where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not.” Id.

¶ 7. Traylor pleaded guilty to culpable-negligence manslaughter and felonious child abuse following the death of his three-month-old son. The charges stemmed from two separate and distinct criminal acts — starving his son to death and breaking his son’s femur. Therefore, a double-jeopardy analysis under Block-burger is unnecessary. “Double jeopardy protects criminal defendants from being exposed to more than one prosecution for the same offense. It does.not protect a defendant against different prosecutions for different offenses.” Tapper v. State, 47 So.3d 95, 103 (¶ 30) (Miss.2010) (quoting Wright v. State, 540 So.2d 1, 5 (Miss.1989)). This issue is without merit.

2. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

¶ 8. Traylor argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney allowed him to plead guilty to two charges stemming from the same crime. To succeed in a challenge to the effectiveness of counsel, Traylor must prove that his counsel was deficient and that this deficiency prejudiced him. Doss v. State, 19 So.3d 690, 694-95 (¶7) (Miss.2009) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)). Both prongs must be pleaded with specific detail. Coleman v. State, 749 So.2d 1003, 1012 (¶ 26) (Miss.1999). In the context of PCR cases, specificity requires more than a party’s own affidavit or mere assertions made within his brief. Vielee v. State, 653 So.2d 920, 922 (Miss.1995).

¶ 9. As discussed above, Traylor was not subjected to double jeopardy; therefore, his argument that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney allowed him to plead guilty to culpable-negligence manslaughter and felonious child abuse is without merit. Traylor makes no other complaints regarding his attorney’s representation and has failed to otherwise demonstrate that his attorney’s representation was deficient. In fact, during his plea hearing, he stated under oath that he was satisfied with his attorney’s representation. As such, this issue is without merit.

¶10. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF LEE COUNTY DENYING THE MOTION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO LEE COUNTY.

LEE, C.J., GRIFFIS, P.J., MYERS, BARNES, ISHEE, ROBERTS, CARLTON, MAXWELL AND RUSSELL, JJ., CONCUR.


author: ROBERTS, J.,

text:
    Jimmy D. BONDS, Appellant v. STATE of Mississippi, Appellee.
    No. 2010-KM-01371-COA.
    Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
    Sept. 27, 2011.

      Robert Bryce Lott, attorney for appellant.
    Office of the Attorney General by W. Glenn Watts, attorney for appellee.
    Before GRIFFIS, P.J., BARNES and ROBERTS, JJ.
   ROBERTS, J.,

for the Court:

¶ 1. In the early morning hours on January 1, 2010, Mississippi Highway Patrol Trooper Chris White issued Jimmy Bonds five driving citations. The citations were issued for the following reasons: a seatbelt violation, careless driving, failure to dim headlights, improper tag, and driving under the influence (DUI). Bonds’s first hearing occurred on March 16, 2010, in the Prentiss County Justice Court. He was convicted of first offense DUI. Bonds appealed his DUI conviction to the Prentiss County Circuit Court. At the de novo hearing on June 21, 2010, the circuit court found Bonds guilty of DUI first offense. Bonds now appeals.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 2. This appeal stems from a traffic stop that occurred at 3:00 a.m. on January 1, 2010. While traveling south on Highway 45 that morning, Trooper White encountered a vehicle driving north; the driver of the vehicle failed to dim the headlights when passing him. Trooper White turned to follow the vehicle, and after following the vehicle for approximately half a mile and witnessing it weave on the highway, he proceeded to stop the vehicle. Bonds, the driver of the vehicle, complied and pulled his vehicle to the side of the highway. Trooper White later testified that upon speaking with Bonds, he noted that Bonds was unsteady; had slurred speech; red, bloodshot eyes; and his breath smelled of alcohol. Trooper White inquired as to where Bonds had been and if he had been drinking; Bonds replied that he had been at Bushwhackers down in Baldwyn, Mississippi, where he had consumed approximately five or six drinks. Trooper White administered a portable Breathalyzer test to Bonds; the results showed that Bonds had an intoxicating beverage in his system.

¶ 3. Based on this result and his observation of Bonds’s driving and behavior, Trooper White issued Bonds five citations. He received a citation for a seatbelt violation, careless driving, failure to dim headlights, and improper tag. He was also issued a citation for a first-offense DUI. The DUI citation showed checkmarks in two separate boxes. One box indicated that Bonds was in violation for being “under the influence of an intoxicating liquor.” The second box indicated that Bonds had “an alcohol concentration of eight one-hun-dreths percent (.08%) or more for persons who are above the legal age to purchase alcoholic beverages under state law, to wit _” Trooper White later filled in the blank with Bond’s Breathalyzer test of “,12%.” Bonds was transported to the Prentiss County Jail where he submitted to taking two Breathalyzer tests. The first test read .128. The second test read .134. He was held in the Prentiss County Jail until he was released on bond at approximately 7:30 a.m. on January 1, 2010.

¶ 4. A hearing was held in the justice court on March 16, 2010, and it resulted in a DUI first offense conviction of Bonds. He appealed his DUI first offense conviction to the circuit court; and on June 21, 2010, the circuit court conducted a de novo trial on the conviction. At the hearing, Bonds, through his attorney, moved to have the DUI charge dismissed based on an invalid affidavit because the citation was not timely filed. The circuit judge denied the motion. Trooper White was then subjected to examination by both sides. After Trooper White’s testimony, the State rested its case, and Bonds moved for a directed verdict on several grounds. He first argued that, at the hearing, Trooper White failed to identify Bonds as the man who drove the vehicle and was sitting as the defendant in the courtroom. He next argued that the State never offered any evidence as to the location of the offense, specifically that it was in Prentiss County Mississippi thus, the circuit court was without proper jurisdiction. Third, he argued that Trooper White had no authority to administer the Breathalyzer tests, so the results of the tests were invalid. Lastly, he again argued that the DUI charge should be dismissed because the citation was not filed timely. The circuit judge overruled Bonds’s motion and found him guilty of first-offense DUI based on common-law DUI elements. The circuit judge imposed a $250 fine. Bonds was also sentenced to complete the MASEP program.

¶ 5. Feeling aggrieved, Bonds perfected his appeal on August 16, 2010. On appeal, he raises the following two issues, which we recite verbatim:

I. Whether the State must prove that the alleged offense occurred in Pren-tiss County, Mississippi in order to invoke the jurisdiction of, and establish venue in, the justice and circuit courts of Prentiss County, Mississippi.
II. Whether the citation must conform to the requirements of the Uniform Traffic Ticket Law in order to be a valid sworn affidavit.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 6. A motion for a directed verdict challenges the sufficiency of the evidence; therefore, on appeal, “the critical inquiry is whether the evidence shows ‘beyond a reasonable doubt that accused committed the act charged, and that he did so under such circumstances that every element of the offense existed; and where the evidence fails to meet this test it is insufficient to support a conviction.’ ” Jones v. State, 904 So.2d 149, 153 (¶ 12) (Miss.2005) (quoting Carr v. State, 208 So.2d 886, 889 (Miss.1968)). “In analyzing the sufficiency of the evidence, ‘[t]he relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” Barfield v. State, 22 So.3d 1175, 1185 (¶ 34) (quoting Jones v. State, 904 So.2d 149, 153-54 (¶ 12) (Miss.2005)).

ANALYSIS

I. Proof of Venue

¶ 7. Bonds first argues that the circuit court erred by denying his motion for a directed verdict on the issue that the State failed to affirmatively establish venue or “rule out any other ‘reasonable theory.’ ” To support his argument, Bonds relies on the Mississippi Supreme Court ease Kitchens v. State, 186 Miss. 443, 191 So. 116 (1939). In Kitchens, the supreme court reversed Robert Kitchens’s conviction of driving a car while in a state of intoxication because the State failed to prove where the incident occurred and did not establish venue because “the only proof offered by the State was that the appellant was drunk when he drove his automobile up to the home of the chief prosecuting witness, and that this witness lived ‘about two miles below Star, off of 49 Highway on the road known as the Stewart and Ella Ross road, in District No. 1 of Rankin County.’ ” Id. at 117. The supreme court further stated that the State failed to offer proof that the offense was committed in Mississippi and “what distance the witness lived from where the trial was being conducted.... ” Id. While recognizing the supreme court’s concern in liberally permitting judicial knowledge of places and locations to establish venue as discussed in Kitchens, we find that the evidence presented in the current case rises above what was presented in Kitchens and is sufficient to support the circuit judge’s decision that venue had been proven and that the motion for a directed verdict was properly denied. We find the case of Bearden v. State, 662 So.2d 620 (Miss.1995), which is relied upon by the State, is more on point. In Bearden, the supreme court affirmed Bearden’s DUI conviction although he argued that the lower court was without jurisdiction because it had not been properly established. Id. at 625. The supreme court stated that venue was proven by the testimony of a witness and, further, that the heading on the citation “inform[ed] Bear-den that Sunflower County is the place of the offense.” Id. In the current case, all five citations, including the DUI citation, list Prentiss County as the county in which the offense occurred. Other evidence includes testimony from Trooper White that he had been transferred to Prentiss County to work as a trooper. He also testified that when he took Bonds to the jail, they went to the Prentiss County Jail. When questioned, he further confirmed that the hearing that day was being held in Pren-tiss County. Trooper White also testified that on that night he was on duty and was “traveling southbound on U.S. [Highway] 45. [He] met a vehicle going northbound on U.S. [Highway] 45.” Finally, the Breathalyzer consent form that was entered into evidence at trial as State’s Exhibit 2 and is signed by Trooper White lists the county where the violation occurred as Prentiss County. At the hearing, the circuit judge stated that it was his “recollection that the officer testified he was working in Prentiss County and met the vehicle because of bright lights, he went across the median, he pursued him, there was no tag, he stopped him. It’s my — I’m not concerned about the location. I do believe that it was shown that it was in Prentiss County based upon his testimony.” After viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we find that the circuit judge did not err in overruling Bonds’s motion for a directed verdict as a rational trier of fact could have determined that the evidence was sufficient to prove venue.

¶ 8. Finding no error, this issue is without merit.

II. Validity of the DUI Citation

¶ 9. Bonds’s second issue involves the timeliness in which Trooper White filed the DUI citation with the clerk of the court. Bonds’s primary argument is that the circuit judge erred in not dismissing the DUI charge because Trooper White did not timely file the citation. He initially raised this issue as a pretrial motion to dismiss and in his motion for a directed verdict; the circuit judge overruled both motions. The DUI citation issued to Bonds lists the day that it was sworn and attested to as January 8, 2010. The remaining citations show that they were sworn and attested to on January 5, 2010. At the hearing, Trooper White testified that he actually filed, swore and attested to the DUI citation on the same day as the other citations, but an error at the clerk’s office required him to re-swear to the citation on January 8, 2010.

¶ 10. Mississippi Code Annotated section 63-9-21 (Rev.2004) is also known as the Uniform Traffic Ticket Law and contains the provisions on how traffic tickets should be filed, what information must be on the ticket, and the ramifications for the failure to issue a ticket in the proper manner. Specifically, Mississippi Code Annotated section 63-9-21(6) states, in part, that “if a ticket is issued and the person is incarcerated based upon the conduct for which the ticket was issued, the ticket shall be filed with the clerk of the court to which it is returnable no later than 5:00 p.m. on the next business day, excluding weekends and holidays, after the date and time of such incarceration.” Bonds argues that, pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated section 63-9-21(6), Trooper White should have filed the DUI citation with the clerk of court no later than 5:00 p.m. on January 4, 2010; therefore, his failure to do so requires dismissal of the case. Interestingly, Bonds relies on Bearden, to argue that, although this particular issue has not been before this Court, violation of this section of the statute requires dismissal because the supreme court found that failure to comply with section 63-9-21(3)(c) requires dismissal. Our reading of Bear-den reveals no such premise. The only discussion found in Bearden is Bearden’s argument that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case because the citation was not sworn to as required by statute. Bearden, 662 So.2d at 625. On that issue, the supreme court simply stated that the officer complied with the statute and properly swore to the citation. Id. There is no discussion found in the opinion that requires dismissal based on the failure to comply with the statute. Further, there are cases to support the proposition that even a defect in a citation can be amended before trial as long as the defendant was not harmed by the defect. See Wildmon v. City of Booneville, 980 So.2d 304, 307 (¶¶ 6-7) (Miss.Ct.App.2007). In this case, Bonds was not held in jail until January 5, 2010, or January 8, 2010. He bonded out of jail approximately three hours later. We cannot see how he would have been harmed by Trooper White’s late filing.

¶ 11. Bonds next relies on his own interpretation of the statute’s legislative history to support his argument that the citation should be dismissed. He argues that since the statute was adopted, there have been several amendments introduced that would change the language in the statute to include a disclaimer that the officer’s failure to timely file the citation could not result in dismissal of the citation. Bonds submits that since these proposed amendments failed, “it can only be concluded that the Legislature intended [Mississippi Code Annotated section 63-9-21(6) ] to be a jurisdictional prerequisite requiring dismissal of the citation for failing to comply therewith.” We decline to extend this interpretation that the Legislature’s rejection of the amendments should logically mean that failure to timely file the citation requires dismissal. Therefore, we affirm the circuit judge’s denial of Bonds’s motion' for a directed verdict.

¶ 12. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PRENTISS COUNTY OF CONVICTION OF DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE, FIRST OFFENSE, AND SENTENCE OF COMPLETION OF THE MASEP PROGRAM AND TO PAY A $250 FINE IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO PREN-TISS COUNTY.

LEE, C.J., IRVING AND GRIFFIS, P.JJ., MYERS, BARNES, ISHEE, CARLTON, MAXWELL AND RUSSELL, JJ., CONCUR.

      . Mr. Bearden’s first name is not contained in the opinion.

      . The form also shows the warning that was read to Bonds regarding his right to refuse the test. It further contains the results of the Breathalyzer tests administered to Bonds.


text:
    James ALEXANDER, Appellant v. Patsy Phillips MUSGROVE a/k/a Patsy Joan Vanderford, Appellee.
    No. 2010-CA-00890-COA.
    Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
    Oct. 11, 2011.

      Jason T. Barrett, attorney for appellant.
    Malcolm T. Rogers, Monticello, attorney for appellee.
    Before IRVING, P.J., MAXWELL and RUSSELL, JJ.
   IRVING, P.J.,

for the Court:

¶ 1. This appeal arises out of two tax sales of a piece of real property in Lawrence County, Mississippi. James Alexander purchased the property at two different tax sales. The property’s previous owner, Patsy Musgrove, filed suit in the Lawrence County Chancery Court seeking to cancel the tax deeds. The chancery court issued an order setting aside a tax deed connected with the property. Feeling aggrieved, Alexander appeals and asserts that: (1) there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding who was entitled to notice for the second tax sale; (2) the final judgment is incomplete and vague; and (3) he is entitled to the proceeds from a lumber sale that he contracted for on the property.

¶ 2. The chancery court’s judgment is ambiguous and insufficient to dispose of the issues before this Court. Accordingly, we reverse and remand this case for a new judgment that adequately addresses the contested issues in this case.

FACTS

¶ 3. In 1993, Alexander obtained a tax deed to the property at issue in this case. However, the statutory notice period required by Mississippi Code Annotated section 27-43-3 (Rev.2010) was not complied with. A month later, Musgrove filed suit, seeking to cancel the tax deed as a cloud on her title.

¶ 4. In 1994, Alexander contracted with Jayess Wood, Inc. to sell timber on the property. The proceeds of that contract, which total almost $15,000, are currently interpleaded with the chancery court.

¶ 5. In 1998, Alexander obtained a second; tax deed to the same property. However, the same statutory notice period was allegedly not complied with in connection with the second sale. Despite the legal troubles concerning the property, Alexander paid the ad valorem taxes on it throughout the late 1990s and 2000s.

¶ 6. On April 27, 2010, the chancery court entered a final judgment adjudicating the issues before it. In its entirety, the judgment states the following:

This cause having come on for hearing upon [an] amended motion for summary judgment[,] and the [e]ourt having heard and considered the same[,] finds as follows, to-wit:
That the [c]ourt has jurisdiction of the parties and subject matter.
That the [c]ourt had previously entered its order finding that the statutory requirements dealing with tax sales had not been complied with and that the tax sale is set aside and declared null and void.
The [c]ourt further finds that the tax deed issued as a result of that void tax sale is likewise set aside.
The [c]ourt further finds that the defendant[,] James AIexander[,] is granted the money expended for the taxes together with the legal interest rate paid from the date of the void tax sale until paid in full. The [c]ourt further finds that attorneys[’] fees in the amount of $1,000 are payable to Mr. Alexander for the failure of the county to comply with the statutes as set forth.

The summary-judgment order referenced in the final judgment disposed of only the 1993 tax deed as void.

¶ 7. Additional facts, as necessary, will be related during our analysis and discussion of the issue.

ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUE

¶ 8. The final judgment did not explicitly address the second tax sale. The chancery court’s statement — that “The [cjourt further finds that the tax deed issued as a result of that void tax sale is likewise set aside” — could refer to either tax sale. In fact, “that void tax sale” would tend to lead the reader to believe that the chancery court was referring to the tax sale that was addressed in its previous summary-judgment order.

¶ 9. Furthermore, the judgment did not address the proceeds of the lumber sale, even though the previous summary-judgment order stated that the sale would be addressed in the chancery court’s final judgment.

¶ 10. Finally, it is impossible to discern from the chancery court’s judgment exactly what monies were to be remitted to Alexander for his payment of the taxes. No specific monetary amount was assigned. While the chancery court was not required to order a specific amount if the amounts were otherwise discernible, it is not clear whether the court was attempting to reimburse Alexander for the monies he paid for the tax deeds or if the court was attempting to reimburse him for the years he paid the ad valorem taxes for the property.

¶ 11. In short, the chancery court’s final judgment was insufficient to adjudicate all the issues before it. On remand, the chancery court should explicitly and clearly address the second tax deed, the timber proceeds, and the exact nature of any reimbursements to Alexander.

¶ 12. THE JUDGMENT OF THE LAWRENCE COUNTY CHANCERY COURT IS REVERSED, AND THIS CASE IS REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE AP-PELLEE.

LEE, C.J., MYERS, BARNES, ISHEE, ROBERTS, CARLTON, MAXWELL AND RUSSELL, JJ„ CONCUR. GRIFFIS, P.J., CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION.

      . Musgrove acquired title to the property from Lib Vanderford and his wife in 1982.


author: CARLTON, J.,

text:
    ASPIRED CUSTOM HOMES, LLC, Appellant v. Todd MELTON and Tina Melton, Appellees.
    No. 2010-CA-00429-COA.
    Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
    Oct. 11, 2011.

      Thomas Melvin McElroy, Tupelo, attorney for appellant.
    Michael Blakely Gratz Jr., attorney for appellees.
    Before IRVING, P.J., ISHEE and CARLTON, JJ.
   CARLTON, J.,

for the Court:

¶ 1. Aspired Custom Homes, LLC (Aspired) appeals the Lee County Chancery Court’s judgment in favor of Tom and Tina Melton (Meltons). Aspired claims that the chancellor erred: by refusing to order specific performance of Aspired’s real-estate contract with the Meltons; entering a final judgment in favor of the Meltons; and making numerous manifestly wrong or clearly erroneous findings. Finding no error, we affirm the chancellor’s judgment.

FACTS

¶ 2. The Meltons entered into a contract to purchase a home from Randall Godwin, the owner of Aspired. The contract, executed on June 25, 2008, listed the sale price of the home at $340,000, and the contract required the Meltons to provide earnest money in the amount of $8,000. The contract listed the closing date as July 9, 2008. The contract also stated that “the property must appraise at or above sales price or Buyers shall not be obligated to complete the purchase of the property described herein and all earnest money shall be refunded to the Buyers.” The contract required Aspired to make a substantial number of changes and additions to the home, and the contract also required the Meltons to apply in proper form for a loan sufficient to close within seven days after the effective date of the contract. The contract also provided that “[s]pecific performance is the essence of this [c]ontract.”

¶ 3. The Meltons contracted with E.C. Neelly IV to perform an appraisal and home inspection of the property. Neelly performed the appraisal six days after the execution of the contract, and Neelly subsequently generated the full report on July 1, 2008, listing the market value of the property at only $330,000. Neelly also performed the home inspection on July 1, 2008, and the home-inspection report set forth his concerns regarding the property.

¶ 4. On July 7 and 8, 2008, the Meltons sent two letters to Aspired to place Aspired on notice that the home inspection revealed standing water and flooding in the front yard. The Meltons also informed Aspired that the property appraised at a value below the purchase price. The Mel-tons informed Aspired of their desire to cancel the contract, and they demanded the return of all of their earnest money due to the standing water and flooding in the front yard.

¶ 5. Then, on July 7, 2008, Aspired sent the Meltons a letter apologizing for the yard flooding, and the letter from Aspired claimed a lack of awareness of the flooding issues. In the letter, Aspired stated that it would attempt to rectify the situation as soon as possible. According to the testimony presented at trial, these three letters passed each other in the mail or by facsimile. Aspired refused to return the earnest money to the Meltons.

¶ 6. On August 13, 2008, Aspired’s real estate agent, Crye-Leike Realty, filed in the Lee County Chancery Court a complaint in interpleader for the earnest money, and Crye-Leike Realty requested that the chancery court continue the action on its merits between Aspired and the Mel-tons. Crye-Leike also requested discharge by the chancery court from any further liability.

¶ 7. On October 2, 2008, Aspired filed its cross-claim against the Meltons in the chancery court, seeking specific performance of the real-estate contract and damages caused by the Meltons’ failure to perform. On October 27, 2008, the chancellor dismissed Crye-Leike as a party through an agreed order. On October 10, 2008, the Meltons filed their cross-claim against Aspired, seeking the return of their earnest money and attorney’s fees.

¶ 8. After a trial held on July 2, 2009, the chancellor issued his judgment on September 24, 2009, and he denied Aspired’s claim for specific performance and damages. The chancellor also declared the real-estate contract between Aspired and the Meltons to be null and void, and the chancellor ordered the earnest money to be returned to the Meltons. The chancellor ultimately ordered Aspired to pay the Meltons’ attorney’s fees and costs in the amount of $6,554.56.

¶ 9. Aspired filed a motion for reconsideration, and the chancellor held hearings on this motion on January 19, 2010, and also on February 5, 2010. The chancellor subsequently denied Aspired’s motion for reconsideration. Aspired now appeals, and it asks this Court to reverse the chancellor’s opinion and judgment and order the Meltons to specifically perform the contract and pay damages to Aspired. Upon our review of the record, we concur in the chancellor’s determination that the contract between the Meltons and Aspired was null and void. We also affirm the chancellor’s order to return the earnest money to the Meltons and to pay the Mel-tons’ attorney’s fees and costs.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 10. This Court “will not disturb the factual findings of a chancellor when supported by substantial evidence unless we can say with reasonable certainty that the chancellor abused his discretion, was manifestly wrong, clearly erroneous[,] or applied an erroneous legal standard.” Gandy v. Estate of Ford, 17 So.3d 189, 192 (¶6) (Miss.Ct.App.2009) (quotation omitted). “The existence of a contract and its terms are questions of fact to be resolved by the fact-finder, whether a jury or a judge in a bench-trial.” Id. However, “the construction of a contract is a question of law that is committed to the court instead of a question of fact committed to the fact-finder.” Id. at 192-93 (¶ 6) (citation omitted). We review questions of law de novo. Id. In this case, Aspired’s notice of appeal reflects an appeal from the judgment of the chancery court, questioning the substance of the judgment. A judgment by the chancellor is final in all respects, thus ending the controversy with no future questions to determine, except for perhaps collateral or separate questions. City of Jackson v. Jackson Oaks Ltd. P’ship, 792 So.2d 983, 985 (¶5) (Miss.2001) (citation omitted). A judgment may be subject to correction or amendment, but such corrections fail to affect its finality. Id.

¶ 11. While Aspired appeals the judgment of the chancery court questioning the judgment’s substance, we acknowledge the record reflects the chancellor denied a timely filed post-trial motion brought by Aspired pursuant to Rule 59(e) — a motion to alter or amend judgment. See M.R.C.P. 59. Aspired filed a motion pursuant to Rule 59(e) and raised four issues before the chancellor. However, a party is not required to file a post-trial motion in chancery court in order to appeal the chancery court’s judgment. We therefore address the merits of the appeal before us, questioning the substance of the chancellor’s judgment.

DISCUSSION

¶ 12. In his opinion and judgment entered on September 24, 2009, the chancellor stated:

Prior to the closing date, [Aspired] had secured a line of credit from Merchants and Farmers Bank which put the value at Three Hundred Thirty-Five Thousand Dollars ($335,000.00) as reflected in Exhibit 11, which was less than the sales price. Prior to the closing date, [Aspired] had no other appraised valuation[,] but [it] estimated that the home was worth Three Hundred Sixty-Eight Thousand Dollars ($368,000.00). The [Meltons] secured an appraisal from E.C. Neelly, IV, an experienced licensed appraiser, who, on July 1, 2008, both inspected and appraised the home for Three Hundred Thirty Thousand Dollars ($330,000.00), less than the sales price, as reflected in Exhibits 1 and 9. Subsequent to the failure to close on July 9, 2008, [Aspired] had two (2) appraisals done of the house, one by Jimmy Langley, licensed appraiser, of July 30, 2008, appraising it at Three Hundred Fifty-Two Thousand Dollars ($352,000.00) and one by Mike Guyton, licensed appraiser, of July 15, 2008, appraising it at Three Hundred Fifty-Eight Thousand Dollars ($358,000.00). Nothing prevented [Aspired] from securing such appraisals before the agree-upon closing date of July 9, 2008. Prior to the time of both of those, the [Mel-tons] had given written notice to [Aspired] that the Contract was null and void, as the sales price had not been met, and that the house had not been completed as of the day they inspected it on July 4, 2008, a date with torrential rains and water standing in the yard, which required considerable work by [Aspired] to rectify, which in great part was done after July 9, 2008.
Much argument was made of the fact that the appraisal of E.C. Neelly, IV, as set forth in Exhibit 1 did not initially have the correct square footage and was based upon calculations from his computer, which was not operating properly; however, this was cured as reflected in Exhibit 9 which did not change the appraisal value whatsoever. The subsequent appraisals of Jimmy Langley and Mike Guyton, which were requested and conducted subsequent to the agreed closing date, have proven to be unreliable because the house has yet to sell for anything approaching those values more than a year later. The evidence was insufficient to establish fraud or collusion on the part of the [Meltons] with Neelly.
The testimony was clear and convincing that though the house was mostly complete, it was not complete on July 4, 2008, or on July 9, 2008, the closing date, and even as late as August 2008, the house was only 95 to 98% complete. To the date of trial, the house had still not been sold, even for a reduced price, but primarily because of declining market conditions.
The Addendum, which is part of Exhibit 7, is part of the Contract that the parties entered into; the [Meltons] had a contractual and lawful right to terminate the Contract because the appraised value was not that of the Contract sales price as of the closing date, and that, in and of itself, was sufficient to cancel the Contract, which they did. Additionally, the house was not complete as was required by July 9, 2008, and that is an additional ground for declaring the Contract null and void, which the [Meltons] did.
There was Eight Thousand Dollars ($8,000.00) placed in escrow as earnest money for the Contract, which pursuant to the terms and provisions of the Contract should be reimbursed to the [Mel-tons], as well as, under the terms of the Contract, reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.

¶ 13. On appeal, Aspired asserts that the Meltons failed to come into court with “clean hands” by breaching the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and also by failing to fulfill a number of their contractual obligations. See Cook v. Whiddon, 866 So.2d 494, 498 (¶ 13) (Miss.Ct.App.2004) (citing Thigpen v. Kennedy, 238 So.2d 744, 746 (Miss.1970) (The clean-hands doctrine provides that “[h]e who comes into equity must come with clean hands.”)). Aspired argues that the Mel-tons breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by failing to obtain a realistic value of the property through a proper appraisal. Aspired claims that Neelly’s appraisal was “fraught with error,” and Aspired submits that Neelly admitted at trial that he mis-meas-ured the property by thirty square feet when performing the appraisal on the property at issue. Aspired asserts that at trial, Neelly admitted that he had used a software program that contained a glitch while performing his appraisal, thereby causing errors in his report. Aspired also claims that Neelly based his appraisal on the condition of the property as appearing at the time of his inspection on July 1, 2008. Aspired argues that Neelly failed to consider any of the numerous changes or additions, which had not been completed as of July 1, but which were yet to be completed pursuant to the “Buyer’s Counter Offer # 1” addendum to the contract.

¶ 14. However, in reviewing Aspired’s claim of error in the appraisal, the record reflects that in performing the appraisal, Neelly, a state-certified real-estate appraiser, utilized a market-value approach for appraising the property. As Neelly explained through his testimony, the market-value approach includes no measure of the garage area or porch area. Neelly also testified that he eventually re-measured the property at the request of Aspired’s realtor, and as a result, he found a thirty-foot discrepancy from his original measurements. However, Neelly testified that this discrepancy warranted no adjustment to the appraisal amount.

¶ 15. Regarding Aspired’s claim of breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, Aspired cites as error the Meltons’ refusal to allow Neelly to reevaluate his appraisal. Aspired claims that the Meltons’ refusal to allow such reevaluation constitutes a failure by the Mel-tons to refrain from actions hindering Aspired’s right to receive the benefits of the real-estate contract. Moreover, Aspired argues that such refusal to allow a reevaluation constitutes a breach of good faith and fair dealing by the Meltons. The Meltons, in response, assert that Aspired failed to raise this issue before the chancellor; thus, Aspired may not raise such issue for the first time on appeal. Aspired argues that its claims regarding the breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing with respect to the appraisal and home inspection merely constitute new arguments to the issues raised and litigated previously in the chancery court. Nonetheless, the testimony and evidence in the record before us show that the Meltons hired a licensed appraiser to appraise the property in question. Neelly even proceeded to re-measure the house at Aspired’s real-estate agent’s request, and Neelly testified that the thirty-square-foot difference in the original measurement failed to impact the appraisal amount.

¶ 16. Aspired also claims that the Mel-tons breached the implied covenant of good faith with regard to the home inspection. According to Aspired, the home-inspection addendum to the real-estate contract at issue required the Meltons to both arrange for a home inspection to be conducted and also arrange for “a written request for repairs delivered” to Aspired within ten calendar days of the execution of the contract. Although Aspired agrees that the Meltons did obtain a home inspection on July 1, 2008, Aspired points out that the Meltons obtained the home inspection from Neelly, who also performed the appraisal. The Meltons cancelled the contract with Aspired after the results revealed that the home failed to meet inspection standards. However, Aspired claims that nowhere in the home-inspection report does the report state that the home was not up to standard; instead, Aspired submits that the report indicates that the home was in good condition and that only minor repairs were recommended. Aspired further contends that the Meltons complained about the various minor repairs, yet the Meltons refused to give Aspired the opportunity to make the repairs recommended in the home-inspection report. Aspired argues that the Meltons refused Aspired the opportunity to make repairs despite the requirement in the contract that the Meltons deliver a written request for repairs to Aspired within ten calendar days of the contract.

¶ 17. However, upon review of the sales contract, we find that the home-inspection addendum provides the Buyer with the discretion to choose to notify the Seller of deficiencies, as follows:

[I]f deficiencies are revealed by the home[-]inspeetion report that have not been previously disclosed, buyer may:
a) identify such deficiencies in writing to the Seller along with a copy of the home inspection report to the Seller. Seller will have three days to consent in writing to correct deficiencies on Buyer’s list, in an amount not to exceed $ to be determined. Should correction of deficiencies cost more than the predetermined expense limitation, Sellers may elect to correct the deficiencies and proceed with the Contract; OR [the] Buyer may[;]
b) accept responsibility for the correction of deficiencies and proceed to closing if Seller(s) elects not to correct deficiencies in excess of the expense limitation; OR [the] Buyer may[;]
c) cancel the Contract; citing the deficiencies in writing that underlie Buyers) cancellation whereupon all earnest[-]money deposit shall be returned to the Buyer.

The record reflects that the Meltons chose option (c), and the Meltons notified Aspired through a written letter of their exercise of the option to cancel the contract. The contract contains no obligation on the part of the Buyer to allow the Seller a “right to cure.” Aspired nonetheless disagrees with this interpretation of the contract, arguing that such an interpretation violates the principles of contract construction. Aspired asserts that it should be allowed to cure the deficiencies found in the home inspection.

¶ 18. We find that the addendum to the contract provided an option for the Meltons to cancel the contract upon the revelation by the home-inspection report of previously unknown or undisclosed deficiencies. The record reflects that the Mel-tons chose to exercise this option to cancel the contract. Upon review, we find that evidence in the record supports the chancellor’s finding that the contract is void; therefore, the record fails to support the claims of breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing asserted by Aspired. This Court has previously recognized that the terms in an addendum to a real-estate contract give parties the right to render the contract null and void if the home-inspection results were not acceptable. See Williams v. Estate of Morrison ex rel. Morrison, 969 So.2d 132, 133, 135 (¶¶2, 9) (Miss.Ct.App.2007).

¶ 19. Aspired next claims that: the Meltons did not “make application in proper form” for a loan sufficient to close on the house within seven days of the contract, and also the Meltons failed to apply for a loan as late as July 4, 2008. After reviewing the record, we find no evidence of fraud or willful misconduct on the part of the Meltons. The record instead reflects substantial evidence showing that the Meltons exercised their rights under the contract to cancel the agreement prior to the closing date. Tina testified that she had spoken to various lenders about securing a loan, and she informed the chancellor that her father may also loan them the money for the house. The Meltons’ agent, Frances Dempsey, testified that she showed no other houses to the Meltons between June 20 and July 8, 2008. Both Dempsey and Tina testified that the Meltons were not looking at other houses prior to the cancellation of the contract. The testimony and evidence presented at trial also supports the chancellor’s finding that the “evidence was insufficient to establish fraud or collusion on the part of the [Meltons] with Neelly.”

¶ 20. Aspired also argues that the chancellor erred when he refused to order the Meltons to specifically perform the real-estate contract. We acknowledge that this Court “has considered specific performance as a ‘particularly appropriate remedy’ in matters pertaining to a breach of a real-estate contract, because of real estate’s unique nature.” Houston v. Willis, 24 So.3d 412, 418 (¶ 19) (Miss.Ct.App.2009) (citations omitted). Additionally, we note that specific performance has been regarded as a remedy for breach of contract but not a remedy of right. Id. The remedy of specific performance falls within sound judicial discretion, but “[j]udicial discretion notwithstanding, where a contracting party can feasibly be given what he bargained for, specific performance is the preferred remedy.” Id. However, in this case, the addendum to the contract provided the Meltons with the option to cancel the contract due to deficiencies revealed by the home inspection report. Therefore, no breach of contract occurred herein, and no basis exists to consider specific performance as a remedy in the present case. Thus, we find no error in the chancellor’s denial of Aspired’s request for specific performance of the contract. We also find no error in the chancellor’s declaration of the contract as null and void.

¶ 21. In addition to the claims of breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing and specific performance, Aspired also claims that numerous factual findings by the chancellor were manifestly wrong or clearly erroneous. Aspired specifically asserts the following findings as error: nothing prevented Aspired from securing appraisals before the July 9, 2008 closing date; a basis for the Meltons’ attempt to cancel the contract was lack of completion of the house as of July 4, 2008, the date the Meltons inspected the home; rectifying a drainage issue required considerable work; the appraisals of Langley and Guy-ton were unreliable; and the failure to complete the house 100% as of July 9, 2008, constituted an additional reason for declaring the contract null and void. This Court will not set aside a chancellor’s findings of fact or disturb such findings on appeal unless the findings are manifestly wrong or clearly erroneous. Patterson v. Trustmark Nat’l Bank, 918 So.2d 792, 794 (¶ 9) (Miss.Ct.App.2005). Additionally, we require a chancellor’s findings to be supported by substantial credible evidence. Id. We will now turn to apply this standard of review to the numerous errors of factual findings raised by Aspired.

¶ 22. Regarding Aspired’s assertion that the chancellor erred in finding that nothing prevented Aspired from securing appraisals before the closing date, Aspired asserts that the Meltons provided notice on July 8, 2008, one day prior to the scheduled July 9, 2008 closing date, of the Meltons’ desire to cancel the contract due to the property not appraising for the purchase price. Aspired argues a lack of ability and impossibility to obtain another appraisal in just one day. However, Aspired notes that it did obtain an appraisal from Guyton less than one week later, on July 15, 2008, and then it obtained a second appraisal from Langley on July 30, 2008. However, we find no error with the chancellor’s findings on this issue. The record reflects no evidence that Aspired lacked the ability to secure an appraisal at any time during the contract negotiations. The record supports the chancellor’s finding that no contract or other hindrance prevented Aspired from obtaining an appraisal on its own, instead of waiting until the Meltons’ presentation of an unsatisfactory appraisal value.

¶ 23. Aspired next asserts error in the chancellor’s finding that a basis for the Meltons’ attempt to cancel the contract was due to the house not being completed as of July 4, 2008, the date the Meltons had inspected the home. Aspired claims that no evidence in the record supports that the Meltons based their cancellation of the contract upon a claim of failure to complete the house as of July 4. Instead, Aspired cites to Tina’s testimony that she and her husband chose not to proceed to closing due to the appraisal amount falling under the agreed purchase price and the home not meeting the standard requirements. In support of this argument, Aspired points to the Meltons’ written notice to cancel the contract, wherein the Meltons cite standing water in the front yard and the appraisal amount as the two reasons for not proceeding with the closing.

¶ 24. Aspired also argues that the chancellor erred in finding that the house failed to be 100% complete on the July 9, 2008 closing date. Although Aspired acknowledges that the new door the Meltons ordered had not been delivered, Aspired states that the testimony in the record supports the fact that the house was substantially complete. Our review of the trial transcript, however, shows that Tina testified regarding the state of the house as of July 4, 2008, explaining:

[The][e]xterior doors were not painted. The front door was not changed out. The transom, I believe, was changed out. The four columns were not changed out to the specifications on this. They were supposed to be cypress and they were not. They were just cased in. They were, like, one by six’s that were just taken and nailed together and cased in. The gutters were being put up, but they were not completed. The repainting and sanding, I’m reading the list, they had begun that, but that was not completed. The professional cleaning was not completed. The lights that were to be installed were not even purchased. They were not done. Cabinet lights were not put up. The cabinetry in the kitchen was just completely not finished. There were shelves missing, there were doors missing, knobs missing, drawers missing, glass cabinets that should have glass shelving, that was missing, none of that was completed. Glazing of both fireplaces was not completed. The shoe molding around the cabinets and all of that was not completed. The tile around the fireplace looked like they had been started [sic] to work on that. That was not completed. The ceiling was not completed. The water leak was not completed. I believe there had been some work done to the storage room, as far as it looked like they had taken out some sheet rock or something and had started working back on that. That was not completed. There was an extra water heater, but it was not hooked up. The plywood had not been added to the attic.

Additionally, Jason Roberts, the real-estate appraiser for Jimmy Langley Appraisal, also testified that the house lacked completion upon his inspection on August 14, 2008. Thus, sufficient evidence exists in the record to support the chancellor’s finding that the house was not 100% complete at the time of closing.

¶ 25. The chancellor’s judgment provides that the Meltons gave written notice to Aspired that the contract was null and void, explaining that:

[T]he sales price had not been met, and ... the house had not been completed as of the day they inspected it on July 4, 2008, a date with torrential rains and water standing in the yard, which required considerable work by [Aspired] to rectify, which in great part was done after July 9, 2008.

The chancellor also stated that:

[T]he [Meltons] had a contractual and lawful right to terminate the Contract because the appraised value was not that of the Contract sales price as of the closing date, and that, in and of itself, was sufficient to cancel the Contract, which they did. Additionally, the house was not complete as was required by July 9, 2008, and that is an additional ground for declaring the Contract null and void, which the [Meltons] did.

Although testimony at trial supported the chancellor’s finding that the house lacked completion on July 4, 2008, the Meltons’ letter to Aspired fails to state that the incompletion of the house constituted a reason for cancelling the contract by the Meltons. However, we do not find that the chancellor’s findings are clearly erroneous, as the Meltons presented testimony that the house was indeed incomplete at the time of closing. The chancellor’s description of incompleteness reflects a con-clusory summary of the testimony as to the condition of the property relative to the parties’ respective rights under the contract. Additionally, the chancellor explained that the Meltons already possessed a lawful right to terminate the contract due to the appraisal falling below the sales price. See Murphy v. Murphy, 631 So.2d 812, 815 (Miss.1994) (An appellate court will not disturb a chancellor’s findings when the findings are supported by substantial evidence.).

¶ 26. Aspired claims that neither evidence nor testimony at trial supports the chancellor’s finding that correction of the deficiency as to standing water required considerable work by Aspired. Aspired submits that the repair work required approximately two or three days to complete. However, the record supports the chancellor’s findings, and it reflects that Randall Godwin, a contractor for Aspired, testified that correction of the standing water required placement of pipes under the sidewalk of the house; digging up the end of the driveway; and installation of a new drainage pipe underneath the driveway. Godwin testified that the repair work for the drainage issue was not completed before July 9, 2008.

¶ 27. Aspired also submits that no evidence exists to support the chancellor’s findings that the appraisals performed by Langley and Guyton lacked reliability. Aspired asserts that the chancellor based his finding solely on the fact that the house at issue had yet to sell. Aspired submits that the chancellor erred in failing to examine other factors, such as the economy and the housing market, when making a finding as to the failure of the house to sell by the time of trial. We acknowledge that despite Aspired’s assertions to the contrary, the chancellor’s September 24, 2009 opinion clearly.states that “to the date of trial, the house had still not been sold, even for a reduced price, but primarily because of declining marketing conditions.”

¶ 28. Aspired finally claims that the chancellor’s award of attorney’s fees cannot stand on appeal. However, since we have found no merit to Aspired’s claims that the chancellor committed error in his findings, and since the contract between the parties authorizes the award of attorney’s fees to the prevailing party in the event of litigation, the chancellor’s award of attorney’s fees and costs in the amount of $6,554.56 will stand. See Hamilton v. Hopkins, 834 So.2d 695, 700 (¶ 16) (Miss.2003) (Recognizing that parties may contractually provide that in the event of a dispute, the losing party will be charged with paying attorney’s fees.). The real-estate contract at issue states that “[i]f it becomes necessary to ensure the performance of this Contract for either party to initiate litigation, then the non-prevailing party agrees to pay reasonable attorney[’s] fees and court costs in connection therewith to the prevailing party.” This Court has held that “enforcing a contract ‘without enforcing the clause addressing attorney's] fees would be contrary to the law.” Indus. and Mech. Contractors of Memphis, Inc. v. Tim Mote Plumbing, LLC, 962 So.2d 632, 638 (¶ 19) (Miss.Ct.App.2007) (quoting Theobald v. Nosser, 752 So.2d 1036, 1042 (¶24) (Miss.1999)). Accordingly, we affirm the chancellor’s ruling that Aspired bears responsibility for paying the Meltons’ attorney fees and costs.

¶ 29. Based upon the foregoing, after a thorough review of the record and the arguments presented, we find the chancellor’s findings to be supported by substantial evidence, and we affirm the chancellor’s judgment in favor of the Meltons.

¶ 30. THE JUDGMENT OF THE LEE COUNTY CHANCERY COURT IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE APPELLANT.

LEE, C.J., IRVING AND GRIFFIS, P.JJ., MYERS, ISHEE, ROBERTS, MAXWELL AND RUSSELL, JJ., CONCUR. BARNES, J., CONCURS IN PART AND IN THE RESULT.

      . If a party's motion for reconsideration is served within ten days of the rendition of judgment, the motion falls under Rule 59(e) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure. Carlisle v. Allen, 40 So.3d 1252, 1260 (¶ 33) (Miss.2010) (citing Cannon v. Cannon, 571 So.2d 976, 978 (Miss.1990)). The Mississippi Supreme Court has established that to succeed on a Rule 59(e) motion, “the movant must show: (i) an intervening change in controlling law, (ii) availability of new evidence not previously available, or (iii) need to correct a clear error of law or to prevent manifest injustice.” Brooks v. Roberts, 882 So.2d 229, 233 (¶ 15) (Miss.2004). Case law has also provided that "[a]n appeal from a denial of a Rule 59 motion may address the merits of the entire underlying proceeding, and review of a trial judge's denial of a Rule 59 motion is limited to abuse of discretion.” Perkins v. Perkins, 787 So.2d 1256, 1261 (119) (Miss.2001). In this case, the notice of appeal reflects only an appeal by Aspired from the judgment of the chancellor, with no reference to the unsuccessful post-trial motion.

      . See 118 Am.Jur. Proof of Fact 3d 403 ¶ 12 (Appraisers owe duty of care to their clients to perform their undertaking with ordinary care and competence reasonably expected of members of the profession in their community.).

      . Neelly explained that by utilizing the market-value approach, his analysis did not require him to take into account a 552-square-foot garage, a part of the property which he would have valued at thirty dollars per square foot.

      . However, see Lassiter v. Bank of North Carolina, 146 N.C.App. 264, 551 S.E.2d 920, 922-23 (2001), wherein the North Carolina Court of Appeals held that a lender’s property inspection is not performed for the benefit of the borrower.

      . A breach of the implied covenant of good faith "is bad faith characterized by some conduct which violates standards of decency, fairness or reasonableness.” Entergy Miss., Inc. v. TCA Cable Partners, 22 So.3d 284, 288 (¶ 13) n. 2 (Miss.Ct.App.2009).

      . See also Mut. Benefit Health & Acc. Ass’n v. Blaylock, 163 Miss. 567, 143 So. 406, 407 (1932) (“It is a familiar rule of construction of contracts ... that they are construed most strongly against the party drafting the contract, and most favorably to the policyholder.”); Cain v. Cain, 967 So.2d 654, 662 (¶ 18) (Miss.Ct.App.2007) ("In determining the meaning of contract terms, this Court reads the contract as a whole, gives contract terms their plain meaning, and construes any ambiguities against the drafter.”).

      . See 78 A.L.R.3d 880 ¶¶ 2-4 (1977) (The sale of real estate contingent upon financing requires reasonable effort or reasonable diligence. Mere inquiries and discussion with lenders have been found sufficient.).

      . Thomas Roberts, an appraiser for Jimmy Langley Appraisal, testified that due to a glitch in their appraisal program, the appraisal form listed June 30, 2008 as the date of the performance of the appraisal. However, Roberts clarified that he actually received the order for the appraisal on August 6, 2008, and he performed the appraisal on August 14, 2008.


text:
    Cedric BROOKS, Appellant v. STATE of Mississippi, Appellee.
    No. 2010-CP-01781-COA.
    Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
    Oct. 18, 2011.

      Cedric Brooks, appellant, pro se.
    Office of the Attorney General by John R. Henry Jr., attorney for appellee.
    Before LEE, C.J., BARNES and ROBERTS, JJ.
   ROBERTS, J.,

for the Court:

¶ 1. This appeal stems from an incident that occurred on May 12, 2008, when Cedric Brooks was found in possession of marijuana while incarcerated at the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC) facility in Parchman, Mississippi. Brooks was indicted for “unlawfully, willfully and feloniously” possessing 6.4 grams of marijuana in a correctional facility. On June 8, 2009, Brooks, with counsel present, entered his guilty plea to the charge at a hearing before the Sunflower County Circuit Court. He was ordered to serve three years in the custody of the MDOC to run consecutively to the sentence he was serving at the time. He was also ordered to pay all courts costs, a $300 lab fee, and $300 to Sunflower County in lieu of attorney’s fees. Brooks subsequently filed his motion for post-conviction relief (PCR) on August 16, 2010. In an order entered by the circuit judge on October 15, 2010, Brooks’s PCR motion was summarily dismissed. Feeling aggrieved, Brooks now appeals.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 2. Brooks began his initial term of incarceration on February 13, 1996, on drug charges. On May 12, 2008, Brooks was still incarcerated on those charges. It was also on this day that two officers at the MDOC correctional facility in Parch-man, Mississippi, entered the area housing several inmates, including Brooks, to perform a check for contraband. One officer approached Brooks, escorted him to a corner, and requested that he remove his pants to check for contraband. When Brooks removed his pants, the officer noticed something fall from the zipper or waist area of Brooks’s pants. This item was later determined to be approximately 6.4 grams of marijuana.

¶ 3. Then, on December 22, 2008, a Sunflower County grand jury indicted Brooks on one count of “unlawfully, willfully, and feloniously” possessing 6.4 grams of “marihuana, a Schedule I controlled substance, within the Mississippi Department of Corrections at Parchman, Mississippi, a correctional facility!!]” Brooks, appearing before the circuit court on June 8, 2009, with counsel present, entered a guilty plea to the charge in the indictment. The circuit judge accepted Brooks’s guilty plea and sentenced him to three years in the custody of the MDOC to run consecutively to the sentence Brooks is currently serving. The circuit judge also assessed court costs, state assessments, a $300 lab fee, and $300 to be paid to Sunflower County in lieu of attorney’s fees.

¶ 4. Over a year later, on August 9, 2010, Brooks filed a PCR motion in the circuit court. The circuit judge summarily dismissed Brooks’s PCR motion in an order entered on October 15, 2010. Feeling aggrieved by the summary dismissal of his PCR motion, Brooks now appeals and raises three issues. The first issue is an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. His second issue is that he claims his guilty plea was not supported by a factual basis when it was accepted. His final issue alleges a double-jeopardy violation.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 5. The standard of review that this Court applies when reviewing the circuit court’s summary dismissal of a PCR motion is found in the Mississippi Supreme Court’s decision State v. Santiago, 773 So.2d 921, 923-24 (¶ 11) (Miss.2000) and provides: “a trial court may summarily dismiss a petition for PCR, without having held an evidentiary hearing, when it is clear that the petitioner is not entitled to relief under the [Uniform Post-Conviction Collateral Relief Act].” The supreme court further elaborated by stating that “dismissal of a PCR motion is proper where ‘it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.’ ” Id. (quoting Turner v. State, 590 So.2d 871, 874 (Miss.1991)).

ANALYSIS

I. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

¶ 6. Brooks’s first issue is that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at his plea hearing; however, that statement is the extent of his argument on the issue. Although in his brief, Brooks provides us with an extremely thorough analysis of the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel, he fails to provide specific examples of how his attorney’s performance was ineffective. The lone statement that provides some insight into this issue is found in Brooks’s reply brief in which he states that his attorney did nothing but coerce him into accepting a guilty plea that was not supported by a factual basis. Pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Appellate Procedure Rule 28(a)(6) which requires the appellant to state his contentions “with respect to the issues presented, and the reasons for those contentions, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on[,]” we find that Brooks failed to demonstrate any reasons for his contention that his attorney was ineffective and failed to cite any part of the record to support that contention. Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel must be pled with specificity, and affidavits to support the claim must also be attached and part of the record. Fairley v. State, 812 So.2d 259, 268-64 (¶¶ 13-14) (Miss.Ct.App.2002). In this case, the record and Brooks’s briefs are void of either. As such, we find no merit to Brooks’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim.

II. Factual Basis to Accept a Guilty Plea

¶ 7. Brooks next asserts that there was not a factual basis for the circuit judge to accept his guilty plea. Pursuant to the Uniform Rule of Circuit and County Court 8.04(A)(3):

Before the trial court may accept a plea of guilty, the court must determine that the plea is voluntarily and intelligently made and that there is a factual basis for the plea. A plea of guilty is not voluntary if induced by fear, violence, deception, or improper inducements. A showing that the plea of guilty was voluntarily and intelligently made must appear in the record.

(Emphasis added). This Court stated: “The purpose of the factual-basis rule is to make the court ‘delve beyond the admission of guilt lying on the surface and determine for itself whether there is substantial evidence that the petitioner did in fact commit those crimes he is charged with and is not entering the plea for some other reason that the law finds objectionable.’ ” Avant v. State, 55 So.3d 1115, 1119-20 (¶ 10) (Miss.Ct.App.2010) (quoting Gaskin v. State, 618 So.2d 103, 106 (Miss.1993)). In his brief, Brooks argues he never actually admitted that he committed any elements of the crime. He further argues that there was not enough evidence that the circuit court could say with confidence that he committed the crime.

¶ 8. When determining if there has been a sufficient factual basis to accept a guilty plea, “[w]e are not limited to the guilty plea transcript[;] however[,][t]he record as a whole must be viewed.” Gaskin, 618 So.2d at 106. In Drake v. State, 823 So.2d 593, 594 (¶7) (Miss.Ct.App.2002), this Court found that there was sufficient factual basis to accept Julius Drake’s guilty plea since at his plea hearing:

Drake was aware of the charges against him and the consequences that would result upon entering a guilty plea. He still chose to enter such a plea. Drake swore to the trial court that he had competent representation and that the elements of the crime were explained to him. He further stated that his counsel read him the written guilty plea and that he understood what it stated.

¶ 9. Then, in Corley v. State, 585 So.2d 765, 767 (Miss.1991), Randy Corley raised the same issue as Brooks and argued that since, at the plea hearing, he said, “I didn’t do the shooting,” that no factual basis existed for the circuit judge to accept the guilty plea. The Mississippi Supreme Court found that there are several ways to establish that there exists a sufficient factual basis to accept the guilty plea, but, simply, “there must be enough [evidence] that the court may say[,] with confidence^ that] the prosecution could prove the accused guilty of the crime charged” and the defendant’s conduct could be defined as criminal. Id.

¶ 10. In the current case, Brooks entered a best-interest plea. Brooks answered in the affirmative when asked if he signed the plea petition and if all the statements and allegations in the plea petition were true. When asked by the circuit judge, Brooks had no complaints about the adequacy of his representation, and he did not indicate that the decision to enter the guilty plea was as a result of threats, force, or offers of reward. After answering in the affirmative to all the circuit judge’s questions, the State read the indictment to demonstrate what it was prepared to prove at trial. After the indictment was read into evidence, the circuit judge asked Brooks if he agreed with what had been read and whether he was pleading guilty to the charge; Brooks again answered in the affirmative. However, the circuit judge then asked if Brooks was guilty of possessing the marijuana, Brooks responded by saying, “not really in fact guilty because due to the circumstance, I am really tired and ready to get it behind me, really ready to get it behind me and go on with my life.” It is this statement on which Brooks relies to argue that there was no factual basis for the circuit judge to accept his guilty plea. Based on the case law, we disagree. Brooks signed the plea petition, verbally acknowledged his signature, and he acknowledged that all the statements and allegations in the petition were true. He was then read the indictment and had the elements of the crime explained; he again answered in the affirmative that he was guilty. Brooks’s one statement does not negate the rest of the evidence presented to establish a factual basis to accept the guilty plea. Therefore, we find that the circuit judge did not err in determining there was a factual basis to accept Brooks’s guilty plea.

III. Double Jeopardy

¶ 11. Brooks’s final argument is that he was subjected to double jeopardy because the rules violation report (RVR) he received from the MDOC about the incident was dismissed; therefore, he could not be subject to punishment through the circuit court for the same crime. This argument fails for several reasons.

¶ 12. First, Brooks cites to several leading cases that discuss due process and double jeopardy, but he fails to cite to any case that supports his contention that the RVR, an administrative proceeding, invokes double-jeopardy concerns. As was discussed in the previous issue, Mississippi Rule of Appellate Procedure Rule 28(a)(6) requires Brooks to state his contentions and also provide supporting evidence and citations. He failed to do this in the previous issue, and he has, again, failed to meet his Rule 28 duty on this issue.

¶ 13. In addition, this Court has held that “[ajdministrative proceedings do not invoke the double[-]jeopardy clause.” Brown v. Miss. Dep’t of Corrs., 906 So.2d 838, 835 (¶ 9) (Miss.Ct.App.2004). The RVR and the subsequent appeals are administrative proceedings within the MDOC; therefore, the double-jeopardy clause is not invoked in this case.

¶ 14. Finally, Brooks refers to the dismissal of his RVR for lack of evidence as a basis that the State had no evidence to indict Brooks for the crime. We must note that the record is unclear as to how the RVR was handled. The only document provided to us for review is a copy of Brooks’s second-step response form; however, this form looks completely blank except for the date and the superintendent’s signature. The rest of the text is so faint that it is impossible to read. Further, in McBride v. Sparkman, 860 So.2d 1237, 1240 (¶ 17) (Miss.Ct.App.2003) (quoting Lightsey v. State, 493 So.2d 375, 377-78 (Miss.1986) (overruled on other grounds)), “for a plea of former jeopardy to avail it must be shown that a defendant was actually acquitted or convicted in a former trial on the merits of the crime for which he is again sought to be convicted.” Even if the double-jeopardy clause was properly applicable here, which we do not find, there is insufficient evidence to show that Brooks was acquitted on the merits.

¶ 15. We find this issue is without merit.

¶ 16. THE JUDGMENT OF THE SUNFLOWER COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT DISMISSING THE MOTION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO SUNFLOWER COUNTY.

LEE, C.J., IRVING AND GRIFFIS, P.JJ., MYERS, BARNES, ISHEE, CARLTON, MAXWELL AND RUSSELL, JJ„ CONCUR.