text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Darrell THOMAS.
    No. 2011-KO-0374.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 16, 2011.
   In re Thomas, Darrell; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. F, No. 479-328; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 20Ó9-KA-1578.

Denied.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    Takeisha WILLIAMS individually and o/b/o her minor child Najae Mott, Deborah Williams, Shamika Williams individually and o/b/o her minor child Sanye Evans and Glenese Boyd v. Andrew ZAR and Department of Transportation, a Political Subdivision of the State of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-CC-2772.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 16, 2011.
   In re Department of Transportation and Development; State of Louisiana; Zar, Andrew et al.; — Defendant(s); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Charles, 29th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 70,405; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 10-C-888.

Denied. See Burnett v. James Construction Group, 10-2608 (La.7/1/11), 66 So.3d 482, and Whitley v. State of Louisiana, 11-0040 (La.7/1/11), 66 So.3d 470.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Jessie ST. AMANT v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-2749.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 16, 2011.
   In re St. Amant, Jessie; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs; Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. N, No. 12-08-0566; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 KW 1108.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Ronald Limond KYLES.
    No. 2011-KO-0429.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 16, 2011.
   In re Kyles, Ronald Limond; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Washington, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 06 CR5 94491; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 KA 1308.

Denied.


text:
    PONTCHARTRAIN MATERIALS CORPORATION v. QUICK RECOVERY COATINGS SERVICES, INC. and Stolt Offshore, Inc. Quick Recovery Coating Systems, Inc. v. Stolt Offshore, Inc., Stolthaven New Orleans, L.L.C. and Stolt-Nielsen Transportation Group Ltd.
    No. 2011-C-1104.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 16, 2011.
   In re Quick Recovery Coating Systems Inc.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Cer-tiorari and/or Review, Parish of Plaque-mines, 25th Judicial District Court Div. A, Nos. 48-253, 50-580; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, Nos. 2010-CA-1476, 2010-CA-1477.

Denied.

JOHNSON, J., would grant.


text:
    Christopher GREEN v. NATIONAL OILWELL VARCO.
    No. 2011-C-1102.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 16, 2011.
   In re National Oilwell Vareo; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review Office of Workers’ Compensation District 04, No. 09-01933; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 10-1041.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant.


text:
    John FREEMAN, et al. v. The LAFAYETTE CITY-PARISH COUNCIL, et al.
    No. 2011-CC-1101.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 16, 2011.
   In re Durel Jr., President L.J.; Lafayette City-Parish Council et al.; — Defendants); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 2010-6284-D; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, Nos. CW 11-00385, CW 11-00424.

Denied.


text:
    Billy WARREN v. Robert KENNY and ABC Insurance Company.
    No. 2011-C-1100.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 16, 2011.
   In re Atlantic Casualty Insurance Company; Kenny Dr., Robert et al.; — Defendant (s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. E, No. 09-1431; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2010-CA-1580.

Denied.

CLARK, J., would grant.


text:
    Elveta DAIGRE, individually and as administratrix of the Estate of William R. Daigre III, and Scott Daigre, William Daigre IV, and Richard Daigre v. INTERNATIONAL TRUCK AND ENGINE CORPORATION, Fort Worth Fabrication, Inc., Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development, and Bowie Lumber Associates.
    No. 2011-C-1099.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 16, 2011.
   In re Daigre IV, William; Daigre, Elve-ta et al.; Daigre, Richard; Daigre, Scott; Estate of William R. Daigre III; — Plaintiffs); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. M, No. 2004-3727; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2010-CA-1379.

Denied.


text:
    Pam SOLIS v. NPK, L.L.C. and Parish Partners Company, L.L.C.
    No. 2011-C-1094.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 16, 2011.
   In re NPK L.L.C. et al.; Parish Partners Company L.L.C.; — Defendant(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. O, No. 660-979; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 10-CA-465.

Denied.


text:
    John BRITTON, Peggy Britton, Anthony and Tiffany Bourgeois, individually and on behalf of Dallin Bourgeois v. Kenneth VALLONE, Omega Natchiq, Inc., National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Lexington Insurance Company and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company.
    No. 2011-CC-0720.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 16, 2011.
   In re Department of Transportation and Development; State of Louisiana; — Defendants); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Ascension, 28rd Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 96,208; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 CW 2110.

Denied. See Burnett v. James Construction Group, 10-2608 (La.7/1/11), 66 So.3d 482, and Whitley v. State of Louisiana, 11-0040 (La.7/1/11), 66 So.3d. 470.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Chadward Channell WELCH.
    No. 2011-K-0423.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 16, 2011.
   In re Welch, Chadward Channell; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. 5, No. 277,887; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 45,950-KA.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Timothy WASHINGTON.
    No. 2011-KO-0422.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 16, 2011.
   In re Washington, Timothy; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. K, No. 481-883; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2010-KA-1026.

Denied.


text:
    Tenesha SMITH, Melvin Porter, Sr. and Wallace Dixon v. TRANSPORT SERVICES COMPANY, Protective Insurance Company and Dan Davis.
    No. 2011-C-1147.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 16, 2011.
   In re Davis, Dan; Protective Insurance Company; Transport Services Co. of Illinois; — Defendant(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. G, No. 2004-8425; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2010-CA-1238.

Denied.


text:
    Betty Ann JOHNSON v. Jay U. HOWINGTON, M.D., et al.
    No. 2011-CC-1146.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 16, 2011.
   In re Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University; Howington M.D., Jay U.; LSU Health Care Services Division; Medical Center of Louisiana at New Orleans a/k/a; — Defendant(s); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. K, No. 2006-12308; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-C-0364.

Denied.


text:
    Lewis J. TUSA v. CITY OF KENNER POLICE DEPARTMENT and Creative Risk Controls, Inc.
    No. 2011-C-1145.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 16, 2011.
   In re Tusa, Lewis J.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review Office of Workers’ Compensation District 7, No. 08-21181; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 10-CA-791.

Denied.


text:
    David and Rochelle BOUDREAUX v. Blake G. MATHERNE and Sandra Deroche Matherne.
    No. 2011-C-1143.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 16, 2011.
   In re Matherne, Blake G. et al.; Math-erne, Sandra Deroche; — Defendant(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Terrebonne, 32nd Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 144492; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 CA 1996.

Denied.


text:
    Joseph A. ROUGON, et al. v. BP AMERICA PRODUCTION COMPANY.
    No. 2011-C-1137.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 16, 2011.
   In re BP America Production Company; Successor-In-Interest to Amoco Production Company; — Defendant(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Pointe Coupee, 18th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 38716; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 CA 2041.

Denied.


text:
    TRI-LAKE OF LOUISIANA, LLC, et al. v. COUTEAU PLATEAU, LLC.
    No. 2011-C-1134.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 16, 2011.
   In re Couteau Plateau LLC; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Cameron, 38th Judicial District Court Div., No. 10-18350; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 10-1384.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Bryan E. MOBLEY.
    No. 2011-KK-1132.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 16, 2011.
   In re Mobley, Bryan E.; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Beauregard, 36th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. CR2010-462; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KW11-00146.

Denied.


text:
    David BURKETT v. LFI FORT PIERCE, INC.
    No. 2011-C-1129.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 16, 2011.
   In re LFI Fort Pierce Inc.; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review Office of Workers’ Compensation District 04, No. 08-23484; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 10-1478.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant.


text:
    Andre J. ROBERT, Randall G. Mourot, J. Storey Charbonnet, and Marketfare, L.L.C. v. ROBERT MANAGEMENT COMPANY, LLC, Claiborne Fresh Market, LLC, Harrison Fresh Market, LLC, Marc L. Robert, II, Darlene P. Robert, Cecilia Poche Bono and Josephine L. Poche.
    No. 2011-CC-1108.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 16, 2011.
   In re Claiborne Fresh Market LLC; Harrison Fresh Market LLC; Marketfare LLC; Robert II, Marc L.; Robert Management Company LLC; Robert, Darlene P.; — Defendant(s); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. L, No. 2010^4150; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-C-0003.

Denied.


text:
    Jennifer L. CAMINITA Wife of/and Frank L. Caminita v. Regina Wife of/and Barney CORE, Smith and Core, Inc., ABC Insurance Company, XYZ Insurance Company, MNO Insurance Company, John Doe Supply and John Doe Subcontractors.
    No. 2011-C-1172.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 16, 2011.
   In re Caminita, Frank L.; Caminita, Jennifer L.; — Plaintiff(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Washington, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 100,021; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 CA 1961.

Denied.


text:
    Sandy BELLANGER, individually and on behalf of her minor child, Tsunami S. Dodge v. Craig WEBRE, Sheriff of Lafourche Parish, the Lafourche Parish Sheriff’s Office, Deputy Ben Dempster, Deputy Jeff Prevost and Deputy Jude Cantrelle.
    No. 2011-C-1171.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 16, 2011.
   In re Bellanger, Sandy; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Lafourche, 17th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 108,211; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 CA 0720.

Denied.


text:
    Calvin EVERETT v. BATON ROUGE STUDENT HOUSING, L.L.C.; Century Campus Housing Management, L.P. d/b/a Campus Living Villages; Admiral Insurance Company.
    No. 2011-OC-1169.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 16, 2011.
   In re Everett, Calvin; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 563,176; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 CA 856.

Denied.


text:
    Kelly Ann MILTON v. Ernest Derry MILTON.
    No. 2011-C-1168.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 16, 2011.
   In re Milton, Ernest Derry; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Tangipahoa, 21st Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 2008-002082; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 CA 1589.

Denied.

VICTORY and KNOLL, JJ., would grant.


text:
    Billie A. PRITCHETT v. DOLLAR GENERAL CORPORATION and Jane Doe.
    No. 2011-C-1165.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 16, 2011.
   In re Pritchett, Billie A.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Washington, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 94714; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 CA 1466.

Denied.


text:
    Welton WALKER v. Cora WALKER, Acme Truck Line, Inc., Zurich North American Insurance, Robert J. Johnson, Jr., Progressive Security Insurance Company and Clearwater Insurance Company.
    No. 2011-C-1164.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 16, 2011.
   In re Walker, Welton; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Mary, 16th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 118-863; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 CA 1865.

Denied.


text:
    Benjamin CROSBY, et al. v. SAHUQUE REALTY COMPANY, INC., et al.
    No. 2011-CC-1163.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 16, 2011.
   In re Bentex Associates Inc.; Crosby, Benjamin et al.; — Plaintiff(s); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. H, No. 09-11421; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-C-0332.

Denied.


text:
    Sallie STRATMANN v. CARDIOVASCULAR SPECIALISTS, INC. a Medical Professional Corporation, Kevin M. White, M.D. and Lois Mailander, M.D.
    No. 2011-C-1161.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 16, 2011.
   In re Louisiana Patient’s Compensation Fund; — Third Party; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. J, No. 2006-12471; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2010-CA-0947.

Denied.


text:
    Mickey ATKINSON, et al. v. LAMMICO INSURANCE COMPANY, et al.
    No. 2011-C-1156.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 16, 2011.
   In re Health Care Indemnity, Inc.; Young M.D., Martin C.; — Defendant(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Rapides, 9th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 238,842; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 11-13.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Danny J. LABORDE.
    No. 2011-KK-1154.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 16, 2011.
   In re Laborde, Danny J.; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or . Remedíal Writs, Parish of Avoyelles, 12th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 151090; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KW 11-00470.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana in the Interest of C.M.S., C.M.S., S.L.D., L.S.W. and S.P.W.
    No. 2011-CJ-1898.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 16, 2011.
   In re P., T.; — Other; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Richland, 5th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. J-06-63; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 46,472-JAC.

Denied.


text:
    Tommie Mack GRANGER v. Stephanie W. GRANGER.
    No. 2011-CJ-1882.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 16, 2011.
   In re Granger, Tommie Mack; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Rapides, 9th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 198,383; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 11-77.

Denied.


text:
    Keisha DESSELLE, et al. v. ACADIAN AMBULANCE SERVICE, INC.
    No. 2011-CC-1799.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 16, 2011.
   In re Acadian Ambulance Service Inc.;— Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Avo-yelles, 12th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 2010-5885; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW11-00894.

Denied.

VICTORY and CLARK, JJ., would grant.


text:
    Mark JONES and Misty Foxworth, individually and on behalf of their minor child, Abigail Foxworth Jones v. BELLELO’S FURNITURE AND APPLIANCE, INC. and Whalen Furniture Manufactory, Inc.—Rita Akehurst and David Bravo.
    No. 2011-CC-1632.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 16, 2011.
   In re Foxworth, Misty; Jones, Mark et al.; — Plaintiffs); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of W. Baton Rouge, 18th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 35,419; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011 CW 0720.

Denied.


text:
    Charles PUCKETT v. WELLS FARGO BANK MINNESOTA NA., Litton Loan Servicing, LP, Prudential Gardner, Realtors, Commerce Title and Abstract Company, and Dale Peoples.
    No. 2011-CC-1189.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 16, 2011.
   In re Commerce Title and Abstract Company; Landry, Steven Y.; — Defendants); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Ascension, 23rd Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 98,195; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011 CW 351.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Terry SIMPSON.
    No. 2011-KK-1188.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 16, 2011.
   In re Simpson, Terry; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. I, No. 503-116; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-K-0354.

Denied.

JOHNSON, J., would grant.


text:
    Jason PELLEGRIN v. LOUISIANA HEART HOSPITAL, L.L.C., Lisa Delgado, Francisco Butler, Brad Stringer, Kerry Trosclair, Herb Collins, Christopher Smith, and John Doe.
    No. 2011-C-1175.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 16, 2011.
   In re Pellegrin, Jason; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 2006-15194; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 CA 2174.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Willie JOSEPH.
    No. 2011-KO-0445.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 23, 2011.
   In re Joseph, Willie; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Landry, 27th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 09-K-0550-D; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 10-800.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. John M. BALLARD.
    No. 2011-KO-0447.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 23, 2011.
   In re Ballard, John M.; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Livingston, 21st Judicial District Corn-t Div. H, No. 21072; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 KA 1026.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. William J. ROPER.
    No. 2011-KO-0448.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 23, 2011.
   In re Roper, William J.; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 02-07-0591; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 KA 1241.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. M.S.L.
    No. 2011-KO-0453.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 23, 2011.
   In re M.S.L.; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. CR-122476; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 10-738.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Kenneth Ray BILBO, II.
    No. 2011-KO-0454.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 23, 2011.
   In re Bilbo II, Kenneth Ray; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 11903-07; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 10-518.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Spurgeon CONDOLL.
    No. 2011-KO-0455.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 23, 2011.
   In re Condolí, Spurgeon; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. L, No. 490-991; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2010-KA-0623.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Carl ENGLAND.
    No. 2011-KO-0456.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 23, 2011.
   In re England, Carl; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. J, No. 396,443; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 KA 1246.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Robert BOTT.
    No. 2011-KO-0457.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 23, 2011.
   In re Bott, Robert; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Vermilion, 15th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 48,475; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 10-0726.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Charles ANDREWS.
    No. 2011-KO-0458.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 23, 2011.
   In re Andrews, Charles; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. A, No. 485-061; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2010-KA-1020.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Jamal L. LEWIS.
    No. 2011-KO-0459.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 23, 2011.
   In re Lewis, Jamal L.; — Defendapt; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. K, No. 06-3453; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 10-KA-386.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Jerome Montrell THOMAS.
    No. 2011-K-0473.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 23, 2011.
   In re Thomas, Jerome Montrell; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 9039-07; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 10-792.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Jordan D. ZANTIZ.
    No. 2011-KO-0481.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 23, 2011.
   In re Zantiz, Jordan D.; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 436391; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 KA 0999.

Deniéd.


text:
    Herman FRANKLIN v. DEPARTMENT OF POLICE.
    No. 2011-C-1074.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 23, 2011.
   In re Franklin, Herman; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, City of New Orleans Civil Service Commission, No. 7681; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2010-CA-1581.

Denied.


text:
    Shawn M. CONNORS v. James M. LEBLANC, Secretary Louisiana Department of Public Safety & Corrections and Alvin Jones, Warden River Bend Detention Center.
    No. 2011-CC-1081.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 23, 2011.
   In re Louisiana Department of Public Safety & Corrections; State of Louisiana; — Defendant(s); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of East Carroll, 6th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 21,426; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 46579-CW.

Denied.


text:
    John Clyde DEVILLE, Sr. v. Warren W. FREY, et al.
    No. 2011-C-1157.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 23, 2011.
   In re Frey, Warren W. et ah; Progressive Security Insurance Company; Savoy, James; — Defendant(s); Applying For Writ of Certioraii and/or Review, Parish of St. Landry, 27th Judicial District Court Div. A, Nos. 09-C-1341-A,; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 10-1290.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant.


text:
    Mary Lu Doucet HARDEE v. CITY OF JENNINGS.
    No. 2011-C-1190.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 23, 2011.
   In re City of Jennings; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review Office of Workers’ Compensation District 3, No. 04-05403; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 10-1540.

Denied.


text:
    John Drew BELANGER, Jr. v. Brian Anthony WASHINGTON, Safeway Insurance Company of Louisiana, Louisiana Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Company and QBE Specialty Insurance Company.
    No. 2011-CC-1207.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 23, 2011.
   In re QBE Specialty Insurance Company; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Terre-bonne, 32nd Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 159996; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011 CW 0350.

Denied.

VICTORY and GUIDRY, JJ, would grant.


text:
    Selena Scifo FORNERETTE, individually and as Executrix of the Succession of Marguerite Scifo Graff, and Randy Scifo v. Kenneth V. WARD and Rosemary E. Ward.
    No. 2011-C-1210.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 23, 2011.
   In re Ward, Kenneth V. et al.; Ward, Rosemary E.; — Defendant(s) Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. L, No. 07-15311; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2010-CA-1219.

Denied.


text:
    Gerald WASHINGTON v. The SHAW GROUP, INC.
    No. 2011-C-1211.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 23, 2011.
   In re The Shaw Group Inc.; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review Office of Workers’ Compensation District 9, No. 07-04670; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 10-CA-568.

Denied.


text:
    In re Medical Review Panel Proceeding of Velda Aline JOHNSON.
    No. 2011-CC-1212.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 23, 2011.
   In re Christus Health Central D/B/A; St. Frances Cabrini Hospital; — Defendants); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Rapides, 9th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 240588; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, Nos. CW 11-00573, CW 11-00526.

Denied.


text:
    D. Wayne ELMORE, et al. v. Rodney H. JACKS, et al.
    No. 2011-CC-1213.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 23, 2011.
   In re Chair Solutions, LLC; Jacks Family, LC; Jacks, Rodney H. et al.; The Glide Store, LC; — Defendant(s); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 2010-2185; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW 11-113.

Denied.


text:
    Lawrence E. BROCK and Emma Brock v. Myron Ellis SINGLETON, A3M Vacuum Services, Inc., and Clarendon America Insurance Company.
    No. 2011-C-1216.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 23, 2011.
   In re A3M Vacuum Services Inc.; Clarendon America Insurance Company; Singleton, Myron Ellis et al.; — Defendant(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. John, 40th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 52577; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 10-CA-550.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant.


text:
    Jonathan STELLY v. MORROW, MORROW, RYAN & BASSET, et al.
    No. 2011-C-1222.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 23, 2011.
   In re Stelly, Jonathan; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 2009-1715; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 10-1353.

Denied.


text:
    Terrell LADNER, individually, and as tutor of his minor daughter, Ashleigh Ladner, and Mary Anne Ladner v. Dr. Arthur CAIRE, Dr. Deborah Pickens and St. Tammany Parish Hospital Service District No. 2 d/b/a Slidell Memorial Hospital, and Dr. Candice Collins.
    No. 2011-CC-1224.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 23, 2011.
   In re Ladner, Terrell et al.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 1994-13484; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011 CW 0419.

Denied.


text:
    HOOVER TREE FARM, L.L.C. v. GOODRICH PETROLEUM COMPANY, L.L.C. et al.
    No. 2011-C-1225.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 23, 2011.
   In re Goodrich Petroleum Company L.L.C.; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 528,504; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 46,153-CA.

Denied.


text:
    Dewayne ELTER and Danielle M. Elter v. GILES AUTOMOTIVE, INC., d/b/a Nissan of Opelousas.
    No. 2011-CC-1231.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 23, 2011.
   In re Giles Automotive, Inc., d/b/a; Nissan of Opelousas; — Defendant (s); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Landry, 27th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 10-C-5575-C; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW 11-00155.

Denied.


text:
    Willie J. ZENO, Sr. v. FLOWERS’ BAKING COMPANY.
    No. 2011-C-1234.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 23, 2011.
   In re Zeno Sr., Willie J.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review Workers’ Compensation District 04, No. 2010-02790; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 10-1413.

Denied.


text:
    HOOVER TREE FARM, L.L.C. v. GOODRICH PETROLEUM COMPANY, L.L.C., et al.
    No. 2011-C-1236.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 23, 2011.
   In re Chesapeake Louisiana, LP; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 528,504; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 46,153-CA.

Denied.


text:
    ABBOTT PAUL OAK, LLC v. JOAQUIN SAMPEDRO, LLC d/b/a Mama Mia Maternity Boutique, Joaquin Sampedro, Alexandra Tate and Kristen Chetta Collura.
    No. 2011-C-1239.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 23, 2011.
   In re Joaquin Sampedro LLC, et al.;— Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certio-rari and/or Review, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 2009-13629; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 CA 1701.

Denied.


text:
    Kelly E. McGEE v. Julian MUTTER, Jr.; Julian Mutter; 511, L.L.C.; Raven Hinojosa, individually and d/b/a Aurora Aerials; and the Black Forest Fancies; as well as their Unknown Liability Insurers.
    No. 2011-C-1240.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 23, 2011.
   In re McGee, Kelly E.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. E, No. 2009-2273; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2010-CA-1334.

Denied.


text:
    Abdul S. MUSA v. LITTON-AVONDALE INDUSTRIES, INC., Avondale Industries, Inc., Avondale Shipyards, Inc., Avondale Enterprises, Inc., ABC Corporation(s), and ABC Insurance Company(s).
    No. 2011-C-1256.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 23, 2011.
   In re Musa, Abdul S.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. L, No. 557-885; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 10-CA-627.

Denied.

JOHNSON, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Charles BALLET.
    No. 2011-KK-1258.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 23, 2011.
   In re Ballet, Charles; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 10-3957; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 11-K-473.

Denied.

WEIMER, J., would grant.


text:
    Ruby FARLEY v. The CITY OF NEW ORLEANS.
    No. 2011-CC-1265.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 23, 2011.
   In re City of New Orleans; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs Office of Workers’ Compensation District 8, No. 10-05143; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-C-0301.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Denise GRINDS.
    No. 2011-KK-1271.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 23, 2011.
   In re Grinds, Denise; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. John, 40th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 2009-CR-225; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. ll-K-323.

Denied.


text:
    Yolanda Marie EBARB v. Philip David MATLOCK, et al.
    No. 2011-C-1272.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 23, 2011.
   In re American States Insurance Company; Matlock, Philip David et al.; — Defendants); Applying For Writ of Certiora-ri and/or Review, Parish of Bossier, 26th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 131,287; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 46,243-CA.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Jon A. WILLIS.
    No. 2011-KK-1273.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 23, 2011.
   In re Willis, Jon A.; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Catahoula, 7th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 05-0664; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KW 11-00364.

Denied.


text:
    Robert Kevin McCARTNEY, et al. v. George McCORMICK, et al.
    No. 2011-CP-1276.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 23, 2011.
   In re McCartney, Robert Kevin; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Rapides, 9th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 225,011; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 10-1225.

Denied.


text:
    BAYOU FLEET PARTNERSHIP, L.L.P. v. ST. CHARLES PARISH.
    No. 2011-CC-1283.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 23, 2011.
   In re Bayou Fleet Partnership L.L.P.;— Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Charles, 29th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 72,433; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. ll-C-560.

Denied.


text:
    Scott GLENDENING v. CARIMI LAW FIRM.
    No. 2011-CC-1284.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 23, 2011.
   In re Glendening, Scott; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. O, No. 636-947; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 11-C-464.

Denied.


text:
    Richard Dean ELSTON, Jr. and Ashley Bruscato Elston v. Jo Nell V. MONTGOMERY and Michael F. Montgomery.
    No. 2011-C-1292.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 23, 2011.
   In re D.A. Richlen Land Company Inc.; Elston Jr., Richard Dean et al.; Elston, Ashley Bruscato; — Plaintiff(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Bossier, 26th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 124,660; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 46,262-CA.

Denied.


text:
    Jack KOTTENBROOK and Angela Kottenbrook v. SHELTER MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY.
    No. 2011-C-1293.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 23, 2011.
   In re Kottenbrook, Angela; Kotten-brook, Jack; — Plaintiff(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Ouachita, 4th Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 10-1992; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 46,312-CA.

Denied.


text:
    Doris Kay HENRY v. Marlan W. ANDERSON.
    No. 2011-C-1294.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 23, 2011.
   In re Henry, Doris Kay; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Natchitoches, 10th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. C-82,374; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 10-941.

Denied.


text:
    Dorothy POLLOCK, et al. v. TALCO MIDSTREAM ASSETS, LTD.
    No. 2011-C-1295.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 23, 2011.
   In re Talco Midstream Assets, Ltd.;— Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certio-rari and/or Review, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. C, Nos. 511,450,; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 46,302-CA.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Gerard SENEGAR v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-1409.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 23, 2011.
   In re Senegar, Gerard; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Martin, 16th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 10-237788; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 11-00667.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Arthur NICHOLAS, III v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-1411.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 23, 2011.
   In re Nicholas III, Arthur; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Ascension, 23rd Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 23,209; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 KA 1808.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Marcus W. ANDERSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-1493.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 23, 2011.
   In re Anderson, Marcus W.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 6611-08; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 11-106.

Denied.


text:
    DOUSSAN PROPERTIES, LLC v. DOUSSAN GAS AND SUPPLY, LLC, Gas Holdings, Inc. and Union Industrial Gas and Supply, Inc.
    No. 2011-CC-1669.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 23, 2011.
   In re Sowell, James E.; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs,- Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. M, No. 2007-6447; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-C-0617.

Denied.


author: KEATY, Judge. THIBODEAUX, Chief Judge,

text:
    LAKE CHARLES MEDICAL & SURGICAL CLINIC, LLP v. Shondra L. SMITH, M.D., et al.
    No. 10-1383.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.
    June 22, 2011.
    Leonard Knapp, Jr., Attorney at Law, Lake Charles, LA, for Plaintiff/Appellant, Lake Charles Medical & Surgical Clinic, LLP.
    Russell T. Tritico, Sr., Attorney at Law, Lake Charles, LA, for Defendant/Appellee, Shondra L. Smith, M.D.
    W. Todd Fontenot, Fontenot & Fonte-not Law Firm, Lake Charles, LA, for Defendant/Appellee, Cindi Reed.
    Court composed of ULYSSES GENE THIBODEAUX, Chief Judge, JIMMIE C. PETERS, J. DAVID PAINTER, JAMES T. GENOVESE, and PHYLLIS M. KEATY, Judges.
   KEATY, Judge.

| ,This litigation arises out of an employment contract and partnership agreement between a physician and a medical clinic. The defendants, a partner-physician and the clinic’s director of research, purposefully changed the terms of a research contract in advance of their leaving the clinic, resulting in the physician directly receiving a check for over $97,000 for research performed while she was employed by the clinic. The clinic filed suit against the defendants. At a hearing on cross motions for partial summary judgment, the trial court found in favor of defendants. This is an appeal by the clinic, suggesting that summary judgment was inappropriate. For the following reasons, we reverse the trial court and remand for further proceedings.

ISSUE

The issue pertinent to our resolution of this matter is whether the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of each defendant was appropriate. To resolve that issue, we must determine whether or not each defendant met her burden in proving that no genuine issue of material fact exists.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The Lake Charles Medical and Surgical Clinic, LLP, (the Clinic) is a multi-specialty group of doctors operating as a general partnership. Defendant, Shondra L. Smith, M.D. (Smith), was a partner at the Clinic and worked as a research dermatologist. She was recruited by defendant, Cindi Reed (Reed), the research director for the Clinic.

Prior to beginning work at the Clinic, Smith signed a physician agreement with the CEO of the Clinic. The physician agreement is important because it contains 1 specific language allowing Smith to take with her any research projects and revenue earned after termination.

After working at the Clinic for a year, Smith became a partner in the Clinic. As a partner, she signed a partnership agreement and all amendments thereto during the course of her employment. The partnership agreement also contains language concerning revenue, expenses, duties of the partners, and termination. The crux of the dispute between the Clinic and Smith arises out of these two documents and differing opinions on how to interpret them.

In July 2004, Smith tendered her resignation, effective September 17, 2004. While employed by the Clinic, Smith worked on research for Genetech. Several times, she and Reed amended the contract with Genetech on behalf of the Clinic. Toward the end of Smith’s employment with the Clinic, she and Reed made a final amendment to the Genetech contract, changing the address, payee, and tax ID from the Clinic to Smith. Whether the Clinic was informed that these changes were being made is disputed.

On September 21, 2004, Genetech issued a check as of September 8, 2004, to Smith in the amount of $97,544, representing final payment for work done from October 1, 2003 through September 8, 2004, while Smith was employed by the Clinic. Smith deposited the check and shared nearly forty thousand dollars with Reed as incentive for Reed to leave her position at the Clinic and begin working for Smith. The defendants assert that this was proper pursuant to Smith’s physician agreement |3with the Clinic and because the check was issued after Smith was no longer employed by the Clinic.

The Clinic filed suit against Smith and Reed, claiming they breached their fiduciary duties to the Clinic, that they acted with the intent to defraud the Clinic, and that they owed the Clinic $97,544 plus judicial interest and legal fees.

At a hearing on cross partial motions for summary judgment, the trial court found that the terms of the physician agreement concerning termination governed Smith particularly, while the partnership agreement only contained general provisions. It further found that because the contracts were drafted on forms prepared by the Clinic, they should be interpreted against the Clinic. The trial court then interpreted the relevant provision of Smith’s physician agreement as meaning that she was entitled to keep all money received after termination with the Clinic, regardless of when the work was performed, whether the Clinic had incurred any fees or expenses, and without incorporating any terms of the partnership agreement. It |4found that Smith was entitled to the final Genetech check, that the Clinic was not entitled to reimbursement for expenses, and that Reed did not breach a fiduciary duty because the terms of the physician agreement concerning termination allowed her and Smith to change the terms of the Genetech contract. The Clinic appealed, seeking to have the judgment reversed and remanded for trial, asserting that as there were genuine issues of material fact, a grant of summary judgment was inappropriate.

DISCUSSION

Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is a procedural tool “designed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action, except those disallowed by Article 969.” La.Code Civ.P. art. 966(A)(2). If the motion for summary judgment and supporting affidavits show that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the mover is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. La. Code Civ.P. art. 966. “An issue is genuine if reasonable persons could disagree. If on the state of the evidence, reasonable persons could reach only one conclusion, there is no need for a trial on that issue. Summary judgment is the means for disposing of such meretricious disputes.” Evans v. Auto. Cas. Ins. Co., 94-129, p. 3 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/5/94), 643 So.2d 389, 391, writ denied, 94-2732 (La.1/6/95), 648 So.2d 930 (quoting Smith v. Our Lady of the Lake Hosp., Inc., 93-2512 (La.1994), 639 So.2d 730). A “material fact” is one whose “existence or nonexistence may be essential to plaintiffs cause of action under the applicable theory of recovery.” Smith, 639 So.2d at 751.

The mover bears the burden of proving that summary judgment is appropriate. La. Pigment Co., L.P. v. Scott Constr. Co., Inc., 06-1026 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/20/06), 945 So.2d 980. However,

Isthe movant’s burden on the motion does not require him to negate all of the essential elements of the adverse party’s claim, but rather to point out to the court that there is an absence of factual support for one or more of the elements essential to the adverse party’s claim.

Id. at 983 (quoting Nguyen v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s, 05-1407 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/3/06), 929 So.2d 821). If the adverse party “fails to produce factual support sufficient to establish that he will be able to satisfy his evidentiary burden of proof at trial, there is no genuine issue of material fact” and summary judgment is appropriate. Meynard v. Pickett Indus., Inc., 04-887, p. 3-4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/15/04), 896 So.2d 126, 128.

“Appellate courts review summary judgments de novo and use the same criteria as the trial court in determining whether summary judgment is appropriate.” La. Pigment, 945 So.2d at 983. In doing so, we “[view] the record and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the non-mov-ant.” Advance Prods. & Sys., Inc. v. Simon, 06-609, p. 4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/6/06), 944 So.2d 788, 791, writ denied 07-26 (La.3/9/07), 949 So.2d 444 (quoting Hines v. Garrett, 04-806 (La.6/25/04), 876 So.2d 764).

Summary Judgment in favor of Cindi Reed

At the hearing on the motions for partial summary judgment, evidence was not presented concerning Reed’s alleged fiduciary duty owed to the Clinic. By virtue of an utter lack of evidence, we find that Reed did not meet her burden of proving that genuine issues of material fact do not exist with regard to the Clinic’s claim against her. Therefore, the grant of summary judgment in favor of Reed is reversed.

\ Summary Judgment in favor of Dr. Smith

The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Smith, finding that the terms of the physician agreement concerning termination are controlling in this litigation and that because there are two possible interpretations of the termination terms of the physician agreement, it must find in favor of Smith and against the Clinic since the agreement was drafted on their standard form.

That interpretation ignored altogether the incorporation of certain terms of the partnership agreement into the physician agreement, requiring that the two be read together. It also failed to take into consideration portions of the physician agreement concerning fee distribution for services rendered by the physician while employed by the Clinic. Finally, it failed to take into consideration the duties Smith owed to the Clinic as a partner.

After carefully reviewing the record, we do not find evidence that Smith met her burden in proving that material issues of fact do not exist concerning Smith’s right to the Genetech check and her fiduciary duty to the Clinic. It is evident that there are outstanding questions of fact needing resolution, and we reverse the grant of summary judgment in favor of Smith and remand for further proceedings.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants, Cindi Reed and Dr. Shondra Smith, and we remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with this ruling.

Costs of this appeal are assessed to defendants, Dr. Shondra Smith and Cindi Reed.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

THIBODEAUX, Chief Judge, dissents and assigns -written reasons.

THIBODEAUX, Chief Judge,

dissenting.

11This is a very simple case. The majority errs when it unnecessarily complicates matters by suggesting the integration of the partnership and physician agreements.

Part IV of the Physician’s Agreement deals with termination. That agreement provides in part that “[i]n addition, the Physician shall be entitled to all ongoing Dermatology research studies, which includes, but is not limited to all study documents, data, contracts, supplies and equipment, and all revenue received from these studies after effective date of termination.” (Emphasis supplied). This agreement is explicit and straightforward. I do not see any genuine issues of material fact regarding the entitlement of the revenues received from these dermatology studies. Dr. Smith was in charge of these studies. Both former CEOs of the partnership admit that Dr. Smith is entitled to this research money. The partnership agreement does not contradict any of these facts.

The partnership agreement refers to “fees” from the practice of medicine and/or surgery. These “fees” shall accrue to the partnership. The $97,544.00 is not a “fee” from the practice of medicine and/or surgery as contemplated by the partnership agreement, even if the partnership agreement does apply. It is money ^deriving from the research studies.

With regard to Ms. Reed, the former employee/research director at the medical partnership, the majority posits that “evidence was not presented concerning Reed’s alleged fiduciary duty owed to the Clinic. By virtue of an utter lack of evidence, ... Reed did not meet her burden of proving that genuine issues of material fact do not exist with regard to the Clinic’s claim against her.” The Clinic/medical partnership is the one alleging a breach of fiduciary duty. It is its duty to come forward with evidence concerning the alleged breach of fiduciary duty, not Ms. Reed’s. Ms. Reed simply changed the payee’s name on the research contract, allowing Dr. Smith to receive the proceeds to which she was entitled after she left the medical partnership. As I see it, the defendants are correct. Ms. Reed was doing simply what the contract allowed Dr. Smith to receive, that is, the proceeds from the research project.

There are no genuine issues of material fact. For the foregoing reasons, I dissent and would affirm the judgment by the trial court in favor of Dr. Smith and Ms. Reed.

      . The physician agreement referred to in this litigation is a copy provided by Dr. Smith. The Clinic’s policy is to keep copies of all physician agreements in each physician's file; however, their copy of the agreement with Dr. Smith cannot be located. Although the former CEO recognized his signature on the physician agreement, he stated that the date was not written in his handwriting. He further stated that he remembered bringing Dr. Smith's contract to the board for approval, but he does not remember any negotiations taking place between he and Dr. Smith, particularly concerning the termination terms in the agreement.

      . Although the check was issued after Smith was no longer employed by the Clinic, it was payment for work done while Smith was employed by the Clinic.

      .The Clinic's motion for partial summary judgment requested that Smith be ordered to return the monies of the Genetech check, totaling $97,544; that Smith’s exception of prescription be denied; and that Smith’s re-conventional demand be limited to 2004. It should be noted that the parties stipulated on the issues of the exception and the reconven-tional demand, and those issues are not before us on appeal.
      Smith and Reed filed a joint motion for partial summary judgment urging the trial court to revisit its earlier denial of their motion for summary judgment and to find, particularly, that Smith does not owe the Clinic $97,544 and that the Clinic’s claims against Smith and Reed regarding the Genetech funds should be dismissed.

      . The provision in the physician agreement states: “The Physician shall be entitled to all ongoing Dermatology research studies, which includes, but is not limited to all study documents, data, contracts, supplies and equipment, and all revenue received from these studies after effective date of termination.”

      . Also in the termination section of the physician agreement, and before the term concerning the Physician’s right to keep all on-going studies and revenues received after termination, is the following term: "This Agreement may be terminated only in accordance with the termination provision of the Partnership Agreement.”


author: GASKINS, J.

text:
    Mary Beth LAIRD, Nee Walley, Plaintiff-Appellant v. John Carlton LAIRD, Defendant-Appellee.
    No. 46,459-CA.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.
    June 22, 2011.

      Loomis & Dement, Monroe, LA, by Albert E. Loomis, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
    Donald L. Kneipp, Monroe, LA, for De-fendanb-Appellee.
    Before WILLIAMS, GASKINS and CARAWAY, JJ.
   GASKINS, J.

hMary Beth Laird filed petitions to partition undivided community property, alleging that her former husband, John Carlton Laird, concealed his interest in a business known as Chapel Hill, LLC, and that the business and a contingency fee in a tort lawsuit were omitted from an earlier partition of the community. Mr. Laird filed an exception of res judicata and a motion for summary judgment, seeking dismissal of her petitions to partition these items. The trial court overruled the exception of res judicata. Finding genuine issues of material fact as to the contingency fee, the trial court denied summary judgment on that matter. As to Chapel Hill, LLC, the trial court found that Mr. Laird did not own an interest in it at the time the community terminated; accordingly, summary judgment was granted on that issue. Mrs. Laird appealed the granting of summary judgment on the ownership of Chapel Hill, LLC. Mr. Laird answered the appeal, contesting the overruling of his exception and the denial of summary judgment on the contingency fee.

We reverse the trial court judgment granting partial summary judgment as to Chapel Hill, LLC. Because the matters raised in the answer to the appeal involve nonappealable interlocutory judgments, we dismiss the answer to the appeal.

FACTS

The parties were married in 1981 and had four children, all of whom are now adults. On February 17, 2006, the wife filed for divorce. Following a hearing officer conference (HOC) on May 5, 2006, the parties entered into a joint stipulation in which they partitioned the community. J_¿The document stated that the husband would receive all other community assets not specifically allocated to the wife. No specific mention was made in the partition documents of Chapel Hill, LLC, or a contingency fee. The parties agreed to prepare and execute a partition agreement and judgment within 10 days of the date of the stipulation. On May 8, 2006, the trial court signed a consent judgment implementing the joint stipulation.

The parties were divorced in September 2006. In late September and early October 2006, the parties executed a detailed community property settlement, which included division of interests in several LLCs. In relevant parts, this document provided:

The parties further agree that they have hereby accomplished the complete' partition of the community of acquets and gains formerly existing between them. It is the intention of the parties that henceforth there shall be, as between them, such rights and obligations as are specifically provided for in this agreement, and that the parties acknowledge that the allocations made to each of them has resulted in each party’s receiving an equal share of the community property.
Both parties, JOHN CARLTON LAIRD and MARY BETH LAIRD, nee WALLEY, declare that they have made a full disclosure of all assets and debts of which the community of acquets and gains consists at the time the suit for divorce herein was filed. Should either party have failed to disclose an asset, said asset shall remain an item of community property subject to future partition between the parties.
The parties hereby acknowledge that this agreement constitutes a legally enforceable contract. Both parties further acknowledge that this agreement shall be construed and governed in accordance with the laws of the State of Louisiana and any legal action necessary to enforce the terms hereof shall be brought in the Fourth Judicial District Court, Ouachita Parish, Louisiana.... [Emphasis added.]

|3On January 17, 2007, the wife filed an ancillary petition for partition of yet undivided community property in which she asserted a belief that the husband had failed to disclose a community property asset. She alleged that she had become aware that the husband may have had an interest in Chapel Hill, LLC, at the time the divorce suit was filed. According to documents filed with the Louisiana Secretary of State on February 10, 2006, the husband was a member and an organizer of this entity. In a deposition in April 2006, the husband had denied having any other “investment vehicles” other than the ones already known to the wife.

On June 14, 2007, the wife filed an amended and supplemental ancillary petition for partition of yet undivided community property. She alleged that she had become aware of a contingency fee owed to her husband, an attorney, in the case of Kemp v. Kansas City Southern Railway. He had denied any contingent work in his April 2006 deposition; in a June 2007 deposition, he admitted that his portion of this contingency fee would be $140,000 to $160,000. In a second amended and supplemental ancillary petition for partition of yet undivided community property filed on July 29, 2008, the wife further alleged that deposition testimony of an accountant indicated that the husband’s law partner was holding certain property for him and that financial records established that the husband had an interest in Chapel Hill, LLC. Additionally, the deposition testimony of the husband’s law partner demonstrated that the husband’s gross portion of the Kemp contingency fee was $168,117.19.

|4On August 26, 2010, the husband answered the ancillary petitions. He contended that he formed the Chapel Hill, LLC, entity for his law partner while the partner was vacationing out of the country and that any interest he had in the company was transferred to his law partner’s entity after he returned on February 13, 2006; therefore, he owned no interest in it when the wife filed her divorce petition. The husband alleged that at various points he was told he could or could not participate in the entity. He admitted that he was allowed to become a member of Chapel Hill, LLC, in the summer of 2006, at which time he received his only distribution from the company that year. He asserted that he answered truthfully in his depositions. As to the contingency fee, he alleged that he believed that it was of little to no value at the time of his deposition. At any rate, the husband alleged that it was only relevant to the valuation given by the parties to his professional law corporation, Dollar Laird, LLP.

On August 26, 2010, an HOC was held as to the two items allegedly omitted from the community property settlement. As to the Kemp contingency fee, the hearing officer concluded that it was an asset at the time of the termination of the community on February 17, 2006, and had to be valued and partitioned. After considering three different approaches, the hearing officer utilized one by which she concluded that the community’s interest in the settlement was 82 percent, or $136,175; thus, the wife’s share |fiwould be $68,088. As to the husband’s alleged interest in Chapel Hill, LLC, a limited liability corporation which was intended to be a vehicle for hurricane levee restoration contracts, the hearing officer found the husband’s account of his transfer of ownership interest in this company was not credible. (She also noted that in 2009, Chapel Hill, LLC, landed a $64.9 million contract with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.) Finding that the February 14, 2006, transfer of the community’s 8.B percent interest to another entity was a “sham,” the hearing officer concluded that the husband’s interest in Chapel Hill, LLC, was community property. Because the parties were unable to assign a value to this asset, the hearing officer ordered that discovery on this issue continue.

On September 15, 2010, the husband filed an objection to the hearing officer’s findings as to these two issues. On that same date, the wife filed an objection to the HOC report only insofar as to the hearing officer stating her recollection that there was some mention of Chapel Hill, LLC, during the May 2006 HOC.

On October 29, 2010, the husband filed an exception of res judicata asserting that the issues of partitioning the contingency fee and Chapel Hill, LLC, had previously been addressed in the May 2006 joint stipulation and consent judgment.

On November 3, 2010, the husband also filed a motion for summary judgment, seeking dismissal of the wife’s petitions to partition yet | (¡undivided community property. Among other things, he alleged that the contingency fee in the Kemp suit involved Dollar Laird, LLP, not the husband individually or his personal law corporation. He also alleged that he did not possess an ownership interest in Chapel Hill, LLC, at the time the community terminated on February 17, 2006, and that he was transferred such an interest in June 2006 as his separate property. On December 9, 2010, the wife filed an answer and opposition to the husband’s exception and motion.

A hearing was held on December 22, 2010. The trial court overruled the exception of res judicata. As to the motion for summary judgment, the trial court denied it as to the contingency fee, finding that there were genuine issues of material fact. However, the court granted summary judgment as to the alleged ownership interest in Chapel Hill, LLC, finding that it was not concealed, having been mentioned before the hearing officer in May 2006, that there was nothing to show it had any value at that time, and that there were no genuine issues of material fact as to ownership of the company by the community at the time of termination. Judgment was signed January 20, 2011.

The -wife appealed the trial court’s granting of summary judgment as to Chapel Hill, LLC; the trial court certified this partial final judgment as suitable for immediate appeal. This court directed the trial court to issue a per curiam to explain the reasons for this certification since the judgment decided only one of the two pending community property claims while the second claim remained unadjudicated. In its per curiam, the trial court |7stated that it granted certification as a matter of judicial economy. In so certifying the issue for appeal, the trial court explained, it desired this court to let the parties know if the lower court ruling was final or if the Chapel Hill matter would have to be tried. By order, this court found no error in the trial court’s determination that this partial final judgment was suitable for immediate appeal; the appeal was allowed to continue.

On March 11, 2011, the husband answered the appeal, complaining of the trial court’s overruling of his exception of res judicata and its denial of summary judgment as to the contingency fee.

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Law

The motion for summary judgment is a procedural device to avoid a full-scale trial when there is no genuine issue of material fact. Duncan v. USAA Insurance Company, 2006-863 (La.11/29/06), 950 So.2d 544; Pruitt v. Nale, 45,483 (La.App.2d Cir.8/11/10), 46 So.3d 780. Appellate courts review summary judgments de novo under the same criteria that govern the district court’s consideration of whether summary judgment is appropriate. Duncan, supra. Summary judgment procedure is designed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action. The proceeding is favored and shall be construed to accomplish these ends. La. C.C.P. art. 966(A)(2). The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to ^material fact, and that mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. La. C.C.P. art. 966(B).

The initial burden of proof remains with the mover to show that a genuine issue of material fact exists. If the mover has made a prima facie showing that the motion should be granted, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to present evidence demonstrating that a material fact issue remains. The failure of the nonmov-ing party to produce evidence of a material factual dispute mandates the granting of the motion. Pruitt, supra; Upchurch v. State, ex rel. Louisiana Department of Transportation, 45,761 (La.App.2d Cir.1/5/11), 57 So.3d 361.

On a motion for summary judgment, the district court cannot make credibility determinations or weigh conflicting evidence. In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the district court must assume that all affiants are credible. Brooks v. Minnieweather, 44,624 (La.App.2d Cir.8/19/09), 16 So.3d 1244. The credibility of a witness is a question of fact. Davis v. Delta Bank, 42,529 (La.App.2d Cir.11/7/07), 968 So.2d 1254, writ not considered, 2007-2473 (La.2/22/08), 976 So.2d 1276.

Discussion

The wife contends that the trial court erred in granting partial summary judgment in favor of the husband as to the ownership of Chapel Hill, LLC.

The retroactive date of termination of the community between the parties was February 17, 2006, the date the wife filed suit for divorce. Several days before, on February 10, 2006, the husband prepared and filed |flthe documents with the Louisiana Secretary of State to organize Chapel Hill, LLC, at the behest of his law partner, Johnny Dollar; Mr. Dollar was out of the country. The husband was listed as an organizer and a member of the company. On February 14, 2006, after the husband informed Mr. Dollar of his marital woes, documents were executed transferring his interest in the company to Eagle Point Properties South, LLC, a company owned by Mr. Dollar. According to the affidavits and deposition testimony of the husband and Mr. Dollar, the interest was transferred because Mr. Dollar did not wish to risk entangling his Chapel Hill investors in the husband’s possible domestic litigation. The men testified that in June 2006, the interest in Chapel Hill was returned to the husband; however, no documents were prepared to that effect. The husband received distributions in excess of $54,000 from Chapel Hill in the summer of 2006.

However, the accountants for Chapel Hill, Ben Hulsey and Amy Hale, both made notations at a meeting in March 2006, that indicated that the husband’s interest in Chapel Hill, LLC, was being held for the husband by Mr. Dollar.

The husband argues that the evidence shows that he was divested of his interest in Chapel Hill, LLC, before his wife filed for divorce on | mFebruary 17, 2006; thus, his interest cannot be considered community property. Furthermore, the interest was returned to him after the termination of the community and should be considered his separate property. However, given the additional evidence indicating that the husband’s interest was being “held” for him and the lack of documents transferring the interest back to him, we find that a credibility call must be made in determining whether the husband had an ownership interest in Chapel Hill, LLC, at the termination of the community.

After carefully considering the evidence, we find that there are genuine issues of material fact which make summary judgment inappropriate as to the ownership of Chapel Hill, LLC. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court judgment insofar as it granted partial summary judgment in favor of Mr. Laird on this matter.

ANSWER TO APPEAL

A judgment that does not determine the merits but only preliminary matters in the course of the action is an interlocutory judgment. La. C.C.P. art. 1841. An interlocutory judgment is appealable only when expressly provided by law. La. C.C.P. art. 2083(C). The denial of a motion for summary judgment is an interlocutory judgment and is not appealable. La. C.C.P. arts. 968, 1841; Fontenot v. Miss Cathie’s Plantation, Inc., 93-926, 93-927 (La.App. 3rd Cir.3/2/94), 634 So.2d 1380. Although La. C.C.P. art. 1915(B) allows a trial court to designate a partial summary judgment as a final judgment, it does not provide that a judgment denying a motion for Insummary judgment can be so designated. Young v. City of Plaquemine, 2004-2305 (La.App. 1st Cir.11/4/05), 927 So.2d 408.

A judgment overruling the peremptory exception of res judicata is interlocutory and is not appealable. Tugler v. James Machine Works, Inc., 41,704 (La.App.2d Cir.1/24/07), 948 So.2d 1157. Also, La. C.C.P. art. 1915 does not authorize a trial court to designate a judgment denying an exception as final. Young v. City of Plaquemine, supra.

Because both of the judgments complained of by the appellee are interlocutory, neither is separately appealable. Furthermore, we conclude that neither is the proper subject of an answer to an appeal under La. C.C.P. art. 2133. Finally, considering that our judgment reverses the only relief granted on the merits, we decline to exercise our supervisory jurisdiction to address the interlocutory judgments. Accordingly, the answer to the appeal is hereby dismissed.

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the trial court granting partial summary judgment as to Chapel Hill, LLC, is reversed. The answer to the appeal is dismissed. Costs are assessed to John Laird.

JUDGMENT GRANTING PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT REVERSED; ANSWER TO APPEAL DISMISSED.

      . The husband’s percentage was .0125 of the $37,500,000 Kemp settlement or $168,117.19. The case involved a car/train wreck.

      . In making this determination, the hearing officer used a “rough adaptation” of the Sims formula. See Sims v. Sims, 358 So.2d 919 (La. 1978). She concluded that the husband worked on the case for 56 months, 46 of which were during the existence of the community.

      . In their notes, the accountants recited the percentages of ownership held in Chapel Hill, LLC, by various parties. Mr. Hulsey wrote in his notes: "8.3 EAGLE POINT -» JED (NOMINEE FOR JACK).” In his deposition, Mr. Hulsey verified that by "Jack,” he was referring to Mr. Laird and indicated that Mr. Dollar was holding the interest for Mr. Laird. In her notes, Ms. Hale gave the ownership percentages and names of owners; last on the list was: "[B]alance [of ownership interest] Eagle Point Prop (JED holding for Jack).” In her deposition, Ms. Hale testified that she understood "Jack” to be Mr. Laird. Both accountants testified in their depositions that Ms. Hale's notes would be more reflective of the exact words spoken by Mr. Dollar; Mr. Hulsey said his notes reflected his "common sense understanding” of what Mr. Dollar told them.
      In his affidavit, Mr. Dollar stated that the accountants must have misinterpreted what he said at the meeting.

      . Should the husband develop additional facts supporting his motion and exception, he can raise them again at the trial court level and also on appeal after a determination on the merits.