text:
    In re AMENDMENTS TO the FLORIDA SUPREME COURT APPROVED FAMILY LAW FORMS.
    No. SC12-510.
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    June 7, 2012.
   PER CURIAM.

Pursuant to the procedures approved by this Court in Amendments to the Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure & Family Law Forms, 810 So.2d 1, 14 (Fla.2000), this Court has internally reviewed the Florida Supreme Court Approved Family Law Forms and has determined that amendments to twenty-four forms regarding domestic, repeat, dating, and sexual violence are needed. In general, the amendments do the following: (1) revise language in notices of hearing to comply with Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.540 (Requests for Accommodations by Persons with Disabilities); (2) remove unnecessary or unauthorized requests for personal information, such as place of marriage, and place of birth or gender of a minor; (3) add language to forms used in proceedings for temporary injunctions to expressly advise litigants that failure to appear at the final hearing may result in the issuance of a permanent injunction; (4) add language in the petition for temporary injunction forms making a specific prayer for entry of a temporary injunction; (5) update language relating to health and dental insurance, where applicable, to reflect current statutory requirements; and (6) revise the method of payment sections, where applicable, to add the central depository within each circuit as an entity able to accept court-ordered payments. Input on these issues was received from the Advisory Workgroup on the Florida Supreme Court Approved Family Law Forms, which provided valuable assistance. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 2(a), Fla. Const.

The new and amended forms are adopted as set forth in the appendix to this opinion, fully engrossed, and ready for use. The forms shall become effective immediately upon release of this opinion. The forms may also be accessed and downloaded from the Florida State Court’s website at www.flcourts.org/gen_public/family/ forms_rules/index.shtml. By adoption of the new and amended forms, we express no opinion as to their correctness or applicability. We also direct that the new and amended forms be published for comment. Interested persons shall have sixty days from the date of this opinion to file comments with the Court.

It is so ordered.

CANADY, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, POLSTON, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur.

APPENDIX

INSTRUCTIONS FOR FLORIDA SUPREME COURT APPROVED FAMILY LAW FORM 12.980(a), PETITION FOR INJUNCTION FOR PROTECTION AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE (06/12)

When should this form be used?

If you are a victim of any act of domestic violence or have reasonable cause to believe that you are in imminent danger of becoming a victim of domestic violence, you can use this form to ask the court for a protective order prohibiting domestic violence. Because you are making a request to the court, you are called the petitioner. The person whom you are asking the court to protect you from is called the respondent. Domestic violence includes: assault, aggravated assault, battery, aggravated battery, sexual assault, sexual battery, stalking, aggravated stalking, kidnapping, false imprisonment, or any other criminal offense resulting in physical injury or death to petitioner by any of petitioner’s family or household members. In determining whether you have reasonable cause to believe you are in imminent danger of becoming a victim of domestic violence, the court must consider all relevant factors alleged in the petition, including, but not limited to the following:

1. The history between the petitioner and the respondent, including threats, harassment, stalking, and physical abuse.
2. Whether the respondent has attempted to harm the petitioner or family members or individuals closely associated with the petitioner.
3. Whether the respondent has threatened to conceal, kidnap, or harm the petitioner’s child or children.
4. Whether the respondent has intentionally injured or killed a family pet.
5. Whether the respondent has used, or has threatened to use, against the petitioner any weapons such as guns or knives.
6. Whether the respondent has physically restrained the petitioner from leaving the home or calling law enforcement.
7. Whether the respondent has a criminal history involving violence or the threat of violence.
8. The existence of a verifiable order of protection issued previously or from another jurisdiction.
9. Whether the respondent has destroyed personal property, including, but not limited to, telephones or other communications equipment, clothing, or other items belonging to the petitioner.
10. Whether the respondent engaged in any other behavior or conduct that leads the petitioner to have reasonable cause to believe that he or she is in imminent danger of becoming a victim of domestic violence.

The domestic violence laws only apply to your situation if the respondent is your spouse, former spouse, related to you by blood or marriage, living with you now or has lived with you in the past (if you are or were living as a family), or the other parent of your children) whether or not you have ever been married or ever lived together. With the exception of persons who have a child in common, the family or household members must be currently residing together or have in the past resided together in the same single dwelling unit. If the respondent is not one of the above, you should look at Petition for Injunction for Protection Against Repeat Violence, Florida Supreme Court Approved Family Law Form 12.980(f), to determine if your situation will qualify for an injunction for protection against repeat violence, or Petition for Injunction for Protection Against Dating Violence, Florida Supreme Court Approved Family Law Form 12.980(n), to determine if your situation will qualify for an injunction for protection against dating violence, or Petition for Injunction for Protection Against Sexual Violence, Florida Supreme Court Approved Family Law Form 12.980(q), to determine if your situation will qualify for an injunction for protection against sexual violence.

If you are under the age of eighteen and you have never been married or had the disabilities of nonage removed by a court, then one of your parents, custodians, or your legal guardian must sign this petition with you.

This form should be typed or printed in black ink. You should complete this form (giving as much detail as possible) and sign it in front of a notary public or the clerk of the circuit court in the county where you live. The clerk will take your completed petition to a judge. You should keep a copy for your records. If you have any questions or need assistance completing this form, the clerk or family law intake staff will help you.

What should I do if the judge grants my petition?

If the facts contained in your petition convince the judge that you are a victim of domestic violence or that an imminent danger of domestic violence exists, the judge will sign either an immediate Temporary Injunction for Protection Against Domestic Violence with Minor Child(ren), Florida Supreme Court Approved Family Law Form 12.980(c)(1) or an immediate Temporary Injunction for Protection Against Domestic Violence without Minor Child(ren), Florida Supreme Court Approved Family Law Form 12.980(c)(2). A temporary injunction is issued without notice to the respondent. The clerk will give your petition, the temporary injunction, and any other papers filed with your petition to the sheriff or other law enforcement officer for personal service on the respondent. The temporary injunction will take effect immediately after the respondent is served with a copy of it. It lasts until a full hearing can be held or for a period of 15 days, whichever comes first. The court may extend the temporary injunction beyond 15 days for a good reason, which may include failure to obtain service on the respondent.

The temporary injunction is issued ex parte. This means that the judge has considered only the information presented by one side — YOU. The temporary injunction gives a date that you must appear in court for a hearing. At that hearing, you will be expected to testify about the facts in your petition. The respondent will be given the opportunity to testify at this hearing, also. At the hearing, the judge will decide whether to issue either a Final Judgment of Injunction for Protection Against Domestic Violence with Minor Child(ren) (After Notice), Florida Supreme Court Approved Family Law Form 12.980(d)(1), or a Final Judgment of Injunction for Protection Against Domestic Violence without Minor Child(ren) (After Notice), Florida Supreme Court Approved Family Law Form 12.980(d)(2). Either of these final judgments will remain in effect for a specific time period or until modified or dissolved by the court. If either you or the respondent does not appear at the final hearing, the temporary injunction may be continued in force, extended, or dismissed, and/or additional orders may be granted, including entry of a permanent injunction and the imposition of court costs. You and respondent will be bound by the terms of any injunction issued at the final hearing.

IF EITHER YOU OR RESPONDENT DOES NOT APPEAR AT THE FINAL HEARING, YOU WILL BOTH BE BOUND BY THE TERMS OF ANY INJUNCTION ISSUED IN THIS MATTER.

If the judge signs a temporary or final injunction, the clerk will provide you with the necessary copies. Make sure that you keep one certified copy of the injunction with you at all times!

What can I do if the judge denies my petition?

If your petition is denied solely on the grounds that it appears to the court that no imminent danger of domestic violence exists, the court will set a full hearing, at the earliest possible time, on your petition, unless you request that no hearing be set. The respondent will be notified by personal service of your petition and the hearing. If your petition is denied, you may: amend your petition by filing a Supplemental Affidavit in Support of Petition for Injunction for Protection Against Domestic Violence, Repeat or Dating Violence, Florida Family Law Form 12.980(g); attend the hearing and present facts that support your petition; and/or dismiss your petition.

Where can I look for more information?

Before proceeding, you should read General Information for Self-Represented Litigants found at the beginning of these forms. The words that are in bold underline are defined in that section. The clerk of the circuit court or family law intake staff will help you complete any necessary domestic violence forms and can give you information about local domestic violence victim assistance programs, shelters, and other related services. You may also call the Domestic Violence Hotline at 1-800-500-1119. For further information, see Chapter 741, Florida Statutes, and Rule 12.610, Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure.

Special notes ...

With this form you may also need to file the.following:

• Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) Affidavit, Florida Supreme Court Approved Family Law Form 12.902(d), must be completed and filed if you are asking the court to determine issues with regard to your parenting plan or time-sharing for a minor child(ren).
• Parenting plan means a document created to govern the relationship between the parents relating to the decisions that must be made regarding the minor children) and must contain a time-sharing schedule for the parents and children). The issues concerning the minor child(ren) may include, but are not limited to, the child(ren)’s education, health care, and physical, social, and emotional well-being. In creating the plan, all circumstances between the parents, including their historic relationship, domestic violence, and other factors must be taken into consideration. The Parenting Plan shall be developed and agreed to by the parents and either approved by a court or established by the court, with or without the use of a court-ordered parenting plan recommendation. If the parents cannot agree, or if the parents agreed to a plan that is not approved by the court, a Parenting Plan shall established by the court. “Time-sharing schedule” means a timetable that must be included in the Parenting Plan that specifies the time, including overnights and holidays, that a minor child will spend with each parent. If developed and agreed to by the parents of a minor child, it must be approved by the court. If the parents cannot agree, of if their agreed-upon schedule is not approved by the court, the schedule shall be established by the court.
• Notice of Social Security Number, Florida Supreme Court Approved Family Law Form 12.902(j), must be completed and filed if you are asking the court to determine issues of temporary child support.
• Family Law Financial Affidavit, Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure Form 12.902(b) or (c), must be completed and filed if you are seeking temporary alimony or temporary child support.
• Child Support Guidelines Worksheet, Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure Form 12.902(e), MUST be filed with the court at or prior to a hearing to establish or modify child support.

Additionally, if you fear that disclosing your address to the respondent would put you in danger, you should complete a Request for Confidential Filing of Address, Florida Supreme Court Approved Family Law Form 12.980(h), and file it . with the clerk of the circuit court and write confidential in the space provided on the petition.

domestic violence or has reasonable cause to believe that te/she is in Imminent danger of becoming a victim of domestic violence by Respondent,

SECTION «I» INJUNCTION AND TERMS

This injunction shall be in full force and effect until either l | further order of the Court or Í 1 ,«This injunction fe valid and enforceable In ail counties of the State of Florida.

The terms of this injunction may not be changed by either party alone or by both parties together. Only the Court may modify the terms of this injunction, Either party may ask the Court to change or end this injunction at anytime.

Any violation of this injunction, whether or not at the. invitation of Petitioner or anyone else, may subject Respondent to civil or indirect criminal contempt proceedings, including the imposition of a fine or Imprisonment Certain willful violations of the terms of this injunction, such as; refusing to vacate the dwelling that the parties sharer going to or being within 500 feat of Petitioner's residence, going to Petitioner's place of employment, school, or other place prohibited In this injunction; telephoning, contacting or communicating with Petitioner if prohibited by this injunction; knowingly or intentionally coming within 100 feet of Petitioner's motor vehicle, whether or not ⅛ is occupied; defacing or destroying Petitioner's personal property; refusing to surrender firearms or ammunition if ordered to do so by- the court; or committing an act of domestic violence against Petitioner constitutes a misdemeanor of the first degree punishable by up to ons year In jail, as provided by sections 775,032 and 775.083, Florida Statutes. In addition, It ⅛ a federal criminal felony offense, punishable by up to life imprisonment, depending.on the nature of the violation, to cross state lines or enter Indian country for the purpose of engaging in conduct that Is prohibited in this injunction, 18 tl.S.C. Section 2262,

ORDERED and ADJUDGED:

1. violence Prohibited. Responden? shall not commit or cause any other person to commit, any acts of domestic violence against Petitioner, Domestic violence includes; assault, aggravated assault, battery, aggravated battery, sexual assault, sexual battery, stalking, aggravated stalking, kidnapping, false imprisonment, or any other criminal offense resulting in physical injury or death to Petitioner or any of Petitioner’s family or household members- Respondent shall not commit any other violation of the injunction through an intentional unlawful threat; word or act to do violence to the Petitioner.

2. No Contact. Respondent shall have no contact with the Petitioner unless otherwise provided in this section, or unless paragraphs 13 through 19 below provide for contact connected with the temporary parenting plan and temporary time-sharing with respect to the minor cbitdjren).

a. Unless otherwise provided herein, Respondent shall have no contact with Petitioner. Respondent shall not directly or indirectly contact Petitioner in person, by mail, e-mail, fax, telephone, through another person, or in any other manner, further. Respondent shall not contact or have any third party contact anyone connected with Petitioner’s employment nr school to inquire about Petitioner or to send

Florida Supreme Court Approved Family Uwi Farm 25.9&⅜¾⅜ float Judgment of injunction of Protection Against Domestic Violence with Minor Children) (After 1¾|⅛⅜ {05/12}

violence by Respondent,

SECTION «I. INJUNCTION AND TERMS

This injunction shall be In foil force and effect until { ] further order of the Court or { )_

This injunction is valid and enforceable in all counties of the State of florida. The terms of this injunction may not be changed by either party alone or by both parties together. Only the Court may modify the terms of this injunction. Slther party may ask the Court to change or end this injunction at any time.

Any violation of this injunction, whether or not at the invitation of Petitioner or anyone else, may subject Respondent to civil or Indirect criminal contempt proceedings, including the imposition of ⅜ fins or imprisonment. Certain willful violations of the terms of this injunction, such as; refusing to vacate the dwelling that the parties share; going to or being within S00 ftet of Petitioner's residence, going to Petitioner's place of employment, school, or other place prohibited in this injunction; telephoning, contacting or communicating with Petitioner 1f prohibited by this injunction; knowingly or intentionally coming within ⅜00 feet of Petitioner's motor vehicle, whether or not it is occupied; defacing or destroying Petitioner's personal property, refusing to surrender firearms or ammunition If ordered to do so by the court; or committing an act Of domestic violence against Petitioner constitutes a misdemeanor of the first degree punishable by up to one year In jail, as provided fey sections 775.082 and 775,083, Florida Statutes. In addition, It Is a federal criminal felony offense, punishable by up to life Imprisonment, depending on the nature of the violation, to cross state lines or enter Indian country for the purpose of engaging ir> conduct that is prohibited in this Injunction, 18 U.5.C, Section 2262,

ORDERED and ADJUDGgOi

1, Violence prohibited. Respondent shall not commit, or cause any other person to commit, any acts of domestic violence against petitioner, Domestic violence includes: assault, aggravated assault, battery, aggravated battery, sexual assault, sexual battery, stalking, aggravated stalking, kidnapping, false Imprisonment, or any other criminal offense resulting in physical injury or death to Petitioner or any of Petitioner’s family or household members. Respondent shall not commit any other violation of the injunction through m\ intentional unlawful threat, word w act to do violente to the Petitioner.

2 No Contact. Respondent shall have no contact with the Petitioner unless otherwise provided in this section.

a. Unless otherwise provided herein. Respondent shall have no contact with Petitioner. Respondent shall nut directly or indirectly contact Petitioner in person, by mail, e-mail, -fax, telephone;, through another person, or In any other manner. Further, Respondent shall not contact or have any third party contact, anyone connected with Petitioner’s employment or school to Inquire about Petitioner or :os®nd any messages to Petitioner,- Unless otherwise provided herein, Respondent shall outgo to, In, or within SOU feet oft petitioner's current residence {Hit odrimssl__

INSTRUCTIONS FOR FLORIDA SUPREME COURT APPROVED FAMILY LAW FORM 12.980(f), PETITION FOR INJUNCTION FOR PROTECTION AGAINST REPEAT VIOLENCE (06/12)

When should this form be used?

If you, or a member of your immediate family, are a victim of repeat violence, you can use this form to ask the court for a protective order prohibiting repeat violence. Repeat violence means that two incidents of violence have been committed against you or a member of your immediate family by another person, one of which must have been within 6 months of filing this petition. Repeat violence includes assault, aggravated assault, battery, aggravated battery, sexual assault, sexual battery, stalking, aggravated stalking, kidnapping, or false imprisonment, or any criminal offense resulting in physical injury or death. Because you are making a request to the court, you are called the petitioner. The person whom you are asking the court to protect you from is called the respondent. If you are under the age of eighteen and have never been married or had the disabilities of nonage removed by a court, one of your parents or your legal guardian must sign this petition on your behalf.

The parent or legal guardian of any minor child who is living at home may seek an injunction for protection against repeat violence on behalf of the minor child. With respect to a minor child who is living at home, the parent or legal guardian must have been an eyewitness to, or have direct physical evidence or affidavits from eyewitnesses of, the specific facts and circumstances that form the basis of the petition.

If the respondent is your spouse, former spouse, related to you by blood or marriage, living with you now or has lived with you in the past (if you are or were living as a family), or the other parent of your children), whether or not you have ever been married or ever lived together, you should use Petition for Injunction for Protection Against Domestic Violence, Florida Supreme Court Approved Family Law Form 12.980(a), rather than this form. This form should be typed or printed in black ink. You should complete this form (giving as much detail as possible) and sign it the presence of a notary or in front of the clerk of the circuit court in the county where you live. The clerk will take your completed petition to a judge. You should keep a copy for your records. If you have any questions or need assistance completing this form, the clerk or family law intake staff will help you.

What should I do if the judge grants my petition?

If the facts contained in your petition convince the judge that you or a member of your immediate family are a victim of repeat violence and that an immediate and present danger of repeat violence to you or your family exists, the judge will sign a Temporary Injunction for Protection Against Repeat Violence, Florida Supreme Court Approved Family Law Form 12.980(k). A temporary injunction is issued without notice to the respondent. The clerk will give your petition, the temporary injunction, and any other papers filed with your petition to the sheriff or other law enforcement officer for personal service on the respondent. The temporary injunction will take effect immediately after the respondent is served with a copy of it. It lasts until a full hearing can be held or for a period of 15 days, whichever comes first. The court may extend the temporary injunction beyond 15 days for a good reason, which may include failure to obtain service on the respondent.

The temporary injunction is issued ex parte. This means that the judge has considered only the information presented by one side — YOU. Section I of the temporary injunction gives a date that you should appear in court for a hearing. You will be expected to testify about the facts in your petition. The respondent will be given the opportunity to testify at this hearing, also. At the hearing, the judge will decide whether to issue a Final Judgment of Injunction for Protection Against Repeat Violence (After Notice), Florida Supreme Court Approved Family Law Form 12.980(Z), which will remain in effect for a specific time period or until modified or dissolved by the court. If you and/or the respondent do not appear, the temporary injunction may be continued in force, extended, or dismissed, and/or additional orders may be granted, including entry of a permanent injunction and the imposition of court costs. You and respondent will be bound by the terms of any injunction or order issued at the final hearing.

IF EITHER YOU OR RESPONDENT DOES NOT APPEAR AT THE FINAL HEARING, YOU WILL BOTH BE BOUND BY THE TERMS OF ANY INJUNCTION OR ORDER ISSUED IN THIS MATTER.

If the judge signs a temporary or final injunction, the clerk will provide you with the necessary copies. Make sure that you keep one certified copy of the injunction with you at all times!

What can I do if the judge denies my petition?

If your petition is denied on the grounds that it appears to the court that no immediate and present danger of repeat violence exists, the court will set a full hearing on your petition. The respondent will be notified by personal service of your petition and the hearing. If your petition is denied, you may: amend your petition by filing a Supplemental Affidavit in Support of Petition for Injunction for Protection, Florida Supreme Court Approved Family Law Form 12.980(g); attend the hearing and present facts that support your petition; and/or dismiss your petition.

Where can I look for more information?

Before proceeding, you should read General Information for Self-Represented Litigants found at the beginning of these forms. The words that are in bold underline are defined in that section. The clerk of the circuit court or family law intake staff will help you complete any necessary forms. For further information, see Section 784.046, Florida Statutes, and Rule 12.610, Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR FLORIDA SUPREME COURT APPROVED FAMILY LAW FORM 12.980(g), SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR INJUNCTION FOR PROTECTION AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, REPEAT VIOLENCE, DATING VIOLENCE, OR SEXUAL VIOLENCE (06/12)

When should this form be used?

You may use this form if your Petition for Injunction for Protection Against Domestic Violence, Florida Supreme Court Approved Family Law Form 12.980(a), or your Petition for Injunction for Protection Against Repeat Violence, Florida Supreme Court Approved Family Law Form 12.980(f), or your Petition for Injunction for Protection Against Dating Violence, Florida Supreme Court Approved Family Law Form 12.980(n), or your Petition for Injunction for Protection Against Sexual Violence, Florida Supreme Court Approved Family Law Form 12.890(q), was denied by the judge.

You should use this supplemental affidavit to add facts or clarify the facts you wrote in your original petition. For a domestic violence case, you should include facts that establish that you have been a victim of violence or are in imminent danger of becoming a victim of violence from the respondent.

For a repeat violence case, you should include facts that establish that you or a member of your immediate family have or has been a victim of at least two prior incidents of violence, that one of those incidents occurred within the last six months and that there is an immediate and present risk of danger to you or a member of your immediate family.

For a dating violence case, you should include fact that establish that you have been a victim of violence or are in imminent danger of becoming a victim of violence from the respondent who is an individual with whom you have or have had a continuing and significant relationship of a romantic or intimate nature, to be determined by consideration of such facts as: whether the dating relationship existed within the past six months; whether the nature of the relationship included an expectation of affection or sexual involvement; and whether the frequency and type of interaction between you and the individual included involvement over time and on a continued basis. Dating violence does not include violence in a casual acquaintanceship or violence between individuals who only have engaged in ordinary fraternization in a business or social context.

For a sexual violence case, you should include facts that establish that you are a victim of sexual violence or the parent of a minor child living at home who is a victim of sexual violence, that you have reported the sexual violence to law enforcement and are cooperating in the criminal proceeding if there is one. If the respondent was in state prison for sexual violence against you or the minor child and respondent is out of prison or is getting out within 90 days of the petition, include that information in your supplemental affidavit, along with a copy of the notice of inmate release.

This form should be typed or printed in black ink. After completing this form, you should sign the form before a notary public or the clerk of the circuit court. You should then file the original with the clerk in the county where the petition was filed and keep a copy for your records.

What should I do next?

After you complete this supplemental affidavit, the clerk will attach it to your original petition and all the documents will be submitted to the judge as your Amended Petition.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR FLORIDA SUPREME COURT APPROVED FAMILY LAW FORM 12.980(h), REQUEST FOR CONFIDENTIAL FILING OF ADDRESS (06/12)

When should this form be used?

If you fear that disclosing your address would put you in danger because you are the victim of sexual battery, aggravated child abuse, aggravated stalking, harassment, aggravated battery, or domestic violence, you should complete this form and file it with the clerk of the circuit court.

This form should be typed or printed in black ink. After completing this form, you should file the original with the clerk of the circuit court in the county where your petition was filed and keep a copy for your records.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR FLORIDA SUPREME COURT APPROVED FAMILY LAW FORM 12.980Ü), MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF INJUNCTION FOR PROTECTION AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, REPEAT VIOLENCE, DATING VIOLENCE, OR SEXUAL VIOLENCE (06/12)

When should this form be used?

If you are the petitioner on a previously entered injunction for protection against domestic violence, repeat violence, dating violence, or sexual violence and that injunction will soon expire, you may use this form to request that the court extend the injunction. You must file a motion for extension BEFORE the previously entered order expires.

This form should be typed or printed in black ink. After completing this form, you should sign it before a notary public or the clerk of the circuit court. You should then file the original with the clerk in the county where the petition was filed and keep a copy for your records. If you have any questions or need assistance completing this form, the clerk or family law intake staff will help you.

What should I do next?

For your case to proceed, you will need to set a hearing on your motion. You must properly notify the other party of the motion and hearing. You should check with the clerk of court for information on the local procedure for scheduling a hearing. When you know the date and time of your hearing, you should file Notice of Hearing (General), Florida Supreme Court Approved Family Law Form 12.923, or other appropriate notice of hearing form. You •will need to serve a copy of your motion and Notice of Hearing on the other party.

Service of your motion must be in a manner that is reasonably calculated to apprise the other party of your motion and the hearing. Please note that if notice is mailed, the court in certain circumstances may not consider mailing to be adequate notice. If you want to be sure, you should consider using certified mail, return receipt requested, or having the motion personally served. This is a technical area of the law; if you have any questions about it, you should consult a lawyer. For more information on personal service, see the instructions for Summons: Personal Service on an Individual, Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure Form 12.910(a).

You will need to appear at the hearing on your motion. After the hearing, if the judge grants your motion, he or she will prepare an Order Extending Injunction for Protection Against Domestic Violence, Repeat Violence, Dating Violence, or Sexual Violence, Florida Supreme Court Approved Family Law Form 12.980(m). After the judge signs the order, the clerk will provide you with the necessary copies. Make sure that you keep a certified copy of the previously entered injunction AND a certified copy of the order extending that injunction with you at all times.

Where can I look for more information?

Before proceeding, you should read General Information for Self-Represented Litigants found at the beginning of these forms. The words that are in bold underline are defined in that section. The clerk of the circuit court or family law intake staff will help you complete any necessary domestic, repeat, dating, or sexual violence forms and will answer any question that you may have.

Special notes ...

With this form you may also file a Request for Confidential Filing of Address, Florida Supreme Court Approved Family Law Form 12.980(h), if you fear that disclosing your address would put you in danger because you are the victim of sexual battery, aggravated child abuse, aggravated stalking, harassment, aggravated battery, or domestic violence, and you wish to keep your address confidential.

When completing this form, you should make sure that your reasons for requesting that the injunction be extended are stated clearly and that you include all relevant facts.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR FLORIDA SUPREME COURT APPROVED FAMILY LAW FORM 12.980(j), MOTION FOR MODIFICATION OF INJUNCTION FOR PROTECTION AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, REPEAT VIOLENCE, DATING VIOLENCE, OR SEXUAL VIOLENCE (06/12)

When should this form be used?

This form may be used if you are a party to a previously entered injunction for protection against domestic violence, repeat violence, dating violence, or sexual violence and you want the court to modify the terms of the injunction. If you use this form, you are called the moving party.

This form should be typed or printed in black ink. After completing this form, you should sign the form before a notary public or the clerk of the circuit court. You should then file the original with the clerk in the county where the original petition was filed and keep a copy for your records. You must file a motion for modification before the previously entered order expires. If you have any questions or need assistance completing this form, the clerk or family law intake staff will help you.

What should I do next?

For your case to proceed, you will need to set a hearing on your motion. You must properly notify the other party of the motion and hearing. You should check with the clerk of court for information on the local procedure for scheduling a hearing. When you know the date and time of your hearing, you should file Notice of Hearing (General), Florida Supreme Court Approved Family Law Form 12.923, or other appropriate notice of hearing form. You will need to serve a copy of your motion and Notice of Hearing on the other party. Service of your motion must be in a manner that is reasonably calculated to apprise the other party of your motion and the hearing. Please note that if notice is mailed, the court in certain circumstances may not consider mailing to be adequate notice. If you want to be sure, you should consider using certified mail, return receipt requested, or having the motion personally served. If you are not represented by an attorney in this action, you must file proof that the other party personally received notice of your motion. This is a technical area of the law; if you have any questions about it, you should consult a lawyer. For more information on personal service, see the instructions for Summons: Personal Service on an Individual, Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure Form 12.910(a).

You will need to appear at a hearing on your motion for modification of injunction. After the hearing, if the judge grants your motion, he or she will prepare a new injunction for protection that contains the modifications. After the judge signs the new injunction, the clerk will provide you with the necessary copies. Make sure that you keep a certified copy of the new injunction with you at all times!

Where can I look for more information?

Before proceeding, you should read General Information for Self-Represented Litigants found at the beginning of these forms. The words that are in bold underline are defined in that section. The clerk of the circuit court or family law intake staff will help you complete any necessary domestic, repeat, dating, or sexual violence forms and will answer any question that you may have.

Special notes ...

If the injunction you are seeking to modify is for domestic violence and you want the court to modify alimony, child support, or time-sharing of minor child(ren), you must establish that there has been a change in circumstance(s), as required by chapter 61, Florida Statutes, or chapter 741, Florida Statutes, as applicable, that requires this (these) modifieation(s). Be sure that you make these change(s) clear in your motion.

With this form you may also file the following:

Request for Confidential Filing of Address, Florida Supreme Court Approved Family Law Form 12.980(h), if you fear that disclosing your address would put you in danger because you are the victim of sexual battery, aggravated child abuse, aggravated stalking, harassment, aggravated battery, or domestic violence, and you wish to keep your address confidential.

Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) Affidavit, Florida Supreme Court Approved Family Law Form 12.902(d), must be completed and attached if the modification(s) you are seeking involves temporary custody of any minor child(ren).

Family Law Financial Affidavit, Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure Form 12.902(b) or (c), must be completed and attached if the modification(s) you are seeking involves temporary alimony or temporary child support,

When completing this form, you should make sure that your reasons for requesting that the injunction be modified are stated clearly and that you include all relevant facts.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR FLORIDA SUPREME COURT APPROVED FAMILY LAW FORM 12.980(n), PETITION FOR INJUNCTION FOR PROTECTION AGAINST DATING VIOLENCE (06/12)

When should this form be used?

If you, or a member of your immediate family, are a victim of dating violence, you can use this form to ask the court for a protective order prohibiting dating violence. Dating violence means violence between individuals who have or have had a continuing and significant relationship of a romantic or intimate nature. The dating relationship must have existed within the past six months, the nature of the relationship must have been characterized by the expectation of affection or sexual involvement between the parties, and the frequency and type of interaction must have included that the persons have been involved over time and on a continuous basis during the course of the relationship. Dating violence does not include violence in a casual acquaintanceship or violence between individuals who only have engaged in ordinary fraternization in a business or social context. Dating violence includes assault, aggravated assault, battery, aggravated battery, sexual assault, sexual battery, stalking, aggravated stalking, kidnapping, or false imprisonment, or any criminal offense resulting in physical injury or death. Because you are making a request to the court, you are called the petitioner. The person whom you are asking the court to protect you from is called the respondent. If you are under the age of eighteen and have never been married or had the disabilities of nonage removed by a court, one of your parents or your legal guardian must sign this petition on your behalf.

The parent or legal guardian of any minor child who is living at home may seek an injunction for protection against dating violence on behalf of the minor child. With respect to a minor child who is living at home, the parent or legal guardian must have been an eyewitness to, or have direct physical evidence or affidavits from eyewitnesses of, the specific facts and circumstances that form the basis of the petition.

If the respondent is your spouse, former spouse, related to you by blood or marriage, living with you now or has lived with you in the past (if you are or were living as a family), or the other parent of your child(ren), whether or not you have ever been married or ever lived together, you should use Petition for Injunction for Protection Against Domestic Violence, Florida Supreme Court Approved Family Law Form 12.980(a), rather than this form.

This form should be typed or printed in black ink. You should complete this form (giving as much detail as possible) and sign it the presence of a notary or in front of the clerk of the circuit court in the county where you live. The clerk will take your completed petition to a judge. You should keep a copy for your records. If you have any questions or need assistance completing this form, the clerk or family law intake staff will help you.

What should I do if the judge grants my petition?

If the facts contained in your petition convince the judge that you or a member of your immediate family are a victim of dating violence and that an immediate and present danger of dating violence to you or your family exists, the judge will sign a Temporary Injunction for Protection Against Dating Violence, Florida Supreme Court Approved Family Law Form 12.980(o). A temporary injunction is issued without notice to the respondent. The clerk will give your petition, the temporary injunction, and any other papers filed with your petition to the sheriff or other law enforcement officer for personal service on the respondent. The temporary injunction will take effect immediately after the respondent is served with a copy of it. It lasts until a full hearing can be held or for a period of 15 days, whichever comes first. The court may extend the temporary injunction beyond 15 days for a good reason, which may include failure to obtain service on the respondent.

The temporary injunction is issued ex parte. This means that the judge has considered only the information presented by one side — YOU. Section I of the temporary injunction gives a date that you should appear in court for a hearing. You will be expected to testify about the facts in your petition. The respondent will be given the opportunity to testify at this hearing, also. At the hearing, the judge will decide whether to issue a Final Judgment of Injunction for Protection Against Dating Violence (After Notice), Florida Supreme Court Approved Family Law Form 12.980(p), which will remain in effect for a specific time period or until modified or dissolved by the court. If you and/or the respondent do not appear, the temporary injunction may be continued in force, extended, or dismissed, and/or additional orders may be granted, including entry of a permanent injunction and the imposition of court costs. You and respondent will be bound by the terms of any injunction or order issued at the final hearing.

IF EITHER YOU OR RESPONDENT DOES NOT APPEAR AT THE FINAL HEARING, YOU WILL BOTH BE BOUND BY THE TERMS OF ANY INJUNCTION OR ORDER ISSUED IN THIS MATTER.

If the judge signs a temporary or final injunction, the clerk will provide you with the necessary copies. Make sure that you keep one certified copy of the injunction with you at all times!

What can I do if the judge denies my petition?

If your petition is denied on the grounds that it appears to the court that no immediate and present danger of dating violence exists, the court will set a full hearing on your petition. The respondent will be notified by personal service of your petition and the hearing. If your petition is denied, you may: amend your petition by filing a Supplemental Affidavit in Support of Petition for Injunction for Protection, Florida Supreme Court Approved Family Law Form 12.980(g); attend the hearing and present facts that support your petition; and/or dismiss your petition.

Where can I look for more information?

Before proceeding, you should read General Information for Self-Represented Litigants found at the beginning of these forms. The words that are in bold underline are defined in that section. The clerk of the circuit court or family law intake staff will help you complete any necessary forms. For further information, see Section 784.046, Florida Statutes, and Rule 12.610, Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure.

injunction it valid and enforceable in all counties of the State of Florida. The term* of this injunction may not be changed by either party alone or by both parties together. Only the Court may modify the terms of this Injunction. Either party may ask the Court to change or end ⅛⅛ Injunction.

Willful violation of the twins of tills injunction, such as refusing to vacate <he dwelling which the parties share, going to Petitioner's residence, place of employment, school, or other place prohibited in this injunction, telephoning, contacting or communicating with Petitioner, ff prohibited by this Injunction, or committing an act of dating violence against Petitioner constitutes a misdemeanor of the first degree punishable by up to one year In jail, as provided by Sections 775,082 and 775.083, Florida Statutes.

Any party violating this injunction may be subject to civil or indirect criminal contempt proceedings, including the Imposition of a fine or Imprisonment, and also may be charged whb a crime punishable by a fine, Jail, or both, as provided by Florida Statutes,

ORDERED and ADJUDGED:

1, Violence Prohibited. Respondent stall nol commit, or cause any other person to commit, any acts of violence against Petitioner, Including assault, aggravated assault, battery, aggravated battery, sexual assault, sexual battery, stalking, aggravated stalking, kidnapping, or false Imprisonment, or any criminal offense resulting In physical Injury or death, Respondent shall not commit any other violation of the Injunction through an intentional unlawful threat, word, or act to do violence to the Petitioner,

2. No contact Respondent shall have no contact with the Petitioner unless otherwise provided In this section.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR FLORIDA SUPREME COURT APPROVED FAMILY LAW FORM 12.980(q), PETITION FOR INJUNCTION FOR PROTECTION AGAINST SEXUAL VIOLENCE (06/12)

When should this form be used?

If you are a victim of sexual violence or the parent or legal guardian of a minor child who is living at home and is a victim of sexual violence, you can use this form to ask the court for a protective order prohibiting sexual violence. Sexual violence means any one incident of:

• sexual battery, as defined in Chapter 794, Florida Statutes;

• a lewd or lascivious act, as defined in Chapter 800, Florida Statutes, committed upon or in the presence of a person younger than 16 years of age;

• luring or enticing a child, as described in Chapter 787, Florida Statutes;

• sexual performance by a child, as described in Chapter 827, Florida Statutes; or

• any other forcible felony wherein a sexual act is committed or attempted

In order to get an injunction you must have reported the sexual violence to a law enforcement agency and be cooperating in the criminal proceeding if there is one. It does not matter whether criminal charges based on the sexual violence have been filed, reduced, or dismissed by the state attorney’s office. You may also seek an injunction for protection against sexual violence if the respondent was sent to prison for committing one of the sexual violence crimes listed above against you or your minor child living at home and respondent is out of prison or is getting out of prison within 90 days of your petition. Attach the notice of inmate release to your petition.

Because you are making a request to the court, you are called the petitioner. The person whom you are asking the court to protect you from is called the respondent. If you are seeking an injunction for protection against sexual violence on behalf of a minor child who is living at home, the parent or legal guardian must have been an eyewitness to, or have direct physical evidence or affidavits from eyewitnesses of, the specific facts and circumstances that form the basis of the petition. If you are under the age of eighteen and have never been married or had the disabilities of nonage removed by a court, one of your parents or your legal guardian must sign this petition on your behalf.

If the respondent is your spouse, former spouse, related to you by blood or marriage, living with you now or has lived with you in the past (if you are or were living as a family), or is the other parent of your child(ren) whether or not you have ever been married or ever lived together, you should use Petition for Injunction for Protection Against Domestic Violence, Florida Supreme Court Approved Family Law Form 12.980(a), rather than this form. This form should be typed or printed in black ink. You should complete this form (giving as much detail as possible) and sign it the presence of a notary or in front of the clerk of the circuit court in the county where you live. The clerk will take your completed petition to a judge. You should keep a copy for your records. If you have any questions or need assistance completing this form, the clerk or family law intake staff will help you.

What should I do if the judge grants my petition?

If the facts contained in your petition convince the judge that an immediate and present danger of violence exists, the judge will sign a Temporary Injunction for Protection Against Sexual Violence, Florida Supreme Court Approved Family Law Form 12.980(r). A temporary injunction is issued without notice to the respondent. The clerk will give your petition, the temporary injunction, and any other papers filed with your petition to the sheriff or other law enforcement officer for personal service on the respondent. The temporary injunction will take effect immediately after the respondent is served •with a copy of it. It lasts until a full hearing can be held or for a period of 15 days, whichever comes first, unless the respondent is incarcerated, and in such instance the temporary injunction is effective for 15 days following the date the respondent is released from incarceration. The court may extend the temporary injunction beyond 15 days for a good reason, which may include failure to obtain service on the respondent.

The temporary injunction is issued ex parte. This means that the judge has considered only the information presented by one side-YOU. Section I of the temporary injunction gives a date that you should appear in court for a hearing. You will be expected to testify about the facts in your petition. The respondent will be given the opportunity to testify at this hearing, also. At the hearing, the judge will decide whether to issue a Final Judgment of Injunction for Protection Against Sexual Violence (After Notice), Florida Supreme Court Approved Family Law Form 12.980(s), which will remain in effect for a specific time period or until modified or dissolved by the court. If you and/or the respondent do not appear, the temporary injunction may be continued in force, extended, or dismissed, and/or additional orders may be granted, including entry of a permanent injunction and the imposition of court costs. You and respondent will be bound by the terms of any injunction or order issued at the final hearing.

IF EITHER YOU OR RESPONDENT DOES NOT APPEAR AT THE FINAL HEARING, YOU WILL BOTH BE BOUND BY THE TERMS OF ANY INJUNCTION OR ORDER ISSUED IN THIS MATTER.

If the judge signs a temporary or final injunction, the clerk will provide you with the necessary copies. Make sure that you keep one certified copy of the injunction with you at all times!

What can I do if the judge denies my petition?

If your petition is denied on the grounds that it appears to the court that no immediate and present danger of sexual violence exists, the court will set a full hearing on your petition. The respondent will be notified by personal service of your petition and the hearing. If your petition is denied, you may: amend your petition by filing a Supplemental Affidavit in Support of Petition for Injunction for Protection, Florida Supreme Court Approved Family Law Form 12.980(g); attend the hearing and present facts that support your petition; and/or dismiss your petition.

Where can I look for more information?

Before proceeding, you should read General Information for Self-Represented Litigants found at the beginning of these forms. The words that are in bold underline are defined in that section. The clerk of the circuit court or family law intake staff will provide you with necessary forms. For further information, see section 784.046, Florida Statutes.

Special Notes ...

If you fear that disclosing your address would put you in danger, you should complete a Request for Confidential Filing of Address, Florida Supreme Court Approved Family Law Form 12.980(h), and file it with the clerk of the circuit court and write confidential in the space provided for your address on the petition.

SECTION IV. INJUNCTION (This section mutt be completed.)

X Petitioner asKs the Court to -enter a TCMPORARV INJUNCTION for protection «gainst sexual violence that will bo fa place from now until tiia scheduled taring In this matter,

2, Petitioner asks the Court to enter at» Injunction prohibiting Respondent tern tommfttfag any acts of violence against Petitioner and:

a, prohibiting Respondent from going to or within 500 te« of any place p«itfan«r lives;

c, prohibiting Respondent from eonrastfcg Petitioner uy telephone, mail, by ⅞-⅞⅜ fa writing, through another person, or in any other manner;

d, ordering Respondent not to use yr possess any guns or firearms;

( UNDERSTAND THAT BY RUING THIS FEHTtON, I AM ASWN6 THE COURT TO HOLD A HEARING ON THIS PETITION, THAT BOTH THE RESPONDENT AND t Will BE NOTIFIED OF THE HEARING, AND THAT I MUST APPEAR AT THE HEARING, 1 UNDERSTAND THAT ÍF EITHER RESPONDENT OP 1 FAIL TO APPEAR AT THE FINAL HEARING, WE Will BE BOUND BY THE TERMS OP AMT INJUNCTION OR ORDER ISSUED ATTHAT HEARING,

I UNDERSTAND THAT I AM SWEARING OR AFFIRMING UNDER: OATH TO THE TRUTHFULNESS OF THE CLAIMS MADE IN THIS PETITION AND THAT THE PUNISHMENT FOR KNOWINGLY MAKING A FALSI STATEMENT INCLUDES FINES AND/OR IMPRISONMENT,

INSTRUCTIONS FOR FLORIDA SUPREME COURT APPROVED FAMILY LAW FORM 12.980(t), PETITION BY AFFIDAVIT FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE FOR A VIOLATION OF FINAL JUDGMENT OF INJUNCTION FOR PROTECTION AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, REPEAT VIOLENCE, DATING VIOLENCE, OR SEXUAL VIOLENCE (06/12)

When should this form be used?

You may use this form if you have a valid Final Judgment of Injunction for Protection Against Domestic Violence, Repeat Violence, Dating Violence, or Sexual Violence in force which has been violated. You should use this affidavit to state the essential facts which establish a violation of the Final Judgment of Injunction.

This form should be typed or printed in black ink. After completing this form, you should sign the form before a notary public or the clerk of the circuit court. You should then file the original with such clerk or judge as determined by the chief judge of your circuit to be the recipient of affidavits of violation, provide a copy to the state attorney of that circuit and keep a copy for your records.

      . An original and nine paper copies of all comments must be filed with the Court on or before August 6, 2012, as well as a separate request for oral argument if the person filing the comment wishes to participate in oral argument, which may be scheduled in this case. Electronic copies of all comments also must be filed in accordance with the Court’s administrative order In re Mandatory Submission of Electronic Copies of Documents, Fla. Admin. Order No. AOSC04-84 (Sept. 13, 2004).


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: PER CURIAM.

license: Public Domain

text:
    Lazaro FLORES, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. SC10-2198.
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    June 7, 2012.

      Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender, and Manuel Alvarez, Assistant Public Defender, Eleventh Judicial Circuit, Miami, FL, for Petitioner.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, FL, and Richard Polin, Bureau Chief and Lunar C. Alvey, Assistant Attorneys General, Miami, FL, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

We initially accepted jurisdiction to review the decision of the Third District Court of Appeal in Flores v. State, 46 So.3d 102 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010), based on express and direct conflict. See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. Upon further consideration, we have determined that jurisdiction was improvidently granted. Accordingly, we hereby discharge jurisdiction and dismiss this review proceeding.

It is so ordered.

CANADY, C.J., and PARIENTE, QUINCE, POLSTON, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur.

LEWIS, J., dissents.


text:
    In re AMENDMENTS TO FLORIDA RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 9.200.
    No. SC12-620.
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    June 14, 2012.
    Jamie B. Moses, Chair, Appellate Court Rules Committee, Fisher, Rushmer, et al., Orlando, FL, John F. Harkness, Jr., Executive Director, and Krys Godwin, Staff Liaison, The Florida Bar, Tallahassee, FL, for Petitioner.
   PER CURIAM.

The Appellate Court Rules Committee (Committee) has filed an out-of-cycle report asking the Court to correct an error in Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.200(b)(4) (The Record; Transcript(s) of Proceedings). The error, which was inadvertently included in the rule as submitted in the Committee’s 2011 regular-cycle report of proposed amendments, was included in the rule as amended in the Court’s November 3, 2011, opinion. See In re Amendments to Fla. Rules App. Pro., 84 So.3d 192, 201 (Fla.2011) (inserting an “or” in place of an “and” in third sentence of rule 9.200(b)(4)). We have jurisdiction, see art. V, § 2(a), Fla. Const., and further amend the rule to correct the error.

Accordingly, we amend Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.200, as reflected in the appendix to this opinion. New language is underscored, and deleted language is struck-through. The amendment shall become effective immediately upon the release of this opinion.

It is so ordered.

CANADY, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, POLSTON, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur.

APPENDIX

RULE 9.200. THE RECORD

(a) [No Change]
(b) Transcript(s) of Proceedings.
(1) — (3) [No Change]
(4) If no report of the proceedings was made, or if the transcript is unavailable, a party may prepare a statement of the evidence or proceedings from the best available means, including the party’s recollection. The statement shall be served on all other parties, who may serve objections or proposed amendments to it within 10 days of service. Thereafter, the statement and any objections or proposed amendments shall be submitted to the lower tribunal for settlement and approval. As settled and approved, the statement shall be included by the clerk of the lower tribunal in the record.
(c)-(g) [No Change]
Committee Notes
[No Change]


text:
    STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Lester HACKLEY, Appellee.
    No. 1D10-0159.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Oct. 29, 2010.
    Bill McCollum, Attorney General, and Trisha Meggs Pate, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Barbara Hobbs, Tallahassee, for Appel-lee.
   PER CURIAM.

The State appeals the trial court’s order granting Appellee’s motion to correct illegal sentence filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). We affirm.

Lester Hackley was originally sentenced as a prison releasee reoffender (PRR) after committing a burglary of a conveyance with an assault. The trial court granted the rule 3.800(a) motion and resentenced Mr. Hackley without the PRR designation because the Florida Supreme Court has determined that burglary of a conveyance with a battery, which is a greater offense than burglary of a conveyance with an assault, does not qualify for PRR sentencing. See State v. Hearns, 961 So.2d 211, 213 (Fla.2007); but see Shaw v. State, 26 So.3d 51, 53 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009) (“[W]e recognize the irony that a defendant who commits a battery during the commission of a felony does not qualify as a PRR under the statute, but a defendant who commits an assault does.”).

A basic tenet of statutory construction compels a court to interpret a statute so as to avoid a construction that would result in unreasonable, harsh, or absurd consequences. See Thompson v. State, 695 So.2d 691, 693 (Fla.1997). Thus, to avoid the absurd consequence of encouraging a defendant who has already committed burglary with an assault to put the victim in physical danger by committing a battery to avoid the possibility of PRR sentencing, we affirm the trial court’s order. To the extent this decision conflicts with the Fifth District’s decision in Shaw, we certify conflict.

AFFIRMED.

BENTON, PADOVANO, and CLARK, JJ., concur.

      . At resentencing, as a result of an apparent oversight, the trial court checked the line designating the appellant as a "prison releasee reoffender." It is apparent from the trial court's order and the reduced sentence that the trial court did not intend to re-sentence the appellant as a PRR.


author: VILLANTI, Judge.

text:
    Anthony BUTLER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 2D11-3605.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    June 29, 2011.
    Anthony Butler, pro se.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Ronald Napolitano, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.
   VILLANTI, Judge.

Anthony Butler appeals from an order denying his motion filed under Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a) and 8.850. We affirm the postconviction court’s denial of Butler’s rule 3.850 claim without further comment. We reverse and remand for further proceedings as to the rule 3.800(a) claim because the record reflects that Butler possesses only two of the three predicate convictions required to support Butler’s violent career criminal (VCC) status.

Butler entered a plea of guilty to one count each of burglary and grand theft in return for a sentence of thirty years’ imprisonment as a VCC for the burglary, with the thirty years designated a minimum-mandatory term, and a concurrent ten years as a habitual felony offender (HFO) for the theft. Butler alleged in his motion that he has been convicted of only two of the three predicate offenses required for a VCC designation and sentence: burglaries for which Butler was sentenced on March 18, 1988, and June 17, 1994. The postconviction court, however, denied Butler’s claim, attaching what it interpreted as the record of another conviction, the judgment and sentence documentation dated November 16, 2001, for a burglary. In a motion for rehearing, Butler correctly pointed out that these documents were entered upon revocation of the probation imposed for the burglaries for which he was originally sentenced on June 17, 1994, and should therefore not count as a separate conviction. The court denied the motion for rehearing.

Rule 3.800(a) is an appropriate vehicle for raising the claim Butler raised. See Bover v. State, 797 So.2d 1246, 1251 (Fla.2001) (“[W]e conclude that the adjudication of a defendant as a habitual offender when the requisite sequential felonies do not exist may be corrected as an illegal sentence pursuant to rule 3.800(a) so long as the error is apparent from the face of the record.”); Molfetto v. State, 874 So.2d 668, 669 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (applying this principle to VCC sentencing). Butler’s claim is facially sufficient because he alleges that a third VCC predicate conviction does not exist. See Macaluso v. State, 912 So.2d 694, 695 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (“A facially sufficient attack on the legality of a habitual felony offender (‘HFO’) sentence requires the defendant to affirmatively allege that the predicate prior convictions do not exist as a matter of law.”).

A violent career criminal is a defendant who “has previously been convicted as an adult three or more times ” of any of certain enumerated offenses, including forcible felonies. § 775.084(1)(d)(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2002) (emphasis added). Although the word “convicted” has minor variations in meaning depending on the statute or other authority, the term does not encompass a new “judgment” entered upon revocation of the probation being served for an earlier offense of which the defendant was already convicted. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 160 Fla. 288, 34 So.2d 533, 534 (1948) (“The word ‘convicted,’ as used in [a minimum-mandatory-sentencing statute since repealed], means the adjudication by the court of the defendant’s guilt and the pronouncement by the court of the penalty imposed on the defendant upon the acceptance of a plea of guilty or upon a verdict of guilty, or a finding of guilty by the court.”); cf. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969) (“A plea of guilty is more than a confession which admits that the accused did various acts; it is itself a conviction; nothing remains but to give judgment and determine punishment.”); Lambert v. State, 545 So.2d 838, 841 (Fla.1989) (noting that a “violation of probation is not itself an independent offense punishable at law in Florida” and that conduct underlying such a violation is punished by, inter alia, “revocation of probation” and “conviction and sentencing for the new offense ” (emphasis added)); see also People v. Nance, 221 P.3d 428, 431 (Colo.App.2009) (“[P]ro-bation revocation is not a conviction....”). To the extent that conviction is considered to occur upon adjudication, Smith, 34 So.2d at 534, and a defendant is first adjudged guilty for the underlying offense upon revocation of probation, § 948.06(1), Fla. Stat. (2002), there is still only one conviction for a given offense. Cf. Valdes v. State, 3 So.3d 1067,1069 (Fla.2009) (noting that the federal and Florida constitutions “prohibit[] subjecting a person to multiple prosecutions, convictions, and punishments for the same criminal offense”).

In short, the postconviction court erred in relying on a second “judgment” that did not reflect a new conviction but merely a revocation of the probation imposed on Butler upon an earlier conviction. The State concedes this in its answer brief. We therefore reverse and remand for further proceedings. The State shall have the opportunity to submit competent evidence of a third conviction. See Martin v. State, 884 So.2d 452, 453 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004). If the State cannot do so, Butler shall have the opportunity to withdraw his plea, see McDuffie v. State, 946 So.2d 99, 100 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006), at which time the parties may arrive at a new plea agreement that omits the VCC designation, failing which a trial will be necessary.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions.

ALTENBERND and DAVIS, JJ„ Concur.

      . The HFO designation is not at issue in this appeal.

      . The November 16, 2001, sentencing court apparently entered a second "judgment” for the earlier offense rather than an order of revocation of probation. Cf. Johnson v. State, 17 So.3d 1290 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (criticizing this practice).

      . Butler’s motion also recites that his trial counsel and the State agreed that he "qualified for [VCC] sentencing.” Ordinarily, a defendant waives the procedural requirements of the habitualization statute, § 775.084(3), Fla. Stat. (2002), when the defendant has stipulated to qualifying for habitualization and to being sentenced accordingly. E.g., Greenlee v. State, 591 So.2d 310, 310-11 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991). However, an exception to the waiver exists when the defendant can demonstrate that the predicate offenses do not exist. Lee v. State, 731 So.2d 71, 73 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999); Hearns v. State, 912 So.2d 377, 379 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005).

      .Burglary is a forcible felony. § 776.08, Fla. Stat. (2002). Butler was sentenced for multiple burglaries on his two original sentencing dates, but only one conviction can be counted for each sentencing proceeding. See Bover, 797 So.2d at 1250; Zink v. State, 951 So.2d 34, 35 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (applying this principle to VCC sentencing).


text:
    Robert Lee COBB, Petitioner, v. The DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent.
    No. 1D11-5342.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Jan. 18, 2012.
    Rehearing Denied Jan. 23, 2012.

      Robert Lee Cobb, pro se, Petitioner.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

Because the petition for writ of certiora-ri was not filed within 30 days of rendition of the order of the circuit court for which review is sought, we are constrained to DISMISS this proceeding for lack of jurisdiction.

PADOVANO, ROBERTS, and SWANSON, JJ., concur.


author: BENTON, C.J.

text:
    R.J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO COMPANY, Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. Diane WEBB, as Personal Representative for the Estate of James Cayce Horner, Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
    No. 1D10-6557.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    April 9, 2012.
    Rehearing Denied June 15, 2012.

      Robert B. Parrish, David C. Reeves, Jeffrey A. Yarbrough and Andrew J. Knight of Moseley, Prichard, Parrish, Knight & Jones, Jacksonville, Stephanie E. Parker of Jones Day, Atlanta, Georgia, and Theodore M. Grossman of Jones Day, Cleveland, OH, pro hac vice, for Appellant/Cross-Appellee.
    Steven L. Brannock, Celene H. Hum-phries, and Tyler K. Pitchford of Brannock & Humphries, Tampa, James W. Gustaf-son, Jr. of Searcy, Denney, Scarola, Barn-hart & Shipley, P.A., Tallahassee, and David J. Sales of David J. Sales, P.A., Jupiter, for Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
   BENTON, C.J.

As personal representative of the estate of her father, James Cayce Horner — a long-time smoker of cigarettes manufactured by R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company (RJR) who died of lung cancer — Diane Webb filed a wrongful-death action against RJR alleging membership in the class described in Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc., 945 So.2d 1246 (Fla.2006), strict liability, fraud by concealment, conspiracy to commit fraud by concealment, and negligence. After the trial court entered judgment in her favor and against RJR for $79,200,000 ($7.2 million in compensatory damages and $72 million in punitive damages), RJR appealed. Ms. Webb did not pursue her cross-appeal. We do not disturb the judgment as to liability, but we vacate the damages award and remand for further proceedings.

I.

RJR argues for reversal on multiple grounds. It contends that (1) the trial court dealt with its statute of limitations defense improperly; (2) the compensatory damage award should be set aside as excessive or be remitted; (3) the punitive damage award should be set aside because the trial court erred in permitting the jury to rely on the Engle findings in determining entitlement and as excessive, or should at least be remitted; (4) the statute of repose and federal preemption operate in combination to bar all concealment and conspiracy claims; (5) Ms. Webb failed to prove Mr. Horner reasonably relied on any statement or omission by any Engle defendant; and (6) use of the Engle findings to establish elements of Ms. Webb’s claims violated Florida law and state and federal due process requirements.

H.

On the basis of recent, definitive precedent, we summarily reject RJR’s last three arguments. First, as regards the combined effect of the statute of repose and federal preemption, we are bound by our supreme court’s decision in Carter v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 778 So.2d 932, 940 (Fla.2000) (concluding the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969 does “ ‘not preempt petitioner’s claims that rely solely on respondent’s testing or research practices or other actions unrelated to advertising or promotion,’ ” “ ‘does not preempt fraudulent misrepresentation claims,’ ” and “ ‘does not preempt conspiracy to defraud claims’ ” (quoting Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 524-30, 112 S.Ct. 2608, 120 L.Ed.2d 407 (1992))). See also Laschke v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 766 So.2d 1076, 1079 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) (“In claims alleging conspiracy, the critical date for statute of repose purposes should be the date of the last act done in furtherance of the conspiracy.”).

Applying the doctrine of stare decisis, we also reject RJR’s argument that Ms. Webb failed to establish her father’s reliance on RJR’s (mis)statements and omissions concerning the effects smoking tobacco can have on smokers’ health. Here as in R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Martin, 53 So.3d 1060, 1069 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010), review denied, 67 So.3d 1050 (Fla.2011), “the record contains abundant evidence from which the jury could infer [Mr. Hor-ner’s] reliance on pervasive misleading advertising campaigns ... and on the false controversy created by the tobacco industry during the years he smoked aimed at creating doubt among smokers that cigarettes were hazardous to health.” Finally, our decision in Martin forecloses RJR’s argument that using the Engle findings in establishing elements of Ms. Webb’s claims violated both Florida law and federal and state due process requirements. See id. at 1066-69.

III.

Nor do we find merit in RJR’s argument that the trial court improperly rejected its statute of limitations defense. RJR argued the action was time-barred under the statute of limitations by virtue of the “first-injury rule,” invoking “the long-standing rule generally applicable to personal injury claims [that] ‘the cause of action accrues and the statute [of limitations] begins to run from the time when the injury was first inflicted, and not from the time when the full extent of the damages sustained ha[s] been ascertained.’” Larson & Larson, P.A. v. TSE Indus., Inc., 22 So.3d 36, 42 (Fla.2009) (quoting Seaboard Air Line R.R. Co. v. Ford, 92 So.2d 160, 164 (Fla.1956)). RJR maintained that Mr. Horner knew or should have known, prior to May 5, 1990 (more than four years before the class action in Engle was filed on May 5, 1994), that he had chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), and that any claim based on any injury from smoking — including lung cancer — accrued as soon as he became aware — or should have become aware — of COPD. The trial court ruled that knowledge of COPD did not, as a matter of law, put him on notice of the cancer to which he eventually succumbed.

We find no error in this ruling. It comports with the Third District’s rationale in Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc. v. Cox, 481 So.2d 517 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985), where a plaintiff who suffered from asbestosis, but not cancer, sought to recover damages not only for asbestosis but also for the enhanced risk of cancer as the result of exposure to asbestos. After a scholarly discussion of the rule against splitting causes of action, the Eagle-Picher court concluded that “to permit an action for cancer only if and when it occurs most assuredly promotes judicial economy by discouraging the filing of anticipatory lawsuits and the concomitant protraction of pending lawsuits so as to allow the still inchoate cancer claim to ripen.” Id. at 521.

The court observed that asbestosis and cancer are medically distinct diseases even though they may emanate from the same exposure to asbestos. Id. at 522. Noting thousands of pending asbestos claims and the long latency period for asbestos-related cancer, the court concluded:

Given the immensity of the demands made and yet to be made upon asbestos litigation defendants, the finite resources available to pay claimants in mass tort litigation, and the real danger that overcompensation of early claimants who may not contract cancer will deplete these finite resources to the detriment of future claimants who do, public policy requires that the resources available for those persons who do contract cancer not be awarded to those whose exposure to asbestos has merely increased their risk of contracting cancer in the future. Eliminating the future risk of cancer as a compensable damage, and permitting an action for later discovered cancer to be independent of any claim for damages, prosecuted or not, on account of asbestosis, will, it is to be hoped, prevent a drain on the assets which could be used to compensate actual cancer victims.

Id. at 525-26. Our supreme court stated with regard to tobacco in Carter, 778 So.2d at 936-37:

Lung cancer caused by smoking is a latent or “creeping disease.” See Copeland v. Armstrong Cork Co., 447 So.2d [922, 926 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984) ] (stating that a latent or “creeping” disease is a disease acquired over a period of years as a result of long-term exposure to injurious substances); see also Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Young, 690 So.2d 1377, 1379 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997) (a latent disease is “difficult to pinpoint when and where it began”).

“[Mjanifestation’ of a latent injury in a products liability claim occurs when the plaintiff is on notice of a causal connection between exposure to the allegedly defective product and the resultant injury.” Barnes v. Clark Sand Co. Inc., 721 So.2d 329, 332 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998).

Smoking cigarettes may cause more than one kind of injury. See Pooshs v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 51 Cal.4th 788, 123 Cal.Rptr.3d 578, 250 P.3d 181, 190-91 (2011) (concluding that “when a later-discovered latent disease is separate and distinct from an earlier-discovered disease, the earlier disease does not trigger the statute of limitations for a lawsuit based on the later disease” and therefore “no good reason appears to require plaintiff, who years ago suffered a smoking-related disease that is not lung cancer, to sue at that time for lung cancer damages based on the speculative possibility that lung cancer might later arise”).

Applying Rhode Island law in Nicolo v. Philip Morris, Inc., 201 F.3d 29, 35 (1st Cir.2000), the court noted that requiring a strict application of the rule against splitting causes of action “would place, as other courts have observed, a victim in an impossible position.”

If he did not sue at the earliest onset of breathing difficulty or emphysema, he would risk being barred from pursuing a remedy for a cancer condition discovered much later. If, on the other hand, he brought suit at such an early stage he would not be able to come forward with the proof of sufficient likelihood of damage from cancer to sustain his cause of action.... As then-Judge Ginsburg wrote in Wilson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 684 F.2d 111 (D.C.Cir.1982): “In latent disease cases, this community interest [in balancing the interests of the parties and producing a fair resolution] would be significantly undermined by a judge-made rule that upon manifestation of any harm, the injured party must then, if ever, sue for all harms the same exposure may (or may not) occasion some time in the future.” Id. at 119.
We, therefore, are confident that a Rhode Island court would not deem cancer to be so foreseeably related to the very beginning of plaintiffs respiratory difficulties as to identify that as the time of accrual of her cause of action for cancer.

Id. The First Circuit recited “a number of characteristics of cancer that militate against requiring a possible victim, even though an addicted smoker, to make an early decision to commence litigation. The causes of cancer are various, by no means confined to prolonged smoking. Nor is cancer an inevitable result of such smoking. Often its incidence defies foreseeability. It is quite different from afflictions of shortness of breath, emphysema, or other respiratory difficulties. It is of a different magnitude.... Unlike impairments to breathing, cancer does not lend itself to lay identification.” Id. at 36.

In the present case, the controlling question was when Mr. Horner knew or should have known that he had smoking-related lung cancer, not COPD, and the trial court so ruled. RJR did not establish that merely learning of his COPD diagnosis meant Mr. Horner knew or should have known he had lung cancer. A person with COPD may or may not develop lung cancer, according to evidence the trial court was entitled to accept. The evidence was undisputed that Mr. Horner was not diagnosed with lung cancer until 1991; and the parties stipulated that lung cancer caused his death in 1996. The trial court did not err in rejecting RJR’s statute of limitations defense, and we find no other error in the trial court’s determination of liability.

IV.

Finding that Ms. Webb sustained $8 million in compensatory (noneconomic) damages and that RJR was 90% responsible for Mr. Horner’s death, the jury awarded an additional $72 million in punitive damages. In the aggregate, the award was $79.2 million. The trial court denied RJR’s motions for new trial or remittitur, and entered judgment on the verdict.

Courts should not “allow a jury to award a greater amount of damages than what is reasonably supported by the evidence at trial.” McCarthy Bros. Co. v. Tilbury Constr., Inc., 849 So.2d 7, 9 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003). Upon the filing of RJR’s motion for new trial or remittitur, the trial court had to review the amount of damages to determine if the award was excessive “in light of the facts and circumstances which were presented to the trier of fact.” § 768.74(1), Fla. Stat. (2010). In determining whether an award is excessive, a trial court is required to consider the following criteria:

(a) Whether the amount awarded is indicative of prejudice, passion, or corruption on the part of the trier of fact;
(b) Whether it appears that the trier of fact ignored the evidence in reaching a verdict or misconceived the merits of the case relating to the amounts of damages recoverable;
(c) Whether the trier of fact took improper elements of damages into account or arrived at the amount of damages by speculation and conjecture;
(d) Whether the amount awarded bears a reasonable relation to the amount of damages proved and the injury suffered; and
(e) Whether the amount awarded is supported by the evidence and is such that it could be adduced in a logical manner by reasonable persons.

§ 768.74(5), Fla. Stat. (2010). “The Legislature recognizes that the reasonable actions of a jury are a fundamental precept of American jurisprudence and that such actions should be disturbed or modified with caution and discretion. However, it is further recognized that a review by the courts in accordance with the standards set forth in this section provides an additional element of soundness and logic to our judicial system and is in the best interests of the citizens of this state.” § 768.74(6), Fla. Stat. (2010).

Under Florida law, a trial court’s order denying a motion for remittitur is reviewed by an appellate court under an abuse of discretion standard. See Engle, 945 So.2d at 1263; City of Hollywood v. Hogan, 986 So.2d 634, 647 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008). “The trial court does not sit as a seventh juror. Neither does the reviewing court reserve the prerogative to overturn a damages verdict with which it merely disagrees.” Dyes v. Spick, 606 So.2d 700, 702 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) (citations omitted). “[I]n determining the adequacy of a verdict the reviewing court must decide whether a jury of reasonable men could have returned that verdict. The use of the term ‘reasonable men’ connotes the application of an objective standard, and requires a determination of whether the verdict is actually based upon the law and evidence as presented at trial.” Id. (citing Griffis v. Hill, 230 So.2d 143 (Fla.1969)). “If the jury’s award is so extravagant that it shocks the judicial conscience, or is manifestly unsupported by the evidence or indicates the jury was influenced by passion, prejudice or other matters outside the record, the court in its discretion may set aside the verdict.” Citrus Cnty. v. McQuillin, 840 So.2d 343, 347 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003).

In reviewing an award of damages for excessiveness, the court may consider the philosophy and general trend of decisions in comparable cases. See Aills v. Boemi, 41 So.3d 1022, 1028 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (“The comparison of jury verdicts reached in similar cases provides one method of assessing ‘[wjhether the amount awarded bears a reasonable relation to the amount of damages proved and the injury suffered.’ § 768.74(5)(d).”). See also Johnson v. U.S., 780 F.2d 902, 908 (11th Cir.1986) (“[EJxcessiveness may be tested by comparing the verdict to those damage awards determined not to be excessive in similar cases.”); McQuillin, 840 So.2d at 347 (reviewing “the awards in other cases for loss of a child, parent or spouse” in determining whether award is so excessive as to shock the judicial conscience).

Only noneconomic damages were awarded in the present case. Recovery was authorized “for lost parental companionship, instruction, and guidance and for mental pain and suffering from the date of injury.” § 768.21(3), Fla. Stat. (1996). Of the thirty-five Engle cases we examined in which the jury awarded compensatory damages, the juries awarded compensatory damages as great as $7 million in only eight cases. Of these eight cases, three were cases in which the plaintiff was the cigarette smoker and the verdicts included economic damage awards. In the others, the decedents died at a much younger age than Mr. Horner did, or were survived by a spouse, by spouse and child, or by two or more children. Our research has failed to uncover a single case in which an adult child received a wrongful death award of this magnitude that was affirmed on appeal (either in Engle progeny cases or other wrongful death actions).

Ms. Webb points to the verdict in Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba, 996 F.Supp. 1239 (S.D.FIa.1997), an award that never received the imprimatur of an appeals court. There Armando Alejandre was on a humanitai’ian mission, searching for rafters in the waters between Cuba and the Florida Keys, when the Cuban Air Force shot down the civilian plane in which he was flying. Forty-five years old at the time of his death, Mr. Alejandre was survived by his wife of twenty-one years and his daughter Marlene, a college student. Id. at 1242-43. His personal representative filed an action against the Republic of Cuba and the Cuban Ah’ Force. The trial court awarded $7,500,000 for mental pain and suffering and $500,000 for loss of companionship and protection to Alejandre’s widow, and $7,500,000 for mental pain and suffering and $500,000 for loss of parental companionship and guidance to Alejandre’s daughter. Neither Cuba nor the Cuban Air Force defended the suit or appealed the judgment. Id. at 1249.

The present case differs in many respects. Experts aside, only four witnesses, including Ms. Webb, testified at trial. All four testified regarding the 1986 death of Ms. Webb’s first husband from a heart attack, the 1993 death of Ms. Webb’s mother from lung cancer, and the death of Ms. Webb’s grandmother (Mr. Horner’s mother) from emphysema. All four of these witnesses attributed all of these illnesses and deaths to cigarette smoking.

The jury also heard much testimony from each of these four witnesses about Ms. Webb’s personal medical difficulties and about the close relationship she had with Mr. Horner and how helpful he was during the life-long illness and death of Ms. Webb’s first-born child. The jury heard that Ms. Webb married when she was nineteen; that she lived with her then husband, a member of the United States Air Force, in England from 1961 through 1963; that their first child, Venetia, was born in 1963 with a rare chromosomal disorder (Trisomy Edwards 18); that her husband was given a compassionate reassignment; that during the ambulance flight from England, the plane was not properly pressurized; and that this resulted in Ms. Webb’s becoming deaf.

The jury heard uncontroverted evidence from which it further appeared: Upon their return from England, when Ms. Webb and her husband lived at Homestead Air Force Base for a year, she could not leave the house unless someone else was in the house with Venetia. She was also experiencing other problems related to her hearing loss during this time. Her mother and father, who lived in Miami, came to Ms. Webb’s house to assist four or five times each week. Later Ms. Webb and her husband purchased a home in Miami, across the street from her parents, and she saw her parents, who continued to help her care for Venetia, every day. Although Venetia required care twenty-four hours a day because of medical and physical problems, no one other than Ms. Webb’s immediate family, including Mr. Horner, cared for her.

Venetia had to be fed like an infant; she was never able to walk or talk, and could not even sit unassisted. When she died in 1977 at the age of thirteen, she weighed only 25 pounds. Without her parents’ assistance, Ms. Webb would not have been able to care for her two younger children, who spent a significant amount of time at Mr. Horner’s home, in part because of Venetia’s medical difficulties. Because Venetia had a compromised immune system, the two younger children would stay at Mr. Horner’s home when they caught colds.

The amount of the compensatory damages suggests an award that is the product of passion, an emotional response to testimony regarding difficulties Ms. Webb and her father faced and overcame before cancer befell him, rather than evidence of his illness, subsequent death, and the noneco-nomic consequences of the death itself. Mr. Horner outlived the grandchild he had been such a help with. Ms. Webb, who was 54 years old when her father died at the age of 78, was not wholly dependent on his companionship, instruction and guidance at that time. She was married, with two adult children and grandchildren, as well.

Although not determinative, the fact that the jury awarded double the amount of compensatory damages requested by Ms. Webb’s counsel and assigned to Mr. Horner half of the percentage of fault her counsel acknowledged during closing argument suggests the jury was influenced by prejudice or passion. While a “ ‘jury might properly award damages equal to or in excess of those requested by counsel in closing argument,’ ... it is common practice for attorneys to suggest damages well in excess of the amount that could be sustained under the facts in the case.” Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. (Amtrak) v. Ahmed, 653 So.2d 1055, 1059 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) (quoting Lopez v. Cohen, 406 So.2d 1253, 1256 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981)). See also Gresham v. Courson, 177 So.2d 33, 39 (Fla. 1st DCA 1965) (“A verdict is not per se excessive because the jury awards the full amount of damages suggested by counsel for the prevailing party, but we would be exceedingly naive should we fail to recognize that as a matter of practice the advocate usually suggests to the jury a figure for damages substantially in excess of the amount that is clearly supportable by the evidence and likewise in excess of the amount which he deems to be supportable in point of law should the jury happen to return a verdict approaching the amount suggested.”). Certainly the compassion Mr. Horner exhibited during his lifetime, and Ms. Webb’s deafness and devotion both to him and her first born, could inspire sympathy and admiration. In the circumstances, however, the compensatory damages award is more than the evidence at trial reasonably supports and “shocks the judicial conscience.” The trial court abused its discretion when it denied RJR’s motion for remittitur or new trial.

Because the award of compensatory damages must be vacated, we also vacate the award of punitive damages. See Engle, 945 So.2d at 1265 (“ ‘[CJourts must ensure that the measure of punishment is both reasonable and proportionate to the amount of harm to the plaintiff and to the general damages recovered.’ Thus, the amount of compensatory damages must be determined in advance of a determination of the amount of punitive damages awarda-ble, if any, so that the relationship between the two may be reviewed for reasonableness.” (quoting State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 426,123 S.Ct. 1513, 155 L.Ed.2d 585 (2003)); Brown v. Ford, 900 So.2d 646, 649 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005) (noting that if a new trial on damages is required the “ ‘better practice and procedure requires that one jury determine both the compensatory and punitive damages’ ” (quoting DuPuis v. 79th Street Hotel, Inc., 231 So.2d 532, 536 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970)); Chillemi v. Rorabeck, 629 So.2d 206, 210 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993) (“Since the amount of compensatory damages is being set aside, the better practice is for the punitive damages award also to be reconsidered at the same time. See Stevens Markets, Inc. v. Markantonatos, 189 So.2d 624 (Fla.1966).”).

V.

We reverse both the compensatory and the punitive damage awards and remand the case with directions that the trial court grant the motion for remittitur or order a new trial on damages only. We affirm the judgment in all other respects.

VAN NORTWICK and SWANSON, JJ., concur.

      . Our supreme court said in Larson & Larson, P.A. v. TSE Industries, Inc., 22 So.3d 36, 47 n. 7 (Fla.2009), " 'The rule against splitting causes of action makes it incumbent upon plaintiffs to raise all available claims involving the same circumstances in one action.' Dep’t of Agric. & Consumer Servs. v. Mid-Florida Growers, Inc., 570 So.2d 892, 901 (Fla. 1990) (emphasis added). The rule does not require the joinder of a cause of action that is not 'available' because it has not accrued with a cause of action that has accrued.”

      . Contra Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Barbanell, — So.3d —, — n. 3, 2012 WL 555402 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012).

      . See Notice of Judgments and Request to Take Judicial Notice and accompanying appendix, filed on September 27, 2011, and Request to Take Judicial Notice, filed on November 9, 2011, in R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Townsend, 1D10-4585.

      . See, e.g., Lukacs v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., No. 01-03822-CA 23 (Fla. 11th Cir.Ct. Nov. 14, 2008) (verdict June 11, 2002), aff'd, 34 So.3d 56 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010); Naugle v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., No. 07-036736CA (Fla. 17th Cir.Ct. Aug. 18, 2010) (verdict Nov. 19, 2009); Tate v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., No.2007-CA-021723 (Fla. 17th Cir.Ct. Aug. 6, 2010) (verdict July 8, 2010).

      . See, e.g., Campbell v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No.2008 CA 2147 (Fla. 1st Cir.Ct. Sept. 13, 2009) (verdict Aug. 19, 2009), aff'd, Liggett Group LLC v. Campbell, 60 So.3d 1078 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (awarding $7.8 compensatory damages to the husband, whose wife died at the age of 64); R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Townsend, 90 So.3d 307 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (affirming $10.8 million compensatory damages award to estate of decedent who died at age 59, survived by his wife of 39 years).

      . See, e.g., Campbell; Cohen v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No.2007-11515 (Fla. 11th Cir.Ct. Jul. 21, 2010) (verdict Mar. 24, 2010); Gray v. RJ. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No.2007-CA-002773 (Fla. 1st Cir.Ct. Mar. 8, 2010) (verdict Feb. 5, 2010), aff'd, 63 So.3d 902 (Fla. 1st DCA), review denied, 67 So.3d 1050 (Fla.2011); Townsend.

      . See, e.g., Allen v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. 16-2007-CA-008311 (Fla. 4th Cir.Ct. May 23, 2011) (verdict April 22, 2011, awarding $3 million to the surviving spouse and $3 million to decedent’s child).

      . See, e.g., Mrozek v. Lorillard Tobacco Co., No. 16-2007-CA-011952-XXXX-MA (Fla. 4th Cir. Ct.. June 8, 2011) (verdict March 2, 2011, awarding $2 million each to three children), aff'd, 60 So.3d 1057 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011); Putney v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No.2007-CV-36668 (Fla. 17th Cir.Ct. Aug. 24, 2010) (verdict April 26, 2010, awarding $5 million each to three children).

      . Compare Citrus Cnty. v. McQuillin, 840 So.2d 343, 347 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003) (concluding, "[ajfter reviewing the awards in other cases for loss of a child, parent or spouse,” that award of $4.4 million in damages for pain and suffering and loss of parental companionship, to seven-year-old child of decedent killed in car accident, "although on the outer limit in size, [wa]s not so excessive as to shock our composite judicial consciences”).

      . The opinion does not reveal Marlene’s age.