author: CARAWAY, J. BROWN, Chief Judge, MOORE, J,

text:
    LOUTRE LAND AND TIMBER COMPANY, Plaintiff v. Wilton A. ROBERTS, Edward Roberts, Mark A. Roberts and Toni L. Roberts Daschke, Defendants.
    No. 45,355-CA.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.
    Aug. 4, 2010.
    Dissenting Opinion of Judge Moore Aug. 11, 2010.
    Rehearing Denied Sept. 16, 2010.

      Robert T. Knight, for appellant, Edward Roberts.
    Cotton, Bolton, Hoychick & Doughty, L.L.P., Rayville, LA, by John Hoychick, Jr. for appellee, Loutre Land and Timber Company.
    Before BROWN, CARAWAY, DREW, MOORE and LOLLEY, JJ.
   CARAWAY, J.

| iThis is a real action involving the ownership of immovable property. The former owners of the property had adversely possessed the disputed tract of approximately 15 to 18 acres along with 100 additional and adjacent acres to which they held title. The former owners’ ownership of this property was conveyed in succession proceedings by two deeds to the parties’ to this action. On the strength of those deeds executed in 2002 and 2003, the parties now claim ownership of the disputed tract. From a ruling in favor of the plaintiff, the defendant now appeals. Finding error in the trial court’s ruling, we reverse and recognize the ownership of the defendant. The case is remanded to fix the boundary to the property in accordance with survey data submitted at trial.

Facts

Prior to deeds executed in 2002-2003 which prompted this lawsuit, the owners of these adjacent properties held title to the land under longstanding recorded deeds which described the following two tracts:

East Half of the Southeast Quarter (E/2 of SE/4) of Section 3, Township 16 North, Range 8 East (hereinafter the “Section 3 Tract”)
The North 15.50 chains (or 1023 feet) of the Northeast Quarter of the Northeast Quarter (NE/4 of NE/4) of Section 10, Township 16 North, Range 8 East (hereinafter the “Section 10 Tract”).

The ideal boundary between these two tracts therefore was the governmental section line between Section 3 to the north and Section 10 to the south separating the SE/4 of the SE/4 of Section 3 and the NE/4 of the NE/4 of Section 10 (hereinafter the “Ideal Boundary”).

|2The Marie Wilson Morgan family owned the 80-acre Section 3 Tract along with 20 additional and contiguous acres lying in the SW/4 of Section 2 (hereinafter collectively the “100 Acres”). The Morgan chain of title to this 100 Acres is evidenced in the record dating back to a deed in 1943 and the Morgan family’s ownership of the 100 Acres is not in dispute.

The Wilton A. Roberts family has held title to the Section 10 Tract for over 40 years. In 1964, Wilton A. Roberts, husband of Rebecca Jane Roberts, was conveyed the Section 10 Tract in a deed from Dorothy Harbour, et al. Edward W. Roberts (“Roberts”), who inherited the interests of his parents, Wilton and Rebecca, following their deaths, is now the defendant in this action.

At the heart of this property dispute is an old fence which runs from east to west approximately in the middle of the Section 10 Tract. The land between the old fence north to the Ideal Boundary is the property now in dispute (hereinafter the “Disputed Tract”). The size of the Disputed Tract revealed by the survey data introduced at trial appears to be 14.36 acres but had been referred to by the parties in varying amounts as comprising up to 18 acres. The Disputed Tract is a portion of the Section 10 Tract, and is roughly described in the present judgment as follows:

[TJhat part of the Northeast Quarter, Section 10, Township 16 North, Range 8 East, lying north of the boundary fence, which fence separates the property owned by Edward Roberts (previously property of Wilton A. Roberts, et al) from the “Morgan Place”

IsWhile the record does not disclose who constructed the old fence, the conflict between the two tract owners arose because of acts of adverse possession by the Morgan family extending from their Section 3 Tract into Section 10 down to the old fence. The evidence shows that even before 1964, when Wilton Roberts acquired title to the Section 10 Tract, approximately half of his land, this Disputed Tract north of the old fence, was in the possession of the Morgans. At all times, the Morgans, or their tenant farmers, actively farmed the Disputed Tract. Testimony from Alton McKeithen, previous game warden for Franklin Parish; Susan F. Turner, Mrs. Morgan’s daughter-in-law; and Harold Dean Cole, who previously hunted and farmed the Disputed Tract, consistently revealed that the fence formed the boundary line between the two properties and had done so for over thirty years. Edward Roberts even acknowledged that when he was a small child his father farmed the Disputed Tract by renting the land from the Morgans and presumably paying rent in order to do so. From these facts, the trial court determined that the Morgan family possessed the Disputed Tract for over thirty years and further found that the possession was continuous, uninterrupted, public, and unequivocal and extending up to the old fence. Roberts makes no assignment of error as to this finding, and we therefore agree with the trial court that the Morgans corporally possessed the Disputed Tract for over thirty years.

On July 29, 2002, the Succession of Marie Wilson Morgan (“the Succession”) executed a full warranty deed in favor of Loutre Land and | ^Timber Company (“Loutre”) transferring the following described tract of land situated in Franklin Parish:

The South Half of the Southwest Quarter of the Southwest Quarter (S-l/2 of SW-1/4 of SW-1/4) of Section 2, Township 16 North, Range 8 East, Franklin Parish, Louisiana, and the East Half of the Southeast Quarter (E-l/2 of SE-1/4) of Section 3, Township 16 North, Range 8 East, Franklin Parish, Louisiana, consisting of 100 acres, more or less, including all crop base acres (65.2),

“together with all rights or prescription, whether acquisitive or liberative, to which said vendor may be entitled.” This deed (hereinafter the “Loutre Deed”) was recorded on August 5, 2002, in the conveyance records of Franklin Parish. The price for this conveyance, as stipulated in the Act of Sale, was $75,000.

Subsequent to Loutre’s acquisition of the above described tract, Roberts obtained a survey which confirmed that his family’s 1964 record title did in fact include the Disputed Tract. On advise of counsel, Roberts procured a quitclaim deed from the Succession (hereinafter the “Quitclaim Deed”). Daniel C. Wirtz, the Succession’s attorney, testified that he was uncertain if the Succession still maintained ownership of the Disputed Tract after its sale to Loutre. Despite his reluctance, Wirtz accepted consideration in the amount of $3,000 on the Succession’s behalf. The Quitclaim Deed was dated January 29, 2003, and recorded on February 27, 2003. It conveyed without warranty any rights, title, or interest of the Succession in the Section 10 Tract, described as follows:

Beginning at the northeast corner of Northeast Quarter of Northeast Quarter of Section 10, Township 16 North, Range 8 East, and running due west along the north line of said forty to the Northwest corner thereof, thence due south a distance of |,45.50 chains, thence due east to the eastern boundary of said forty, thence due north a distance of 15.50 chains, to the northeast corner of said forty and the point of beginning, containing 32 acres, more or less, in the Northeast Quarter of Northeast Quarter of Section 10, Township 16 North, Range 8 East.

Thus, while the description in the Quitclaim Deed is overly broad, including all of the Section 10 Tract, the portion of the tract north of the old fence, the Disputed Tract, was clearly included in the description.

In June 2003, after obtaining the Quitclaim Deed, Roberts went on the Disputed Tract and attempted to erect a new fence along.the Ideal Boundary according to the recent survey. In doing so, he crossed the existing fence and “bush hogged” a path for the new fence, destroying a number of pine seedlings previously planted by Lou-tre.

On June 30, 2003, Loutre filed suit, claiming possession for over thirty years to the Disputed Tract by virtue of tacking the possession of its ancestors in title, the Morgans. Based on this possessory interest, Loutre sought, among other things, damages for trespass and destruction of property, including damages commensurate with Louisiana’s statutory scheme relegating treble damages for destroying trees on the land of another. Roberts answered and reconvened, asserting ownership of the Disputed Tract and seeking damages.

On October 7, 2004, Loutre filed a motion for partial summary judgment, seeking a declaration that the fence constituted the boundary between the property owned by it and that owned by the Roberts. By judgment, rendered and signed on June 2, 2005, the trial court recognized Loutre as the owner of the Disputed Tract by virtue of acquisitive prescription. On a later date, June 25, 2007, the trial court further ordered, Rafter a trial on the merits, that Edward Roberts pay $15,250.00 to Loutre. Defendants appealed these judgments to this court. In Loutre Land and Timber Co. v. Roberts, 42,918 (La.App.2d Cir.4/16/08), 981 So.2d 775, writ denied, 08-1422 (La.10/31/08), 994 So.2d 535 (“hereinafter Loutre I”), this court held that genuine issues of material fact existed so as to preclude summary judgment.

On remand, during a trial on the merits, the court heard testimony regarding the Morgan family’s possession of the Disputed Tract. Additionally, the court received evidence concerning the two sales by the Succession to Loutre and Roberts, including evidence of the considerations paid by the parties to the Succession and the parties’ intentions concerning those deeds.

At the conclusion of trial, the trial court ruled in favor of Loutre, recognizing its ownership of the Disputed Tract. Considering the Quitclaim Deed of Roberts, the trial court expressed as follows its concerns regarding the impact upon the rule for tacking of boundary possession under Civil Code Article 794 if the Quitclaim Deed were to be given effect:

The problem I have with this situation is in my mind it would — it could set a very dangerous precedent for Louisiana property law. To allow a seller to sell to Buyer A and then find out well, wait a minute there was three extra acres stuck on that east boundary I can sell it to someone else now. I think that would cause such a tremendous upheaval in the property law in the state that there’s no way we can allow that to happen.

^Additionally, the court awarded $17,750 in damages for trespass and attorneys fees. It is from this judgment that both Loutre and Roberts now appeal.

Discussion

In its petition commencing this action, Loutre first acknowledged that Roberts was “purportedly” the “owner” of the Section 10 Tract which included the parcel of land in dispute. This was recognition of Wilton A. Roberts’s,1964 deed to the Section 10 Tract. Nevertheless, in paragraph 10 of the petition, Loutre asserted:

Defendants [Roberts] have intentionally disregarded occupational fences that have been used as boundaries for possession for more than thirty years and is hable to Loutre for trespass and intentional injury to property.

In response to Loutre’s suit, Roberts reconvened, asserting his ownership of the Disputed Tract. At the trial of this matter, prior deeds, including the parties’ recent deeds from the Succession, and the facts of the Morgan family’s lengthy adverse possession were presented as the evidence for the resolution of Loutre’s claim and Roberts’s reconventional demand.

From the allegations in the parties’ pleadings and the evidence produced at trial, this action is not a simple tort action in trespass, involving a defendant with no ownership claim or intention to possess as owner. The dispute involves “real action” claims of both parties addressed under Title II of the Special Proceedings of Book VII of the Code of Civil Procedure, whether characterized as a petitory or boundary action. Addressing such actions, Article 3654 of the Code of Civil Procedure sets the parties’ burdens of proof as follows:

IsWhen the issue of ownership of immovable property or of a real right therein is presented in an action for a declaratory judgment, or in a concursus, expropriation, or similar proceeding, or the issue of the ownership of funds deposit ed in the registry of the court and which belong to the owner of the immovable property or of the real right therein is so presented, the court shall render judgment in favor of the party:
(1) Who would be entitled to the possession of the immovable property or real right therein in a possessory action, unless the adverse party proves that he has acquired ownership from a previous owner or by acquisitive prescription; or
(2) Who proves better title to the immovable property or real right therein, when neither party would be entitled to the possession of the immovable property or real right therein in a possessory action.

The possession of the Disputed Tract prior to the time of the deeds from the Succession in 2002-2003 is now undisput-edly established as having been in the Morgans. Their possession, however, was more than mere possession but had extended in time for over thirty years. As such, the Morgans had acquired ownership of the Disputed Tract by acquisitive prescription of thirty years prior to the execution of the two deeds of the Succession. La. C.C. art. 3486. At the time of 2002-2003 deeds, the Morgans’ existing ownership did not involve a written title to the Disputed Tract or anything recorded in the public records, but nevertheless could be established, and has now been established, by evidentiary proof of facts outside the public records.

19After the Loutre Deed, Loutre continued with acts of possession over the Disputed Tract by the planting of the pine tree seedlings on the property. Thus, under the test of La. C.C.P. art. 3654(1), Roberts’s brief actions in coming on the Disputed Tract and destroying some of those seedlings precipitated this suit and placed Roberts in the position of the “adverse party.” Roberts’s burden of proof therefore for the resolution of “the issue of ownership of immovable property” in this real action was to prove that “he has acquired ownership” of the Disputed Tract “from a previous owner.”

Roberts’s claim for the ownership of the Disputed Tract rests upon the rights he purportedly received from the Succession in the Quitclaim Deed. Roberts recorded the Quitclaim Deed in the conveyance records, and the Quitclaim Deed purports to be a transfer of rights “from a previous owner” of the Disputed Tract which is fully described in the deed. The recordation of the Quitclaim Deed implicates Louisiana’s public records doctrine, which must now be reviewed for consideration of Roberts’s claim.

On the other hand, Loutre’s claim for ownership of the Disputed Tract rests upon its assertions regarding Civil Code Article 794 (hereinafter “Article 794”), which it claims operates to its benefit in a manner superior to the public records doctrine. When asked at oral argument whether the recorded deed to Loutre with its lack of any description of the Disputed Tract gave “notice to third parties that the ownership rights of the Morgans in Section 10 have been conveyed,” counsel responded as follows:

No, Sir, it does not. But that’s not the issue. The issue is possession.

| mThe “possession issue” which Loutre asserts rests on Article 794, which provides as follows:

When a party proves acquisitive prescription, the boundary shall be fixed according to limits established by prescription rather than titles. If a party and his ancestors in title possessed for thirty years without interruption, within visible bounds, more land than their title called for, the boundary shall be fixed along these bounds.

To summarize this dispute, therefore, Roberts’s claim of ownership rests upon a recorded Quitclaim Deed from “the previous owner” specifically describing the Disputed Tract. Loutre’s claim for ownership rests upon the transfer of the Succession’s title to the 100 Acres in Sections 2 and 3 and the rights afforded Loutre under the last sentence of Article 794 for the so-called “tacking” of possession of “the previous owner” to the Disputed Tract in Section 10. This asserted clash between the public records doctrine and Article 794’s tacking rule in boundary actions requires our review of both bodies of law and their importance for the resolution of ownership disputes.

The public records doctrine as now expressed in the Civil Code’s new articles on registry provides that the rights established or created by an instrument that transfers an immovable are without effect as to a third person unless the transfer instrument is registered by recording it in the conveyance records. La. C.C. art. 3838. The Code defines a “third person” as a person who is not a party to or personally bound by an instrument. La. C.C. art. 3343. The public records doctrine therefore has been given effect to the prejudice of the acquiring party in favor of a third party where there is |nan absence of recordation of the transfer instrument to the acquiring party. Camel v. Waller, 526 So.2d 1086 (La.1988).

Louisiana’s prior statute addressing the law of registry, La. R.S. 9:2721, repealed by Act 169 of 2005, provided that “neither secret claims or equities nor other matters outside the public records shall be binding on or affect such third parties.” This rule is now reflected in the new Article 3342, effective January 1, 2006. “A party to a recorded instrument may not contradict the terms of the instrument or statements of fact it contains to the prejudice of a third person who after its recordation acquires an interest in or over the immovable to which the instrument relates.” La. C.C. art. 3342.

In Professor Redman’s discussion of Louisiana’s public records doctrine in 1965, he articulated the so-called “pure race” principle, as follows:

Since an interest is null as to third persons until recorded, among otherwise equal claimants, priority in ranking goes to the winner of the race to the public records office.

William V. Redmann, The Louisiana Law of Recordation: Some Principles and Problems, 39 Tul. L.Rev. 491 (1965). He then gives the example of a double sale or conveyance of an immovable, as follows:

If the sale from O to A is not recorded, it is not effective against third person B, whether B knew of the sale or not; if the sale from O to A is recorded, it is effective against B, whether B knew it or not. Thus, in case of either recordation or non-recordation, whether B actually knows of the sale or not has no bearing on the result.

Id. Such double sale was indeed the fact situation involved in Louisiana’s seminal public records case, McDuffie v. Walker, 125 La. 152, 51 So. 100 (1909), where the second purchaser with a recorded act of title prevailed over the first purchaser with an unrecorded deed.

A quitclaim deed at common law is recognized in the civil law as an assignment of rights without warranty. See La. C.C. art. 2502, comment (c). A quitclaim deed has been held to be a deed transla-tive of title. Bolding v. Eason Oil Co., 248 La. 269, 178 So.2d 246 (1965); Board of Com’rs for Lafourche Basin Levee Dist. v. Elmer, 268 So.2d 274 (La.App. 4th Cir.1972), writ denied, 263 La. 613, 268 So.2d 675 (La.1972), citing Bolding v. Eason Oil Co., 248 La. 269, 178 So.2d 246 (1965). In other words, the ownership to immovable property may be as effectually transferred by quitclaim as by any other form of conveyance. Waterman v. Tidewater Associated Oil Co., 213 La. 588, 35 So.2d 225 (La.1947). Furthermore, although such a deed conveys only such title or interest that the grantor had at the time it is given, it is sufficient to support a plea of acquisitive prescription. Id. These rulings have now been included in the revision of the law of Sale, and new Article 2502 of the Civil Code provides:

Such a transfer does not give rise to a presumption of bad faith on the part of the transferee and is just title for purposes of acquisitive prescription.

From these principles, it follows that a quitclaim deed would be a sufficient transfer of rights so that the public records doctrine provision of Civil Code Article 3338(1) applies to the recorded quitclaim deed.

Critical to the public records doctrine and the notice which is given by a recorded instrument is the description of the immovable which is the subject of such instrument. Louisiana jurisprudence has not established 1 ^precise criteria to determine what description in the public records is sufficient to place third persons on notice, and such determination is to be made on a case by case basis. Nitro Energy, L.L.C. v. Nelson Energy, Inc., 45,201 (La.App.2d Cir.4/14/10), 34 So.3d 524, quoting Consolidated Ass’n of Planters of Louisiana v. Mason, 24 La. Ann. 518 (1872). In Hargrove v. Hodge, 9 La.App. 434, 121 So. 224, 225 (La.App. 2d Cir.1928), it was determined that the property description in the instrument must be such that the property intended to be conveyed could be located and identified, and the general rule is that the description must fully appear within the four corners of the instrument itself, or that the instrument should refer to some map, plat, or deed as a part of the description, so that the same may be clear. It is not permissible to indulge in speculation when interpreting deeds to real property. Id.

In reference to the sectional subdivision of public lands in the official plats of the governmental surveys, the courts have said that the “description [of a governmental quarter/quarter section] is mathematically certain and calls for no extrinsic evidence to explain the intention of the parties as to the tract intended to be conveyed.” Haas v. Fontenot, 132 La. 812, 61 So. 831 (1913). On the other hand, certain omnibus or similar descriptions have been uniformly held not to put third parties on notice of the location and identity of the property which is the subject of an instrument. Williams v. Bowie Lumber Co., 214 La. 750, 38 So.2d 729 (1948) (It seems to be settled now by the jurisprudence in Louisiana that such a vague and indefinite description, in an instrument purporting to convey title to real estate, as all h4of the land owned by the seller in a named parish, is not sufficiently specific to give notice to third parties thereafter dealing with the seller.) Blevins v. Manufacturers Record Pub. Co., 235 La. 708, 105 So.2d 392 (1957) (A sale by given bounds conveys only the property within such bounds, and acreage designations appended to such specific descriptions do not enlarge or restrict the grant described by the specific bounds.) W.B. Thompson & Co. v. McNair, 199 La. 918, 7 So.2d 184 (1942) (Innocent third purchasers cannot be held to the necessity of ascertaining whether or not the land remaining to their vendors is equal in area to the body of land purchased.)

Considering the two property descriptions contained in the deeds conveyed by the Succession, we agree with Loutre’s counsel that the Loutre Deed does not describe any lands in Section 10 so as to place a third party on notice that Loutre had acquired from the Succession any interest in the Disputed Tract. The Loutre Deed only describes, by referencing the governmental survey, the 100 Acres in Sections 2 and 3. Additionally, the deed’s omnibus expression of a transfer of “all rights of prescription, whether acquisitive or liberative, to which vendor may be entitled,” does not direct a third party viewing the Loutre Deed to the Disputed Tract where the Morgans’ right of ownership by thirty-years acquisitive prescription had accrued. Nevertheless, Loutre’s claim for ownership is now argued to rest on something beyond a recorded written conveyance to Loutre with a description of the Disputed Tract. Loutre claims rights afforded it under Article 794.

11fiArticle 794 is contained in Book II of the Civil Code which deals with “The Different Modifications of Ownership.” One of those modifications concerns “Boundaries” between contiguous lands, Book II, Title VI, and the “Effect of Titles, Prescription or Possession” in a boundary dispute as addressed in Title VI, Chapter 2 of Book II. La. C.C. arts. 784 et seq.

Article 794 is best understood, therefore, by reviewing the first three articles of Chapter 2 dealing with the boundary action, which provide:

La. C.C. art. 792. Fixing of boundary according to ownership or possession
The court shall fix the boundary according to the ownership of the parties; if neither party proves ownership, the boundary shall be fixed according to limits established by possession.
La. C.C. art. 793. Determination of ownership according to titles
When both parties rely on titles only, the boundary shall be fixed according to titles. When the parties trace their titles to a common author preference shall be given to the more ancient title.
La. C.C. art. 794. Determination of ownership according to prescription
When a party proves acquisitive prescription, the boundary shall be fixed according to limits established by prescription rather than titles. If a party and his ancestors in title possessed for thirty years without interruption, within visible bounds, more land than their title called for, the boundary shall be fixed along these bounds.

These articles concern the boundary action where the court considers recorded titles and possible acts of adverse possession to “fix the boundary according to the ownership of the parties.” The boundary is the line of |10separation between contiguous lands. La. C.C. art. 784. Therefore, the conflict is between one landowner against an adjacent neighbor. As in this case, the conflict may involve one party and the facts of possession concerning the ancestors in his chain of title on one side of an ideal boundary against the neighboring party and the facts concerning her ancestors in her title chain. The two ancestral title chains therefore usually describe a common or ideal boundary, as in this case.

Turning specifically to Article 794 and its final sentence, the rule calls the court to credit the proof by one of the adjacent landowners of the acts of adverse possession for over 30 years which occur on land extending beyond the ideal boundary to a “visible bound” (hereinafter the “Extra Land”). According to Article 794, that landowner, who makes the claim of ownership to the Extra Land attributable to adverse possession of over 30 years, need not have been in possession himself for 30 years but may rely upon or “tack” the possession of his ancestors in title. Moreover, if those “ancestors in title” executed previous deeds or transfers to the tract, describing land only to the ideal boundary and not including the Extra Land, the lack of a descriptive and juridical link or “particular title” to the Extra Land does not prevent the current landowner’s proof of acquisitive prescription through evidence of the combined acts of possession of himself and all his ancestors. Such proof by the tacking of possession allows for a judicial recognition of the ownership of the Extra Land from which the court shall fix the new boundary. On the whole, the final sentence of | ^Article 794 provides a litigant an evidentiary proof allowance in the trial of a boundary action.

The important benefit of Article 794’s boundary tacking, therefore, is that the established visible bound that has existed for over 30 years becomes the new boundary superseding the ideal boundary expressed in the adjacent landowners’ titles. The Extra Land becomes owned by the landowner who has used and employed that land through acts of corporeal possession up to the visible bound even though his use and adverse possession extended beyond his title. Finally, an erroneously fixed visible boundary may in many instances only involve a few feet and a minimal quantity of land so that neither of the adjoining landowners may have been alerted to the problem over a lengthy passage of time. This means that from the prior transfers of the land the party in possession of the Extra Land may not have had it transferred to him from his ancestors in title by a particular title with an appropriate metes and bounds description of the Extra Land. Therefore, upon its employment for proof in the boundary action, the boundary tacking rule of Article 794 operates as an exception to the general rule of Civil Code Article 3441 which otherwise requires a “particular title” for the transfer of | ^possession. Brown v. Wood, 451 So.2d 569 (La.App. 2d Cir.1984), writ denied, 452 So.2d 1176 (La.1984).

Nevertheless, there are significant aspects of this boundary dispute which are not specifically addressed in Article 794. Most importantly, the “ancestors in title” expression in the article concerns the predecessors/ transferors of the landowner/litigant who is asserting ownership to the Extra Land derived in part from the acts of corporeal possession of those predecessors who had also previously possessed beyond their title to the visible bound. Thus, Loutre’s “ancestor in title” for purposes of Article 794 is the Succession which conveyed by particular title only the lands in Sections 2 and 3. Nevertheless, the benefit of the boundary tacking rule of Article 794 is now claimed by Loutre as attendant to the Succession’s sale extending to Loutre the Succession’s rights in the Extra Land, which in this case is the Disputed Tract. The peculiarity of this case, however, is that the Succession is also the “ancestor in title" to Roberts. Clearly, under Article 794, when a landowner/litigant asserts his ancestor in title’s adverse 119possession, that “ancestor in title” is not understood as also an “ancestor in title” to the neighboring and opposing landowner. The Succession’s unusual dual role as an “ancestor in title,” or ak owner who purportedly conveyed the same land to both adjacent landowner claimants immediately before this boundary dispute, suggests that something other -than Article 794 must be considered for the ranking of these competing transfers of rights in the immovable from the same transferor.

Second, Article 794 addresses the effect of the combined possessions of the party claimant in the boundary action and his “ancestors in title” when cumulatively amounting to thirty years of uninterrupted possession. In this case, Loutre did not need to tack the mere possession of the Morgans to its own possession to effect an accrual of the thirty years for acquisitive prescription through their combined adverse possession. The Morgans alone had amassed thirty years of possession and thus ownership through acquisitive prescription at the time of the sale to Loutre. In that sense, a deed by particular title describing the Disputed Tract from the Succession to Loutre would have conveyed ownership to the Disputed Tract, and with 12nrecordation of such title, Loutre could have resolved this boundary dispute in its favor without the need for the possession tacking rule of Article 794.

In summary, Article 794 allows for a special mode of proof for the determination of thirty-year acquisitive prescription, and thus ownership, in a boundary action between neighboring landowners. The “ancestor in title” of one party whose prior acts of adverse possession serve to contribute to that party’s proof of acquisitive prescription is generally understood not to also be the “ancestor in title” of the neighboring and opposing landowner. However, if two successive sales are made by that ancestor in title after the time that the adverse possession of the ancestor has occurred, such double sale in our opinion brings into play the application of the public records doctrine to determine which of the two transferees shall prevail. The fact that Article 794 is a special evidentiary rule for proof in a court proceeding to establish acquisitive prescription does not mean that the policy principles for the transfer of ownership of an immovable under the public records doctrine are in conflict with Article 794 or, in any way, superseded by Article 794.

121The interplay between the public records doctrine and Article 794 in this case was clearly illuminated in a hypothetical illustration upon which the trial court remarked in the parties’ oral argument, as follows:

Obviously, as Mr. Hoychick pointed out if the Morgan Estate had sold Mr. Ed [Roberts] that 14.6 acres before it sold to Loutre ... that would be a legitimate and valid sale of ... a property acquired ... by acquisitive prescription.

This illustration correctly acknowledges that the Succession could have intended to sell the Disputed Tract and the 100 Acres separately to different parties. If so, the deeds in such illustration would describe the separate properties in exactly the same manner as the separate deeds in this case — the Quitclaim Deed and the Loutre Deed — describing respectively the 14.6 acres in Section 10 and the 100 Acres in Sections 2 and 3. Therefore, since the recorded descriptions reflect on the face of each deed separate transfers of differently described immovables, it does not matter which deed occurred first or was recorded first. Moreover, it is clear under the public records doctrine that if a deed to Lou-tre had described all 114.6 acres (the 100 Acres and the Disputed Tract) but not been recorded, a second sale by the Succession of the 14.6 acres to Roberts gains the protection of the public records doctrine after its recordation; and the prior transfer to Loutre is “without effect” as to the rights acquired by Roberts. La. C.C. art. 3838. From yet another perspective, after the recordation of the Loutre Deed which occurred first in this case, Roberts as a third party to the Loutre Deed may consider that the Succession intended only to sell the 100 Acres as identified in that deed and to retain the 14.6-acre Disputed Tract. If a | ^contrary intent existed between the Succession and Loutre, a third party seeking to purchase the Disputed Tract was not bound by such secret equity between the parties that was not expressed by the inclusion of a description of the Disputed Tract in the recorded Loutre Deed. La. C.C. art. 3342.

This does not mean that Loutre was unprotected at the time of its purchase nor that it could not have brought a boundary action against Roberts and asserted the acquisitive prescription obtained by acts of the Morgan family over the Disputed Tract. Clearly, a complete assessment of the lands involved in the proposed sale from the Succession to Loutre would have revealed the sizable tract of land of the Morgan farm that extended into Section 10. As shown by the survey data presented at trial, the Disputed Tract is obviously not in Sections 2 and 3. The southern boundary of the 100 Acres stretches east to west one-half mile running in a straight line along the south section fines for Sections 2 and 3. Yet, the Disputed Tract extends some 400 feet off of that fine to the south. The Loutre Deed neglected to describe this unusually large tract extending beyond the Ideal Boundary into the Section 10 Tract over which the Roberts family held record title. Thus, the first protection available to Loutre was the execution and recordation of a deed accurately describing the entire 115-acre tract which it claims to have purchased from the Succession.

Nevertheless, even with the inadequate description contained in the Loutre Deed, Loutre could have immediately instituted a boundary, action and proven the acquisitive prescription by which its ancestor in title had acquired ownership of the Disputed Tract. Such suit would have allowed | gjLoutre to establish the Morgans’ ownership of the Disputed Tract and itself as successor to the Morgans. With the re-cordation of a notice of lis pendens of the real action under La. C.C.P. arts. 3751, et seq., such action would also prevent the possibility of the double sale by the Succession which later occurred. In proving the acquisitive prescription of its predecessors, the Morgans, Loutre would be meeting the burden of proof in the boundary action of the first sentence of Article 794 without the need for the tacking rule of its second sentence for the accumulation of a thirty-year period of possession between multiple parties.

In conclusion, the facts of this boundary dispute are unusual. The misplaced boundary is not one which merely strayed slightly off course from the ideal boundary called for in the title deeds of the two adjacent landowners. In such case, double sales involving a minimal strip and quantity of land would not be expected. The misplaced boundary in this case is some 400 feet south of the Ideal Boundary. The attorney representing the Succession was apparently unclear whether the sizable 15 to 18-acre tract in Section 10 had been sold to Loutre. So the Succession sold again. This is therefore not a case of the proof of an ownership change caused by acquisitive prescription along a boundary line where Article 794 resolves the dispute. This is a case of the transfer of that ownership by parties with two competing deeds from the same prior owner of the immovable where the public records doctrine must govern. Under our law of registry, Roberts’s deed was the superior deed recorded in the | ^conveyance records, and he therefore proved that he acquired ownership from the previous owner.

Conclusion

For the above reasons, we reverse the trial court’s judgment. It is hereby ordered, adjudged and decreed that Edward W. Roberts is the owner of the Disputed Tract which is described as that portion of the Northeast Quarter of the Northeast Quarter of Section 10, Township 16 North, Range 8 East, lying north of the old fence shown on the two surveys presented at trial. Although the surveys of the parties appear to coincide and place the Ideal Boundary in approximately the same location, there is apparently no visible boundary along the section line between Sections 8 and 10. Therefore, the case is remanded to the trial court to fix the boundary visibly by reference to markers on the ground between the parties’ adjacent tracts in accordance with the two surveys and with Roberts’s ownership as recognized herein. Additionally, we find nothing in the record to support Roberts’s claim for damages and that claim is dismissed.

Costs of appeal are assessed to Loutre Land and Timber Company.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

BROWN, C.J., concurs with written reasons.

DREW, J., concurs for the reasons assigned by Judge BROWN.

MOORE, J., dissents and with written reasons.

BROWN, Chief Judge,

concurring.

Iil agree fully with Judge Caraway’s opinion but write to emphasize that Loutre Land & Timber Company specifically bought a 100-acre tract with the intent to obtain a windfall of an additional 14-18 acres. H.E. Perry, an experienced forester, represented Loutre in this acquisition from the Morgan estate. He testified as follows:

Q. Tell me what you did in preparation for the-for the sale going through?
A. Well, I walked the boundaries and I already knew where part of them were and then talked to Dr. Holder and I knew approximately how many acres were involved.
Q. So — and Dr. Holder told you, you said you talked to him about the acres involved, how many acres did you believe was involved?
A. He — he offered us the land — well, we asked if he would sell it to us, he offered us the land and he said a hundred acres at seventy — at $750 an acre.
Q. Is that believe — was that your belief on how many acres were being transferred to Loutre was a hundred acres?
A. I knew there was — I knew there was -more acres than that.
Q. Did you let Dr. Holder know about that?
A. Dr. Holder didn’t ask me, he told me what they wanted and we offered that to him.
Q. How did you know that there was more acres involved than — than a hundred acres?
A. Because I’ve been there a long time and I’ve looked at lots of maps in that area.
|2Q. So would it be fair to say you knew you were getting a deal, you were getting ...
A. I knew that there was some adverse possession there, yes.

H.E. Perry walked the boundaries and knew exactly where the section line was and that Loutre was only buying and paying for 100 acres. Mr. Perry omitted to disclose the information about the extra 14-18 acres when he talked with Dr. Holder. He knew that Dr. Holder was misinformed.

MOORE, J,

dissents.

IH dissent. The majority has taken so many liberties with the law and with the trial court record that it is hard to know where to begin. The burning motive behind the majority’s labored and opaque opinion seems to be moral indignation that Loutre Land might possibly acquire 14 to 18 acres of land for which it did not pay. To avoid this perceived inequity, the majority has revised the law and disregarded the factual findings.

La. C.C. art. 794 regulates boundary actions, such as this case. It states the simple rule, “When a party proves acquisitive prescription, the boundary shall be fixed according to limits established by prescription rather than titles.” The district court found, and the record fully supports, that the Morgan Estate possessed the disputed tract continuously, without interruption, peaceably, publicly and unequivocally for well over 30 years. As a result, it owned the disputed tract at the time of its cash deed to Loutre.

In addition to this clear Civil Code mandate, the caselaw is settled that “ownership of immovable property under record title may be eclipsed and superseded by ownership acquired under prescriptive title.” Brown v. Wood, 451 So.2d 569 (La.App. 2 Cir.), writ denied, 452 So.2d 1176 (1984); McIlwain v. Manville Forest Products Corp., 499 So.2d 1138 (La.App. 2 Cir.1986). Contrary to the majority’s suggestion, acquisitive prescription actually preserves the stability of titles. Board of Com’rs v. Elmer, 268 So.2d 274 (La.App. 4 Cir.), writ ref'd, 263 La. 613, 268 So.2d 675 (1974).

To circumvent this definitive principle, the majority has woven a bizarre and unprecedented theory based on the public records doctrine. |2 However, there is nothing in the text of the new La. C.C. art. 3338 or in the long jurisprudence following McDuffie v. Walker, supra, to support the vain attempt to excise Art. 794 from the law.

Even if the public records doctrine somehow trumped acquisitive prescription, it would not do so in this case. First, the cash deed from the Morgan Estate to Lou-tre conveyed 100 acres “more or less, * ⅜ * together ¶⅝⅛⅛ all rights or prescriptions, whether acquisitive or liberative, to which said vendor may be entitled,” evidencing a clear intent by both seller and buyer to convey any portion not strictly described. Tracts far larger than 18 acres have been conveyed by acquisitive title. Broussard v. Guidry, 127 La. 708, 53 So. 964 (1911) (over 84 acres). Second, La. C.C. art. 793 provides, “When the parties trace their titles to a common author preference shall be given to the more ancient title.” Loutre acquired title by deed dated July 29 and filed on August 5, 2002; Roberts acquired title by quitclaim dated January 29 and filed February 27, 2003. Lou-tre’s title is obviously “more ancient.”

The concurring opinion quotes the testimony of Loutre’s forester, H.E. Perry, to show that Loutre was fully aware of the “windfall” of an additional 14 to 18 acres; ergo, it deserved to lose this case. Despite the appearance of inequity, Loutre’s good faith or bad faith at the time of the deed is irrelevant. Under La. C.C. art. 3486, “Ownership and other real rights in im-movables may be acquired by the prescription of thirty years without the need of just title or possession in good faith.” (Emphasis added.)

IsPerplexingly, the majority makes much of Roberts’s quitclaim deed, but the law is settled that such a nonwarranty declaration can convey only whatever interest the seller has in the property. Scurlock Oil Co. v. Getty Oil Co., 294 So.2d 810 (La.1974). As the Morgan Estate had conveyed 100 acres more or less, plus prescriptive rights, six months earlier, it obviously could not convey them to Roberts. Pilcher v. Paulk, 228 So.2d 663 (La.App. 8 Cir.1969). Indeed, the fact that Roberts requested only a quitclaim deed shows that he was aware of a potential title problem. The late Mrs. Morgan’s attorney, Daniel Wirtz, testified that in his view, the estate no longer owned the disputed tract, but because of the insistence of Roberts’s counsel, he executed the quitclaim deed. The trial court fully credited Mr. Wirtz’s testimony; for reasons never explained, the majority now dismisses it as “unclear.”

This point leads to the majority’s coup de grace, a reversal of the district court’s credibility calls and factual findings without one mention of the concept of manifest error. Where is the manifest error in the district court’s findings of undisturbed possession, the passage of over 30 years, the interpretation of Loutre’s cash deed, the reservations of the estate’s attorney, and the interpretation of Roberts’s quitclaim? The majority does not even favor us with a finding of legal error, but instead drapes a new and fantastic theory over the whole case. This is not the proper role of the intermediate court.

There is no manifest error in the district court’s factual findings and no legal error in its conclusions. I would affirm.

APPLICATION FOR REHEARING

Before BROWN, CARAWAY, DREW, MOORE and LOLLEY, JJ.

Rehearing denied.

MOORE, J., would grant rehearing.

      . This description describing the entire NE/4 of Section 10 is misleadingly broad, as the old fence in dispute only extends east and west through the NE/4 of the NE/4.

      . We reject Loutre’s present assertions in brief that the plurality opinion of four judges in Loutre I decided in any manner legal issues in the case so that the law of case doctrine has application to this appeal. In considering the two undisputed deeds executed by the Succession, the concurring opinion did express the legal conclusion that "Roberts has the best recorded title from a common author.”

      . This twofold proof burden of Article 3654 would be the same for the boundary action, as Article 3693 of the Code of Civil Procedure directs the court to fix the boundary “in accordance with the ownership or possession of the parties.”

      . La. C.C. art. 3486. Immovables; prescription of thirty years.
      Ownership and other real rights in immov-ables may be acquired by the prescription of thirty years without the need of just title or possession in good faith.

      . On the other hand, if the misplaced visible boundary involves more than a few feet, runs a course totally different from the ideal boundary, or involves a large expanse of Extra Land as a possessory encroachment upon a neighboring tract of land, it becomes more difficult to understand why the chain of transfers by the parties with adverse possession does not include in their transfers the Extra Land by a metes and bounds description. As emphasized by this court in Loutre I, there arises a question of the intent of the parties to such transfer, or as in this case, whether the Succession intended to transfer only 100 acres for $750 per acre or 115 acres. On remand, the evidence showed that the parties intended a $750 per acre price, yet the Succession was only paid $75,000 by Loutre.

      . Article 3441 provides that "[pjossession is transferable by universal title or by particular title." La. C.C. art. 3441. Thus, in a case where a party has obtained the right to possess (La. C.C. art. 3422) through adequate acts of corporeal possession over the land of another and that party has no title to adjacent lands, the party must appropriately describe in an instrument the land in his possession in order to transfer his right to possess by "particular title.” This principle is the general rule for the transfer and tacking of possession in a non-boundary setting. See, La. C.C. art. 3442. Likewise, if that same party's possession had extended in time for over thirty years so that he had acquired ownership by acquisitive prescription, the party’s transfer of that ownership would require a "particular title” describing the property which would then allow the transferee the protection of the public records doctrine by the recordation of that title.

      .Article 794’s beneficial effect was memorably expressed by the Louisiana Supreme Court in Opdenwyer v. Brown, 155 La. 617, 626-627, 99 So. 482 (1924), where the court explained the source articles to present Articles 794 and 3441, holding that boundary tacking is an exception to the general rule, as follows:
      ... [I]f perchance it should be discovered that Bienville had misread the plan of his engineer and located his "place d’armes” a few hundred feet higher up, or lower down, the Mississippi than such plan calls for, there is no title to a foot of land in the city of New Orleans, which would not call for correction; and since the land which each successive purchaser took possession of would not be the same land which his title called for, it follows (if we accept the Le Rosen Case) that he could not "tack” onto his own possession that of his supposed author, and thus could not protect his boundaries, by the prescription of 30 years. That would be against all common sense; and law is common sense, as far as legislators, courts and men of law will let it remain so.

      . Loutre has argued to this court that Brown v. Wood, supra, presents "almost exactly the same facts” as the present dispute. This is incorrect. In that case the defendants, the Woods, had possessed the extra land beyond that called for in their title. Their title was acquired from Oliveaux 26 years prior to the suit, and Oliveaux also had previously been in possession of the extra land for over four years. Therefore, utilizing Article 794, the Woods proved that they and their ancestor in title had possessed the extra land for over 30 years, and their ownership was recognized by this court. Additionally, immediately prior to the suit, Oliveaux had executed a second transfer, a quitclaim deed, to the Woods specifically describing the extra land. The quitclaim was unnecessary for the ruling since the Woods had acquired the extra land by virtue of the operation of the tacking rule of Article 794 and the earlier deed from Oli-veaux. Likewise, unlike the present case, Oli-veaux made no quitclaim transfer to the other party in the boundary dispute, the Browns. The only case Loutre cites with apparently similar facts is McIlwain v. Manville Forest Products Corp., 499 So.2d 1138 (La.App. 2d Cir.1986). However, in that ruling the public record doctrine was never addressed by the court.

      . This is not to say, as explained below, that Loutre was not entitled to have immediately instituted a boundary action against Roberts after its acquisition from the Succession and before the Quitclaim Deed, to have asserted the ownership of the Disputed Tract as transferred to Loutre by the Succession, and to have had the court fix the boundary line between the two tracts.

      . The trial court’s concern expressed in its oral ruling, quoted above, is a concern that sellers sometimes sell an immovable twice because of unscrupulous conduct, error, or some other cause. This is what the public records doctrine addresses; yet such double dealing, particularly misconduct or fraud, is not the subject matter of Article 794. A seller, who intends to sell all of his rights in a tract within existing visible bounds and who warrants that sale, would generally be expected to understand that he is breaching that sales contract and its warranties by executing a second sale. Yet, when the rare double sale occurs, the public records doctrine will have application for the determination of the competing claims of the vendees.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: FREDERICKA HOMBERG WICKER, Judge.

license: Public Domain

text:
    Mark ALLERTON v. Leslie BROUSSARD and James Edwards.
    No. 10-CA-110.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fifth Circuit.
    Aug. 10, 2010.

      David O. Way, Kenny L. Oliver, Attorneys at Law, Lafayette, LA, for Defendant/Appellant.
    Robert J. Caluda, Attorney at Law, Me-tairie, LA, for Plaintiff/App ellee.
    Panel composed of Judges SUSAN M. CHEHARDY, FREDERICKA HOMBERG WICKER, and MARC E. JOHNSON.
   FREDERICKA HOMBERG WICKER, Judge.

Lin this personal injury matter, defendant/appellant Mercury County Mutual Insurance Company (“Mercury”) appeals a judgment awarding Mark Allerton $20,000.00 in damages, judicial interest, and court costs. Mercury assigns the following errors to the proceedings below: (1) the trial court erred in finding that the ownership of a vehicle did not transfer until the title had been transferred and the prior insurance canceled, (2) the trial court erred by accepting a state trooper as an expert in accident investigation, (3) the trial court erred by allowing the state trooper to testify as to the statements of others which constituted impermissible hearsay, (4) the trial court erred by finding Mr. Allerton had carried his burden of proving permissive use to trigger coverage. For the reasons that follow, we find that the trial court erred in finding that ownership of the vehicle had not transferred prior to Mr. Allerton’s accident. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and render judgment in favor of Mercury.

h FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Mark Allerton filed a petition for damages on May 9, 2006. In the petition he alleged the following: (1) on October 25, 2005, he was waiting to cross Jefferson Highway on his bicycle while waiting in a parking lot, (2) at the time of his accident, he was attempting to cross the highway, (3) Leslie Broussard, the driver of a 1992 Ford Explorer, negligently veered across two lanes of traffic into the parking lot and struck him, (4) he sustained severe injuries to his neck, back, and legs as a result of Ms. Broussard’s negligence, and, (5) James Edwards and Barbara Edwards were the owners of the 1992 Ford Explorer at the time of the accident. Neither Ms. Broussard nor her husband Richard Broussard were served with the petition. Mr. Allerton later filed a supplemental and amending petition contending that Mercury provided automobile insurance for Mr. Edwards and Ms. Edwards.

Mercury and Mr. Allerton subsequently filed motions for summary judgment. In its motion for summary judgment, Mercury contended that Mr. Edwards and Ms. Edwards’ son Aaron Edwards was the regular operator of the 1992 Explorer at the time of Mr. Allerton’s accident. Mercury further contended that Aaron had asked for and received permission from his parents to sell the vehicle to Mr. Broussard on October 20, 2005. Mercury further argued that it could not be liable to Mr. Allerton as Mr. Edwards and Ms. Edwards’ insurer because Mr. Broussard, not Mr. Edwards, was the owner of the Explorer at the time of Mr. Allerton’s accident.

In his motion for summary judgment, Mr. Allerton contended that neither Ms. Broussard nor Mr. Broussard were owners of record of the Explorer on October 25, 2005. Mr. Allerton further argued that Mr. Edwards was the owner of record of the Explorer on October 25, 2005, thus, Mercury’s insurance policy was |4in effect at the time of Mr. Allerton’s accident. Mr. Allerton also contended that the “fact that [Mr. and Ms. Edwards] did not notify their insurance company of the alleged change of ownership until two (2) weeks after the accident occurred” proves that Mr. and Ms. Edwards were the owners of the Explorer at the time of his accident. The trial court denied both motions for summary judgment on January 28, 2009.

A bench trial commenced in this matter on July 27, 2009. At trial, the plaintiff attempted to prove that Mr. Edwards was the owner of the Explorer on the date of Mr. Allerton’s accident, or alternatively, that Aaron Edwards or Mr. Broussard gave Ms. Broussard permission to use the Explorer. At trial the defense attempted to prove that ownership of the Explorer had passed to Mr. Broussard on October 20, 2005, the date Mr. Broussard paid Aaron Edwards one thousand dollars in cash for the vehicle. The defense also attempted to prove that, assuming Mr. Edwards was the owner of the Explorer on October 20, 2005, Ms. Broussard could not be covered by Mr. Edwards’s Mercury insurance policy because Ms. Broussard was not a permissive user of the Explorer.

The plaintiffs first witness at trial was Trooper Alan Rickmeyer of the Louisiana State Police. Trooper Rickmeyer was the police officer that investigated the October 25, 2005 accident. Counsel for Mr. Aller-ton attempted to tender Trooper Rickmeyer as an expert witness in the field of accident investigation. Counsel for Mercury objected, however, the trial court overruled defense counsel’s objection and allowed Trooper Rickmeyer to testify as an expert in accident investigation.

Trooper Rickmeyer proceeded to testify about his investigation of the October 25, 2005 accident. Trooper Rickmeyer testified that a witness to the accident was able to provide him with the vehicle’s license plate number. After |Bfurther investigation, Trooper Rickmeyer determined that the registered owners of the vehicle were Mr. Edwards and Ms. Edwards, who at the time were residents of Shiner, Texas. Trooper Rickmeyer thereafter contacted Mr. Edwards.

Trooper Rickmeyer subsequently testified that Mr. Edwards told him that he was the owner of the Explorer and that he had loaned the vehicle out to Aaron. According to Trooper Rickmeyer, during the conversation that he had with Mr. Edwards, Mr. Edwards never told him that his son had sold the vehicle or that he did not own the vehicle.

Trooper Rickmeyer testified that after speaking to Mr. Edwards, he spoke to Aaron Edwards. Aaron told him that he was in the possession of the Explorer, but that Mr. Broussard was in the process of repairing the vehicle. According to Trooper Rickmeyer, Aaron Edwards also told him that he was under the impression that he had not sold the vehicle to Mr. Brous-sard.

Trooper Rickmeyer thereafter contacted Mr. Broussard, who confirmed that he was repairing the 1992 Ford Explorer at the time of the accident. Mr. Broussard told Trooper Rickmeyer that he had not operated the vehicle personally. However, Mr. Broussard admitted that he periodically loaned the vehicle to his wife for her use. On cross-examination Trooper Rickmeyer admitted that he could hot recall whether Mr. Edwards expressly told him that he owned the 1992 Ford Explorer. Trooper Rickmeyer could not recall whether Aaron Edwards told him whether his father was the owner of the Explorer.

Mr. Allerton was the next witness. On October 25, 2005, Mr. Allerton was riding his bicycle near the corner of Jefferson Highway and Newman Avenue in Jefferson Parish. He was preparing to cross the highway while in a parking lot on the side of the street. Mr. Allerton testified that he turned his head, and looked back across Jefferson Highway. At that time he saw a red Ford Explorer moving |fltoward him at a high rate of speed. Mr. Allerton attempted to move out of the Explorer’s path, but was unable to do so. The Explorer struck him in the lower half of his body while he was standing on the sidewalk. At the time of the accident, Mr. Allerton was still on his bicycle. As a result of the accident, Mr. Allerton suffered injuries to his legs and back. Mr. Allerton testified that he still receives medical treatment for the October 25, 2005 accident.

Aaron Edwards was the final witness to testify. Aaron testified that he moved to New Orleans in April 2004 and that his parents gave him the Explorer to use in New Orleans at that time. Aaron mentioned that his parents had told him that their insurance would not provide coverage for the Explorer in Louisiana. According to Aaron, the Explorer had several serious mechanical problems which were not worth repairing, thus, he decided to sell the vehicle rather than repairing it for his own use. Aaron thereafter contacted his parents about whether they would allow him to sell the vehicle. Aaron testified that his parents told him that he could sell the vehicle.

Aaron Edwards testified that he met Mr. Broussard at the lumber company at which he was working in 2005. Mr. Brous-sard told Aaron that he was interested in purchasing a vehicle because the vehicle he was using at the time was not working properly. Aaron testified that he told Mr. Broussard he had a vehicle available. Aaron proceeded to tell Mr. Broussard about the Explorer. Mr. Broussard offered to buy the Explorer from Aaron for one thousand dollars. Aaron testified that on October 20, 2005, Mr. Broussard paid him one thousand dollars in cash for the Explorer and that he gave Mr. Broussard the keys to the Explorer. Aaron informed his parents thereafter that he had received the one thousand dollars from Mr. Brous-sard.

17Aaron Edwards further testified that on the same day, Mr. Broussard also paid him two hundred dollars in cash for helping him move some refrigerators out of homes damaged by Hurricane Katrina. Aaron Edwards deposited the twelve hundred dollars cash into his business partner’s bank account. Aaron admitted that the title to the Explorer had not transferred at that point; it was still in his father’s possession in Texas. The title transferred after Mr. Allerton’s October 25 accident.

Aaron recalled speaking to a police officer on October 25, 2005. The police officer told Aaron that if he did not bring the Explorer to the police station, his father would be arrested for hit and run. Aaron told the police officer that Mr. Broussard was in possession of the Explorer.

After the police officer told Aaron that the Explorer had been involved in an accident, Aaron proceeded to Mr. Broussard’s home. Mr. Broussard told him that Ms. Broussard had been using the Explorer. Aaron testified that he recalled meeting Ms. Broussard prior to October 25, 2005, but that he did not give Ms. Broussard permission to use the Explorer. Aaron thereafter drove the Explorer to the police station.

During cross-examination, Aaron stated that after he gave Mr. Broussard the keys to the Explorer, Mr. Broussard was attempting to repair the vehicle in front of his house. Aaron further stated that he was aware that Ms. Edwards did not cancel the insurance on the Explorer until approximately two weeks after October 25, 2005. Aaron testified that he was unsure as to why this was the case.

The material portions of Aaron Edwards’s testimony were confirmed by Ms. Edwards’s deposition, which was introduced into evidence at trial. In the deposition, Ms. Edwards testified that she and Mr. Edwards gave Aaron permission to use the Explorer when he moved to New Orleans in 2004. Ms. |sEdwards testified that Aaron contacted her before Mr. Aller-ton’s accident and asked her for to permission to sell the Explorer to Mr. Broussard, which permission she gave. According to Ms. Edwards, Aaron contacted her before October 25, 2005 and told her that he had sold the Explorer to Mr. Broussard for one thousand dollars. Ms. Edwards admitted at her deposition that she did not cancel the insurance on the Explorer until after October 25, 2005. Ms. Edwards also admitted that title of the Explorer did not transfer until after October 25, 2005.

At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court ruled in favor of Mr. Ailerton. In ruling for Mr. Ailerton, the trial court indicated her belief that Mr. Edwards was the owner of the vehicle on October 25, 2005 because title had not transferred to Mr. Broussard and because neither Mr. Edwards nor Ms. Edwards had canceled their insurance policy on the Explorer as of October 25, 2005. Moreover, the trial court noted that she believed “the evidence was uncontroverted that [Ms. Broussard] was cloaked with and given full permission to use the vehicle.” By judgment dated August 10, 2009, the trial court awarded Mr. Allerton $20,000.00 plus interest from the date of judicial demand and court costs.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A trial court’s findings of fact will not be disturbed on appeal unless the reviewing court finds that they are clearly wrong or manifestly erroneous. Stobart v. State, Through Dept. of Transp. and Dev., 617 So.2d 880, 882 (La.1993). This standard of review does not allow the appellate court to reweigh the evidence or substitute its own factual findings. Salvant v. State, 05-2126 (La.7/6/06), 935 So.2d 646, 650. In order to reverse a district court’s determination of a fact, a reviewing court must review the record in its entirety and (1) find a reasonable factual basis does not exist for the finding, and (2) further determine the record establishes the fact finder is clearly wrong or manifestly erroneous. Stobart, 617 So.2d at 882. |9 The issue to be resolved by the reviewing court is not whether the fact finder was right or wrong, but whether the fact finder’s conclusion was a reasonable one. Garrity v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 07-965, (La.App. 5 Cir. 4/15/08), 984 So.2d 900, 904, writ denied, 08-1051 (La.8/29/08), 989 So.2d 106.

Conversely, we review decisions of law de novo. Hall v. Folger Coffee Co., 03-1734 (La.4/14/04), 874 So.2d 90, 99. If the trial court’s decision was based on its erroneous application of law, rather than on a valid exercise of discretion, the trial court’s decision is not entitled to deference by the reviewing court. Kem Search, Inc. v. Sheffield, 434 So.2d 1067, 1071-72 (La.1983). Moreover, an error as to whether a sale of a thing occurred is a legal error. See, e.g., Cluse v. H & E Equipment Services, Inc., 2009-574 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/31/10), 34 So.3d 959, 964, (“[w]e find the jury erred as a matter of law in concluding there was not a completed sale [of a movable] ... Because we find the jury committed legal error we must review the case de novo.”).

FIRST SPECIFICATION OF ERROR

Mercury contends that the trial court erred in determining that Mr. Edwards was the owner of the Explorer at the time of the October 25, 2005 accident. Mercury further contends that ownership of the Explorer transferred to Mr. Broussard when Aaron Edwards and Mr. Broussard agreed to sell the Explorer for one thousand dollars on October 20, 2005. Mr. Alerton contends that ownership of the Explorer transferred after October 25, 2005 because title to the Explorer transferred and Ms. Edwards canceled the insurance on the Explorer after October 25, 2005. Mr. Alerton further contends that the trial court’s finding that Mr. Edwards was the owner of the Explorer on October 25, 2005 was a factual determination subject to the clearly wrong/manifest error standard of review.

|inAt the outset, we note that Mr. Aler-ton’s assertion that this assignment of error is subject to the clearly wrong/manifest error standard of review is not correct; as noted above, the trial court’s determination of whether a sale occurred is a legal question subject to this Court’s de novo review. In analyzing this specification of error de novo, we must consider these pertinent issues: (1) did Aaron Edwards have the authority to sell the Explorer; (2) if so, did ownership of the Explorer pass to Mr. Broussard prior to October 25, 2010. We answer yes to both.

Authority to Sell the Explorer

Generally, an agent is one who acts for or in the place of another by authority from the latter. Color Stone Intern., Inc. v. Last Chance CDP, LLC, 08-35 (La.App. 5 Cir. 5/27/08), 986 So.2d 707, 713. A mandate is a contract by which a person, the principal, confers authority on another person, the mandatary, to transact one or more affairs for the principal. La.C.C. art. 2989. A contract of mandate is not required to be in any particular form, however, the existence of a mandate must be substantiated by evidence indicating that the principal authorized the mandatary to act on his behalf. La.C.C. art. 2993. The authority of a man-datary to alienate property must be given expressly. La.C.C. art. 2996. Neither the property nor its location need be specifically described. Id.

Prior to Mr. Allerton’s accident, Mr. and Ms. Edwards owned the Explorer. Aaron Edwards testified that he asked his parents if they would allow him to sell the Explorer. The uncontroverted testimony of Aaron Edwards and Ms. Edwards indicates that Mr. and Ms. Edwards expressly gave Aaron such permission to sell the Explorer. It is of no consequence that the agreement was not in writing; a contract of mandate is not required to be in any particular form, nor must the sale of a movable be in any particular form. Compare La.C.C. art. 2440 (“[a] sale or Inpromise of sale of an immovable must be made by authentic act or by act under private signature, except as provided in [Civil Code] Article 1839.”). Thus, we find that Aaron had the authority to sell the Explorer.

Transfer of Ownership of the Explorer

La.C.C. art. 2439 defines a “sale” as a “contract whereby a person transfers ownership of a thing to another for a price in money.” The thing, the price, and the consent of the parties are requirements for the perfection of a sale. Id. A sale occurs and “[o]wnership is transferred between the parties as soon as there is agreement on the thing and the price is fixed, even though the thing sold is not yet delivered nor the price paid.” La.C.C. art. 2456. The price must be fixed by the parties in a sum either certain or determinable through a method agreed by them. La. C.C. art. 2464. There is no sale unless the parties intended that a price be paid. Id. The sale of a motor vehicle is governed by the articles in the Louisiana Civil Code relating to the sale of movables. Lambert v. Ray Brandt Dodge, Inc., 09-739 (La.App. 5 Cir. 1/26/10), 31 So.3d 1108, 1112 (citing Biggs v. Prewitt, 95-0315 (La.App. 1 Cir. 10/6/95); 669 So.2d 441, 443, writ denied, 96-1035 (La.5/31/96); 674 So.2d 264). Louisiana does not require that the certificate of title to a vehicle be transferred in order for the sale to be a valid one. Id. The certificate of title constitutes prima facie proof of ownership. However, the certificate of title is not conclusive proof of ownership, and proof showing different ownership is admissible. Id.

We find that ownership of the Explorer passed to Mr. Broussard on October 20, 2005. The testimony developed at trial indicates that Aaron Edwards and Mr. Broussard agreed on the thing (the Explorer) and the price (one thousand dollars in cash) on October 20, 2005. Under the Civil Code, the vehicle was sold and ownership passed to Mr. Broussard at that point. There is no support in Louisiana | jurisprudence or in the Civil Code for Mr. Allerton’s proposition that title must transfer and a prior owner of a vehicle must cancel his insurance before ownership of the vehicle transfers to a subsequent owner.

The result with respect to ownership of the Explorer is supported by Louisiana jurisprudence. For example, in Hayden v. Spencer, 2004-1140 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/2/05), 894 So.2d 551, writ denied, 2005-0982 (La.6/3/05), 903 So.2d 464, the plaintiff was parked at an intersection, at which time a pole on a truck trailer in front of her vehicle fell off the trailer, punctured the windshield of her vehicle, and injured her. She filed suit against the driver of the truck and his insurer.

At the time of the accident, the vehicle was not titled in the name of the plaintiffs stepdaughter. Id. at 552. The plaintiffs stepdaughter was a resident of Texas. At trial, the plaintiff testified that she agreed to buy the vehicle from her stepdaughter on an installment plan, was in possession of the vehicle for three or four weeks prior to the accident, and had just paid the last installment prior to the accident. Id. The plaintiffs stepdaughter testified that she and the plaintiff were going to transfer the title on the day of the accident. Id. at 553.

After a bench trial, the trial court awarded the plaintiff damages for pain and suffering, past medical expenses, and lost wages. Id. at 552. The trial court determined that the plaintiff was the owner of the vehicle at the time of the accident. Id. at 553. The Third Circuit affirmed, reasoning that “[t]he ownership of the [vehicle] was transferred by [the plaintiffs stepdaughter] to [the plaintiff] even though the Texas certificate of title reflected [the stepdaughter] as the registered owner.” Id. at 554. The essential facts of this case are similar. Here, Aaron Edwards and Mr. Broussard agreed on the price and the thing to be sold on October 20, 2005. Ownership of the Explorer passed to Mr. Broussard that day, | Taeven though Mr. Broussard did not receive the certificate of title for the Explorer until after October 25, 2005.

Accordingly, we find that the trial court erred in determining that Mr. and Ms. Edwards were the owners of the Explorer on October 25, 2005. We will pretermit consideration of Mr. Allerton’s remaining assignments of error.

CONCLUSION AND DECREE

For the reasons discussed above, the judgment of the trial court is reversed and judgment is rendered in favor of Mercury. Costs of this appeal are taxed to Mr. Aller-ton.

REVERSED AND RENDERED.

      . It is not clear from the record whether Aaron spoke to Trooper Rickmeyer or another police officer on October 25, 2005.


author: PARRO, J.

text:
    ROBA, INC. v. Mona Lackmann COURTNEY and James B. Courtney, II.
    No. 2009 CA 0508.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.
    Aug. 10, 2010.

      Peggy M.H. Robinson, Baton Rouge, LA, Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant Roba, Inc.
    Robert J. Carter, Greensburg, LA, for Defendants-Appellees Mona L. Courtney and James B. Courtney, II.
    Before PARRO, KUHN, and McDonald, jj.
   PARRO, J.

| 2The plaintiff appeals a judgment sustaining an exception raising the objection of prescription in favor of two defendants and dismissing its claim against them for damages and attorney fees relating to an “Agreement for Right of Way.” For the following reasons, the judgment is affirmed, and the matter is remanded.

Factual Background and Procedural History

In 1988, Roba, Inc. (Roba) purchased a 12-acre tract of land from James Courtney, II and his wife. To the east of the 12-acre tract, and adjacent thereto, was a 49.9678-acre tract of land that had been purchased by Robert L. Lucien from the Courtneys in 1987 that fronted on Highway 1047. In connection with the sale of the 12-acre tract, a document entitled “Agreement for Right of Way” (the 1988 agreement) was executed on an unspecified day in May 1988 by the Courtneys only, even though Roba was a named party to the document. In that document, it was declared that:

they will establish the Right of Way from the “lake” property to Louisiana Highway 1047 on the North side of the Roba, Inc. property not to be included in the Roba, Inc. property. The Courtneys agree that the Right of Way will be created on the property they own on the North side of the Roba, Inc. property [the legal description of which was provided] ....

This document was recorded on the same day as the deed, May 18, 1988, in conveyance book number 176, page 674, instrument number 062686, in the official records of the parish of St. Helena.

In 1992, Roba purchased a 51.3449-acre tract of land from the Courtneys. The tract included a lake and borders Roba’s 12-acre tract to the west and the south. The 1992 cash deed does not refer to any right-of-way associated with the sale. Neither the 1988 nor the 1992 deeds reflected that those tracts were burdened by a servitude.

On April 30, 1998, Roba filed suit against the Courtneys for specific performance, | ¡¡seeking to enforce the 1988 agreement and its provision allegedly requiring the establishment of a right-of-way. Roba demanded a 40-foot-wide right-of-way over the southern boundary of the Courtneys’ remaining property. In their answer, the Courtneys pled that Roba’s claim for the establishment of the right-of-way had prescribed. On November 2, 1998, Roba supplemented and amended its petition to add as defendants Mitchell R. and Pamela J. Radecker, who had purchased a 12.87-acre tract on July 28, 1998, from the Courtneys that bordered Roba’s property to the north and was allegedly subject to a proposed east/west right-of-way. Roba alleged that a plat of survey attached to the Radeckers’ deed disclosed that a portion of the tract was burdened with a right-of-way of an undetermined size along the south property line in favor of Roba and Mr. Lucien. A default judgment was confirmed on June 2, 1999, against the Radeckers, recognizing a 30-foot-wide right-of-way along the southern boundary line of their 12.87-acre tract as shown in a June 2, 1998 survey by Robert G. Barrilleaux & Associates, Inc. registered in conveyance book 222, page 177 in the official records of St. Helena Parish.

Pursuant to an August 24, 2001 deed, Tony L. Noto, Jr. and his wife bought two tracts of land from Mr. Courtney. Those tracts bordered the northern side of Mr. Lucien’s property. In the 2001 deed, the Notos acknowledged that this property was burdened by a servitude described in an agreement recorded in conveyance book 170, page 638 of the official records of St. Helena Parish.

On December 22, 2004, the Radeckers sold their 12.87-acre tract to William J. and Lori B. Hall, who owned a 10.5-acre tract that bordered the 12.87-acre tract on the north. In connection with the 2004 sale, a title examination was performed by the same attorney who rendered a title opinion in connection with the 1992 sale to Roba. |4The 2004 opinion indicated that the Radeckers’ title was subject, in pertinent part, to the following:

4) Right of way granted by [the Court-neys] across property to North of ROBA, Inc. and in favor of ROBA, Inc. from “Lake Property” to Louisiana Highway 1047 dated May, 1988 and duly recorded at Conveyance Book 176, Page 674.
* * *
11) The map and survey of the 12.87 acre tract of property belonging to [the Radeckers] and recorded at Conveyance Book 222, Page 177 indicates that there is a shed located on the hereinabove described tract of property that appears to be located within the right of way apparently established by ROBA, Inc. as set forth hereinabove.

On February 22, 2006, Roba filed a second supplemental and amending petition, adding the Notos as defendants. In that supplemental and amending petition, Roba averred:

The named Defendants, Courtneys, Radeckers, and Notos, have been amicably asked to acknowledge the right-of-way in favor of ROBA, Inc., granted by the Courtneys in the original acquisition and agreement to provide right-of-way and have refused to sign same. In actual fact, the right-of-way is encumbered by a fence with a lock and the parties, despite amicable demand, have not removed the restrictions for a free right-of-way.

Additionally, Roba asserted for the first time a claim for damages and torney fees against all of the defendants. In particular, Roba alleged:

The Defendants and their successors, as obligors, are liable to your Plaintiff for attorney’s fees, cost of providing or constructing the right-of-way in accordance with La. C.C. Art.1997 and 1998 and your Petitioner asks that after a trial on the merits, said damages be assessed against the Defendants, jointly, [severally], and in solido, to your Plaintiff.

The Courtneys then filed an exception raising the objection of prescription as to Roba’s claim for damages and attorney fees. Their exception focused on the eight-year delay in Roba’s assertion of its claim for damages and attorney fees. They urged that they were prejudiced by the 2006 amendment to Roba’s petition, thus the amendment should not be allowed to relate back to the original filing.

Roba opposed the exception in light of the Courtneys’ continuous denial of its right to a servitude as set out in the agreement to provide a right-of-way in connection with the original transfer of the property. According to Roba, the subsequent sales to Ifithe Radeckers and the Notos diluted its ability to have the servitude established. The claim for damages and attorney fees against the Courtneys was allegedly necessitated by the sale of property to the Radeckers and the Notos without disclosure of the 1988 right-of-way agreement. Accordingly, Roba asserted that the Courtneys’ actions “interrupted” prescription as to its claim for damages and attorney fees.

Following a hearing on the Courtneys’ exception of prescription regarding the second supplemental arid amending petition, the trial court analyzed the issues presented as follows:

Exceptors maintain that the failure to bring claims for damages until the amendment of pleadings some eight years subsequent to the filing of the original petition should bar these claims by prescription. Plaintiff maintains that these claims should relate back to the filing of the original petition, under Article 1153 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and further contends that the actions of Exceptors amount to a continuous tort, which is ongoing, and has therefore not prescribed.
In Spencer-Wallington, Inc. v. Service Merchandise, Inc., 562 So.2d 1060, (La.App. 1st Cir.1990), writ denied, 567 So.2d 109 (La.1990), the original corporate plaintiff filed an action seeking damages for breach of contract. A later claim for delictual damages then otherwise prescribed was not held to relate back to the original petition for purposes of defeating the claim of prescription.
As stated in National Surety Corp. v. Standard Accident Insurance Co., 168 So.2d 858, (La.App. 2nd Cir.1964): ... one of the essential requirements for the application of prescriptive provisions, as established in our jurisprudence, is the notification to a defendant not only of the cause of the action, but the nature and extent of the demand. It therefore appears proper to conclude that a claim which either changes the nature or enlarges the extent of the demand is not protected against the limitation of a prescriptive period.
IfiThe decision in Giroir v. South Louisiana Medical Center, 475 So.2d 1040, (La.1985) allowed the relation back of an amended petition to allow the addition of the claims of children to that of their father, the original plaintiff in a wrongful death suit, and developed a four step analysis with respect to weighing whether an amended claim relates back to the filing of an original petition. One of the factors to be considered is whether the defendant is thereby prejudiced in preparing or conducting his defense.
Certainly, in the present litigation, a defendant would be less concerned with pressing forward toward a resolution which would amount solely to the existence, nature and extent of a servitude of passage, than with a potential damage claim which would arguably continue to increase in size with the passage of time. This seems particularly true where the amendment claiming delictual damages is not brought until eight years from the filing of the original petition. For all these reasons, this Court concludes that the amendment should not relate back to the original filing, and would therefore be prescribed.
As to the claim that the delictual claim is an ongoing claim or continuous tort, the court in Crump v. Sabine River Authority, 1998-2826 (La.6/29/99) 737 So.2d 720, held that a “continuous tort” required that the operating cause of the injury be continuous, or repetitive. A single act giving rise to ongoing damages did not amount to a continuous tort based on the fact that damages continued to accrue.
In Thomas v. State Employees Group Benefits Program, 2005-0392 (La.App. 1st Cir.3/24/06), 934 So.2d 753, ... [t] he Court stated that to qualify as a continuing tort, there had to be both continuous action and continuous damage. If the “operating cause” of the damage is discontinuous in nature, even if the damage is continuous, the continuing tort theory is inapplicable.
In the present case, any delictual claim is based upon damages for Plaintiffs lack of access to its property. While conceivably damages are ongoing, the claim is based on the alleged refusal to provide the servitude of access, a single event. At the very least as to the claim against exceptors, their involvement with the property apparently ceased in 2004, at which time they were no longer able to “refuse” to grant the servitude, as no longer owning the property over which the servitude would traverse. Where a damage claim was not brought until over two years later, prescription has occurred.

Accordingly, the trial court sustained the Courtneys’ exception raising the objection of prescription and dismissed all claims against them for damages and attorney fees under LSA-C.C. arts.1997 and 1998 alleged in Roba’s second supplemental and amending 17petition. A motion for new trial by Roba was denied. Roba appealed, contending the trial court erred in sustaining the Courtneys’ exception and dismissing its claim for damages and attorney fees.

Discussion

Liberative prescription is a mode of barring actions as a result of inaction for a period of time. LSA-C.C. art. 3447. Generally, the burden of proving that a cause of action has prescribed rests with the party pleading prescription; however, when the plaintiffs petition shows on its face that the prescriptive period has run, and the plaintiff contends there is a suspension or interruption of prescription, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove suspension or interruption. St. Romain v. Luker, 00-1366 (La.App. 1st Cir.11/9/01), 804 So.2d 85, 88, writ denied, 02-0336 (La.4/19/02), 813 So.2d 1083. Moreover, the ordinary rule of the burden of proof is that one who claims the benefit of an exception to the general law must show he comes within the exception. Houston General Ins. Co. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 612 So.2d 787, 789 (La.App. 1st Cir.1992), writ denied, 614 So.2d 82 (La.1993).

Roba’s claim for damages was first asserted on February 22, 2006, by way of its second supplemental and amending petition. Following its 2001 sale to the Notos, the Courtneys no longer had ownership of the property affected by the contested right-of-way sought by Roba. Thus any claim against the Courtneys for interference with Roba’s use of the alleged east/west right-of-way would have prescribed prior to the | s2006 filing. To the extent that Rsoba petition as supplemented and amended a second time in 2006 sets forth a claim for delictual damages against the Courtneys we find no error in the trial court’s decision to dismiss such a claim.

However, Roba’s original petition sought enforcement of the 1988 agreement. The prescriptive period applicable to an action alleging breach of contract is ten years. Alien v. Carollo, 95-1840 (La.App. 1st Cir.4/4/96), 674 So.2d 283, 286; see LSA-C.C. art. 3499. The ten-year prescriptive period for contracts does not begin to run until the date the contract is allegedly breached. Dauterive Contractors, Inc. v. Landry and Watkins, 01-1112 (La.App. 3rd Cir.3/13/02), 811 So.2d 1242, 1249; see Loewer v. Texas Gas Transmission Co., 615 F.Supp. 1, 2 (La.W.D.1984). In this case, the petition, as supplemented and amended, does not indicate the date on which the agreement was allegedly breached; nor does the “Agreement for Right of Way” by its terms specify a term for performance. The absence of a stipulated term for performance does not preclude the perfection of a valid obligation. Caston v. Woman’s Hospital Foundation, Inc., 262 So.2d 62, 64 (La.App. 1st Cir.), writ refused, 262 La. 1087, 266 So.2d 220 (1972); see LSA-C.C. art. 1778. When no term for performance has been stipulated, the inference will be supplied that the parties intended the obligation to be undertaken within a reasonable time. What constitutes a reasonable time must be determined by the circumstances of each case. Perrin v. Hellback, 296 So.2d 342, 344 (La.App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 300 So.2d 184 (La.1974).

Liberative prescription commences from the date of an obligor’s breach of his obligation. As previously noted, the nature and validity of the 1988 agreement for a right-of-way and the resulting obligations have not yet been challenged by the parties or addressed by the trial court. However, with respect to the initial action for specific ^performance, this court concludes that such an action brought within 10 years of the execution of the agreement for a right-of-way would not have been barred by prescription. Cf. Loewer, 615 F.Supp. at 2.

Upon an obligor’s failure to perform an obligation to deliver a thing, or not to do an act, or to execute an instrument, the court shall grant specific performance plus damages for delay, if the obligee so demands. LSA-C.C. art.1986. If specific performance is impracticable, the court may allow damages to the obli-gee. Id. Upon a failure to perform an obligation that has another object, such as an obligation to do, the granting of specific performance is at the discretion of the court. Id. Roba’s claim for damages in its 2006 second supplemental and amending petition was premised on a breach of the Courtneys’ alleged obligation to perform in connection with the 1988 agreement.

Damages for failure to perform a conventional obligation are measured by the loss sustained by the obligee and the profit of which he has been deprived. See LSAC.C. art.1995. Notably, in its second supplemental amending petition, Roba specifically sought damages pursuant to LSA-C.C. arts.1997 and 1998. Louisiana Civil Code article 1997 provides for the recovery of damages from an obligor that is in bad faith, and LSA-C.C. art.1998 authorizes the recovery of nonpecuniary loss.

An obligor in bad faith is liable for all the damages, foreseeable or not, that are a direct consequence of his failure to perform. LSA-C.C. art.1997. By bad faith is not |lflmeant the mere breach of faith in not complying with a contract, but a designed breach of it from some motive of interest or ill will. Williams v. Coe, 417 So.2d 426, 430 (La.App. 1st Cir.1982). An obligor is in bad faith if he intentionally and maliciously fails to perform his obligation. LSA-C.C. art.1997, Revision Comments — 1984, comments (b) & (c). Damages for nonpecuniary loss may be recovered when the contract, because of its nature, is intended to gratify a nonpecuni-ary interest and, because of the circumstances surrounding the formation or the nonperformance of the contract, the obli-gor knew, or should have known, that his failure to perform would cause that kind of loss. LSA-C.C. art.1998. Regardless of the nature of the contract, these damages may be recovered also when the obligor intended, through his failure to perform, to aggrieve the feelings of the obligee. Id. A contract made for the gratification of a nonpecuniary interest means one intended to satisfy an interest of a spiritual order, such as a contract to create a work of art, or a contract to conduct scientific research, or a contract involving matters of sentimental value. LSA-C.C. art.1998, Revision Comments — 1984, comment (c).

Although we find that the allegations in Roba’s original petition for specific performance were sufficient to notify the Courtneys of Roba’s possible claim for damages under LSA-C.C. art.1986 in connection with their alleged nonperformance of the 1988 agreement, we note the absence of any allegation in that petition that the Courtneys intentionally and maliciously failed to perform their obligation or that the 1988 agreement was. intended to gratify a nonpecuniary interest. In the absence of such allegations, we are unable to find that the allegations of Roba’s 1998 petition were sufficient to notify the Court-neys of Roba’s possible claims for the types of additional damages authorized by LSA-C.C. arts.1997 and 1998. Accordingly, we find that the 2006 amendment setting forth a claim for damages and attorney fees under LSA-C.C. arts.1997 and 1998 does not relate back to the date of filing of the original pleading. See LSA-C.C.P. art. 1158.

Decree

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. This matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. The costs of this appeal are assessed to Roba, Inc.

AFFIRMED AND REMANDED.

      . That deed was recorded on May 18, 1988, in conveyance book number 176, page 670, instrument number 062683, in the official records of the parish of St. Helena.

      . Mr. Lucien was the vice president and secretary of Roba at that time.

      . In connection with the 1987 deed, an agreement similar to the 1988 agreement had been executed by the Courtneys only, even though Mr. Lucien was a named party to the document.

      . A title examination performed by an attorney in connection with Roba’s 1992 purchase revealed that "[tjhere is no right of way from the above said property to a public road.”

      . A notice of the pendency of that action was filed with the clerk of court for the parish of St. Helena.

      . That act reflects that the Courtneys were divorced by this time.

      . This reference is to the "Agreement for Right of Way” executed in connection with the Courtneys’ 1987 sale to Mr. Lucien.

      .The Halls had purchased the 10.5-acre tract on May 29, 1996. A May 18, 1998 survey map of this tract reflects that a barbed-wire fence surrounded most of the 10.5-acre tract. It also disclosed the existence of a 12-foot gravel driveway extending south from “Idle Lane” (a 14-foot public gravel road) to the south property line near the Hall’s home.

      . In a third supplemental and amending petition filed on January 10, 2007, Roba sought damages and attorney fees from the defendants in connection with their interference with Roba’s use of an alleged right-of-way dating back to 1974, which provided access to Idle Acres Lane. Roba alleged:
      The owners-in-succession are aware of the right-of-way and, in actual fact, are using the right-of-way up to the line of the Roba, Inc. property, but they have consciously and consistently denied access to this servitude which was already established in title and part of the acquisition by Roba, Inc. from the Courtneys to the detriment and damages to Roba, Inc. Plaintiff, Roba, Inc. asks the Court to order the owners of the property, the Halls, to open the gate and make the access from the lake property to the highway available to Roba, Inc., as was included in their sale and the successive sales of said property. Roba, Inc. holds [the Courtneys], the Radeckers, the Halls and the Notos responsible for any and all damages, attorney’s fees in the premises, and lack of access and convenience to be shown at the trial on the merits of this case. A title opinion rendered ... for the Hall/Ra-decker sale in 2004 reflects the right-of-way. Roba, Inc. was deliberately deceived by the Courtneys in the exclusion of the established right-of-way. A copy of the opinion rendered is attached as Exhibit "B.”

      . The Honorable Elizabeth P. Wolfe presided at the hearing on the motion for new trial.

      . Since the trial court rendered a partial judgment as to less than all of the claims, demands, issues, or theories relative to the Courtneys, the judgment did not constitute a final judgment. To be appealable, such a judgment had to be designated as a final judgment by the trial court after an express determination that there is no just reason for delay. See LSA-C.C.P. art. 1915(B)(1). Pursuant to a rule to show cause issued by this court, the Courtneys obtained the needed designation, and the record has been supplemented accordingly. Therefore, the judgment is properly before us on appeal.

      .Roba has separately appealed a judgment denying its motion for preliminary injunction, sustaining an exception filed by the Halls raising the objection of prescription regarding a 1974 servitude asserted in a third supplemental and amending petition that was filed on January 10, 2007, and dismissing Roba’s claims relating to the 1974 servitude. See Roba, Inc. v. Courtney, 09-0509 (La.App. 1st Cir.8/10/10), 2010 WL 3196195, 47 So.3d 509.

      . An additional claim for damages associated with a 1974 servitude was set forth in Roba’s 2007 third supplemental and amending petition.

      . Delictual actions are subject to a liberative prescription of one year, which runs from the date injury or damage is sustained. LSA-C.C. art. 3492.

      . The nature and validity of this agreement and resulting obligations have not been challenged by the parties or addressed by the trial court. Therefore, these issues are not properly before us on appeal. For purposes of this appeal, we will assume that the "Agreement for Right of Way” constitutes an otherwise valid contract. Nonetheless, we note that the establishment of a predial servitude by juridical act is an alienation of a part of the property; hence, it is subject to the requirements governing the validity and effect of acts of disposition. LSA-C.C. art. 708, Revision Comments — 1977, comment (d).

      . An obligor is liable for the damages caused by his failure to perform a conventional obligation. A failure to perform results from nonperformance, defective performance, or delay in performance. LSA-C.C. art. 1994. An award of such damages is governed by LSA-C.C. arts.1995 though 2012. See Lombardo v. Deshotel, 94-1172 (La. 11/30/94), 647 So.2d 1086, 1090; see also Bourgeois v. Dunn, 01-1185 (La.App. 1st Cir.6/21/02), 822 So.2d 708, 711.

      . See Lombardo, 647 So.2d at 1090; Charter School of Pine Grove, Inc. v. St. Helena Parish School Bd., 07-2238 (La.App. 1st Cir.2/19/09), 9 So.3d 209, 222.

      . As we noted in footnote 15, the nature and validity of the 1988 agreement and resulting obligations have not yet been addressed by the trial court. Therefore, we are uncertain of the Courtneys’ ultimate obligation in this matter.

      .The owner of the servient estate is not required to do anything. His obligation is to abstain from doing something on his estate or to permit something to be done on it. He may be required by convention or by law to keep his estate in suitable condition for the exercise of the servitude due to the dominant estate. LSA-C.C. art. 651. The owner of the servient estate may bind himself by a personal obligation to perform certain affirmative duties in connection with a predial servitude. These obligations may be heritable, but they are not transferred to successors by particular title without express stipulation to that effect. LSA-C.C. art. 651, Revised Comments — 1977, comment (c).

      . See Womack v. Custom Homes and Renovations, 02-0193 (La.App. 4th Cir.6/5/02), 820 So.2d 1196, 1203, writ denied, 02-1871 (La.9/13/02), 824 So.2d 1165.

      . Notably, any claim that Roba may have asserted in its 2006 supplemental and amending petition for other types of monetary damages allowed by LSA-C.C. art.1986 was not affected by the judgment.