author: PER CURIAM.

text:
    In re AMENDMENTS TO the FLORIDA RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE—ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY.
    No. SC11-1542.
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    July 5, 2012.
    Kevin D. Johnson, Chair, Civil Procedure Rules Committee, Tampa, FL, and John F. Harkness, Jr., Executive Director, The Florida Bar, Tallahassee, FL, for Petitioner.
    Henry P. Trawick, Jr. of Henry P. Trawick, P.A., Sarasota, FL; Ralph Artig-liere, Blue Ridge, GA, William F. Hamilton of Quarles & Brady, LLP, Tampa, FL, and Ralph C. Losey of Jackson, Lewis, LLP, Orlando, FL; Donald R. Fountain, Jr. of Clark, Fountain, La Vista, Prather, Keen & Littky-Rubin, LLP, West Palm Beach, FL; L. Johnson Sarber, III, Marks of Marks, Gray, Conroy & Gibbs, Jacksonville, FL, and L. Gino Marchetti, President, Lawyers for Civil Justice, Washington, DC, Responding with comments.
   PER CURIAM.

The Florida Bar’s Civil Procedure Rules Committee (Committee) filed an out-of-cycle report proposing amendments to the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure to address discovery of electronically stored information (ESI). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 2(a), Fla. Const.

BACKGROUND

The Committee proposes amendments to seven civil procedure rules: 1.200 (Pretrial Procedure); 1.201 (Complex Litigation); 1.280 (General Provisions Governing Discovery); 1.340 (Interrogatories to Parties); 1.350 (Production of Documents and Things and Entry Upon Land for Inspection and Other Purposes); 1.380 (Failure to Make Discovery; Sanctions); and 1.410 (Subpoena). The Committee’s proposals were unanimously approved by The Florida Bar Board of Governors. After the Committee submitted its report to the Court, the Court published the proposed amendments in The Florida Bar News for public comment. We received and considered comments from several organizations and members of the Bar. We have also considered the issues discussed during the oral argument in this case. As explained below, we adopt the amendments as proposed by the Committee.

AMENDMENTS

First, rule 1.200 (Pretrial Procedure) is amended to allow the trial court to consider various issues related to electronic discovery during a pretrial conference, including the possibility of obtaining admissions of fact, the voluntary exchange of documents and electronically stored information, and stipulations regarding the authenticity of documents and electronically stored information; the need for advance rulings on the admissibility of some documents or ESI; and finally, specifically as to electronically stored information, the possibility of an agreement between the parties regarding the extent to which such information should be preserved and the form in which it should be produced. Similarly, rule 1.201 (Complex Litigation) is also amended to require the parties in a complex civil case to address the possibility of an agreement between them addressing the extent to which electronic information should be preserved and the form in which it should be produced.

Next, rule 1.280 (General Provisions Governing Discovery) is amended to expressly authorize discovery of electronically stored information. Rule 1.280 is also amended to add new subdivision (d), which provides some specific limitations on discovery of ESI; the subsequent subdivisions are relettered accordingly. Under new subdivision (d)(1), a person may object to a discovery request seeking electronically stored information. On a motion to compel discovery, or a motion for a protective order, the person from whom the discovery is sought must show that the information sought or the format requested is not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost. If this showing is made, the court may nonetheless order the discovery if the requesting party shows good cause. However, the court may specify certain conditions of discovery, including ordering that some or all of the expenses incurred while complying with the discovery request be paid by the party seeking the discovery. Under subdivision (d)(2) the court, in addressing a motion pertaining to discovery of ESI, must limit the frequency or extent of discovery if it determines that the information sought is: (i) unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or can be obtained from another source or in another manner that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive; or (ii) the burden or expense of the discovery outweighs its likely benefit.

Rule 1.340 (Interrogatories to Parties) and rule 1.350 (Production of Docuinents and Things and Entry Upon Land for Inspection and Other Purposes) are both amended to allow for the production of electronically stored information, either as an answer to an interrogatory or in response to a specific request. Both rules provide for a party to produce the ESI in the form in which it is ordinarily maintained or in a reasonably usable form.

Rule 1.380 (Failure to Make Discovery; Sanctions) is amended to provide that, absent exceptional circumstances, a court may not impose sanctions on a party for failing to provide electronically stored information that was lost as a result of the routine, good-faith operation of an electronic information system.

Finally, rule 1.410 (Subpoena) is amended to authorize a subpoena requesting electronically stored information. A person receiving a subpoena may object to the discovery of the ESI. The person from whom discovery is sought must show that the information or the form requested is not reasonably accessible because of undue costs or burden. If that showing is made, the court may nonetheless order the discovery if the requesting party shows good cause and consistent with the limitations provided in ' rule 1.280(d)(2) discussed above. The court may also specify conditions of the discovery, including ordering that some or all of the expenses be paid by the party seeking the discovery.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, we amend the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure as set forth in the appendix to this opinion. New language is indicated by underscoring; deletions are indicated by struck-through type. The committee notes are offered for explanation only and are not adopted as an official part of the rules. These amendments shall become effective September 1, 2012, at 12:02 a.m.

It is so ordered.

POLSTON, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANADY, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur.

APPENDIX

RULE 1.200. PRETRIAL PROCEDURE

(a) Case Management Conference. At any time after responsive pleadings or motions are due, the court may order, or a party by serving a notice may convene, a case management conference. The matter to be considered shall be specified in the order or notice setting the conference. At such a conference the court may:

(1) — (4) [No Change]
(5) consider the possibility of obtaining admissions of fact and voluntary exchange of documents and electronically stored information, and stipulations regarding authenticity of documents and electronically stored information;
(6) consider the need for advance rulings from the court on the admissibility of documents and electronically stored information;
(7) discuss as to electronically stored information, the possibility of agreements from the parties regarding the extent to which such evidence should be preserved, the form in which such evidence should be produced, and whether discovery of such information should be conducted in phases or limited to particular individuals, time periods, or sources;
(58) schedule disclosure of expert witnesses and the discovery of facts known and opinions held by such experts;
(69) schedule or hear motions in li-mine;
(710) pursue the possibilities of settlement;
(811) require filing of preliminary stipulations if issues can be narrowed;
(912) consider referring issues to a magistrate for findings of fact; and
(1013) schedule other conferences or determine other matters that may aid in the disposition of the action.

(b)-(d) [No Change]

Committee Notes

1971-1992 Amendments. [No Change]

2012 Amendment. Subdivisions (a)(5) to (a)(7) are added to address issues involving electronically stored information.

Court Commentary

[No Change]

RULE 1.201. COMPLEX LITIGATION

(a) [No Change]

(b) Initial Case Management Report and Conference. The court shall hold an initial case management conference within 60 days from the date of the order declaring the action complex.

(1) At least 20 days prior to the date of the initial case management conference, attorneys for the parties as well as any parties appearing pro se shall confer and prepare a joint statement, which shall be filed with the clerk of the court no later than 14 days before the conference, outlining a discovery plan and stating:
(A)-(I) [No Change]
(J) the possibility of obtaining agreements among the parties regarding the extent to which such electronically stored information should be preserved, the form in which such information should be produced, and whether discovery of such information should be conducted in phases or limited to particular individuals, time periods, or sources;
(JK) suggestions on the advisability and timing of referring matters to a magistrate, master, other neutral, or mediation;
(KL) a preliminary estimate of the time required for trial;
(LM) requested date or dates for conferences before trial, a final pretrial conference, and trial;
(MN) a description of pertinent documents and a list of fact witnesses the parties believe to be relevant;
(NO) number of experts and fields of expertise; and
(OP) any other information that might be helpful to the court in setting further conferences and the trial date.
(2) — (3) [No Change]

(c) The Case Management Order. The case management order shall address each matter set forth under rule 1.200(a) and set the action for a pretrial conference and trial. The case management order also shall specify the following:

(1) Dates by which all parties shall name their expert witnesses and provide the expert information required by rule 1.280(b)(45). If a party has named an expert witness in a field in which any other parties have not identified experts, the other parties may name experts in that field within 30 days thereafter. No additional experts may be named unless good cause is shown.
(2) — (6) [No Change]

(d) [No Change]

Committee Notes

2012 Amendment._Subdivision (b)(l)(J) is added to address issues involving electronically stored information.

RULE 1.280. GENERAL PROVISIONS GOVERNING DISCOVERY

(a) [No Change]

(b) Scope of Discovery. Unless otherwise limited by order of the court in accordance with these rules, the scope of discovery is as follows:

(l)-(2) [No Change]
(3) Electronically Stored Information. A party may obtain discovery of electronically stored information in accordance with these rules.
(34) Trial Preparation: Materials. Subject to the provisions of subdivision (b)(45) of this rule, a party may obtain discovery of documents and tangible things otherwise discoverable under subdivision (b)(1) of this rule and prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party or by or for that part/s representative, including that party’s attorney, consultant, surety, in-demnitor, insurer, or agent, only upon a showing that the party seeking discovery has need of the materials in the preparation of the case and is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means. In ordering discovery of the materials when the required showing has been made, the court shall protect against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other representative of a party concerning the litigation. Without the required showing a party may obtain a copy of a statement concerning the action or its subject matter previously made by that party. Upon request without the required showing a person not a party may obtain a copy of a statement concerning the action or its subject matter previously made by that person. If the request is refused, the person may move for an order to obtain a copy. The provisions of rule 1.380(a)(4) apply to the award of expenses incurred as a result of making the motion. For purposes of this paragraph, a statement previously made is a written statement signed or otherwise adopted or approved by the person making it, or a stenographic, mechanical, electrical, or other recording or transcription of it that is a substantially verbatim recital of an oral statement by the person making it and contemporaneously recorded.
(45) Trial Preparation: Experts. Discovery of facts known and opinions held by experts, otherwise discoverable under the provisions of subdivision (b)(1) of this rule and acquired or developed in anticipation of litigation or for trial, may be obtained only as follows:
(A)(i) By interrogatories a party may require any other party to identify each person whom the other party expects to call as an expert witness at trial and to state the subject matter on which the expert is expected to testify, and to state the substance of the facts and opinions to which the expert is expected to testify and a summary of the grounds for each opinion.
(ii) Any person disclosed by interrogatories or otherwise as a person expected to be called as an expert witness at trial may be deposed in accordance with rule 1.390 without motion or order of court.
(iii) A party may obtain the following discovery regarding any person disclosed by interrogatories or otherwise as a person expected to be called as an expert witness at trial:
1. The scope of employment in the pending case and the compensation for such service.
2. The expert’s general litigation experience, including the percentage of work performed for plaintiffs and defendants.
3. The identity of other cases, within a reasonable time period, in which the expert has testified by deposition or at trial.
4. An approximation of the portion of the expert’s involvement as an expert witness, which may be based on the number of hours, percentage of hours, or percentage of earned income derived from serving as an expert witness; however, the expert shall not be required to disclose his or her earnings as an expert witness or income derived from other services.

An expert may be required to produce financial and business records only under the most unusual or compelling circumstances and may not be compelled to compile or produce nonexistent documents. Upon motion, the court may order further discovery by other means, subject to such restrictions as to scope and other provisions pursuant to subdivision (b)(45)(C) of this rule concerning fees and expenses as the court may deem appropriate.

(B) A party may discover facts known or opinions held by an expert who has been retained or specially employed by another party in anticipation of litigation or preparation for trial and who is not expected to be called as a witness at trial, only as provided in rule 1.360(b) or upon a showing of exceptional circumstances under which it is impracticable for the party seeking discovery to obtain facts or opinions on the same subject by other means.
(C) Unless manifest injustice would result, the court shall require that the party seeking discovery pay the expert a reasonable fee for time spent in responding to discovery under subdivisions (b)(45)(A) and (b)(45)(B) of this rule; and concerning discovery from an expert obtained under subdivision (b)(45)(A) of this rule the court may require, and concerning discovery obtained under subdivision (b)(45)(B) of this rule shall require, the party seeking discovery to pay the other party a fair part of the fees and expenses reasonably incurred by the latter party in obtaining facts and opinions from the expert.
(D) As used in these rules an expert shall be an expert witness as defined in rule 1.390(a).

(56) Claims of Privilege or Protection of Trial Preparation Materials. When a party withholds information otherwise discoverable under these rules by claiming that it is privileged or subject to protection as trial preparation material, the party shall make the claim expressly and shall describe the nature of the documents, communications, or things not produced or disclosed in a manner that, without revealing information itself privileged or protected, will enable other parties to assess the applicability of the privilege or protection.

(c) [No Change]

(d) Limitations on Discovery of Electronically Stored Information.

(1) A person may object to discovery of electronically stored information from sources that the person identifies as not reasonably accessible because of burden or cost. On motion to compel discovery or for a protective order, the person from whom discovery is sought must show that the information sought or the format requested is not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost. If that showing is made, the court may nonetheless order the discovery from such sources or in such formats if the requesting party shows good cause. The court may specify conditions of the discovery, including ordering that some or all of the expenses incurred by the person from whom discovery is sought be paid by the party seeking the discovery.

(2) In determining any motion involving discovery of electronically stored information, the court must limit the frequency or extent of discovery otherwise allowed by these rules if it determines that (i) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or can be obtained from another source or in another manner that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive; or (ii) the burden or expense of the discovery outweighs its likely benefit, considering the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the parties’ resources, the importance of the issues at stake in the action, and the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues.

(de) Sequence and Timing of Discovery. Except as provided in subdivision (b)(45) or unless the court upon motion for the convenience of parties and witnesses and in the interest of justice orders otherwise, methods of discovery may be used in any sequence, and the fact that a party is conducting discovery, whether by deposition or otherwise, shall not delay any other party’s discovery.

(ef) Supplementing of Responses. A party who has responded to a request for discovery with a response that was complete when made is under no duty to supplement the response to include information thereafter acquired.

(fg) Court Filing of Documents and Discovery. Information obtained during discovery shall not be filed with the court until such time as it is filed for good cause. The requirement of good cause is satisfied only where the filing of the information is allowed or required by another applicable rule of procedure or by court order. All filings of discovery documents shall comply with Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.425. The court shall have the authority to impose sanctions for violation of this rule.

Committee Notes

1972-2011 Amendments. [No Change]

2012 Amendment. Subdivisions (b)(3) and (d) are added to address discovery of electronically stored information.

The parties should consider conferring with one another at the earliest practical opportunity to discuss the reasonable scope of preservation and production of electronically stored information. These issues may also be addressed by means of a rule 1.200 or rule 1.201 case management conference.

Under the good cause test in subdivision (d)(1), the court should balance the costs and burden of the requested discovery, including the potential for disruption of operations or corruption of the electronic devices or systems from which discovery is sought, against the relevance of the information and the requesting party’s need for that information. Under the proportionality and reasonableness factors set out in subdivision (d)(2), the court must limit the frequency or extent of discovery if it determines that the discovery sought is excessive in relation to the factors listed.

In evaluating the good cause or proportionality tests, the court may find its task complicated if the parties know little about what information the sources at issue contain, whether the information sought is relevant, or how valuable it may be to the litigation. If appropriate, the court may direct the parties to develop the record further by engaging in focused discovery, including sampling of the sources, to learn more about what electronically stored information may be contained in those sources, what costs and burdens are involved in retrieving, reviewing, and producing the information, and how valuable the information sought may be to the litigation in light of the availability of information from other sources or methods of discovery, and in light of the parties’ resources and the issues at stake in the litigation.

Court Commentary

[No Change]

RULE 1.340. INTERROGATORIES TO PARTIES

(a)-(b) [No Change]

(c) Option to Produce Records. When the answer to an interrogatory may be derived or ascertained from the records (including electronically stored information) of the party to whom the interrogatory is directed or from an examination, audit, or inspection of the records or from a compilation, abstract, or summary based on the records and the burden of deriving or ascertaining the answer is substantially the same for the party serving the interrogatory as for the party to whom it is directed, an answer to the interrogatory specifying the records from which the answer may be derived or ascertained and offering to give the party serving the interrogatory a reasonable opportunity to examine, audit, or inspect the records and to make copies, compilations, abstracts, or summaries is a sufficient answer. An answer shall be in sufficient detail to permit the interrogating party to locate and to identify, as readily as can the party interrogated, the records from which the answer may be derived or ascertained, or shall identify a person or persons representing the interrogated party who will be available to assist the interrogating party in locating and identifying the records at the time they are produced. If the records to be produced consist of electronically stored information, the records shall be produced in a form or forms in which they are ordinarily maintained or in a reasonably usable form or forms.

(d) [No Change]

(e) Service and Filing. Interrogatories shall be arranged so that a blank space is provided after each separately numbered interrogatory. The space shall be reasonably sufficient to enable the answering party to insert the answer within the space. If sufficient space is not provided, the answering party may attach additional papers with answers and refer to them in the space provided in the interrogatories. The interrogatories shall be served on the party to whom the interrogatories are directed and copies shall be served on all other parties. A certificate of service of the interrogatories shall be filed, giving the date of service and the name of the party to whom they were directed. The answers to the interrogatories shall be served upon the party originally propounding the interrogatories and a copy shall be served on all other parties by the answering party. The original or any copy of the answers to interrogatories may be filed in compliance with Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.425 and rule 1.280(fg) by any party when the court should consider the answers to interrogatories in determining any matter pending before the court. The court may order a copy of the answers to interrogatories filed at any time when the court determines that examination of the answers to interrogatories is necessary to determine any matter pending before the court.

Committee Notes

1972-2011 Amendments. [No Change]

2012 Amendment. Subdivision (c) is amended to provide for the production of electronically stored information in answer to interrogatories and to set out a procedure for determining the form in which to produce electronically stored information.

Court Commentary

[No Change]

RULE 1.350. PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS AND THINGS AND ENTRY UPON LAND FOR INSPECTION AND OTHER PURPOSES

(a) Request; Scope. Any party may request any other party (1) to produce and permit the party making the request, or someone acting in the requesting party’s behalf, to inspect and copy any designated documents, including electronically stored information, writings, drawings, graphs, charts, photographs, phono-rec-ords, and other data compilations from which information can be obtained,.translated, if necessary, by the party to whom the request is directed through detection devices into reasonably usable form, that constitute or contain matters within the scope of rule 1.280(b) and that are in the possession, custody, or control of the party to whom the request is directed; (2) to inspect and copy, test, or sample any tangible things that constitute or contain matters within the scope of rule 1.280(b) and that are in the possession, custody, or control of the party to whom the request is directed; or (3) to permit entry upon designated land or other property in the possession or control of the party upon whom the request is served for the purpose of inspection and measuring, surveying, photographing, testing, or sampling the property or any designated object or operation on it within the scope of rule 1.280(b).

(b) Procedure. Without leave of court the request may be served on the plaintiff after commencement of the action and on any other party with or after service of the process and initial pleading on that party. The request shall set forth the items to be inspected, either by individual item or category, and describe each item and category with reasonable particularity. The request shall specify a reasonable time, place, and manner of making the inspection or performing the related acts. The party to whom the request is directed shall serve a written response within 30 days after service of the request, except that a defendant may serve a response within 45 days after service of the process and initial pleading on that defendant. The court may allow a shorter or longer time. For each item or category the response shall state that inspection and related activities will be permitted as requested unless the request is objected to, in which event the reasons for the objection shall be stated. If an objection is made to part of an item or category, the part shall be specified. When producing documents, the producing party shall either produce them as they are kept in the usual course of business or shall identify them to correspond with the categories in the request. A request for electronically stored information may specify the form or forms in which electronically stored information is to be produced. If the responding party objects to a requested form, or if no form is specified in the request, the responding party must state the form or forms it intends to use. If a request for electronically stored information does not specify the form of production, the producing party must produce the information in a form or forms in which it is ordinarily maintained or in a reasonably usable form or forms. The party submitting the request may move for an order under rule 1.380 concerning any objection, failure to respond to the request, or any part of it, or failure to permit the inspection as requested.

(c) [No Change]

(d) Filing of Documents. Unless required by the court, a party shall not file any of the documents or things produced with the response. Documents or things may be filed in compliance with Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.425 and rule 1.280(£g) when they should be considered by the court in determining a matter pending before the court.

Committee Notes

1972-2011 Amendments. [No Change]

2012 Amendment. Subdivision (a) is amended to address the production of electronically stored information. Subdivision (b) is amended to set out a procedure for determining the form to be used in producing electronically stored information.

RULE 1.380. FAILURE TO MAKE DISCOVERY; SANCTIONS

(a)-(d) [No Change]

(e)Electronically Stored Information; Sanctions for Failure to Preserve. Absent exceptional circumstances, a court may not impose sanctions under these rules on a party for failing to provide electronically stored information lost as a result of the routine, good faith operation of an electronic information system.

Committee Notes

1972-2005 Amendments. [No Change]

2012 Amendment. Subdivision (e) is added to make clear that a party should not be sanctioned for the loss of electronic evidence due to the good-faith operation of an electronic information system; the language mirrors that of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(e). Nevertheless, the good-faith requirement contained in subdivision (e) should prevent a party from exploiting the routine operation of an information system to thwart discovery obligations by allowing that operation to destroy information that party is required to preserve or produce. In determining good faith, the court may consider any steps taken by the party to comply with court orders, party agreements, or requests to preserve such information.

RULE 1.410. SUBPOENA

(a)-(b) [No Change]

(c) For Production of Documentary Evidence. A subpoena may also command the person to whom it is directed to produce the books, papers, documents (including electronically stored information), or tangible things designated therein, but the court, upon motion made promptly and in any event at or before the time specified in the subpoena for compliance therewith, may (1) quash or modify the subpoena if it is unreasonable and oppressive, or (2) condition denial of the motion upon the advancement by the person in whose behalf the subpoena is issued of the reasonable cost of producing the books, papers, documents, or tangible things. If a subpoena does not specify a form for producing electronically stored information, the person responding must produce it in a form or forms in which it is ordinarily maintained or in a reasonably usable form or forms. A person responding to a subpoena may object to discovery of electronically stored information from sources that the person identifies as not reasonably accessible because of undue costs or burden. On motion to compel discovery or to quash, the person from whom discovery is sought must show that the information sought or the form requested is not reasonably accessible because of undue costs or burden. If that showing is made, the court may nonetheless order discovery from such sources or in such forms if the requesting party shows good cause, considering the limitations set out in rule 1.280(d)(2). The court may specify conditions of the discovery, including ordering that some or all of the expenses of the discovery be paid by the party seeking the discovery. A party seeking a production of evidence at trial which would be subject to a subpoena may compel such production by serving a notice to produce such evidence on an adverse party as provided in rule 1.080. Such notice shall have the same effect and be subject to the same limitations as a subpoena served on the party.

(d)-(h) [No Change]

Committee Notes

1972-2012 Amendments. [No Change]

2012 Amendment. Subdivision (c) is amended to address the production of electronically stored information pursuant to a subpoena. The procedures for dealing with disputes concerning the accessibility of the information sought or the form for its production are intended to correspond to those set out in Rule 1.280(d).


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: CANADY, J.

license: Public Domain

text:
    Jeffrey H. ATWATER, Appellant, v. Frederick W. KORTUM, Appellee.
    No. SC11-133.
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    July 5, 2012.

      Michael H. Davidson, Florida Department of Financial Services, Tallahassee, FL; Cynthia S. Tunnicliff of Pennington, Moore, Wilkinson, Bell & Dunbar, P.A., Tallahassee, FL; Maria E. Abate and Ela-na H. Gloetzner of Colodny, Fass, Talen-feld, Karlinsky & Abate, P.A., Fort Laud-erdale, FL, for Appellant.
    Wilbur E. Brewton and Kelly B. Plante of Brewton & Plante, P.A., Tallahassee, FL; Talbot D’Alemberte and Patsy Palmer of D’Alemberte & Palmer, PLLC, Tallahassee, FL, for Appellee.
   CANADY, J.

This case concerns a statutory regulation affecting public insurance adjusters, who are authorized to assist insureds and thirty-party claimants in the filing and settlement of insurance claims. We have on appeal Kortum v. Sink, 54 So.3d 1012 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010), in which the First District Court of Appeal declared invalid section 626.854(6), Florida Statutes (2008), a provision regulating solicitation by public adjusters. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. We affirm the First District’s decision that the statute unconstitutionally restricts the commercial speech of public adjusters because it is not narrowly tailored to serve the State’s interests in ensuring ethical conduct by public adjusters and protecting homeowners.

I. BACKGROUND

During a 2007 special session, the Florida Legislature created the Task Force on Citizens Property Insurance Claims Handling and Resolution (Task Force) to make recommendations regarding the 2004-2005 hurricane claims of Citizens Property Insurance Corporation. Among other recommendations, the Task Force proposed that the Legislature enact the following provision governing public adjusters:

A public adjuster shall not directly or indirectly through any other person or entity engage in face-to-face or telephonic solicitation or enter into a contract with any insured or claimant under an insurance policy until at least 72 hours after the occurrence of an event that may be the subject of a claim under the insurance policy unless contact is initiated by the insured or claimant.

Kortum, 54 So.3d at 1014.

During its 2008 regular session, the Legislature enacted a law similar to the Task Force’s proposal. The Legislature added to the proposal a provision stating that a public adjuster may not “initiate contact” with a claimant and reduced the period of the restriction from seventy-two to forty-eight hours. Section 626.854(6), Florida Statutes (2008), thus provides:

A public adjuster may not directly or indirectly through any other person or entity initiate contact or engage in face-to-face or telephonic solicitation or enter into a contract -with any insured or claimant under an insurance policy until at least 48 hours after the occurrence of an event that may be the subject of a claim under the insurance policy unless contact is initiated by the insured or claimant.

The Legislature passed amendments to other portions of section 626.854 in 2009 and 2011, but there have been no revisions to section 626.854(6) since its enactment.

In October 2009, Frederick W. Kortum, Jr., a public adjuster, filed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief “alleging that section 626.854(6) violates his constitutional rights to free speech, equal protection of the laws, and to be rewarded for his industry.” Kortum, 54 So.3d at 1014. Kortum asserted that the statute prohibits all public adjuster-initiated communication during the forty-eight-hour period. In response, the Department of Financial Services (Department) contended that section 626.854(6) does not prohibit a public adjuster from using written methods of communication to contact a potential claimant. Kortum, 54 So.3d at 1015.

The trial court determined that section 626.854(6) is ambiguous, accepted the Department’s interpretation that the statute prohibited only in-person or telephonic communication, and ruled that the statute is constitutional. The trial court concluded that because section 626.854(6) primarily regulates conduct — not speech — the case was governed by United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 20 L.Ed.2d 672 (1968), in which the United States Supreme Court stated:

[Government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.

Kortum, 54 So.3d at 1015 (quoting O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377, 88 S.Ct. 1673). In O’Brien, the Court upheld a federal statute prohibiting the knowing destruction or mutilation of selective service certificates.

In the decision now on review, the First District reversed the trial court’s decision. After determining that the plain language of section 626.854(6) “prohibits all public adjuster-initiated contact, whether electronic, written or oral,” the First District concluded that section 626.854(6) regulates commercial speech — not merely conduct. Kortum, 54 So.3d at 1018. As a result, the First District applied the test from Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 100 S.Ct. 2343, 65 L.Ed.2d 341 (1980), rather than the more deferential O’Brien standard.

In Central Hudson, the Supreme Court set out a four-prong test to be used to evaluate the constitutionality of a statute regulating commercial speech:

At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected by the First Amendment. For commercial speech to come within that provision, it at least must [1] concern lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask [2] whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine [3] whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and [4] whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.

447 U.S. at 566, 100 S.Ct. 2343. The First District concluded that section 626.854(6) satisfies the first three prongs of this test but held that the statute does not satisfy the fourth prong of Central Hudson. The First District concluded that the Department failed to demonstrate “that prohibiting property owners from receiving any information from public adjusters for a period of 48 hours is justified by the possibility that some public adjuster may unduly pressure traumatized victims or otherwise engage in unethical behavior.” Kortum, 54 So.3d at 1020. Because the First District concluded that section 626.854(6) unconstitutionally burdens the commercial speech of public adjusters, it did not address Kortum’s assertions that the statute violates his right to equal protection of the law or his right “to be rewarded for his industry” guaranteed by article I, section two of the Florida Constitution. Id. at 1014.

Jeffery Atwater, in his capacity as Chief Financial Officer and head of the Department, appealed the First District’s decision. The Department contends on appeal that section 626.854(6) does not restrict written communication and that because the statute regulates conduct and not the content of speech, the requirements of Central Hudson are not applicable. Based on this narrow reading of the statute, the Department thus argues that the statute is in “the rational relationship test category for the regulation of conduct” and that the statute should be sustained under this test. Appellant’s Initial Brief at 4.

II. ANALYSIS

In the analysis that follows, we first conclude that section 626.854(6) prohibits public adjusters from initiating any form of communication with a potential claimant during the hours immediately following a claim-producing event and that the statute regulates protected commercial speech. We then conclude that the First District was correct in applying the test outlined by the Supreme Court in Central Hudson to evaluate the constitutionality of section 626.854(6). The Department’s argument is predicated entirely on its position regarding the proper interpretation of the statute — a position that we reject. No alternative basis is asserted by the Department for sustaining the constitutionality of the statute and reversing the First District’s decision.

Section 626.854, Florida Statutes (2008), defines and regulates public adjusters in Florida. It states in part:

The Legislature finds that it is necessary for the protection of the public to regulate public insurance adjusters and to prevent the unauthorized practice of law.
(1) A “public adjuster” is any person, except a duly licensed attorney at law as hereinafter in s. 626.860 provided, who, for money, commission, or any other thing of value, prepares, completes, or files an insurance claim form for an insured or third-party claimant or who, for money, commission, or any other thing of value, acts or aids in any manner on behalf of an insured or third-party claimant in negotiating for or effecting the settlement of a claim or claims for loss or damage covered by an insurance contract or who advertises for employment as an adjuster of such claims, and also includes any person who, for money, commission, or any other thing of value, solicits, investigates, or adjusts such claims on behalf of any such public adjuster.
(6) A public adjuster may not directly or indirectly through any other person or entity initiate contact or engage in face-to-face or telephonic solicitation or enter into a contract with any insured or claimant under an insurance policy until at least 48 hours after the occurrence of an event that may be the subject of a claim under the insurance policy unless contact is initiated by the insured or claimant.
The provisions of subsections (5)-(12) apply only to residential property insur-anee policies and condominium association policies as defined in s. 718.111(11).

Kortum asserts that section 626.854(6) acts as a forty-eight-hour ban on all commercial speech from public adjusters to potential clients. The Department in turn asserts that section 626.854(6) does not actually regulate commercial speech. According to the Department, the statute only restricts how a public adjuster may contact the potential client during a forty-eight-hour period, not what a public adjuster may say to a potential client during that time. Specifically, the Department contends that the statute prohibits only in-person or telephonic solicitation and that because written communications are not initiated through “any other person or entity,” the statute does not prohibit public adjusters from distributing written documents, such as informational mailings, to potential claimants during the forty-eight-hour period. Neither party contends that the statute limits a public adjuster’s ability to engage in general advertising not targeted at a specific homeowner known to have experienced a recent loss.

The First District concluded that the plain language of section 626.854(6) “prohibits all public adjuster-initiated contact, whether electronic, written or oral” and declared the statute unconstitutional. Kortum, 54 So.3d at 1018. This Court “review[s] de novo a district court decision declaring a statute unconstitutional.” Fla. Dep’t of Children & Families v. F.L., 880 So.2d 602, 607 (Fla.2004).

“[W]hen the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no occasion for resorting to the rules of statutory interpretation and construction; the statute must be given its plain and obvious meaning.” Holly v. Auld, 450 So.2d 217, 219 (Fla.1984) (quoting A.R. Douglass, Inc. v. McRainey, 102 Fla. 1141, 1144, 137 So. 157, 159 (1931)). “[W]ords or phrases in a statute must be construed in accordance with their common and ordinary meaning.” Donato v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 767 So.2d 1146, 1154 (Fla.2000). “It is only if the statutory language is ambiguous that ‘the Court must resort to traditional rules of statutory construction to determine legislative intent.’ ” Blanton v. City of Pinellas Park, 887 So.2d 1224, 1230 (Fla.2004) (quoting Palm Beach Cnty. Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So.2d 1273, 1282 (Fla.2000)). Likewise, the “Administrative construction of a statute, the legislative history of its enactment, and other extraneous matters are properly considered only in the construction of a statute of doubtful meaning.” Donato, 767 So.2d at 1153 (quoting Fla. State Racing Comm’n v. McLaughlin, 102 So.2d 574, 576-77 (Fla.1958)). In the instant case, we agree with the First District that the plain language of section 626.854(6) “prohibits all public adjuster-initiated contact, whether electronic, written or oral” and that the Department’s interpretation of the statute is untenable because it requires “the court to eliminate the ‘initiate contact’ prohibition inserted by the legislature.” Kortum, 54 So.3d at 1018.

Section 626.854(6) states that a public adjuster “may not directly or indirectly through any other person or entity initiate contact” with a potential claimant during the specified time frame. As noted above, the Legislature added the phrase “initiate contact” to the Task Force’s proposal when adopting section 626.854(6). This Court is bound to “interpret statutes as they are written and give effect to each word in the statute.” Fla. Dep’t of Revenue v. Fla. Mun. Power Agency, 789 So.2d 320, 324 (Fla.2001). Consequently, the Legislature’s insertion of the broad phase “initiate contact” causes us to conclude that section 626.854(6) bans all public adjuster-initiated communication with a potential claimant during the forty-eight-hour period.

Contact means to “get in communication with,” to “make connection with,” or “to talk or confer with.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 490 (1993) (second definition). The definition of “contact” is not restricted to any particular type of communication, but rather encompasses both written and oral transmissions. The statute’s prohibition against initiating contact thus means that a public adjuster may not make any sort of communication to an identified claimant during the forty-eight-hour period. It is unreasonable to read the restriction on “initiat[ing] contact” “directly or indirectly through any other person or entity” to permit — as the Department urges — a public adjuster to initiate the dissemination of written materials to a claimant during the forty-eight-hour period.

The Department’s claim that the public adjuster-initiated contact and solicitation regulated by section 626.854(6) are conduct — not protected commercial speech — is unpersuasive. This argument is predicated on the strained reading of the statute advanced by the Department. With the rejection of that strained statutory reading, the argument collapses.

The Supreme Court has expressly held that solicitation in a business context is protected commercial speech. In Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 764, 113 S.Ct. 1792, 123 L.Ed.2d 543 (1993), the Supreme Court reviewed a Florida regulation providing that a certified public accountant (CPA) “shall not by any direct, in-person, uninvited solicitation solicit an engagement to perform public accounting services ... where the engagement would be for a person or entity not already a client of [the CPA], unless such person or entity has invited such a communication.” (alteration in original) (quoting Fla. Admin. Code R. 21A-24.002(2)(c) (1992)). The Supreme Court stated that “it is clear that this type of personal solicitation is commercial expression to which the protections of the First Amendment apply.” Id. at 765, 113 S.Ct. 1792. The Supreme Court then reiterated that “even a communication that does no more than propose a commercial transaction is entitled to the coverage of the First Amendment.” Id. at 767, 113 S.Ct. 1792. The Department offers no reason why solicitation by a public adjuster would not be protected speech when solicitation by a CPA is “clear[ly] ... commercial expression to which the protections of the First Amendment applies].” Id. at 765, 113 S.Ct. 1792.

O’Brien likewise supports the conclusion that section 626.854(6) regulates commercial speech. In O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 375-76, 88 S.Ct. 1673, the Supreme Court distinguished nonexpressive conduct from protected speech in the context of reviewing a federal law prohibiting the knowing destruction of a selective service certificate. The Supreme Court rejected “the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled ‘speech’ whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea.” Id. at 376, 88 S.Ct. 1673. Instead, the Supreme Court limited the protections that accompany pure speech to conduct that is “necessarily expressive” and concluded that the statute regarding selective service certificates only incidentally affected speech. Id. at 385, 88 S.Ct. 1673. Unlike the destruction of a draft card, a public adjuster’s act of contacting or soliciting a potential customer is necessarily expressive. The purpose and intent of the public adjuster’s act of contacting the claimant is to inform the potential client of the services offered by public adjusters and to obtain the customer’s consent to a contract. There is no reason for a public adjuster — in his capacity as a public adjuster — to contact a claimant but to engage in communication about the commercial transaction of public adjusting.

Because section 626.854(6) regulates commercial speech — not merely conduct— the First District was correct in applying the test from Central Hudson to evaluate the constitutionality of the statute. The Department has failed to present any argument showing that the First District erred in concluding that the challenged restriction is more extensive than necessary to serve the State’s interests.

III. CONCLUSION

As explained above, the plain language of section 626.854(6), Florida Statutes (2008), prohibits all public adjuster-initiated contact with potential claimants during the forty-eight-hour period following a claim-producing event. Because this statute regulates commercial speech, the First District did not err in applying the four-prong test from Central Hudson. Accordingly, we affirm the First District’s decision and lift the stay that was imposed pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.310(b)(2).

It is so ordered.

POLSTON, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur.


text:
    STATE of Florida, Petitioner, v. Lester HACKLEY, Respondent.
    No. SC10-2316.
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    July 5, 2012.

      Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Trisha M. Pate, Bureau Chief and Samuel A. Perrone, Assistant Attorneys General, Tallahassee, FL, for Petitioner.
    Barbara K. Hobbs of Cummings, Hobbs & Wallace, Tallahassee, FL, for Respondent.
   CANADY, J.

In this case, we consider whether a conviction for burglary of a conveyance with an assault qualifies a defendant for sentencing as a prison releasee reoffender (PRR) under section 775.082(9)(a)1, Florida Statutes (2006). We have for review the decision of the First District Court of Appeal in State v. Hackley, 93 So.3d 327 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010), which held that burglary of a conveyance with an assault does not qualify for PRR sentencing. The First District certified its decision to be in direct conflict with the decision of the Fifth District Court of Appeal in Shaw v. State, 26 So.3d 51 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. For the reasons that follow, we agree with the Fifth District that burglary of a conveyance with an assault is a qualifying offense under the PRR statute.

BACKGROUND

On October 3, 2006, Lester Hackley was convicted of one count of burglary of a conveyance with a person assaulted. Hackley’s conviction stemmed from a March 12, 2006, incident in which Hackley assaulted two individuals — one of whom was inside a car. Because the offense for which Hackley was convicted occurred less than three years after he had been released from serving another sentence in state prison, the trial court sentenced Hackley to life in prison as a PRR pursuant to section 775.082(9)(a)1, Florida Statutes (2006).

On June 2, 2009, Hackley filed a motion to correct illegal sentence in the trial court, alleging that the crime for which he was convicted did not qualify him for PRR sentencing. The trial court granted Hack-ley’s motion.

The First District affirmed the trial court’s ruling, holding that burglary of a conveyance with an assault is not a qualifying offense under the PRR statute. Hackley, 93 So.3d at 327. The First District relied on this Court’s decision in State v. Hearns, 961 So.2d 211, 213 (Fla.2007), which held that battery of a law enforcement officer (BOLEO) was not a forcible felony under section 775.084, Florida Statutes (2000), the statute providing enhanced sentencing for violent career criminals.

ANALYSIS

The question of statutory interpretation presented here is subject to de novo review. See Curd v. Mosaic Fertilizer, LLC, 39 So.3d 1216, 1220 (Fla.2010). The first place we look when construing a statute is to its plain language — if the meaning of the statute is clear and unambiguous, we look no further. Id. (citing Borden v. East-European Ins. Co., 921 So.2d 587, 595 (Fla.2006)).

The PRR statute provides, in relevant part:

(9)(a)l. “Prison releasee reoffender” means any defendant who commits, or attempts to commit:
a. Treason;
b. Murder;
c. Manslaughter;
d. Sexual battery;
e. Carjacking;
f. Home-invasion robbery;
g. Robbery;
h. Arson;
i. Kidnapping;
j. Aggravated assault with a deadly weapon;
k. Aggravated battery;
l. Aggravated stalking;
m. Aircraft piracy;
n. Unlawful throwing, placing, or discharging of a destructive device or bomb;
o. Any felony that involves the use or threat of physical foYce or violence against an individual;
p. Armed burglary;
q. Burglary of a dwelling or burglary of an occupied structure; or
r. Any felony violation of s. 790.07, s. 800.04, s. 827.03, or s. 827.071;
within 3 years after being released from a state correctional facility operated by the Department of Corrections or a private vendor or within 3 years after being released from a correctional institution of another state, the District of Columbia, the United States, any possession or territory of the United States, or any foreign jurisdiction, following incarceration for an offense for which the sentence is punishable by more than 1 year in this state.

§ 775.082(9)(a)1, Fla. Stat. (2006) (emphasis added). Because burglary of a conveyance with an assault is not an enumerated offense under the PRR statute, it is a qualifying offense only if it falls under subsection (o) — “[a]ny felony that involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against an individual.” We conclude that it does.

Burglary of a conveyance with an assault — a first-degree felony — is the unauthorized “[ejntering [of] a ... conveyance with the intent to commit an offense therein,” where, “in the course of committing the offense, the offender ... [m]akes an assault ... upon any person.” § 810.02(1)(b)1-(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2006). “An ‘assault’ is an intentional, unlawful threat by word or act to do violence to the person of another, coupled with an apparent ability to do so, and doing some act which creates a well-founded fear in such other person that such violence is imminent.” § 784.011(1), Fla. Stat. (2006).

The plain language of the burglary, assault, and PRR statutes leads us to conclude that burglary of a conveyance with an assault is a qualifying PRR offense. Because burglary of a conveyance with an assault is a felony that necessarily involves the “threat by word or act to do violence to the person of another,” it falls within subsection (o) of the PRR statute, which covers “[a]ny felony that involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against an individual.”

Our decision in Hearns does not require a different result. In Hearns, we held that a conviction for BOLEO did not qualify a defendant for sentencing as a violent career criminal (VCC). 961 So.2d at 219. The VCC statute contains a list of enumerated qualifying offenses, as well as a provision incorporating “[a]ny forcible felony, as described in s. 776.08.” § 775.084(1)(d)1.a, Fla. Stat. (2000). Section 776.08 enumerates several forcible felonies and also includes a catch-all provision covering “any other felony which involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against any individual.” § 776.08, Fla. Stat. (2000). Applying the “statutory elements” test set forth in Perkins v. State, 576 So.2d 1310 (Fla.1991), we reasoned that

for an offense to be a forcible felony under section 776.08, the “use or threat of physical force or violence” must be a necessary element of the crime. If an offense may be committed without the use or threat of physical force or violence, then it is not a forcible felony.

Hearns, 961 So.2d at 215 (quoting Perkins, 576 So.2d at 1313). We concluded that because BOLEO can be committed by merely intentionally touching a law enforcement officer against his will, it is not a forcible felony “as described in the final clause of section 776.08” and therefore not a qualifying offense under the VCC statute. Id. at 218-19.

Although Hearns involved sentencing under the VCC statute, we recognized that “whether BOLEO is a qualifying offense must be answered consistently under both the VCC statute and the PRR statute,” id. at 217, because both statutes extended to any felony which “involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against an individual.” Id. (quoting § 775.082(9)(a)1.o, Fla. Stat. (2000)). We observed that “where the Legislature uses the exact same words or phrases in two different statutes, we may assume it intended the same meaning to apply.” Hearns, 961 So.2d at 217 (citing Goldstein v. Acme Concrete Corp., 103 So.2d 202 (Fla.1958)). Accordingly, we held that “[b]ecause unwanted touching under [the BOLEO statute] may not necessarily be a violent act, it cannot be a qualifying offense for PRR sentencing.” Id. at 218.

The First District correctly concluded that — after Hearns — burglary of a conveyance with a battery is not a qualifying offense under the PRR statute. The First District, however, incorrectly relied on this point in holding that burglary of a conveyance with an assault is likewise not a PRR qualifying offense. The First District reasoned that to hold otherwise would lead to “the absurd consequence of encouraging a defendant who has already committed burglary with an assault to put the victim in physical danger by committing a battery to avoid the possibility of PRR sentencing.” Hackley, 93 So.3d at 328. We disagree.

In certain circumstances, the absurdity doctrine may be used to justify departures from the general rule that courts will apply a statute’s plain language. See State v. Burris, 875 So.2d 408, 414 (Fla.2004). We thus have recognized that “a sterile literal interpretation should not be adhered to when it would lead to absurd results.” Maddox v. State, 923 So.2d 442, 448 (Fla.2006). But the absurdity doctrine is not to be used as a freewheeling tool for courts to second-guess and supplant the policy judgments made by the Legislature. It has long been recognized that the absurdity doctrine “is to be applied to override the literal terms of a statute only under rare and exceptional circumstances.” Crooks v. Harrelson, 282 U.S. 55, 60, 51 S.Ct. 49, 75 L.Ed. 156 (1930); see also Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 459, 122 S.Ct. 941, 151 L.Ed.2d 908 (2002) (noting that the Supreme Court “rarely invokes such a test to override unambiguous legislation”).

The absurdity doctrine does not apply in this case. An assault — by definition — always includes the threat to do violence. § 784.011(1), Fla. Stat. (2006). Battery, on the other hand, does not necessarily involve the threat or use of force or violence. § 784.03(1), Fla. Stat. (2006); Hearns, 961 So.2d at 218. The Legislature could rationally have intended — as the plain language of the PRR statute suggests — to subject a defendant to PRR sentencing for committing a felony that necessarily involves violence or the threat of violence, but not for a felony that can be committed without violence or the threat of violence.

The First District’s postulate of a rational criminal calculating how to avoid the PRR sanction is a postulate that itself courts absurdity. If we suspend disbelief, however, and entertain the First District’s concept of such a rationally calculating offender deciding to escalate his offense, we would see that his calculation would likely be too clever by half, since battery — at least when committed in the course of another felony such as burglary of an occupied conveyance — is in the nature of things likely to be preceded by conduct that constitutes an assault.

CONCLUSION

We therefore quash the First District’s decision on review and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. We approve the Fifth District’s decision in Shaw.

It is so ordered.

POLSTON, C.J., and LEWIS, QUINCE, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur.

PARIENTE, J., concurs in result.

      . Those portions of section 775.082(9)(a)1 relevant to this decision have remained unchanged since the time of Hackley’s crime, conviction, and sentencing. The sole revision to section 775.082(9)(a)1 since that time has been to add "or s. 847.0135(5)” to subsection (r), which — prior to the revision — only incorporated "[a]ny felony violation of s. 790.07, s. 800.04, s. 827.03, or s. 827.071” into the PRR statute. Ch. 2008-172, § 13, at 1984-85, Laws of Fla.


text:
    In re AMENDMENTS TO the FLORIDA RULES OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, the FLORIDA RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, the FLORIDA RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, the FLORIDA RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR INVOLUNTARY COMMITMENT OF SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATORS, the FLORIDA PROBATE RULES, THE FLORIDA RULES OF TRAFFIC COURT, the FLORIDA RULES OF JUVENILE PROCEDURE, the FLORIDA RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE, AND the FLORIDA FAMILY LAW RULES OF PROCEDURE-COMPUTATION OF TIME.
    No. SC10-2299.
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    July 12, 2012.
    Judge Richard Allen Nielsen, Chair, Rules of Civil Procedure Committee, Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, Tampa, FL, and Kevin D. Johnson, Past Chair, Thompson, Sizemore, Gonzalez and Hearing, P.A., Tampa, FL; Alexandra V. Rieman, Chair, Judicial Administration Rules Committee, Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Fort Lauder-dale, FL, Keith H. Park, Past Chair, West Palm Beach, FL, and Katherine E. Gid-dings, Past Chair, Akerman Senterfitt, Tallahassee, FL; Mark Caliel, Chair, Criminal Procedure Committee, Office of the State Attorney, Jacksonville, FL, and Donald E. Scaglione, Past Chair, Brooks-ville, FL; James Raymond George, Chair, Probate Rules Committee, of Greenberg Traurig, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, FL, and Tasha K. Peeper-Dickinson, Past Chair, Jones, Foster, Johnston and Stubbs, P.A., West Palm Beach, FL; David Haenel, Chair, Traffic Court Rules Committee of Finebloom and Haenel, Sarasota, FL, and Jill M. Hampton, Past Cham, Orlando, FL; Judge Daniel Dawson, Chair, Juvenile Procedure Committee, Ninth Judicial Circuit, Orlando, FL, Joel M. Silvershein, Past Chair, Office of State Attorney, Fort Lauderdale, FL; Michael Robert Uffer-man, Chair, Appellate Procedure Rules Committee of Ufferman Law Firm, P.A., Tallahassee, FL, and Jamie B. Moses, Past Chair, Fisher, Rushmer, et al., Orlando, FL; Matthew Burns Capstrraw, Chair, Family Law Rules Committee of Norman D. Levin, P.A., Longwood, FL and Ashley McCorvey Myers, Past Chair, McCorvey and Myers, Jacksonville, FL; Judge Kevin M. Emas, Chair, Criminal Court Steering Committee, Third District Court of Appeal, Miami, FL; and John F. Harkness, Jr., Executive Director, The Florida Bar, Tallahassee, FL, for Petitioners.
    Patrick S. Scott of GrayRobinson, Fort Lauderdale, FL, Responding with comments.
   PER CURIAM.

We have for consideration a proposed new uniform computation of time rule, Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.514, and conforming amendments to the various rules of procedure. The amendments were proposed by The Florida Bar’s rules committees and this Court’s Criminal Court Steering Committee. Fla. R. Jud. Admin. 2.140(f). We have jurisdiction and adopt the proposals with a number of modifications. We also amend several other rules on our own motion.

Background

The committees’ proposals are in response to a request by the Court that the committees “work together to propose a uniform rule of procedure to govern the computation of time periods in all types of proceedings, for possible placement in the Rules of Judicial Administration.” See Letter from Thomas D. Hall, Clerk of the Florida Supreme Court, to The Florida Bar Rules Committee Chairs and Chair of Criminal Court Steering Committee (June 16, 2010) (on file with the Clerk in Case No. 10-2299). The need for a uniform computation rule came to the Court’s attention when the Court was considering standard language to be used in administrative orders issued by the Chief Justice, under Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.205(a)(2)(B)(iv), extending time limits imposed by rule or statute due to an emergency requiring the closure of courts or otherwise affecting the ability of litigants or their attorneys to comply with the deadlines imposed. Due to issues surrounding the effect of what used to be referred to as “tolling orders,” the Court revised the language of the model administrative order to replace references to “tolled” with the words “extended” and “suspended.” The Court also determined that a uniform rule was needed because the current computation rules vary and they do not factor in periods of time extended by administrative order of the chief justice. See, e.g., Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.090(a); Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.040; Fla. R. Civ. P. Invol. Commit. 4.090(a); Fla. R.App. P. 9.420(f).

In response to the Court’s request for a uniform computation rule, the committees propose new Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.514 (Computing and Extending Time) and conforming amendments to the various rules of procedure. The Executive Committee of the Board of Governors of The Florida Bar unanimously approved the proposals. The Court published proposals for comment. One comment was filed, to which the rules committees filed a joint response.

After hearing oral argument, the Court sought input from the committees on a number of revisions to the proposed amendments and several additional amendments suggested by the Court. See In re Computation of Time, No. SC10-2299 (Fla. order filed Oct. 13, 2011). The committees agreed with the Court’s revisions and offered minor revisions of their own. The Executive Committee of The Florida Bar Board of Governors unanimously approved the revisions.

After considering the committees’ proposals, the comment filed, and the committees’ responses, we adopt new Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.514 (Computing and Extending Time) and conforming amendments to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.090 (Time); Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.040 (Computation of Time); Florida Rule of Civil Procedure for Involuntary Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators 4.090 (Time); Florida Probate Rule 5.042 (Time); Florida Rules of Traffic Court 6.350 (Computation of Time) and 6.370 (Additional Time after Service by Mail); Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure 8.085 (Prehearing Motions and Service), 8.180 (Computation and Enlargement of Time), 8.240 (Computation, Continuance, Extension, and Enlargement of Time), 8.680 (Computation and Enlargement of Time); Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.420 (Filing; Service of Copies; Computation of Time); and Florida Family Law Rule of Procedure 12.090 (Time). We discuss the more significant amendments below.

Amendments

First, we discuss new Rule of Judicial Administration 2.514 (Computing and Extending Time). Subdivision (a) (Computing Time) sets forth the rules that apply in computing time periods specified in any rule of procedure, local rule, court order, or statute that does not specify a method of computing time. Subdivision (a)(1) provides the rules for computing time periods stated in days or longer units. When the period is stated in days or a longer unit of time, the day of the event that triggers the period is excluded. Every day, including intermediate Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays, is counted. The last day of the period is included, but if the last day is a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, or falls within any period of time extended through an order of the chief justice under Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.205(a)(2)(B)(iv), the period continues to run until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday and does not fall within any period of time extended through an order of the chief justice. Under subdivision (a)(3), when a period stated in days is less than seven days, intermediate Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays are not included in the computation.

Subdivision (a)(2) provides the rules for computing time periods stated in hours. When the period is stated in hours, counting begins immediately on the occurrence of the event that triggers the period. Every hour, including hours during intermediate Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays, is counted. If the period ends on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, or during any period of time extended through an order of the chief justice under Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.205(a)(2)(B)(iv), the period continues to run until the same time on the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday and does not fall within any period of time extended through an order of the chief justice.

Subdivision (a)(4) defines “last day,” “next day,” and “legal holiday” for purposes of the rule.

Subdivision (b) (Additional Time after Service by Mail or E-mail) replaces existing Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.090(e) (Additional Time after Service by Mail), which is deleted. Subdivision (b) is similar to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(d) (Additional Time after Certain Kinds of Service), which treats the computation of time after service by mail and e-mail the same. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(d) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 5(b)(2)(C), (E)). Subdivision (b) also is consistent with the recently adopted e-mail service rule, Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.516, which contemplates retaining the five additional mailing days in civil cases and three additional days in criminal cases when service is by e-mail. See In re Amends. to Fla. Rules of Jud. Admin., Fla. Rules of Civ. Pro., Fla. Rules of Crim. Pro., Fla. Probate Rules, Fla. Rules of Traffic Court, Fla. Small Claims Rules, Fla. Rules of Juv. Pro., Fla. Rules of App. Pro., and Fla. Family Law Rules of Pro.—Email Service Rule, 2012 WL 2400760 (Fla.2012) (adopting new Rule of Judicial Administration 2.516(b)(1)(D) providing that e-mail service is treated as service by mail for the computation of time and amending Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.070 to provide for additional three days after service by e-mail in criminal cases).

The amendments to the various rules of procedure primarily conform the various computation rules to new rule 2.514. Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure 8.180(a), 8.240(a), and 8.630(a) are amended to state that computation of time shall be governed by new rule 2.514, except for rules relating to shelter and detention hearings, to which the statutory time periods shall apply. These exceptions ensure that shelter and detention hearings will continue to be held within 24 hours after the child is taken into custody, as required by statute. See Sections 39.402(8)(a), 984.14(4), and 985.255(3)(a), Florida Statutes (2011).

Accordingly, we adopt new Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.514, and amend the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure for Involuntary Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators, the Florida Probate Rules, the Florida Rules of Traffic Court, the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure, the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, and the Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure as set forth in the appendix to this opinion. New language is indicated by underscoring; deletions are indicated by struck-through type. The committee notes are offered for explanation only and are not adopted as an official part of the rules. The amendments shall become effective October 1, 2012, at 12:01 a.m.

It is so ordered.

POLSTON, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANADY, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur.

APPENDIX

RULE 1.090. TIME

(a) Computation. In-computing any pe■riod-of-time prescribed or allowed by-these rules-by-order of-court, or by any applicable-statute, the day-of-the-act, event,-or default from which the designated-period of time begins -to-r-un shall not be -includedr The last day--of — the period so ■■ computed shall be included-unless it is a Saturdays Sunday,-or legal holiday,-in-which event the-per-iod shall run-until-the end of- the next-day-which is- neither-a-Saturday, Sunday,-or-legal holiday- — When the period-of time prescribed-or allowed is less-than-7days, — intermediate.Saturdays,—Sundays, and-legal holidays-shall be excluded in-the Computation-Computation of time shall be governed by Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.514.

(b)-(d) [No change]

(e) Additional Time-after Service by Mail, When a party has the right or- -is required to - do-some act or take-some proceeding within- a prescribed -period-after the service of a notice- or other-paper upon that party and the notice or paper is served upon-that- party by mail,-5-days shall — be-added to.the-pr-escribed period,-

RULE 2.514. COMPUTING AND EXTENDING TIME

(a) Computing Time. The following rules apply in computing time periods specified in any rule of procedure, local rule, court order, or statute that does not specify a method of computing time.

(1) Period Stated in Days or a Longer Unit. When the period is stated in days or a longer unit of time
(A) exclude the day of the event that triggers the period;
(B) count every day, including intermediate Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays; and
(C) include the last day of the period, but if the last day is a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, or falls within any period of time extended through an order of the chief justice under Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.205(a)(2)(B)(iv), the period continues to run until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday and does not fall within any period of time extended through an order of the chief justice.
(2) Period Stated in Hours. When the period is stated in hours
(A) begin counting immediately on the occurrence of the event that triggers the period;
(B) count every hour, including hours during intermediate Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays; and
(C) if the period would end on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, or during any period of time extended through an order of the chief .justice under Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.205(a)(2)(B)(iv), the period continues to run until the same time on the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday and does not fall within any period of time extended through an order of the chief justice.
(3) Period Stated in Days Less Than Seven Days. When the period stated in days is less than 7 days, intermediate Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays shall be excluded in the computation.
(4) “Last Day” Defined. Unless a different time is set by a statute, local rule, or court order, the last day ends
(A) for electronic Sling or for service by any means, at midnight; and
(B) for filing by other means, when the clerk’s office is scheduled to close.
(5) “Next Day” Defined. The “next day” is determined by continuing to count forward when the period is measured after an event and backward when measured before an event.
(6) “Legal Holiday” Defined. “Legal holiday” means
(A) the day set aside by section 110.117, Florida Statutes, for observing New Year’s Day, Martin Luther King, Jr.’s Birthday, Memorial Day, Independence Day, Labor Day, Veterans’ Day, Thanksgiving Day, the Friday after Thanksgiving Day, or Christmas Day, and
(B) any day observed as a holiday by the clerk’s office or as designated by the chief judge.

(b) Additional Time after Service by Mail or E-mail. When a party may or must act within a specified time after service and service is made by mail or e-mail, 5 days are added after the period that would otherwise expire under subdivision (ah

RULE 3.040. COMPUTATION OF TIME

in — computing -any period of time prescribed or allowed by -these rules, by order of-court, or by any-applicable- statute, the day of the act or event from — which.the designated period of time begins-to -run- is not-to-be-included'. — The last day of the period-so computed shall be counted, unless — it—is—a—Saturday, Sunday> or legal ■holiday7-in-which-event the period shall run until the end of the next day that is neither Sr- Saturday, Sunday- non legal holiday.When the period of time prescribed — on allowed-shall be less-than 7 days, intermediate-Saturdays,-Sundays, and legal holidays ■shall be excluded in the- computation, except-for the periods- of time of less than ⅞-days-contained" in-rules 3.130, 3.132(a) and (c-X-and 3.133(abComputation of time shall be governed by Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.514(a), except for the periods of time of less than 7 days contained in rules 3.130, 3.132(a) and (c), and 3.133(a).

Committee Notes

[No Change]

RULE 4.090. TIME

(a) Computation. In computing any period-of-time prescribed or allowed by-these rules, by -order-of court, or by any applicable statute, the day of the act, event, or default from which the designated period of-time-begins to run,, shall not be included. The last-day-of-the period so-computed shall be-included unless it is a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, in which event the period -shall-run — until the end-of-the next day-whieh-is-neither a Saturday, Sunday^oi — legal holiday. — When the period-of time prescr-ibed-or allowed is-less-than — 7-days, intermediate.Saturdays, — Sundays,. and legal holidays- shall be excluded in-the eemputatiomComputation of time shall be governed by Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.514.

(b) [No Change]

RULE 5.042. TIME

(a) Computation. In computing any period of-time-prescribed or allowed-by-these rules, by order-of-court, or by any applicable-statute, the-day-of the act, event,-or-default-from-which tho period begi-ns-to run-shall-not be included. — The last day of the period- -shall-be included unless-it-is a Saturday,.Sunday, or -legal holiday, in which-event the period shall -run-until the end-of — the next- day which - is-neither a Saturday, — Sunday,—ner—legal—holiday. When-the period is less than 7- days,-intermediate-Saturdays, Sundays, and legal- holidays shall be-excluded. — Any day the clerk’s office -is -closed shall be deemed a legal — holiday for- purposes of this rule. Computation of time shall be governed by Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.514.

(b)-(c) [No Change]

(d) Additional Time after Service by Mail or E-mail. Except when serving formal notice, or when serving a motion, pleading, or other paperdocument in the manner provided for service of formal notice, Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.514 shall apply to the computation of time following servicewhen an interested person has the -r-ight or is required-to act within-a-pi-eset-lbed period after-the-service of notice-or-other paper on-the interested person and the--notice or paper-is-served by mail,-5-days- shall be--added to the prescribed period.

Committee Notes

[No Change]

Rule History

1984 Revision — 2008 Revision: [No Change]

2012 Revision: Subdivision (a) revised to refer to Rule 2,514 and delete duplica-tive provisions. Subdivision (d) revised to incorporate service by e-mail and the filing and service of documents, rather than papers. Committee notes revised.

Statutory References

[No Change]

Rule References

Fla. Prob. R. 5.040(a)(1) Notice.

Fla. Prob. R. 5.150 Order requiring accounting.

Fla. Prob. R. 5.240 Notice of administration.

Fla. Prob. R. 5.241 Notice to creditors.

Fla. Prob. R. 5.340(a)-(b) Inventory.

Fla. Prob. R. 5.345 Accountings other than personal representatives’ final ac-countings.

Fla. Prob. R. 5.395 Notice of federal estate tax return.

Fla. Prob. R. 5.400 Distribution and discharge.

Fla. Prob. R. 5.649 Guardian advocate.

Fla. Prob. R. 5.681 Restoration of rights of person with developmental disability.

Fla. Prob. R. 5.700 Objection to guardianship reports.

Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.090 Time.

Fla. R. Jud. Admin. 2.514 Computing and extending time.

RULE 6.350. COMPUTATION OF TIME.

In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by these rules, by order of-an official, or by any-applicable statute, the-day-of-the act or event-from which the designated-period- of time begins-to-run is not-to-be included. — The-last day of the period so computed shall be counted, unless it is — Saturday Sunday— or— a- legal holiday, in-whlch event the period-shall run until the end of the next day that is neither a -Satar-day,--Sunday, nor a legal- holiday. When-the period of time-prescribed or allowed--is-less than 7 -days,-Intermediate Saturdays, Sundays, and.-legal holidays shall be excluded in the computation.Computation of time shall be governed by Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.514.

RULE 6,370, ADDITIONAL TIME AFTER SERVICE--OTHER- THAN BY SAND-DELIVERY

When — a—defendant—has-a right or is required--to do some-act within a prescribed-period after service of a notice or ether — document and -the notiee-or ■ document-is-served by a-method other than hand delivery, 5 days shall-be added to the ■prescribed-period-.-

Committee-Notes

4992-Amendment. -A-change from 3 to 5 additional -days allowed ■ for-mailing, as allowed by Florida Rule of Civil Procedure -l-.l-90(e).

RULE 8.085. PREHEARING MOTIONS AND SERVICE

(a)-(d) [No Change]

(-e)-Additional Time After — Service by Mail. Whenever- service-by-mail- is permitted, and a party has the r-ight or is required to-do-some act or take-some proceedings within a prescribed-period after ■the service of notice or other-paper and the-notice -or paper is-served by mail, 5 days-shall- be added to-the-prescribed peri-oíL

(fe) Pleading to Be Signed by Attorney. Every written paper or pleading of a party represented by an attorney shall be signed in the attorney’s individual name by such attorney, whose mailing address, primary e-mail address and telephone number, including area code, and Florida Bar number shall be stated, and who shall be duly licensed to practice law in Florida. The attorney may be required by an order of court to vouch for the authority to represent such party and to give the address of such party. Except when otherwise specifically provided by these rules or applicable statute, pleadings as such need not be verified or accompanied by affidavit.

(gf) Pleading to Be Signed by Unrepresented Party. A party who has no attorney but represents himself or herself shall sign the written pleading or other paper to be filed and state his or her primary e-mail address, mailing address, and telephone number, including area code.

(hg) Effect of Signing Pleading. The signature of a person shall constitute a certificate that the paper or pleading has been read; that to the best of the person’s knowledge, information, and belief there is good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay. If a pleading or paper is not signed, or is signed with intent to defeat the purpose of this rule, it may be stricken and the action may proceed as though the pleading or paper had not been served.

(ih) Service of Orders. A copy of all orders must be transmitted by the court or under its direction to all parties at the time of the entry of the order. The court may require that orders be prepared by a party, may require the party to furnish the court with stamped addressed envelopes for service of the order or judgment, and may require that proposed orders be furnished to all parties before entry by the court of the order. The court may serve any order by e-mail to all attorneys who were not excused from e-mail service and to all parties not represented by an attorney who have designated an e-mail address for service. This subdivision is directory, and a failure to comply with it does not affect the order or its finality or any proceedings arising in the matter.

Committee Notes

[No Change]

RULE 8.180. COMPUTATION AND ENLARGEMENT OF TIME

(a) Computation. In computing-any-period-of time prescribed -or-allowed by these rules, — except rules 8.013 and — &010, by order of-court, or by-any-applicable statute, the-day of tlm act or event from which the designated period' of-time-begins to run is not to-be included. — The last'day of the period so-computed shall-be counted, unless it--is-Saturday, ■ Sunday, or a legal holiday, in which event the period-shall run until the-end of the next-day — which-is neither a- Saturday, Sunday, — nor- a legal holiday. — When the period of time prescribed or allowed shall be less-than 7 days, intermediate Saturdays--Sundays, and legal-holidays shall-be-excluded from ■the-computation.Computation of time shall be governed by Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2,514, except for rules 8.013 and 8.010, to which rule 2.514(a)(2)(C) shall not apply and the statutory time period shall govern.

(b) [No Change]

RULE 8.240. COMPUTATION, CONTINUANCE, EXTENSION, AND ENLARGEMENT OF TIME

(a) Computation. In-computing any period of time prescribed or-allowed-by these rules, ■except rules 8.300-and — ⅛305, by order-of-court, or by any-applicable statute, the day of the act or event-from which the designated period of time-begins to run is not to be included. — The-last-day of the period so computed shall be ■counted, unless it is a Saturday, a Sunday — or- a legal holiday, in which event the period-shall run ■until — the-end-of—the next day-which is neither a Saturday-r-a-Sunday, nor a legal holiday; — When-the period of time prescribed-or allowed shall be less than 7 days,--intermediate — Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays shall be-excluded from ■the-compatation.Computation of time shall be governed by Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.514, except for rules 8.300 and 8.305, to which rule 2.514(a)(2)(C) shall not apply and the statutory time period shall govern.

(b) [No Change]

(c) Time for Service^) of Motions and Notice of Hearing. A copy of any written motion that may not be heard ex parte and a copy of the notice of hearing shall be served a reasonable time before the time specified for the hearing.

(-2-)^4dditional -Time After Sendee by Mail.-Whenever a party has-the-r-ight-or is required to do some — act--or-take some proceeding-s-within a prescribed period after-the-service -of notice or other paper is served by mail, 5 days shal-l-be-added-to the prescribed-period.

(d) [No Change]

RULE 8.630. COMPUTATION AND ENLARGEMENT OF TIME

(a) Computation. I-n-computing any period of time prescr-ibed-or allowed by these ralesr-by-order of court or by-an-y- applicable-statute, the day^of-the-act or event from which the designated period of time ■begins to run is not-included. ■ The last day of the period so computed shall be counted ■unless it is Saturday, Sunday, or a legal ■holiday, in which event the period shall run until the end of the-next day which is ■neither a Saturday-,-Sunday, nor a legal holiday. — When--the period -of-time--prescribed or allowed shall be — less-than 7 days, intermediate Saturdays, — Sundays, and legal holidays-shall be excluded from ■the-computation.Computation of time shall be governed by Florida Rule of Judicial Administration, except for rule 8.655, to which rule 2.514(a)(2)(C) shall not apply and the statutory time period shall govern.

(b) [No Change]

(c) Time for Service^!) of Motions and Notice of Hearing. A copy of any written motion which may not be heard ex parte and a copy of the notice of the hearing thereof shall be served a reasonable time before the time specified for the hearing.

(2) Additional Time after Sendee b}r Mail. Whenever-a -party has-the-right or is required to do some act or.take some proceedings within a-prescribed period after the service of notice or other paper and the-notice or paper- is served-by-mail, 5 day-s-shall be added-to-the prescribed peri-o4-

RULE 9.420. FILING; SERVICE OF COPIES; COMPUTATION OF TIME

(a)-(d) [No Change]

(-e)-Additional Time After Sendee by Mai-L-If a party, eour-t reporter, or clerk is required or permitted to do-an-act- within some prescribed time after-service of a document, and the-document is served by mail, 5 days shall be added-to the prescribed period.

(fe) Computation. Computation of time shall be governed by Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.514.In computing any-period- of time prescribed or allowed by these r-ules, by order of the-court, or by any-applicable statute^the-day of the act, evenVor-default from whieh-the designated-period- of time begms-lo-r-un shall not be included. — T-he-last day of the-per-iod- -so computed.shall be included-unless it is a Saturday, a Sunday^-or-a-holiday described below, in-which-event, the period-shall-run until the end-of the next day -t-haf-is-neither a-Saturday, Sunday — nor-holiday.—If -the period-of-time prescribed or allowed-is-less than 7 day^-i-nter-mediate--Saturdays, Sunday-s,--and holidays shall be excluded-in-the computation-. — -As-used in this rule, holiday means

(1) New Year’s Day;
(¾-Mar-tin-Luther -King, Jr.’s Birthday,-the-third Monday in January;
(g)-Washington’s Birthda-y — the-third Monday-in-February;
(4) Good Friday;
(5) Memorial-Day, the lasbMonday in May;
(6) Independence Day;
(7) Labor Day, the-fir-st — Monday-in September-;
(8) Columbus Dayr~the-second Monday-in-October;
(9) Veterans’ Day-;
(10) General-Election Day;-
(l-l-b-Tha-nksgiving — Day,—the fourth Thursday in November;.
(12) Christmas Day;
(13) any statewide primary day;
(14) any Monday-immediately follow-i-ng-a-Banday on which-one-of the foregoing holidays falls; and
(15) any other ■ day-when the clerk’s

Committee Notes

[No Change]

Court Commentary

[No Change]

RULE 12.090. TIME

Computation of time shall be governed by Florida Rule of f Judicial Administration 2,514. Other aspects of tTime shall be governed by Florida Rules of Civil Procedure 1.090(b)-(d)r-exeept- that an additional 5 days added to the- prescribed — period after-service, as provided-in rule-l-090(e), shall also-apply-to-service by e-mail.

Committee Notes

[No Change]

      . See art. V, § 2(a), Fla. Const.

      . Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.205(a)(2)(B)(iv) recognizes the Chief Justice’s administrative power to
      upon request of the chief judge of any circuit or district, or sua sponte, in the event of natural disaster, civil disobedience, or other emergency situation requiring the closure of courts or other circumstances inhibiting the ability of litigants to comply with deadlines imposed by rules of procedure applicable in the courts of this state, to enter such order or orders as may be appropriate to suspend, toll, or otherwise grant relief from time deadlines imposed by otherwise applicable statutes and rules of procedure for such period as may be appropriate, including, without limitation, those affecting speedy trial procedures in criminal and juvenile proceedings, all civil process and proceedings, and all appellate time limitations.

      . See Ramirez v. McCravy, 37 So.3d 240 (Fla.2010) (discharging jurisdiction in case raising issue of whether tolling orders issued by Chief Justice stops the running of statute of limitations).

      . As relevant here, the Court revised the model order to provide:
      all time limits prescribed or allowed by rule of procedure, court order, statutes applicable to court proceedings, or otherwise pertaining to court proceedings are extended from ...
      All time limits involving the speedy trial procedure, in criminal and juvenile court proceedings, are suspended from ...

        See, e.g., In re Emergency Request to Extend Time Periods under all Florida Rules of Procedure for Monroe County in The Sixteenth Judicial Circuit, Fla. Admin. Order No. AOSC10-43, 2 (July 27, 2010) (on file with the Clerk) (emphasis added). The following language explaining the extension of time periods applicable to court proceedings also was added to the model order:
      The extension of time periods under the order shall apply only when the last day of those periods falls within the time extended.

        See id.

      . Based on a companion referral to the Criminal Procedure Rules Committee, the Court recently amended Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191(i)(5) to provide that the time periods under the speedy trial rule may be extended by an "administrative order issued by the chief justice, under Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.205(a)(2)(B)(iv), suspending the speedy trial procedures as stated therein.” See In re Amendments to the Fla. R.Crim. P.—Rule 3.191, 66 So.3d 851 (2011).

      . Florida Rule of Traffic Court 6.370 is deleted in its entirety.

      . Other rules addressing additional time after service by mail or e-mail also are deleted.

      . The Small Claims Rules Committee advises that Florida Small Claims Rule 7.020(a), as currently written, adequately addresses the computation of time in small claims cases.


text:
    In re STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES— REPORT NO. 2011-03.
    No. SC11-1313.
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    July 12, 2012.
   In light of the revised opinion, the Motion for Rehearing is hereby denied.

POLSTON, C.J., and PARIENTE, QUINCE, CANADY, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur.

LEWIS, J., would grant and revise opinion.