author: IRVING, P.J., for the Court:

text:
    William R. CROMWELL, Appellant v. MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY and Big M Transportation, Inc., Appellees.
    No. 2010-CC-01249-COA.
    Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
    July 19, 2011.
    Rehearing Denied Jan. 17, 2012.
    Certiorari Denied May 3, 2012.
    William R. Cromwell, appellant, pro se.
    Leanne F. Brady, attorney for appellees.
    Before IRVING, P.J., ISHEE and CARLTON, JJ.
   IRVING, P.J., for the Court:

¶ 1. This appeal arises out of William R. Cromwell’s unsuccessful application for unemployment benefits to the Mississippi Department of Employment Security (MDES). After MDES denied Cromwell’s application, the Marshall County Circuit Court affirmed that decision. Feeling aggrieved, Cromwell filed a notice of appeal.

¶ 2. Cromwell’s notice of appeal was not timely filed; therefore, we lack jurisdiction and dismiss his appeal.

ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUE

¶ 3. The circuit court rendered its judgment on June 14, 2010, but the judgment was not filed until June 22, 2010. Cromwell received permission to proceed in for-ma pauperis in early July but did not file his notice of appeal until July 29, 2010.

¶ 4. According to Rule 4(a) of the Mississippi Rules of Appellate Procedure, an appellant has thirty days from the date of a judgment in which to file an appeal of that judgment. Under that time restriction, Cromwell had until July 22, 2010, to file his notice of appeal. However, he did not file his notice until July 29.

¶ 5. As we have stated before: “Timely notice of appeal is jurisdictional; where the appellant has not given proper noticed,] this Court lacks jurisdiction to address the appeal.” Mold Pro, Inc. v. Alford, 52 So.3d 1260, 1262 (¶ 13) (Miss.Ct.App.2011) (quoting Curry v. B.C. Rogers Poultry, Inc., 797 So.2d 265, 267 (¶ 11) (Miss.Ct. App.2001)).

¶ 6. Accordingly, we must dismiss Cromwell’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

¶ 7. THIS APPEAL IS DISMISSED FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION.

LEE, C.J., GRIFFIS, P.J., MYERS, BARNES, ISHEE, ROBERTS, CARLTON, MAXWELL AND RUSSELL, JJ., CONCUR.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: ISHEE, J., for the court:

license: Public Domain

text:
    Freddie Joe CARTER, Appellant v. STATE of Mississippi, Appellee.
    No. 2010-KA-00768-COA.
    Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
    Oct. 11, 2011.
    Rehearing Denied Feb. 21, 2012.
    Certiorari Denied May 3, 2012.
    Theressia A. Lyons, Mollie M. McMillin, attorneys for appellant.
    Office of the Attorney General By Jeffrey A. Klingfuss, attorney for appellee.
    Before GRIFFIS, P.J., MYERS and ISHEE, JJ.
   ISHEE, J., for the court:

¶ 1. In January 2010, Freddie Joe Carter was convicted in the Harrison County Circuit Court, First Judicial District, of armed robbery. He was subsequently sentenced as a habitual offender to fifteen years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC). Because Carter was proven to have been a convicted felon at the time of the incident and proven to have displayed and used a firearm during the commission of the armed robbery, his sentence was enhanced to include an additional ten years in the custody of the MDOC, to run consecutively to his fifteen-year sentence for armed robbery. Carter filed a motion for a new trial, which the circuit court denied. Carter now appeals claiming that the evidence did not support the jury’s verdict of guilty or the circuit court’s application of the firearm-enhancement statute. We disagree and affirm the circuit court’s judgment.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

¶ 2. On May 15, 2008, Michael Hillie was at home with his sister, Tyetta Jackson, and his mother, Brenda Waits, at Waits’s house in Orange Grove, Mississippi. In addition to living in the house, Waits also ran a hair salon out of the home. While some of the facts are in dispute, the record supports that late in the evening of May 15, Carter arrived at Waits’s salon door. Carter banged on the door and yelled that he wanted to speak with Hillie’s older brother, Ardelius Stewart.

¶ 3. Hillie heard the loud knocking and advised his mother that someone was at the door. Waits instructed Hillie to investigate; Hillie then approached the back door and asked who was knocking. Carter replied that he was Hillie’s cousin, Derek, and that he was looking for Stewart. Hil-lie responded that Stewart was not there and moved to the window next to the door to get a better look at the person who was knocking. Upon reaching the window, Hil-lie recognized that Carter was not Hillie’s cousin, Derek, and he saw that Carter had a gun pointed at him through the window. Carter began yelling at Hillie to open the door, which Hillie did.

¶ 4. Carter then barged into the house accompanied by two persons wearing masks. He repeatedly asked Hillie, “Where the money at?” Hillie responded that he did not have any money and did not know what money to which Carter was referring. Hillie then began wrestling with Carter to get the gun away from him. One of the masked accomplices began shouting, “Shoot that n-r, shoot that n-r,” and hit Hillie from behind. Hillie fell to the floor; then Carter hit Hillie on the head with the gun approximately two or three times and ran toward the back of the house where Waits and Jackson were located.

¶ 5. Carter found Waits and demanded that she give him the money she had earned from that day’s work in the salon. Waits gave her purse to Carter with approximately $500 inside, and all three perpetrators ran out of the house. Waits notified the Gulfport Police Department, which dispatched officers to the scene.

¶ 6. Upon his arrival, Detective Matthew Thomas with the Gulfport Police Department recovered a cell phone from Waits’s yard. After some investigation into the cell phone and its contents, Detective Thomas spoke with several suspects who identified Carter as a person of interest. Detective Thomas then compiled a photographic lineup of individuals, including Carter and others who resembled Carter. Detective Thomas contacted Waits a few days after the crime had occurred and asked her to come to the Gulfport Police Department’s headquarters. While there, Waits positively identified Carter in the photographic lineup as the man who had robbed her. Detective Thomas stated that it took Waits approximately “half of a second,” with no hesitation, to provide positive identification of Carter as the perpetrator.

¶ 7. Sometime later, an arrest warrant was issued for Carter. Officer Jarred Fore with the Gulfport Police Department was apprised of Carter’s arrest warrant and then charged with finding Carter and bringing him in for questioning. When Officer Fore arrived at Carter’s father’s residence, he observed a vehicle leaving the residence with a driver who resembled Carter. Officer Fore then followed the vehicle and activated his blue lights and siren, signaling for the vehicle to pull over. The vehicle accelerated and began making multiple evasive maneuvers to elude Officer Fore. After approximately a five-minute chase, the vehicle slammed on its brakes, and the driver attempted to exit the vehicle. Officer Fore reached the vehicle’s door in time to stop it from opening any further, and then he observed Carter attempt to crawl out of the vehicle’s window. Officer Fore tased Carter, at which point Carter fell out of the window and was arrested by Officer Fore.

¶ 8. Thereafter, Carter was charged with armed robbery, and a trial was set for January 20, 2010. At trial, although Carter did not testify, his counsel maintained that on the night of the incident Carter was at home drinking and playing cards with his girlfriend, Demetreal Robinson; her mother, Adrienne Clark; and several friends. Robinson, Clark, and Carter’s brother all testified in support of Carter’s alibi; they stated that Carter was home drinking and playing cards until sometime between 1:00 and 3:00 in the morning before everyone went to bed.

¶ 9. The State presented testimony from Jennifer Shaw, Lashonda Kelly (Lashon-da), and Tameka Kelly (Tameka), who claimed to be Carter’s accomplices in the crime. Shaw testified that she and Stewart have a child together; therefore, Waits is the child’s grandmother. Shaw further testified that on the evening in question, she contacted Carter and asked him to help her retrieve money from Stewart that she claimed he owed her in child support. Carter agreed to help Shaw. Shaw, La-shonda, and Tameka met Carter at the apartment Carter shared with Robinson; their son, Rodriguez; and Robinson’s mother, Clark. Shaw stated that Robinson, Clark, and two other unidentified persons were all present at the apartment when she, Lashonda, and Tameka arrived.

¶ 10. Thereafter, Carter, Shaw, La-shonda, and Tameka got into Tameka’s vehicle and drove to Waits’s house. Shaw then corroborated the State’s theory of the case that Carter demanded at gunpoint that Hillie open the door, beat Hillie on the head with the gun, and robbed Waits. Shaw also stated that after leaving the house, they drove back to Shaw’s apartment, where Shaw and Lashonda were dropped off. Tameka then returned Carter to his apartment. Lashonda and Tameka testified to the same events.

¶ 11. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury returned a verdict of guilty for Carter on the charge of armed robbery. The circuit court then sentenced Carter to fifteen years in the custody of the MDOC. Because Carter was a convicted felon and the jury had established the fact that a firearm was used in the commission of the robbery, the circuit court applied a firearm enhancement to Carter’s sentence, which added an additional ten years to run consecutively to Carter’s fifteen-year sentence for armed robbery. Carter was also found to be a habitual offender and was sentenced to a total of twenty-five years in the custody of the MDOC, without eligibility for parole or probation. Aggrieved, Carter appeals, claiming the evidence is insufficient to support the jury’s verdict and his sentence enhancement for the firearm. Finding no error, we affirm the circuit court’s judgment.

DISCUSSION

¶ 12. A motion for a new trial challenges the weight of the evidence. Bush v. State, 895 So.2d 836, 844 (¶ 18) (Miss.Ct.App.2005). We will not disturb a circuit court’s denial of a motion for a new trial unless the verdict “is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence that to allow it to stand would sanction an unconscionable injustice.” Id. We weigh the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict. Id.

¶ 13. The State presented testimony from Officer Fore, Detective Thomas, Shaw, Lashonda, and Tameka in support of Carter’s guilt. Detective Thomas fully explained to the jury how he came into contact with the cell phone left in Waits’s yard and how he used the cell phone and the information contained therein to uncover the details of the crime at hand. Officer Fore further explained his encounter with Carter, and Carter’s attempt to flee from authorities. Finally, Shaw, La-shonda, and Tameka all testified that they were with Carter from the inception of the crime until well after the crime had been committed. Them testimony not only corroborated the testimony of Detective Thomas, it also corroborated the testimonies of Waits and Hillie as to the events that occurred just before and during the crime itself.

¶ 14. While Carter offered fact witnesses to dispute the State’s theory of the case and support Carter’s alibi that he was at home on the night in question, it was the jury’s ultimate decision as to which side to believe. Carter’s corroborating witnesses consisted of, his live-in girlfriend, who is also the mother of his child; his child’s grandmother; and his brother. Accordingly, it is reasonable to assume that each of Carter’s witnesses had plausible motives to protect him. As such, we cannot say that the jury’s verdict, or the circuit court’s denial of Carter’s motion for a new trial, was unsubstantiated. The State presented strong eyewitness evidence that Carter was guilty of the crime charged, and it was not unreasonable to doubt Carter’s alibi.

¶ 15. Finally, Carter argues that the circuit court did not have substantial evidence to support a firearm sentence enhancement. Mississippi Code Annotated section 97-37-37(2) (Rev.2007) provides:

[A]ny convicted felon who uses or displays a firearm during the commission of any felony shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such felony, be sentenced to an additional term of imprisonment in the custody of the Department of Corrections of ten (10) years, to run consecutively, not concurrently, which sentence shall not be reduced or suspended.

The jury found Carter guilty of armed robbery, as defined in Mississippi Code Annotated section 97-3-79 (Rev.2007), stating:

Every person who shall feloniously take or attempt to take from the person or from the presence the personal property of another and against his will by violence to his person or by putting such person in fear of immediate injury to his person by the exhibition of a deadly weapon shall be guilty of robbery and, upon conviction, shall be imprisoned for life in the state penitentiary if the penalty is so fixed by the jury; and in cases where the jury fails to fix the penalty at imprisonment for life in the state penitentiary the court shall fix the penalty at imprisonment in the state penitentiary for any term not less than three (3) years.

¶ 16. The eyewitnesses to the crime asserted that Carter was displaying a small handgun at all times during the commission of the crime. Had the jury not been privy to the information regarding the handgun, which was the “deadly weapon” used in the armed robbery, the charge of “armed” robbery would not have been available to them. As such, the jury clearly established that Carter was displaying and using a firearm during the robbery. We cannot say that the circuit court’s enhancement of Carter’s sentence using the firearms-enhancement statute was error. We affirm the circuit court’s judgment.

¶ 17. THE JUDGMENT OF THE HARRISON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT OF CONVICTION OF ARMED ROBBERY AND SENTENCE OF FIFTEEN YEARS AS A HABITUAL OFFENDER, AND SENTENCE OF TEN YEARS AS A SENTENCE ENHANCEMENT FOR THE DISPLAY AND USE OF A FIREARM AS A CONVICTED FELON DURING THE COMMISSION OF A FELONY, WITH THE SENTENCES TO RUN CONSECUTIVELY WITHOUT ELIGIBILITY FOR PAROLE OR PROBATION, ALL IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO HARRISON COUNTY.

LEE, C.J., IRVING AND GRIFFIS, P.JJ., MYERS, BARNES, CARLTON AND RUSSELL, JJ„ CONCUR. ROBERTS AND MAXWELL, JJ., CONCUR IN PART AND IN THE RESULT WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION.


text:
    William Lee GREEN, Appellant v. STATE of Mississippi, Appellee.
    No. 2010-CP-00899-COA.
    Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
    Oct. 11, 2011.
    Rehearing Denied Jan. 10, 2012.
    Certiorari Denied May 3, 2012.

      William Lee Green, appellant, pro se.
    Office of the Attorney General by John R. Henry Jr., attorney for appellee.
    Before IRVING, P.J., MAXWELL and RUSSELL, JJ.
   IRVING, P.J., for the Court:

¶ 1. On June 16, 2008, William Lee Green pleaded guilty to armed robbery. Following his plea, the Warren County Circuit Court sentenced Green to thirty-five years’ imprisonment in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. On April 22, 2010, Green filed a motion for post-conviction relief (PCR), which the circuit court denied. Feeling aggrieved, Green appeals and argues that: (1) his due process rights were violated because the circuit court failed to advise him of his right to appeal his sentence; (2) his plea was invalid because he never admitted the elements of armed robbery; (3) his sentence is illegal because it exceeds his life expectancy; and (4) he received ineffective assistance of counsel.

¶ 2. Finding no error, we affirm.

FACTS

¶ 3. On May 8, 2007, a Warren County grand jury indicted Green for three counts of armed robbery under Mississippi Code Annotated section 97-3-79 (Rev.2006). As part of his plea agreement, the State agreed to dismiss Counts II and III in exchange for Green’s testimony against his codefendants. On June 16, 2008, Green pleaded guilty to one count of armed robbery, and the circuit court sentenced Green to thirty-five years’ imprisonment.

¶ 4. Additional facts, as necessary, will be related during our analysis and discussion of the issues.

ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUES

¶ 5. When reviewing a circuit court’s denial of a motion for post-conviction relief, factual findings will not be disturbed unless they are clearly erroneous. Presley v. State, 48 So.3d 526, 528-29 (¶ 10) (Miss.2010). However, questions of law are reviewed de novo. Id. at 529 (¶ 10).

1. Due Process Violation

¶ 6. Green alleges that his due process rights were violated because the circuit court failed to inform him of his right to a direct appeal of his sentence. However, “our law has never required a trial judge to inform a criminal defendant about the right to appeal directly the sentence received based on a guilty plea.” Burrough v. State, 9 So.3d 368, 374 (¶ 20) (Miss.2009) (citing Coleman v. State, 979 So.2d 731, 733 (¶4) (Miss.Ct.App.2008)). As this Court pointed out in Coleman, a circuit court is only required to determine the following:

a. That the accused is competent to understand the nature of the charge;
b. That the accused understands the nature and consequences of the plea, and the maximum and minimum penalties provided by law;
c. That the accused understands that by pleading guilty (s)he waives his/her constitutional rights of trial by jury, the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses, and the right against self-incrimination; if the accused is not represented by an attorney, that (s)he is aware of his/her right to an attorney at every stage of the proceeding and that one will be appointed to represent him/ her if (s)he is indigent.

Coleman, 979 So.2d at 733 (¶ 5) (quoting URCCC 8.04(A)(4)). Additionally, the circuit court must determine that the defendant’s plea was given “voluntarily and intelligently.” Id. (quoting URCCC 8.04(A)(3)). Based on our review of the transcript from the plea hearing, the circuit court addressed whether Green was competent, advised him of the nature and consequences of his plea, informed him of the constitutional rights he was waiving by pleading guilty, and determined that his plea was voluntarily and intelligently given. Thus, we hold that the circuit court complied with the requirements of Rule 8.04(A)(4) and that the circuit court did not err by failing to inform Green of his right to a direct appeal of his sentence. This issue is without merit.

2. Validity of Guilty Plea

¶ 7. Green argues that his guilty plea is invalid because he never admitted to the elements of armed robbery. However, the transcript from the plea hearing completely belies Green’s argument. At the plea hearing, the State read the indictment, which included a recitation of the elements of armed robbery. Then, the circuit court asked Green: “[D]id you commit that crime?” He responded in the affirmative. Later, the circuit court asked: “[D]o you understand [that] you’re admitting that you did, in fact, commit the crime of armed robbery ... ?” Again, Green answered affirmatively. Based on the transcript from the plea hearing, Green was made aware of the elements of armed robbery and admitted that he had committed armed robbery. This issue is without merit.

3. Illegal Sentence

¶ 8. Green contends that his thirty-five-year sentence is illegal because it exceeds his life expectancy. However, Green did not object to his sentence at the sentencing hearing. Therefore, he must rely on plain error because otherwise the issue is procedurally barred. Cox v. State, 793 So.2d 591, 599 (¶¶ 33-34) (Miss.2001). Plain-error review is employed when a defendant’s substantive or fundamental rights are affected. Neal v. State, 15 So.3d 388, 403 (¶ 32) (Miss.2009). Our supreme court has held that the right to be free from an illegal sentence is a fundamental right. Sneed v. State, 722 So.2d 1255, 1257 (¶ 11) (Miss.1998). Therefore, this Court may review the issue under the plain-error doctrine.

¶ 9. The circuit court sentenced Green to thirty five years’ imprisonment. Section 97-3-79 sets forth the punishment for armed robbery as follows:

[U]pon conviction, [a defendant] shall be imprisoned for life in the state penitentiary if the penalty is so fixed by the jury; and in cases where the jury fails to fix the penalty at imprisonment for life in the state penitentiary the court shall fix the penalty at imprisonment in the state penitentiary for any term not less than three (3) years.

Because Green pleaded guilty rather than being convicted by a jury, the circuit court was required under section 97-3-79 to sentence him to a term of imprisonment of at least three years but less than life. This Court has held: “When a jury does not recommend a life sentence on a conviction for armed robbery, the [circuit] court’s imposition of a sentence is proper where the [circuit] court takes into consideration the defendant’s life expectancy and ‘all the relevant facts necessary to fix a sentence for a definite term of years reasonably expected to be less than life.’ ” Trammell v. State, 62 So.3d 424, 432 (¶ 34) (Miss.Ct.App.2011) (quoting Lindsay v. State, 720 So.2d 182, 185 (¶ 9) (Miss.1998)).

¶ 10. At the sentencing hearing, the circuit court advised Green that it had consulted the United States Labor Tables for Life Expectancy, which estimated Green’s life expectancy at 47.1 years. Additionally, the circuit court consulted actuaiial tables and workers’ compensation tables, which estimated Green’s life expectancy at 42.9 and 51 years, respectively. Green’s thirty-five-year sentence is less than each of the life expectancies considered by the circuit court; therefore, his sentence does not amount to a life sentence and is not illegal. This issue is without merit.

A Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

¶ 11. Green alleges that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to object when the circuit court accepted Green’s plea even though Green had not admitted the elements of armed robbery and had not been advised of his right to appeal his sentence. Additionally, Green contends that his attorney was ineffective for failing to object to Green’s sentence. As we have determined that Green admitted the elements of armed robbery at the plea hearing, that the circuit court was not required to advise Green of his right to a direct appeal of his sentence, and that his sentence is not illegal, Green’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is without merit.

¶ 12. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF WARREN COUNTY DENYING THE MOTION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO WARREN COUNTY.

LEE, C.J., GRIFFIS, P.J., MYERS, BARNES, ISHEE, ROBERTS, CARLTON, MAXWELL AND RUSSELL, JJ., CONCUR.


author: LEE, C.J.,

text:
    Daniel Zachary ROSS, Appellant v. STATE of Mississippi, Appellee.
    No. 2010-CP-01078-COA.
    Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
    Oct. 18, 2011.
    Rehearing Denied Jan. 17, 2012.
    Certiorari Denied May 3, 2012.

      Daniel Zachary Ross, appellant, pro se.
    Office of the Attorney General by Stephanie B. Wood, attorney for appellee.
    Before LEE, C.J., BARNES and ROBERTS, JJ.
   LEE, C.J.,

for the Court:

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 1. Daniel Zachary Ross, along with three other men, were indicted for armed robbery and conspiracy to commit armed robbery. The four men were accused of taking a man’s wallet in Lee County, Mississippi, after displaying a .38-caliber revolver to him.

¶2. Ross pleaded guilty to armed robbery, and in exchange, the conspiracy charge was dismissed. Ross was sentenced by the Lee County Circuit Court to thirty years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections with eighteen years suspended and five years of post-release supervision.

¶ 3. Ross filed a motion for post-conviction relief in the trial court, asserting: (1) the indictment charged him under the wrong statute, and (2) one of his co-defendants was allowed to plead guilty to a lesser crime than armed robbery and received a lesser sentence. Ross now appeals the denial of his motion for post-conviction relief.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 4. A trial court’s denial of a motion for post-conviction relief will not be reversed absent a finding that the trial court’s decision to deny the motion was clearly erroneous. Smith v. State, 806 So.2d 1148, 1150 (¶ 3) (Miss.Ct.App.2002). However, when reviewing issues of law, this Court’s proper standard of review is de novo. Brown v. State, 731 So.2d 595, 598 (¶ 6) (Miss.1999).

DISCUSSION

I. INDICTMENT

¶ 5. Ross argues that the trial court erroneously sentenced him under Mississippi Code Annotated section 47-7-3(1)(d)(ii) (Supp.2011), which denies eligibility for parole for armed robbery. He argues that he should have been sentenced under Mississippi Code Annotated section 47-7-3(1)(d)(i) (Supp.2011), which allows for parole.

¶ 6. Section 47 — 7—3(l)(d)(i) states:

No person shall be eligible for parole who shall, on or after January 1, 1977, be convicted of robbery or attempted robbery through the display of a firearm until he shall have served ten (10) years if sentenced to a term or terms of more than ten (10) years or if sentenced for the term of the natural life of such person. If such person is sentenced to a term or terms of ten (10) years or less, then such person shall not be eligible for parole. The provisions of this paragraph (d) shall also apply to any person who shall commit robbery or attempted robbery on or after July 1, 1982, through the display of a deadly weapon. This paragraph (d)(i) shall not apply to persons convicted after September 30, 1994....

Mississippi Code Annotated section 47-7-3(l)(d)(ii) states:

No person shall be eligible for parole who shall, on or after October 1, 1994, be convicted of robbery, attempted robbery[,] or carjacking as provided in Section 97-3-115 et seq., through the display of a firearm or drive-by shooting as provided in Section 97-3-109. The provisions of this paragraph (d)(ii) shall also apply to any person who shall commit robbery, attempted robbery, earjack-ing[,] or a drive-by shooting on or after October 1,1994, through the display of a deadly weapon....

¶ 7. Ross argues that the sentence under section 47 — 7—3(1)(d)(ii) was incorrect because he was charged with armed robbery under Mississippi Code Annotated section 97-3-79 (Rev.2006), which does not mention carjacking. He argues that section 47 — 7—3(l)(d)(ii) is for sentences involving carjackings. This argument is without merit since section 47 — 7—3(1)(d)(ii) applies to “robbery, attempted robbery, carjacking[,] or a drive-by shooting.”

¶ 8. The significant difference between these two sections was discussed by this Court in Banks v. State, 37 So.3d 81 (Miss.Ct.App.2009). Banks argued that he was erroneously sentenced under section 47 — 7—3(l)(d)(ii) when he should have been sentenced under section 47 — 7—3(1)(d)(i). Id. at 84. This Court found Banks’s argument without merit because “[sjection 47-7 — 3[l](d)(i) ... provides that it does not apply to any person convicted after September 30, 1994.” As Banks pleaded guilty to armed robbery on March 20, 2002, section 47 — 7—3(1)(d)(i) did not apply. Id. Section 47 — 7—3(1)(d)(ii), however, applies to crimes committed “on or after October 1, 1994.” Thus, Banks was appropriately sentenced under section 47-7-3(l)(d)(ii).

¶ 9. The same is true for Ross. The armed robbery occurred “on or about January 9, 2007.” As this was after October 1, 1994, Ross was correctly sentenced under section 47 — 7—3(l)(d)(ii). This issue is without merit.

II. SENTENCE OF CO-DEFENDANT

¶ 10. Next, Ross argues that he was denied due process of law because one of his co-defendants was allowed to enter a guilty plea to simple robbery and was given a lesser sentence than Ross. Ross argues that his sentence was disproportionate and illegal.

¶ 11. With regard to sentencing, “a trial judge acts with the broadest of discretion as long as the sentence is within the statutory guidelines.” Vaughn v. State, 964 So.2d 509, 510 (¶ 8) (Miss.Ct.App.2006). Further, “a sentence that does not exceed the maximum term allowed by the statute, cannot be disturbed on appeal.” Edwards v. State, 800 So.2d 454, 468 (¶ 45) (Miss.2001) (citing Fleming v. State, 604 So.2d 280, 302 (Miss.1992)).

¶ 12. The sentence for armed robbery is “not less than three (3) years,” and the maximum sentence is life if that sentence is imposed by a jury. Miss.Code Ann. § 97-3-79. Ross was sentenced by the trial court to thirty years with eighteen years suspended and five years of post-release supervision. Ross’s sentence falls within the statutory guidelines. As for Ross’s argument that his sentence was disproportionate, the trial court noted that “[t]he sentences imposed in this matter were all the results of plea negotiations and recommendations by the State of Mississippi.” “Further, there is no requirement that co-conspirators receive identical sentences.” Collins v. State, 822 So.2d 364, 366 (¶ 6) (Miss.Ct.App.2002) (citing Jones v. State, 669 So.2d 1383, 1393 (Miss.1995)).

¶ 13. We find that this issue is without merit.

¶ 14. THE JUDGMENT OF THE LEE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT DENYING THE MOTION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO LEE COUNTY.

IRVING AND GRIFFIS, P.JJ., MYERS, BARNES, ISHEE, ROBERTS, CARLTON, MAXWELL AND RUSSELL, JJ„ CONCUR.


author: GRIFFIS, P. J., for the Court:

text:
    Benjamin WHITE, Appellant v. STATE of Mississippi, Appellee.
    No. 2010-KM-01850-COA.
    Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
    Oct. 25, 2011.
    Rehearing Denied Feb. 7, 2012.
    Certiorari Denied May 3, 2012.

      Kevin Dale Camp, Jackson, John Michael Duncan, attorneys for appellant.
    Office of Attorney General by Scott A. Johnson, Linda Coston Davis, attorneys for appellee.
    Before GRIFFIS, P.J., MYERS and ISHEE, JJ.
   GRIFFIS, P. J., for the Court:

¶ 1. Benjamin White was found guilty by a jury sitting before the Madison County County Court of misdemeanor home-repair fraud under Mississippi Code Annotated section 97-23-103 (Rev.2006). The county court sentenced White to six months in the custody of the Sheriff of Madison County, with all but fifteen days of said sentence conditionally suspended, and to pay a $1,277 fine and restitution in the amount of $37,539.33.

¶ 2. White appealed to the Madison County Circuit Court, where it was argued that: (1) no disproportionate amount of work was done to the home in question compared to the amount of money advanced by the homeowners; (2) no home-repair fraud was committed because in the contract White and the homeowners specifically provided that if the homeowners failed to make payments White could stop work on the project; (3) the county court erred in allowing evidence that White failed to pay some of his subcontractors; (4) the county court erred in refusing to grant defense jury instruction D-12; (5) the county court erred in refusing to consider testimony from White’s expert witness when determining the amount of restitution; and (6) White’s conviction of home-repair fraud will operate to subject an enormous number of contractors to criminal prosecution in this State.

¶ 3. The circuit court affirmed White’s conviction and sentence. This appeal followed. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the circuit court’s judgment, which affirmed the county court’s judgment.

FACTS

¶ 4. On October 11, 2005, David and Joanne Buchanan accepted a $90,300 proposal/offer from White, owner of BW Construction, for the performance of certain renovations and additions to their home. Under the general terms of the contract, White agreed to convert the home’s two-car garage into a living room area; build a three-car garage with a bonus room and a bathroom in the space above it; construct a hallway, with a half bath and a closet, adjoining the said structures; install new granite countertops in the home’s kitchen; and replace the home’s existing driveway with a circular driveway. The $90,300 contract total covered all the material and labor necessary to meet the itemized specifications listed in the contract. That amount was subsequently reduced to $86,247.45, after the parties agreed to modify the contract to allow the Buchan-ans, instead of White, to purchase and install the granite countertops and pay for the cost of the building permit.

¶ 5. Pursuant to a provision in the contract, the Buchanans paid White a $22,500 down payment immediately after accepting White’s initial proposal, and they agreed to submit further payments to White “on each Friday as the work progress[ed] to the value of 100% of all work completed[— t]he entire amount of the contract [to be] paid within [two] days after completion.”

¶ 6. The contract also contained the following provision:

If payment is not made when due, [White] may suspend work on the job until such time as all payments due have been made. A failure to make payments for a period in excess of [two] days from the due date of the payment shall be deemed a material breach of this contract.

¶ 7. From October to December 2005, the Buchanans issued a number of draws to White by check, as follows: $6,000 on October 21; $6,500 on October 28; $9,000 on November 4; $1,400 on December 5; and $7,650 on December 9. According to David, White told him that building materials, such as lumber and Sheetrock, were in short supply and increasing in price due to the aftereffects of “Hurricane Katrina,” and he needed advances in order to reserve or pay for the materials.

¶ 8. On Friday, December 16, 2005, White reportedly telephoned David and asked for another draw. David, who was out of town on business, told White that he was concerned that the amount of work White had done, which David estimated to be approximately ten to fifteen percent of the contract, did not mesh with the $53,050 he had already advanced to White. David then informed White that he would not advance him any additional funds until the work caught up with the amount of funds already provided to White.

¶ 9. Later that same day, David received a telephone call from Karen Powell, who White had hired to supervise the building project at the Buchanans’ home. Powell informed David that White had called her and told her that she and the subcontractors would not be getting paid because David had refused to pay him.

¶ 10. The Buchanans met with White in his office the following week. David there told White they wanted to see progress on the project. David asked White if he had any receipts available for the materials that White had previously indicated had been purchased for the project. White reportedly was unable to produce any receipts, but said he could supply the purchased materials. The Buchanans requested that the materials be delivered to the job site before Christmas. According to David, nothing was delivered to the job site by Christmas, nor at any point thereafter.

¶ 11. David testified that White became unresponsive to his and Joanne’s attempts to contact him afterwards. Eventually, they sent White a letter informing him that they were terminating the contract because White had breached its terms. The Buchanans subsequently contacted the Mississippi Attorney General’s Office (AG), and an investigation ensued.

¶ 12. In January 2009, White provided a voluntary statement to an investigator from the AG’s office, which the State later submitted into evidence during its case-in-chief at White’s trial. According to the statement, White acknowledged that the Buchanans had paid him “approximately] $50,000 to perform work” on their home. White stated that he had charged the Bu-chanans approximately $10,000 for designs and plans for the renovation project, and he claimed that he had paid for the following:

$6,500 for [dirtwork] labor[;] ... $7,000 for the new septic unit[;] ... $3,000 for the demolition] work[;] ... $4,000 for the plumbing[,] electricalf, and] pesticide [treatment;] ... $8,000 for the foundation^] forming[,] and finishing[;] ... $5,000 for the materials for the concrete foundation, concrete, rebar, visqueen, limestone bed[;] ... $400 for the dumpster fee concerning the demolition^] ... $7,000 for the cost of the project managers to oversee [the] project[;] ... $800 for permit fees and soil samples.

¶ 13. David’s testimony disputed much of what White had claimed in his statement to the AG investigator. According to David, White did not install a new septic tank on their property, nor did the contract call for one. No electrical work was performed by White. No pesticide treatment was performed by White, as David had an annual termite plan with a pest control company that covered such treatment. No dumpster was ever placed on his property by White. David acknowledged that a concrete foundation was completed by White, but he stated that White did not pay for the concrete that was later poured over the foundation.

¶ 14. According to Powell’s trial testimony, White had promised her $700 per week to supervise the project at the Bu-chanans’ home. Powell said she worked a total of four weeks at the job site for White, but White had only paid her for two weeks.

¶ 15. Bill Reeves, a representative from Spencer Ready Mix, testified that his company sold $3,490.34 worth of concrete to White for use at the Buchanans’ home. Reeves presented an invoice showing that said concrete was delivered to the Buchan-ans’ home on December 15, 2005. According to Reeves, Spencer Ready Mix has not been paid for the concrete.

¶ 16. Kenneth Barker, a representative from Hercules Concrete Pumping, testified that his company pumped the concrete at the Buchanans’ home on December 15. Barker presented an invoice showing that White was billed $683.81 for the service. According to Barker, the bill has gone unpaid.

¶ 17. During David’s testimony, David testified to all the items listed in the contract that White did or did not complete. According to David, White had completed the first three items of the fourteen items listed under section A of the contract, “Remodeling of the Existing Garage.” Item A1 called for removing and salvaging the existing garage-door unit; item A2 called for removing the existing interior walls, Sheetroek, exterior doors, and electrical fixtures; and item A3 called for installing a new concrete foundation to bring the height of the new room level with the existing home. With regard to section B of the contract, “Constructing the New Addition[s] ...,” David testified that White had completed the first three items of the twenty-eight items listed under that section. Item B1 called for removing the existing concrete driveway in preparation for the new foundation; item B2 called for installing the plumbing drain pipes and tying them into the existing treatment plant; and item B3 called for installing the new concrete foundation for the addition, as described on the plans provided for the project. David testified that White did not complete any of the items listed under section C of the contract, which pertained to the new circular driveway.

¶ 18. Randy Robertson testified for the State as an expert in residential construction. Robertson stated, in his opinion, all the work performed by White on the project, up until the point the Buchanans had ceased payments to White, was worth approximately $9,300. Having viewed photographs taken by David in January 2006 (which was prior to when David had hired a new contractor to complete the project) and inspecting the property afterwards, Robertson provided the following estimates with regard to his assessment of the reasonable value of the work that had been completed by White on the project prior to December 16:

Plumbing rough-in: $2,000
Form materials: $1,600
Labor to remove portions of the existing garage: $950
Demolition: $3,250
Plans: $1,500

¶ 19. White, who did not testify at trial, presented one witness during the defense’s case-in-chief. Bert Green testified on White’s behalf as an expert in residential building and remodeling. Green estimated that White had performed $49,286.47 worth of work on the project. Green based his estimation on a number of sources, such as: White’s statement to the AG investigator, interviews Green had with White, and Green’s review of the same photographs taken by David in January 2006 that Robertson had viewed. The following cost estimate was prepared by Green prior to trial, provided to the State during discovery, and introduced by the State into evidence during its case-in-chief:

Plans: $4,900
Soil engineering: $455
Demolition (removal of driveway): $4,200
Site work: $6,540
Electrical: $500
Plumbing rough: $2,448
Septic tank unit (removal and installation): $5,500
Form materials: $1,800
Concrete materials: $8,956.87
Termite pretreatment: $752
Labor foundation form: $1,487.50
Labor finisher: $1,723.30
Supervision costs: $2,800
Trash removal — dumpster: $400
Trash removal — labor: $200
Portable toilet rental: $250
Sub Total: $37,912.67
Unscheduled expenses (@ 5%): $1,895.63
Profit & Overhead (@ 25%): $9,478.17 Total: $49,286.47

¶20. The jury found White guilty of home-repair fraud. The county court held a restitution hearing five days later, without the jury. The county court ordered White to pay restitution to the following entities and persons in the denoted amounts:

(1) Spencer Concrete - $ 3,490.34
(2) Hercules Concrete - $ 683.81
(3) Steve Tyner - $ 2,000.00
(4) Karen Powell - $ 1,400.00
(5) David Buchanan - $29,965.18
TOTAL: $37,539.33

DISCUSSION

I. NO DISPROPORTIONATE AMOUNT OF WORK WAS DONE TO THE BUCHANANS’ HOME AS COMPARED TO THE AMOUNT OF MONEY ADVANCED BY THE HOMEOWNERS.

II. CONTRACT SPECIFICALLY PROVIDED THAT IF PAYMENTS ARE NOT MADE, THE WORK SHALL CEASE.

III. EVIDENCE WAS ERRONEOUSLY ALLOWED INTO THE CASE THAT WHITE HAD FAILED TO PAY SOME OF HIS SUBCONTRACTORS.

¶ 21. To avoid repetitiveness, we address issues one, two, and three together. White argues that he was not guilty of home-repair fraud, because as his expert witness, Green, testified, the $53,050 paid by David was not disproportional to the work done on the project. White contends that the building contract between him and the Buchanans contained a valid and enforceable provision which allowed him to cease work on the project if the Buchanans failed to make a timely payment. White also contends that evidence showing he had failed to pay some of his subcontractors was both irrelevant and prejudicial because whether or not he paid his subcontractors had no relation to the charges against him for home-repair fraud.

¶ 22. The State responds that despite what White claimed at trial through his expert witness, the State’s evidence showed a large “chasm” between the amount of work done by White and the amount of money advanced by the Buchan-ans, and the jury chose to believe the State’s evidence over Green’s expert opinion. The State maintains that White was not prosecuted for having a fee dispute with the Buchanans; rather, White was prosecuted for entering into a contract with the Buchanans knowing that he would not perfoi’m the promises contained therein. Such performance, the State contends, included White’s promise to pay his subcontractors, which the State submits was important enough to be an independent provision within the terms of the contract.

¶ 23. We review a criminal conviction “in the light most favorable to the conviction.” King v. State, 798 So.2d 1258, 1261 (¶ 12) (Miss.2001). A verdict will not be set aside unless the evidence shows that no reasonable person could have found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Bush v. State, 895 So.2d 836, 843-44 (¶ 16) (Miss.2005). Determinations regarding the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimonies rest with the trier of fact. Miller v. State, 983 So.2d 1051, 1054 (¶ 14) (Miss.2008). The admissibility of evidence lies within the sound discretion of the trial judge; error will not be found unless the trial judge abused his or her discretion. Mixon v. State, 921 So.2d 275, 277 (¶ 6) (Miss.2005).

¶ 24. Section 97 — 23—103(2)(4) provides, in pertinent part, the following:

(2) A person commits the offense of home repair fraud when he knowingly:
(a) Enters into an agreement or contract, written or oral, with a person for home repair, and he knowingly:
(i) Misrepresents a material fact relating to the terms of the contract or agreement or the preexisting or existing condition of any portion of the property involved, or creates or confirms another’s impression which is false and which he does not believe to be true, or promises performance which he does not intend to perform or knows will not be performed;
(3) Intent and knowledge shall be determined by an evaluation of all circumstances surrounding a transaction and the determination shall not be limited to the time of contract or agreement.
(4) Substantial performance shall not include work performed in a manner of little or no value or work that fails to comply with the appropriate municipal, county, state[,] or federal regulations or codes.

¶ 25. The State prosecuted White on the basis that he entered into a written contract with the Buchanans for certain renovations and additions to their home with no intention of performing the promises set forth therein or that he knew those promises would not be performed. The evidence shows that White told David following their December 16 conversation that he had purchased building materials for the project with the funds David and Joanne had provided and that the materials would be delivered to the job site. They were not. White later gave a statement in which he justified essentially every dollar advanced to him. The only building materials mentioned in the statement, however, were those for the concrete foundation, which everybody agrees had been completed prior to December 16. The State’s evidence significantly contravened the value of the other work/items listed in the statement, and the jury obviously rejected the information provided by White’s expert, Green. One can logically infer from White’s conflicting representations, and the evidence in general, that White could not account for the advances provided to him by the Buchanans. One can also logically conclude from White’s reported conduct in the matter (e.g., misrepresenting that materials would be delivered, failing to pay his subcontractors as promised, not responding to the Buchanans’ repeated attempts to contact him, etc.) that he used the provision in the contract, which allowed him to cease work on the project, as a pretext to walk away from the promises he knew would not be performed, thereby concealing his intent.

¶ 26. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we find that a reasonable fact-finder could have found the above-mentioned elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. For these reasons, we find no merit to issues one, two, and three.

IV. COUNTY COURT REFUSED TO GRANT DEFENSE JURY INSTRUCTION D-12

¶ 27. White contends that the county court erred in denying defense jury instruction D-12, which stated, in part, that: “The [c]ourt instructs the jury that if the jury believes [the Buchanans] materially breached the contract entered into for home repair fraud by failing to make payments as required by the contract ..., then the jury should return a verdict of not guilty.” The county court denied the jury instruction because it appeared to work an “absolute defense” for White to the crime of home-repair fraud.

¶28. We agree with the county court. Section 97-28-108 contains no language that excuses a person’s criminal culpability for entering into a contract with a homeowner with promises of performance the person knows will not be performed, based on the homeowner’s subsequent conduct in relation to the contract. Accordingly, we find that jury instruction D-12, as worded, incorrectly stated the law and was properly denied. See Miller v. State, 801 So.2d 799, 805 (¶ 27) (Miss.Ct.App.2001) (holding that a defendant is not entitled to a jury instruction which incorrectly states the law). This issue is without merit.

V. COUNTY COURT REFUSED TO CONSIDER THE TESTIMONY OF WHITE’S DEFENSE EXPERT WHEN DETERMINING THE AMOUNT OF RESTITUTION.

¶ 29. White’s sole contention with regard to the county court judge’s restitution order is that the judge’s determination of the amount of restitution owed was fundamentally flawed because the judge refused to take into consideration the estimates presented by his expert witness, Green.

¶ 30. Factual findings made by a trial judge sitting without a jury will not be disturbed on appeal unless such findings are clearly erroneous. House v. State, 754 So.2d 1147, 1152 (¶ 22) (Miss.1999). Again, determinations regarding the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimonies rest with the trier of fact. Miller, 983 So.2d at 1054 (¶ 14).

¶ 31. During the trial, the county court heard extensive testimony from both Green and Robertson. Each expert was allowed to develop the bases for his findings with regard to the estimated value of the work White had performed versus the amount of money David had advanced to him. The county court also heard testimony from witnesses who claimed White had failed to pay for their services provided on the project.

¶ 32. Based on our review of the record, many of Green’s cost estimates were based on White’s statement provided to the AG investigator, much of which was negated by the State’s evidence. This, of course, brought into question the credibility of Green’s cost estimates. The county court, nonetheless, accepted some of Green’s cost estimations and rejected others. Sitting as fact-finder in the sentencing phase, the county court had the discretion to do so, and we find no abuse thereof. This issue is without merit.

VI. SUBJECTING WHITE TO CRIMINAL PROSECUTION WOULD OPERATE TO SUBJECT AN ENORMOUS NUMBER OF CONTRACTORS OPERATING IN THIS STATE TO PROSECUTION.

¶ 33. White offers no authority in support of this issue. “Failure to cite relevant authority obviates the appellate court’s obligation to review such issues.” Simmons v. State, 805 So.2d 452, 487 (¶ 90) (Miss.2001). Therefore, we find this issue is procedurally barred.

¶ 34. THE JUDGMENT OF THE MADISON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT OF CONVICTION OF MISDEMEANOR HOME-REPAIR FRAUD AND SENTENCE OF SIX MONTHS IN THE CUSTODY OF THE SHERIFF OF MADISON COUNTY, WITH ALL BUT FIFTEEN DAYS OF SAID SENTENCE CONDITIONALLY SUSPENDED, AND TO PAY A $1,277 FINE AND $37,539.33 IN RESTITUTION IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE APPELLANT.

LEE, C.J., IRVING, P.J., MYERS, BARNES, ISHEE, ROBERTS, MAXWELL AND RUSSELL, JJ„ CONCUR. CARLTON, J„ NOT PARTICIPATING.


text:
    Sherida C. POWELL, Appellant v. James Samuel POWELL, Appellee.
    No. 2010-CA-01041-COA.
    Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
    Nov. 8, 2011.
    Rehearing Denied Feb. 14, 2012.
    Certiorari Denied May 3, 2012.

      John D. Smallwood, Thomas T. Buchanan, Laurel, attorneys for appellant.
    Terry L. Caves, Laurel, attorney for appellee.
    Before IRVING, P.J., ISHEE and CARLTON, JJ.
   IRVING, P.J., for the Court:

¶ 1. This appeal arises out of an order by the Jones County Chancery Court granting James Samuel Powell a divorce from Sherida C. Powell on the ground of uncon-doned adultery. After finding that Sheri-da had committed uncondoned adultery, the chancery court ordered an equitable division of the marital estate. Feeling aggrieved, Sherida appeals and asserts that the chancery court’s division was not equitable.

¶ 2. Finding no error, we affirm.

FACTS

¶ 3. James and Sherida were wed in February 1993, in Jones County, Mississippi. No children were born to the marriage, which was neither James’s nor Sher-ida’s first marriage. James and Sherida lived together as man and wife until September 2007, when Sherida left the marital home. Sherida claimed that she left the marital home because she and James disagreed over how to run their business. Sherida testified that James told her multiple times that she should pack her “sh*t” and leave if she disagreed with him; James denied having made any such statements. James filed a complaint for divorce on September 23, 2008, wherein he alleged that he was entitled to a divorce from Sherida on the grounds of desertion, habitual cruel and inhuman treatment, and irreconcilable differences. Sherida filed an answer and counter-complaint for divorce on October 29, 2008, alleging identical grounds for divorce as those stated by James.

¶ 4. On February 12, 2009, James amended his divorce complaint to include uncondoned adultery as a ground for divorce. The chancery court entered an agreed order on March 10, 2009, allowing the amendment. In her answer to the amended complaint, Sherida admitted to having committed adultery, but she claimed that James condoned the adultery when he told her to “go on with her life.” On March 18, 2010, the chancery court granted James a divorce from Sherida on the ground of uncondoned adultery. On May 12, 2010, the chancery court issued its findings of fact and conclusions of law in support of the divorce.

¶ 5. In its findings of fact and conclusions of law, the chancery court noted that James was in poor health at the time of trial, while Sherida was in good health and was employed full time. The chancery court noted that James receives pensions in the amount of $2,929.50 each month, while Sherida’s gross income per month is $4,170. The chancery court found that James owned the marital home, a pickup truck, household furniture, appliances, a travel trailer, and $43,000 in cash at the time of the marriage, while Sherida owned a car (which James had paid for), a “few items of furniture,” personal items, and a 401 (k) retirement account from Masonite Corporation, where Sherida worked at the time of the marriage. Sherida testified that she did not know the value of her 401 (k) at the time of the marriage and that her efforts to learn its value had been unsuccessful.

¶ 6. James testified that he had completed high school and had extensive work experience as an emergency-medical technician. James indicated that he began working for the Laurel Fire Department in 1985. In 2003, James became disabled and retired from the fire department. In 1993 or 1994, James started a business, Safety on Site (SOS). Through SOS, James contracted with various companies to provide on-site fire-brigade training. James operated SOS until 1996, when he opened an ambulance-service-provider business, ASAP.

¶ 7. The chancellor found that, shortly before the marriage, James borrowed approximately $59,200 to remodel the marital home. James estimated that the home was worth approximately $80,000 prior to the remodeling. This value was disputed at trial by Sherida, but no other evidence was produced to value the residence. The note for the remodeling was paid during the course of the marriage, although the chancellor found that “[a]ll but one of the note payments ... were paid ... out of [James’s] income.” The chancellor also noted that James purchased a lot, titled in his and Sherida’s name, that had a value of $3,200 at the time of trial.

¶ 8. In 1996, James borrowed almost $300,000 to start ASAP. In 1997, Sherida stopped working for Masonite and went to work as ASAP’s office manager. According to Sherida, she began working for ASAP at the rate of $15 per hour, and her salary was later increased to $17.25 per hour. However, James testified that Sher-ida was supposed to be paid a monthly salary rather than by the hour. Sherida worked from the marital home. The chancellor found that James “handled all other business matters for ASAP, including hiring and replacing ambulance personnel, contract negotiations[,] scheduling!,] and other functions typically performed by the owner of a business.” Despite performing all this work for ASAP, the chancellor noted that James “received no salary or wages from ASAP except for the period of February 2002 to May 2003[,] when Sherifda] issued checks payable to [James] in the total amount of $62,798.00.... ” James testified that he did not learn about the checks until after he and Sherida had separated. Apparently, Sherida deposited the checks into a joint checking account that she and James shared.

¶ 9. The chancellor ultimately concluded that Sherida overpaid her wages while she managed ASAP, while James was not compensated for his work on the business. Furthermore, during her time as ASAP’s manager, Sherida allowed ASAP to become delinquent on its taxes; ultimately, the Internal Revenue Service froze ASAP’s bank account. ASAP repaid the delinquent taxes through an installment program, and the last of the delinquent taxes were paid out of the proceeds from ASAP’s sale. According to the chancellor’s findings, Sherida “admitted that [James] knew nothing about the payment [for delinquent taxes] but was well awai-e that the payroll taxes were not being paid.” The certified public accountant who worked for ASAP testified that James knew about the delinquent payroll taxes. Additionally, ASAP billed services to Medicaid that were not proper; Sherida admitted at trial that James did not know about the Medicaid issues until her April 2009 deposition.

¶ 10. In 2006, James sold ASAP for $490,000 dollars. The buyer paid $200,000 at closing and agreed to pay $290,000 over the next twelve years. After its sale, Sherida continued to work for ASAP. In 1996 or 1997, James rented a piece of property in Laurel, Mississippi, for ASAP to use; Sherida later purchased the land and ASAP’s trailer on it for ASAP’s benefit. Although Sherida took on the note for the Laurel property, the chancellor found that “ASAP paid for all indebtedness incurred by Sheri[da]” for the property. After ASAP’s sale, Sherida received $600 in rent each month for the property. The Laurel property was appraised and valued at $78,500.

¶ 11. The chancellor found that the $200,000 from ASAP’s sale was used to pay the following items: (1) $34,628.21 for the delinquent taxes; (2) $36,429.73 to pay a bank note that had been used to establish ASAP; (3) $83,755 for Sherida to deposit in a mutual-fund investment; and (4) $45,187.06 for James to deposit in the couple’s joint checking account. Out of the $45,187.06 that was deposited into the joint checking account, the chancery court found that: (1) $4,142.55 was used to pay the remaining obligation on the Laurel property; (2) $15,000 was paid to a law firm who handled ASAP’s sale; (3) $7,500 was paid to ASAP’s purchaser to allow it to buy liability insurance; (4) Sherida was paid $13,000 for funds that she had allegedly advanced to ASAP; (5) $2,000 was used to pay ASAP’s insurance premiums; (6) $504.38 was used to pay the bank note from ASAP’s founding; (7) $190 was used to purchase gravel for the Laurel property; (8) $466.24 was used to pay for Sheri-da’s vehicle; (9) $550 was used to purchase a casket for a family pet; (10) $600 was paid to Sherida’s personal-investment account; (11) $600 was paid to Western Asset; and (12) $782.22 was paid to James when he closed the joint account in November 2007. After James and Sherida separated, James received monthly payments totaling $98,473.90 on the $290,000 promissory note owed to him by ASAP’s purchaser. In 2009, the South Mississippi Planning and Development District forgave James’s debt owed to it from ASAP’s opening. However, James incurred an income-tax liability of $32,461 as a result of the loan forgiveness.

¶ 12. After James sold ASAP, ASAP maintained its office in the marital home. ASAP paid no rent, but it contributed $250 each month for utilities. Eventually, James demanded that ASAP vacate the premises, which it did. Sherida began planning her exit from the marital home shortly thereafter. Eleven months after James sold ASAP, the business finally moved from the marital home. James estimated that it would cost him between $20,000 to $30,000 to restore his home after ASAP had left.

¶ 13. Sherida ultimately left the marital home in September 2007. Prior to leaving, Sherida rented a storage unit and applied to rent an apartment. James testified that Sherida refused to sleep in a bed with him or have sexual relations with him for “several years” prior to the separation. Sheri-da used the Internet to meet other people, including men, at least one of whom she met in person. Sherida denied that the in-person encounters resulted in sexual contact. The chancellor found that Sherida had no reason for leaving the marital home, other than her allegation that James had told her to leave. This caused the chancellor to “conclude that Sheri[da] decided to end the marriage for her own personal reasons ... which she did not reveal to the [cjourt.”

¶ 14. After separating from James, Sherida met a man named James Niss on the Internet. Unlike the other men that Sherida had met online, Sherida admitted that her relationship with Niss evolved into a sexual one. Sherida testified that she and Niss first had sex in April 2008. Eventually, in September 2008, Sherida and Niss moved in together. After moving in together, Sherida and Niss opened a joint bank account and shared household expenses.

¶ 15. After hearing all of the evidence, the chancery court concluded that the marital estate consisted of the following assets: (1) the marital home, which the chancellor valued at $123,200, $43,200 of which had accrued during the marriage; (2) the Laurel property, valued at $78,500; (3) proceeds from the sale of ASAP, which included scheduled payments of $3,265.05 per month until January 2019; (4) a MetLife account for Sherida with a balance of $61,672.29 as of December 2009; and (5) items of personal property. The chancellor did not discuss the marital debt at any length, but found that the tax liability as a result of James’s debt forgiveness was a marital debt.

¶ 16. After applying the factors found in Ferguson v. Ferguson, 639 So.2d 921 (Miss.1994), the chancellor made the following equitable distribution of the marital assets: (1) Sherida retained the $88,755 that she had received from the sale of ASAP; (2) Sherida was allowed to keep the rental proceeds from the Laurel property; (3) James retained the marital home; (4) James retained the proceeds that he had already received from the sale of ASAP, plus all future proceeds from the sale; (5) Sherida was required to deed a one-half interest in the Laurel property to James, and they were to share equally in the “income and expenses associated with the property”; (6) James was responsible for the tax liability as a result of the debt forgiveness; and (7) James and Sherida each retained the personal items that each already had possession of, with the exception of any items that James had agreed to allow Sherida to remove.

¶ 17. Additional facts, as necessary, will be related during our analysis and discussion of the issue.

ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUE

¶ 18. The standard of review in domestic-relations cases is limited. In re Dissolution of the Marriage of Wood, 35 So.3d 507, 512 (¶ 8) (Miss.2010). As such, an appellate court “will not disturb the findings of a chancellor when supported by substantial evidence unless the chancellor abused his discretion, was manifestly wrong, clearly erroneous[,] or an erroneous legal standard was applied.” Id. (quoting Duncan v. Duncan, 774 So.2d 418, 419 (¶ 4) (Miss.2000)). However, questions of law are reviewed de novo. Id.

¶ 19. Sherida first claims that the chancery court erred in its determination of which assets were marital and the value of those assets. In dividing a marital estate, a chancery court must determine which assets are marital and which are separate, value the assets, and then equitably divide the same. Wheat v. Wheat, 37 So.3d 632, 637 (¶14) (Miss. 2010). The Mississippi Supreme Court has defined marital assets as “any and all property acquired or accumulated during the marriage.” Id. (quoting Hemsley v. Hemsley, 639 So.2d 909, 915 (Miss.1994)). “[T]he chancellor’s discretion in the area of equitable distribution is exceedingly broad[,] and he ‘has the flexibility to do what equity and justice requires.’ ” Wood, 35 So.3d at 516 (¶ 20) (quoting Hensarling v. Hensarling, 824 So.2d 583, 590 (¶ 21) (Miss.2002)).

¶ 20. Sherida first attacks the value that the chancery court assigned to the marital home, which James testified was worth $80,000 before he renovated it prior to his marriage to Sherida. Sherida complains that numerous documents could have been provided to prove the value of the home. While such documents could have been provided, they were not-not by James, and not by Sherida. Sherida was entitled to provide whatever documentation she could obtain regarding the value of the home; in the absence of such, we decline to find error with the chancery court’s valuation of the home. The chancery court was entitled to rely on James’s estimation of the home’s value. Sherida also complains that the chancery court declined to find that any part of the marital home was marital property. Having reviewed the chancery court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law, we disagree with this assessment. In fact, the chancery court explicitly found that the marital home was one of the marital assets that would be equitably divided. The fact that the chancery court then concluded that James should have full possession of the home in the distribution does not change the home’s classification as marital property. We find no error with the chancery court’s valuation of the home or distribution thereof.

¶ 21. Sherida next complains that the chancellor erred in “failing to calculate the value” of the future payments on the promissory note from ASAP’s sale. We note that Sherida made no effort to provide a calculation of the future value of the payments. In the absence of any valuation of the ASAP promissory note payments, we decline to hold the chancery court in error in its valuation of the payments.

¶22. Sherida also complains that James’s retirement account should have been considered a marital asset. In her brief, Sherida concedes that the only evidence as to the value of the account came from her trial exhibit 31. That exhibit was simply a summary of Sherida’s valuation of certain assets, including James’s retirement account. It appears that Sherida’s “value” for the account is simply the percentage that she believes she should receive of each of his monthly disability checks. This did not provide the chancery court with an adequate valuation of the retirement account. No other evidence was presented by either party that conclusively established the account’s value. Under these circumstances, the chancery court did not err in declining to evaluate the account as a marital asset.

¶ 23. Finally, Sherida complains that the chancery court’s distribution of the marital property was inequitable. In distributing the property, the chancery court considered the Ferguson factors and found that: (1) James had “made substantially all of the direct economic contribution to the acquisition of the marital assets”; (2) Sherida effectively ended the marriage years prior to the parties’ separation when she refused to sleep or have sexual relations with James; (3) to the extent that there was any fault in the end of the marriage, Sherida was solely responsible; (4) Sherida’s needs were being met both by her continued employment and by her relationship with Niss; (5) James’s efforts and work at ASAP had been largely uncompensated; and (6) while there were future payments from the sale of ASAP, “the ASAP note is largely unsecured[,] and if ASAP should default on payment of the note[,] the likelihood of a successful recovery of the balance due is negligible.”

¶ 24. We find no error in the chancery court’s findings and conclusions. While Sherida disputed that she had overpaid herself at ASAP and denied that James did not know about the payroll checks that she had distributed on his behalf, the chancery court was not required to find her testimony more credible than James’s. Under the circumstances of this case and applying the Ferguson factors, the chancery court did not err in its distribution. “Divorcing parties ... have no right to equal distribution even where the parties jointly accumulated the property.” Owen v. Owen, 928 So.2d 156, 164 (¶ 16) (Miss.2006) (citation omitted). While the distribution in this case may not have been equal, it appears to be equitable. An equitable distribution is all that Sherida is entitled to. As such, this contention of error is also without merit.

¶ 25. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CHANCERY COURT OF JONES COUNTY IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE APPELLANT.

LEE, C.J., GRIFFIS, P.J., BARNES, ISHEE, ROBERTS, CARLTON, MAXWELL AND RUSSELL, JJ„ CONCUR. MYERS, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.

      . Sherida actually raises two separate issues: whether the chancery court erred in its classification of marital assets and whether the chancery court equitably divided said assets. We consider these two issues as a single question of whether the chancery court’s distribution of marital assets was equitable.

      . James testified that there were two businesses called ASAP, one of which did business solely with Lamar County. The Lamar County ASAP was opened in 2000. As the parties and the chancery court generally did at trial, we have treated ASAP as one business entity.