author: PER CURIAM. MURDOCK, Justice LYONS, Justice

text:
    CITIZENSHIP TRUST et al. v. Mary Kathleen KEDDIE-HILL et al. Mary Kathleen Keddie-Hill et al. v. Citizenship Trust et al.
    1090545 and 1090625.
    Supreme Court of Alabama.
    Jan. 14, 2011.

      Troy King, atty. gen., and Corey L. Maze, Margaret L. Fleming, and William G. Parker, Jr., asst, attys. gen., for all appellants/cross-appellees except Tom Walker in his individual capacity; JoClau-dia Moore, Charles B. Paterson, and Dor-man Walker, deputy attys. gen., of Balch & Bingham, LLP, Montgomery, for appellants/cross-appellees Citizenship Trust and Tom Walker in both his individual capacity and in his official capacity as executive dir. of the Citizenship Trust; and Frank C. Ellis, Jr., of Wallace, Ellis, Fowler & Head, Columbiana, for appellant/cross-ap-pellee Tom Walker in his individual capacity.
    Shannon L. Holliday and Robert D. Se-gall of Copeland, Franco, Screws & Gill, P.A., Montgomery; and Ralph E. Coleman, Jr., Birmingham, for appellees/cross-appellants Mary Kathleen Keddie-Hill et al.
   PER CURIAM.

The Citizenship Trust; Tom Walker, individually and in his capacity as executive director of the Citizenship Trust; Michael Sparks, individually and in his official capacity as director of the Alabama Department of Forensic Sciences; and Michael Hudson, individually and in his official capacity as comptroller of the State of Alabama, appeal from a preliminary injunction entered in favor of Mary Kathleen Keddie-Hill, Cheryl Tillman, and Justin Hammond. Keddie-Hill, Tillman, and Hammond cross-appeal from the trial court’s denial of their motion for class certification. We reverse the trial court’s order issuing the injunction, affirm its order denying class certification, and dismiss the appeal as to Hammond.

Facts

I. Act No. 2009-768

In 2009, the Alabama Legislature passed Act No. 2009-768, which provides:

“AN ACT
“Relating to criminal procedure; to allow an individual convicted of a capital offense who is serving a term of imprisonment or awaiting execution for a capital offense to file a motion to obtain forensic DNA testing on evidence that was secured in relation to the trial that resulted in his or her conviction; to provide that notice be given to the state when an individual files a motion for DNA testing; to specify the information to be included in the motion; to specify certain findings the court would make before ordering forensic DNA testing; to provide for testing procedures and post-testing procedures; to amend Sections 86-18-24, 86-18-25, and 36-18-32, Code of Alabama 1975, relating to DNA database; to provide under certain conditions for DNA testing of all persons arrested for a felony offense after October 1, 2010, or for any sexual offense; to increase the DNA database fee in all municipal, district, and circuit court criminal cases and certain other proceedings; to provide for distribution of the fee; and to provide for an appropriation, for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2009, and September 30, 2010. “BE IT ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF ALABAMA:
“Section 2. Sections 36-18-24, 36-18-25, and 36-18-32, Code of Alabama 1975, are amended to read as follows:
“ § 36-18-32
“(a) There is hereby established a special fund to be known as the Alabama DNA Database Fund.
“(e) Monies deposited in the Alabama DNA Database Fund may be expended by the Director of the Alabama Department of Forensic Sciences in accordance with the provisions of this article....
“(h) In all municipal, district, and circuit court civil cases ... a fee in the amount of two dollars ($2) shall be assessed and collected. In all municipal, district, and circuit court criminal cases ... a fee in the amount of twelve dollars ($12) shall be assessed and collected. The fee shall be collected by the court clerk and remitted as follows:
“(1) Alabama DNA Database Fund,
“a. For fiscal years 2009 and 2010, $7.
“b. For fiscal year 2011, $8.
“c. For fiscal year 2012 and thereafter, $11.
“(2) Citizenship Trust pursuant to Section 16-44A-30, Code of Alabama 1975, for the purposes described in Section 4 of this act.
“a. For fiscal years 2009 and 2010, $5.
“b. For fiscal year 2011, $4.
“c. For fiscal year 2012 and thereafter, $1....
“Section 4. It is the intent of this act to effect the changes provided in criminal procedure, and concurrently, to reduce criminal conduct by promoting good citizenship education. The amounts specified by this act to be remitted to the Citizenship Trust (‘Trust’) shall be appropriated, expended, and audited in the manner provided by Act 2008-551 and Section 16-44A-30, et seq., Code of Alabama 1975, of which one half shall be for the David Mathews Center for Civic Life.... ”

II. Underlying Proceedings

A.Keddie-Hill’s Traffic Citation

In September 2009, Keddie-Hill received a citation in the mail charging her with running a stop sign in the City of Montgomery. On October 2, 2009, Ked-die-Hill pleaded guilty to the traffic violation and paid the fines and court costs assessed against her in the case, including the $12 “DNA database fee” assessed pursuant to Act No. 2009-768. Along with the fee, Keddie-Hill submitted a letter from her attorney that stated:

“This firm represents Ms. Keddie-Hill, and she submits this payment in full, but she is paying the additional $10.00 required by Act 2009-768 under protest. She does not believe that the addition [sic] $10.00 charge is valid.”

The record contains an affidavit in which Keddie-Hill testified as follows:

“I paid the DNA Database Fee charged in connection with the above-mentioned citation under protest.... While I protested $10.00 of the payment in [the letter written by her attorney], I have now been told that only $5.00 of the fee collected was unconstitutional.
“... I could not afford a lawyer to challenge the portion of the fee that I consider unconstitutional, that $5.00 portion that is being submitted to The Citizenship Trust, because it would have cost me far more to do so than I would have received.
“... I did not wish to challenge the citation or the judgment of the Municipal Court against me as I was guilty of the traffic violation.”

B. Tillman’s Traffic Citation

On October 2, 2009, Cheryl Tillman received a citation for speeding in Greene County. The citation stated: “This case can be settled without a court appearance by payment of the ordered amount,” ie., $183, which included the $12 “DNA database fee.”

The record contains an affidavit by Cheryl Tillman in which she testifies as follows:

“I pleaded guilty to this traffic violation and since that time I have paid to the district court of Greene County all fines and court costs assessed against me in that case, including the $12.00 fee required by Act 2009-768.
“... I could not afford a lawyer to challenge the portion of the fee that I consider unconstitutional, that $5.00 portion that is being submitted to The Citizenship Trust, because it would have cost me far more to do so than I would have received.
“... I did not wish to challenge the citation or the Judgment of the Greene County District Court against me as I was guilty of the traffic violation.”

C. Hammond’s Traffic Citation

The record contains an affidavit by Justin Hammond in which he testifies as follows:

“On November 1, 2009, I, Justin Hammond, received a citation for speeding in Jefferson County. A court appearance is set on December 14, 2009 before the Honorable Sheldon Watkins in the District Court of Jefferson County. Should I plea[d] or be found guilty I anticipate being ordered to pay fines and court costs assessed against me in that case, including the $12.00 fee required by Act 2009 — T 68. []
“... I can’t afford a lawyer to challenge the portion of the fee that I consider unconstitutional, that $5.00 portion that is being submitted to The Citizenship Trust, because it would cost me far more to do so than what I would save.”

III. Procedural History

On October 7, 2009, Keddie-Hill, individually and as representative of all individuals who had paid the $12 fee required by Act No. 2009-768, filed a complaint against the Citizenship Trust, Walker (individually and in his capacity as executive director of the Citizenship Trust), Sparks (individually and in his official capacity as director of the Alabama Department of Forensic Sciences), and Hudson (individually and in his official capacity as comptroller of the State of Alabama) (hereinafter referred to collectively as “the defendants”). Keddie-Hill alleged that that portion of Act No. 2009-768 allocating a portion of the $12 DNA database fee to the Citizenship Trust was unconstitutional on several grounds, including, she alleged, on grounds that the act violated Art. IV, §§ 45 and 61, Ala. Const. 1901. Among other things, Ked-die-Hill sought a preliminary injunction prohibiting the defendants from disbursing the funds collected pursuant to Act No. 2009-768. In addition, she sought a judgment declaring the disputed portion of Act No. 2009-768 unconstitutional and a permanent injunction requiring the defendants to return to the appropriate circuit, district, and municipal clerks the money disbursed to the defendants from the collection of the fee. Keddie-Hill subsequently amended her complaint to add Tillman and Hammond as named plaintiffs. (Keddie-Hill, Tillman, and Hammond, in their individual capacities and as putative class representatives, will be referred to hereinafter as “the plaintiffs.”) The plaintiffs also requested that all fees disbursed to the Citizenship Trust pursuant to Act No. 2009-768 be returned to the putative class members or, alternatively, be distributed pursuant to the cy pres doctrine after provision was made for payment of the plaintiffs’ attorneys fees.

On November 2, 2009, the plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification or, in the alternative, for provisional class certification pending a hearing on the issue. On January 8, 2010, the trial court denied the motion without holding a hearing on the issue of class certification. Also in its January 8, 2010, order, the trial court issued a preliminary injunction requiring the defendants to escrow all funds received by them pursuant to Act No. 2009-768.

On January 22, 2010, the defendants appealed the preliminary injunction to this Court. On February 5, 2010, the plaintiffs filed a notice of cross-appeal seeking review of the denial of their motion for class certification.

Standard, of Review

In reviewing the grant or denial of a preliminary injunction, “ ‘[w]e review the [trial] [c]ourt’s legal rulings de novo and its ultimate decision to issue the preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion.’ ” Holiday Isle, LLC v. Adkins, 12 So.3d 1173, 1176 (Ala.2008) (quoting Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 428, 126 S.Ct. 1211, 163 L.Ed.2d 1017 (2006)).

“A preliminary injunction should be issued only when the party seeking an injunction demonstrates:
“ ‘ “(1) that without the injunction the [party] would suffer irreparable injury; (2) that the [party] has no adequate remedy at law; (3) that the [party] has at least a reasonable chance of success on the ultimate merits of his case; and (4) that the hardship imposed on the [party opposing the preliminary injunction] by the injunction would not unreasonably outweigh the benefit accruing to the [party seeking the injunction].” ’ ”

Holiday Isle, 12 So.3d at 1176 (quoting Orroco Corp. v. Johns, 869 So.2d 1109, 1113 (Ala.2003), quoting in turn Perley v. Tapscan, Inc., 646 So.2d 585, 587 (Ala.1994) (alterations in Holiday Isle)).

Analysis

I. The Appeal and Cross-Appeal With Respect to Keddie-Hill and Tillman

Rule 32.1(a) and (c), Ala. R.Crim. P., provide:

“Subject to the limitations of Rule 32.2, any defendant who has been convicted of a criminal offense may institute a proceeding in the court of original conviction to secure appropriate relief on the ground that:
“(a) The constitution ... of the State of Alabama requires ... a new sentence proceeding, or other relief.
“(c) The sentence imposed exceeds the maximum authorized by law or is otherwise not authorized by law.”

In the underlying action, Keddie-Hill and Tillman seek an order declaring unconstitutional Act No. 2009-768, under which they (and the putative class members they seek to represent) were required to pay a $12 DNA database fee. They seek an injunction remedying the payment of the allegedly unconstitutional fine by ordering the defendants to refund the fees or, alternatively, an order making distribution of those fees pursuant to the cy pres doctrine. Thus, the present proceeding is a collateral proceeding to secure relief from criminal sentences on constitutional grounds. See Rule 26.11(c) and (j), Ala. R.Crim. P. (“Docket fees and other costs in criminal cases shall be assessed upon conviction.... Court costs shall be deemed part of the penalty and the same procedures provided herein for nonpayment of fines shall apply for nonpayment of costs.”); Manning v. Wingo, 577 So.2d 865, 867 (Ala.1991) (“ ‘[A] collateral attack on a judgment is an attack made by or in an action or proceeding that has an independent purpose other than impeaching or overturning the judgment.’ Black’s Law Dictionary 237 (5th ed.1979).”).

However, Keddie-Hill and Tillman argue that this proceeding should not be governed by the usual rules that apply to collateral attacks on criminal judgments because, they argue, an appeal would cost more to prosecute than any portion of the $12 DNA database fee they might recover were they to prevail on appeal. Although the cost of an appeal might outweigh any potential monetary benefit to Keddie-Hill, Tillman, and the putative class members, that alone is not a sufficient reason to depart from the plain language of our rules of procedure or the legal precedent cited above. We have held that Rule 32 applies to postconviction challenges to death sentences. See, e.g., Ex parte Dobyne, 805 So.2d 763, 766-67 (Ala.2001). Rule 32 also applies to postconviction challenges to sentences of life imprisonment without the possibility parole. See, e.g., Rivera v. State, 615 So.2d 659, 660 (Ala.Crim.App.1992) (opinion on rehearing). Rule 32 applies likewise to a postconviction challenge to a portion of a court cost. Cf. Tarver v. State, 761 So.2d 266, 268 (Ala. Crim.App.2000) (“[W]e have repeatedly held that the procedural bars in Rule 32 apply equally to all cases, including those in which the death penalty has been imposed. See Nicks v. State, 783 So.2d 895 (Ala.Cr.App.1999); Horsley v. State, 675 So.2d 908 (Ala.Cr.App.1996); Thompson v. State, 615 So.2d 129 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 976, 114 S.Ct. 467, 126 L.Ed.2d 418 (1993).”).

Keddie-Hill and Tillman cite Brown v. State, 565 So.2d 585 (Ala.1990) (plurality opinion), in support of their argument that they may proceed with a civil class action to challenge the DNA database fee. In Brown, the plaintiffs filed a class action against the State of Alabama, the City of Montgomery, and others. The plaintiffs had been convicted of traffic offenses based on improperly verified Uniform Traffic Ticket and Complaints (“UTTCs”). 565 So.2d at 586. Their complaint was styled “Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus or in the Alternative Bill for Declaratory Judgment or Other Injunctive Relief.” Id. In it, “[t]hey sought to have all improperly verified UTTC convictions expunged from the records and to have all fines and costs paid as a result of the convictions refunded to the plaintiffs.” Id. Six Justices of this Court concurred to affirm the trial court’s denial of that relief. The Court stated:

“The members of the plaintiff class were put to trial on, or pleaded guilty to, charges to which no person had sworn on oath before a judge or other official. They cannot be said to have waived the defect, because it was not apparent on the face of the UTTC that it was defective. However, their attack on the judgments is a collateral one, coming many years after the judgments were entered. They now seek to have the judgments vacated and the fines refunded. They cannot prevail on these claims.”

565 So.2d at 590 (emphasis added).

In light of Brown and the plain language of the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure, we hold that, because this is a civil proceeding collaterally attacking the judgments in criminal cases, it falls within the scope of Rule 32, Ala. R.Crim. P. See Rule 32.1, supra; see also Ex parte Powell, 641 So.2d 772, 775 (Ala.1994) (“Rule 32, Ala. R.Crim. P., provides a procedure for securing the post-conviction relief from a conviction or sentence previously provided by either a writ of habeas corpus or a writ of error coram nobis. H. Maddox, Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure, § 32.0 (1990).”). Accordingly, we must treat this action as we would any other Rule 32 proceeding. Rule 32.4, Ala. R.Crim. P. (“A proceeding under [Rule 32] displaces all post-trial remedies except post-trial motions under Rule 24 and appeal. Any other post-conviction petition seeking relief from a conviction or sentence shall be treated as a proceeding under this rule.” (emphasis added)); Rivera v. State, 615 So.2d 659, 660 (Ala.Crim.App.1992) (opinion on rehearing) (“[B]ecause the petition sought relief from a sentence, it should have been treated as a proceeding under Rule 32.” (citing Rule 32.4, Ala. R.Crim. P.)).

We note that, when this Court decided Brown in 1990, the Temporary Rules of Criminal Procedure were in effect. Those rules contained counterparts to the current Rule 32.1(a) and (c), Ala. R.Crim. P. Unlike the current Rule 32.1, however, the Temporary Rules in place when Brown was decided did not prohibit petitions for postconviction relief from “multiple judgments entered in more than a single trial or guilty-plea proceeding.” Rule 32.1, Ala. R.Crim. P. Rule 32.1, however, requires that such petitions “shall be dismissed without prejudice.” Accordingly, with respect Keddie-Hill and Tillman, the preliminary injunction entered by the trial court is vacated, the order denying class certification is affirmed, and the court is ordered to dismiss the case as to Keddie-Hill and Tillman without prejudice.

II. The Preliminary Injunction with respect to Hammond and Hammond’s Cross-Appeal of the Denial of Class Certification

As to the appeal of the injunctive relief in favor of Hammond, the issue before us is the propriety of a preliminary injunction entered in aid of an action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief as to the alleged unconstitutionality of a penalty in Hammond’s pending criminal proceeding. The trial court was without subject-matter jurisdiction, however, to grant such preliminary relief or to entertain the underlying action brought by Hammond. “The general rule is that a court may not interfere with the enforcement of criminal laws through a civil action....” Tyson v. Macon County Greyhound Park, Inc., 43 So.3d 587, 589 (Ala.2010) (holding that, with exceptions not applicable here, courts are without subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate in civil proceedings matters that should be decided in criminal proceedings or related forfeiture actions for which the legislature has provided). See 22A Am. Jur.2d Declaratory Judgments § 57 (2003) (“A declaratory judgment will generally not be granted where its only effect would be to decide matters which properly should be decided in a criminal action.” (quoted with approval in Tyson, 43 So.3d at 589)). Accordingly, the trial court was without subject-matter jurisdiction over the action brought by Hammond. The trial court’s order granting preliminary injunctive relief and denying class certification is due to be vacated; Hammond’s action, as well as the present appeal, are due to be dismissed without prejudice.

Conclusion

The trial court’s order issuing the preliminary injunction is reversed, the order denying class certification is affirmed, and the case is remanded for the trial court to dismiss the case without prejudice. As to the appeal brought by Hammond, that appeal is dismissed.

1090545 — REVERSED AND REMANDED.

1090625 — AFFIRMED IN PART; APPEAL DISMISSED IN PART.

WOODALL, STUART, SMITH, BOLIN, and PARKER, JJ., concur.

MURDOCK, J., concurs specially.

SHAW, J., concurs in the result.

COBB, C.J., concurs in the rationale in part and concurs in the result.

LYONS, J., concurs in the rationale in part and dissents from the judgment.

MURDOCK, Justice

(concurring specially).

Part I of the main opinion dismisses Mary Kathleen Keddie-Hill and Cheryl Tillman’s case below on the ground that Rule 32.1, Ala. R.Crim. P., requires that a postconviction petition seeking relief from “multiple judgments entered in more than a single trial or guilty-plea proceeding ... be dismissed without prejudice.” I concur in this dismissal, and I agree that the dismissal should be without prejudice to the extent those petitioners have sought relief in this case that hereafter may be pursued in a properly structured Rule 32 proceeding. I note, however, that to the extent the petitioners hereafter might again seek injunctive or declaratory relief in a future petition, not only is such relief not contemplated under Rule 32, Ala. R.Crim. P., but an action seeking such relief would be beyond this Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction for the reasons described in Part II of the main opinion.

COBB, Chief Justice (concurring in the rationale in part and concurring in the result).

As to the dismissal of the civil action brought by Justin Hammond, I concur in the result. I am convinced that, once charged with a crime, a criminal defendant may not subsequently sue for declaratory or injunctive relief to resolve issues that are properly to be decided in the criminal action. Cf. Gulf House Ass’n v. Town of Gulf Shores, 484 So.2d 1061, 1064 (Ala.1985) (“A permanent injunction will be granted when ... there is no adequate remedy at law.”); Trimble v. City of Prichard, 438 So.2d 745 (Ala.1983) (holding that a plaintiff could not maintain a declaratory-judgment action contesting the validity of a municipal ordinance during the pending prosecution of the plaintiff under the ordinance). Further, I am convinced that the constitutionality of the DNA database fee is an issue that should properly be decided in Hammond’s criminal case. Therefore, I agree that Hammond’s civil action is due to be dismissed.

However, I cannot concur in the majority’s reliance on Tyson v. Macon County Greyhound Park, 43 So.3d 587, 589 (Ala. 2010), as its rationale for dismissing Hammond’s claims for declaratory relief for lack of jurisdiction. I concurred with Justice Woodall’s dissent in Tyson, 43 So.3d at 592 (Woodall, J., dissenting), and, in my view, Tyson was incorrectly decided. Further, Tyson contained dicta that expressly disclaimed its application to cases in which “the plaintiff contends that the statute at issue is void.” 43 So.3d at 589. Subsequently, in Chorba-Lee Scholarship Fund, Inc. v. Hale, 60 So.3d 279 (Ala.2010), this Court reached the merits of an action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief that was substantively indistinguishable from Tyson, except that, in Chorbctr-Lee, the legal issue to be decided was not the legality of the plaintiffs’ conduct, but the constitutional validity of a law under which a prosecutor had threatened to bring charges. I concurred in Chorbctr-Lee without writing because it was my understanding at the time that Tyson expressly permitted actions to enjoin enforcement of a void law. See Tyson, 43 So.3d at 589-90.

Unlike the plaintiff in Tyson, Hammond does not seek a declaratory judgment as to the legality of his conduct. Hammond simply seeks to relief from a law he contends is unconstitutional and void. Therefore, in my view, Tyson is distinguishable.

In all other respects, I concur with the Court’s opinion.

LYONS, Justice

(concurring in the rationale in part and dissenting from the judgment).

I concur in all aspects of the main opinion except for its affirmance of the order denying of certification of a class. As to that issue, I dissent from the judgment. The claims of Mary Kathleen Keddie-Hill and Cheryl Tillman are not cognizable in a civil action subject to the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure; they are cognizable only in a Rule 32, Ala. R.Crim. P., proceeding. Each claim is therefore due to be dismissed without prejudice pursuant to Rule 32.1, Ala. R.Crim. P. The dismissal of the action moots the issue of class certification.

      . In briefs to this Court, the parties at times refer to Keddie-Hill as “Katherine Keddie-Hill.” The record, however, supports the conclusion that Keddie-Hill's name is “Mary Kathleen Keddie-Hill.”

      . As of the time Hammond filed his brief in the present appeal, the district court had not yet disposed of Hammond’s speeding citation.

      . Alabama Const. 1901, Art. IV, § 45, provides, in pertinent part:
      "Each law shall contain but one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title, except general appropriation bills, general revenue bills, and bills adopting a code, digest, or revision of statutes....”

      .Alabama Const. 1901, Art. IV, § 61, provides, in pertinent part:
      "[N]o bill shall be so altered or amended on its passage through either house as to change its original purpose.”

      . Additionally, on February 19, 2010, the defendants filed a petition for writ of mandamus in this Court seeking dismissal of the case for lack of jurisdiction on grounds of State immunity and lack of standing. On March 10, 2010, this Court dismissed the petition without a written opinion. Ex parte Citizenship Trust (No. 1090676, March 10, 2010).

      . Although Brown was a plurality opinion, three Justices concurred completely in the main opinion, and three additional Justices concurred in the portion of the main opinion that included this quote.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: PER CURIAM. PER CURIAM.

license: Public Domain

text:
    Brent Andre PARRIS v. PRISON HEALTH SERVICES, INC., William Hobbs, and Debbie Hunt.
    2070831.
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    March 13, 2009.
    Opinion on Return to Remand Jan. 8, 2010.
    Rehearing Denied March 12, 2010.
    Certiorari Denied Feb. 11, 2011 Alabama Supreme Court 1090860.

      Brent Andre Parris, pro se.
    Paul M. James, Jr., of Rushton, Stakely, Johnston & Garrett, P.A., Montgomery, for appellees.
   PER CURIAM.

Brent Andre Parris appeals from the trial court’s dismissal of the amended complaint, in which he sought to amend his earlier “filing,” which was captioned “Motion for Injunctive Relief (For Specialized Medical Care)” (“the initial pleading”).

Parris is an inmate at Limestone Correctional Facility. In the initial pleading, he alleged that defendants Prison Health Services, Inc. (“Prison Health”), Dr. William Hobbs, and Debbie Hunt (collectively, “the defendants”) had denied him medical treatment after he had injured his shoulder playing basketball. The defendants moved for a dismissal of the action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ. P., arguing that the initial pleading failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The trial court granted the defendants’ motion on July 31, 2007.

On August 7, 2007, Parris filed an “amended complaint,” and on August 9, 2007, he filed a motion asking the court to set aside its July 31 order. The trial court denied Parris’s August 9 postjudgment motion, but it did not dismiss the amended complaint. Parris appealed. On appeal, this court concluded that because the trial court’s order dismissing the initial pleading had not expressly limited Parris’s right to amend the initial pleading, Rule 78, Ala. R. Civ. P., provided Parris with an “automatic right of amendment” within ten days after service of the trial court’s order dismissing his initial pleading. Parris v. Prison Health Servs., Inc., 991 So.2d 270, 272-73 (Ala.Civ.App.2008). This court held that Parris had timely exercised his right to amend; therefore, because the timely amended complaint was still pending in the trial court, this court dismissed the appeal as being from a nonfinal judgment. Id. at 273.

Thereafter, on April 4, 2008, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint pursuant to Rules 8(a) and 12(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ. P, asserting that Par-ris had again failed to state a claim for which relief could be granted. On April 7, 2008, the trial court entered an order dismissing Parris’s amended complaint. The record does not indicate that Parris filed a postjudgment motion. The case-action summary shows that on May 27, 2008, some 50 days after the trial court entered its order dismissing the amended complaint, Parris filed his notice of appeal. The defendants contend that Parris’s notice of appeal was untimely because it was filed eight days after the expiration of the 42-day period in which Parris had to timely file the notice of appeal. See Rule 4(a)(1), Ala. R.App. P. (requiring appeals to be filed within 42 days of the entry of judgment).

In the case of an inmate’s filing a notice of appeal, the date the notice is filed in the court clerk’s office is not necessarily controlling. In Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 108 S.Ct. 2379, 101 L.Ed.2d 245 (1988), the United States Supreme Court held that a pro se prisoner-litigant’s notice of appeal was deemed filed on the day that the notice was accepted by the prison mail system and not when it arrived at the court clerk’s office. The Alabama Supreme Court adopted this rule, known as the “mailbox rule,” in Ex parte Williams, 651 So.2d 569 (Ala.1992), in which the court held that a pro se prisoner-litigant’s petition for a writ of certiorari directed to the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals under Rule 25, Ala. R.App. P., was timely filed on the date that the petition was delivered to the prison officials for mailing. The “mailbox rule” governs as to the time of filing of the pro se prisoner-litigant’s notice of appeal in both criminal and civil cases. See Ex parte Jones, 773 So.2d 989 (Ala.1998) (inmate’s notice of appeal was deemed filed on the date he gave it to prison authorities for mailing); Veteto v. Yocum, 793 So.2d 814 (Ala.Civ.App.2001) (extending to civil cases the rule that a pro se prisoner-litigant’s notice of appeal is deemed filed when that document is delivered to a prison official for mailing).

The “mailbox rule” was incorporated into Rule 4(c), Ala. RApp. P., which states:

“(c) Appeals by Inmates Confined in Institutions. If an inmate confined in an institution and proceeding pro se files a notice of appeal in either a civil or a criminal case, the notice will be considered timely filed if it is deposited in the institution’s internal mail system on or before the last day for filing. If an institution has a system designed for ‘legal’ mail to be processed by the United States Post Office, the inmate must use that system to receive the benefit of this rule. Timely filing may be shown by a notarized statement that sets forth the date the filing was deposited in the institution’s mail system.”

The defendants claim that to take advantage of the “mail box” rule Parris’s filing “must” contain a notarized statement setting forth the date he placed his notice of appeal in the prison’s mail system. The Alabama Supreme Court has held otherwise, however.

“While Rule 4(c), Ala. RApp. P., includes a provision that ‘[tjimely filing may be shown by a notarized statement that sets forth the date the filing was deposited in the institution’s mail system’ (emphasis added), this rule does not mandate such a notarized statement as the only way to establish the timeliness of a filing. Such a mandate would create still further issues about the availability and expense of a notary public that the rule is not drawn to resolve. The nonmandatory nature of the provision for the notarized statement is connoted by the use of the word may in contradistinction to the use of the word must elsewhere in the very same rule to connote a measure that is mandatory— the inmate’s use of the ‘legal’ mail system, if one is available in the institution, instead of the general mail system there.”

Ex parte Wright, 860 So.2d 1253, 1257 (Ala.2002).

In this case, the unverified certificate of service on Parris’s notice of appeal states that the notice was placed in the “U.S. Mail” on May 8, 2008. There is no evidence in the record as to when Parris delivered his notice of appeal to the prison’s mail system. In his reply brief, Par-ris claims that he filed his notice of appeal with the circuit clerk and simultaneously filed a copy of his notice of appeal with this court. The records of this court tend to support Parris’s claim. On May 19, 2008, which would have been the 42nd day after the order dismissing the amended complaint was entered, this court sent a letter to Parris returning his notice of appeal and informing him of the proper forum in which to file his notice of appeal. If Parris did file his notice of appeal simultaneously in this court and in the circuit court, then the notice had to have been delivered in a timely manner to the prison mail system because the notice had reached this court by the 42nd day after the entry of the order from which Parris appealed.

In Ex parte Wright, supra, the Alabama Supreme Court noted that “the filing of [Wright’s] notice of appeal in the court required no judicial action” and that the parties did not contest the timeliness of the notice of appeal before the trial court. Wright, 860 So.2d at 1257. In reversing the Court of Criminal Appeals’ judgment dismissing Wright’s appeal for untimeliness, the supreme court pointed out that the Court of Criminal Appeals had been the first court to have the opportunity to consider the timeliness of Wright’s appeal, and that there had been no evidence before it to contradict the averments in Wright’s “Declaration of Mailing,” which, if true, established that his notice of appeal was timely under the mailbox rule. Therefore, the supreme court remanded the cause with instructions for the trial court to determine whether Wright had timely deposited his notice of appeal in the internal mail system of the prison. Id.

The record in this case indicates that this court is the first to consider the timeliness of Parris’s notice of appeal. The certificate of service included with Parris’s notice of appeal indicates that he “mailed” the notice on May 8, 2008, within the time allowed by law for the filing of a notice of appeal in this case. The letter to Parris from the clerk of this court returning his notice of appeal is dated on the last date that a filing of the notice of appeal would have been timely; thus, the letter suggests that Parris’s notice was placed in the prison mail system in a timely manner. However, we cannot verify that Parris delivered his notice of appeal to the prison mail system by May 19, 2008, the day on which the period for filing his notice lapsed. As was the case with the Court of Criminal Appeals in Ex parte Wright, this court has no evidence before it to contradict Parris’s assertion. Accordingly, on the authority of Ex parte Wright and the cases cited therein, we must remand this cause for the trial court to determine, as expeditiously as possible, whether Parris did in fact deposit his notice of appeal in the appropriate prison mail system or hand the notice of appeal to an appropriate officer of the prison for that officer to make the deposit in the mail on or before May 19, 2008. On remand, the trial court may conduct such proceedings and take such evidence as it deems necessary to make its findings of fact. A written return to remand, including the trial court’s findings of fact, shall be filed with this court as expeditiously as possible.

REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

All the judges concur.

On Return from Remand

PER CURIAM.

On March 13, 2009, this court remanded this cause for the trial court to take evidence and to make findings of fact regarding whether Brent Andre Parris, an inmate at Limestone Correctional Facility (“the prison”), had timely deposited his notice of appeal in the appropriate prison mail system. Pursuant to this court’s directive, the trial court returned a detailed order containing findings of fact and conclusions of law and determining that, based on the evidence presented to the trial court, Parris had failed to establish that he had timely and proeedurally complied with Rule 4(c), Ala. R.App. P. Therefore, the trial court found, Parris’s appeal was untimely filed.

A full procedural history of this matter appears in Parris v. Prison Health Services, Inc., 68 So.3d 108 (Ala.Civ.App. 2009). As to the procedural history pertinent to this matter, the record indicates that on April 7, 2008, the trial court entered an order dismissing Parris’s amended complaint against defendants Prison Health Services, Inc. (“Prison Health”), Dr. William Hobbs, and Debbie Hunt (hereinafter referred to collectively as “the defendants”).

As this court stated in Parris:

“The record does not indicate that Par-ris filed a postjudgment motion. The case-action summary shows that on May 27, 2008, some 50 days after the trial court entered its order dismissing the amended complaint, Parris filed his notice of appeal. The defendants contend that Parris’s notice of appeal was untimely because it was filed eight days after the expiration of the 42-day period in which Parris had to timely file the notice of appeal. See Rule 4(a)(1), Ala. R.App. P. (requiring appeals to be filed within 42 days of the entry of judgment).
“In the case of an inmate’s filing a notice of appeal, the date the notice is filed in the court clerk’s office is not necessarily controlling. In Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 108 S.Ct. 2379, 101 L.Ed.2d 245 (1988), the United States Supreme Court held that a pro se prisoner-litigant’s notice of appeal was deemed filed on the day that the notice was accepted by the prison mail system and not when it arrived at the court clerk’s office. The Alabama Supreme Court adopted this rule, known as the ‘mailbox rule,’ in Ex parte Williams, 651 So.2d 569 (Ala.1992), in which the court held that a pro se prisoner-litigant’s petition for a writ of certiorari directed to the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals under Rule 25, Ala. R.App. P., was timely filed on the date that the petition was delivered to the prison officials for mailing. The ‘mailbox rule’ governs as to the time of filing of the pro se prisoner-litigant’s notice of appeal in both criminal and civil cases. See Ex parte Jones, 773 So.2d 989 (Ala.1998) (inmate’s notice of appeal was deemed filed on the date he gave it to prison authorities for mailing); Veteto v. Yocum, 793 So.2d 814 (Ala.Civ.App.2001) (extending to civil cases the rule that a pro se prisoner-litigant’s notice of appeal is deemed filed when that document is delivered to a prison official for mailing).”

Parris, 68 So.3d at 110. Rule 4(c), Ala. R.App. P., provides as follows:

“If an inmate confined in an institution and proceeding pro se files a notice of appeal in either a civil or a criminal case, the notice will be considered timely filed if it is deposited in the institution’s internal mail system on or before the last day for filing. If an institution has a system designed for ‘legal’ mail to be processed by the United States Post Office, the inmate must use that system to receive the benefit of this rule. Timely filing may be shown by a notarized statement that sets forth the date the filing was deposited in the institution’s mail system.”

The date that Parris mailed his notice of appeal to the trial court is crucial because, if the mailing was untimely, this court does not have jurisdiction to consider this appeal. “[A]n untimely filed notice of appeal results in a lack of appellate jurisdiction, which cannot be waived.” Parker v. Parker, 946 So.2d 480, 485 (Ala.Civ.App. 2006). To have timely filed his notice of appeal in this case, Parris had to have placed his notice of appeal to the Limestone Circuit Court in the prison’s internal mail system by May 19, 2008. The unverified certificate of service on Parris’s notice of appeal states that the notice was placed in the “U.S. Mail” on May 8, 2008. However, initially, there was no sworn evidence in the record regarding when Parris delivered his notice of appeal to the prison’s mail system. Because this court was unable to determine the timeliness of Parris’s mailing, the cause was remanded to the trial court for it to take evidence on the issue.

In its findings of fact in the order it entered on remand, the trial court stated that, according to the affidavit of Lt. John Romine, who apparently worked at the prison, “there appeared] to be no log or record” indicating that Parris attempted to deposit his notice of appeal within the prison mail system. In his affidavit, Lt. Ro-mine stated that it was the prison’s policy to log an inmate’s “legal mail” when the inmate requested stamps for such mail, but, he said, the person who kept the log during the time in question no longer works for the Department of Corrections, and prison officials could not locate the log. The court further found that, “[ajlterna-tively, inmates can stamp their own legal mail using their own stamp and such mailings would not have been logged by the mailroom clerk.” The trial court noted that Parris had submitted no evidence indicating that he had used that “alternative” method to mail his notice of appeal in this case. Instead, the trial court said, Parris claimed to have dropped his notice of appeal into the prison “legal mail” mailbox. However, the trial court added, Par-ris had also claimed to have submitted letters to the circuit clerk’s office, and “the record is undisputed that no such letters were sent to the Clerk’s office, casting doubt on Parris’s testimony concerning mailings.”

Kelly Sandy, a clerk in the Limestone County Circuit Clerk’s office, submitted an affidavit indicating that the clerk’s office did not receive letters that Parris claimed to have sent inquiring into the status of his case and informing the clerk of his desire to appeal. Sandy said that if the clerk’s office had received such letters from Par-ris, they would have been included in the official record; the trial court stated that the letters do not appear in the record.

Moreover, although Rule 4(c) provides that “[tjimely filing may be shown by a notarized statement that sets forth the date the filing was deposited in the institution’s mail system,” Parris provided no such statement. The trial court concluded that, based upon the evidence before it, Parris had failed to show that he had timely and procedurally complied with Rule 4(c); thus, his notice of appeal to the Limestone Circuit Court was untimely.

Parris appears to have failed to avail himself of the mechanism provided for in Rule 4(c) — a notarized statement setting forth the date on which the notice of appeal was placed in the prison mailing system — which would prove that his notice of appeal was timely mailed. Our review of the record indicates that no evidence was presented that would indicate that the notice of appeal was timely mailed. On the other hand, the evidence is undisputed that the notice of appeal was filed in the circuit clerk’s office on May 27, 2008, more than a week after the May 19, 2008, deadline for filing a timely notice of appeal. Accordingly, based upon the record before us, we must conclude that Parris’s appeal is untimely.

Because Parris’s appeal is untimely, this court has no jurisdiction, and the appeal must be dismissed. Rule 2(a)(1), Ala. R.App. P.

APPEAL DISMISSED.

THOMPSON, P.J., and PITTMAN, BRYAN, and THOMAS, JJ., concur.

MOORE, J., concurs in the result, without writing.

      . In that complaint, Parris alleged that the defendants had denied him medical treatment after he had injured his shoulder playing basketball.


author: THOMAS, Judge.

text:
    DOLLAR GENERAL CORPORATION v. Patricia R. NELSON.
    2070889.
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    July 2, 2009.
    Certiorari Denied Feb. 11, 2011 Alabama Supreme Court 1081361.

      Rick D. Norris, Jr., and Lynn B. Randall of Lamar, Miller, Norris, Haggard & Christie, P.C., Birmingham, for appellant.
    Charles R. Godwin, Timothy J. Godwin, and Gordon B. Godwin, Atmore, for appel-lee.
   THOMAS, Judge.

In 2001, Patricia R. Nelson was employed by Dollar General Corporation at a store located in Brewton. Although Nelson was originally hired as a clerk in the Brewton store, she was promoted to “third key,” assistant manager, and, ultimately, manager. As manager, Nelson was responsible for numerous duties, including opening and closing the store, hiring and scheduling employees, ordering merchandise, stocking shelves, unloading trucks, operating the cash register, and cleaning the store. Nelson’s position required that she check in all merchandise shipped to the store. This duty required Nelson to assist in the unloading of the delivery truck.

On July 30, 2001, Nelson was checking in merchandise and unloading a truck filled with merchandise for her store. She was inside the tractor-trailer, lifting boxes, when she felt pain in her chest. She continued to work because she knew that the truck needed to be unloaded. However, she broke out in a “cold, freaky sweat” and her employees commented that she was “white as a sheet.” Nelson said that she felt faint and that, at the urging of her employees, she went inside the store to the break room to get some water to splash on her face. Once inside the break room, Nelson passed out; apparently, Nelson revived relatively quickly. Although her employees urged her to go home at this point, Nelson remained at work for a while longer. She did leave work early; however, she did not seek medical attention until the following day, July 31, 2001.

Nelson went to the office of her personal physician, Dr. Stanley Barnes, on July 31. Dr. Barnes was not available to see her, so Nelson saw his partner, Dr. Stephen West. Nelson described the incident the day before to Dr. West, stating that she had felt pain in the left part of her chest and in her left arm and that she had broken out in a sweat. Dr. West’s records indicate that her blood pressure at the time of the office visit was 148/82. Nelson had been treated for high blood pressure by Dr. Barnes since November 1999, when her blood pressure was 170/104. Because of his concern over the possibility that Nelson’s pain and sweating might be linked to a cardiac problem, Dr. West referred Nelson to a cardiologist in Montgomery for testing. That testing did not reveal any cardiac abnormalities.

Upon her return visit after the cardiologist appointment, Nelson saw Dr. Barnes on August 17, 2001. Dr. Barnes reported that Nelson was still suffering chest pain at that time. According to Dr. Barnes, because cardiac problems had been ruled out, he diagnosed Nelson with chest-wall pain arising from costochondritis, which can manifest after overexertion or straining. Dr. Barnes injected Nelson with anti-inflammatory medication and told her to avoid lifting anything heavy. He indicated in his deposition that he had recommended that Nelson take off from work for a time but that she had told him that she could not do so because she had to be at work at the store.

On August 25, 2001, Nelson went to work early, at approximately 5:30 a.m., to prepare the stockroom for a specially scheduled delivery truck expected at around 6:00 or 6:30 a.m. Nelson had been off of work the day before. She had scheduled several employees to be in early at work that morning in expectation of the delivery. Because she was still suffering pain from her costochondritis and because Dr. Barnes had advised her not to lift anything heavy for a few weeks, Nelson had come to work planning to run the register while the other employees unloaded the truck; she testified that she did not do any heavy lifting that morning.

At some point, Nelson received a telephone call from the truck driver notifying her that he had been pulled over by the Alabama Department of Transportation and that the delivery would be delayed. Nelson said that she became frustrated at the news because she had scheduled her employees to be in at the early hour and she could only have so many hours on the payroll. Describing the situation, she said “[i]t was just pure stress. I mean, I went my limit.”

Nelson received another telephone call from a customer, at which point she became “thick tongued,” “dumbfounded,” and was unable to communicate on the telephone. Nelson said that it was like she was trying to think but could not. An employee took her to Evergreen Hospital, where she was diagnosed as suffering from a stroke, briefly treated, and then transferred to Sacred Heart Hospital in Pensacola because the doctors believed that a CAT scan revealed an intereranial hemorrhage. Upon her admission and treatment at Sacred Heart, however, it was determined that Nelson had not suffered an intereranial hemorrhage, or a stroke resulting from a burst blood vessel, but instead that she had suffered an “infarct,” a type of stroke that results from the blockage of a blood vessel inside the brain.

Nelson had a history of high blood pressure, having sought treatment for that condition from Dr. Barnes since November 1999. Dr. Barnes explained, in one of his two depositions admitted into evidence at trial, that his treatment of Nelson’s blood pressure with medication had been successful, having reduced her pressure from 170/104 to readings like 160/80, which was her blood pressure on August 17, 2001, and 148/82, which was her blood pressure on July 31, 2001. He noted that the cause of high blood pressure is quite often multifac-torial, including such factors as genetics, smoking, and general lifestyle, which would include a person’s diet, stress level, and tolerance of stress. Dr. Barnes noted that Nelson was a smoker, which he said he had discouraged. He also noted that Nelson had reported stress-related problems to him in June 2001, including some family issues and some work-related issues. He noted in his notes that Nelson had reported working 75-80 hours per week, which he felt was too much for her. He said he urged her to cut back her hours and to take a vacation.

In addition to her high blood pressure, Dr. Barnes also treated Nelson for menopause-related health concerns and anxiety, stress, and depression issues. As he explained in one of his depositions:

“She did, in fact, have some complaints from time to time of some anxiety associated with normal life events, and we did put her on some medication. We gave her samples, and — as I say, we can be very, very specific, as we go long, but I gave her samples of medicine out of the office. She is in an age range where hormones, blood pressure, and anxiety can interplay to create depressive symptoms, and in treating the menopausal symptoms and the blood pressure, sometimes you also in addition treat the anxiety or the depressive symptoms.
“Ms. Nelson is a person who is — she did indicate on many occasions where she had problems at home, problems with relationships, problems with work, problems with relatives, in-laws, that type of thing, and, yet, they all boil down to the same diagnosis of hypertension, anxiety, menopausal symptoms.”

Dr. Barnes testified that stress and pain can affect a person’s blood pressure. In his opinion, the stress from work on the date of the stroke and the continued pain Nelson suffered because of her costochon-dritis combined to increase Nelson’s blood pressure on that date. He testified that, in his opinion, the stress, the pain, and the aggravated blood pressure played a role in Nelson’s stroke on August 25, 2001.

Dr. George Dmytrenko, the neurologist who treated Nelson at Sacred Heart Hospital, also testified by deposition. He testified that his medical history for Nelson, part of which his notes reflect was relayed by Nelson’s mother, Eunice Jackson, revealed that Nelson had suffered an inability to speak coherently both on August 25 and on August 24, 2001. Dr. Dmytrenko’s records indicate that Nelson was transferred to Sacred Heart from Evergreen Hospital based on concern that she had intercranial bleeding. Dr. Dmytrenko testified that Nelson had no intercranial bleeding, however, and that she had suffered what is called an “infarct,” which denotes a cerebral vascular incident without bleeding. This type of stroke, according to Dr. Dmytrenko, is known as

“a bland infarct. A small blood vessel somehow got blocked off, just like your old galvanized water pipes in your 1890s Victorian home, all of a sudden the water doesn’t run, is because there’s too much crud on the inside of the pipe, and that’s the kind of stroke that she ultimately had, and that stroke is due to lifestyle, smoking, and hypertension.”

When asked what role high blood pressure plays in strokes, Dr. Dmytrenko explained:

“As I mentioned earlier hypertension is one of a number of constitutional maladies that can predispose patients to having a stroke. These are things that are usually present and prevalent for years, that have not occurred just overnight, and that have either been not properly cared for or not cared for at all for long periods of time. We’re not talking days and weeks, and in particularly, because of the kind of pathology in her case where the blood vessel somehow for — we don’t know what reason became blocked off, our best guess is that those blood vessels had, quote, hardening of the arteries, atherosclerotic disease, and that hardening of the arteries is due to high blood pressure, diabetes, smoking. She’s got two of those three.
“So — and, again, it’s — the high blood pressure and the smoking are long term lifestyle events. Now, I’ll turn that around a little bit so that we don’t have to go any further on the blood pressure issue. If all of a sudden for no reason at all her blood pressure went totally out of control and she had a massive hemorrhage, a blood vessel blew open in her brain like the radiator hose does on your car on a hot day and we saw a huge clot in her head, then I would say, yeah, that looks like that’s due to high blood pressure. That’s a completely different kind of stroke. That is not at all what this woman had.”

When asked about whether Nelson’s earlier injury and her continued pain while working could have aggravated her blood pressure to a dangerous level, precipitating a blood clot and resulting stroke, as Nelson had alleged in her complaint, Dr. Dmytrenko testified as follows:

“The wive’s tale or the common saw that stress leads to strokes is exactly that. That, in fact, the concept of the type A personality having heart attacks or having strokes does not occur because of specific individual point events. That these are things that occur over years and years and years of uncontrolled high blood pressure, uncontrolled cholesterol, uncontrolled smoking, but that in my opinion to say that somebody lifted a box, developed some chest pain, didn’t feel good, the blood pressure went up, and that all led to a stroke is stretching anything believable.”

The trial court’s lengthy judgment rejects Dr. Dmytrenko’s opinion because both Nelson and Jackson denied Nelson’s having had any symptoms of a stroke on August 24; both women denied reporting that fact to Dr. Dmytrenko. Based on that discrepancy, the trial court concluded that Dr. Dmytrenko’s medical opinion that Nelson’s stroke was not related to her job was unreliable because he did not have a full history or a history reported by Nelson or another proper source.

The procedural history of this case is long and complicated. In fact, this is the second time this case has been before this court. See Nelson v. Dollar Gen. Corp., 900 So.2d 1248 (Ala.Civ.App.2004). Nelson sued Dollar General, seeking workers’ compensation benefits for her stroke on October 13, 2001. The trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of Dollar General in November 2008; we reversed that judgment for its failure to comply with Ala.Code 1975, § 25-5-88, in 2004. Nelson, 900 So.2d at 1249. After the reversal, Nelson, among other things, amended her complaint to include a claim regarding her wages under the federal Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq.; the entire case was then removed to federal court, and the workers’ compensation claim was later remanded to the trial court. In October 2005, the trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of Dollar General; after considering Nelson’s postjudgment motion, the trial court set the summary judgment aside, and the case was set for trial. After some delay caused by continuances and the retirement of the original trial judge, the case was ultimately tried in January 2008. The trial court entered a judgment finding in favor of Nelson, finding her to be permanently and totally disabled, finding her average weekly wage to be $425, and awarding benefits accordingly. After its postjudgment motion was denied, Dollar General appealed.

On appeal, Dollar General argues that the trial court erred in concluding that Nelson proved both legal and medical causation of her stroke. It further argues that the trial court erred in computing Nelson’s average weekly wage. Because we agree that Nelson failed to prove legal causation, we pretermit discussion of Dollar General’s other issues. See Favorite Market Store v. Waldrop, 924 So.2d 719, 723 (Ala.Civ.App.2005) (stating that this court would pretermit discussion of further issues in light of the dispositive nature of another issue).

Our review of this case is governed by the Workers’ Compensation Act, Ala.Code 1975, § 25-5-1 et seq., which states in pertinent part: “In reviewing pure findings of fact, the finding of the circuit court shall not be reversed if that finding is supported by substantial evidence.” Ala. Code 1975, § 25-5-81 (e)(2). Therefore, this court “will view the facts in the light most favorable to the findings of the trial court.” Whitsett v. BAMSI, Inc., 652 So.2d 287, 290 (Ala.Civ.App.1994), overruled on other grounds, Ex parte Trinity Indus., Inc., 680 So.2d 262, 269 (Ala.1996). Further, a trial court’s finding of fact is supported by substantial evidence if it is “supported by ‘evidence of such weight and quality that fair-minded persons in the exercise of impartial judgment can reasonably infer the existence of the fact sought to be proved.’ ” Ex parte Trinity Indus., 680 So.2d at 269 (quoting West v. Founders Life Assurance Co. of Florida, 547 So.2d 870, 871 (Ala.1989), and citing Ala. Code 1975, § 12 — 21—12(d)). Our review of legal issues is without a presumption of correctness. Ala.Code 1975, § 25-5-81(e)(1); see also Ex parte Trinity Indus., 680 So.2d at 268.

Because Nelson did not suffer an “accident” as that term is used in workers’ compensation law, see Ala.Code 1975, § 25-5-1(7) (defining the word “accident” as “an unexpected or unforeseen event, happening suddenly or violently”); Ex parte Trinity Indus., 680 So.2d at 266 & 266 n. 3 (explaining that an accident is “a sudden and traumatic external event”), Nelson’s stroke is considered a “nonacci-dental” injury, caused by the combination and culmination of physical activity and conditions. To succeed in her action for benefits, Nelson must prove both medical and legal causation. The purpose of the distinction between “accidental” and “non-accidental” injuries created by our supreme court in Ex parte Trinity Industries is to require an injured employee to present evidence to enable “ ‘ “the rational mind ... to trace the resultant injury to a proximate cause set in motion by the employment and not otherwise. Id. at 268 (quoting Slimfold Mfg. Co. v. Martin, 417 So.2d 199, 202 (Ala.Civ.App.1981), quoting in turn Wooten v. Roden, 260 Ala. 606, 610, 71 So.2d 802, 805 (1954)). Our supreme court has made it very clear that the purpose of the legal-causation standard is “to prevent employers from being unfairly saddled with the cost of being made an absolute insurer of an employee’s health.” Id. at 267. The accidental/nonac-cidental distinction requires an injured employee who is injured in a manner unlike being struck by a hammer or falling off a ladder to prove more than just that the incident occurred and resulted in an injury. Id. at 266. To establish legal causation, an injured employee suffering from a nonaccidental injury must prove that he or she was exposed to a “ ‘danger or risk materially in excess’ of that danger to which all persons are ordinarily exposed in their everyday lives.” Id. at 269 (quoting City of Tuscaloosa v. Howard, 55 Ala.App. 701, 705, 318 So.2d 729, 732 (Civ.1975)).

The facts that Nelson argues would tend to prove whether, in fact, she was exposed to a risk materially in excess of the typical risks to which all persons are ordinarily exposed in daily life include Nelson’s long hours, the stress of her job, the pain of her earlier injury, and the stress she experienced on the date of the stroke. As explained above, Nelson presented evidence indicating that she worked long hours, between 70 and 80 per week, as the manager of the store. She described her job as stressful, and Dr. Barnes’s notes and testimony revealed that she had mentioned the stressful nature of her job to him. However, Dr. Barnes also noted that Nelson had other stress-causing issues in her life, including problems with family members, problems with relationships, and her own health issues, including her high blood pressure and menopausal concerns. He testified that Nelson was “in an age range where hormones, blood pressure, and anxiety can interplay to create depressive symptoms,” which he said he treated by prescribing medications to regulate her blood pressure and her anxiety or depression symptoms.

On the day of Nelson’s stroke, Nelson arrived at work quite early to prepare the stockroom for incoming merchandise she expected to arrive via a specially arranged truck delivery at around 6:00 or 6:30 a.m. Nelson testified that she had not done any heavy lifting that morning. Nelson was informed at some point that morning that the truck would not be arriving as scheduled. This event, Nelson said, “was just pure stress”; she described her feelings about the event as “I went my limit.” After this stressful event, Nelson suffered her stroke.

This case is not unlike Safeco Insurance Cos. v. Blackmon, 851 So.2d 532, 538 (Ala.Civ.App.2002), in which this court reversed a trial court’s judgment determining that an employee’s working in a stressful job 70-75 hours a week for a two- to three-month period before being diagnosed with a heart condition had proven legal causation of his heart condition. The employee in Blackmon had also suffered other stressful events in and around the same time, including a divorce, the death of a family member, and sending his child to college. Blackmon, 851 So.2d at 538. In reversing the trial court’s judgment, we stated that, “[i]n their everyday lives, people often are exposed to temporary periods of significant stress.” Id. We reversed the trial court’s judgment because there was not enough evidence from which the trial court could have concluded that the employee’s stress “was more severe than what people generally are exposed to at some time or another in their everyday lives.” Id.

The stress that Nelson described suffering cannot be said to have been a “ ‘risk materially in excess’ of that danger to which all persons are ordinarily exposed in their everyday lives.” Ex parte Trinity Indus., 680 So.2d at 269. Nelson testified that she had loved her job as a manager, and she said that she worked hard because she, like her boss, wanted everything perfect in the store. Even she admitted that every employee suffers some level of stress over his or her employment because the employee needs the job and should want to do a good job. Everyone has had to deal with changes in schedules and with situations that go awry, both in employment and in everyday life. Working extended hours and dealing with pain after an injury are also typical situations that people must endure in both their employment and in their everyday lives. We cannot agree that Nelson presented substantial evidence indicating that she was exposed to a “ ‘danger or risk materially in excess’ of that danger to which all persons are ordinarily exposed in their everyday lives.” Id.

Because Nelson failed to present evidence sufficient to prove that she was exposed to a “ ‘danger or risk materially in excess’ of that danger to which all persons are ordinarily exposed in their everyday lives,” id., she failed to prove legal causation of her stroke. We therefore reverse the trial court’s judgment awarding Nelson workers’ compensation benefits. Because our conclusion that Nelson failed to prove legal causation is dispositive, we pretermit discussion of Dollar General’s other arguments on appeal. See Waldrop, 924 So.2d at 723.

REVERSED.

PITTMAN and BRYAN, JJ., concur.

THOMPSON, P.J., and MOORE, J., concur in the result, without writings.

      . Although the employee in Blackmon was required to prove legal causation by clear and convincing evidence, see Blackmon, 851 So.2d at 537 (explaining that the employee, because he was arguing that his condition had developed gradually over time, was required to prove legal causation by clear and convincing evidence), as opposed to merely by a preponderance of the evidence, we find the rationale of the opinion instructive.