author: BENTON, C.J.

text:
    Lonnie FRITTS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D10-0944.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    April 15, 2011.

      Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and David P. Gauldin, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Christine Ann Guard, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   BENTON, C.J.

Lonnie Fritts appeals his conviction for grand theft, a felony of the third degree. Because evidence of value was insufficient to prove the felony beyond a reasonable doubt, we reverse with directions to enter judgment for the lesser included offense of petit theft, and to resentence him accordingly.

“We review de novo the trial court’s denial of a motion for [judgment of acquittal], to determine solely whether the evidence is legally sufficient.” Robinson v. State, 986 So.2d 1164, 1166 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (citing Pagan v. State, 830 So.2d 792, 803 (Fla.2002); Jones v. State, 790 So.2d 1194, 1196 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001) (en banc)). “The legal test for determining whether a JOA should be granted is “whether after all conflicts in the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom have been resolved in favor of the verdict on appeal, there is substantial, competent evidence to support the verdict and judgment.’ ” Id. (quoting Tibbs v. State, 397 So.2d 1120, 1123 (Fla.1981)). In the present case, the state had the burden of proving, inter alia, that the value of the property Mr. Fritts unlawfully obtained was $300 or more. See § 812.014(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (2007).

“Value means the market value of the property at the time and place of the offense ....” § 812.012(10)(a)l., Fla. Stat. (2007). The value of tangible personal property may be proved with evidence of the original purchase price, together with the percentage or amount of depreciation since the property’s purchase, its manner of use, and its condition and quality. See Pickett v. State, 839 So.2d 860, 861-62 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (citing Negron v. State, 306 So.2d 104, 108 (Fla.1974), receded from on other grounds, Butterworth v. Fluellen, 389 So.2d 968 (Fla.1980)). Here, the property owner’s testimony as to the value of a television (“probably worth a hundred bucks now”), a DVD/VCR combination (“[a]bout a hundred fifty bucks, maybe”), and a stereo set (“[a]bout $200”) was equivocal and uncertain. The property owner did testify to what he paid to purchase two of the items, and to when he had acquired the television, but this testimony did not establish the value of any of the items at the time of the theft beyond a reasonable doubt, considering the nature of the property. See Lucky v. State, 25 So.3d 691, 692 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (“Electrical components like televisions, computers, and stereo systems are subject to accelerated obsolescence....”).

“[A]n owner is generally presumed as competent to testify to the value of his stolen property.” Taylor v. State, 425 So.2d 1191, 1193 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). But a property owner’s mere guess at, or uninformed estimate of, the value of his property is insufficient, without more, to establish its value beyond a reasonable doubt. See Sellers v. State, 838 So.2d 661, 663 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) (citing Gilbert v. State, 817 So.2d 980, 982 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)). Mr. Cappelletti, the owner of the property at issue here, conceded on cross-examination that he had guessed at the values to which he testified.

Accordingly, pursuant to section 924.34, Florida Statutes (2010), we reverse the conviction and sentence for felony grand theft, and remand with directions to enter judgment for the lesser included offense of petit theft, a misdemeanor; and to resen-tence appellant accordingly. See § 812.014(3)(a), Fla. Stat. (2007). ’

Reversed and remanded, with instructions.

PADOVANO and WETHERELL, JJ., concur.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: PER CURIAM.

license: Public Domain

text:
    Darrell JOHNSON, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 1D11-1500.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    April 15, 2011.
    Darrell Johnson, pro se, Petitioner.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

The petition for writ of mandamus is denied on the merits.

WEBSTER, ROBERTS, and WETHERELL, JJ., concur.


text:
    A STOP PAIN MANAGEMENT, LLC, Petitioner, v. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, Respondent.
    No. 1D11-1070.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    April 15, 2011.

      Anthony Vitale and Jon May, Miami, for Petitioner.
    Mark Graham Hanson, Assistant General Counsel, Department of Health, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

The petition for review of non-final administrative action is denied on the merits.

WOLF, WEBSTER, and VAN NORTWICK, JJ., concur.


author: WARNER, J.

text:
    M.S., Sr., P.S., individually and as parents and next friends of M.S., Jr., a minor, Appellants, v. KIDS IN DISTRESS, INC., Appellee.
    Nos. 4D09-1394, 4D10-2905.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    April 20, 2011.

      Keith Chasin of Law Office of Keith Chasin, Miami, for appellant.
    Yamile Tamargo of Mintzer, Sarowitz, Zeris, Ledva & Meyers, LLP, Coral Gables, for appellee.
   WARNER, J.

The parents of a minor, who was sexually abused by another child in an after-school program, appeal a summary judgment entered in favor of Kids in Distress, a provider of social services to abused and neglected children. The judgment determines that Kids in Distress (“KID”) had no duty to disclose the perpetrator’s history of engaging in sexual abuse, because section 39.202, Florida Statutes (2004), prohibits the dissemination of this information to the afterschool program, run by the City of Wilton Manors. In addition, the trial court rejected the claim that KID should have notified the abuser’s foster parent, who would have told the program of the child’s tendencies, because such a claim was not pled. We hold that while KID could not disseminate the child’s history to the afterschool program, it could have disclosed the information to the school administration itself. Because the principal testified that she would have notified the afterschool program of the need to closely supervise the child, disputed issues of material fact remain. However, as to the foster parent, we agree with the trial court that an action based upon failure to notify the foster parent was not pled.

In their complaint, the parents of M.S., a five-year-old child, alleged that he was sexually assaulted by S.T., another student of the same age, while the two were in a restroom at Wilton Manors Elementary School and attending an afterschool program called “BASH.” The City of Wilton Manors, not the school, operates and runs the BASH program. However, the school and the program work closely together, as they serve the same children. KID is a child placement agency under contract with ChildNet to provide services for sexually abused children. The Department of Children and Families contracts with ChildNet to provide social services to dependent children. S.T. had been placed with a foster parent, Ms. Harding, through KID. The complaint alleged that KID placed S.T. in BASH without providing information to BASH regarding S.T.’s background, which included prior incidents involving deviant sexual behavior. KID knew that S.T. needed to be closely monitored so that he would not harm other children, but failed to inform BASH of S.T.’s issues. KID failed to give this information to any of S.T.’s caregivers. Had it disclosed S.T.’s background, supervisory precautions would have been taken so that S.T. would not have been allowed to follow M.S. into the bathroom alone. Because of KID’s failure to give this information, S.T. was left alone with M.S. when the abuse took place.

KID answered the complaint and denied the allegations. Discovery revealed that S.T.’s foster mother, and not KID, enrolled S.T. in BASH. However, KID had enrolled the child in the elementary school and did not tell the principal of S.T.’s issues. The principal testified by way of deposition that had she known of S.T.’s issues she would have required one-on-one supervision of S.T. at all times and would also have alerted BASH of the necessity to keep close supervision of S.T. A KID manager told her after the incident that he should have informed the school about S.T.’s issues.

The foster parent testified that KID did not tell her of S.T.’s prior incidents, and had she been informed, she would have alerted BASH. On the second day after she received S.T. in foster care, S.T. had a sexual incident with the foster parent’s roommate, which she reported to KID. Another sexually charged incident occurred shortly before the incident with M.S., and the foster parent also reported this incident to KID.

KID moved for summary judgment on the basis that KID was statutorily prohibited from disclosing information regarding S.T.’s history to BASH, because BASH was not within the class of persons and entities permitted to receive such information pursuant to section 39.202, Florida Statutes. Moreover, the complaint did not define “caregivers” to whom KID failed to give S.T.’s background information. In response, M.S.’s parents claimed that KID had not divulged the full extent of S.T.’s prior deviant behavior to his foster parent or to the school.

The trial court entered summary judgment for KID, concluding that KID was not authorized to furnish information on S.T.’s prior history to BASH. The court further ruled that failure to notify the foster parent of S.T.’s sexual abuse history was not pled in the complaint and that KID had no duty to notify her, as she was not the foster parent of S.T. (This fact, of course, is contrary to the evidence presented.) From this order, the parents of M.S. appeal. We review a summary judgment de novo. See Fina v. Hennarichs, 19 So.3d 1081, 1084 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009).

Section 39.202 provides for the confidentiality of reports and records maintained by the DCF of cases of child abuse and neglect. It prohibits the dissemination of those reports and records except to certain classes of persons and entities:

(1) In order to protect the rights of the child and the child’s parents or other persons responsible for the child’s welfare, all records held by the department concerning reports of child ... abuse ... shall be confidential and ... shall not be disclosed except as specifically authorized by this chapter....
(2) Except as provided in subsection (4), access to such records, excluding the name of the reporter which shall be released only as provided in subsection (5), shall be granted only to the following persons, officials, and agencies:
(a) Employees, authorized agents, or contract providers of the department, the Department of Health, or county agencies responsible for carrying out:
1. Child or adult protective investigations;
2. Ongoing child or adult protective services;
3. Healthy Start services; or
4. Licensure or approval of adoptive homes, foster homes, or child care facilities, or family day care homes or informal child care providers who receive subsidized child care funding, or other homes used to provide for the care and welfare of children.
5. Services for victims of domestic violence when provided by certified domestic violence centers working at the department’s request as case consultants or with shared clients.
(d) The parent or legal custodian of any child who is alleged to have been abused
(p) The principal of a public school, private school, or charter school where the child is a student. Information contained in the records which the principal determines are necessary for a school employee to effectively provide a student with educational services may be released to that employee.

§ 39.202, Fla. Stat. (2004) (Emphasis added). A general provider of child care is not included in the list of authorized persons who may receive such access.

The statute is clear and unambiguous on its face. KID, being a contract provider for the Department of Children and Families, although authorized to receive the reports and records of DCF regarding abuse to S.T., was not authorized to disclose the information to BASH, a childcare provider. If it had done so, it would have committed a misdemeanor. See § 39.205(3), Fla. Stat. (2004).

No provision of the statute allows a child caretaker to receive these records. While it may seem to us that BASH had need of that information to secure the safety of the other children in the program, the Legislature did not include child caretakers in the list of authorized receivers of the abuse information.

Nevertheless, KID could have disseminated these reports and the information contained therein to the principal of the elementary school pursuant to section 39.202(2)(p). In her deposition, the principal testified that had she known of S.T.’s issues, she would have required someone to be present with S.T. at all times, and she would have informed BASH. Although the statute permits the principal to share the information contained in the records only with a “school employee,” and BASH was not a school-run program, the statute would not preclude the principal from informing BASH that S.T. would require additional supervision, without revealing the information contained in abuse records of DCF. The statute requires only that the records of child abuse reports made to DCF be kept confidential. Telling BASH to provide additional supervision for S.T. would not violate the statute.

The parents also claim that the trial court erred in failing to allow the amendment of the complaint to allege in more detail a cause of action against KID for failure to inform the foster parent of S.T.’s issues, which would have led the foster parent to report them to BASH. They rely on section 39.202(2)(s), Florida Statutes, which authorizes the dissemination of the Department’s abuse reports to foster parents. That section, however, was not enacted until 2008 and would not apply to this incident, which occurred in 2004. For that reason, we conclude that the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment as to any claim against KID for failure to inform S.T.’s foster parent of S.T.’s history, because no cause of action for failure to inform the foster parent was specifically pled nor has it been shown that the complaint could be amended to state a cause of action. Cf. Hervey v. Alfonso, 650 So.2d 644, 647 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995).

We conclude that the court erred in determining that KID was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Although KID could not disclose DCF reports of abuse directly to BASH, the child caretak-ing program, section 39.202(2)(p) permitted it to inform the school of S.T.’s history. Whether the failure to inform constituted a proximate cause of the abuse suffered by M.S. was not determined by the court, and it remains a disputed issue of fact.

For these reasons, we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

POLEN and LEVINE, JJ., concur.

      . We find 2004 to be the applicable year of the statute, as it was the statute in effect at the time of the alleged sexual assault.


author: WHATLEY, Judge.

text:
    Dana Alan PEVEY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 2D10-3963.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    April 20, 2011.
    Dana Alan Pevey, pro se.
   WHATLEY, Judge.

Dana Alan Pevey appeals the order granting in part and denying in part his motion pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a) seeking proper credit for time served. The postconviction court determined that Pevey was entitled to five more days credit than he had received, and it awarded him those five additional days on count one only. Consequently, the court denied Pevey’s assertion that the sentencing court had orally pronounced that he would receive credit against both counts of his consecutive sentences. The record before us does not contain the sentencing transcript, and it was not attached to either Pevey’s motion or the court’s order. Accordingly, we remand for the postconviction court to determine whether the transcript is in the record. If it is, the court shall either grant Pevey’s motion or deny it and attach the portions of the record refuting Pevey’s claim. If the transcript is not in the record, the court shall deny Pevey’s motion without prejudice to him filing an amended motion with the relevant portion of the transcript attached. See Beard v. State, 27 So.3d 186, 187-88 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010) (citing Williams v. State, 957 So.2d 600, 604 (Fla.2007)).

Remanded with directions.

KELLY and LaROSE, JJ., Concur.


text:
    Miguel FLORES, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D10-1349.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    April 20, 2011.
    Miguel Flores, Arcadia, pro se.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Jeanine M. Germanowiez, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

We reverse the trial court’s order denying appellant’s Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a) motion to correct illegal sentence. The factual basis for the plea in this case did not establish actual possession of the firearm which is necessary for the three-year mandatory minimum to apply. Dawkins v. State, 923 So.2d 520 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005); § 775.087(2)(a)l, Fla. Stat. (2001). The face of the record shows that appellant was in constructive, not actual, possession of the firearm. We reverse and remand for the trial court to strike the mandatory minimum term from the sentence imposed on the possession of a firearm by a convicted felon count. Resen-tencing is not required, and appellant need not be present for this ministerial sentence correction.

Reverse and remand with directions to strike the three-year firearm mandatory minimum.

WARNER, TAYLOR and HAZOURI, JJ., concur.


text:
    Jeffrey H. GALPERN, Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE o/b/o Gina Marie GALPERN, Appellees.
    No. 4D10-993.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    April 20, 2011.
    Benjamin T. Hodas of Law Office of Benjamin T. Hodas, LLC, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and William H. Branch, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for appel-lee Department of Revenue.
   PER CURIAM.

A father appeals an order holding him in contempt for failure to pay child support, claiming that the order is facially deficient in its findings that he has the ability to pay the purge amount set. The court found that he made $400 per week plus commissions but found that he was on food stamps and had not made a mortgage payment in 18 months. Nevertheless, the court set the purge amount at $700 to be paid immediately and $20,000 every sixty days thereafter until the entire $92,000 arrearage is paid. The Department concedes that the order is facially defective. We reverse and remand for the court to make sufficient findings to support its order, or to revise the purge amount. The court, or child support hearing officer, may take additional evidence on the issue.

WARNER, LEVINE and CONNER, JJ., concur.


author: POLEN, J.

text:
    Miratel CAPITAINE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D10-630.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    April 20, 2011.

      Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Anthony Calvello, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Heidi L. Bettendorf, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
   POLEN, J.

Appellant challenges his- sentence on the charge of grand theft auto, arguing that the trial court failed to renew the offer of counsel prior to sentencing. We agree and reverse and remand for resentencing.

Appellant proceeded to trial on three charges. A Faretta hearing was held on January 20, 2010, immediately prior to the commencement of trial. Appellant represented himself at trial and solely conducted his defense. Most of the trial took place on January 20; however, the trial ended five days later, on January 25, 2010. The jury convicted appellant on count 3, grand theft auto. Immediately after polling the jury, the trial court proceeded with sentencing. Prior to sentencing, the trial court did not renew an offer of counsel. The trial court sentenced appellant to three years in prison.

Appellant argues that the court erred in failing to renew the offer of counsel prior to sentencing. The State acknowledges that the trial court did not renew the offer of counsel at the beginning of the sentencing portion of the proceeding, but argues that any error was harmless.

Rule 3.111(d)(5) provides that an offer of assistance of counsel shall be renewed by the court at each subsequent stage of the proceeding at which the defendant appears without counsel. “Sentencing is a critical stage of a criminal proceeding, and a trial court must renew the offer of counsel even if the defendant has previously waived counsel.” Monte v. State, 51 So.3d 1196, 1201 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011) (quoting Beard v. State, 751 So.2d 61, 62 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)). “[Ejven if a defendant does not request appointment of counsel, this omission is not considered a knowing waiver of the right to counsel” before sentencing. Id. (quoting Hardy v. State, 655 So.2d 1245, 1248 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995)).

The trial court erred in failing to renew an offer of counsel before appellant’s sentencing. See id.; see also Kep-ner v. State, 911 So.2d 1256, 1258 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (“[T]he court’s failure to renew the offer of counsel prior to sentencing was error requiring reversal and resen-tencing.”); Bowman v. State, 550 So.2d 544, 544 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989) (“[W]e reverse appellant’s sentence since it was error not to renew the offer of assistance of counsel to him at sentencing.”).

Mincey v. State, 684 So.2d 236 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996), cited by the State in support of its harmless error argument, is distinguishable. In Mincey, “appellant relied on standby counsel extensively, before, during and after the trial,” and standby counsel handled the sentencing. Id. at 238. But see Harris v. State, 687 So.2d 29, 30 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997) (“While we agree that the court should have renewed the offer of assistance of counsel prior to sentencing, we find such error to be harmless in this case. Harris was sentenced within the guideline range and, based on this record, we do not believe that he would have gotten a lesser sentence had the court appointed ten lawyers to speak for him.”).

Accordingly, we reverse the sentence on appeal, and remand for resentencing after a proper renewal of the offer of counsel.

Reversed and Remanded.

GROSS, C.J., and DAMOORGIAN, JJ., concur.

      . Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975).


text:
    Vincent BILELLO, Appellant, v. STATE FARM FLORIDIAN INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee.
    No. 4D09-4995.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    April 20, 2011.
    Jonathan Mann of Law Offices of Robin Bresky, Boca Raton, and Peter G. Walsh of Stabinski & Funt, P.A., Miami, for appellant.
    Elizabeth K. Russo of Russo Appellate Firm, P.A., Miami, and Bernstein, Chack-man, Liss & Rose, Hollywood, for appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. See Ellie’s 50’s Diner, Inc. v. Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp., 54 So.3d 1081 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011).

GROSS, C.J., HAZOURI and CIKLIN, JJ., concur.


author: WEIMER, Justice. GUIDRY, Justice,

text:
    Laurie Ann SENSEBE v. CANAL INDEMNITY COMPANY, Mississippi Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Company, Top Hatch, Inc. and Deborah Boudreaux.
    No. 2010-C-0703.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 28, 2011.

      Porteous, Hainkel & Johnson, LLP, Dan Richard Dorsey, Covington, for Appellant.
    Michael John Bourquard, New Orleans; Cashe Coudrain & Sandage, Ashley Edwards-Sandage, Hammond; Discon Law Firm, Thomas M. Discon, Mandeville; Johnson, Johnson, Barrios & Yacoubian, Nicholas John Chauvin, Rene Sylvain Paysse, Jr.; Michael Hingle & Associates, LLC, Samuel Austin McElroy, Bryan August Pfleeger, New Orleans, Waldon Michael Hingle, for Respondents.
   WEIMER, Justice.

| ,This court granted a writ application filed by a defendant insurer to determine whether coverage must be provided under a motor vehicle insurance policy that purports to exclude coverage for a driver who is engaged in the “automobile business.” We find that the “automobile business” exclusion in the insurance policy violates Louisiana’s public policy of requiring insurance coverage as expressed in the Louisiana Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Law, LSA-R.S. 32:851 to 1043. Most specifically, LSA-R.S. 32:900(B)(2) requires coverage for permissive drivers. The “automobile business” exclusion impermissibly conflicts with LSA-R.S. 32:900(B)(2). Therefore, the district court’s dismissal from this lawsuit of an insurer invoking the “automobile business” exclusion is reversed. Though our reasoning significantly differs from the court of appeal, inasmuch as the court of appeal ruled that the automobile business exclusion did not justify dismissing the insurer, the judgment of the court of appeal is affirmed.

| .FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The question of insurance coverage arises from the following events. On November 14, 2006, Laurie Ann Sensebe was driving on the 1-10 “twin span” bridge in St. Tammany Parish when her vehicle was rear-ended by a pickup truck owned by Gregory Hyneman and operated by Deborah Boudreaux.

At the time of the accident, Ms. Bou-dreaux was an employee of Top Hatch, Inc. (“Top Hatch”). Ms. Boudreaux was driving the pickup truck from Dub Herring Ford, Inc., the dealership where Mr. Hyneman had purchased the vehicle several months earlier. The dealership had contracted with Top Hatch to replace the seat covers with leather at Top Hatch’s shop. Ms. Boudreaux was transporting the vehicle to Top Hatch so that the work could be done on the seats.

Ms. Sensebe has filed the instant lawsuit seeking damages for personal injuries and property damages she allegedly suffered from the accident. In her petition, Ms. Sensebe names as a defendant Mississippi Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Co. (“Farm Bureau”), which insured Mr. Hyneman’s pickup truck. Ms. Sensebe also names as a defendant Canal Indemnity Co. (“Canal Indemnity”), which insured Top Hatch.

Farm Bureau moved for summary judgment, urging that the Farm Bureau insurance policy provides no coverage and, therefore, Farm Bureau should be dismissed from the lawsuit. Farm Bureau explained that the insurance policy Mr. Hyneman purchased has an “automobile business” exclusion, and Farm Bureau argued that this exclusion applied because Ms. Boudreaux was driving the Hyneman vehicle while employed by Top Hatch. “[Ejmploying the general rules of interpretation of contracts set forth in the Louisiana Civil Code,” argued Farm Bureau, the automobile business exclusion unambiguously reflected the insurer’s and | Sinsured’s intent to exclude a driver such as Ms. Boudreaux from coverage. Farm Bureau also cited examples from Louisiana’s jurisprudence when courts have indeed enforced automobile business exclusions.

Acknowledging that much of the jurisprudence upon which Farm Bureau relied pre-dated Louisiana’s Compulsory Motor Vehicle Liability Security law enacted in 1977, Farm Bureau noted the possibility that the automobile business exclusion may violate the current public policy of this state. Therefore, in its motion, Farm Bureau advanced an alternative argument: “if the Farm Bureau automobile business exclusion is found to be contrary to public policy, Farm Bureau’s coverage is limited to the statutory minimum limits of coverage of $10,000.00/$20,000.00.” The limits of coverage stated in Farm Bureau’s policy are $100,000 per person and $800,000 per accident.

Both the plaintiff, Ms. Sensebe, and Farm Bureau’s co-defendant, Canal Indemnity, opposed Farm Bureau’s motion for summary judgment. Taking the lead in opposing Farm Bureau, Canal Indemnity argued that Top Hatch was not the type of business contemplated by the automobile business exclusion. Canal Indemnity urged that Top Hatch’s upholstery work, such as replacing the seat covers in the pickup truck with leather, did not render Top Hatch a “repair shop” as defined in Farm Bureau’s automobile business exclusion. Canal Indemnity also argued that the 14automobile business exclusion did — as Farm Bureau alluded it might — violate Louisiana’s public policy of covering permissive drivers.

Canal Indemnity and Top Hatch together brought their own motion for summary judgment, urging that Farm Bureau’s policy provides primary coverage and, consequently, Canal Indemnity’s policy should only provide coverage after the Farm Bureau policy limits of $100,000.00 are exhausted.

The district court heard argument on the two motions for summary judgment and ruled from the bench. Granting Farm Bureau’s motion, the court explained:

the automobile business exclusion of Farm Bureau’s policy is clearly applicable and does not apply to the named insure[d].
Top Hatch is an automobile business, and Ms. Boudreaux was operating Hyneman’s vehicle while in the course and scope of her employment when the accident had occurred. Under these facts the exclusion is not against public policy when applied to dispute coverage in favor of the third party, Ms. Bou-dreaux, who is covered by another policy of insurance, specifically the policy issued by Canal Indemnity.

The court denied Canal Indemnity’s and Top Hatch’s motion for summary judgment, explaining:

The Court’s finding that the Farm Bureau policy excludes coverage and is therefore not collectible results in the Canal policy providing primary coverage for the negligence of Ms. Boudreaux. The motions for summary judgment filed by Canal [are] therefore denied.

The district court’s rulings were formalized in a written judgment, which was certified to be a final judgment pursuant to LSA-C.C.P. art. 1915(B). Canal Indemnity and Top Hatch moved for a devolutive appeal, which the district court granted and designated the summary judgment in favor of Farm Bureau as a final, appeal-able judgment.

|sThe court of appeal reversed the district court, finding Farm Bureau had failed to carry its burden of proving that the automobile business exclusion applied. Sensebe v. Canal Indem. Co., 2009-1325, p. 7 (La.App. 1 Cir. 2/24/10), 35 So.3d 1122, 1126. The court explained that according to a strict construction of the exclusionary terms, “the installation of leather upholstery is an after-market upgrade and not an automobile repair or service as reasonably contemplated by these terms.” Sensebe, 2009-1325 at 7, 35 So.3d at 1126. The court of appeal did not reach the question of whether the exclusion should be struck as violating Louisiana’s public policy because the court instead found that the exclusion did not apply as a matter of contractual interpretation. Sensebe, 2009-1325 at 7, 35 So.3d at 1126.

Farm Bureau applied for a writ of review, which this court granted. Sensebe v. Canal Indem. Co., 2010-0703 (La.6/25/10), 38 So.3d 358.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

Appellate courts review summary judgments de novo, using the same criteria that govern the district court’s consideration of whether summary judgment is appropriate. Schroeder v. Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University, 591 So.2d 342, 345 (La.1991). A court must grant a motion for summary judgment “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to material fact, and that mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” LSA-C.C.P. art. 966(B). The summary judgment procedure, which is designed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of civil actions, is now favored in our law. LSA-C.C.P. art. 966(A)(2). The summary judgment procedure is also an appropriate procedure for determining certain insurance coverage issues. See, e.g., Peterson v. Schimek, 98-1712 (La.3/2/99), 729 So.2d 1024.

|fiIn this case, Farm Bureau moved for summary judgment and advanced two arguments: 1) the policy issued to Mr. Hyneman afforded no coverage at all because under the wording of the automobile business exclusion, Ms. Boudreaux was not insured when driving to her employer, Top Hatch; and 2) at most, and if the automobile business exclusion were found to violate the public policy of this state, liability coverage should be limited to the statutory minimum of $10,000/20,000.

In order to analyze the merits of these arguments, the relevant language from the insurance policy must be examined. Under the “DEFINITION OF INSURED,” the policy states, in pertinent part:

The insurance with respect to any person or. organization other than the named Insured or spouse does not apply:
(1) to any person or organization, or to any agent or employee thereof, operating an automobile business, with respect to any accident arising out of the operation thereof....

Then, under the “OTHER DEFINITIONS” heading, the policy states, in pertinent part:

(2) Automobile Business means an automobile sales agency, repair shop, service station, storage garage or public parking place.

The starting point in analyzing insurance policies is the principle that an insurance policy is a contract between the parties and should be construed using the general rules of interpretation of contracts set forth in the Civil Code. LeBlanc v. Aysenne, 2005-0297, p. 3 (La.1/19/06), 921 So.2d 85, 89; Edwards v. Daugherty, 2003-2103 & 2104, p. 11 (La.10/1/04), 883 So.2d 932, 940; Cadwallader v. Allstate Insurance Co., 2002-1637, p. 3 (La.6/27/03), 848 So.2d 577, 580; Louisiana Insurance Guaranty Association v. Interstate Fire & Casualty Co., 1993-0911, p. 5 (La.1/14/94), 630 So.2d 759, 763. Though there are numerous well-settled interpretive principles specific to insurance policies, for present purposes, one is especially pertinent: “When the words of an insurance contract are clear and explicit and lead to no absurd consequences, no further interpretation may be made in search of the parties’ intent and courts must enforce the contract as written.” Sims v. Mulhearn Funeral Home, Inc., 2007-0054, p. 8 (La.5/22/07), 956 So.2d 583, 589, citing LSA-C.C. art. 2046.

In the record before us, Top Hatch indicated in a discovery response that it “installs leather interiors and performs repairs to sunroofs.” While it might be said that Top Hatch’s business involves both installation and repairs-undeniably, engaging in repairs is part of its business. The driver from such a business fits within the contractually excluded category of “repair shop” drivers. In determining the applicability of automobile business exclusions, we find it was error for the appellate court to myopically focus on the fact that the vehicle was being driven in anticipation of installing the seats instead of focusing on the fact that the business itself was engaged in repairs. The conditions for the exclusion have therefore been met, and from a purely contractual standpoint, the exclusion would be given effect. See Sims, 2007-0054 at 8-9, 956 So.2d at 589 (“Courts lack the authority to alter the terms of insurance contracts under the guise of contractual interpretation when the policy’s provisions are couched in unambiguous terms.”).

This case, however, calls upon us not only to contractually interpret the automobile business exclusion, but also to evaluate the effect of the exclusion based on relevant statutory provisions which recite the public policy of Louisiana. As we | shave previously observed: “exclusions contained within the policy that conflict with statutes or public policy will not be enforced.” Marcus v. Hanover Ins. Co., 98-2040, p. 4 (La.6/4/99), 740 So.2d 603, 606.

The court’s search for the public policy governing automobile insurance policies, therefore, must begin with the statutes enacted by the legislature. We have previously found: “The Louisiana Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Law, LSA-R.S. 32:851 through LSA-R.S. 32:1043, sets forth a mandatory, comprehensive scheme to provide financial protection to those involved in motor vehicle accidents.” Hawkins v. Redmon, 2009-2418, p. 4 (La.7/6/10), 42 So.3d 360, 362. This protective statutory scheme not only mandates that owners of motor vehicles obtain insurance coverage, but these comprehensive statutes also mandate many of the contractual terms of insurance policies. Hawkins, 2009-2418 at 5, 42 So.3d at 363. For example, there is a statutory requirement for insurance policies to provide minimal dollar amounts of coverage for accidents. Id., citing LSA-R.S. 32:861.

Importantly, there is also a statutory requirement for insurance policies to designate what drivers are covered. LSA-R.S. 32:900(B)(2) provides:

B. Such owner’s policy of liability insurance:
(2) Shall insure the person named therein and any other person, as insured, using any such motor vehicle or motor vehicles with the express or implied permission of such named insured against loss from the liability imposed by law for damages arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of such motor vehicle or motor vehicles....

In applying LSA-R.S. 32:900(B)(2) to the facts of this case, we begin as we must with the words of the statute itself.

The starting point in the interpretation of any statute is the language of the statute itself. Words and phrases shall be read in context and shall be construed according to the common and approved usage of the | slanguage. LSA-R.S. 1:3. The meaning and intent of a law is determined by considering the law in its entirety and by placing a construction on the law that is consistent with the express terms of the law and with the obvious intent of the legislature in enacting the law.

Hawkins, 2009-2418 at 9, 42 So.3d at 365.

Under the plain language of LSA-R.S. 32:900(B)(2), there is a mechanism for motor vehicle liability policies to cover not only the insured specifically named in the policy, but also to cover any other driver who drives with the permission of the named insured. From the legislature’s choice of the word “shall” in LSA-R.S. 32:900(B)(2), we are bound to conclude that the mechanism for coverage of permissive drivers is not optional, but mandatory. See Borel v. Young, 2007-0419 (La.11/27/07), 989 So.2d 42, quoting BlacK’s Law Dictionary, 1375 (6th ed.1990) and citing Pittman Construction Co. v. Housing Authority of Opelousas, 167 F.Supp. 517, 523 n. 38 (W.D.La.1958), aff'd, 264 F.2d 695 (5th Cir.1959) (“The word ‘shall’ is ordinarily imperative, of similar effect and import with the word ‘must,’ and inconsistent with the idea of discretion.”).

The language within an insurance policy which fulfills the requirement of LSA-R.S. 32:900(B)(2) is “commonly known as the statutory omnibus clause.” Simms v. Butler, 1997-0416, p. 3 (La.12/2/97), 702 So.2d 686, 688. The requirement for omnibus coverage for drivers who use the insured’s vehicle with permission is so crucial to Louisiana’s public policy that “La. R.S. 32:900(B)(2) is incorporated into |10every policy of insurance to which it is applicable, as if it were written in the policy itself.” Id.

Farm Bureau’s insurance policy has an omnibus clause, but the automobile business exclusion quoted earlier — if given effect — would negate the liability coverage afforded under the omnibus clause. Therefore, the automobile business exclusion and the omnibus insured coverage required by LSA-R.S. 32:900(B)(2) are in direct conflict. Faced with this conflict, this court must choose to enforce the statute by striking down the conflicting exclusion. See Marcus, 98-2040 at 4, 740 So.2d at 606 (“Any policy provision that narrows or restricts statutorily-mandated coverage will not be enforced.”).

In Marcus, we struck down a more general “business use exclusion” and noted that the “automobile business exclusion [is] another use exclusion similar to” the general “business use exclusion.” Marcus, 98-2040 at 5, 740 So.2d at 607. We cited court of appeal decisions from the First, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits holding that the automobile business exclusion “violates public policy because it conflicts with the so-called ‘omnibus clause.’ ” We explained that “[t]hese courts found that because the exclusion conflicted with the statutory provisions mandating compulsory insurance for all drivers who use the insured’s vehicle with his permission, the exclusion was unenforceable.” Marcus, 98-2040 at 6, 740 So.2d at 607, citing McCrossen v. Star Auto Service, Inc., 628 So.2d 1350 (La.App. 5 Cir.1993); Arnaud v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 594 So.2d 992 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1992); Louisiana Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Darjean, 554 So.2d 1376 (La.App. 1 Cir.1989); and Rudison v. Richard, 526 So.2d 369 (La. App. 4 Cir.1988).

After Marcus, and against the great weight of these authorities we favorably cited therein, the Fifth Circuit recently enforced an exclusion similar to the automobile business exclusion here. In Burgos v. Star Auto Service, Inc., 07-229 (La.App. 5 Cir. 11/13/07), 973 So.2d 29, plaintiffs car was rear-ended by a vehicle driven by Joseph Margavio, who was employed by Star Auto, which had been hired to repair the vehicle. Mr. Margavio was test-driving the vehicle owned by Carmen Tessitore. At the time, Ms. Tessitore had liability insurance issued by Electric Insurance Company, and Star Auto had a “garagekeepers” liability policy issued by Lafayette Insurance Company. The Electric Insurance Company insurance policy on Ms. Tessitore’s vehicle contained an exclusion for “road testing and delivery.” Burgos, 07-229 at 5, 973 So.2d at 31.

Noting that in Marcus a general business exclusion was sought to be enforced against the named insured when driving his own vehicle while at work, the Burgos court found “Marcus ... is limited to its facts, that is to say, to cases in which the relevant carrier was invoking the business use exclusion against the named insured with regard to the operation of the owned vehicle.” Burgos, 07-229 at 7, 973 So.2d at 33. Because Electric Insurance Company was not attempting to enforce an exclusion against the vehicle’s operation by Ms. Tessitore, the named insured, the 112Burgos court reasoned that Electric Insurance Company’s “road testing and delivery” exclusion must be enforced. See Burgos, supra.

Here, Farm Bureau relies on Bur-gos to support Farm Bureau’s argument that the automobile business exclusion should be upheld. In its motion for summary judgment, Farm Bureau seeks to enforce the exclusion not for the named insured’s operation of the vehicle, but for Ms. Boudreaux’s permissive operation of the vehicle on behalf of Top Hatch. According to Farm Bureau’s argument, Bur-gos stands for the proposition that only the situation in Marcus, i.e., when the insurer seeks to enforce an exclusion against the named insured, can public policy be violated.

113Farm Bureau’s argument is misplaced. While it is true that an insurer may violate public policy by taking a position contrary to the interests of the insured after a claim has been made, the public policy we must observe here lies at the origin of the insurance relationship, i.e., -within the insurance policy itself. As we have noted above and in Marcus, LSA-R.S 32:900(B)(2) requires that insurance policies provide coverage for permissive drivers. To the extent Bur-gos upheld an automobile business exclusion in a liability policy with omnibus coverage mandated by LSA-R.S 32:900(B)(2), but the court did not observe the requirement of providing coverage for a permissive driver, Burgos is hereby overruled.

In Marcus, and here, we have seen practical effects stemming from an insurance policy exclusion that violate the requirement for omnibus coverage. For example, in Marcus we noted that if a general “business exclusion” were enforced, then “motorists would be allowed to drive in and out of coverage, depending on the purpose of a particular excursion, which would wreak havoc on the legislature’s goal in enacting an orderly and comprehensive scheme designed for the protection of injured victims of careless drivers.” Marcus, 98-2040 at 8, 740 So.2d at 608. Here, if the automobile business exclusion were found enforceable, the exclusion would eliminate coverage irrespective of whether the repair shop had coverage. Such a result is contrary to the public policy the legislature has described in the direct action statute, LSA-R.S. 22:1269(D): “all liability policies within their terms and limits are executed for the benefit of all injured persons and their survivors or heirs to whom the insured is liable; and ... it is the purpose of all liability policies to give | protection and coverage to all insureds, whether they are named insured or additional insureds under the omnibus clause[.]”

The automobile business exclusion, commentators have noted, “can rather easily conflict with the omnibus clause; any provision which is in derogation of that clause should be construed narrowly as a matter of public policy.” Lee R. Russ & Thomas F. Segalla, 8a Couch on InsüRance 3d, § 120:78 (2005). In our public policy analysis, we find that Farm Bureau’s automobile business exclusion conflicts with LSA-R.S. 32:900(B)(2), as these commentators predicted it “rather easily” could.

We also note the commentators’ predicted result within numerous other jurisdictions, as the following courts have found automobile business exclusions of various formulations to conflict with public policy: Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 541 F.Supp. 755 (D.C.Miss., 1982) (Erie doctrine analysis applying Mississippi law); Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Dairyland Mut. Ins. Co., 5 Ariz.App. 174, 424 P.2d 465 (1967), vacated on other grounds, 102 Ariz. 518, 433 P.2d 966 (1967), overruled on other grounds by Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 164 Ariz. 286, 792 P.2d 749 (1990) (“Universal is overruled to the extent it rejects equitable subrogation.”); Exchange Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Scott, 56 Cal.2d 613, 15 Cal.Rptr. 897, 364 P.2d 833 (1961); Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 669 A.2d 45 (Del.1995); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Smith, 197 Ill.2d 369, 259 Ill.Dec. 18, 757 N.E.2d 881 (2001); DeWitt v. Young, 229 Kan. 474, 625 P.2d 478 (1981); Distler v. Reuther Jeep Eagle, 14 S.W.3d 179 (Mo.App. E.D. 2000); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 283 N.C. 87, 194 S.E.2d 834 (1973); Tapp v. Perciful, 120 P.3d 480 (Okla.2005); American Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 303 S.C. 301, 400 S.E.2d 147 (1991). Appearing to represent a minority view, the following courts have upheld automobile business exclusions as not violating public policy: Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Castillo, 362 So.2d 88 (Fla.App.1978); United Services Auto. Ass’n v. Reilly, 122 Or.App. 459, 858 P.2d 457 (1993); Murray v. Remuck, 108 R.I. 179, 273 A.2d 491 (1971); Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co. v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of North America, 186 Va. 204, 42 S.E.2d 298 (1947); Gulmire v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 269 Wis.2d 501, 674 N.W.2d 629 (Wis.App.2003), writ denied, 271 Wis.2d 111, 679 N.W.2d 546 (2004).

In our review of statutory public policy considerations, we also see that the legislature has deemed it advisable within LSA-R.S. 32:900 to allow certain exceptions to omnibus coverage. “An owner may ex-elude a named person as an insured under a commercial policy if the owner obtains and maintains in force another policy of motor vehicle insurance which provides coverage for the person so excluded.” LSA-R.S. 32:900(B)(2)(d). Also, the legislature has allowed insurance policies to “exclude from coverage the named insured and the spouse of the named insured. The insurer and an insured may also exclude from coverage any other named person who is a resident of the same household as the named insured.” LSA-R.S. 32:900(L)(1).

11(¡Because the legislature has listed these specific exclusions, “the time honored maxim, expressio unius et exclusio alterius ... teaches us that when the legislature specifically enumerates a series of things, the legislature’s omission of other items, which could have been easily included in the statute, is deemed intentional.” Theriot v. Midland Risk Ins. Co., 1995-2895, p. 4 (La.5/20/97), 694 So.2d 184, 187. The expressio -unius maxim instructs us here that since an automobile business exclusion is not one of the legislature’s enumerated exceptions to LSA-R.S. 32:900, Farm Bureau’s automobile business exclusion is not allowed.

As a final consideration, we note that “an automobile business” exclusion is a species of “[bjusiness use-related exclusions” which “may be phrased in any number of ways.” Russ & Segalla, 8a Couoh on Insurance 3d, § 120:22. Having concluded in Marcus that the general business exclusion is offensive to this state’s public policy, logic counsels the court here, that because the automobile business exclusion is a subset of what we have already found offensive to public policy, that Farm Bureau’s automobile business exclusion cannot be enforced.

Having concluded that the automobile business exclusion cannot be enforced, we return to the procedural context in which this matter arose. In its motion for summary judgment, Farm Bureau urged that “if the Farm Bureau automobile business exclusion is found to be contrary to public policy, Farm Bureau’s coverage is limited to the statutory minimum limits of coverage of $10,000.00/$20,000.00.” The district court did not reach the issue of whether coverage should be reduced to the statutory minimum, because the court granted Farm Bureau its preferred relief of enforcing the automobile business exclusion and dismissing Farm Bureau from the lawsuit. The court of appeal did not reach the limits of coverage issue because when that court reversed the district court’s ruling, the court of appeal did not find Farm Bureau’s 117exclusion unenforceable on public policy grounds, but on contractual grounds. Though Canal Indemnity and Top Hatch, in their brief to this court, urge that “coverage afforded by the Farm Bureau policy should be the stated policy limits of $100,000,” Canal Indemnity and Top Hatch did not seek a writ to this court on the limits of coverage issue. Farm Bureau did not raise the issue of the limits of coverage in its writ application to this court, and Farm Bureau has not briefed the issue. We do not, therefore, reach the limits of coverage issue. See, e.g., Agilus Health (Taylor) v. Accor Lodging North America, 2010-0800, p. 6 n. 4, 52 So.3d 68 (La.11/30/10) (“because this issue was not raised in connection to this writ application, we will not reach it in this opinion.”).

CONCLUSION

Because the insurance policy at issue contains an exclusion for a driver engaged in an automobile business, but that exclusion conflicts with the legislated public policy of affording coverage to permissive drivers, the automobile business exclusion cannot be enforced in this matter. The judgment of the district court granting Farm Bureau’s motion for summary judgment and dismissing Farm Bureau from this lawsuit is therefore reversed. To the extent the court of appeal found the automobile business exclusion unenforceable, the decision of the court of appeal is hereby affirmed. This matter is remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

AFFIRMED AND REMANDED.

JOHNSON, Justice, concurs.

GUIDRY, Justice, concurs in part, dissents in part, and assigns reasons.

GUIDRY, Justice,

concurs in part, dissents in part, and assigns reasons.

_JjI agree with the majority that the automobile business exclusion of the Mississippi Farm Bureau policy applied to the business activity in which Top Hatch, Inc., was engaged, i.e., the after-market installation of leather upholstery. Thus, I agree the court of appeal erred in finding the exclusion did not apply as a matter of contractual interpretation.

However, I disagree with the majority that enforcement of the automobile business exclusion under the facts of this case necessarily violates Louisiana’s public policy with regard to mandatory automobile liability coverage and permissive drivers. As this court explained in Marcus v. Hanover Ins. Co., 98-2040, p. 8 (La.6/4/99), 740 So.2d 603, 608, the “purpose of automobile liability coverage is the protection of the injured person and the coverage and protection of the insured....” I disagree with the majority that Marcus sets forth a broad principle that automobile business exclusions will generally always violate public policy with regard to permissive drivers as expressed in La.Rev.Stat. 32:900(B)(2).

Instead, I would distinguish Marcus on its facts, as did the court in Burgos v. Star Auto Service, Inc., 07-229 (La.App. 5 Cir. 11/13/07), 973 So.2d 29, writ denied, 2007-2406 (La.2/15/08), 976 So.2d 179. As in Burgos, the insurer here, Mississippi | ¡¿Farm Bureau, is not invoking the business exclusion against its named insured, Gregory Hyneman, with regard to the operation of the owned vehicle; instead, the insurer seeks to invoke the exclusion against a third party, defendant Deborah Boudreaux, who is otherwise covered by a garage liability policy issued to her employer, Top Hatch, by Canal Indemnity Company. In my view, “the goal of all liability policies, which is to benefit injured persons and to give protection and coverage to all insureds ...,” Marcus, 98-2040, p. 8, 740 So.2d at 608, is simply not impinged by enforcement of the automobile business exclusion under the facts of this case. Because the driver of the vehicle was insured under her employer’s liability policy, I see no need to determine which policy is primary when an otherwise valid exclusion applies. Accordingly, I would reverse the court of appeal’s decision and reinstate the judgment of the trial court sustaining Mississippi Farm Bureau’s motion for summary judgment.

      . In this court’s review of the record, we observe that Farm Bureau’s insurance policy was issued to Mr. Hyneman at a Mississippi address. In the relevant pleadings, and in the decisions of the courts below, nowhere do we discern that choice of law issues have ever been raised. The court has previously ruled that where, as here, an accident occurs in Louisiana involving a Louisiana resident and the applicable insurance policy was issued outside of Louisiana, a choice of law analysis is appropriate. See Champagne v. Ward, 2003-3211, p. 22 (La.1/19/05), 893 So.2d 773, 786. Here, given that Farm Bureau has argued for application of Louisiana law in its motion for summary judgment, we find that Farm Bureau concedes that the application of Louisiana law is proper.

      . See 1977 La. Acts, No. 115, § 1, effective July 1, 1978.

      . The district court also designated as a final judgment the denial of the summary judgment sought by Canal Indemnity and Top Hatch on the issue of whether Canal Indemnity's policy should provide secondary coverage after exhausting Farm Bureau's coverage. That issue, however, has not been presented to this court.

      . The minimal limits of liability coverage are stated in LSA-R.S. 32:900(B)(2)(a) and (b). The legislature has recently raised the minimal limits (see 2008 La. Acts, No. 921, § 1, effective January 1, 2010), but during the relevant time here, the limits were: "(a) Ten thousand dollars because of bodily injury to or death of one person in any one accident, and, (b) Subject to said limit for one person, twenty thousand dollars because of bodily injury to or death of two or more persons in any one accident....”

      . The court in Borel, 2007-0419 at 10, 989 So.2d at 58, stated:
      Shall. As used in statutes, contracts, or the like, this word is generally imperative or mandatory. In common or ordinary parlance, and in its ordinary signification, the term 'shall' is a word of command, and one which has always or which must be given a compulsory meaning; as denoting obligation. The word in ordinary usage means ‘must’ and is inconsistent with a concept of discretion.

      . The insurance policy states: “the unqualified word Insured means the named Insured and, if the named Insured is an individual, his spouse, and also any person while using the Automobile and any person or organization legally responsible for its use, provided the actual use of the Automobile is by the named Insured or spouse or with permission of either.”

      . Indeed, in Marcus, the plaintiffs were injured by a driver, who "was operating his personal vehicle in the course and scope of his employment with J & J Mechanical, Inc.” Marcus, 98-2040 at 2, 740 So.2d at 604. The driver's insurer sought to enforce an exclusion for operating the vehicle "in any business other than an auto business” against the driver. Id. And, as Farm Bureau here correctly notes, this court ruled in Marcus that "the business use exclusion that excludes from coverage the named insured while operating his insured car in 'any business other than an auto business,' contravenes” Louisiana’s public policy. Marcus, 98-2040 at 7, 740 So.2d at 608.

      . In the record of this summary judgment case, we note that actual evidence of permissive use of Mr. Hyneman's vehicle is scant. Permission is easily inferred, however, under the broad construction of the law regarding permission:
      In the seminal case of Parks v. Hall, 189 La. 849, 181 So. 191 (1938), this court addressed what constitutes permission in an omnibus clause and adopted the "initial permission” rule. Under this rule, once consent, express or implied, is granted by the insured to use the vehicle, any subsequent changes in the character or scope of the use do not require additional specific consent of the insured. Norton v. Lewis, 623 So.2d 874, 875 (La.1993). Thereafter, "coverage will be precluded only where the deviation from the use consented to amounts to theft or other conduct displaying an utter disregard for the return or safekeeping of the vehicle." Id. ... Manzella v. Doe, 94-2854 (La. 12/8/95), 664 So.2d 398, 402. Permission extends to subsequent users if it was reasonably foreseeable that the first permitted would allow others to operate the vehicle. See American Home Assur. Co. v. Czarniecki, 255 La. 251, 262, 230 So.2d 253, 257 (1970).
      Here, Mr. Hyneman purchased his vehicle several months before Ms. Boudreaux picked it up from Dub Herring Ford. Dub Herring Ford contracted with Ms. Boudreaux's employer, Top Hatch, to replace the seat covers in Mr. Hyneman's vehicle with leather. Ms. Boudreaux testified that she had picked up vehicles numerous times before from Dub Herring Ford and that dealership knew her as a Top Hatch employee. Ms. Boudreaux stated that in this instance as in prior instances, Dub Herring Ford entrusted her with taking a vehicle to her employer, Top Hatch.
      Additionally, because Farm Bureau acknowledged there is a question of whether its automobile business exclusion may have violated Louisiana’s public policy of providing coverage for permissive drivers, the court is satisfied that the predicate condition of permission has been met. See, e.g., Stanfel v. Shelton, 563 So.2d 410, 413 n. 4 (La.App. 1 Cir.1990):
      [Although there are no allegations or evidence in the record regarding permission or the scope of any permission, [the insurer] has never raised as an issue that [the driver] did not have permission or that he was not within the scope of that permission. Rather, [the insurer] has contended that its policy does not apply because the automobile was used in the course of employment; therefore, the issue of permission is not before us as a contested matter.

      . See, e.g., LSA-R.S. 22:1973(B) (describing bad faith settlement practices).

      . This same public policy, when we cited it in Marcus, was at the time designated as LSA-R.S. 22:655(D). The enumeration of certain insurance statutes, including the direct action statute, has changed since we decided Marcus. The public policy concerns, however, have not changed.

      . Universal Underwriters is actually couched with language indicating "^at an automobile business exclusion did not violate public policy. See Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 669 A.2d at 48. But the court adjudged the exclusion in two ways: 1) the court found the insurer “concedes its obligation as the insurer of the ... vehicle owners, [is] to provide coverage up to the statutory minimum” notwithstanding the exclusion; and 2) for liability over the statutorily-required minimum limit, the court concluded the exclusion would be given effect. Id. Because of the first aspect, i.e., the court's resolution of a conflict between an automobile business exclusion and statutorily-required insurance, Universal Underwriters is included in this listing.


text:
    George IGBINOGHENE and Sebastian Busari. v. ST. PAUL TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANY.
    No. 2011-CC-0124.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 4, 2011.
   PER CURIAM.

bln this application, relator, Standard Fire Insurance Co., seeks review of a judgment of the district court denying its Motion to Dismiss and/or Declinatory Exception of Insufficiency of Service of Process and Citation.

It is undisputed plaintiffs did not request service within ninety days of filing their May 18, 2007 petition for damages, as required by La.Code Civ. P. art. 1201(C). However, relying on La.Code Civ. P. art. 1672(C), plaintiffs argue they demonstrated good cause for their failure to request service timely. In support, plaintiffs submit they were engaged in ongoing settlement negotiations with relator, and agreed to relator’s requests for extension of time to file responsive pleadings.

Many of the actions relied upon by plaintiffs appear to be of questionable relevance, as they occurred in 2008 and 2009, well outside of the ninety-day period for requesting service of the May 18, 2007 petition. Moreover, it is clear relator’s actions do not constitute an express written waiver of citation and service as contemplated in La.Code Civ. P. art. 1201(C). See Filson v. Windsor Court Hotel, 04-2893 at p. 8 (La.6/29/05), 907 So.2d 728, 729 (“the mere act of filing an answer and participating in discovery does not constitute an express written waiver of citation and service as contemplated by La. C.C.P. art. 1201(C)”). Similarly, relator’s actual knowledge of the filing of plaintiffs’ suit does not obviate the need for service. See Naquin v. Titan Indemnity Co., 00-1585 at p. 8 (La.2/21/01), 779 So.2d 704, 710 (“it is well-accepted that even a defendant’s actual knowledge of a legal action cannot supply the want of citation because proper citation is the foundation of all actions”).

In the absence of a proper showing of good cause for plaintiffs’ failure to request service in a timely manner, we find the district court erred in denying relator’s motion to dismiss. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is reversed. Judgment is rendered in favor of relator, granting its motion and dismissing plaintiffs’ suit without prejudice pursuant to La.Code Civ. P. art. 1672(C).

       Chief Justice Kimball not participating in this opinion.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Larry DRAPER.
    No. 2011-KK-0388.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 25, 2011.
   In re Draper, Larry; —Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. I, No. 501-525; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-K-0255.

Writ Denied. Stay Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Mervin Patrick WHITE.
    No. 2010-K-1799.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 25, 2011.
   In re State of Louisiana; —Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. N, No. 08-2390; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 09-KA-1071.

Granted.


text:
    Willie J. ZENO, Sr. v. Charles J. FORET.
    No. 2010-C-2482.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 25, 2011.
   In re Zeno Sr., Willie J.; —Plaintiff; Applying for Reconsideration of this Court’s action dated January 14, 2011; Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. J, No. 2009-5791; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 10-330.

Rehearing not considered. See Louisiana Supreme Court Rule IX, Section 6.


text:
    Clara HARRELL v. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HOSPITALS, OFFICE FOR CITIZENS WITH DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES, Pinecrest Supports and Services Center C/W Brenda Prater v. Department of Health and Hospitals, Office for Citizens With Developmental Disabilities, Pinecrest Supports and Services Center.
    No. 2010-C-2310.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 25, 2011.
   In re Harrell, Clara et al.; Prater, Brenda; —Plaintiff (s); Applying for Reconsideration of this Courts action dated December 10, 2010; Parish of Rapides, State Civil Service Commission, Nos. S-16498, S — 16499; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, Nos. 2010 CA 0281, 2010 CA 0282.

Reconsideration denied. See Louisiana R.S. 1:55(E)(8).

WEIMER, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Daniel RONQUILLE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-0525.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 25, 2011.
   In re Ronquille, Daniel; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 06-5856; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 09-KA-231.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Lee D. BLANCHARD.
    No. 2010-K-1843.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 25, 2011.
   In re Blanchard, Lee D.; —Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Ascension, 23rd Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 23795; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 KA 0014.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Kerri SMITH.
    No. 2010-KO-2318.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 25, 2011.
   In re Smith, Kerri; —Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 422493-D; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 KA 0344.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Lynn BESS, III.
    No. 2010-KO-2368.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 25, 2011.
   In re Bess III, Lynn; —Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Ouachita, 4th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 07-F3173; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 45,-358-KA.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Roderick DANGERFIELD.
    No. 2010-KO-2370.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 25, 2011.
   In re Dangerfield, Roderick; —Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Tangipahoa, 21st Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 109619; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 KA 0366.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Leroy DAVIS.
    No. 2010-KO-2400.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 25, 2011.
   In re Davis, Leroy; —Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Tensas, 6th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 76,643; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 45,-556-KA.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Michael Bradford BASS.
    No. 2010-KO-2405.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 25, 2011.
   In re Bass, Michael Bradford; —Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Ouachita, 4th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 07F1592; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 45,298-KA.

Denied.

CLARK, J., recused.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. John Edward MARSHALL.
    No. 2010-K-2411.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 25, 2011.
   In re Marshall, John Edward; —Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. 5, No. 274,768; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 45,567-KA.

Denied.


text:
    Richard C. BENTLEY v. Bobby FANGUY.
    No. 2010-C-2854.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 25, 2011.
   In re Fanguy, Robert “Bobby”; —Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Martin, 16th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 69461; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, Nos. 09-822, 09-1509.

Denied.


text:
    Michael WELCH, et al. v. Willis-Knighton PIERREMONT, et al.
    No. 2011-C-0075.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 25, 2011.
   In re Willis-Knighton Pierremont Health Center; —Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 480,461; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 45,554-CA.

Denied.


text:
    Gerald O. BELL v. Patrick THIBODEAUX and Affiliated Blind of Louisiana, Inc.
    No. 2011-C-0079.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 25, 2011.
   In re Bell, Gerald O.; —Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 2007-6244; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 10-174.

Denied.


text:
    Nolton F. SEMIEN v. The GEO GROUP, INC.
    No. 2011-C-0083.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 25, 2011.
   In re Semien, Nolton F.; —Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Allen, 33rd Judicial District Court Div. B, No. C-2009-554; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 10-642.

Denied.


text:
    Jason LESTAGE v. NABORS DRILLING COMPANY.
    No. 2011-C-0088.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 25, 2011.
   In re Lestage, Jason; —Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review Office of Workers’ Compensation, District 04, No. 06-04387; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. WCA 10-728.

Denied.


text:
    Elizabeth PEARSON and Upton Pearson v. Thomas J. DELAUNE, Tommy’s Seafood, Inc., and Lafayette Insurance Company.
    No. 2011-C-0091.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 25, 2011.
   In re Pearson, Elizabeth et al.; Pearson, Upton; —Plaintiffs); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. H, No. 2005-463; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2010-CA-0475.

Denied.


text:
    Janet Sue MULLER. v. COLONY INSURANCE COMPANY and William H. Muller.
    No. 2011-C-0092.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 25, 2011.
   In re Colony Insurance Company; —. Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certio-rari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 545,576; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 CA 0688.

Denied.


text:
    Michael WELCH, et al. v. Willis-Knighton PIERREMONT, et al.
    No. 2011-C-0109.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 25, 2011.
   In re Louisiana Patient’s Compensation Fund; Louisiana Patient’s Compensation Fund Oversight Board; —Other(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 480,461; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 45,554-CA.

Denied.


text:
    LOUISIANA CAPITAL ASSISTANCE CENTER v. Warren RILEY, in his Capacity as Chief of the New Orleans Police Department and Custodian of Public Records.
    No. 2011-C-0115.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 25, 2011.
   In re Orleans Parish District Attorney’s Office; —Other; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. J, No. 2009-12298; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2010-CA-0733.

Denied.

KNOLL, J., would grant.


text:
    Jamie CASS v. Kevin Charlie CASS.
    No. 2011-CJ-0178.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 25, 2011.
   In re Cass, Jamie; —Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Grant, 35th Judicial District Court Div. 0, No. 19395; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 10-327.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Paul L. TURNER, Jr.
    No. 2010-KO-2383.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 25, 2011.
   In re Turner Jr., Paul L.; —Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. E, No. 474-324; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2010-KA-0038.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Rony O. ARIAS-CHAVARRIA v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KO-2432.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 25, 2011.
   In re Arias-Chavarria, Rony O.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 08-189; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 10-KA-116.

Denied.

GUIDRY, J., recused.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Kelvin HARRISON.
    No. 2011-KK-0405.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 28, 2011.
   In re Harrison, Kelvin; —Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. L, No. 500-622; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-K-0117.

Stay denied; writ denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Jarrel ARLINE.
    No. 2011-KK-0402.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 28, 2011.
   In re: Arline, Jarrel; —Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. M, Nos. 10-2796, 10-2798; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. ll-K-193.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. James WILSON.
    No. 2011-KK-0424.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 1, 2011.
   In re Wilson, James; —Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. C, No. 494-358; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-K-0276.

Stay denied; writ denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant.


text:
    August GUILLOT and Juli Guillot, Individually and as Survivors of their Minor Child, Collin Jacob Guillot, and Natural Tutor of their Minor Child, Madison Guillot v. DAIMLERCHRYSLER CORPORATION, Lamarque Dodge, Inc., ABC Insurance Company, XYZ Insurance Company and John Doe.
    No. 2011-OC-0321.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 2, 2011.
   In re Guillot, August et al.; Guillot, Collin Jacob; Guillot, Juli; Guillot, Madison; —Plaintiff(s); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Bernard, 34th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 94-840.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Samuel WILSON.
    No. 2011-KK-0230.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 2, 2011.
   In re State of Louisiana; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. A, No. 493-133; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-K-0153.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. John W. MATHIEU.
    No. 2010-K-2421.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 4, 2011.
   In re State of Louisiana; —Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Divs. N, G, Nos. 05-4388,; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 09-KA-631.

Granted.


text:
    Margie MCGLOTHLIN, et al. v. CHRISTUS ST. PATRICK HOSPITAL.
    No. 2010-C-2775.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 4, 2011.
   In re Christas St. Patrick Hospital of Lake Charles; —Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 2005-004108; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 10-0278.

Granted.


text:
    B.W. GREEMON v. CITY OF BOSSIER CITY, Louisiana and the Bossier City Municipal Fire and Police Civil Service Board.
    No. 2010-C-2828.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 4, 2011.
   In re Bossier City, City of et al.; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Mandamus and/or Writ of Prohibition, Parish of Bossier, 26th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 126,232; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 45,664-CA.

Granted.


text:
    B.W. GREEMON v. CITY OF BOSSIER CITY, Louisiana and the Bossier City Municipal Fire and Police Civil Service Board.
    No. 2011-C-0039.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 4, 2011.
   In re Municipal Fire and Police Civil Ser. Bd., Bossier City; —Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Bossier, 26th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 126,232; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 45,-664-CA.

Granted.


text:
    Regina Marie WHITLEY, Individually and on behalf of Chance Whitley (D) v. STATE of Louisiana, through the BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY AGRICULTURAL MECHANICAL COLLEGE, on behalf of the Medical Center of Louisiana at New Orleans-University Campus.
    No. 2011-CC-0040.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 4, 2011.
   In re LSU A & M Board of Supervisors; Medical Center of Louisiana at New Orleans-University Campus; State of Louisiana et al.; —Defendant(s); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. I, No. 2007-14119; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2010-C-1198.

Granted.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Rodney FORTENBERRY v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-0600.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 4, 2011.
   In re Fortenberry, Rodney; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Washington, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 94,157; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2009 CA 0822.

Writ granted in part; otherwise denied. The Franklinton Police Department is ordered to provide relator with an estimate of the costs of reproducing public records relator has requested and to which relator is entitled. La. Const, art. XII, section 3; R.S. 44:31; R.S. 44:31.1; State ex rel. Barbee v. State, 10-0275 (La.2/4/11), 57 So.3d 318; State ex rel Leonard v. State, 96-1889 (La.6/13/97), 695 So.2d 1325; State ex rel. Level v. State, 99-2266 (La.12/17/99), 751 So.2d 869; Range v. Moreau, 96-1607 (La.9/3/96), 678 So.2d 537. In all other respects, the application is denied.

CLARK, J., would deny.


text:
    Michael HINDELANG, III v. Regina Louviere HINDELANG.
    No. 2010-C-2701.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 4, 2011.
   In re Hindelang III, Michael; —Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 2008-1114; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 10-397.

Writ Granted in Part; denied in Part. We reinstate the portion of the trial court’s judgment that awarded final periodic spousal support for twelve months. However, we affirm the portion of the court of appeal’s judgment that orders the award to be paid retroactive to the date of judgment. See La.R.S. 9:321(B).


text:
    Gwendolyn JONES and Sandra Durbin v. RUSTON LOUISIANA HOSPITAL COMPANY, LLC d/b/a Northern Louisiana Medical Center a/k/a Lincoln General Hospital, et al.
    No. 2011-OC-0117.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 4, 2011.
   In re Northern Louisiana Medical Center a/k/a; Ruston Louisiana Hospital Company LLC d/b/a et al.; —Defendant(s); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Lincoln, 3rd Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 54,465; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 46,-202-CW.

Granted. Based on the transcript, we find the trial court and the parties contemplated that a written judgment would be signed, making the October 21, 2010 judgment the “ruling” at issue for purposes of Rule 4-3. See Kosmitis v. Bailey, 96-1573 (La.10/4/96), 680 So.2d 1167. Accordingly, the case is remanded to the court of appeal to rule on the merits of the application.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Darryl ROBINSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-0544.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 4, 2011.
   In re Robinson, Darryl; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. I, No. 375,936; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2010-K-0034.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; State v. Parker, 98-0256 (La.5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694; La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Henry F. WEBER v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-0543.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 4, 2011.
   In re Weber, Henry F.; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court’ Div. C, No. 416-357; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2009-K-1043.

Denied.

JOHNSON, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Derrick WYATT v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-0532.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 4, 2011.
   In re Wyatt, Derrick; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. C, No. 388-725; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2010-K-0081.

Denied. See State ex rel. McKnight v. State, 98-2258 (La. App 1st Cir. 12/3/98), 742 So.2d 894.

JOHNSON, J., would grant.


text:
    Marcus STEINFELDS v. David VILLARUBIA and Degas House.
    No. 2011-C-0137.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 4, 2011.
   In re House, Degas; Villarubia, David; —Defendant(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review Office of Workers’ Compensation, District #8, No. 08-20337; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2010-CA-0975.

Not considered; not timely filed. See Supreme Court Rule X, Election 5.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Daniel HINTON, Jr.
    No. 2009-K-0821.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 4, 2011.
   In re State of Louisiana; —Plaintiff; Applying for Reconsideration of this court’s action dated January 7, 2011; Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. N, No. 12-07-0226 to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2008 KA1849.

Reconsideration granted. Writ denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Gary WILSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-0545.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 4, 2011.
   In re Wilson, Gary; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. L, No. 453-109; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2009-K-1732.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 980.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.


text:
    Clarence SAMUELS v. Brenda ACKLIN, et al.
    No. 2010-CI-0613.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 4, 2011.
   In re Samuels, Clarence; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 571,614; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2009 CA 1279.

Denied.


text:
    Aaron HARRELL v. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND CORRECTIONS.
    No. 2010-CI-0611.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 4, 2011.
   In re Harrell, Aaron; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 574,776; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2009 CA 1421.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Carl COTLONG v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-0608.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 4, 2011.
   In re Cotlong, Carl; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 6976-04; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 09-01357.

Denied. Moot. The district court has acted


text:
    STATE ex rel. Randy HARRINGTON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-0604.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 4, 2011.
   In re Harrington, Randy; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedíal Writs, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. K, No. 97540; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 09-01124.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172; cf. La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.4(D).


text:
    STATE ex rel. Ron Karry LASTER v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-0603.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 4, 2011.
   In re Laster, Ron Karry; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 239,773; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 44, 870-KA.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Darrell ST. JULIEN, Jr. v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-0602.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 4, 2011.
   In re St. Julien Jr., Darrell; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 62872; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 09-01284.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Preston DEMOUCHETTE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-0553.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 4, 2011.
   In re Demouchette, Preston; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Mary, 16th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 95-141810; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2009 KW 2339.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; State v. Parker, 98-0256 (La.5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694; La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Ricky NICHOLAS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-0551.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 4, 2011.
   In re Nicholas, Ricky; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Divs. H, B, Nos. 82-8, 82-321; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 08-WR-887.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Keith MESSIAH v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-0550.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 4, 2011.
   In re Messiah, Keith; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. E, No. 295-139; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2009-K-1641.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Johnny HENDERSON, Jr. v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-0616.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 4, 2011.
   In re Henderson Jr., Johnny; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 271,869; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 45,-369-KH.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Undre H. MARTIN.
    No. 2010-KO-2315.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 4, 2011.
   In re Martin, Undre H.; —Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Tangipahoa, 21st Judicial District Court- Div. G, No. 703173; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 KA 0101.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Kirk MOSBY.
    No. 2010-KO-2306.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 4, 2011.
   In re Mosby, Kirk; —Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Iberville, 18th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 236-03; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 KA 0508.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Winston Jerald CRADDOCK.
    No. 2010-KP-1672.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 4, 2011.
   In re Craddock, Winston Jerald; —Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 326256; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 KW 0425.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Elton COWART v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-0650.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 4, 2011.
   In re Cowart, Elton; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 99-5664; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 08-WR-979.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Houston JACKSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-0649.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 4, 2011.
   In re Jackson, Houston; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 98 — 4959; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 08-WR-975.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. David WILLIAMS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-0648.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 4, 2011.
   In re Williams, David; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. C, Nos. 12-93-0357, 12-93-0358; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2009 KW 2248.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189. Cf. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4(D).


text:
    STATE ex rel. Allen JAMES v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-OK-0638.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 4, 2011.
   In re James, Allen; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. N, Nos. 00-5760, 01-2077; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 09-K-946.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Phanord BILLY v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-0620.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 4, 2011.
   In re Billy, Phanord; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. P, No. 01-6415; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 09-KH-951.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 980.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2830 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Shawna FARLEY v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-0619.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 4, 2011.
   In re Farley, Shawna; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. G, Nos. 99-3320, 99-5050; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 08-WR-859.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Terrell CASBY v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-0618.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 4, 2011.
   In re Casby, Terrell; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 07-5786; to the Court of APPeal> Fifth Circuit> Na 10KH-30-

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.

GUIDRY, J., recused.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Tisean STEWART.
    No. 2010-KK-2480.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 4, 2011.
   In re Stewart, Tisean; —Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. D, No. 490-540; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2010-K-1016.

Denied.


text:
    TENSAS POPPADOC, INC. v. CHEVRON U.S.A., INC., et al.
    No. 2011-C-0077.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 4, 2011.
   In re Angelle (Secy.), Scott; —Other; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Concordia, 7th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 40,769; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 10-124.

Writ granted. The plaintiff has failed to sustain its burden of proving under La. R.S. 18:3667.3(A) the relevancy of the facts sought to be proven set forth in its motion to compel and the necessity of the testimony of the witness prior to and at the hearing conducted pursuant to La. R.S. 30:29 on the availability of a more feasible remediation plan. As such, the motions to compel the witness’ testimony by deposition and at the La. R.S. 30:29 hearing are denied. The case is remanded to the district court for further proceedings in light of this ruling.

KNOLL and WEIMER, JJ„ recused.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Steven Mark “Marc” ANDERSON.
    No. 2010-K-2472.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 4, 2011.
   In re Anderson, Steven Mark “Marc”; —Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. CR-120075; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 10-0256.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. James Edward BURNS.
    No. 2010-KO-2449.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 4, 2011.
   In re Burns, James Edward; —Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Madison, 6th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 127229; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 45,539-KA.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Marcus COLEMAN.
    No. 2010-KO-2448.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 4, 2011.
   In re Coleman, Marcus; —Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 18915-04; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 10-301.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Earton Lynn SMITH.
    No. 2010-KO-2384.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 4, 2011.
   In re Smith, Earton Lynn; —Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Bossier, 26th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 168,438; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 45,-430-KA.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Jackie WAFFER.
    No. 2010-KO-2382.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 4, 2011.
   In re Waffer, Jackie; —Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Ouachita, 4th Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 03-F0707; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 45,-210-KA.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Jackie WAFFER.
    No. 2010-K-2375.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 4, 2011.
   In re Waffer, Jackie; —Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Ouachita, 4th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 03 F0707; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 45,-210-KA.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Courtney DAVIS.
    No. 2010-KO-2373.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 4, 2011.
   In re Davis, Courtney; —Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of East Feliciana, 20th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 07-CR-752; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 KA 0073.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Jason Frank St. ROMAIN.
    No. 2010-KO-2321.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 4, 2011.
   In re St. Romain, Jason Frank; —Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Pointe Coupee, 18th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 73623-F; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 KA 0419.

Denied.


text:
    Henry Adam BALTAZAR, et al. v. Dennis R. WOLINSKI, et al.
    No. 2011-C-0058.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 4, 2011.
   In re Continental Casualty Company; Kirpatrick Industrial Supply, Inc.; Wolin-ski, Dennis R. et al.; —Defendant(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Martin, 16th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 71088; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, Nos. 10-0757,10-0758.

Denied.


text:
    AMERICAN MOVING AND STORAGE OF LEESVILLE, INC. v. Cynthia BRIDGES, Secretary, Department of Revenue.
    No. 2011-C-0047.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 4, 2011.
   In re Bridges Secy., Cynthia et al.; Department of Revenue; State cf. Louisiana; — Defendant(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Vernon, 30th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 82098; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 10-825.

Denied.

CLARK, J., would grant.


text:
    Jane SUMNER v. Kimberly MATHES, The City of New Orleans, Sanitation Department and Progressive Security Insurance Co.
    No. 2011-C-0016.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 4, 2011.
   In re Division of Administration; Office of Group Benefits; Office of the Governor; State of Louisiana, et al.; —Other(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. J, No. 2004-15572; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2010-CA-0438.

Denied.

JOHNSON and WEIMER, JJ., would grant.


text:
    Jane SUMNER v. Kimberly MATHES, The City of New Orleans, Sanitation Department and Progressive Security Insurance Co.
    No. 2010-C-2824.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 4, 2011.
   In re Sumner, Jane; —Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. J, No. 2004-15572; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2010-CA-0438.

Denied.

JOHNSON and WEIMER, JJ., would grant.


text:
    Johnny LEE, Jr. and Michelle Lee, Individually and on Behalf of their Minor Child, Taylor Lee v. Michael FRIERSON, M.D.
    No. 2010-CC-2808.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 4, 2011.
   In re Frierson M.D., Michael; —Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 577,512; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 CW1627.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Telly HANKTON, et al.
    No. 2010-KK-2791.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 4, 2011.
   In re State of Louisiana; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. C, No. 491-394; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2010-K-1397.

Denied.

JOHNSON, J., would grant.


text:
    MARKETFARE ST. CLAUDE, LLC, et al. v. UNITED FIRE & CASUALTY COMPANY, et al.
    No. 2010-CC-2778.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 4, 2011.
   In re Marketfare St. Claude LLC et al.; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. I, Nos. 2009-10823, 2006-8176; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, Nos. 2010-C-0840, 2010-C-1233.

Denied.


text:
    Gabrielle L. DANIELS, Allariet S. Howard and Maryta B. Hullaby v. IMPERIAL FIRE & CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY.
    No. 2010-CC-2736.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 4, 2011.
   In re Imperial Fire & Casualty Insurance Company; —Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 538,140a; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 46,109-CW.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Lavester GILMORE.
    No. 2010-K-2491.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 4, 2011.
   In re Gilmore, Lavester; —Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. E, No. 479-812; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2010-KA-0059.

Denied.


text:
    Tom CLEMENT v. CITY OF LAKE CHARLES, et al.
    No. 2011-C-0085.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 4, 2011.
   In re Turnberry Row Homeowner’s Association; —Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 2008-5293; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 10-703.

Denied.

KNOLL and GUDRY, JJ., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Robert CARLEY, et al.
    No. 2011-KD-0318.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 4, 2011.
   In re Carley, Robert; —Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of West Feliciana, 20th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. W-04-3-77; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011 KW 0244.

Denied.


text:
    Sharone KNIGHT, et al. v. Navarro A. EDWARDS, et al.
    No. 2011-CC-0245.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    March 4, 2011.
   In re James, Latanya; Knight, Shan-nell; —Plaintiff(s); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, First City Court of New Orleans, No. 10-51228; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2010-C-1474.

Denied.

JOHNSON, J., would grant.

KNOLL, J., concurs in the denial. The result is correct.