author: WALLER, Presiding Justice,

text:
    The MISSISSIPPI BAR v. Gail P. THOMPSON.
    No. 2007-BA-00556-SCT.
    Supreme Court of Mississippi.
    June 19, 2008.

      James R. Clark, Gwendolyn G. Combs, Jackson, attorneys for appellant.
    Leonard McClellan, Jackson, attorney for appellee.
   WALLER, Presiding Justice,

for the Court.

¶ 1. The Mississippi Bar appeals from a complaint tribunal’s order imposing a one-year, retroactive suspension on Gail Thompson for violating Rules 1.15, 5.3, and 8.4(a), (d), of the Mississippi Rules of Professional Conduct. We affirm the complaint tribunal’s order with regard to its finding that Thompson violated Rules 1.15, 5.3, and 8.4(a), (d), but reverse its finding that Thompson did not violate Rule 5.5(b). Furthermore, we reverse the one-year, retroactive suspension and remand this case for consideration of the proper sanction(s) in light of the nine Liebling factors that must be examined in attorney discipline matters. Liebling v. The Mississippi Bar, 929 So.2d 911 (Miss.2006).

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2. Gail Thompson employed Robert Tubwell, a former inmate at the Mississippi State Penitentiary at Parchman, as a paralegal at the Thompson Law Firm in Tunica County. Thompson hired Tubwell based, in part, on his reputation as a successful writ writer while at Parchman, and his potential ability to generate business for Thompson’s firm.

¶ 3. Mario McGaughy, an inmate serving a life sentence without the possibility of parole, met Tubwell while the two were at Parchman. When McGaughy learned that Tubwell was working as a paralegal, he wrote Tubwell at Thompson’s law office. McGaughy sought to hire a lawyer to file his petition for post-conviction relief. A series of communications then ensued between Tubwell and McGaughy, McGau-ghy’s mother, and McGaughy’s stepfather.

¶ 4. On February 1, 2002, Tubwell wrote McGaughy on Thompson Law Firm letterhead. The letter stated that Tubwell had consulted with Thompson and that she had agreed to work with him on McGaughy’s case. Tubwell stated that everything would be reviewed by an attorney and quoted McGaughy a fee of $500 for the preliminary work. He also requested that McGaughy send future correspondence to his Southaven apartment address, and provided McGaughy his personal home and cellular- phone numbers.

¶ 5. It is somewhat unclear whether the $500 payment was made, and if so, to whom such payment was directed. McGaughy stated that his father paid $550 via money order, but could not confirm whether the payment was made to the Thompson Law Firm or to Tubwell himself. Tubwell acknowledged that he received fifty dollars for travel-related expenses, but claimed that he never received the $500 money order. Thompson also denied ever receiving anything from McGaughy. Regardless, the complaint tribunal found implicitly that the $500 payment was made.

¶ 6. On March 18, 2002, Tubwell again wrote McGaughy on Thompson Law Firm letterhead. Tubwell advised McGaughy that he had a strong case and that there was a seventy-percent chance that this Court would reverse and grant a new trial.

¶ 7. Tubwell eventually obtained McGau-ghy’s court records and mailed McGaughy his files, along with a pro se petition for post-conviction relief. Per Tubwell’s instructions, McGaughy signed and had notarized the necessary documentation without realizing that he was filing pro se. This Court ultimately denied McGaughy’s pro se petition for post-conviction relief.

¶ 8. Thereafter, Tubwell informed McGaughy that the next step would be to file a writ of habeas corpus in federal court. Tubwell later wrote McGaughy to inform him that he had begun work on filing the habeas corpus petition. But a petition for habeas corpus was never filed on McGaughy’s behalf.

¶ 9. On November 18, 2004, McGaughy, on the belief that he had hired Thompson’s law firm to represent him on his application for post-conviction relief and his federal habeas corpus petition, filed an informal complaint against Thompson with the Mississippi Bar. In its Amended Formal Complaint, the Bar alleged that Thompson violated Rules 1.2(a), 1.15, 1.3, 1.6(a), 5.8, 5.5, and 8.4(a),(d), of the Mississippi Rules of Professional Conduct.

¶ 10. A hearing was held on March 14, 2006, in which Thompson testified that she was unaware of Tubwell’s correspondence with McGaughy, and claimed that he had taken advantage of her. Thompson stated that she trusted Tubwell and had instructed him that any cases he was working on had to come through her office. Yet she admitted that additional safeguards should have been implemented.

¶ 11. In addition to the McGaughy matter, the Bar inquired about Thompson’s handling of client files after she moved her law office irom Oxford to Tunica in 2000, and when she closed her Tunica practice in 2003. When Thompson moved her practice from Oxford to Tunica in 2000, she left some client files in a storage facility in Oxford. She admitted that those files had been lost. In 2003, Thompson closed her Tunica office after being suspended from the practice of law for a period of eighteen months. After closing the Tunica office, Thompson kept two file drawers of client files in a storage unit in Tunica. She testified that those file drawers were later moved to the home/office of Oxford attorney Alvin Chambliss. She explained that those file drawers remain locked because she lost the keys.

¶ 12. After hearing testimony and arguments, the complaint tribunal issued its opinion on March 16, 2007. The tribunal’ found that Thompson had not violated Rules 1.2(a), 1.3, 1.6(a), or 5.5 of the Rules of Professional Conduct. However, the complaint tribunal determined that Thompson had violated Rules 1.15, 5.3, and 8.4(a), (d). As a result, Thompson was suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year, effective from March 14, 2006. Thompson was further ordered to pay costs and expenses incurred by the Bar in the amount of $24.53.

¶ 13. Aggrieved by the complaint tribunal’s ruling, the Bar appeals to this Court.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 14. When reviewing matters pertaining to attorney discipline, this Court “reviews the evidence de novo, on a case-by-case basis, sitting as triers of fact, and no substantial evidence or manifest error rule shields the Tribunal from scrutiny.” Foote v. Miss. State Bar Ass’n., 517 So.2d 561, 564 (Miss.1987). However, the Court may grant deference to the tribunal “due to its exclusive opportunity to observe the demeanor and attitude of witnesses, including the attorney, which is vital in weighing evidence.” The Miss. Bar v. Logan, 726 So.2d 170, 175 (Miss. 1998) (quoting Parrish v. The Miss. Bar, 691 So.2d 904, 906 (Miss.1996)). The Bar bears the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that Thompson violated the rules of professional conduct. Logan, 726 So.2d at 175.

DISCUSSION

I. Whether Thompson failed to safeguard client property and/or improperly disclosed confidential client information.

A. Rule 1.15: Safekeeping Property.

¶ 15. The complaint tribunal found that Thompson failed to adequately safeguard client property by losing or misplacing client files.

¶ 16. Rule 1.15 requires lawyers to hold the property of others with the care required of a professional fiduciary. M.R.P.C. 1.15, cmt. The loss of client files constitutes a violation of Rule 1.15. In re Craig, 344 S.C. 646, 648-51, 545 S.E.2d 823 (2001); In re Evans, 175 Ariz. 404, 406, 857 P.2d 1258 (1993).

¶ 17. Thompson admitted to losing client files that she had placed in an Oxford storage unit. Although Thompson said that she returned important documents to clients “most times,” she could not say that she had done so every time.

¶ 18. We find that Thompson violated Rule 1.15.

B. Rule 1.6: Confidentiality of Information.

¶ 19. The complaint tribunal found that Thompson did not violate Rule 1.6 because there was no proof that she divulged any confidential client information. With certain exceptions, Rule 1.6 generally prohibits the disclosure of information relating to the representation of a client, absent the client’s informed consent. M.R.P.C. 1.6.

¶ 20. While Thompson admitted to losing the client files in Oxford, there is no evidence that any of those files were divulged. Likewise, there is no evidence that any of the client files from her Tunica office were disclosed.

¶ 21. We find that there is insufficient evidence to show that Thompson violated Rule 1.6.

II. Whether an attorney-client relationship existed between Thompson and McGaughy.

¶ 22. The complaint tribunal found that Thompson had not violated Rules 1.2(a) or 1.3 because no attorney-client relationship existed between Thompson and McGau-ghy. The Bar contends that Tubwell, acting as an agent for Thompson, communicated Thompson’s consent to act as McGaughy’s lawyer, and that Thompson should have known of McGaughy’s reliance.

¶ 23. Rule 1.2(a) provides that a lawyer shall abide by a client’s decisions concerning the objectives of representation and shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are pursued. M.R.P.C. 1.2(a). Rule 1.3 requires a lawyer to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client. M.R.C.P. 1.3. For either rule to be implicated, an attorney-client relationship must exist.

¶ 24. The existence of an attorney-client relationship depends upon the circumstances and may be a question of fact. M.R.P.C., SCOPE. The Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers, Section 14, (2000), states, in pertinent part, that:

A relationship of client and lawyer arises when:

(1) a person manifests to a lawyer the person’s intent that the lawyer provide legal services for the person; and either

(a) the lawyer manifests to the person consent to do so; or
(b) the lawyer fails to manifest lack of consent to do so, and the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the person reasonably relies on the lawyer to provide the services....

Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 14 (2000). A lawyer’s consent to represent a client need not be made by the lawyer himself. “An agent for the lawyer may communicate consent, for example, a secretary or paralegal with express, implied, or apparent authority to act for the lawyer in undertaking a representation.” Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 14 cmt. e (2000).

¶ 25. Thompson hired Tubwell to do legal research and draft briefs. He was told not to independently communicate with clients. Thus, Tubwell lacked express authority to communicate Thompson’s consent to represent a client. Tub-well also lacked implied authority because communicating Thompson’s consent to represent a client was not “necessary, proper, and usual,” in the exercise of his express duties. Patriot Commercial Leasing Co. v. Jerry Enis Motors, Inc., 928 So.2d 856, 864 (Miss.2006) (emphasis removed) (citing Bolus v. United Penn. Bank, 363 Pa.Super. 247, 259, 525 A.2d 1215, 1221 (1987), alloc, denied, 518 Pa. 627, 541 A.2d 1138 (1988)).

¶ 26. Apparent authority is “authority that the principal has by words or conduct held the alleged agent out as having.” Patriot Commercial Leasing Co., 928 So.2d at 864 (citing Bolus, 525 A.2d at 1221). Apparent authority requires “(1) acts or conduct of the principal indicating the agent’s authority, (2) reasonable reliance on those acts, and (3) detrimental change in position as a result of reliance.” Christian Methodist Episcopal Church v. S & S Constr. Co., Inc., 615 So.2d 568, 573 (Miss.1993) (citing Andrew Jackson Life Ins. Co. v. Williams, 566 So.2d 1172, 1181 (Miss.1990)). A principal is “bound if the conduct of the principal is such that persons of reasonable prudence, ordinarily familiar with business practices, dealing with the agent might rightfully believe the agent to have the power he assumes to have.” Christian Methodist Episcopal Church, 615 So.2d at 573.

¶ 27. The Bar cites De Vaux v. American Home Assurance Co., 387 Mass. 814, 444 N.E.2d 355 (1983), for support. In De Vaux, an individual called the attorney’s office seeking legal advice. De Vaux, 387 Mass, at 816, 444 N.E.2d 355. The attorney’s secretary returned this person’s phone call and rendered some legal advice, arranged for a medical examination, and instructed the person to write a letter requesting the attorney’s assistance. Id. This person delivered a letter to the attorney’s office, but the secretary misfiled the letter. Id. As a result, the attorney failed to discover the letter until after the statute of limitations had expired. Id. at 816-17, 444 N.E.2d 355. The person then filed a malpractice suit against the attorney based, in part, on a theory that the secretary had apparent authority to establish an attorney-client relationship on behalf of the attorney. Id. at 819, 444 N.E.2d 355. The plaintiff claimed that the attorney had placed the secretary in a position in which prospective clients might reasonably believe that she had the authority to establish an attorney-client relationship. Id. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that “[i]t is a question for the jury whether the attorney allowed his secretary to act as she did, and whether he knew what she was doing.” Id. at 820, 444 N.E.2d 355.

¶ 28. Thompson stated that Tubwell had not been given authority independently to communicate with clients and had been instructed not to sign any letters. She told Tubwell that any cases he worked on had to come through her office. Thompson included Tubwell’s name on the law firm letterhead, but identified him as a paralegal. Furthermore, she disclaimed any knowledge of Tubwell’s correspondence with McGaughy or his work on McGaugh/s ease.

¶29. We find insufficient evidence to support that Thompson, by her words, actions, or conduct, indicated that Tubwell had authority to communicate her consent to undertake the representation of a client. We also find that no attorney-client relationship was established by Thompson’s failure to communicate her lack of consent to represent McGaughy. Thompson had no knowledge of McGaughy’s case or Tub-well’s correspondence with McGaughy, and therefore, could not reasonably have known about McGaughy’s reliance on her services.

¶ 30. Because no attorney-client relationship existed, we find that Thompson did not violate Rules 1.2(a) and 1.3.

III. Whether Thompson failed to properly supervise a non-lawyer assistant and/or assisted a non-lawyer in the unauthorized practice of law.

A. Rule 5.3: Responsibilities Regarding Non-Lawyer Assistants.

¶ 31. The complaint tribunal found that Thompson had violated Rule 5.3 by failing to implement adequate safeguards to give reasonable assurance that Tubwell’s conduct complied with the professional obligations of a lawyer. The tribunal concluded that Thompson’s lack of supervision had permitted Tubwell to engage in the unauthorized practice of law.

¶32. Rule 5.3 provides .that a lawyer with managerial authority in a law firm “shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect measures giving reasonable assurance that the [non-lawyer’s] conduct is compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer.... ” M.R.P.C. 5.3.

¶ 33. Thompson testified that she had total control of the firm’s post office box and that she reviewed all mail that came into the firm, including any letters addressed to Tubwell. McGaughy stated that every letter he wrote to Tubwell was addressed to the Thompson Law Firm in Tunica. While it is unclear from the record exactly how many letters McGaughy sent to Tubwell, six letters from Tubwell to McGaughy acknowledged, either directly or implicitly, the receipt of an earlier letter from McGaughy. Nevertheless, Thompson said she could not recall seeing any letters from McGaughy.

¶ 34. While Thompson set forth some general instructions and procedures, she admitted that she had not done enough. When asked what steps she had put into place to ensure that Tubwell was not independently working on cases that he had handled while in prison, Thompson answered: Furthermore, while she knew about Tub-well’s armed robbery conviction at the time she hired him, she was unaware of his prior conviction for forgery until she read his deposition in this matter.

Other than trusting him and, you know, telling him that any cases that, you know, we have, any cases that you have that you’re working on, its got to come through my office.... And, you know, had I — I guess had the foresight or just had — had didn’t give me any reason to distrust him. You know, I wouldn’t have — you know, I would have put other, I guess, precautions in place.

¶ 35. We find that Thompson violated Rule 5.3 by failing to make sufficient efforts to supervise Tubwell’s work. This is especially true in light of Tubwell’s criminal past and Thompson’s awareness of the fact that Tubwell might have continued to work on cases from his earlier days as a writ writer. While Thompson’s ill-advised choice of an untrustworthy paralegal may bear upon the degree to which she could foresee Tubwell’s actions, it does not excuse her violation of the rules of professional conduct. In re Complaint of Jones, 308 Or. 306, 311, 779 P.2d 1016 (1989).

B. Rule 5.5(b): Unauthorized Practice of Law.

¶ 36. The complaint tribunal held that there was insufficient evidence to find that Tubwell had violated Rule 5.5(b). The tribunal determined that there was not enough evidence to show that Thompson knew or should have known that Tub-well was holding out himself or her firm as attorneys for McGaughy. The Bar, however, asserts that a lawyer can assist a non-lawyer in the unauthorized practice of law by giving him all the necessary resources to practice law, and then failing to supervise him.

¶ 37. Rule 5.5(b) prohibits a lawyer from assisting a non-lawyer in the unauthorized practice of law. M.R.P.C. 5.5(b). While a lawyer may employ paralegals and delegate duties to them, the lawyer must supervise the delegated work and retain responsibility for it. M.R.P.C. 5.5, cmt.

¶ 38. The Bar cites In Re Gaff, 272 Ga. 7, 524 S.E.2d 728 (2000), to support its argument that a Rule 5.5 violation can occur as a result of a lawyer’s failure to supervise. In In Re Gaff, Gaff opened a second law office in another town and allowed a disbarred attorney, Ellis, to work there unsupervised as a paralegal. Gaff, 524 S.E.2d. at 728. Gaff failed to implement procedures to insure that Ellis did not have contact with Gaffs clients. Id. Ellis engaged in forgery, theft, and met with and assisted clients on his own. Id. at 729. The Supreme Court of Georgia held that Gaff had assisted Ellis in the unauthorized practice of law by failing to supervise him and failing to establish precautionary policies and procedures. Id. at 729.

¶ 39. Other jurisdictions also have found that a lawyer’s failure to supervise a non-lawyer employee constitutes assistance in the unauthorized practice of law. People v. Smith, 74 P.3d 566, 572 (Col. 2003); In re Sledge, 859 So.2d 671, 684-86 (La.2003); In re McMillian, 359 S.C. 52, 59-60, 596 S.E.2d 494 (S.C.2004); In re Complaint of Jones, 308 Or. at 309-11, 779 P.2d 1016 (1989). Mere warnings or instructions are inadequate unless actual efforts are made to enforce those instructions. In re Complaint of Jones, 308 Or. at 309-11, 779 P.2d 1016.

¶ 40. While Tubwell took advantage of his position in Thompson’s firm and engaged in the unauthorized practice of law without her direct knowledge, her failure to supervise and enforce necessary precautions allowed his actions to go unnoticed. See supra Part III.A. Accordingly, we find that Thompson assisted Tubwell in the unauthorized practice of law by giving him the position and resources necessary to practice law, and then failing to adequately supervise him. Therefore, we find that Thompson violated Rule 5.5(b).

IV. Whether Thompson violated Rules 8.4(a), (d).

¶41. Rule 8.4(a), (d), provides that it is professional misconduct to violate or to attempt to violate the rules of professional conduct and to engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice. M.R.P.C. 8.4(a), (d). Whenever there is a violation of any other rule, there will always be a violation under Rule 8.4. L.S. v. The Miss. Bar, 649 So.2d 810, 814 (Miss.1994).

¶ 42. Having found that Thompson violated Rules 1.15, 5.3, and 5.5(b), we necessarily find that she violated Rule 8.4(a) as well. Furthermore, Thompson’s conduct was prejudicial to the administration of justice, because McGaughy was deprived of his right to file a habeas corpus petition and paid for non-existent representation. Therefore, we find that Thompson violated Rule 8.4(a), (d).

Y. Whether a retroactive, one-year suspension is an appropriate sanction, and whether the complaint tribunal erred in failing to consider the nine factors that must be considered when imposing attorney discipline, as set forth in Liebling v. The Mississippi Bar, 929 So.2d 911, (Miss. 2006).

¶ 43. In imposing the retroactive, one-year suspension, the complaint tribunal failed to examine the nine factors that are required to be considered in attorney disciplinary matters. Those factors are:

(1) The nature of the misconduct involved; (2) the need to deter similar misconduct; (3) the preservation of dignity and reputation of the legal profession; (4) the protection of the public; (5) sanctions imposed in similar cases; (6) the duty violated; (7) the lawyer’s mental state; (8) the actual or potential injury resulting from the misconduct; and (9) the existence of aggravating or mitigating factors.

Liebling, 929 So.2d at 918 (quoting Miss. Bar v. Walls, 890 So.2d 875, 877 (Miss. 2004)).

¶ 44. In Liebling, this Court stated that an analysis of the above factors would be required “in the opinions of all Tribunals which conduct hearings after today’s decision.” Liebling, 929 So.2d at 918. Liebling was handed down on March 23, 2006. Id. at 911. The hearing in this matter occurred prior to Liebling, but the complaint tribunal’s opinion was not issued until nearly one year after Liebling, on March 16, 2007. Under a strict interpretation, this case falls outside of the requirement we imposed in Liebling. Yet, even before Liebling, we had noted that these nine factors should be included in tribunal opinions. Id. at 918. Liebling further emphasized the importance of considering these factors. Id. Given the significance we have continually prescribed to these nine factors, as clearly highlighted by Lie-bling, we find that the complaint tribunal erred in failing to analyze the factors.

¶ 45. The Bar contends that this case merits a harsher penalty than a one-year, retroactive suspension. In determining whether retroactive discipline is appropriate, we find the following factors set forth by the New Jersey Supreme Court to be helpful:

[Wjhether the conduct is part of a continuing pattern or whether there is only a single instance of misconduct; whether there is a significantly attenuated relationship between the misconduct and the practice of law; and whether the passage of time mitigates the severity of the discipline required. The last factor — the remoteness of the misconduct — has two facets. The first is whether the passage of time itself has accomplished rehabilitation of the lawyer. The second is whether the transgressions are so remote in time that intervening developments and current circumstances dilute the public interest in proper and prompt discipline.

People v. Abelman, 804 P.2d 859, 862 (Colo.1991) (internal citations omitted). Thompson’s conduct reflects a continuing pattern of neglect as to her professional responsibilities. Her neglect ultimately caused severe prejudice to McGaughy. While Thompson acknowledged her wrongdoing and gave some indication that she has learned from her mistakes, the public maintains an interest in proper and prompt discipline. See Shah v. Miss. Bar, 962 So.2d 514, 525 (Miss.2007) (“The purpose of discipline is not simply to punish the guilty attorney, but to protect the public, the administration of justice, to maintain appropriate professional standards, and to deter similar misconduct.”) (quoting Miss. State Bar Ass’n v. A Miss. Attorney, 489 So.2d 1081, 1084 (Miss.1986)). Neither the passage of time nor subsequent developments have lessened such public interest in this case.

¶ 46. The delay of disciplinary proceedings is a mitigating circumstance to be considered when determining sanctions. See Clark v. Miss. State Bar Ass’n, 471 So.2d 352, 357 (Miss.1985) (citing 93 A.L.R. 3rd 1057, 1091 (1979)). But after considering the aforementioned factors and the prejudice resulting to McGaughy, we find that a one-year, retroactive suspension is insufficient. Nevertheless, we must await an examination of the Liebling factors before imposing any sanction(s).

CONCLUSION

¶ 47. We affirm the complaint tribunal with regard to its finding that Thompson violated Rules 1.15, 5.3, and 8.4(a), (d). We find that Thompson also violated Rule 5.5(b), and therefore, reverse the complaint tribunal’s finding as to that issue. Because the complaint tribunal failed to consider the nine Liebling factors, we reverse the one-year, retroactive suspension and remand this case to the tribunal for consideration of the appropriate sanction(s) in light of these factors.

¶ 48. AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED AND RENDERED IN PART; REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART.

SMITH, C.J., DIAZ, P.J., CARLSON, GRAVES, DICKINSON, RANDOLPH AND LAMAR, JJ., CONCUR. EASLEY, J., CONCURS IN PART AND DISSENTS IN PART WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION.

      . Gail Thompson was admitted to practice in the State of Mississippi in April 1990.

      . Tubwell was convicted for armed robbery and false pretense.

      . Thompson did not have printed letterhead. Instead, she made her own computer-generated letterhead.

      . Despite Tubwell's request that McGaughy send future correspondence to the Southaven address, McGaughy testified that he sent all of his letters to the Thompson Law Firm.

      . In a letter to McGaughy dated January 3, 2003, Tubwell acknowledged receiving a money order from McGaughy's father. However, it is not clear whether this money order represented the fifty dollars or the $500 amount.

      . In its opinion, the complaint tribunal found that “[McGaughy] was also prejudiced in that his family was duped into paying for non[]existent representation.”

      . While working as a writ writer at Parch-man, Tubwell had designed a general form that inmates could fill in and use to file a pro se petition for post-conviction relief. Tubwell claims that he sent McGaughy only the court records and a copy of the form itself. However, McGaughy testified that the petition already had been prepared when he received it.

      . Thompson was suspended from the practice of law for mishandling client funds in her trust account. Mississippi Supreme Court Cause Number 2002-B-645.

      . The complaint tribunal made the suspension effective from the date of her hearing. Thus, her suspension ended two days prior to the entry of the complaint tribunal’s order.

      . "The practice of law includes the drafting or selection of documents, the giving of advice in regard to them, and the using of an informed or trained discretion in the drafting of documents to meet the needs of the person being served. So any exercise of intelligent choice in advising another of his legal rights and duties brings the activity within the practice of the legal profession.” Darby v. Miss. State Bd. of Bar Admissions, 185 So.2d 684, 687 (Miss. 1966) (citing Oregon State Bar v. Security Escrows, Inc., 233 Or. 80, 377 P.2d 334 (1962)).

      . In five letters, Tubwell expressly acknowledged the receipt of a letter from McGaughy and was writing in response to those letters. Tubwell's initial letter to McGaughy, dated January 4, 2002, did not acknowledge receipt of an earlier letter from McGaughy. However, McGaughy testified that he wrote Tubwell prior to the January 4, 2002, letter.

      . The record indicates that Thompson has a history of disciplinary violations. In addition to her aforementioned eighteen-month suspension for mishandling client funds in 2003/ Thompson was privately reprimanded in 1997 and 2002, and publicly reprimanded in 2002. Thompson's prior disciplinary conduct should be considered as an aggravating factor on remand.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: ANN H. LAMAR, Justice.

license: Public Domain

text:
    The MISSISSIPPI BAR v. David Zachary SCRUGGS.
    No. 2008-BD-00486-SCT.
    Supreme Court of Mississippi.
    July 28, 2008.
   ORDER

ANN H. LAMAR, Justice.

This matter came before the Court, en banc, on a Formal Complaint filed by The Mississippi Bar (“Bar”) requesting that David Zachary Scruggs (“Scruggs”) be disbarred based upon his plea of guilty in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi to one count of misprision of a felony in violation of Title 18 U.S.C. § 4. United States of America v. David Zachary Scruggs, Cause No. 3:07CR00192-002. Scruggs filed a Motion to Dismiss Formal Complaint, alleging the Complaint failed to afford him with due process of law and did not strictly comply with the requirements of Rule 6 of the Mississippi Rules of Discipline.

The Bar then filed a Response to Scruggs’ Motion to Dismiss Formal Complaint and a separate Motion for Indefinite Suspension, Striking from Rolls, Suspending and Staying Proceedings. In its motion, the Bar requested that this Court strike the name of Scruggs from the rolls of The Mississippi Bar and suspend Scruggs from the practice of law pursuant to Rule 6 of the Mississippi Rules of Discipline, and upon subsequent motion, Scruggs should be disbarred. Scruggs filed a Response to the Mississippi Bar’s Motion for Indefinite Suspension, stating he did not oppose the relief requested by the Bar.

On July 2, 2008, a final judgment was entered in the criminal case, United States of America v. David Zachary Scruggs, Cause No. 3:07CR00192-002. Scruggs was adjudicated guilty of misprision of a felony pursuant to Title 18 U.S.C. § 4. On July 9, 2008, The Mississippi Bar filed a Motion to Disbar or to Grant Other Relief, requesting this Court disbar David Zachary Scruggs pursuant to Rule 6 of the Mississippi Rules of Discipline. Scruggs filed his Response to the Bar’s Motion to Disbar or to Grant Other Relief on July 23, 2008. In his Response, Scruggs did not oppose the Bar’s Motion for his disbarment. This Court finds the Motion to Disbar or to Grant Other Relief is well-taken and should be granted.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that:

1. David Zachary Scruggs’ Motion to Dismiss Formal Complaint is hereby dismissed as moot.

2. The Bar’s Motion for Indefinite Suspension, Striking from Rolls, Suspending and Staying Proceedings is dismissed as moot.

3. The name of David Zachary Scruggs shall be stricken from the rolls of The Mississippi Bar.

4. David Zachary Scruggs is hereby permanently disbarred from the practice of law in the State of Mississippi.

5. This order shall constitute notice of permanent disbarment in this cause.

6. The Clerk of this Court shall forward an attested copy of this order to David Zachary Scruggs and the Executive Director of The Mississippi Bar.

7. David Zachary Scruggs shall, within thirty days following entry of this order, notify clients and affected courts of his disbarment and comply with all other requirements applicable to disbarred attorneys pursuant to MRD 11.

8. David Zachary Scruggs shall, within forty-five days following entry of this order, file an affidavit with this Court stating that all of his clients have been notified of his disbarment and his consequent inability to practice law in Mississippi and that he has complied fully with all the requirements set forth in MRD 11.

9. The Clerk of this Court shall immediately forward an attested copy of this order to the circuit court judges and chancellors in and for Lafayette County, Mississippi, and the senior judge of each court shall enter this order upon the minutes of his or her respective court.

10. The Clerk of this Court likewise shall immediately forward an attested copy of this order to the Clerks of the United States District Courts for the Northern and Southern Districts of Mississippi, the Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, and the Clerk of the Supreme Court of the United States.

11. The Bar shall recover from David Zachary Scruggs all of its costs and expenses of this disciplinary action.

SO ORDERED.


author: MICHAEL K. RANDOLPH,

text:
    The MISSISSIPPI BAR v. Richard F. “Dickie” SCRUGGS.
    No. 2008-BD-00451-SCT.
    Supreme Court of Mississippi.
    July 28, 2008.
   ORDER

MICHAEL K. RANDOLPH,

Justice, for the Court.

This matter first came before the Court, sitting en banc, on a Formal Complaint filed by The Mississippi Bar (“Bar”) which alleged that “Richard F. ‘Dickie’ Scruggs [‘Scruggs’] tendered a plea of guilty in United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi to one count of conspiracy to corruptly influence a state circuit court judge in violation of Title 18 U.S.C. § 371.” Scruggs filed a Motion to Dismiss Formal Complaint, alleging that the Formal Complaint was fatally defective and should be dismissed for failure to strictly comply with the requirements of Rule 6 of the Mississippi Rules of Discipline.

The Bar then filed a Response to Scruggs’ Motion to Dismiss Formal Complaint and a separate Motion for Indefinite Suspension, Striking from Rolls, Suspending and Staying Proceedings. The motion requested that this Court strike Scruggs’ name from the rolls of the Mississippi Bar, suspend Scruggs from the practice of law, stay the disciplinary proceedings until the criminal proceedings have been concluded, and finally, upon separate motion, Scruggs should be disbarred.

Scruggs filed a Response to the Bar’s Motion for Indefinite Suspension, Striking from Rolls, Suspending and Staying Proceedings relating that he did not oppose the relief requested by the Bar in its motion.

On July 2, 2008, final judgment was entered in United States of America v. Richard F. “Dickie” Scruggs, 2008 WL 2643074, Criminal Case No. 3:07CR00192-001 in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi, finding that on June 27, 2008, Scruggs was adjudicated guilty of Conspiracy to Commit Bribery of an Elected State Official by Means of Wire Fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. On July 9, 2008, pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Discipline 6, the Bar then filed a Motion to Disbar or to Grant Other Relief. Scruggs filed a response to the Bar’s motion averring that he did not oppose the relief requested by the Bar. Therefore, this Court finds the Motion to Disbar by the Bar is well-taken and should be granted.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that:

1.Richard F. Scruggs’ Motion to Dismiss Formal Complaint is hereby dismissed as moot.

2. The Bar’s Motion for Indefinite Suspension and Suspending and Staying Proceedings is dismissed as moot.

3. The name of Richard F. Scruggs shall be stricken from the rolls of the Mississippi Bar.

4. Richard F. Scruggs is hereby permanently disbarred from the practice of law in the state of Mississippi.

6.This order shall constitute notice of permanent disbarment in this cause.

6. The Clerk of this Court shall forward an attested copy of this order to Richard F. Scruggs and the Executive Director of the Mississippi Bar.

7. Richard F. Scruggs shall, within thirty days following entry of this order, notify clients and affected courts of his disbarment and comply with all other requirements applicable to disbarred attorneys pursuant to MRD 11.

8. Richard F. Scruggs shall, within forty-five days following entry of this order, file an affidavit with this Court stating that all of his clients have been notified of his disbarment and his consequent inability to practice law in Mississippi and that he has complied fully with all the requirements set forth in MRD 11.

9. The Clerk of this Court shall immediately forward an attested copy of this order to the circuit court judges and chancellors in and for Lafayette County, Mississippi, and the senior judge of each court shall enter this order upon the minutes of his or her respective court.

10. The Clerk of this Court likewise shall immediately forward an attested copy of this order to the Clerks of the United States District Courts for the Northern and Southern Districts of Mississippi, the Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, and the Clerk of the Supreme Court of the United States.

11. The Bar shall recover from Richard F. Scruggs all of its costs and expenses of this disciplinary action.

SO ORDERED.


author: WALLER, Presiding Justice, DICKINSON, Justice,

text:
    Joe Gregory STEWART v. THE MISSISSIPPI BAR.
    No. 2008-BR-00138-SCT.
    Supreme Court of Mississippi.
    Sept. 18, 2008.

      Michael B. Martz, attorney for appellant.
    Adam Bradley Kilgore, Jackson, attorney for appellee.
   WALLER, Presiding Justice,

for the Court.

¶ 1. Joe Gregory Stewart seeks reinstatement to the practice of law. Because Stewart’s petition lacks sufficient justification for reinstatement, we deny the requested relief.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 2. Stewart pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit extortion under color of official right in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi. See United States v. Stewart, No. 2:03CR00048-001 (N.D.Miss.2004). This felony charge was made against him for engaging in a pattern of paying Ferrell Hunter, a Tunica County Sheriffs deputy who cited Stewart’s clients for driving under the influence (DUD, to intentionally absent himself from the justice court proceedings on the DUI citations. Hunter’s absence resulted in the dismissal of the cases against Stewart’s clients. Stewart testified he self-reported this illegal activity to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. He was sentenced to serve three years on probation and to pay a $20,000 fine and a $100 special assessment. The probation term ended March 3, 2007.

¶ 3. Shortly after Stewart’s guilty plea, the Mississippi Bar filed a complaint to have. Stewart disbarred. Stewart did not respond to the complaint, and this Court disbarred him by order entered September 1, 2004. See Miss. Bar v. Stewart, 890 So.2d 900 (Miss.2004). Stewart did not file a motion for rehearing. This order imposed no additional conditions precedent to Stewart’s petition for reinstatement.

¶ 4. Stewart filed his petition for reinstatement to the practice of law with this Court on January 22, 2008. The Bar deposed him eight days later and filed a response. Miss. R. Disc. 3; 12.8. Within the response, the Bar generally acknowledged that Stewart had met the jurisdictional prerequisites for filing his petition, and noted that Stewart had not taken the Mississippi Bar Examination. The Bar opposes his reinstatement on the basis that his misconduct was too egregious for readmission to be considered:

It is the Bar’s position that Mr. Stewart should not be reinstated to the practice of law. While Mr. Stewart’s handling of his personal matters since his disbarment and his expressed desire to enter the military should he be readmitted are admirable, the underlying misconduct which led to his criminal conviction violated the basic principles that attorneys must live by in order to honorably serve their clients, the courts, and the legal system. His misconduct was of such a serious nature that the Bar cannot support his reinstatement.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 5. The disbarred attorney seeking reinstatement carries the burden of proving that he has rehabilitated himself and has established the requisite moral character to entitle him to the privilege of practicing law. In re Holleman, 826 So.2d 1248, 1246 (Miss.2002). We review attorney petitions for reinstatement under a de novo standard and are not bound by any manifest-error or substantial-evidence rule. See In re Baker, 649 So.2d 850, 852 (Miss.1995).

DISCUSSION

I. JURISDICTIONAL PREREQUISITES

¶ 6. We find that Stewart’s petition met the jurisdictional prerequisites for consideration. His petition was filed more than three years after this Court ordered his disbarment. Miss. R. Disc. 12.1. He took and passed the Multi-State Professional Responsibility Exam in November of 2007, with a scaled score of not less than 80. Miss. R. Disc. 12.5. While he has not taken the Mississippi Bar Exam, nothing in the rules of discipline require him to take this prior to petitioning this Court for reinstatement, and it is this Court’s practice to grant reinstatement on the condition that the petitioner subsequently pass the bar exam. Miss. R. Disc. 12.5; see, e.g., In re McGuire, 912 So.2d 902 (Miss.2005).

II. JURISDICTIONAL REQUIREMENTS ADDRESSED FOR REINSTATEMENT

¶ 7. As this Court has stated in the past, certain factors must be met prior to reinstatement:

The petitioner must: (1) state the cause or causes for suspension or disbarment; (2) give the name and current address of all persons, parties, firms, or legal entities who suffered pecuniary loss due to the improper conduct; (3) make full amends and restitution; (4) show that he has the necessary moral character for the practice of law; and (5) demonstrate the requisite legal education to be reinstated to the privilege of practicing law.

In re Benson, 890 So.2d, 888, 890 (Miss.2004). Using these factors, this Court weighs Stewart’s petition for reinstatement.

A. Cause for Disbarment.

¶ 8. Stewart’s petition for reinstatement identifies his guilty plea as the cause for his disbarment. The offense for which Stewart pleaded guilty was not only a felony conviction of extortion, but one which undermined the integrity of our legal system.

B. Name of Anyone Suffering Pecuniary Loss.

¶ 9. Stewart alleges that no person, party, firm, or legal entity suffered pecuniary loss due to his improper conduct. Miss. R. Disc. 12.7. However, there is the possibility, assuming Stewart’s clients were guilty, that the State suffered pecuniary loss in the amount of the applicable fine. Miss.Code Ann. § 99-19-73(1) (Rev. 2007). See e.g., Miss. Comm’n on Judicial Performance v. Gibson, 883 So.2d 1155 (Miss.2004) (court imposed fine equaling amount lost to municipality in fines and court costs); see also Miss. Comm’n on Judicial Performance v. Hartzog, 904 So.2d 981, 986 (Miss.2004) (suspended judge fined costs incurred by county to employ interim judge). Stewart made no mention of this or any other potential costs to the community in his petition for reinstatement. He paid the fine and special assessment imposed by the federal district court and paid the full costs and expenses related to his disbarment. Miss. R. Disc. 12.7.

C. Full Amends and Restitution.

¶ 10. The petition for reinstatement indicates Stewart paid the $500 investigatory fee to the Bar, as well as his fíne and special assessment arising from the underlying felony. Miss. R. Disc. 12.7. No determination has been made of any pecuniary loss incurred by the state.

D. Rehabilitation and Requisite Moral Character.

¶ 11. The ultimate inquiry for this Court is whether Stewart has demonstrated sufficient rehabilitation in character and conduct for consideration of readmission:

This Court’s fundamental inquiry is whether the attorney has rehabilitated himself in conduct and character since the suspension was imposed. In re Mathes, 653 So.2d 928, 929 (Miss.1995). A firm resolve to live a correct life evidenced by outward manifestation sufficient to convince a reasonable mind clearly that the person has reformed is only required. In re Underwood, 649 So.2d 825, 828-29 (Miss.1995).

In re Flautt, 890 So.2d 928, 930 (Miss. 2004).

¶ 12. Stewart submitted his own affidavit in support of his petition for reinstatement. The Bar also deposed Stewart as part of its investigation of Stewart’s Petition for Reinstatement. We subdivide the relevant information provided in his petition and testimony as follows:

1.Civic, Church, and Charitable Involvement.

¶ 13. Stewart testified that before he began serving his three-year probation period, he and his family moved from Oxford to Gulfport, Mississippi. As evidence of his rehabilitation, Stewart cites community service, church involvement, and accommodations provided by the hotel he manages. Stewart performed fifty hours of community service as part of his court-ordered probation at a Gulfport Catholic church of which he is not a member. He stated that he is actively involved with his own church and that he is especially involved with his Sunday school class. Stewart submitted letters of appreciation from: (1) a speaker at a continuing legal education seminar for consideration and assistance in hosting the seminar at the hotel; (2) the president of Mississippi Power Company for holding rooms open at the hotel for its employees after Hurricane Katrina; (3) a church’s hurricane cleanup crew for the use of the hotel’s pool; (4) the Bayou View Elementary PTA for a $500 donation; (5) the executive director of Beauvoir for a donation of rooms at the hotel for out-of-town visitors and restoration crews to Beauvoir; and (6) the executive director of the Harrison County Habitat for Humanity for hosting weekly pool parties at the hotel for its staff. He also submits a certificate of appreciation dated August 10, 2006, from the Sons of the American Revolution for “outstanding support” when the hotel hosted pool parties for them. Stewart provided little or no information regarding the nature or extent of his personal involvement in the listed events.

2. Employment Since Disbarment.

¶ 14. Since his disbarment, Stewart has not engaged in the practice of law. He has worked at the Holiday Inn owned by his wife both during and after his probationary period. Stewart did not have any open cases at the time of disbarment and had successfully transferred all existing clients to his former law partner.

3. Personal Recommendations.

¶ 15. Stewart submitted letters of recommendation from the chancellor of the University of Mississippi, one faculty member of the University of Mississippi, one faculty member of the Mississippi College School of Law, a retired chancellor, and six members of the Bar in support of his petition for reinstatement. These letters speak highly of Stewart’s family and personal character, and recommend without reservation Stewart’s reinstatement. These letters relate additional activities Stewart undertook that demonstrate his good character, including hosting weekly cookouts for cleanup volunteers and hosting foreign students. After publishing Stewart’s intention to seek reinstatement for public comment, the Bar received one letter supporting Stewart’s petition from another lawyer and no letters in opposition.

4. Mental and Emotional Status.

¶ 16. The Bar states Stewart appeared mentally and emotionally stable at his deposition. He testified that he was not using, nor had he used, illegal or prescription drugs before or after his disbarment. He further stated that while stressed by the proceedings he had not been diagnosed with depression.

5. Other Actions Touching on Reformation.

¶ 17. Stewart testified that he has not been arrested since the disbarment nor cited with any misdemeanor except for a single speeding ticket which he promptly paid. He stated that he is current with all debts and taxes, although he did file for bankruptcy prior to the disbarment. He has been sued by a former employee of the hotel who was implicated for embezzlement. Stewart has representation for this matter, and was unaware of the current status of the case. He was also privately reprimanded by the Mississippi Bar concerning unauthorized interactions of his former assistant and a client. The client was reimbursed all payments made to Stewart’s firm. Stewart stated he has been rehabilitated because he self-reported his crime and cooperated with the FBI. He distanced himself from “that same situation” and moved to the coast before his probationary sentence began.

E. Future Plans.

¶ 18. Stewart plans to represent himself in future business dealings with his hotel development business, and possibly work for another real-estate attorney. If not reinstated, he will “continue to build hotels.” Stewart submitted in his deposition that he should be reinstated because he would be a good example of someone who had erred ethically and was able to be rehabilitated and reinstated to the practice of law. Stewart submitted to the Bar that:

I would like to be seen as a good example of how to really screw it up and how to come back the right way. The loss of honor is one thing, but I think people should know from my example that you don’t have to stay outside. You can earn your way back in, and you should try. And even if it’s not granted, you should still try. And hopefully that’s what I’ve demonstrated.

F. Requisite Legal Education for Reinstatement.

¶ 19. Stewart attests that he has satisfied the fifth criteria of maintaining his legal skills “by reading advance sheets of Mississippi opinions.” He attended one probate continuing legal education seminar in 2005 and another general-law update seminar. He read internet websites which discuss Mississippi law, and read legal reporting in the newspaper. He passed the Multi-State Professional Responsibility-Exam in 2007, with a scaled score not less than 80, which is required for reinstatement. We find Stewart’s demonstrated legal learning to be modest, but not so lacking as to prevent reinstatement on this-ground alone.

III. ANALYSIS AND DECISION.

¶ 20. While the Bar has opposed reinstatement of Stewart on the basis of his flagrant conduct, he is eligible to seek reinstatement under the Rules of Discipline existing at the time of his disbarment. The actions for which Stewart was disbarred were very grievous in nature. His illegal activity circumvented the justice system’s fairness and impartiality and injured the Bar’s reputation for professionalism. We must weigh Stewart’s rehabilitated moral character against these misdeeds. We previously stated the necessity of demonstrating sufficient rehabilitation of character before reinstatement to the practice of law in In re Tucker:

The legal profession has come a long way from the days when attorneys were automatically presumed honorable. The quality and reputation of the Mississippi Bar and the public interest which it serves warrant stringent standards for reinstatement following disbarment. This Court remains firm in its resolve that one who has acted in a manner sufficiently egregious to warrant disbarment must clearly show a rehabilitation of character before reinstatement to the privilege of practicing law. Compromise of the standards to which attorneys are held will surely cripple the profession, with concomitant harm to the public.

In re Morrison, 819 So.2d at 1186 (quoting In re Tucker, 656 So.2d 799, 805 (Miss. 1995)). Stewart must establish an active and sustained personal commitment through concrete actions to prove that his character has been rehabilitated.

¶ 21. We recently have dealt with the reinstatement of members of the Bar who committed serious, felonious actions which are arguably comparable to the actions of Stewart. Jimmy D. McGuire was disbarred from the practice of law based on a felony conviction for filing false currency reports to the Internal Revenue Service. In re McGuire, 912 So.2d at 903. This felony included conspiring to shield drug money, money-laundering schemes and attempting to obstruct justice in his trial. In re McGuire, 912 So.2d at 903 (citing McGuire v. Miss. Bar, 798 So.2d 476, 477 (Miss.2001)). McGuire was denied reinstatement twice before this Court found that he had rehabilitated his character sufficiently to be allowed back into the Bar. McGuire showed an active, sustained effort to rehabilitate himself and to prove the requisite moral character for readmission.

[McGuire] is an active member of Gateway United Methodist Church in Gulfport, where he serves as an usher, church historian and Chairman of the finance committee. He has also volunteered for vacation bible school, is a member of the United Methodist’s Men’s group and has recently become certified as a lay speaker in the Methodist Church.
McGuire is a volunteer with the M.L. Tootle Mission project, tutor and substitute teacher, and volunteer with Memorial Hospice. McGuire has also made charitable donations to Make-a-Wish Foundation, Alzheimer’s Foundation, American Diabetes Association, Christopher Reeve Foundation, Habitat for Humanity and the Ocean Springs Honor Choir. McGuire testified that he spends approximately 10-14 hours per week doing charitable work, which he will continue to do if he is reinstated to the practice of law.
McGuire attached approximately sixty-six letters of recommendation to his Petition for Reinstatement. These letters were from law enforcement officers, former and current Circuit and Chancery Clerk personnel, professional and business persons, and persons from McGuire’s church. Approximately fifteen of the letters were from members of the Bar. Most of these letters acknowledged the severity of McGuire’s conduct leading to his disbarment and his remorse regarding the crimes he committed.
McGuire stated that his future plans were to reestablish a practice on the Mississippi Gulf Coast, but that prior to doing so he would seek out a firm of reputable lawyers to work for so that he could be supervised and brought up to speed as to the practice of law. He also expressed an interest in serving as a public defender. He indicated he does not intend to represent anyone who is charged with a drug violation. McGuire further stated that he was considering entering a Ph.D. program at Temple University in constitutional law.

In re McGuire, 912 So.2d at 904-905.

¶ 22. The evidence of Stewart’s civic and community involvement centers around gratuities made by his family-owned hotel, including hosting pool parties and reserving blocks of rooms for workers on the coast after Hurricane Katrina. Furthermore, because the hotel is owned by his wife, it is unclear whether these gratuities are solely attributable to him. Stewart must show that his good deeds have arisen from his own efforts and resources and demonstrate clearly a reformation of character and conduct since his disbarment. Rehabilitative actions showing some relationship with the wrong committed would have weighed more heavily in Stewart’s favor. See In Re Woolbright, 890 So.2d 884, 886-887 (Miss.2004) (Petitioner volunteered at alcohol and drug counseling program after being disbarred for felony DUI arrest.).

¶ 23. Stewart must show that his actions, beyond being good deeds of a general nature, evidence a fundamental change in his character. “The Court’s fundamental inquiry is whether [the attorney] has rehabilitated himself in conduct and character since the suspension was imposed. A firm resolve to live a correct life evidenced by outward manifestation sufficient to convince a reasonable mind clearly that the person has reformed is only required.” In re Morrison, 819 So.2d 1181 (Miss.2001), quoting In re Steele, 722 So.2d 662, 664 (Miss.1998) (emphasis added). Stewart has failed to evidence the firm resolve we require.

¶ 24. Stewart performed no community service beyond what was required of him during his sentencing for the underlying felony and has indicated no intent to do so in the future. See In re McGuire, 912 So.2d at 904-905 (performed 10-14 hours of community service per week with the intention to continue service after reinstatement.) Stewart is correct in stating that his rehabilitation began when he self-reported his illegal activity to the FBI. Stewart’s rehabilitation path naturally would be shorter than those who either refuse to acknowledge the gravity of their wrongdoing, or those who must be caught before repenting. However, acknowledgment of one’s mistakes is only the first step to rehabilitation.

¶ 25. Though Stewart has successfully shown some rehabilitation and outward improvement in his conduct, we find he has failed to show the requisite rehabilitated moral character to be reinstated. See In re McGuire, 912 So.2d at 904-905.

CONCLUSION

¶ 26. After our plenary review, we find the evidence in the record does not warrant Stewart’s reinstatement to the practice of law because of a lack of demonstrated rehabilitation of character. Due to the seriousness of his offense, we find that the civic, church, and charitable involvement offered by Stewart lacked sufficient substance to clearly show a fundamental change in his character.

¶ 27. PETITION FOR REINSTATEMENT TO THE PRACTICE OF LAW DENIED.

SMITH, C.J., CARLSON, RANDOLPH AND LAMAR, JJ., CONCUR. DICKINSON, J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY DIAZ, P.J., AND GRAVES, J. EASLEY, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.

DICKINSON, Justice,

Dissenting:

¶ 28. Joe Gregory Stewart clearly met the requirements for reinstatement, as those requirements existed at the time of his disbarment. However, as pointed out in a footnote by the majority, “Miss. R. Disc 12(c) was amended April 4, 2002, which may have made Stewart ineligible for reinstatement if such conduct were to occur after the effective date of the amendment.” Stewart has complied with and met every requirement set forth in In re Benson, 890 So.2d, 888, 890 (Miss.2004). In my view, Stewart is being denied reinstatement solely because this Court changed the rules after Stewart’s disbarment. Numerous others whose wrongful conduct equaled or exceed Stewart’s have been granted reinstatement. In the interest of fairness, justice, and equal application of the law, I would grant his petition for reinstatement.

DIAZ, P.J., AND GRAVES, J., JOIN THIS OPINION.

      . This illegal activity occurred before April 4, 2002. See Miss. R. Disc. 12(c).

      . These individuals are Robert Khayat, Guthrie Abbott, Shelton Hand, Norman Gillespie, Richelle Lumpkin, Keith Wiseman, John Cocke, William Hooper, Jr., Andre de Gruy, and Carl Ford, respectively.

      . Though not an issue here, as a condition precedent to his reinstatement, Stewart would be required to take and pass the Mississippi Bar Exam. Miss. R. Disc. 12.5.

      . Miss. R. Disc 12(c) was amended April 4, 2002. This rule may have made Stewart ineligible for reinstatement if such conduct had occurred after the effective date of the amendment.


author: RANDOLPH, Justice,

text:
    In re Petition of Azki SHAH for the Reinstatement to the Practice of Law.
    No. 2008-BR-00408-SCT.
    Supreme Court of Mississippi.
    Oct. 2, 2008.

      Azki Shah, pro se.
    James R. Clark, Jackson, attorney for appellee.
   RANDOLPH, Justice,

for the Court.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 1. This matter is before the Court upon Azki Shah’s Petition for Reinstatement to the Practice of Law. In response, the Mississippi Bar (“the Bar”) has filed a Motion to Dismiss the Petition, averring that (a) Shah’s petition has been filed prematurely, and (b) that Shah has not complied with the conditions for reinstatement which were imposed by this Court when suspending Shah.

¶ 2. The Bar initiated a Formal Complaint against Shah, alleging he violated Mississippi Rules of Professional Conduct 1.2(a), 1.3, 1.4, 8.1(b) and 8.4(a). A hearing was held on the Formal Complaint, and the Complaint Tribunal found by clear and convincing evidence that Shah had violated Mississippi Rules of Professional Conduct 1.2(a), 1.3, 1.4, 8.1(a), 8.4(a) and 8.4(c). The Complaint Tribunal found that “due to Shah’s prior violations, pattern of misconduct, refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of his misconduct, his substantial experience in the practice of law and the fact that there were no mitigating factors,” that Shah should be immediately disbarred and pay all costs of the proceedings. Id.

¶ 3. Shah appealed the decision of the tribunal to this Court. The Court agreed with the tribunal’s findings that Shah violated Mississippi Rules of Professional Conduct 1.2(a), 1.3, 1.4, 8.1(a), 8.4(a) and 8.4(c). However, this Court ruled that the “leap between private reprimand and disbarment is too great.” Id. at 517. This Court suspended Shah from the practice of law for three years and ordered that “upon completion of this suspension, and preceding his application for reinstatement pursuant to M.R.D.12.2, Shah shall be required to take and pass the Multi-State Professional Responsibility Exam, consistent with the guidelines set forth in M.R.D. 12.5 ... [and] shall pay the costs of these proceedings.” Id. at 525.

¶ 4. Shah files his Petition for Reinstatement from the suspension issued on January 4, 2007.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 5. “This Court has ‘exclusive and inherent jurisdiction of matters pertaining to attorney discipline [and] reinstatement. ...’” M.R.D. 1(a). This Court reviews “petitions for reinstatement de novo. We also sit as trier of fact and therefore are not bound by substantial evidence or manifest error rules.” In re Prisock, 5 So.3d 319, 322, 2008 Miss. LEXIS 287, *8 (Miss. June 5, 2008) (citations omitted).

ANALYSIS

¶ 6. Rule 12(a) of the Mississippi Rules of Discipline states that “[n]o person disbarred or suspended for a period of six months or longer shall be reinstated to the privilege of practicing law except upon petition to the Court.” The procedure for reinstatement, as set forth in Mississippi Rule of Discipline 12, is as follows:

(12.2) Suspensions. A petition for reinstatement shall be required in all cases of suspension for a period of six months or more. In cases of suspension pending satisfaction of conditions precedent, reinstatement shall not be permitted except upon proof that the conditions have been met.
(12.4) Suspensions-Time for Filing Petitions for Reinstatement. A suspended attorney shall not file a petition for reinstatement until the expiration of the period of suspension. In cases of suspension of six months or longer pending satisfaction of conditions precedent, the petition for reinstatement may be filed immediately upon the attorney’s meeting these conditions.
(12.5) Examination Requirements. Subsequent to the time of eligibility for reinstatement of an attorney suspended for six months or longer, the petitioning attorney shall take the Multi-State Professional Responsibility Exam, as prepared by the National Conference of Bar Examiners, and achieve a scaled score of not less than 80, if the Complaint Tribunal determines, on a case-by-case basis, that good cause exists to require the applicant for reinstatement to take such test. A disbarred attorney, prior to reinstatement, shall be required to take and pass the complete bar examination administered by the Mississippi Board of Bar Admissions and achieve the score then required for admission to the bar of new attorneys as well as passing the Multi-State Professional Responsibility Exam with the score required for admission of new lawyers. (12.7) Contents of Reinstatement Petitions — Jurisdictional Matters. All reinstatement petitions shall be addressed to the Court, shall state the cause or causes for suspension or disbarment, give the names and current addresses of all persons, parties, firms, or legal entities who suffered pecuniary loss due to the improper conduct, the making of full amends and restitution, the reasons justifying reinstatement, and requisite moral character and legal learning to be reinstated to the privilege of practicing law. Upon filing, the petition shall be served on, and an investigatory fee of $ 500.00 shall be paid to the Bar, same to be in addition to any other sum due the Bar, or persons injured by the petitioner’s improper conduct. The matters set out in this paragraph shall be jurisdictional.

¶ 7. In his Petition, Shah asserts the following:

a) That the client who filed the informal complaint against Shah was fully reimbursed before the client filed the complaint with the Bar.
b) That Shah has completed more than thirty hours of Continuing Legal Education.
c) That in his Petition for Reinstatement filed in his previous disciplinary case, In re Shah, 987 So.2d 964, 2008 Miss. LEXIS 253 (May 22, 2008), Shah included a petition signed by more than sixty people who supported his reinstatement.
d) That Shah paid the $500 investigatory fee required by the Bar in his previous cause, In re Shah, 987 So.2d 964, 2008 Miss. LEXIS 258 (May 22, 2008), and that he should not be required to do so in this cause.
e) That the Bar has been reimbursed $341.56, which were the costs of the proceedings.
f) That this Court should consolidate this cause with the previous matter, In re Shah, 987 So.2d 964, 2008 Miss. LEXIS 253 (May 22, 2008).
h) That this Court should require Shah to take only one exam, the complete Mississippi Bar Exam.

¶ 8. In its Motion to Dismiss Shah’s Petition, the Bar states that Shah should be allowed to petition for reinstatement on January 4, 2010, at the earliest. The Bar further contends that Shah has not complied with the requirements of Mississippi Rules of Discipline 12.2 or 12.5. The Bar requests that this Court dismiss Shah’s petition with prejudice.

¶ 9. It is clear from the limited record with which we are provided that Shah has, in fact, not complied with the requirements set forth by this Court in Shah, 962 So.2d at 525, nor with the requirements of Mississippi Rules of Discipline 12.2 or 12.5.

¶ 10. Additionally, the Bar is correct in its assertion that Shah has filed his petition prematurely pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Discipline 12.4. The opinion suspending Shah was issued on January 4, 2007, and rehearing was denied on April 19, 2007, effectively suspending Shah on April 26, 2007.

¶ 11. Shah’s reinstatement was addressed in a recent opinion authored by Presiding Justice Waller, wherein Shah’s Petition for Reinstatement from a previous disbarment was dismissed without prejudice, as it was prematurely filed. See In Re Shah, 987 So.2d 964, 965-66, 2008 WL 2140582 at **1-2, 2008 Miss. LEXIS at *6. That opinion additionally addressed Shah’s suspension in the case sub judice. The Court ruled:

Shah’s suspension ... extends the period he is prohibited from petitioning this Court for reinstatement to April 19, 2010.... Any petition to have Shah reinstated to the practice of law filed on or before this date will be dismissed as premature.... Furthermore, any petition which does not provide proof that Shah satisfied the conditions precedent to his reinstatement under his suspension ... will be dismissed, as this Court would lack jurisdiction.

Id. at 966-67, 2008 WL 2140582 at **2-3, 2008 Miss. LEXIS at 6-7.

¶ 12. Shah has prematurely filed this Petition for Reinstatement, and it is clear he has made no attempt to comply with Mississippi Rule of Discipline 12, nor with the mandate of this Court in Shah, 962 So.2d at 525. Shah’s petition is hereby denied. See In re Petition ex rel. Baldwin, 987 So.2d 961, 2008 Miss. LEXIS 256 (Miss. May 22, 2008).

CONCLUSION

¶ 13. Shah’s Petition for Reinstatement to the Practice of Law is denied. Consistent with this Court’s opinions in Shah, 962 So.2d at 525, and Shah, 2008 WL 2140582 at **2-3, 2008 Miss. LEXIS at *7, Shah is prohibited from petitioning this Court for reinstatement until April 19, 2010. Shah may only petition for reinstatement after he submits proof of satisfaction of all conditions precedent pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Discipline 12.2 and after completion and passage of the Multi-State Professional Responsibility Exam pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Discipline 12.5.

¶ 14. SHAH’S PETITION FOR REINSTATEMENT TO THE PRACTICE OF LAW IS DENIED.

SMITH, C.J., WALLER AND DIAZ, P.JJ., CARLSON, GRAVES, DICKINSON AND LAMAR, JJ., CONCUR. EASLEY, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.

      . Shah produced no receipt or check which evidenced that his client was reimbursed.

      . On September 8, 2008, Shah filed with this Court a supplement to his petition which stated he has completed 37.2 hours of continuing legal education.

      . This request to consolidate was denied, and an opinion in this matter was issued by Presiding Justice Waller on May 22, 2008. See In Re Shah, 987 So.2d 964, 2008 Miss. LEXIS 253 (May 22, 2008).

      . On September 19, 2008, Shah filed with this Court a supplement showing proof he sat for the Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination. However, Shah did not achieve the scaled score required by Mississippi Rule of Discipline 12.5.

      .Pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Appellate Procedure 41(a), the mandate of the Supreme Court shall issue seven days after entry of the order denying the motion for rehearing.