text:
    FLORIDA EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, et al., Appellants, v. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF STATE, et al., Appellees.
    No. SC10-1784.
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    Oct. 7, 2010.

      Ronald G. Meyer, Jennifer S. Blohm, and Lynn C. Hearn of Meyer, Brooks, Demma and Blohm, P.A., Tallahassee, FL, for Appellants.
    Scott D. Makar, Solicitor General, Timothy D. Osterhaus, Deputy Solicitor General, and Jonathan A. Glogau, Special Counsel, Office of the Attorney General, Tallahassee, FL, and C.B. Upton, General Counsel, Florida Department of State, Tallahassee, FL, for Appellees.
   PER CURIAM.

This appeal concerns an attack on Amendment 8, a legislatively proposed amendment to the Florida Constitution concerning class size, brought by the Florida Education Association (FEA), Andy Ford, and Lynette Estrada. The trial court upheld Amendment 8 and ordered that it remain on the November 2010 general election ballot. On appeal, the First District Court of Appeal certified to this Court that the trial court’s judgment is of great public importance and requires immediate resolution by this Court. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(5), Fla. Const.

We accepted jurisdiction and granted expedited review in light of the pending election of November 2, 2010. As further explained below, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This case involves a joint resolution of the Florida Legislature that proposes an amendment to the Florida Constitution concerning class size. See Fla. S.J. Res. 2 (2010) (joint resolution proposing to amend article IX, section 1, of the Florida Constitution relating to class sizes) (hereinafter Joint Resolution). The proposed amendment, which has been designated as Amendment 8 by the Division of Elections, was passed by the constitutionally required three-fifths vote of the membership of each house during the 2010 Florida legislative session. The Joint Resolution contained the text of the proposed amendment and a ballot title and summary that the Legislature specified should be placed on the ballot.

The ballot title and summary for proposed Amendment 8 provides:

REVISION OF THE CLASS SIZE REQUIREMENTS FOR PUBLIC SCHOOLS — The Florida Constitution currently limits the maximum number of students assigned to each teacher in public school classrooms in the following grade groupings: for prekindergarten through grade 3, 18 students; for grades 4 through 8, 22 students; and for grades 9 through 12, 25 students. Under this amendment, the current limits on the maximum number of students assigned to each teacher in public school classrooms would become limits on the average number of students assigned per class to each teacher, by specified grade grouping, in each public school. This amendment also adopts new limits on the maximum number of students assigned to each teacher in an individual classroom as follows: for prekindergarten through grade 3, 21 students; for grades 4 through 8, 27 students; and for grades 9 through 12, 30 students. This amendment specifies that class size limits do not apply to virtual classes, requires the Legislature to provide sufficient funds to maintain the average number of students required by this amendment, and schedules these revisions to take effect upon approval by the electors of this state and to operate retroactively to the beginning of the 2010-2011 school year.

The revised language and changes to article IX, section 1, were also set forth in the Joint Resolution and provided in pertinent part as follows (words stricken are deletions; words underlined are additions):

ARTICLE IX EDUCATION
SECTION 1. Public education.—
(a)_ To assure that children attending public schools obtain a high quality education, the legislature shall make adequate provision to ensure that, by the beginning of the 2010-2011 2040 school year and for each school year thereafter, there are a sufficient number of classrooms so
(1) Within each public school, the average maximum number of students who are assigned per class to each teacher who is teaching in-publie-school-class-rooms — for prekindergarten through grade 3 does not exceed 18 students and the maximum number of students assigned to each teacher in an individual classroom does not exceed 21 students;
(2) Within each public school, the average maximum number of students who are assigned per class to each teacher who is teaching in public school classrooms for grades 4 through 8 does not exceed 22 students and the maximum number of students assigned to each teacher in an individual classroom does not exceed 27 students; and
(3) Within each public school, the average maximum number of students who are assigned per class to each teacher who is teaching in public school classrooms-for- grades 9 through 12 does not exceed 25 students and the maximum number of students assigned to each teacher in an individual classroom does not exceed 30 students.
The class size requirements of this subsection do not apply to extracurricular or virtual classes. Payment of the costs associated with meeting reducing c-lass-size-to- meet these requirements is the responsibility of the state and not of local school schools districts. Beginning with-lhe-2003-2004 fiscal year. The legislature shall provide sufficient funds to maintain reduce the average number of students required by in each classroom by at least two students-per year until the-maximum ■ -number-of-students-per-classroom does not exceed the requirements-of this subsection.

FEA, Andy Ford, and Lynette Estrada filed a complaint on July 23, 2010, asking the trial court to determine whether the ballot summary complies with the requirements of section 101.161(1), Florida Statutes (2009). Both sides submitted motions for summary judgment, agreeing that there were no issues of material fact for determination.

The trial court rejected the challenge to Amendment 8:

[Wjhen read together, the ballot title and summary clearly and unambiguously advise the voter that the Legislature is still obligated to provide the funding required to meet the class size approved by the voter if the amendment passes, and it clearly and unambiguously advises the voter of the new class size and attendant funding obligation.

The trial court found that the ballot title and summary met the requirements of law and ordered the amendment to remain on the ballot for the November 2010 general election.

ANALYSIS

The standard of review of the validity of a proposed constitutional amendment is de novo. Armstrong v. Harris, 773 So.2d 7, 11 (Fla.2000). In reviewing the validity of Amendment 8, we will first set forth the requirements of law that apply to proposed amendments and explain the scope of our review. We will then explain the history of the Class Size Amendment adopted in 2002. Finally, we will evaluate whether Amendment 8 comports with the requirements of law. For the reasons explained below, we conclude that it does.

Requirements for Proposed Constitutional Amendments

The Florida Constitution gives the Legislature authority to propose amendments for submission to the electorate. See art. XI, § 1, Fla. Const. Article XI, section 1, provides that the Legislature may propose an amendment to the Florida Constitution by a “joint resolution agreed to by three-fifths of the membership of each house of the legislature.” Id. Then the proposed constitutional amendment must be “submitted to the electors at the next general election.” Art. XI, § 5(a), Fla. Const. “Implicit in this provision is the requirement that the proposed amendment be accurately represented on the ballot; otherwise, voter approval would be a nullity.” Armstrong, 773 So.2d at 12. “[T]he accuracy requirement in article XI, section 5, functions as a kind of ‘truth in packaging law for the ballot.” Id. at 13. The accuracy requirement applies to all proposed constitutional amendments, including those proposed by the Legislature. Id. at 16.

The Court has recognized that “[although the constitution does not expressly authorize judicial review of amendments proposed by the Legislature, this Court long ago explained that the courts are the proper forum in which to litigate the validity of such amendments.” Id. at 13-14 (footnote omitted). Specifically, the Court has stated:

Under our system of constitutional government regulated by law, a determination of whether an amendment to the Constitution has been validly proposed and agreed to by the Legislature depends upon the fact of substantial compliance or noncompliance with the mandatory provisions of the existing Constitution as to how such amendments shall be proposed and agreed to, and such determination is necessarily-required to be in a judicial forum where the Constitution provides no other means of authoritatively determining such questions.

Id. at 14 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Crawford v. Gilchrist, 64 Fla. 41, 59 So. 968, 966 (1912)).

This Court has traditionally “accorded a measure of deference to constitutional amendments proposed by the Legislature.” Id. at 21. However, that deference “is not boundless, for the constitution imposes strict minimum requirements that apply across-the-board to all constitutional amendments, including those arising in the Legislature.” Id. at 14.

The accuracy requirement in article XI, section 5, imposes a strict minimum standard for ballot clarity. This requirement plays no favorites — it applies across-the-board to all constitutional amendments, including those proposed by the Legislature. The purpose of this requirement is above reproach — it is to ensure that each voter will cast a ballot based on the full truth. To function effectively — and to remain viable — a constitutional democracy must require no less.

Id. at 21 (emphasis omitted).

Section 101.161(1), Florida Statutes (2009), is a “codification of the accuracy requirement implicit in article XI, section 5 of the Florida Constitution.” Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Referenda Required for Adoption & Amend. of Local Gov’t Comprehensive Land Use Plans, 902 So.2d 763, 770 (Fla.2005). Thus, section 101.161(1) provides that the substance of a proposed constitutional amendment must be printed on the ballot in “clear and unambiguous language.”

In reviewing the validity of ballot language submitted to the voters for a proposed constitutional amendment, this Court does not consider or review the substantive merits or the wisdom of the amendment. See Fla. Dep’t of State v. Slough, 992 So.2d 142, 147 (Fla.2008); Askew v. Firestone, 421 So.2d 151, 155 (Fla.1982). Rather, our task is to determine whether the ballot language sets forth the substance of the amendment in a manner that satisfies the requirements of section 101.161, Florida Statutes, and article XI, section 5, of the Florida Constitution.

The purpose of a ballot title and summary is “to provide fair notice of the content of the proposed amendment so that the voter will not be misled as to its purpose, and can cast an intelligent and informed ballot.” Advisory Op. to the Att’y Gen. re Right of Citizens to Choose Health Care Providers, 705 So.2d 563, 566 (Fla.1998) (quoting Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen.-Fee on Everglades Sugar Prod., 681 So.2d 1124, 1127 (Fla.1996)). To comply with the requirements of law, the ballot language “must state the chief purpose of the proposed amendment.” Armstrong, 773 So.2d at 18. This Court has explained that the ballot must “advise the voter sufficiently to enable him intelligently to cast his ballot.” Askew, 421 So.2d at 155 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Hill v. Milander, 72 So.2d 796, 798 (Fla.1954)). While the ballot title and summary must state in clear and unambiguous language the chief purpose of the measure, they need not explain every detail or ramification of the proposed amendment. See Carroll v. Firestone, 497 So.2d 1204, 1206 (Fla.1986). The ballot language must, however, give “the voter fair notice of the decision he [or she] must make.” Askew, 421 So.2d at 155.

A court may declare a proposed constitutional amendment invalid only if the record shows that the proposal is clearly and conclusively defective. Armstrong, 773 So.2d at 11. In assessing the ballot title and summary, the reviewing court should ask two questions: First, whether the ballot title and summary “fairly inform the voter of the chief purpose of the amendment,” and second, “whether the language of the title and summary, as written, misleads the public.” Slough, 992 So.2d at 147 (quoting Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Prohibiting State Spending for Experimentation that Involves the Destruction of a Live Human Embryo, 959 So.2d 210, 213-14 (Fla.2007)). This Court presumes that the average voter has a certain amount of common understanding and knowledge. See Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Protect People from the Health Hazards of Second-Hand Smoke, 814 So.2d 415, 419 (Fla.2002).

This evaluation also includes consideration of the amendment’s “true meaning, and ramifications.” Armstrong, 773 So.2d at 16 (quoting Askew, 421 So.2d at 156). The unifying principle for all proposed constitutional changes is that the voters “must be able to comprehend the sweep of each proposal from a fair notification in the proposition itself that is neither less nor more extensive than it appears to be.” Smothers v. Smith, 338 So.2d 825, 829 (Fla.1976). The proposed amendment “must stand on its own merits and not be disguised as something else.” Askew, 421 So.2d at 156. “A ballot title and summary cannot either ‘fly under false colors’ or ‘hide the ball’ as to the amendment’s true effect.” Armstrong, 773 So.2d at 16.

The 2002 Class Size Amendment

Because Amendment 8 would amend the 2002 Class Size Amendment passed by the voters, we begin with a review of that amendment. In 2002, an amendment to article IX, section 1, of the Florida Constitution was proposed by citizen initiative. The summary for the proposed amendment provided:

Proposes an amendment to the State Constitution to require that the Legislature provide funding for sufficient classrooms so that there be a maximum number of students in public school classrooms for various grade levels; requires compliance by the beginning of 2010 school year; requires the Legislature, and not local school districts, to pay for the costs associated with reduced class size; prescribes a schedule for phased-in funding to achieve the required maximum class size.

Advisory Op. to the Att’y Gen. re Flo’s Amend, to Reduce Class Size, 816 So.2d 580, 581 (Fla.2002).

In its evaluation of the initiative, this Court first analyzed whether the proposed amendment met the single subject requirement. A group who opposed the ballot initiative contended that the amendment violated the single subject requirement “because it requires voters who may favor a reduction in class size in Florida to also vote for whatever unspecified and unlimited expenditure of State funds may be necessary to construct or purchase additional classrooms for public schools.” Id. at 582. This Court rejected that argument: “[T]he ballot initiative deals with a single subject — the reduction of class size. The fact that the ballot initiative requires the Legislature to fund this reduction does not constitute ... impermissible logrolling ..., but rather provides the details of how the ballot initiative will be implemented” Id. at 583.

The Court further concluded that the initiative would not substantially alter or perform multiple functions of state government because it did “not specify a certain percentage of the budget or a specific amount to be spent on reducing class size.” Id. at 584. The Court also stated that the amendment would not substantially alter or perform the functions of the local school boards:

Although, as a result of the amendment, the Legislature may choose to fund the building of new schools to achieve the maximum classroom size set as a goal of the proposed amendment, this is not the only method of ensuring that the number of students meets the numbers set forth in the amendment. Rather than restricting the Legislature, the proposed amendment gives the Legislature latitude in designing ways to reach the class size goal articulated in the ballot initiative, and places the obligation to ensure compliance on the Legislature, not the local school boards.

Id. at 584-85.

In addition to whether the amendment met the single subject requirement, this Court evaluated whether the ballot information properly informed the voters in accordance with the requirements of section 101.161(1). The Court concluded that the ballot language informed voters of the amendment’s chief purpose and effect:

The title of this initiative is “Florida’s Amendment to Reduce Class Size.” The ballot summary makes clear that the Legislature is responsible for providing funding to reduce the number of students in public school classrooms in various grade levels. Thus, when read together, the ballot title and summary clearly inform voters of the amendment’s chief purpose, and provide an accurate description of the amendment.

Id. at 585. The Court also stated that “the primary purpose of the amendment — the legislative funding of reduced classroom size — is adequately disclosed in the ballot title and summary.” Id.

The Florida voters subsequently approved the 2002 Class Size Amendment, adding both a maximum class size requirement and an obligation on the Legislature to fund the class size requirement to article IX, section 1, of the Florida Constitution.

Whether Amendment 8 Complies with the Requirements of Law

We begin by noting that the ballot title and summary clearly and unambiguously explain the text of the constitutional amendment. Appellants do not contest this. The ballot title clearly sets forth the substance of the amendment: “REVISION OF THE CLASS SIZE REQUIREMENTS FOR PUBLIC SCHOOLS.” The ballot summary unambiguously explains the existing class size requirements as well as how the required class sizes would change. Appellants also agree that the ballot summary discloses a legislative funding obligation upon passage of the proposed amendment. Indeed, the summary states that it shall be the Legislature’s responsibility to fund this amendment by stating that the amendment “requires the Legislature to provide sufficient funds to maintain the average number of students required by this amendment.”

Although the Appellants agree that the ballot summary unambiguously explains the text of the amendment, they contend that it is defective because it fails to state that the amendment’s chief purpose and effect is to reduce the amount of state funding for education and, further, that the ballot summary is misleading for its failure to disclose the financial impact. Essentially, Appellants’ contention is that the summary is defective for failing to explain that this amendment will substantially reduce the amount of the state’s current constitutional obligation to fund the existing class size restrictions.

We disagree that the failure to address the effect on state class size funding renders the ballot summary defective. Although the dollar amount required to fund the class size requirements will be affected by the change in the formula for class sizes, the constitutional obligation of the state to provide “sufficient funds” for the revised class size requirements is not being altered. Under both the current provision and under Amendment 8, Floridians would have the same right to have the state provide “sufficient funds” for the mandated class sizes. As stated by the trial court:

Both the 2002 amendment to Article IX, Section 1, and Amendment 8 have as the stated purpose the establishment of a maximum class size, and the obligation of the Legislature to fund whatever maximum class size the voters elect. The voters will decide what the class size will be, and Amendment 8 is not confusing or misleading as to that being the decision the voter makes. Amendment 8, if passed, would not alter the Legislature’s duty to fund the required class size, nor does it shift any funding obligation to the school boards. The ballot summary is not misleading in that respect in that it specifically provides and “requires the Legislature to provide sufficient funds to maintain the average number of students required by this amendment.”

Further, under both the current provision and under Amendment 8, Floridians would have the same right to have the Legislature “make adequate provision” to ensure that there are a sufficient number of classrooms for the required class sizes. Thus, this case is unlike Armstrong and Askew, where we struck proposed amendments for failing to disclose that they would diminish an existing constitutional right.

Although the logical effect of increasing the maximum number of students will be to reduce the dollar amount of state class size funding, this effect flows naturally from the chief purpose — to revise and relax class sizes while providing that the Legislature has the attendant funding obligation. Further, we note that a voter would be able to draw a common-sense conclusion from a review of the ballot summary that the amount of funding needed to sufficiently fund the revised class sizes will likely be reduced. Accordingly, we conclude that the ballot language gives “the voter fair notice of the decision he must make,” Armstrong, 773 So.2d at 15, and is not defective for failing to state that the passage of Amendment 8 may affect the amount of state class size funding.

Appellants also argue that the ballot language indicating that the Legislature is required to provide sufficient funds to “maintain the average number of students” required by the amendment is affirmatively misleading because it hides from voters the fact that funding levels will actually be reduced. We conclude that the use of the word “maintain” in the ballot summary is not misleading. Rather, it accurately conveys that the Legislature, not the school district, is the entity responsible for continuously providing funding for the class sizes required by the amendment and does not carry an implication that the amount of funding will not be reduced as a result of the amendment.

Finally, Appellants contend that the summary is misleading for failing to mention that the constitution currently mandates the Legislature to provide funding to reduce class sizes. Thus, they assert, the current amendment could mislead a voter into believing that Amendment 8 would shift the funding responsibility for class sizes from the local school districts to the Legislature. Appellants argue that as a result of this omission, some voters are likely to believe that their local school districts are currently forced to fund the requirements and thus a favorable vote on the amendment is necessary to lessen the burden on local school districts or to avoid an increase in local property taxes.

Our test in determining the validity of the ballot title and summary is not what “some voters” might believe but rather whether the ballot title and summary provide the voter with “fair notice of the decision he [or she] must make.” Askew, 421 So.2d at 155. The voters “must be able to comprehend the sweep of each proposal from a fair notification in the proposition itself that is neither less nor more extensive than it appears to be.” Smothers, 338 So.2d at 827. The Court will presume that the average voter has a certain amount of common understanding and knowledge. See Second-Hand Smoke, 814 So.2d at 419.

Although there are cases where this Court has held that a ballot summary was defective for failing to mention an existing constitutional obligation, see, e.g., Armstrong, 773 So.2d at 17; Fla. Dep’t of State v. Fla. State Conference of NAACP Branches, 43 So.3d 662, 668 (Fla.2010), we conclude that, here, the failure to mention the Legislature’s existing funding obligation does not render Amendment 8’s ballot summary defective. The ballot summary is not affirmatively misleading: there is nothing in the ballot summary that would imply or affirmatively convey that the local school districts currently have the funding obligation.

CONCLUSION

We conclude that the ballot title and summary accurately represent the chief purpose of the amendment. It further provides fair notice of what the amendment contains and does not mislead the voters as to the amendment’s true effect. Accordingly, we hold that the ballot language is not defective and that Amendment 8 complies with the requirements of law. We affirm the trial court’s judgment that Amendment 8 shall remain on the ballot for the November 2010 general election.

It is so ordered.

CANADY, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, POLSTON, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur.

      . The Appellees objected to the First District certifying this case because the ballots have already been printed and the Appellants delayed filing their complaint until July 2010. However, we consider that it is preferable for this Court to determine any issues regarding whether the ballot title and summary are defective before the election.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: PER CURIAM. CANADY, C.J., POLSTON, J.,

license: Public Domain

text:
    Willie F. JONES, Petitioner, v. FLORIDA PAROLE COMMISSION, Respondent.
    No. SC09-612.
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    Oct. 14, 2010.

      John R. Hamilton of Foley and Lardner, LLP, Orlando, FL, for Petitioner.
    Sarah J. Rumph, General Counsel, and Anthony Andres, Assistant General Counsel, Florida Parole Commission, Tallahassee, FL, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

This case is before the Court for review of the decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal in Jones v. Florida Parole Commission, 4 So.3d 91 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009). The district court certified that its decision is in direct conflict with the decisions of the First and Second District Courts of Appeal in Martin v. Florida Parole Commission, 951 So.2d 84 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007), and Carpenter v. Florida Parole Commission, 958 So.2d 564 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In March 1968, Willie F. Jones (Jones) was sentenced to prison for a term of 99 years. After Jones had served over 14 years in prison, the Parole Commission entered an order releasing him on parole in May 1982. On April 21,1990, Jones was arrested in Broward County, Florida on charges of possession of cocaine and prowling but Jones was never convicted of either offense. On April 30, 1990, the State filed a formal “No Information” with regard to those charges. Even though the State had previously filed a formal “No Information,” on August 1, 1990, the Parole Commission revoked Jones’s parole for violation of a condition of his release. The Parole Commission determined that Jones violated the terms and conditions of his parole, specifically stating that Jones:

Violated Condition 8 by failing to live and remain at liberty without violating the law in that on or about April 21, 1990, in Broward County, Florida he did unlawfully possess a controlled substance, to-wit: cocaine.

The report also indicated that Jones denied the allegations against him, but that the commission relied on the testimony of an officer who observed Jones sitting directly next to a bag of drugs. Jones was subsequently returned to prison to serve out the remainder of his sentence and remains there today.

On November 20, 2008, Jones filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit alleging factual innocence. On December 5, 2008, the Nineteenth Circuit sua sponte rendered a final order dismissing Jones’ petition, finding that the petition “is wholly without merit, and ... untimely,” citing section 95.11(5)(f), Florida Statutes (2008), as the basis for declaring the petition untimely. On December 31, 2008, Jones filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the Fourth District. The Fourth District redesignat-ed the petition as an appeal and without briefing or argument summarily affirmed the order of dismissal. See Jones v. Florida Parole Comm’n, 4 So.3d 91 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009).

THE CERTIFIED CONFLICT

This case arises from a certified conflict between the Fourth District, on one hand, and the First and Second Districts on the other. Specifically, the district courts disagree with regard to the applicability of section 95.11(5)(f) to a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by an inmate seeking release from unlawful detention by the State. That statute of limitation provides, in pertinent part:

95.11 Limitations other than for the recovery of real property. — Actions other than for recovery for real property shall be commenced as follows:
(5) Within one year.—
(f) Except for actions described in subsection (8), a petition for extraordinary writ, other than a petition challenging a criminal conviction, filed by or on behalf of a prisoner as defined in section 57.085.

Judicial history with regard to the application of this statute has been checkered. Previously, in Cooper v. Florida Parole Commission, 924 So.2d 966, 967 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006), the Fourth District held that the trial court properly denied a petition for habeas corpus as untimely, relying upon section 95.11(5)(f). However, one year later in Martin v. Florida Parole Commission, 951 So.2d 84 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007), the First District rejected the argument advanced and accepted by the Fourth District in Cooper:

We find this reasoning to be flawed for two reasons. First, the legitimacy of applying section 95.11(5)(f) in this situation is questionable in light of Allen v. Butterworth, 756 So.2d 52 (Fla.2000), in which the court held that the legislature was without authority to establish deadlines for asserting claims traditionally remediable through habeas corpus. More to the point, the fundamental characteristic of a habeas claim is an assertion of continued unlawful detention, and the “purpose of a habeas corpus proceeding is to inquire into the legality of the petitioner’s present detention.” See Sneed v. Mayo, 69 So.2d 653 (Fla.1954). Inasmuch as Martin alleged that he continued to be unlawfully detained, his claim was necessarily filed within the one-year time limitation established by the statute.

Id. at 85-86 (footnote omitted). The First District then certified that its decision was in conflict with Cooper. See id. at 86. A few months later, in Carpenter v. Florida Parole Commission, 958 So.2d 564, 565 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007), the Second District explicitly adopted the reasoning of the First District in Martin and also certified that its decision was in conflict with Cooper. In Smith v. Florida Parole Commission, 987 So.2d 229, 229-30 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008), the Fourth District affirmed its earlier decision in Cooper and also certified that its decision was in conflict with Martin and Carpenter.

The opinion in the case before this Court today in its entirety provides:

Willie F. Jones (Jones) filed a petition for writ of certiorari in this court, challenging an order dismissing his petition for writ of habeas corpus, filed in the circuit court in November 2008, in which he challenged the revocation of his parole, which occurred in 1990.
We redesignate the certiorari proceeding as an appeal, see Cooper v. Fla. Parole Comm’n, 924 So.2d 966, 967 n. 1 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006), rev. pending, No. SC06-1236 (Fla. June 21, 2006); Roth v. Crosby, 884 So.2d 407, 408 n. 2 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004); Green v. Moore, 111 So.2d 425, 426 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000), and treat the petition as Jones’ initial brief.
We summarily affirm, pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.315(a), concluding that the circuit court did not err in dismissing the habeas corpus petition as untimely. See § 95.11(5)(f), Fla. Stat. (2008); Smith v. Fla. Parole Comm’n, 987 So.2d 229 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008); Cooper, 924 So.2d at 967.
As we did in Smith, we certify conflict with Martin v. Florida Parole Commission, 951 So.2d 84 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007), rev. dismissed, 957 So.2d 635 (Fla.2007), and Carpenter v. Florida Parole Commission, 958 So.2d 564 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007).
Redesignated as an appeal and Affirmed; Conflict Certified.

Jones, 4 So.3d at 91.

ANALYSIS

Jones asserts that the application of section 95.11(5)(f) to habeas petitions violates the doctrine of separation of powers and is expressly contrary to Allen v. Butterworth, 756 So.2d 52 (Fla.2000). We agree.

“It may be said as a general rule that whatever power is conferred upon the courts by the Constitution cannot be enlarged or abridged by the Legislature.” State ex rel. Buckwalter v. City of Lakeland, 112 Fla. 200, 150 So. 508, 512 (1933) (citing State ex. rel. Robinson v. Durand, 36 Utah 93,104 P. 760 (1908)). In Allen v. Butterworth, 756 So.2d 52 (Fla.2000), this Court held:

[T]he writ of habeas corpus and other postconviction remedies are not the type of “original civil action” described in Williams [v. Law, 368 So.2d 1285 (Fla.1979) ], for which the Legislature can establish deadlines pursuant to a statute of limitations. Due to the constitutional and quasi-criminal nature of habeas proceedings and the fact that such proceedings are the primary avenue through which convicted defendants are able to challenge the validity of a conviction and sentence, we hold that article V, section 2(a) of the Florida Constitution grants this Court the exclusive authority to set deadlines for postconviction motions.

Id. at 62 (emphasis supplied).

The clear rule established by Allen is that the Legislature cannot impose procedural limitations on habeas petitions. Section 95.11(5)(f) provides that “a petition for extraordinary writ, other than a petition challenging a criminal conviction,” must commence within one year. Accordingly, based on this Court’s decision in Allen, any application of section 95.11(5)(f) to a habeas petition violates the doctrine of separation of powers.

The dissent attempts to circumvent this clear rule articulated in Allen by relying on Williams v. Law, 368 So.2d 1285 (Fla.1979), a case that involved a challenge to an administrative decision of a county board of tax adjustment. In Allen, however, we explicitly refused to extend the rule articulated in Williams to the fervently guarded right to petition for habeas corpus. See Allen, 756 So.2d at 60. We made absolutely clear that “[although ha-beas corpus petitions are technically civil actions, they are unlike other traditional civil actions.” Id. (emphasis supplied). The dissent is merely endeavoring to revisit an argument that this Court unequivocally rejected in Allen.

The Parole Commission asserts that the application of section 95.11(5)(f) to a petition for habeas corpus does not violate the doctrine of separation of powers because the Parole Commission’s actions with regard to the revocation of parole or conditional release are essentially administrative in nature. Specifically, the Parole Commission asserts that this Court’s holding in Allen is limited to habeas petitions that “challenge the validity of a conviction and sentence,” and the habeas petition filed by Jones does not. The only authority upon which the Parole Commission relies to support this contention is this Court’s decision in Kalway v. Singletary, 708 So.2d 267 (Fla.1998). This argument is without merit and has previously been directly and specifically rejected by this Court.

In Kalway, the defendant filed a petition for a writ of mandamus that challenged disciplinary action imposed by the Department of Corrections. See id. at 268. Kal-way claimed that the application of section 95.11(8) constituted a violation of the separation of powers doctrine which was rejected by this Court at that time. Section 95.11(8) provides:

Any court action challenging prisoner disciplinary proceedings conducted by the Department of Corrections pursuant to s. 944.28(2) must be commenced within 30 days after final disposition of the prisoner disciplinary proceedings through the administrative grievance process under chapter 33, Florida Administrative Code. Any action challenging prisoner disciplinary proceedings shall be barred by the court unless it is commenced within the time period provided by this section.

In Allen, the State asserted the same argument as that advanced here. This Court specifically rejected the State’s assertion that Kalway applies to habeas petitions and wrote:

It is important to note that, unlike the [Death Penalty Reform Act], which poses equal protection and due process problems, there were no constitutional infirmities with the thirty-day deadline at issue in Kalway. However, we clarify our holding in Kalway in order to make it clear that this Court did not cede to the Legislature the power to control the time in which extraordinary writ actions must be commenced.

Allen, 756 So.2d at 62 n. 4.

In sum, the only argument and authority provided by the Parole Commission to support the notion that habeas petitions should be treated differently in parole revocation matters is this Court’s decision in Kalway, which, in Allen, this Court clearly distinguished and rejected. The Parole Commission’s claim both misstates this Court’s decision in Kalway and ignores this Court’s actual decision in Allen. To the contrary, Florida courts have long recognized the legitimacy and application of habeas petitions that do not challenge criminal convictions and sentences. See, e.g., State v. Luster, 596 So.2d 454, 455 (Fla.1992) (interstate extradition); Sandstrom v. Leader, 370 So.2d 3, 5 (Fla.1979) (challenge to statute under which petitioner is confined); Champion v. Cochran, 133 So.2d 68, 68 (Fla.1961) (confinement of a minor); Tittsworth v. Akin, 118 Fla. 454, 159 So. 779, 780 (1985) (challenge to validity of ordinance); Ex parte Pitts, 35 Fla. 149, 17 So. 76, 76-77 (1895) (challenge to legal existence of court by whose judgment petitioner is imprisoned); Clarke v. Regier, 881 So.2d 656, 657 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004) (involuntary hospitalization); Parsons v. Wennet, 625 So.2d 945, 946 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993) (confinement for civil contempt); MacNeil v. State, 586 So.2d 98, 99 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991) (involuntary commitment for mental illness); Lee v. State, 546 So.2d 436, 436 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989) (involuntary commitment for treatment for alcoholism); Durant v. Boone, 509 So.2d 1275, 1276 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987) (procedural validity of contempt order).

The Parole Commission also attempts to advance the federal system’s acceptance of a legislatively created statute of limitation on habeas corpus actions as justification for denying relief here. Specifically, the Parole Commission refers to the Antiter-rorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). In Allen, however, this Court also explained why the federal constitutional framework in which the AED-PA was enacted is distinguishable from Florida’s government structure as formulated in the state constitution:

The State also directs our attention to the “Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996” (AEDPA), wherein Congress imposed a one-year deadline for habeas corpus filings in federal courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (Supp. Ill 1997) (standard for prisoners in state custody); id. at § ,2255 (standard for prisoners in federal custody). This deadline has been interpreted by the federal courts as a statute of limitations. See, e.g., Weekley v. Moore, 204 F.3d 1083, 1083 (11th Cir.2000) (“The AEDPA added a one year statute of limitations to federal habeas corpus actions.”). The State asserts that if Congress has the authority to set a statute of limitations in this area, then the Florida Legislature should also have that authority. This argument, however, is not persuasive, as there are significant distinctions between the balance of power in the federal system and the balance of power in this state. Although the federal constitution grants the United States Supreme Court limited original jurisdiction, article III, section 2 provides that the appellate jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court is derived from the authority of Congress. In contrast, the original and appellate jurisdiction of the courts of Florida is derived entirely from article V of the Florida Constitution. See art. V, §§ 3(b), 4(b), 5(b), Fla. Const. Further, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that “the power to award the writ [of habeas corpus] by any of the courts of the United States, must be given by written law” and “judgments about the proper scope of the writ are normally for Congress to make.” Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 664, 116 S.Ct. 2333, 135 L.Ed.2d 827 (1996) (internal quotation marks omitted). In Florida, article V of the Florida Constitution explicitly grants circuit courts, district courts, and this Court the authority to issue writs of habeas corpus. See art. V, §§ 3(b)(9), 4(b)(3), 5(b), Fla. Const. Finally, the United States Supreme Court promulgates the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure pursuant to the authority conferred to it by Congress under the Rules Enabling Act. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1994). As pointed out by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals:
It has long been settled that Congress has the authority to regulate matters of practice and procedure in the federal courts. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 9-10[, 61 S.Ct. 422, 85 L.Ed. 479] (1941). Congress delegated some of this power in 1934 by passing the Rules Enabling Act, which gave the Supreme Court the power to promulgate rules of practice and procedure for United States courts. Despite this delegation of authority, Congress maintains an integral, albeit passive, role in implementing any rules drafted by the Court. For example, all such rules are subject to review by Congress; they take effect only after the Supreme Court has presented them to Congress and after Congress has had seven months to review proposed rules or changes. Congress uses the review period to “make sure that the action under the delegation squares with the Congressional purpose.” Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 15 [, 61 S.Ct. 422], Although Congress has authorized the Court to exercise some legislative authority to regulate the courts, Congress at all times maintains the power to repeal, amend, or supersede its delegation of authority or the rules of procedure themselves. Therefore Congress may at any time amend or abridge by statute the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rules of Evidence, or other federal procedural rules promulgated under the Rules Enabling Act.
Jackson v. Stinnett, 102 F.3d 132, 134 (5th Cir.1996) (citations omitted). In Florida, article V, section 2(a) of the Florida Constitution grants this Court the exclusive authority to adopt rules of procedure. Consequently, the separation of powers argument raised in the present case would never be an issue in the federal system. Unlike the Florida Constitution, the federal constitution does not expressly grant the United States Supreme Court the power to adopt rules of procedure. In fact, it appears that the two branches work together in formulating procedural rules in the federal system. Hence, the State’s reliance on the AEDPA is clearly without merit.

756 So.2d at 62-64 (emphasis supplied).

The Parole Commission attempts to rely upon authority from three states, Washington, Kansas, and California, that “em-bracen statutes of limitation in habeas corpus proceedings.” These cases are unpersuasive. First, none of the decisions cited by the Parole Commission address the separation of powers concerns present here. See In re Gallego, 18 Cal.4th 825, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 132, 959 P.2d 290 (1998); Battrick v. State, 267 Kan. 389, 985 P.2d 707 (1999); In re Bonds, 165 Wash.2d 135, 196 P.3d 672 (2008). Secondly, the Parole Commission overlooks that none of those decisions involve the specific constitutional provisions which are present in the Florida Constitution and cause the constitutional infirmities here. See id.

The writ of habeas corpus is one of the most important and protected legal rights in both United States and Florida jurisprudence. “The purpose of a habeas corpus proceeding is to inquire into the legality of the petitioner’s present detention.” Sneed v. Mayo, 69 So.2d 653, 654 (Fla.1954) (emphasis supplied). The purpose of a habeas petition is not to challenge the judicial action that places a petitioner in jail; rather, it challenges the detention itself. Section 95.11(5)(f) does not provide for a specific time when causes of action subject to its statute of limitations accrue. Even if this Court were to find that section 95.11(5)(f) can constitutionally be applied to habeas petitions, which we do not, a new cause of action would accrue each day that a defendant is detained. If a petitioner alleges that he is unlawfully detained, “his claim [is] necessarily filed within the one-year time limitation established by the statute.” Martin, 951 So.2d at 86. Here, Jones was detained at the time his habeas petition was filed, so it was timely even under an unconstitutional application of section 95.11(5)(f).

CONCLUSION

Allen is controlling here. Accordingly, we again apply Florida’s constitutional provisions and hold that the application of section 95.11(5)(f) to petitions for writs of habeas corpus is unconstitutional. The question of whether Jones’ habeas petition was timely under that section is moot because we find the application of section 95.11(5)(f) to habeas petitions unconstitutional. We quash • the decision of the Fourth District below and approve of the decisions of the First and Second District Courts of Appeal.

It is so ordered.

PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur.

CANADY, C.J., and Polston, J., dissent with opinions.

CANADY, C.J.,

dissenting.

I would approve the decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal, which recognizes that section 95.11(5)(f), Florida Statutes (2008), barred Jones’s 2008 petition seeking habeas relief from the decision of the Florida Parole Commission to revoke his parole in 1990.

The conclusion that the adoption by the Legislature of this statute of limitations violates the constitutional separation of powers is grounded on a confusion of the fundamental distinction between original judicial jurisdiction and appellate judicial jurisdiction. The Florida Constitution expressly gives the Supreme Court the authority to “adopt rules for ... the time for seeking appellate review,” but it gives the Supreme Court no similar authority to adopt rules establishing the time for initiating original proceedings such as habeas proceedings. Art. V, § 2(a), Fla. Const, (emphasis added).

The distinction between original proceedings and appellate proceedings was the basis for our decision in Williams v. Law, 868 So.2d 1285 (Fla.1979), where we upheld a statutory time limitation for challenging an administrative decision of a county board of tax adjustment. We reasoned that the challenge in question was “intended to be an original action rather than an appeal.” Id. at 1287. Since the challenge in Williams was an original action, we concluded that the statutory time limitation was “not a time limit for filing an appeal ... but, rather, ... a statute of limitations governing the time for filing an original action.” Id. We held that “the legislature clearly has the authority to establish such limitations” with respect to an original action. Id. at 1287-88.

Since the constitutional text specifically grants — in conjunction with the general authority to adopt procedural rules — the authority to establish time limitations with respect to the initiation of one broad category of proceedings, the conclusion is unavoidable that similar authority is not granted with respect to a category of proceedings that is not specified. Under the doctrine of inclusio unius est exclusio al-terius, “when a law expressly describes the particular situation in which something should apply, an inference must be drawn that what is not included by specific reference was intended to be omitted or excluded.” Gay v. Singletary, 700 So.2d 1220, 1221 (Fla.1997).

Allen v. Butterworth, 756 So.2d 52, 60-62 (2000), attempted to distinguish Williams by concluding that case dealt with an original civil action rather than with a quasi-criminal proceeding such as habeas. But this entirely misses the point of Williams. In its analysis of the constitutionality of the statutory time limitation, Williams focused not on the civil/criminal distinction but on the original/appellate distinction. See Williams, 368 So.2d at 1287 (“The determination of the circuit court that the sixty-day time limit on filing an original action ... is in violation of article V, section 2(a), Florida Constitution, is necessarily erroneous in light of our interpretation.”). The civil nature of the proceeding in Williams played no part in the Court’s reasoning.

The analysis in Allen never considers the significance of the provision of article V, section (2)(a), which gives the Supreme Court the power to adopt rules establishing “the time for seeking appellate review.” Id. (emphasis added). This is indeed a salient deficiency in the Court’s reasoning on the separation-of-powers issue presented in Allen concerning statutory time limitations with respect to postcon-viction motions. The separation-of-powers issue cannot be properly considered without taking into account the constitutional provision which specifically addresses the Supreme Court’s authority to adopt time limitations governing the initiation of judicial proceedings — a constitutional provision which expressly grants such authority with respect to “appellate review” but does not mention original proceedings. Whether or not other constitutional grounds may justify the result reached by the Court in Allen, the Court’s reasoning on the separation-of-powers issue is seriously flawed.

In view of the text of article V, section (2)(a), the clear and compelling reasoning of Williams and the failure of Allen to consider the significance of either the relevant constitutional text or the actual rationale of our decision in Williams, I would not extend the holding of Allen to the context presented here. Jones has failed to present any argument justifying the conclusion that section 95.11(5)(f) violates article V, section (2)(a), Florida Constitution.

I would also reject Jones’s argument that the limitation period under section 95.11(5)(f) “cannot commence as long as a petitioner remains confined.” Acceptance of Jones’s argument on this point would effectively read the statute of limitations into nonexistence with respect to habeas petitions. There is nothing in the text or context of section 95.11(5)(f) suggesting that habeas petitions are not included within the broad category of “petition[s] for extraordinary writ.” No persuasive ground has been offered for implying an exception from the one-year statute of limitations for habeas petitions.

It is unquestionably true that a habeas petition challenges the legality of a prisoner’s detention. But it is also unquestionably true that the habeas petitioner must establish the reason that the detention is illegal. When a prisoner challenges his detention on the ground that his parole was illegally revoked, the habeas petition necessarily is predicated on the actions of the Parole Commission that resulted in the decision to revoke parole.

Under section 95.031, .Florida Statutes (2008), the general rule is that “the time within which an action shall be begun under any statute of limitations runs from the time the cause of action accrues.” Section 95.031(1) provides that “[a] cause of action accrues when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs.” Here, Jones’s cause of action accrued when his parole was revoked and he was subjected to incarceration as a consequence. Under the clear provisions of section 95.031, there is no basis for concluding that Jones’s cause of action had not accrued at that point.

I therefore dissent from the majority’s decision which requires the trial court to consider Jones’s stale claim — a claim that he first asserted about seventeen years too late.

POLSTON, J.,

dissenting.

Although I would quash the decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal below, I would not address the constitutionality of applying section 95.11(5)(f), Florida Statutes (2008), to habeas petitions. Instead, I would hold that section 95.11(5)® does not bar habeas petitions challenging present detention.

Section 95.11(5)® provides that “a petition for extraordinary writ, other than a petition challenging a criminal conviction, filed by or on behalf of a prisoner” must be filed within one year. In addition, section 95.081, Florida Statutes (2008), provides that “the time within which an action shall be begun under any statute of limitations runs from the time the cause of action accrues.” Section 95.031(1), Florida Statutes (2008), further states that “[a] cause of action accrues when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs.”

Based upon this statutory language, it is not clear that the Legislature intended the one-year limitation for filing a habeas petition to begin to run on the date of revocation of parole or conditional release as the Parole Commission argues. To the contrary, this Court has explained that “[t]he purpose of a habeas corpus proceeding is to inquire into the legality of the petitioner’s present detention.” Sneed v. Mayo, 69 So.2d 653, 654 (Fla.1954) (emphasis added); see also McCrae v. Wainwright, 439 So.2d 868, 870 (Fla.1983) (“The purpose of the ancient and high prerogative writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into the legality of a prisoner’s present detention.”); Cole v. State, 714 So.2d 479, 492 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (“A writ of habeas corpus may be employed to secure the release of a person who is being unlawfully detained.”); Mann v. Wainwright, 191 So.2d 867, 868 (Fla. 1st DCA 1966) (“The function of habeas corpus is to test the legality of a petitioner’s present detention.”). Therefore, as ruled by the First District Court of Appeal in Martin v. Florida Parole Commission, 951 So.2d 84 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007), it appears that the one-year statutory limitation cannot begin to run as long as the petitioner is presently detained. A new cause of action essentially accrues each day that a prisoner is illegally detained. Cf. Millender v. Fla. Dep’t of Transp., 774 So.2d 767, 769 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) (“[T]he statute of limitations, in a continuing tort action, runs from the time of the last tortious act.”). '

This analysis would be different if section 95.11(5)® included specific times when a cause of action subject to its limitation accrues. The Legislature clearly could have chosen to delineate such time-lines. For instance, the federal statute provides very specific guidelines regarding when the one-year limitation on filing federal habeas petitions begins to run. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) (2006) (providing that “[t]he limitation period shall run from the latest of ... (A) the date on which the judgment became final by conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time seeking such review; ... or (D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence” among others).

Section 95.11(5)(f) does not similarly specify when the statutory limitation begins to run; therefore, it does not bar habeas petitions from prisoners currently detained. Because I do not believe it is necessary to address the constitutionality of applying section 95.11(5)(f) to habeas petitions, I respectfully dissent.

      . I do not share Justice Canady’s concern that this interpretation of section 95.11(5)(f) reads the statutory limitation out of existence. The one-year limitation applies to other extraordinary writs, including writs of mandamus. See Head v. McNeil, 975 So.2d 583 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (applying section 95.11(5)(f) to a prisoner’s petition for writ of mandamus); Canete v. Fla. Dep’t of Con., 967 So.2d 412 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (same).


author: LABARGA, J. CANADY, C.J.,

text:
    FLORIDA PAROLE COMMISSION, Petitioner, v. Joseph Robert SPAZIANO, Respondent.
    No. SC06-1252.
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    Oct. 14, 2010.

      Sarah J. Rumph, General Counsel and Susan Schwartz, Assistant General Counsel, The Florida Parole Commission, Tallahassee, FL, for Petitioner.
    James M. Russ and Terrence E. Kehoe, Orlando, FL, for Respondent.
   LABARGA, J.

This case is before the Court for review of the decision of the First District Court of Appeal in Spaziano v. Florida Parole Commission, 46 So.3d 576 (1st DCA 2006). In its decision, the district court certified a question of great public importance, which we have rephrased as follows:

DOES THE EXEMPTION IN SECTION 57.085(10), FLORIDA STATUTES, APPLY TO ANY INMATE ACTIONS CHALLENGING THE FLORIDA PAROLE COMMISSION’S DETERMINATION OF THE INMATE’S PRESUMPTIVE PAROLE RELEASE DATE, THEREBY PRECLUDING IMPOSITION OF A LIEN ON THE INMATE’S TRUST ACCOUNT TO RECOVER APPLICABLE COURT FILING FEES?

See 46 So.3d at 582. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. We answer the certified question in the affirmative and approve the decision of the district court. As we explain below, an action challenging the Florida Parole Commission’s determination of an inmate’s presumptive parole release date is a collateral criminal proceeding for the purposes of section 57.085(10), Florida Statutes (2009), which exempts such proceedings from the fee and lien provisions of section 57.085.

BACKGROUND

Joseph Spaziano, an inmate currently-incarcerated at the Taylor Correctional Institution, is serving a life sentence for “forcible carnal knowledge,” a sexual offense, committed in 1975. Under the law in effect when he was sentenced, he is eligible to be considered for parole. In October of 2004, Spaziano filed a petition for writ of mandamus in the circuit court of the Second Judicial Circuit challenging the correctness of the Florida Parole Commission’s determination of his presumptive parole release date (PPRD). The Florida Parole Commission (“the Commission”) determined that Spaziano’s PPRD is April 28, 2060.

Spaziano’s PPRD of April 28, 2060, was originally determined in 1999. After a hearing before the Commission in 2004, that date was confirmed by the Commission in an order dated February 27, 2004. Spaziano filed his mandamus petition in the circuit court, alleging errors in the factors upon which his PPRD was based, but the circuit court denied the writ. After determining that Spaziano was indigent and could not prepay court fees, the circuit court entered an order pursuant to section 57.085, Florida Statutes (2004), requiring that a lien be placed upon Spazi-ano’s inmate trust account to provide payment for the court filing fee and partial setup fee. Spaziano filed a motion in the circuit court to vacate that order, citing the exemption provided in section 57.085(10), Florida Statutes, for collateral criminal proceedings. The circuit court denied the motion, concluding that an action challenging the Commission’s determination of an inmate’s PPRD is not a collateral criminal proceeding for the purposes of section 57.085(10), Florida Statutes, and is therefore not exempt from the payment and lien provisions of that statute.

Spaziano appealed the circuit court’s denial of the writ and the order requiring imposition of a lien on his inmate trust account to the First District Court of Appeal. In its decision, the district court affirmed the denial of the writ, but reversed the circuit court’s order imposing a lien on Spaziano’s inmate trust account. The district court explained its reasoning for concluding that a challenge to an inmate’s PPRD was exempt from the inmate lien requirements of section 57.085 in part as follows:

We do, however, agree that the lower court departed from the essential requirements of law by denying petitioner’s motion for relief from the order imposing a lien on his prison trust account for the purpose of covering his appellate costs. In our judgment, a petition for writ of mandamus challenging a PPRD is a “collateral criminal proceeding.” In Schmidt v. Crusoe, 878 So.2d 361, 367 (Fla.2003), the supreme court concluded “that a gain time challenge is analogous to a collateral challenge to a sentence in a criminal proceeding because the end result is the same — the inmate’s time in prison is directly affected.” Under such circumstances, the general indigency statute, section 57.01, Florida Statutes, applies.
The test adopted in Schmidt for treatment of an action as a collateral criminal proceeding for the purpose of the exemption from the prisoner indigency lien provision is whether the action affects the length of time an inmate will actually serve in prison. In our judgment, a mandamus petition seeking the correct calculation of a prisoner’s PPRD is analogous to an action raising a gain time issue, because a PPRD imposed outside the maximum matrix time range for a specific offense clearly affects the length of time an inmate will spend in prison. Accordingly, we conclude the trial court departed from the essential requirements of law in denying petitioner’s motion to vacate the lien on his inmate trust account.

46 So.3d at 582.

The question of whether section 57.085(10) exempts judicial challenges to the Commission’s determination of an inmate’s PPRD is a pure question of law; thus, our review is de novo. See D’Angelo v. Fitzmaurice, 863 So.2d 311, 314 (Fla.2003) (“The standard of review for the pure questions of law before us is de novo.”); Borden v. Eash-European Ins. Co., 921 So.2d 587, 591 (Fla.2006) (holding that a question of statutory interpretation is subject to de novo review). Where, as here, the question of law turns on the provisions of a statute, we must first and foremost endeavor to give effect to the legislative intent underlying that statute, which is the polestar that guides us. See, e.g., Knowles v. Beverly Enterprises-Florida, Inc., 898 So.2d 1, 5 (Fla.2004). In determining the Legislature’s intent in enacting the statute, we look first to the text of the provision. See id. Thus, we turn next to an examination of the pertinent provisions of section 57.085. We also review other pertinent provisions of the Florida statutes, as well as our judicial precedent, all of which inform our analysis of the question presented in this case.

THE APPLICABLE LAW

A. Section 57.085, Florida Statutes, the Prisoner Indigency Statute

Prison inmates are not completely exempt from the payment of court costs and fees for certain legal actions in Florida. The general indigency statute, section 57.081, Florida Statutes (2009), provides a general waiver of prepayment of court costs and fees for persons who are determined to be indigent, but expressly does not apply to prisoners who file or intervene in civil proceedings. See § 57.081(1), Fla. Stat. (2009). Under section 57.085, known as the “Prisoner Indigency Statute,” prepayment of court costs is deferred rather than waived, meaning that an indigent prisoner, if he or she is able, must make an initial partial payment of court costs and fees. A lien is then placed on that inmate’s trust account for payment of the remaining costs and fees in monthly installments. See § 57.085(4)-(5), Fla. Stat. Importantly, the act expressly exempts criminal proceedings and collateral criminal proceedings from application of the payment and lien provisions of the statute. See § 57.085(10), Fla. Stat. (2009).

Section 57.085 was enacted in 1996 in an effort to discourage frivolous civil suits by prison inmates. See eh. 96-106, § 2, at 93-95, Laws of Florida. The “Whereas” clauses in the preamble to chapter 96-106 focus on “frivolous” inmate lawsuits and the fact that they “congest civil court dockets and delay the administration of justice for all litigants.” The preamble provides in pertinent part:

WHEREAS, frivolous inmate lawsuits congest civil court dockets and delay the administration of justice for all litigants, and
WHEREAS, each year self-represented indigent inmates in Florida’s jails and prisons file an ever-increasing number of frivolous lawsuits at public expense against public officers and employees, and
WHEREAS, state and local governments spend millions of dollars each year processing, serving, and defending frivolous lawsuits filed by self-represented indigent inmates, and
WHEREAS, the overwhelming majority of civil lawsuits filed by self-represented indigent inmates are frivolous and malicious actions intended to embarrass or harass public officers and employees, and
WHEREAS, under current law frivolous inmate lawsuits are dismissable by the courts only after considerable expenditure of precious taxpayer and judicial resources....

Ch. 96-106, preamble, Laws of Fla.

To effectuate the intent set forth in the preamble, section 57.085 calls upon the circuit court to screen inmate court filings to determine whether the prisoner’s action is “frivolous” or falls within the category of civil litigation that the Legislature seeks to discourage by implementation of this law. See § 57.085(9), Fla. Stat. (2009). Those inmate actions found by the circuit court to be frivolous, malicious, or intended to harass may be dismissed. See § 57.085(6), Fla. Stat. (2009). As we explained in McNeil v. Cox, 997 So.2d 343 (Fla.2008), the Florida prisoner indigency statute “was enacted to discourage filing of frivolous civil lawsuits involving challenges to prison conditions, such as [complaints about] ‘peanut butter,’ ‘pancake[s],’ ‘dinner roll[s],’ ‘salad,’ ‘fine china,’ ‘satellite television,’ and ‘shoe brand[s].’ ” Id. at 346 (footnotes omitted).

Actions not found to be frivolous or malicious or otherwise subject to dismissal under the act will proceed, but with the requirement that the prisoner prepay filing fees and related costs or be subject to a lien on his or her inmate trust account. However, the Legislature has expressly determined in section 57.085(10) that any criminal proceeding or collateral criminal proceeding brought by a prisoner is exempt from section 57.085. Thus, when a prisoner files or intervenes in any judicial proceeding, the question arises as to whether the action is one intended to be exempt from the payment and lien requirements of section 57.085. It is instructive to our analysis to review the manner in which section 57.085 has been applied in our judicial precedent.

B. Judicial Precedent

In Schmidt v. Crusoe, 878 So.2d 361 (Fla.2003), we considered whether an inmate’s petition for writ of mandamus challenging forfeiture of gain time is essentially a collateral criminal proceeding or whether it is a civil proceeding subject to the payment and hen provisions of the Prisoner Indigency Statute. We concluded that a gain time challenge was analogous to a collateral criminal proceeding for the purposes of section 57.085(10) and was therefore exempt from the fee and lien provisions of section 57.085. In so holding, we recognized that section 57.085 was enacted as part of a Legislative effort intended to reduce unnecessary or frivolous prisoner filings. Id. at 363; see also Geffken v. Strickler, 778 So.2d 975, 977 (Fla.2001) (“The legislative history of these amendments makes clear that the intent of all the amendments was to reduce the filing of frivolous lawsuits and reduce the amount of funds unnecessarily expended on such lawsuits in the courts.”). Because gain time challenges, if successful, affect the amount of time a prisoner must spend in prison, we concluded in Schmidt that such challenges were analogous to collateral criminal proceedings.

In arriving at this holding in Schmidt, we also considered the provisions of the federal Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) enacted by Congress in 1996. See Pub.L. No. 104-134, §§ 801-10, 110 Stat. 1321-66-1321-77 (1996) (codified in part at 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (2006)). We noted that the PLRA was also intended to discourage filing of frivolous inmate actions, but “the federal courts have concluded that claims contesting the computation of criminal sentences should continue to be treated as traditional collateral criminal proceedings under habeas corpus, since they were not the type of civil lawsuits Congress meant to discourage or restrict.” Schmidt, 878 So.2d at 365. The federal courts have held that the PLRA was promulgated by Congress “to curtail prisoner tort, civil rights and conditions litigation” and not the filing of habeas type suits. Anderson v. Singletary, 111 F.3d 801, 805 (11th Cir.1997). We further explained in Schmidt that “[t]he federal decisions have found no indication in the text of the PLRA or its legislative history to indicate that Congress expected its filing fee payment requirements to apply to traditional hybrid civil-criminal, habeas-type actions in which inmates assert an entitlement to gain time and an accelerated release from prison but were not contesting their conditions of confinement.” Schmidt, 878 So.2d at 364. We similarly concluded that Florida’s Prisoner Indigency Statute, section 57.085, was intended only “to discourage the filing of frivolous inmate lawsuits, but not to prevent the filing of claims contesting the computation of criminal sentences.” Id. at 366. In holding that prisoners’ gain time challenges are collateral criminal proceedings for purposes of section 57.085(10), we explained:

Long ago, [the United States Supreme Court] made clear that “[a] prisoner’s eligibility for reduced imprisonment is a significant factor entering into both the defendant’s decision to plea bargain and the judge’s calculation of the sentence to be imposed.” Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 32[, 101 S.Ct. 960, 67 L.Ed.2d 17] (1981).... It is clear that the Supreme Court has refused to be bound by the variations in terminology used in the various challenges to the computation of an inmate’s sentence. Instead, it has looked to the effect the challenged action had on the amount of time an inmate has to actually spend in prison. We think we should do the same; thus, we conclude that a gain time challenge is analogous to a collateral challenge to a sentence in a criminal proceeding because the end result is the same — the inmate’s time in prison is directly affected.
In the instant case, Schmidt’s loss of gain time effectively lengthened his sentence, since by the Department of Corrections’ action he now has to serve that additional time in prison. Therefore, we agree, in accord with the authorities discussed above, that his gain time challenge should be considered a “collateral criminal proceeding,” and the Prisoner Indigency Statute should not apply. To hold otherwise would result in an unlawful “ ‘chilling’ of a criminal defendant’s right to appeal or otherwise challenge the propriety or constitutionality of the conviction or sentence,” Geffken v. Strickler, 778 So.2d 975, 977 n. 5 (Fla.2001), and raise a serious issue as to criminal defendants’ constitutional rights of access to the courts to challenge their sentences.

Schmidt, 878 So.2d at 366-67 (footnote omitted).

The next relevant decision in this line of cases is Cox v. Crosby, 27 So.3d 45 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006). In Cox, the First District had for consideration the question of whether Cox’s petition for writ of mandamus challenging the constitutionality of a 1993 amendment to section 944.275, Florida Statutes, was exempt from the fee and lien requirements under section 57.085(10). Section 944.275, as amended, precluded Cox from receiving basic gain time. The trial court in Cox held that the action was not exempt from the payment and lien provisions of section 57.085. See id. at 45. Cox sought review in the district court, where the State argued that the holding in Schmidt should be limited to actual gain time forfeitures and not apply to an action challenging a statute. The First District disagreed and concluded that Cox’s action was one that is exempt from payment and lien requirements because, if successful, it would directly affect the time that Cox would spend in prison. Cox, 27 So.3d at 46. The district court then certified the following question to this Court in Cox v. Crosby:

Does the holding in Schmidt v. Crusoe, 878 So.2d 361 (Fla.2003), extend to all actions, regardless of their nature, in which, if successful, the complaining party’s claim would directly affect his or her time in prison, so to preclude imposition of a lien on the inmate’s trust account to recover applicable filing fees?

Id.

We granted review and rephrased the certified question in McNeil v. Cox, 997 So.2d 343, 346 (Fla.2008). After specifically limiting the question to all “gain time” actions, we answered it in the affirmative. See id. at 344. In so holding, we determined that “[t]he prisoner indigency statute was intended to supplant the general indigency statute for most purposes where prisoners’ civil filings are concerned.” Id. at 345. We also concluded that “the prisoner indigency statute was intended to ‘discourage the filing of frivolous civil lawsuits’ with respect to prison conditions.” Id. at 348 (quoting Schmidt, 878 So.2d at 366). Based on the text and intent of section 57.085 and on our decision in Schmidt, we held in Cox that all gain time actions, including actions challenging a gain time statute, are “collateral criminal proceedings” for the purposes of section 57.085(10), and thus exempt from the payment and lien requirements of the act. Cox, 997 So.2d at 348.

Because thé question we answered in Cox was limited to gain time challenges, that decision is not dispositive of the question presented in this case, which pertains to actions challenging the Commission’s determination of an inmate’s presumptive parole release date. We have never addressed the question now before us concerning whether an action challenging the Commission’s determination of an inmate’s PPRD is a collateral criminal proceeding intended to be exempt from the lien provisions of section 57.085. Thus, we must examine the statutory framework in which the Commission calculates a prisoner’s presumptive parole release date and attempt to determine the effect that calculation has on the setting of an inmate’s actual parole release date.

C. The Statutory and Administrative Framework for Determination of PPRD and its Role in a Final Parole Decision

The Commission contends that PPRD decisions are so different from gain time challenges that they cannot fall within the exemption set forth in section 57.085(10), and that the rationale of Cox is not applicable to the determination of an inmate’s PPRD because that calculation does not alter the stated term of the inmate’s original sentence. The Commission further contends that although gain time directly affects the length of an inmate’s sentence and is essentially a sentence-related matter, parole decisions are discretionary determinations that are separate and apart from the sentence and from calculation of the length of the sentence. We have considered each of these contentions and find that none of them supports the Commission’s contention that section 57.085(10) is inapplicable to actions challenging an inmate’s PPRD calculation.

Chapter 947 sets forth the legislative scheme governing parole in this state. We recognize that section 947.002, Florida Statutes (2009), titled “Intent,” confirms that parole is not a matter of right, but is one of legislative grace. § 947.002(5), Fla. Stat. (2009). Even so, an inmate who is entitled to consideration for parole is entitled under chapter 947 to an initial determination by the Commission of a PPRD based on objective guidelines and relevant aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Section 947.172, Florida Statutes (2009), “Establishment of presumptive parole release date,” provides that a hearing examiner shall conduct an initial interview with the inmate in preparation for recommending a PPRD to a panel of no fewer than two parole commissioners appointed by the Commission chair. § 947.172(2), Fla. Stat. (2009). Under section 947.172(2), Florida Statutes, the hearing examiner’s recommendation of a PPRD is to be based on objective parole guidelines and “any other competent evidence relevant to aggravating and mitigating circumstances.” § 947.172(2), Fla. Stat.; see also § 947.005(5), Fla. Stat. (2009) (defining “Presumptive Parole Release Date” as the tentative parole release date “as determined by objective parole guidelines”). Section 947.165, Florida Statutes (2009), directs the Commission to develop and implement the objective parole guidelines, “which shall be the criteria upon which parole decisions are made.” § 947.165(10), Fla. Stat. (2009). Under this statutory scheme, where aggravating circumstances are found to exist, additional months are added to the PPRD calculation.

We also recognized in Florida Parole & Probation Commission v. Paige, 462 So.2d 817 (Fla.1985), that although “[placement of the inmate on parole on the date of his presumptive parole release date ... is not automatic,” the PPRD “becomes binding on the Commission in the sense that, once established, it is not to be changed except for reasons of institutional conduct, acquisition of new information ... or for good cause in exceptional circumstances.” Id. at 819. This is also reflected in section 947.172(3), which provides in pertinent part:

(3) A presumptive parole release date shall become binding on the commission when agreement [by the commissioners] on the presumptive parole release date is reached. Should the presumptive parole release date fall outside the matrix time ranges as determined by the objective parole guidelines, the reasons for this decision shall be stated in writing with individual particularities.

§ 947.172(8), Fla. Stat. (2009) (emphasis added). The significance of a properly calculated PPRD is apparent when it is viewed within the statutory scheme for progressing to the next critical step in the parole process, determination of the inmate’s “effective parole release date.” Section 947.005(5), Florida Statutes (2009), defines “[e]ffective parole release date” as “the actual parole release date as determined by the presumptive parole release date, satisfactory institutional conduct, and an acceptable parole plan.” § 947.005(5), Fla. Stat. (emphasis added). Section 947.1745, Florida Statutes (2009), directs the Commission to establish the inmate’s effective parole release date and provides in pertinent part that “[i]f the inmate’s institutional conduct has been satisfactory, the presumptive parole release date shall become the effective parole release date.” Thus, only after the Commission determines the PPRD can the Commission progress to the point of setting the inmate’s effective parole release date (EPRD).

While it can be seen that the PPRD is not the final determination of the inmate’s parole release date, we cannot ignore the fact that without this first critical step, none of the other statutory steps may be taken on the path to reaching an effective parole release date for the inmate. Unless corrected, errors in determination of the PPRD, such as consideration of improper aggravating circumstances, will necessarily cause the effective parole release date and, if parole is ultimately granted, the actual release date to be delayed.

As we noted in Schmidt, gain time credits “are ‘one determinant of a petitioner’s prison term ... and [his] effective sentence is altered once this determinant is changed.’ ” Schmidt, 878 So.2d at 367 (quoting Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433, 445, 117 S.Ct. 891, 137 L.Ed.2d 63 (1997)). Similarly, alterations to the calculation of an inmate’s PPRD based upon elimination of an erroneous aggravating circumstance in turn alters a prisoner’s presumptive parole release date and, thus, alters the effective parole release date, once that determinant is changed.

We therefore conclude that although the PPRD does not determine an inmate’s actual parole release date, and while we recognize that parole is not a matter of right, an action challenging the correctness of the PPRD determination can directly affect the length of time that an inmate will spend in prison. Accordingly, challenges to the PPRD do not fall into the category of frivolous or malicious civil actions which the Legislature sought to discourage by the enactment of section 57.085, but are instead analogous to collateral criminal proceedings intended by the Legislature to be exempt from the fee and lien provisions of the act. Such actions fall within the exception expressly set forth by the Legislature in section 57.085(10) for “collateral criminal proceedings.” Further, similar to the concern we voiced in Schmidt, to hold otherwise would effectively result in an unlawful “chilling” of a prisoner’s right to seek review of the Commission’s determination of his presumptive parole release date. See Schmidt, 878 So.2d at 367 (citing Geffken, 778 So.2d at 977 n. 5). For these reasons, we answer the rephrased certified question in the affirmative.

THIS CASE

Spaziano filed his challenge to the Commission’s determination of his presumptive parole release date by petition for writ of mandamus in the circuit court, which is the proper vehicle for challenging such decisions. His challenge was not determined to be frivolous or malicious by the circuit court or the district court, nor do we view it as such. Spaziano’s challenge, if successful, would have directly affected his presumptive parole release date and, in turn, his effective parole release date. Because these dates are critical to the calculation of an inmate’s parole release date for those inmates who are ultimately granted parole, we conclude that Spazi-ano’s challenge to the PPRD is a collateral criminal proceeding for the purposes of section 57.085(10). The Legislature has specifically exempted collateral criminal proceedings from the fee and lien provisions of section 57.085, and we are not at liberty to ignore this express legislative directive. For these reasons, we approve the decision of the First District Court of Appeal vacating the order of the circuit court, which imposed a lien upon Spazi-ano’s trust account.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, we answer the rephrased certified question in the affirmative and approve the decision of the district court. We hold that inmate challenges, regardless of their nature, to the Florida Parole Commission’s determination of an inmate’s presumptive parole release date constitute collateral criminal proceedings for the purposes of section 57.085(10). Accordingly, when such an action is brought, section 57.085(10) precludes imposition of a lien on the inmate’s trust account to recover applicable filing fees.

It is so ordered.

PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, POLSTON, and PERRY, JJ., concur.

CANADY, C.J., dissents with an opinion.

CANADY, C.J.,

dissenting.

Because a proceeding to challenge the Florida Parole Commission’s determination of a presumptive parole release date (PPRD) is not a collateral criminal proceeding, I dissent.

The requirements of the Prisoner Indi-gency Statute apply generally to any “prisoner who is intervening in or initiating a judicial proceeding.” § 57.085(2), Fla. Stat. (2004). The only exceptions from the operation of the statutory requirements are for “a criminal proceeding or a collateral criminal proceeding.” § 57.085(10), Fla. Stat. (2004). As we have previously recognized, “collateral criminal proceedings” are proceedings “which contest a criminal conviction or sentence.” Geffken v. Strickler, 778 So.2d 975, 976 (Fla.2001). That is, they are proceedings which involve a collateral attack on the conviction or sentence entered in a criminal case.

A proceeding challenging a parole commission PPRD determination is not a “collateral criminal proceeding.” A challenge to a PPRD does not involve a collateral attack on a criminal conviction or sentence. An attack on a PPRD determination has nothing to do with the validity of the conviction or sentence. “A parole hearing is an administrative proceeding” and “it is not part of a criminal prosecution.” State v. Scarlet, 800 So.2d 220, 221 (Fla.2001) (quoting Scarlet v. State, 766 So.2d 1110, 1110-11 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000)).

The majority here concludes, however, that because “challenges to the PPRD” are “analogous to collateral criminal proceedings” they “fall within the exception expressly set forth by the Legislature in section 57.085(10) for ‘collateral criminal proceedings.’ ” 48 So.3d at 723 (emphasis added). In reaching this conclusion, the majority relies on our decision in Schmidt v. Crusoe, 878 So.2d 361, 367 (Fla.2003), where we held that “a gain time challenge is analogous to a collateral challenge to a sentence in a criminal proceeding because ... the inmate’s time in prison is directly affected.” (Emphasis added.)

But there is no justification for applying the unambiguous exception for “a collateral criminal proceeding” to a proceeding which is not “a collateral criminal proceeding” but which this Court determines to be “analogous” to such proceedings. Such an “extension by analogy” of a statutory provision “involves creative judicial lawmaking to produce consequences beyond what could reasonably be said to have been intended or communicated” by the statute. 2B Norman J. Singer & J.D. Shambie Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction § 55:1 (7th ed.2008). This violates “the overarching principle that judges lack the power ‘to construe an unambiguous statute in a way which would extend, modify, or limit its express terms or its reasonable and obvious implications.’ ” Horowitz v. Plantation Gen. Hosp. Ltd. P’ship, 959 So.2d 176, 182 (Fla.2007) (emphasis removed) (quoting Holly v. Auld, 450 So.2d-217, 219 (Fla.1984)). Although “extension by analogy” is an important part of common law adjudication, it cannot properly be employed as a method of interpreting an unambiguous statutory text. The use of “extension by analogy” in such a context is inconsistent with the respect due to the limits set by the Legislature in the statutory text.

Moreover, legal challenges to PPRD determinations are not analogous to collateral criminal proceedings in the same way that the gain time proceedings at issue in Schmidt were analogous to collateral criminal proceedings. Contrary to the majority’s reliance on Schmidt, an attack on a PPRD determination does not challenge a decision by which “the inmate’s time in prison is directly affected.” Schmidt, 878 So.2d at 367. Under the statutory scheme governing parole, an inmate does not have an enforceable right to release based on the PPRD. See Fla. Parole & Prob. Comm’n v. Paige, 462 So.2d 817, 820 (Fla.1985) (“ ‘[T]he use of the terms “guidelines” and “presumptive parole release date” clearly conveys the message that the final parole decision will depend upon the commission’s finding that the prisoner meets the conditions provided in section 947.18.’ [May v. Fla. Parole & Prob. Comm’n, 435 So.2d 834, 837 (Fla.1983)].... On the record before us, we find no abuse of discretion by the Commission in declining at this time to set an effective parole release date.”); see also § 947.002(5), Fla. Stat. (2004) (“It is the intent of the Legislature that the decision to parole an inmate from the incarceration portion of the inmate’s sentence is an act of grace of the state and shall not be considered a right.”).

Here the majority thus pushes Schmidt’s expansion of the statutory exemption for collateral criminal proceedings even beyond the bounds contemplated by Schmidt. The majority’s extension of Schmidt’s reasoning to the context at issue here illustrates how far the trajectory of Schmidt’s reasoning veers away from the governing statutory text. I would return to the text of the statute adopted by the Legislature. Failing to do so results in “an abrogation of legislative power.” Holly, 450 So.2d at 219 (quoting Am. Bankers Life Assurance Co. of Fla. v. Williams, 212 So.2d 777, 778 (Fla. 1st DCA 1968)).

The rewriting of the unambiguous statutory exception in section 57.085(10) is not justified by the majority’s assertion that applying the requirements of the Prisoner Indigency Statute to Spaziano would “effectively result in an unlawful ‘chilling of a prisoner’s right to seek review of the Commission’s determination of his presumptive parole release date.” 48 So.3d at 723-24. If application of the plain terms of the statute results in a constitutional violation, the constitutionality of the statute should be squarely addressed. Vague assertions of constitutional problems — unaccompanied by any analysis — do not provide a basis for deciding this or any other case.

I therefore would quash the decision of the First District Court of Appeal and answer the rephrased certified question in the negative.

      . The actual question certified by the district court was the following:
      Does the holding in Schmidt v. Crusoe, 878 So.2d 361 (Fla.2003), extend to all actions, regardless of their nature, in which, if successful, the complaining party’s claim would directly affect his or her time in prison, so to preclude imposition of a lien on the inmate’s trust account to recover applicable filing fees?

        See Spaziano, 46 So.3d at 582 (certifying by reference the same question certified in Cox v. Crosby, 27 So.3d 45, 46 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006), which was restated by this Court to limit the question to gain time challenges and answered in the affirmative in McNeil v. Cox, 997 So.2d 343, 344 (Fla.2008)).

      . The determination of a PPRD for parole-eligible inmates is required under chapter 947, Florida Statutes. The procedure for that initial determination and for subsequent reviews of the date by the Commission is set forth in sections 947.172-174, Florida Statutes (2009). The correctness of the calculation of Spaziano's PPRD is not an issue before this Court. The certified question in this case focuses only on whether Spaziano’s court challenge is subject to imposition of a lien on his inmate trust account to pay filing and other court fees. We also note that the Commission asserted below that Spaziano's petition was untimely, but the district court rejected that argument. Timeliness of the petition is not an issue in this Court.

      . In his petition, Spaziano alleged that the Commission erroneously relied upon five unsupported aggravating factors in calculating a presumptive parole release date that was in excess of the maximum matrix time range. See Spaziano, 46 So.3d at 580. He contended in his petition that if the erroneous factors were eliminated, the correct matrix time range under the applicable parole laws would be 228 months rather than the 1020 months determined by the Commission, and that he had already served 354 months.

      . The provisions of section 57.085(10), Florida Statutes (2009), are identical to section 57.085(10), Florida Statutes (2004), in effect when Spaziano filed his petition.

      . Section 57.085 also provides that the court may dismiss all or part of an indigent prisoner’s claims if it finds that the action fails to state a cause of action, seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from suit, or seeks relief for mental or emotional injury where there is no allegation of physical injury. See § 57.085(6)(a)-(c), Fla. Stat. (2009). The statute further provides that in any judicial proceeding in which a certificate of indigence has been issued to a prisoner, the court may dismiss the action in whole or in part on a finding that the prisoner’s claim of indigence is false or if the action is frivolous or malicious. See § 57.085(8)(a), (d), Fla. Stat. (2009). An action is frivolous under the statute if it has no arguable basis in law or fact, is similar to a previous claim involving the same parties or arises from the same operative facts as a previous claim, has little likelihood of success on its merits, or is based on allegations that are fanciful or not credible. See § 57.085(9)(a)-(e), Fla. Stat. (2009).

      . As we explained in Schmidt, the federal courts have not discussed the application of the federal Prisoner Litigation Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1915, to mandamus petitions because all gain time petitions in the federal courts must be filed as habeas petitions. 878 So.2d at 364 n. 4. In Florida, mandamus petitions are a proper vehicle for bringing a gain time challenge that will not result in immediate release. See Bush v. State, 945 So.2d 1207, 1210 (Fla.2006), ("[I]f the prisoner alleges entitlement to immediate release, a petition for writ of habeas corpus is the proper remedy; whereas if the prisoner does not allege entitlement to immediate release, a petition for writ of mandamus is the proper remedy." (footnote omitted)). Mandamus is also the proper remedy in Florida for review of an order of the Commission determining a presumptive parole release date. See Griffith v. Florida Parole & Probation Comm'n, 485 So.2d 818, 820 (Fla.1986).

      . Rule 23-21.009, Florida Administrative Code, establishes matrix time ranges for parole determinations. Matrix time ranges are reported in months. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 23-21.009. "Matrix Time Range” is defined in Florida Parole Commission rule 23-21.001(26), Florida Administrative Code, as "the appropriate range of months found where the offender's salient factor score total intersects with the offender’s severity of offense behavior.” Rule 23-21.010, Florida Administrative Code, provides that the Commission may render a decision outside the matrix time range based on "competent and persuasive evidence relevant to aggravating or mitigating circumstances” under certain specified conditions. Fla. Admin. Code R. 23-21.010(1). Rule 23-21.010(5) sets forth a list of possible aggravating circumstances as follows:
      (a) Aggravation — Decisions above the matrix time range:
      1. Reasons related to aggravation of the severity of offense behavior can include:
      a. The offense involved the use of a firearm or dangerous weapon;
      b. The offense resulted in great bodily injury or pecuniary loss;
      c. The offense involved multiple victims or knowingly created a great risk of bodily injury or death to many people;
      d. The offense involved exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty;
      e. The offense was part of a large-scale organized scheme of criminal conspiracy;
      f. The offense was committed against a victim known to be particularly vulnerable, such as elderly persons, physically or mentally handicapped persons, children;
      g. The offense was committed in an unusually sophisticated manner;
      h. Any additional offenses;
      i. The inmate committed an offense while holding public office and the offense was related to his conduct in office;
      j. The inmate committed an offense using his professional reputation or position in the community to effectuate the offense or to afford him an easier means of perpetrating it; and
      k. The inmate committed an offense for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest or effecting an escape.
      2. Reasons related to likelihood of favorable parole outcome, negative indicants of parole prognosis can include:
      a. The offense was committed while on bond, after bond was entreated or on release on recognizance;
      b. The inmate has a history of alcohol or narcotics abuse;
      c. The inmate has a history of assaultive or violent behavior; and
      d. The inmate has failed or refused to make restitution when he was able to do so.

      . Rule 23-21.015, Florida Administrative Code, sets forth the specific procedures to be followed in determining the effective parole release date.