text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Elton PARKER.
    No. 2011-KP-0302.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 24, 2011.
   In re Parker, Elton; —Defendant; Applying For. Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of W. Baton Rouge, 18th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 43007.

Denied.

JOHNSON and KNOLL, JJ., would grant.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Carl Joseph KELLY.
    No. 2011-KO-0217.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 24, 2011.
   In re Kelly, Carl Joseph; —Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. James, 23rd Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 4946; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 10-KA-528.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. David SKIDMORE.
    No. 2011-K-0213.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 24, 2011.
   In re Skidmore, David; —Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. F1767082; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 10-KH-9S1.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Chirstopher KENNER, etc.
    No. 2011-KP-0102.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 24, 2011.
   In re Kenner A/K/A, Christopher; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. E, No. 327-373; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2010-K-1232.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Louis LEDET.
    No. 2010-KP-2811.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 24, 2011.
   In re Ledet, Louis; —Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Assumption, 23rd Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 03-118; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 KW 1300.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Dallas TRAHAN, Jr.
    No. 2010-KO-1636.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 24, 2011.
   In re Trahan Jr., Dallas; —Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Terrebonne, 32nd Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 464,472; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2009 KA 2077.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Jerome NORMAN v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-1502.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 24, 2011.
   In re Norman, Jerome; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 97-6758; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 10-KH-328.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Kevin GEORGE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-1497.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 24, 2011.
   In re George, Kevin; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. F, No. 469-701; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2010-K-0606.

Denied.


text:
    Tabatha NOLAN, et al. v. AUDUBON INSURANCE GROUP, et al.
    No. 2011-C-0987.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 24, 2011.
   In re Nolan, Blake; Nolan, Brent; Nolan, Ciji; Nolan, Robert; Nolan, Tabatha et al.; —Plaintiffs); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Acadia, 15th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 80866; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CA10-1362.

Denied.


text:
    RIVER BEND CAPITAL, LLC v. LLOYD’S OF LONDON.
    No. 2011-C-0986.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 24, 2011.
   In re Riverbend Capital L.L.C.; —Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. L, No. 2007-07063; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2010-CA-1317.

Denied.


text:
    Luis P. WILSON v. Danny E. ALLUMS and Angela W. Allums.
    No. 2011-CC-0983.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 24, 2011.
   In re Allums, Angela W.; Allums, Danny E. et al.; —Defendant(s); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Bossier, 26th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 132906-A; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 46311-CW.

Denied.


text:
    Leandez McGEE v. BRAND SERVICES, INC.
    No. 2011-00969.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 24, 2011.
   In re Brand Services Inc.; —Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review Office of Workers’ Compensation Dist. 08, No. 08-4805; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2010 CA 0307.

Denied.

VICTORY and CLARK, JJ., would grant.


text:
    Barbara Escude LEMOINE v. Jon Oliver DOWNS.
    No. 2011-C-0923.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 24, 2011.
   In re Lemoine, Barbara Escude; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Avoyelles, 12th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 2009-4158-A; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 10-1073.

Denied.

KNOLL, J., recused.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Donald J. AARON.
    No. 2011-K-0634.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 24, 2011.
   In re Aaron, Donald J.; —Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. 2, No. 241,337; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 45,-433-KA.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. James PENDELTON.
    No. 2011-KP-0500.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 24, 2011.
   In re Pendelton, James; —Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 98-630; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 10-KH-959.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Raffaelous Jechania WHITE.
    No. 2011-KO-0373.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 24, 2011.
   In re White, Raffaelous J.; —Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. 5, No. 269,119; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 45,-915-KA.

Denied.

JOHNSON, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana in the Interest of R.W.
    No. 2011-CK-0364.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 24, 2011.
   In re State of Louisiana; —Other; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Orleans Parish Juvenile Court, No. 2010-034-01-DQ-E; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2010-CA-1138.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Eric Dejuan BAULKMAN.
    No. 2011-K-0360.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 24, 2011.
   In re Baulkman, Erie Dejuan; —Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. 5, No. 270,405; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 45,969-KA.

Denied.


text:
    Randall Harvey TRANTHAM v. CITY OF BAKER; Chief Sid Gautreaux in his Official Capacity; Officer Jason Shows; Officer James Broussard; Officer Greg Brown; Officer Darryl Rainwater; Officer Jason Ransome; Officer Christopher Daniels; Officer Tanzania Ennis; Randall Steven Trantham; and Karla Messenger Maddox.
    No. 2011-C-1049.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 24, 2011.
   In re Trantham, Randall Harvey; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 560-829; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 CA1695.

Denied.


text:
    TTV, L.L.C. v. David B. SIMMONS.
    No. 2011-C-1048.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 24, 2011.
   In re Simmons, David B.; —Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 2007-5954; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 10-1163.

Denied.


text:
    Shannon JONES et al. v. ABC INSURANCE COMPANY, et al.
    No. 2011-CC-1047.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 24, 2011.
   In re Boxer & Gerson L.L.P.; Roth, Gary B.; —Third Party(s); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. J, No. 535-525; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 11-C-283.

Denied.


text:
    SOUTHWEST LOUISIANA ASSOCIATION OF CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYERS, INC., et al. v. CALCASIEU PARISH SHERIFF’S OFFICE, et al.
    No. 2011-OC-1045.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 24, 2011.
   In re Guel, Daniel; Southwest Louisiana Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers Inc. et al.; —Plaintiff(s); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 10-2865; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW11-00031.

Denied.


text:
    Tamica R. STOOT-WILLIAMS, et al. v. LMS REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT, LLC, et al.
    No. 2011-CC-1029.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 24, 2011.
   In re Stoot-Williams, Tamica R.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. D, No. 2010-8960; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-C-0305.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Demectrius COOK.
    No. 2011-KK-1013.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 24, 2011.
   In re Cook, Demectrius; —Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. D, No. 497-945; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-K-0056.

Denied.


text:
    Scott G. WOLFE, Sr., Wagner World, LLC, Wolfe World, LLC, Pig Feet, Inc., and Aberta, Inc. v. GALLODORO INSURANCE AGENCIES, INC. and Joseph Lester Gallodoro.
    No. 2011-CC-1012.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 24, 2011.
   In re Pig Feet Inc.; Wagner World LLC; Wolfe Sr., Scott G. et al.; Wolfe World LLC; —Plaintiffs); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. D, No. 2006-9149; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-C-0561.

Denied.


text:
    COFFMAN HOMES, L.L.C. v. Robert SUTHERLAND and Jeanne Sutherland.
    No. 2011-C-10111.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 24, 2011.
   In re Sutherland, Jeanne; Sutherland, Robert et al.; —Defendant(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 143-332; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 10-CA-178.

Denied.

JOHNSON, J., would grant.


text:
    Rev. Norwood THOMPSON, Jr. and/his Wife Wynnette Thompson v. BANK ONE OF LOUISIANA, NA, et al.
    No. 2011-C-1010.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 24, 2011.
   In re Bank One of Louisiana NA et al.; —Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. N, No. 99-17279; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2010-CA-1489.

Denied.


text:
    AMERICAN THRIFT & FINANCE PLAN L.L.C v. Aretha J. LEWIS, et al.
    No. 2011-CC-0999.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 24, 2011.
   In re American Thrift & Finance Plan L.L.C; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, First City Court of New Orleans, No. 2010-54659; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-C-0225.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant.


text:
    The LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND DEVELOPMENT v. OILFIELD HEAVY HAULERS, L.L.C., ACE Transportation, Inc., David Kyle Vincent, II, and Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company.
    No. 2011-C-0912.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 24, 2011.
   In re Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development; —Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Acadia, 15th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 84958; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 10-1392.

Granted.


text:
    Tahereh GHASSEMI v. Hamid GHASSEMI.
    No. 2011-CC-1117.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 24, 2011.
   In re Ghassemi, Hamid; —Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, East Baton Rouge Family Court, No. 158,469; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011 CW 0874.

Denied.


text:
    RIVERSIDE FAMILY, LLC and Spring Lakes Group, LLC v. ADVANCED LOGISTICS, LLC consolidated with Advanced Logistics, LLC v. Riverside Family, LLC.
    No. 2011-CC-1086.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 24, 2011.
   In re Advanced Logistics LLC; —Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. J, Nos. 2009-6311-J, 2010-1086-1; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW 11-00058.

Denied.


text:
    Ruth M. MARRERO v. David R. BURNS and Burns Estate Planning, LLC.
    No. 2011-CC-1051.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 24, 2011.
   In re Burns Estate Planning LLC; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. P, No. 687-385; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. ll-C-110.

Denied.


text:
    SUCCESSIONS OF Adrian Frayle POWELL, Wife of/and Robert Glen Powell.
    No. 2011-C-0995.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 24, 2011.
   In re Mott TTE, Eulalie Anna; —Other; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. M, Nos. 655-937,; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 10-CA-480.

Denied.

CLARK, J., would grant.


text:
    James Bruce JOHNSON, M.D. v. LOUISIANA STATE BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS.
    No. 2011-C-0994.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 24, 2011.
   In re Johnson M. D., James Bruce; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. C, No. 2009-12361; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2010-CA-1253.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Guy ATCHLEY.
    No. 2011-KK-0993.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 24, 2011.
   In re Atchley, Guy; —Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Washington, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 09-CR8-105033; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011 KW 0313.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Virginia ATCHLEY.
    No. 2011-KK-0992.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 24, 2011.
   In re Atchley, Virginia; —Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Washington, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 09-CR3-105032; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011 KW 0312.

Denied.


text:
    Robert L. WANTON and Janet F. Manton v. The AUDUBON NATURE INSTITUTE, INC., Travelers Insurance Company and Melvin Pepp, Jr.
    No. 2011-C-0988.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 24, 2011.
    Writ Denied June 24, 2011.
   In re Manton, Janet F.; Manton, Robert L. et al.; —Plaintiffs); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. G, No. 07-15791; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2010-CA-1547.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Steve GIVENS.
    No. 2011-KK-1302.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 24, 2011.
   In re Givens, Steve; —Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. F, No. 498-623; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-K-0674.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Dontae CREAR.
    No. 2011-KK-1233.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 24, 2011.
   In re Department of Children and Family Services; — Other; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. J, No. 481779; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011 KW 0728.

Denied.


text:
    HESS CORPORATION v. Robert R. “Bobby” GRAVOLET, et al.
    No. 2011-CC-1310.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 29, 2011.
   In re Hess Corporation; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Plaquemines, 25th Judicial District Court Div. A, Nos. 57-313, 57-907; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-C-0730.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Frederic BIRGANS.
    No. 2011-OK-1303.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 29, 2011.
   In re Birgans, Frederic; —Defendant; Applying For Writ of Mandamus and/or Writ of Prohibition, Parish of Ouachita, 4th Judicial District Court Div. K, No. 09-F0298-4.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Joseph SMITH.
    No. 2011-KK-1267.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 29, 2011.
   In re Smith, Joseph; —Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. A, No. 502-372; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-K-0761.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana in the Interest of D.A.
    No. 2011-CJ-1306.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 29, 2011.
   In re State of Louisiana; —Other; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, East Baton Rouge Juvenile Court, No. 97973; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011 CW 0704.

Stay denied; writ denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Andre SMITH.
    No. 2011-KK-1305.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 29, 2011.
   In re State of Louisiana; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. H, No. 504-382; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-K-705.

Stay denied; writ denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Ivory GRACE.
    No. 2011-KK-1128.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 29, 2011.
   In re Grace, Ivory; —Defendant; Applying for Reconsideration of this Court’s action dated June 3, 2011; Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. E, No. 503-879; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-K-0706.

Rehearing denied.

JOHNSON, J., would grant rehearing.


text:
    In re Eric J. BERGER.
    No. 2011-OB-1359.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 29, 2011.
   In re Berger, Eric; —Plaintiff; Applying For Permission to Take Bar Examination.

Denied.

WEIMER, J., would grant.


text:
    In re Quendi Delaila BALONEY.
    No. 2011-OB-1328.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 29, 2011.
   In re Baloney, Quendi Delaila; —Plaintiff; Applying For Permission to Take Bar Examination.

Denied.

JOHNSON and WEIMER, JJ., would grant.


text:
    The BASS PARTNERSHIP, BEPCO, L.P. and BOPCO, v. Robert R. “Bobby” GRAVOLET, et al.
    No. 2011-CC-1317.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 29, 2011.
   In re The Bass Partnership; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Plaquemines, 25th Judicial District Court Div. A, Nos. 57-911, 57-316; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-C-0726.

Denied.


text:
    CLAYTON WILLIAMS ENERGY, INC. v. Robert R. “Bobby” GRAVOLET, et al.
    No. 2011-CC-1316.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 29, 2011.
   In re Clayton Williams Energy, Inc.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Plaquemines, 25th Judicial District Court Div. A, Nos. 57-906, 57-317; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-C-0722.

Denied.


text:
    COX INTERESTS, L.L.C. and Cox Operating, L.L.C. v. Robert R. “Bobby” GRAVOLET, et al.
    No. 2011-CC-1315.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 29, 2011.
   In re Cox Interests, L.L.C; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Plaquemines, 25th Judicial District Court Div. A, Nos. 57-913, 57-315; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-C-0729.

Denied.


text:
    STONE ENERGY OFFSHORE, L.L.C. and Stone Energy Corporation v. Robert R. “Bobby” GRAVOLET, et al.
    No. 2011-CC-1314.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 29, 2011.
   In re Stone Energy Offshore, L.L.C; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Plaquemines, 25th Judicial District Court Div. A, Nos. 57-917, 57-326; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-C-0723.

Denied.


text:
    TEXAS PETROLEUM INVESTMENT COMPANY v. Robert R. “Bobby” GRAVOLET, et al.
    No. 2011-CC-1313.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 29, 2011.
   In re Texas Petroleum Investment Company; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Plaquemines, 25th Judicial District Court Div. A, Nos. 57-916, 57-324; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-C-0728.

Denied.


text:
    W & T OFFSHORE, INC. v. Robert R. “Bobby” GRAVOLET, et al.
    No. 2011-CC-1312.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 29, 2011.
   In re W & T Offshore, Inc.; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Plaquemines, 25th Judicial District Court Div. A, Nos. 57-915, 57-325; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-C-0724.

Denied.


text:
    HILCORP ENERGY I, L.P. and Hilcorp Energy Company v. Robert R. “Bobby” GRAVOLET, et al.
    No. 2011-CC-1311.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 29, 2011.
   In re Hilcorp Energy I, L.P.; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Plaquemines, 25th Judicial District Court Div. A, Nos. 57-908, 57-327; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-C-0725.

Denied.


text:
    In re Paul J. TANNER.
    No. 2011-OB-1343.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 29, 2011.
   In re Tanner, Paul J.; —Plaintiff; Applying For Permission to Take Bar Examination.

Granted. Petitioner is allowed to take the Louisiana State Bar Examination. Within fifteen days of notification that he has satisfactorily passed the examination, petitioner may file a brief with this court, supported by appropriate documentary evidence, responding in further detail to the objections that have been raised in this matter by the Committee on Bar Admissions.


text:
    In re Robin Kent LJUNGBERG.
    No. 2011-OB-1365.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 29, 2011.
   In re Ljungberg, Robin Kent; —Plaintiff; Applying For Permission to Take Bar Examination.

Granted. Petitioner is allowed to take the Louisiana State Bar Examination. However, petitioner shall not be considered for admission to the bar until he can demonstrate at least a one-year period of sobriety and compliance with the terms and conditions of a contract with the Lawyers Assistance Program.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Sheila KELLER.
    No. 2011-KK-1410.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 30, 2011.
   In re Keller, Sheila; —Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. I, No. 503-883; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-K-0697.

Denied.


text:
    Vanessa REECE and Ramon Reece v. ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY.
    No. 2010-CC-0260.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 1, 2011.
   In re Allstate Insurance Company; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 675-719; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 09-C-1085.

Denied.

VICTORY and GUIDRY, JJ., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Kevin SCOTT.
    No. 2011-KK-0822.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 1, 2011.
   In re Scott, Kevin; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. K, No. 489-746; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-K-0242.

Denied.

JOHNSON, KNOLL and WEIMER, JJ., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana in the Interest of H.A.
    No. 2011-CK-0960.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 1, 2011.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Other; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 10-JU-393; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 11-K-403.

Writ Granted. La. Ch.C. art. 879(B) clearly states that “[a]ll proceedings in a juvenile delinquency case involving a crime of violence ... shall be open to the public.” La. Ch.C. art. 832 is not an exception to Article 879(B) in that Article 832 does not mandate that a hearing to determine a juvenile’s capacity to proceed be closed to the public. Rather, Article 832 prevents further steps in the prosecution of the juvenile until the juvenile is found to have the mental capacity to proceed. Therefore, the ruling of the trial court is reversed, and the hearing concerning defendant’s capacity to proceed shall be open to the public.

KNOLL, J., would deny the writ.


text:
    Nakisha CREDIT and Kevin Credit, Sr., Individually and on Behalf of their Minor Children, Adrienne Breana Howard, Kaylin Howard and Kevin Credit, Jr. v. RICHLAND PARISH SCHOOL BOARD, State Farm Mutual Insurance Company, Cathy Stockton, Georgia Ineichen, Larry Wright, Sr., Samuel G. Hesser, Rayville High School, XYZ Duty Teachers, Gail McClain as the Mother of Courtney McClain, Richland Career Center at Archibald, and Amy Doe as the Mother of Lebaron Sledge.
    No. 2011-C-1003.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 1, 2011.
   In re Richland Parish School Board, et al.; —Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Rich-land, 5th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 41,549; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 46,163-CA.

Granted.


text:
    Roger E. PRICE, et al. v. Roy O. MARTIN, et al.
    No. 2011-C-0853.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 1, 2011.
   In re Beazer East Inc.; Roy 0. Martin Lumber Company; —Defendant(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Rapides, 9th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 224,041; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 10-599.

Granted.


text:
    Ginger Hinch DURIO v. HORACE MANN INSURANCE COMPANY, et al.
    No. 2011-C-0084.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 1, 2011.
   In re Horace Mann Ins. Co. et al.; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 2006-002759; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 10-698.

Granted.


text:
    MCI COMMUNICATIONS SERVICES, INC. v. Wayne HAGAN and James Joubert.
    No. 2011-CG-1039.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 1, 2011.
   In re MCI Communications Services, Inc.; —Plaintiff; Applying For Certified Question United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, No. 09-31226.

Certification granted.


text:
    Tommy G. HILLMAN v. Thomas M. ANDRUS, et ux.
    No. 2011-C-1004.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 1, 2011.
   In re Andrus, Rachael Lea Berken; An-drus, Thomas M. et ux.; —Defendant(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Evangeline, 13th Judicial District Court Div..B, No. 70840-B; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 11-5.

Denied.

KNOLL, J., would grant the writ.


text:
    R. Alan KITE v. Jeffrey D. KITE and Transamerica Occidental Life Insurance Company.
    No. 2011-C-1001.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 1, 2011.
   In re Kite, Jeffrey D.; —Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Beauregard, 36th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. C-2010-522; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 10-1442.

Denied.

KNOLL, J., would grant.


text:
    R. Alan KITE v. Jeffrey D. KITE and Transamerica Occidental Life Insurance Company.
    No. 2011-C-0942.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 1, 2011.
   In re Transamerica Occidental Life Insurance Company; —Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Beauregard, 36th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. C-2010-522; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 10-1442.

Denied.

KNOLL, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Arthur WILLIAMS v. JUDICIARY COMMISSION OF LOUISIANA.
    No. 2011-O-1062.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 1, 2011.
   In re Williams, Arthur; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs Office of the Judiciary Commission, No. 11-7931.

Granted. The Office of Special Counsel erred in finding it lacked jurisdiction to consider the complaint. Our jurisprudence establishes the Judiciary Commission has jurisdiction to investigate a judge’s pre-judicial conduct, although such conduct generally may not form the sole basis for disciplinary proceedings against the judge before the Judiciary Commission. See In re: Hughes, 03-3408 (La.4/22/04), 874 So.2d 746. Accordingly, the matter is remanded to the Office of Special Counsel for further proceedings.

GUIDRY and CLARK, JJ., would deny.


author: JUDE G. GRAVOIS, Judge.

text:
    Darlene LOZIER v. ESTATE OF William Jay ELMER.
    No. 10-CA-754.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fifth Circuit.
    Feb. 15, 2011.
    Writ Denied April 25, 2011.

      Boolus J. Boohaker, Attorney at Law, Baton Rouge, LA, for PlaintiffAppellant.
    William J. Faustermann, Jr., Attorney at Law, Slidell, LA, for Defendant/Appel-lee.
    Panel composed of Judges WALTER J. ROTHSCHILD, FREDERICKA HOMBERG WICKER, and JUDE G. GRAVOIS.
   JUDE G. GRAVOIS, Judge.

| ¡.The plaintiff, Darlene Lozier, has appealed the trial court’s denial of her Motion for New Trial. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The following facts are taken from plaintiffs prior appeal in this matter:

On October 26, 2001, plaintiff filed a “Petition to Recover Damages for Breach of Contract Against the Estate of William Jay Elmer and to Recover Payment of Wages Owed by the Estate of William Jay Elmer.” In her petition, plaintiff asserts that William Elmer was her employer from September 1989 until his death on June 17, 2001. She claims that during her employment with Mr. Elmer, she normally worked 104 hours per week and received $5.00 per hour. She alleges that although the federal minimum wage rate increased to $5.15 per hour on September 1, 1997, she continued to receive $5.00 per hour, and she never received compensation for her overtime hours at one and one-half times the regular rate, as required by law. Further, Ms. Lozier contends that Mr. Elmer promised her that if she continued to work for him and act as his partner to develop his commercial property, known as Elmer’s Island, he would take care of her for the rest of her life by providing a house, car, and living expenses. In her petition, Ms. Lozier seeks a judgment against the Estate of William Elmer (“the Estate”) for compensation for nonpayment of wages at the accepted federal minimum wage for regular and overtime work, and a judgment for a house, car, and living expenses for the rest of her life, as well as any other reasonable damages.
|sOn December 10, 2001, the Estate filed an Answer and Reconventional Demand, asserting that no damages, wages, or other compensation is owed to Ms. Lozier, and seeking damages against Ms. Lozier for wrongful conversion of succession assets.
Lozier v. Estate of Elmer, 08-225 (La.App. 5 Cir. 9/30/08), 996 So.2d 511-512.

The trial court’s grant of defendant’s Exception of Res Judicata formed the basis of plaintiffs first appeal. This court reversed the trial court’s grant of defendant’s exception and remanded the matter for further proceedings.

The matter proceeded and was set for trial on August 24, 2009. However, on the morning of trial, plaintiff filed a Motion to Recuse the trial judge. Plaintiffs attorney did not appear for the hearing on the motion, which the trial judge denied. The trial judge then granted defendant’s oral motion to dismiss plaintiffs suit with prejudice. On October 29, 2009, the trial judge signed a judgment denying the Motion to Recuse and dismissing plaintiffs suit with prejudice. Said judgment was mailed to the parties on November 2, 2009. On November 9, 2009, plaintiff filed a Motion for New Trial. This motion was denied after a hearing conducted on February 4, 2010. On March 31, 2010, plaintiff filed a Motion and Order for Devolutive Appeal, specifically stating “[pjlaintiff desires to appeal devolutively from the final judgment denying a Motion for a New Trial in this action”.

APPEALABILITY OF DENIAL OF MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL

The denial of a motion for new trial is an interlocutory judgment which is not appealable. Brister v. Continental Ins. Co., 30,429 (La.App. 2 Cir. 4/8/98), 712 So.2d 177. Rather, the denial of a motion for new trial is reviewable only under the appellate court’s supervisory jurisdiction for abuse of discretion. Jennings v. J. Ray McDermott Holdings, Inc., 99-3161 (La.App. 4 Cir. 4/5/00), 760 So.2d 462, 463.

However, our courts have held that appeals are favored in law, must be maintained whenever possible, and will not be dismissed for mere technicalities. Parfait v. Transocean Offshore, Inc., 07-1915 (La.3/14/08), 980 So.2d 634, 639; Smith v. Hartford Accident and Indem. Co., 254 La. 341, 223 So.2d 826 (1969); Fruehauf Trailer Co. v. Baillio, 252 La. 181, 210 So.2d 312 (1968); Kirkeby-Natus Corp. v. Campbell, 250 La. 868, 199 So.2d 904 (1967). Any doubt concerning the validity of an appeal should be resolved in favor of the appellant to the end that an appeal can be sustained. Smith, supra; Fruehauf, supra; Kirkeby-Natus Corp., supra.

Thus, an appeal from the order denying a new trial, rather than from the judgment from which the new trial is sought, is improper. However, when the motion for appeal refers to a specific judgment denying a motion for new trial, yet the appellant exhibits a clear intention to appeal instead the judgment on the merits, then the appeal should be considered. Smith, supra; Fruehauf, supra; Kirkeby-Natus, supra; Brister, supra. This view conforms to the mandate of LSA-C.C.P. art. 865 to construe every pleading so “as to do substantial justice.”

In her appellate brief, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in denying her Motion for New Trial because the trial court erred in denying her Motion to Re-cuse. In plaintiffs view, once the Motion to Recuse was filed, the trial court had to either grant the motion recusing itself or refer the motion to another judge for ruling. Plaintiff contends that once the Motion to Recuse was filed, the trial court had no power to act until the motion was either granted or referred to another judge for ruling. Plaintiff concludes that the trial judge was without authority |5when she denied the Motion to Recuse and dismissed plaintiffs action with prejudice. Thus, it is obvious from plaintiffs brief that she contends that the underlying judgment on the Motion to Recuse was improperly denied. Accordingly, we will maintain the appeal and address the merits of plaintiffs arguments.

MOTION TO RECUSE

The record reflects that at 8:38 a.m. on August 24, 2009, plaintiff filed a Motion to Recuse Judge Joan Benge from this matter. Plaintiff admits that the trial on the merits of plaintiffs case was set for the morning of August 24, 2009, but contends the motion was timely filed because it was filed prior to trial. Plaintiffs counsel states that he called opposing counsel to inform him that he was filing said motion but was told opposing counsel was unavailable. After filing the motion, plaintiffs counsel left the courthouse and brought a copy of the motion to opposing counsel’s office.

The recusal motion alleges that pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 151(A)(4), the trial judge should be recused. La. C.C.P. art. 151(A)(4) states:

A. A judge of any court, trial or appellate, shall be recused when he:
(4) Is biased, prejudiced, or interested in the cause or its outcome or biased or prejudiced toward or against the parties or the parties’ attorney or any witness to such an extent that he would be unable to conduct fair and impartial proceedings.

The motion alleges that Judge Benge was the subject of a proceeding by the Judiciary Commission which recommended she be removed from office. The motion also alleges that Judge Benge exhibited an unfavorable opinion of the plaintiffs cause of action and the plaintiffs attorney “starting in May of 2006 when the defendant hired an attorney who was a social and golfing friend of Judge |fiBenge.” The motion also alleges that the favorable view of defendant’s attorney and unfavorable view of plaintiffs action and her attorney were apparent at a motion hearing that took place on July 25, 2006 in which the trial judge ruled in favor of defendant and against plaintiff. The motion also alleges that this bias continued on August 18, 2009 when the trial judge denied plaintiffs motion to appeal a judgment entered on June 2, 2009. The motion states that a motion to appeal the August 13, 2009 judgment was still pending. The recusal motion was not accompanied by a memorandum. The order attached to the recusal motion was signed by the trial judge and states that the hearing on the motion would be held on August 24, 2009 at 1:00 o’clock p.m.

The record reflects that when the matter was called on the trial court’s docket neither plaintiff nor plaintiffs counsel were present. Other matters on the docket were then taken up. The matter was called again and it was noted on the record that the matter was set for trial that morning. Again, neither plaintiff nor her counsel were present. The trial judge noted that plaintiffs counsel was in the courthouse earlier that morning. The trial judge then allowed opposing counsel to argue his opposition to the Motion to Re-cuse. The trial judge then stated:

... For the record, too, I want to state that Mr. Boohaker [counsel for plaintiff] was called at 11:30 this morning. I did get him on the phone. I had in chambers with me both defense counsel, Mr. Hooks, Mr. Mounger, and Ms. Liz Burke, my law clerk.
We informed him that I was in receipt of his motion to recuse....
... Mr. Boohaker did not file a motion to continue this trial. This trial has been ongoing since 2001. There was no memo filed in support of the motion to recuse.
Mr. Boohaker relayed on the phone that he would not be present at 1:00 o’clock even though I gave him an hour and a half to return to the courthouse today. He indicated on the phone for me to do what I had to do, that he would not be present at 1:00 p.m.
|7The trial judge then went on to address the merits of the Motion to Recuse.

The trial judge stated that the “golfing friend” referred to in the Motion must be Mr. Zibilich, who was enrolled as counsel for defendant at one point in these proceedings. The trial judge explained that her relationship with Mr. Zibilich was revealed to plaintiffs attorney at the onset of Mr. Zibilich’s involvement and plaintiffs attorney stated that he had “no problem with it.” The trial judge noted that during Mr. Zibilich’s involvement, there had been rulings favorable to plaintiff. The trial judge further noted that the judgment to which plaintiff refers was three years old and that Mr. Zibilich had been off of this ease since February 2009.

The trial judge further stated that the judicial complaint filed against her had been made public since July 15, 2009 and plaintiff’s attorney had since that date to file the Motion to Recuse if he felt that proceeding would affect her ability to be fair and impartial in this case.

The trial judge then denied the Motion to Recuse stating that “if the motion does not allege a valid ground for recusal, the trial judge may deny a motion without referring the matter to another [judge].” The trial judge further stated that the motion was insufficient since there was no memorandum attached to the motion and the motion was not filed timely. Noting that this was the sixth setting for trial in this matter, the trial court found that the Motion to Recuse was “a complete sabotage in my opinion to the trial of this matter knowing that it has been set today for trial.”

Once Judge Benge denied the Motion to Recuse, the defense attorney orally moved for a dismissal of the case with prejudice based because of the failure by plaintiff and her counsel to appear. The trial court then granted this motion and dismissed the case.

Is A judgment denying the Motion to Re-cuse and dismissing plaintiffs suit with prejudice was signed on October 29, 2009 and mailed by the clerk of court on November 2, 2009. Plaintiff filed a Motion for New Trial on November 9, 2009.

At the hearing on the Motion for New Trial, which was heard by ad hoc Judge William Credo, the plaintiffs attorney was questioned as to why he left the courthouse after filing the Motion to Recuse. Plaintiffs attorney responded that he had left because once a motion to recuse has been filed, the trial judge had no authority to act in a case. He explained that pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 154, the trial judge can either recuse himself or refer the motion to another judge. Plaintiffs counsel argued that under La. C.C.P. art. 155, the motion has to be randomly allotted to another judge. Plaintiff’s counsel admitted to receiving a phone call from Judge Benge who informed him that she was going to try the Motion to Recuse at 1:00 o’clock p.m. that day. Plaintiffs counsel stated that he told Judge Benge of his interpretation of the law but Judge Benge stated that she was going to try the motion. He admitted that he informed Judge Benge that he would not be returning to the courthouse for the hearing on the Motion to Recuse. At the hearing on the Motion for New Trial, plaintiffs counsel argued that any actions taken by the trial judge after the Motion to Recuse was filed has no effect. Under plaintiffs counsel’s interpretation of the law, he could file a Motion to Recuse up to the time the trial began.

In opposition, defendant argued that two of plaintiffs allegations for recusal were based on rulings made by the trial judge in 2006, while the third related to the trial judge’s denial of plaintiffs motion for appeal. Defendant noted that plaintiff could have taken a writ on the alleged adverse rulings but failed to do so. With respect to the allegations regarding proceedings by the judiciary commission, defendant noted that at the time the Motion to Re-cuse was filed, the Supreme Court |9had not removed Judge Benge from office indicating that the Supreme Court was not concerned about her ability to continue on the bench. Defendant concluded the Motion to Recuse was properly granted.

In denying the Motion for New Trial, Judge Credo noted that in denying the recusal, Judge Benge found that there was “no valid ground for recusal” set forth in the motion. Judge Credo disagreed with plaintiffs counsel’s interpretation of the law that the filing of a Motion to Recuse stops a trial judge from acting. Further, Judge Credo noted that the timeliness of the filing of the Motion to Recuse was suspect and stated “that the timeliness of your motion would preclude any relief on it just on that issue alone.” Judge Credo then denied the Motion for New Trial and ordered that the ruling on the Motion to Recuse be upheld.

ANALYSIS

La. C.C.P. art. 154 provides:

A party desiring to recuse a judge of a district court shall file a written motion therefor assigning the ground for recu-sation. This motion shall be filed prior to trial or hearing unless the party discovers the facts constituting the ground for recusation thereafter, in which event it shall be filed immediately after these facts are discovered, but prior to judgment. If a valid ground for recusation is set forth in the motion, the judge shall either recuse himself, or refer the motion to another judge or a judge ad hoc, as provided in Articles 155 and 156, for a hearing.

In the instant case, the allegation claiming the trial judge should be recused due to the proceedings of the judiciary commission is without merit. As stated by defendant, the Supreme Court chose not to remove Judge Benge from the bench during the pendency of the proceedings against her.

With regard to the allegation referencing Mr. Zibilieh, the record reflects that the ruling adverse to plaintiff occurred some three years prior to the time plaintiff filed the recusal motion. The Motion for Recusal states: “In a hearing on |inan Exception of Res Judicata and No Cause of Action held before Judge Benge on July 25, 2006, it was alarmingly apparent that Judge Benge had a ‘favorable view of the defendant’s attorney5 and an ‘unfavorable view* of the Plaintiffs action and her attorney.” Neither the record on appeal, nor the record from the prior appeal, which is an exhibit to the record on appeal, contains a transcript of a hearing held on July 25, 2006.

Further, while Mr. Zibilich was enrolled as counsel for defendant, the trial court denied defendant’s Exception of No Cause of Action. Additionally, at the hearing on the exception, counsel for plaintiff stated:

... [T]hank God Mr. Zibilich has been in this case for two years. That’s the longest — or three years. That’s the longest any attorney has been in this case since 2001....
I would be happy to try it before Your Honor without a jury....

Thus, we find that the allegation regarding bias related to Mr. Zibilich and the hearing of July 25, 2006 to be completely without merit.

The Motion to Recuse further alleges that Judge Benge exhibited bias and prejudice to plaintiffs action and plaintiffs attorney on August 18, 2009 when Judge Benge denied plaintiffs motion to appeal a final judgment dated June 2, 2009. The record on appeal does not contain a judgment dated June 2, 2009. However, the record does contain a judgment dated June 3, 2009 in which Judge Benge denied plaintiffs motion to subpoena the decedent’s attorney, finding that any information this attorney may have is protected by the attorney-client privilege and the exceptions to this privilege urged by plaintiff do not apply. The record does contain an order dated August 13, 2009 denying plaintiffs motion for devolutive appeal of the trial court judgment dated June 3, 2009 stating “An interlocutory judgment is ap-pealable only when expressly provided by law. La. C.C.P. art. 2083.” Assuming the allegation in the recusal motion referencing a |nJune 2, 2009 judgment actually refers to the June 3, 2009 judgment, then Judge Benge correctly denied the Motion to Appeal. In that instance, the judgment sought to be appealed was an interlocutory judgment involving a discovery matter which is a non-appealable judgment. Thus, the allegation in the recusal motion alleging bias on the part of Judge Benge for her August 13, 2009 denial of plaintiffs Motion to Appeal is completely without merit.

Finally, the recusal motion states a “Motion to [A]ppeal the Judgment of the [sic] August 13, is pending.” The record reflects that plaintiff filed a Motion and Order for Devolutive Appeal from the August 13, 2009 judgment on August 21, 2009. On August 24, 2009, the trial court denied this motion stating: “The proper procedure for challenging this Court’s August 13, 2009 judgment is an application for supervisory writs. See La. C.C.P. arts. 2201 & 2083.” This ruling was correct. Thus, we find that the allegation regarding bias related Judge Benge’s denial of plaintiffs motion for appeal to be completely without merit.

To form a valid ground for re-cusal pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 151, the bias or prejudice alleged is required to be of a substantial nature and based on more than conelusory allegations. Augman v. City of Morgan City, 03-0396 (La.App. 1 Cir. 12/31/03), 864 So.2d 248, 249. When the Motion to Recuse fails to enunciate valid grounds for recusation, the trial judge may overrule the motion without referring the matter to another judge. Id. at 250. As discussed above, the allegations contained in plaintiffs Motion to Re-cuse are without merit and do not state a valid ground for recusation. For this reason, Judge Benge was not precluded from taking up and ruling on the Motion for Recusal. Furthermore, Judge Benge correctly denied plaintiffs Motion to Recuse. Moreover, because the recusal motion did not state a valid ground for recusation, Judge Benge had the |12authority to dismiss plaintiffs action due to no appearance being made by plaintiff -when the matter was called for trial.

Appellate review of a ruling on a motion for new trial is whether the trial court abused its discretion. Guillory v. Lee, 09-0075 (La.2009), 16 So.3d 1104, 1131. Having found the Motion to Recuse did not state a valid ground for recusal and that Judge Benge did not err in ruling on the Motion to Recuse, we find no abuse of discretion by Judge Credo in denying plaintiffs Motion for New Trial.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. All costs of this appeal are assessed to plaintiff.

AFFIRMED


author: PETTIGREW, J.

text:
    Bob WELCH & Daniel Hoover v. EAST BATON ROUGE PARISH METROPOLITAN COUNCIL.
    No. 2010 CA 1531.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.
    March 25, 2011.

      Alexis A. St. Amant II, Robert L. Roland Baton Rouge, LA, for Plaintiffs-Appellants Bob Welch & Daniel Hoover.
    Lea Anne Batson, Baton Rouge, LA, for Defendant-Appellee East Baton Rouge Parish Metropolitan Council.
    Juston M. O’Brien, Brook L. Thibo-deaux, Baton Rouge, LA, for Intervenor-Appellee 2590 Associates, LLC.
    Charles W. Belsom, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Baton Rouge, LA Attorney for Defendant-Appellee State of La. Through Attorney General James D. Caldwell.
    Before KUHN, PETTIGREW, and HIGGINBOTHAM, JJ.
   PETTIGREW, J.

| ^Plaintiffs appeal a partial summary judgment in favor of intervenor wherein the trial court dismissed, with prejudice, two of plaintiffs’ three claims. Because we conclude that this summary judgment was improperly certified as a final appealable judgment, we dismiss the appeal.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

At the time of her death on October 24, 2003, Mary Bordelon Ford owned approximately 124 acres at the corner of Perkins Road and Glasgow Avenue in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. All of the land was zoned “A-l Single Family residential.” In her will, she bequeathed to each plaintiff, Bob Welch and Daniel Hoover, a remunerative donation of a tract of land together with a house and further bequeathed to plaintiffs jointly a third tract of land with a barn situated on it. The total area of the three tracts of land owned by plaintiffs was slightly more than 5 acres, and the tracts were situated within the boundaries of the remaining 119 acres of Mrs. Ford’s property. Because the tracts were so situated, Mrs. Ford also bequeathed to plaintiffs a private access servitude to Glasgow Avenue, which crossed a portion of the 119 acres and provided access to plaintiffs’ property.

Mrs. Ford’s succession sold the remaining 119 acres to a developer named 2590 Associates, LLC (“2590 Associates”), managed by Joseph T. Spinosa. With plans for a development named “Rouzan,” which would consist of a combination of commercial, single family residential, and multifamily residential units, the developer applied to the East Baton Rouge Parish Metropolitan Council (“Council”) to amend the Master Land Use and Development Plan to permit a use change from “Low Density Residential” to “Planned Unit Development” and to rezone from “A-l Single Family Residential” to a “Traditional Neighborhood Development” (“TND”).

Following a hearing on January 23, 2008, the Council adopted Municipal Ordinance 14280, which rezoned the property as a TND and changed the permitted use of the 119 acres to a “Planned Unit Development.” Thereafter, plaintiffs filed a petition for declaratory judgment against the Council, challenging the rezoning ordinance and alleging | othat the Council’s actions were in violation of the Unified Development Code (“UDC”) and an abuse of discretion. 2590 Associates intervened as the property owner.

Plaintiffs base their challenge of the rezoning ordinance on three violations of the UDC, each of which they allege adversely affected their rights. The first violation of the UDC relates to Section 8.218C(3)(b) of the UDC, which requires that all residents shall be within approximately 1/4 mile distance from existing or proposed commercial, civic, and open space areas. Plaintiffs alleged that the conceptual plan for Rouz-an provides for all of the commercial development to be on the edge of the TND on Perkins Road rather than mixed throughout the development and that the distance between many of the residences and the commercial, civic, and open spaces is well in excess of 1/4 mile.

The second violation pertains to Section 8.218H, the UDC requirement that prior to the approval of the conceptual plan, 2590 Associates was required to request and attend a pre-application conference and provide a statement indicating it has financial responsibility sufficient to complete the Public Improvements shown on the conceptual plan. Plaintiffs contend that no such financial statement was provided by 2590 Associates at a pre-application conference.

The third and final violation concerns Section 8.218F of the UDC relating to the control of the land within the TND. Plaintiffs note that they own and reside on property completely surrounded by, and included within the boundaries of, Rouzan and that they have the benefit of one or more servitudes of passage over a portion of the Rouzan development that provides access to their property to and from Glasgow Avenue. Thus plaintiffs maintain that 2590 Associates cannot meet the UDC requirement that it have complete, unified, and legal control of all land included in the TND.

In September 2008, plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment on the first two violations, which was denied by the trial court in a judgment signed on December 10, 2008. An application to this court by plaintiffs for supervisory writs was subsequently denied.

On January 21, 2010, plaintiffs filed a supplemental petition for declaratory judgment. According to this supplemental petition, after adopting Ordinance 14280 the b Council filed several amendments to the UDC. Plaintiffs allege that these amendments are “unconstitutional as they violate the substantive due process clauses of the Louisiana and United States Constitutions in their application to this lawsuit to the extent they seek to divest plaintiffs of their rights acquired prior to the amendments.”

Thereafter, on February 2, 2010, 2590 Associates filed a motion for partial summary judgment on the first two violations, arguing that there were no genuine issues of material fact and that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The matter was scheduled for hearing, but before the hearing on its motion, 2590 Associates filed an exception to plaintiffs’ supplemental petition raising the objection of no cause of action. 2590 Associates alleged that plaintiffs failed to plead, with sufficient specificity, a valid constitutional claim and cannot identify a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest sufficient to support a substantive due process claim.

2590 Associates’ motion for partial summary judgment proceeded to hearing on March 29, 2010. The minute entry from the hearing provides, in pertinent part, as follows: “This matter came on for hearing on a Motion for Summary Judgment filed on behalf of interveners, the 2590 Associates.[] ... The matter was argued by counsel, documentary evidence was introduced and the matter was submitted to the Court.” After considering the evidence, the court granted the motion, designating same as a final judgment. The trial court signed a judgment on April 15, 2010, decreeing as follows:

Plaintiffs’ claims that the actions of the ... Council in adopting Ordinance 14280 approving the [TND] violated the [UDC] because (a) each residence was not within 1/4 mile of each and every commercial, civic, and open space, and (b) a statement of financial responsibility was not submitted at the pre-application conference are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
It is further ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that there is no just reason for delaying any appeal of this matter because the legal interpretation of the [UDC] is determinative of the rights of the parties to this matter. Therefore, this Court’s Judgment granting 2590 Associates and |Bthe ... Council’s summary judgment is now designated a Final Judgment pursuant to La. [Code Civ. P.] art. 1915(B).

Plaintiffs subsequently requested that the trial court provide written findings of fact and reasons for judgment, but none were provided. Plaintiffs appealed, challenging the trial court’s denial of their motion for partial summary judgment and the April 15, 2010 judgment granting the motion for partial summary judgment in favor of 2590 Associates and the Council.

DISCUSSION

Appellate courts have the duty to examine subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte, even when the parties do not raise the issue. Motorola, Inc. v. Associated Indem. Corp., 2002-0716, p. 4 (La.App. 1 Cir. 4/30/03), 867 So.2d 715, 717. A partial summary judgment rendered pursuant to La.Code Civ. P. art. 966(E) may be immediately appealed during an ongoing litigation only if it has been properly designated as a final judgment by the trial court. La.Code Civ. P. art. 1915(B). Although the trial court designated the April 15, 2010 partial summary judgment to be a final one under Article 1915(B), that designation is not determinative of this court’s jurisdiction. Van ex rel. White v. Davis, 2000-0206, p. 2 (La.App. 1 Cir. 2/16/01), 808 So.2d 478, 480. We must ascertain whether this court has appellate jurisdiction to review the partial judgment appealed from. Because the trial court gave reasons for certifying the judgment as immediately appealable, we review the certification applying the abuse of discretion standard. R.J. Messinger, Inc. v. Rosenblum, 2004-1664, p. 13 (La.3/2/05), 894 So.2d 1113, 1122.

(¡Historically, our courts have had a policy against multiple appeals and piecemeal litigation. Article 1915(B) attempts to strike a balance between the undesirability of piecemeal appeals and the need for making review available at a time that best serves the needs of the parties. Thus, in considering whether a judgment is properly designated as a final one pursuant to Article 1915(B), a trial court must take into account judicial administrative interests as well as the equities involved. R.J. Messinger, Inc., 2004-1664 at 13, 894 So.2d at 1122; Templet v. State of Louisiana, Department of Public Safety and Corrections, 2005-1903, p. 6 (La.App. 1 Cir. 11/3/06), 951 So.2d 182, 185. Some factors a trial court should take into account in making the certification determination is the relationship between the adjudicated and unadjudicated claims; the possibility that the need for review might or might not be mooted by future developments in the trial court; the possibility that the reviewing court might be obliged to consider the same issue a second time; and miscellaneous factors such as delay, economic and solvency considerations, shortening the time of trial, frivolity of competing claims, expense, and the like. R.J. Messinger, Inc., 2004-1664 at 14, 894 So.2d at 1122. However, the overriding inquiry for the trial court is whether there is no just reason for delay. R.J. Messinger, Inc., 2004-1664 at 14, 894 So.2d at 1122-1123.

In light of these considerations and based on the record before us, we find the trial court abused its discretion in designating the partial summary judgment as final and immediately appealable. The trial court concluded there was no just reason for delaying the appeal of this judgment because “the legal interpretation of the [UDC] is determinative of the rights of the parties to this matter.” Had all of plaintiffs’ claims concerning the Council’s actions and the alleged violations of the UDC been decided below, we would agree. However, that is not the case. Considering the factors set forth in Messinger, we note that the adjudicated and unadjudicat-ed claims in this case are very closely related. The April 15, 2010 partial summary judgment only resolved issues relating to the first two violations alleged by plaintiffs, i.e., the requirement that all residents in the TND be within approximately 1/4 mile distance from the commercial, |7civic, and open spaces and the requirement that prior to the approval of the conceptual plan, 2590 Associates attend a pre-application conference and provide a statement indicating its financial responsibility sufficient to complete the Public Improvements shown on the plan. Plaintiffs, however, also challenged the rezoning ordinance based on the claim that 2590 Associates did not have complete, unified, and legal control of all the land included in the TND. All of plaintiffs’ claims hinge on the legal interpretation of the UDC as it pertains to Municipal Ordinance 14280. Moreover, plaintiffs filed a supplemental petition for declaratory judgment, alleging that certain amendments to the UDC were unconstitutional and in violation of their substantive due process rights. Under these circumstances, we conclude that allowing an immediate appeal of the partial summary judgment rendered on April 15, 2010, only serves to encourage multiple appeals (as is evidenced by the appeal that is currently before us on the second motion for summary judgment filed in this case) and piecemeal litigation that causes delay and judicial inefficiency.

CONCLUSION

For the above and foregoing reasons, we find that the trial court improperly designated the April 15, 2010 partial summary judgment appealed herein as a final ap-pealable judgment. Therefore, we dismiss the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. All costs associated with this appeal are assessed against plaintiffs-appellants, Bob Welch and Daniel Hoover.

APPEAL DISMISSED.

      . We note a discrepancy in the record concerning whether this motion was "joined by” the Council or filed solely by 2590 Associates. The March 29, 2010 minute entry refers to the motion as being filed on behalf of 2590 Associates alone. The April 15, 2010 minute entry references the trial court's judgment granting summary judgment in favor of both 2590 Associates and the Council. The April 15, 2010 written judgment references the motion as being filed on behalf of 2590 Associates and joined by the Council, and judgment is granted in favor of both 2590 Associates and the Council. Moreover, 2590 Associates indicates in brief to this court that the Council joined with it in filing for partial summary judgment. However, we can find nothing in the record before us to confirm that the Council joined in the motion with 2590 Associates.

      . The denial of a motion for summary judgment, in whole or in part is an interlocutory judgment that is not appealable. Ascension School Employees Credit Union v. Provost Salter Harper & Alford, L.L.C, 2006-0992, p. 2 (La.App. 1 Cir. 3/23/07), 960 So.2d 939, 940; La.Code Civ. P. arts. 968 and 2083(C). However, when an unrestricted appeal is taken from a final judgment, the appellants are entitled to seek review of all adverse interlocutory judgments prejudicial to them, in addition to the review of the final judgment. Price v. Kids World, 2008-1815, p. 3 (La.App. 1 Cir. 3/27/09), 9 So.3d 992, 994. Although the April 15, 2010 judgment was designated as a final and appealable judgment by the trial court, we have concluded that this improper certification by the trial court was an abuse of discretion and dismiss the instant appeal. Thus, plaintiffs are not entitled to review of the interlocutory judgment denying their motion for summary judgment.

      . 2590 Associates moved for summary judgment as to plaintiffs' sole remaining claim, arguing that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the land plaintiffs claim to own was not within the boundaries of the TND. Again, there is some discrepancy in the record as to whether the Council joined in with 2590 Associates in this motion. While the trial court's judgment and the briefs to this court seem to indicate the Council was a party to the motion, there is nothing in the record confirming same. Following a hearing on May 17, 2010, the trial court granted summary judgment "filed on behalf of Intervenors, 2590 Associates ... joined by ... the Council,” dismissing plaintiffs' suit, with prejudice. A judgment followed on May 27, 2010. Plaintiffs were granted a devolutive appeal from both the April 15, 2010 judgment and the May 27, 2010 judgment. 2590 Associates filed a motion to consolidate the two appeals, arguing that the facts of the case were the same, the standard of review was the same, and the legal arguments were similar. According to the motion, the Council was in agreement with consolidating the appeals for briefing and argument, but plaintiffs were in opposition. The motion was denied by another panel of this court on October 14, 2010. We address the merits of the appeal of the May 27, 2010 judgment in a separate opinion decided this same date. See Welch v. East Baton Rouge Parish Metropolitan Council, 2010-1532 (La.App. 1 Cir. 3/25/11), 64 So.3d 249.


text:
    Bob WELCH & Daniel Hoover v. EAST BATON ROUGE PARISH METROPOLITAN COUNCIL.
    No. 2010 CA 1532.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.
    March 25, 2011.

      Alexis A. St. Amant II, Robert L. Roland, Baton Rouge, LA, Plaintiffs-Appellants Bob Welch & Daniel Hoover.
    Lea Anne Batson, Baton Rouge, LA, for Defendant-Appellee East Baton Rouge Parish Metropolitan Council.

      Juston M. O’Brien, Brook L. Thibo-deaux, Baton Rouge, LA, for Intervenor-Appellee 2590 Associates, LLC.
    Charles W. Belsom, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Baton Rouge, LA, for Defendant-Appellee State of La. Through Attorney General James D. Caldwell.
    Before KUHN, PETTIGREW, and HIGGINBOTHAM, JJ.
   PETTIGREW, J.

12PIaintiffs challenge the trial court’s judgment granting summary judgment in favor of intervenor and dismissing their suit with prejudice. For the reasons that follow, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

At the time of her death on October 24, 2003, Mary Bordelon Ford owned approximately 124 acres at the comer of Perkins Road and Glasgow Avenue in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. All of the land was zoned “A-l Single Family residential.” In her will, she bequeathed to each plaintiff, Bob Welch and Daniel Hoover, a remunerative donation of a tract of land together with a house and further bequeathed to plaintiffs jointly a third tract of land with a barn situated on it. The total area of the three tracts of land owned by plaintiffs was slightly more than 5 acres, and the tracts were situated within the boundaries of the remaining 119 acres of Mrs. Ford’s property. Because the tracts were so situated, Mrs. Ford also bequeathed to plaintiffs a private access servitude to Glasgow Avenue, which crossed a portion of the 119 acres and provided access to plaintiffs’ property.

Mrs. Ford’s succession sold the remaining 119 acres to a developer named 2590 Associates, LLC (“2590 Associates”), managed by Joseph T. Spinosa. With plans for a development named “Rouzan,” which would consist of a combination of commercial, single family residential, and multifamily residential units, the developer applied to the East Baton Rouge Parish Metropolitan Council (“Council”) to amend the Master Land Use and Development Plan to permit a use change from “Low Density Residential” to “Planned Unit Development” and to rezone from “A-l Single Family Residential” to a “Traditional Neighborhood Development” (“TND”).

Following a hearing on January 23, 2008, the Council adopted Municipal Ordinance 14280, which rezoned the property as a TND and changed the permitted use of the 119 acres to a “Planned Unit Development.” Thereafter, plaintiffs filed a petition for declaratory judgment against the Council, challenging the rezoning ordinance and alleging |sthat the Council's actions were in violation of the Unified Development Code (“UDC”) and an abuse of discretion. 2590 Associates intervened as the property owner.

Plaintiffs base their challenge of the rezoning ordinance on three violations of the UDC, each of which they allege adversely affected their rights. The first violation of the UDC relates to Section 8.218C(3)(b) of the UDC, which requires that all residents shall be within approximately 1/4 mile distance from existing or proposed commercial, civic, and open space areas. Plaintiffs alleged that the conceptual plan for Rouz-an provides for all of the commercial development to be on the edge of the TND on Perkins Road rather than mixed throughout the development and that the distance between many of the residences and the commercial, civic, and open spaces is well in excess of 1/4 mile.

The second violation pertains to Section 8.218H, the UDC requirement that prior to the approval of the conceptual plan, 2590 Associates was required to request and attend a pre-application conference and provide a statement indicating it has financial responsibility sufficient to complete the Public Improvements shown on the conceptual plan. Plaintiffs contend that no such financial statement was provided by 2590 Associates at a pre-application conference.

The third and final violation concerns Section 8.218F of the UDC relating to the control of the land within the TND. Plaintiffs note that they own and reside on property completely surrounded by, and included within the boundaries of, Rouzan and that they have the benefit of one or more servitudes of passage over a portion of the Rouzan development that provides access to their property to and from Glasgow Avenue. Thus plaintiffs maintain that 2590 Associates cannot meet the UDC requirement that it have complete, unified, and legal control of all land included in the TND.

In September 2008, plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment on the first two violations, which was denied by the trial court in a judgment signed on December 10, 2008. An application to this court by plaintiffs for supervisory writs was subsequently denied.

On January 21, 2010, plaintiffs filed a supplemental petition for declaratory judgment. According to this supplemental petition, after adopting Ordinance 14280 the 14Council filed several amendments to the UDC. Plaintiffs allege that these amendments are “unconstitutional as they violate the substantive due process clauses of the Louisiana and United States Constitutions in their application to this lawsuit to the extent they seek to divest plaintiffs of their rights acquired prior to the amendments.”

Thereafter, on February 2, 2010, 2590 Associates filed a motion for partial summary judgment on the first two violations, arguing that there were no genuine issues of material fact and that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The matter was scheduled for hearing, but before the hearing on its motion, 2590 Associates filed an exception to plaintiffs’ supplemental petition raising the objection of no cause of action. 2590 Associates alleged that plaintiffs failed to plead, with sufficient specificity, a valid constitutional claim and cannot identify a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest sufficient to support a substantive due process claim. The trial court never set this matter for hearing, nor did it ever address the constitutional issues raised by plaintiffs in their supplemental petition for declaratory judgment.

2590 Associates’ motion for partial summary judgment proceeded to hearing on March 29, 2010, at which time the court heard argument from the parties, and evidence was introduced. After considering the evidence, the court granted the motion, designating same as final, in a judgment signed on April 15, 2010.

1 =,2590 Associates filed a second motion for summary judgment as to plaintiffs’ sole remaining claim, arguing that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the land plaintiffs claimed to own was not within the boundaries of the TND. In an attempt to complete discovery prior to the hearing on this motion for summary judgment and within the discovery deadlines set by the court, plaintiffs notified 2590 Associates and the Council that they wished to take the depositions of Troy Bunch, director of the Planning Commission Staff, and Joseph T. Spinosa, manager of 2590 Associates. According to the record, Mr. Bunch’s deposition was scheduled for and taken on the morning of April 28, 2010. 2590 Associates refused to make Mr. Spinosa available for deposition without a subpoena. A subpoena for Mr. Spi-nosa was subsequently issued, and, in response, 2590 Associates filed a multitude of motions including a motion to stay discovery and upset scheduling until after a ruling on the motion for summary judgment had been made and a motion to quash the subpoena. Plaintiffs countered with a motion to compel discovery and a motion to continue the motion for summary judgment, arguing that they could not completely oppose the motion for summary judgment without the testimony of Mr. Spinosa. Plaintiffs argued that Mr. Spino-sa had knowledge of and could identify documents to support their contention that the property they owned was made a part of the TND. According to the record, plaintiffs’ motion to compel discovery and motion to continue was summarily denied by the trial court without a hearing on May 17, 2010.

The motion for summary judgment, as well as the motion to stay discovery and upset scheduling and motion to quash, were heard by the trial court on May 17, 2010. The May 17, 2010 minute entry provides as follows: “The matters were argued by counsel and submitted to the Court. Whereupon, the Court granted the Motion for Summary Judgment rendering the remaining motions moot.” The trial court signed a judgment on May 27, 2010, granting summary judgment and dismissing plaintiffs’ suit |fiwith prejudice. The instant appeal by plaintiffs followed, wherein they argue the trial court erred in granting the summary judgment.

DISCUSSION

On appeal, plaintiffs argue there are still material factual issues to be resolved involving whether the plaintiffs’ property is within the boundaries of the TND and whether the property is part of the “Planned Unit Development.” Plaintiffs contend that without Mr. Spinosa’s deposition, they were hindered in demonstrating 2590 Associates’ intentions to include their property in the TND. Plaintiffs maintain that “[t]he mere fact that [they] were thwarted in taking the deposition of Mr. Spinosa should in itself be sufficient to reverse the [summary] judgment and remand for further proceedings.” In response, 2590 Associates argue that plaintiffs request to take Mr. Spinosa’s deposition was untimely as a matter of law, unnecessary, and duplicative of information already obtained by plaintiffs. We agree with plaintiffs on the issue of the deposition and find legal error in the trial court’s decision to proceed with the hearing on the motion for summary judgment without first allowing the deposition of Mr. Spinosa to take place.

A defendant may file a summary judgment motion at any time. La.Code Civ. P. art. 966(A). However, a trial court shall consider a summary judgment motion only “[a]fter adequate discovery or after a case is set for trial.” La.Code Civ. P. art. 966(C)(1). The requirement that a summary judgment should be considered only after “adequate discovery” has been construed to mean that there is no absolute right to delay action on a summary judgment motion until discovery is complete; rather, the requirement is only that parties have a fair opportunity to carry out discovery and to present their claim. Unless plaintiff shows a probable injustice a suit should not be delayed pending discovery when it appears at an early stage that there is no genuine issue of fact. See Simoneaux v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Co., Inc., 483 So.2d 908, 912-913 (La. 1986); see also Vanderbrook v. Coachmen Industries, Inc., 2001-0809, p. 8 (La.App. 1 Cir. 5/10/02), 818 So.2d 906, 911. When a trial court cannot positively determine the diligence of a party in securing evidence through discovery, it should grant a requested continuance. The continuance produces delay, but the denial of the continuance may cause irreparable injury. Judson v. Davis, 2004-1699, pp. 13-14 (La.App. 1 Cir. 6/29/05), 916 So.2d 1106, 1116, writ denied, 2005-1998 (La.2/10/06), 924 So.2d 167.

The mere contention of an opponent that he lacks sufficient information to defend a motion for summary judgment because of movant’s failure to comply with discovery is insufficient to defeat the motion. Crocker v. Levy, 615 So.2d 918, 920 (La.App. 1 Cir.1993). However, when the plaintiff alleges sufficient reasons why additional evidence to oppose the summary judgment motion could not be produced, it is an abuse of discretion for the trial court to deny the plaintiffs request for a continuance. See Migliore v. Kinsley, 531 So.2d 1091, 1094 (La.App. 4 Cir.1988); Leake & Andersson, LLP v. SIA Ins. Co. (Risk Retention Group), Ltd., 2003-1600, p. 4 (La.App. 4 Cir. 3/3/04), 868 So.2d 967, 969 (finding summary judgment premature when the information the opposing party seeks to discover pertains directly to the unresolved factual issue in the case).

In the instant case, prior to the hearing on the motion for summary judgment, plaintiffs filed a motion to compel Mr. Spi-nosa to appear for his deposition and further urged the trial court to continue the hearing on the summary judgment until after the deposition could be taken. Plaintiffs argued that Mr. Spinosa had knowledge of and could identify documents that supported their contention that the property they owned had been made a part of the TND. Thus, plaintiffs maintained, they could not present a complete defense to the motion for summary judgment without Mr. Spinosa’s sworn testimony. Plaintiffs noted further that they had noticed Mr. Spinosa’s deposition within the time limits for discovery in the case management schedule and, therefore, should be allowed to take the deposition. As previously indicated, plaintiffs’ motion to compel and motion to continue the hearing on the motion for summary judgment was summarily denied by the trial court on May 17, 2010, without a hearing.

IsBased on our review of the record and the applicable jurisprudence, we find the trial court abused its discretion in denying plaintiffs’ motion for a continuance. It is clear that Mr. Spinosa, as manager of 2590 Associates, was directly involved in the transactions relating to plaintiffs’ property and may have information relevant to the issue before us now, i.e., whether 2590 Associates had complete, unified, and legal control of their property as is required pursuant to Section 8.218F of the UDC. By refusing to allow plaintiffs the opportunity to depose Mr. Spinosa prior to ruling on the motion for summary judgment, the trial court committed legal error and prematurely granted summary judgment in favor of 2590 Associates and the Council.

Moreover, as discussed in footnote 1 herein, it was legal error for the trial court to dismiss plaintiffs’ suit with prejudice without first setting the no cause of action exception for hearing and addressing the constitutional challenge raised by plaintiffs in their supplemental petition for declaratory judgment.

CONCLUSION

For the above and foregoing reasons, the May 27, 2010 judgment of the trial court granting summary judgment in favor of 2590 Associates and the Council and dismissing plaintiffs’ suit with prejudice is reversed. This case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. All costs associated with this appeal are assessed against intervenor-appellee, 2590 Associates, LLC.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

      . During oral argument before this court, the attorneys were asked to file supplemental briefs to address the issue of whether we could consider the unanswered constitutional challenge raised by plaintiffs in their supplemental petition for declaratory judgment. As we appreciate plaintiffs’ claim, they are not arguing that the amendments to the UDC are unconstitutional on their face. They are simply arguing that the amendments, if applied to their cause of action, are unconstitutional. Although this exception was filed before either of the summary judgment hearings below, the trial court never set the exception for hearing. Rather, in the case before us now, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of 2590 Associates and the Council, dismissing plaintiffs' suit with prejudice without ever addressing the exception or the constitutional claim by the plaintiffs. Thus, the judgment rendered herein leaves the issue of the constitutionality of the amendments to the UDC undecided. We find it was error for the trial court to consider the summary judgment without first setting the no cause of action exception for hearing and ruling on the constitutionality of the amendments to the UDC as they apply to plaintiffs' claim.

      . We note a discrepancy in the record concerning whether this motion was "joined by” the Council or filed solely by 2590 Associates. The March 29, 2010 minute entry refers to the motion as being filed on behalf of 2590 Associates alone. The April 15, 2010 minute entry references the trial court’s judgment granting summary judgment in favor of both 2590 Associates and the Council. The April 15, 2010 written judgment references the motion as being filed on behalf of 2590 Associates and joined by the Council, and judgment is granted in favor of both 2590 Associates and the Council. Moreover, 2590 Associates indicates in brief to this court that the Council joined with it in filing for partial summary judgment. However, we can find nothing in the record before us to confirm that the Council joined in the motion with 2590 Associates.

      . Plaintiffs’ appeal of the April 15, 2010 judgment and the previous denial of their motion for summary judgment are addressed in a separate opinion decided this same date. See Welch v. East Baton Rouge Parish Metropolitan Council, 2010-1531 (La.App. 1 Cir. 3/25/11), 64 So.3d 244.

      . Again there is some discrepancy in the record as to whether the Council joined in with 2590 Associates in this motion. While the trial court’s judgment and the briefs to this court seem to indicate the Council was a party to the motion, there is nothing in the record confirming same. Following a hearing on May 17, 2010, the trial court signed a judgment on May 27, 2010, granting summary judgment “filed on behalf of Interve-nors, 2590 Associates ... joined by ... the Council,” dismissing plaintiffs’ suit, with prejudice.

      . 2590 Associates filed a motion to consolidate its two appeals, arguing that the facts of the case were the same, the standard of review was the same, and the legal arguments were similar. According to the motion, the Council was in agreement with consolidating the appeals for briefing and argument, but plaintiffs were in opposition. The motion was denied by another panel of this court on October 14, 2010.