author: PER CURIAM. PARIENTE, J.,

text:
    Michael A. TANZI, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. Michael A. Tanzi, Petitioner, v. Kenneth S. Tucker, etc., Respondent.
    Nos. SC10-807, SC11-81.
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    April 19, 2012.
    Rehearing Denied July 24, 2012.

      Neal A. Dupree, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Paul Edward Kalil, Assistant CCR Counsel and Scott Gavin, Staff Attorney, Region South, Fort Lauderdale, FL, for Appellant/Petitioner.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, FL, and Scott A. Browne, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, FL, for Appellee/Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

Michael A. Tanzi appeals the denial of his postconviction motion filed under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851 and petitions this Court for a writ of habeas corpus. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the denial of his motion and deny his habeas petition.

I. BACKGROUND

Michael A. Tanzi pled guilty and was sentenced to death for the murder of Janet Acosta. On direct appeal, this Court described the facts as follows:

During her lunch hour on April 25, 2000, Janet Acosta was reading a book while seated inside her maroon van parked at the Japanese Gardens in Miami. At that time, Tanzi was stranded in Miami without a means of returning to Key West, where he had been residing for the previous months. Tanzi saw Acosta sitting in her vehicle with her window rolled down and approached her, asking for a cigarette and the time. When Acosta was distracted, Tanzi punched her in the face until he gained entry to the van. He then threatened her with a razor blade and drove away with Acosta in the van. Tanzi held Acosta by the wrist until he reached Homestead.
Upon reaching Homestead, Tanzi stopped at a gas station, where he bound Acosta with rope that was in her van and gagged her with a towel. Tanzi further threatened Acosta, telling her that if she kicked or made noise he would cut her from ear to ear. Tanzi took Acosta’s fifty-three dollars in cash. He then bought some cigarettes and a soda and attempted to use Acosta’s bank card, which he had obtained after rifling through her belongings. While still in Homestead, Tanzi also forced Acosta to perform oral sex, threatening to kill her with his razor if she injured him. However, he stopped her from continuing because Acosta’s teeth were loose as a result of the earlier beating.
Tanzi then continued to drive with Acosta bound and gagged in the rear of the van until he reached Tavernier in the Florida Keys, where he stopped at approximately 5:15 p.m. to withdraw money from Acosta’s bank account. He again threatened Acosta with the razor in order to obtain Acosta’s personal identification number. Tanzi thereafter stopped at a hardware store to purchase duct tape and razor blades.
Tanzi continued his journey until approximately 6:30 p.m. when he reached Sugarloaf Key. He decided that he needed to get rid of Acosta as she was getting in the way. He also knew he would get caught quickly if he released her alive. Tanzi proceeded to Blimp Road, an isolated area in Cudjoe Key. Tanzi told Acosta that he was going to kill her and then crosslaeed a piece of rope and began to strangle her. He temporarily stopped to place duct tape over her mouth, nose, and eyes in an attempt to stifle the noise. Tanzi then continued to strangle Acosta until she died. Tanzi disposed of Acosta’s body in a wooded, secluded area where he thought she would go unnoticed.
After the murder, Tanzi drove to Key West, where he shopped, ate, smoked marijuana, visited with friends, and used Acosta’s ATM card. Tanzi had planned to access more of Acosta’s money, sleep in a hotel, purchase drugs, and alter the van’s appearance. However, on April 27, 2000, Tanzi’s activities were interrupted when the police observed him returning to Acosta’s van, which the police had located and placed under surveillance after Acosta’s friends and coworkers reported her missing. When the police approached Tanzi, he had receipts in his pocket showing his ATM withdrawals and purchases. Tanzi stated that he “knew what this was about.” He also spontaneously stated he wanted to talk about some bad things he had done.
After waiving his rights and while in a police car en route to the Key West Police Department, Tanzi confessed that he had assaulted, abducted, robbed, sexually battered, and killed Janet Acosta. Tanzi repeated his confession with greater detail several times on audio and video tape. Tanzi also showed the police where he had disposed of Janet Acosta’s body and where he had discarded the duct tape and rope.
Tanzi was indicted for the first-degree murder of Janet Acosta.... Initially, Tanzi pled not guilty; however, shortly before trial, Tanzi entered a guilty plea to the first-degree murder, carjacking, kidnapping, and armed robbery counts.

Tanzi v. State, 964 So.2d 106, 110-11 (Fla.2007).

During the penalty phase, Tanzi presented two mental health experts, a forensics social worker specializing in sexual behavior problems, and a counselor at a homeless shelter, who testified about Tan-zi’s long history of mental problems and his stays in and diagnoses at various institutions. The social worker disclosed that Tanzi, when eight years old, was fondled by a thirteen-year-old boy and that the older boy later penetrated Tanzi anally. The sexual abuse continued for five years, ending only when the perpetrator turned eighteen and enlisted in the military. The social worker also explained that Tanzi acted out sexually in his youth following the abuse.

Dr. Vicary, a psychiatrist, testified that Tanzi suffered from bipolar disorder, substance abuse, paraphilia, and antisocial personality disorder. Dr. Raphael, a psychologist, testified that Tanzi suffered from polysubstance dependence, PTSD, exhibitionism, sexual sadism, voyeurism, ADHD, a learning disability, bereavement, and antisocial personality disorder. Dr. Raphael also stated that his firm suspected one of (and could not rule out) schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorder, or psychotic disorder.

Additionally, Tanzi’s mother testified that she thought that Tanzi was a normal three year old but that he was having trouble getting along with other children by six years old. She also testified that Tanzi’s father abused him verbally and physically after Tanzi’s father was diagnosed with pancreatic cancer. She noticed changes in Tanzi’s behavior when he was eight years old following his father’s illness and death and following sexual abuse at the hands of an older boy. She sought treatment for Tanzi at various institutions throughout Tanzi’s childhood.

Following the penalty phase, the jury returned a unanimous recommendation of death, and the trial court followed the jury’s recommendation. Tanzi, 964 So.2d at 110. This Court affirmed the death sentence on direct appeal. M

In February 2009, Tanzi filed a motion for postconviction relief. After summarily denying several claims and after holding an evidentiary hearing on Tanzi’s claims alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel during the penalty phase, the postconviction court denied relief. Tanzi now appeals the denial of his postconviction motion. He also petitions this Court for a writ of habeas corpus.

II. POSTCONVICTION MOTION

A. Meaningful Appellate Review

First, Tanzi asserts that he is being denied a meaningful appellate review because the trial court did not render an order that included detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law. Because the orders in this case are sufficient to discern the trial court’s reasoning for denying Tanzi’s postconviction claims, we conclude that Tanzi is not being denied meaningful appellate review.

Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851(f)(5)(D) sets forth the trial judge’s responsibilities in rendering a postconviction order:

Immediately following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court shall order a transcript of the hearing which shall be filed within 30 days. Within 30 days of receipt of the transcript, the court shall render its order, ruling on each claim considered at the evidentiary hearing and all other claims raised in the motion, making detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect to each claim, and attaching or referencing such portions of the record as are necessary to allow for meaningful appellate review. The order issued after the evidentiary hearing shall resolve all the claims raised in the motion and shall be considered the final order for purposes of appeal. The clerk of the trial court shall promptly serve upon the parties and the attorney general a copy of the final order, with a certificate of service.

In Mendoza v. State, 964 So.2d 121, 129 (Fla.2007), this Court determined that the circuit court had, after an evidentiary hearing, rendered an order denying post-conviction relief that did not provide sufficient findings of facts and conclusions of law to provide meaningful appellate review. This Court stated that “the circuit court neither stated on the record nor rendered an order detailing its factual findings and the reasons for its decision on the postconviction motion.” Id. at 128. Specifically, this Court explained that “[t]he circuit court denied Mendoza’s post-conviction motion claims in a very brief, two-page order, which simply set out the standards from case law ... and held: ‘This Court finds that the Defendant’s petition did not meet nor did it overcome the requirements of the above-mentioned case law.’ ” Id. at 127. And because the judge was deceased, this Court remanded for a new evidentiary hearing before a new judge. Id. at 128.

In contrast to the order in Mendoza, the order following the evidentiary hearing in this case is nine and one-half pages and includes forty-nine findings of fact and nine conclusions of law. And importantly, one can discern from the order the trial court’s reasoning for denying Tanzi’s various ineffectiveness of counsel during the penalty phase claims. For example, it is apparent from the order that the trial court concluded that Tanzi was not prejudiced by trial counsel’s failure to call Tan-zi’s abuser to testify during the penalty phase because the abuser’s testimony during the evidentiary hearing actually served to minimize the sexual abuse that Tanzi had suffered.

Tanzi also mentions that the order following the evidentiary hearing did not address his claims that were summarily denied. Tanzi’s statement is accurate in this regard. However, the trial court did issue an order after the Hujf hearing that provides the court’s reasoning for summarily denying Tanzi’s other claims.

Accordingly, because the orders included sufficient findings of facts and reasoning for the trial court’s denial of Tanzi’s claims, Tanzi is not being deprived of meaningful appellate review.

B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel During the Penalty Phase

Next, Tanzi asserts that trial counsel was ineffective during the penalty phase for (1) failing to present consistent mental health testimony; (2) failing to investigate and present Tanzi’s XYY abnormality; (3) presenting Dr. Vicary’s testimony; and (4) failing to present additional mitigation witnesses. Because Tanzi has failed to establish the requirements necessary for relief, we disagree.

After the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), this Court explained that for ineffective assistance of counsel claims to be successful, two prongs must be satisfied:

First, the claimant must identify particular acts or omissions of the lawyer that are shown to be outside the broad range of reasonably competent performance under prevailing professional standards. Second, the clear, substantial deficiency shown must further be demonstrated to have so affected the fairness and reliability of the proceeding that confidence in the outcome is undermined.

Bolin v. State, 41 So.3d 151, 155 (Fla.2010) (quoting Maxwell v. Wainwright, 490 So.2d 927, 932 (Fla.1986)).

Regarding the deficiency prong of Strickland, there is a strong presumption that trial counsel’s performance was not ineffective. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Moreover, “[a] fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.” Id. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052. The defendant carries the burden to “overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’ ” Id. (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101, 76 S.Ct. 158, 100 L.Ed. 83 (1955)).

Regarding the prejudice prong of Strickland, the defendant “must show that but for his counsel’s deficiency, there is a reasonable probability he would have received a different sentence. To assess that probability, we consider ‘the totality of the available mitigation evidence — both that adduced at trial, and the evidence adduced in the [postconviction] proceeding1 — and ‘reweig[h] it against the evidence in aggravation.’ ” Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 130 S.Ct. 447, 453-54, 175 L.Ed.2d 398 (2009) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 397-98, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000)). “A reasonable probability is a ‘probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.’ ” Henry v. State, 948 So.2d 609, 617 (Fla.2006) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052).

Because both prongs of Strickland present mixed questions of law and fact, this Court employs a mixed standard of review, deferring to the trial court’s factual findings that are supported by competent, substantial evidence, but reviewing the trial court’s legal conclusions de novo. See Sochor v. State, 883 So.2d 766, 771-72 (Fla.2004).

1. Consistent Mental Health Testimony

Tanzi argues that trial counsel was ineffective for presenting the testimony of mental health experts who did not collaborate and, therefore, diagnosed Tanzi with varying mental disorders. This Court disagrees.

Tanzi has failed to demonstrate deficiency. At the evidentiary hearing, trial counsel testified that his strategy was to “compartmentalize” his mental health experts to avoid any charge of collusion and any lessening of the experts’ credibility. And “strategic decisions do not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel if alternative courses have been considered and rejected and counsel’s decision was reasonable under the norms of professional conduct.” Occhicone v. State, 768 So.2d 1037, 1048 (Fla.2000).

Additionally, Tanzi has not demonstrated prejudice. The jury benefited from extensive testimony regarding Tanzi’s serious mental health problems, including his diagnoses and stays at various institutions in his youth. This mental health evidence served as compelling mitigating evidence. Further, Dr. Vieary testified during the penalty phase that Tanzi had been diagnosed as bipolar by personnel at the Key West jail; therefore, the bipolar diagnosis did not stand out during the penalty phase as an inconsistent diagnosis. In fact, during the evidentiary hearing, Dr. Raphael explained that he considered bipolar elements of Tanzi’s personality and stated that he could not rule out the possibility that Tanzi suffered from schizoaffective disorder bipolar type. Therefore, the nonidentical diagnoses of Dr. Vieary and Dr. Raphael are not sufficient to undermine our confidence in the outcome.

Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s denial of relief.

2. XYY Abnormality

Further, Tanzi claims that counsel was ineffective during the penalty phase for failing to investigate and present evidence of Tanzi’s XYY genotype. We disagree.

During the evidentiary hearing, Dr. Muench testified that having an extra Y chromosome does not cause criminal or antisocial behavior. While the XYY abnormality is statistically associated with developmental problems, Dr. Muench agreed with a study concluding that as a general condition XYY boys develop normally during childhood. Dr. Muench also explained that when he advised parents in cases where their child was going to be born XYY, he advised them “that more than likely their child would be normal.” Furthermore, Dr. Raphael testified during the evidentiary hearing that the knowledge that Tanzi had an extra Y chromosome would not have changed any of the opinions he expressed during the penalty phase. Additionally, to the extent that XYY is statistically associated with developmental issues, trial counsel during the penalty phase presented evidence of Tan-zi’s childhood developmental problems, including diminished socialization and a learning disorder. Therefore, there is not a reasonable probability that investigating and presenting evidence of Tanzi’s XYY genetic abnormality would have led to a different result. The mitigating evidence adduced at the evidentiary hearing combined with the mitigating evidence presented at the penalty phase would not outweigh the evidence in aggravation as this case included six aggravating circumstances given great and utmost weight. Our confidence in the outcome is not undermined.

Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s denial of relief.

3. Dr. Vieary

Tanzi also claims that trial counsel was ineffective for presenting the testimony of Dr. Vieary as a mental health expert and for failing to provide Dr. Vieary with a videotape of Tanzi’s confession. However, we affirm the trial court’s denial of this claim.

First, Tanzi has failed to demonstrate that the decision to present Dr. Vicary’s testimony during the penalty phase was deficient. Although Dr. Vicary’s testimony was subject to impeachment based upon Dr. Vicary’s misconduct in altering his notes during the Menendez brothers’ trial in California, Dr. Vicary was the only defense mental health expert that had diagnosed Tanzi with bipolar disorder, a serious mental health disorder that could serve as mitigating evidence. Furthermore, trial counsel sought to minimize the damage to Dr. Vicary’s credibility by first filing a motion in limine to exclude this evidence and then by addressing the misconduct issue during direct examination. Therefore, the presentation of Dr. Vicary’s testimony appears to have been a reasonable strategic decision. See Occhicone v. State, 768 So.2d 1087, 1048 (Fla.2000).

Additionally, Tanzi has failed to establish prejudice. Both Dr. Vicary and Dr. Raphael testified that Tanzi suffered from serious mental health issues throughout his life. However, as explained above, Dr. Vicary’s testimony was particularly helpful in establishing mitigation due to his diagnosis of bipolar disorder and his description of the difficulties facing bipolar children. While Dr. Vicary’s credibility may have been lessened by the disclosure of his misconduct in the Menendez case as well as Dr. Vicary’s admission that, although he had read a transcript, he had not viewed Tanzi’s videotaped confession, the overall presentation of Dr. Vicary’s testimony does not undermine confidence in the outcome. Given the aggravation and mitigation evidence in this case, there is not a reasonable probability that the result would have been different absent Dr. Vi-cary’s testimony.

Accordingly, because Tanzi has not shown either deficiency or prejudice, we affirm the trial court’s denial of this claim.

4. Additional Mitigation Witnesses

Tanzi further argues that trial counsel was ineffective during the penalty phase because his abuser, two former neighbors, an additional mental health expert, and a former camp counselor were available but never called to testify. Additionally, Tanzi argues that his mother’s testimony during the penalty phase was incomplete. However, because Tanzi has not demonstrated either the deficiency or prejudice prongs of Strickland, we affirm the trial court’s denial of relief.

The trial record reflects that trial counsel sought and was granted the appointment of multiple mental health experts to assist with the defense. Further, during the evidentiary hearing, trial counsel explained that he sought out lay witnesses, school records, medical records, and psychological records. Trial counsel also explained that he and an investigator traveled to Massachusetts to uncover information regarding Tanzi’s background ' and possible mitigation evidence. And during the penalty phase, trial counsel presented the testimony of two mental health experts to support the proposed mitigator that Tanzi’s ability to appreciate the criminality of his conduct and to conform it to the requirements of the law was impaired. The mental health experts, a social worker, and a homeless shelter counselor testified during the penalty phase about Tanzi’s history of mental problems and his stays in and diagnoses at various institutions. The witnesses also addressed the sexual abuse Tanzi suffered as a young child. Further, in an effort to humanize Tanzi, trial counsel presented the testimony of Tanzi’s mother along with photographs of Tanzi growing up. Thus, Tanzi has failed to demonstrate that trial counsel’s decision to not present all possible witnesses was deficient. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (“[Cjounsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.”); see also Everett v. State, 54 So.3d 464, 474 (Fla.2010) (“This Court has also consistently held that a trial counsel’s decision to not call certain witnesses to testify at trial can be reasonable trial strategy.”).

Additionally, Tanzi has failed to establish prejudice. Presenting the above-mentioned witnesses who testified during the postconviction hearing “would barely have altered the sentencing profile presented to the sentencing judge.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 700, 104 S.Ct. 2052. This is because the mitigation evidence Tanzi presented through these witnesses was largely cumulative of the mitigation evidence presented during the penalty phase. For example, while Shawn Martin testified during the evidentiary hearing that he had a sexual relationship with Tanzi when Tan-zi was a child, multiple witnesses testified during the penalty phase that Tanzi had been sexually abused by an older boy and that the abuse began when Tanzi was eight and continued for years. And although Shawn Martin also testified during the evi-dentiary hearing that Tanzi had been exposed to pornography and had watched his mother having sex, Dr. Vicary testified during the penalty phase that Tanzi had been exposed to pornography at an early age and had witnessed his mother having sex in an aggressive manner with various boyfriends. Moreover, witnesses at both the postconviction hearing and the penalty phase testified that Tanzi’s father became abusive after becoming ill and that Tanzi exhibited behavioral issues following his father’s death and following sexual abuse. Tanzi’s mother even acknowledged on cross-examination during the evidentiary hearing that there was nothing that she could add that was not provided to the defense originally. Therefore, because the additional evidence presented during the postconviction hearing was largely cumulative of the evidence presented during the penalty phase, Tanzi has not established a reasonable probability of a different result had trial counsel presented this additional evidence during the penalty phase. See Atwater v. State, 788 So.2d 223, 284 (Fla.2001) (“There is no reasonable probability that re-presenting virtually the same evidence through other witnesses would have altered the outcome in any manner.”). Confidence in the outcome is not undermined.

Accordingly, this Court affirms the trial court’s denial of Tanzi’s claim that trial counsel was ineffective during the penalty phase.

C. Summarily Denied Claims

Tanzi argues that the trial court erred in denying several of his postconviction claims without an evidentiary hearing. However, because the claims were either facially insufficient, procedurally barred, or without merit, this Court affirms the trial court’s summary denial.

An evidentiary hearing must be held on an initial 8.851 motion whenever the movant makes a facially sufficient claim that requires a factual determination. See Amendments to Fla. Rules of Crim. Pro. 3.851, 772 So.2d 488, 491 n. 2 (Fla.2000). “A summary or conclusory allegation is insufficient to allow the trial court to examine the specific allegations against the record.” Ragsdale v. State, 720 So.2d 203, 207 (Fla.1998). Because a court’s decision whether to grant an evi-dentiary hearing on a rule 3.851 motion is ultimately based on written materials before the court, its ruling is tantamount to a pure question of law, subject to de novo review. See State v. Coney, 845 So.2d 120, 137 (Fla.2003).

First, Tanzi argues that the trial court should have granted a hearing on his claim that the jury improperly considered lack of remorse. He also alleges that the trial court improperly denied his request to interview the jurors. However, this claim was properly denied -without a hearing because it is procedurally barred. According to Tanzi, it was reported in a newspaper in April 2003, shortly after the penalty phase, that a juror had commented about Tanzi’s lack of remorse for his crimes. Tanzi did not raise the issue in the trial court after the juror’s alleged comment first came to light in 2003. Moreover, Tanzi did not raise the issue on direct appeal even though the direct appeal followed the entry of a written order denying his motion to withdraw his plea, an order that was issued in January 2005. Therefore, Tanzi’s juror misconduct claim is proeedurally barred.

Next, Tanzi asserts that an ev-identiary hearing should have been held on his claim that the State violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), by failing to timely disclose evidence that Tanzi may have the XYY genotype. But since Tanzi acknowledges that the State in fact disclosed this possibility to the defense before the penalty phase, summary denial was proper. As part of establishing a Brady violation, the defendant must show that favorable evidence was willfully or inadvertently suppressed by the State. See Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82, 119 S.Ct. 1936, 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999); see also United States v. Ziperstein, 601 F.2d 281, 291 (7th Cir.1979) (“As long as ultimate disclosure is made before it is too late for the defendant to make use of any benefits of the evidence, Due Process is satisfied.”); White v. State, 816 A.2d 776, 778 (Del.2003) (finding no Brady violation where materials were disclosed a week prior to trial and defense counsel did not object or ask for a continuance).

Tanzi also alleges that the trial court erred in summarily denying his claim that counsel was ineffective at the Spencer hearing. However, Tanzi did not allege specific facts explaining how additional testimony (primarily from unnamed sources) at the Spencer hearing would have established prejudice. Accordingly, the motion did not sufficiently allege prejudice, and we affirm the summary denial of this claim. See Ragsdale, 720 So.2d at 208 (finding that trial judge properly denied evidentiary hearing where defendant provided insufficient facts as to “how the outcome would have been different had counsel acted otherwise”); see also Doorbal v. State, 983 So.2d 464, 484 (Fla.2008) (“Counsel for Doorbal appears to operate under the incorrect assumption that con-clusory, nonspecific allegations are sufficient to obtain an evidentiary hearing on claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, and specific facts and arguments need not be disclosed or presented until the eviden-tiary hearing.”).

Further, Tanzi argues that the trial court erred in summarily denying his claim that trial counsel was laboring under a conflict of interest. However, Tanzi bases this postconviction claim upon allegations that were known during the direct appeal. Thus, this conflict of interest claim could have and should have been raised on direct appeal and is now procedurally barred.

Finally, Tanzi argues that the trial court erred in summarily denying his claim that Florida’s lethal injection statute and existing lethal injection procedures violate the U.S. and Florida Constitutions. However, the trial court did not err in denying Tan-zi’s claim without an evidentiary hearing as this Court has repeatedly rejected similar lethal injection challenges. See, e.g., Everett v. State, 54 So.3d 464, 486 (Fla.2010); Tompkins v. State, 994 So.2d 1072, 1081 (Fla.2008); Power v. State, 992 So.2d 218, 220-21 (Fla.2008).

Accordingly, because the claims Tanzi mentions were facially insufficient, procedurally barred, or without merit, we affirm the trial court’s summary denial.

D. Motion to Amend

Under this claim, Tanzi contends that his motion for leave to amend his postconviction motion should have been granted. Tanzi’s motion for leave, which sought to add two claims, was filed more than thirty days before the evidentiary hearing. However, because good cause was not shown, the trial judge did not abuse its discretion in denying Tanzi’s motion for leave to amend. See Doorbal, 983 So.2d at 484 (“The refusal of a trial court to grant a party leave to amend a 3.851 motion is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.”).

Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851(f)(4) provides the following in pertinent part:

A motion filed under this rule may be amended up to 30 days prior to the evidentiary hearing upon motion and good cause shown. The trial court may in its discretion grant a motion to amend provided that the motion sets forth the reason the claim was not raised earlier and attaches a copy of the claim sought to be added.

A trial court does not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant leave to amend when the facts asserted in the amended motion are vague, nonspecific, and fail to suggest how relief may be warranted. Doorbal, 983 So.2d at 485. Additionally, a trial court does not abuse its discretion when the facts in the amended motion “were readily available to postconviction counsel at the time that [the defendant] filed his initial 3.851 motion and, therefore, these claims should have been raised in that motion.” Lugo v. State, 2 So.3d 1, 19 (Fla.2008).

Here, with regard to his claim based upon a 2009 National Academy of Sciences (NAS) report on forensic science, Tanzi’s amended motion asserted facts that were vague and that failed to suggest how relief may be warranted. The amendment describes some of the NAS report’s recommendations for and issues with DNA evidence and asserts that this information somehow provides a basis for attacking the State’s DNA expert’s testimony that Tan-zi’s blood was found on the inside pocket of the victim’s jeans. Tanzi then argues that, because the report undermines this DNA expert’s testimony, the trial court’s finding of the aggravator that the murder was committed during sexual batteries would be discredited. However, it is unclear how the report’s discussion of DNA evidence could discredit the committed during sexual batteries aggravator given the other evidence supporting this aggravator, namely Tanzi’s confession to forcing the victim to perform oral sex and the medical examiner’s testimony that the victim had a laceration to the labia shortly before death.

The other claim in Tanzi’s amended motion concerned an alleged confrontation clause violation based upon Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004), and Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 129 S.Ct. 2527, 174 L.Ed.2d 314 (2009). However, no good cause was shown for Tanzi’s failure to raise this claim in his original 3.851 motion as the trial testimony sought to be challenged has always been available.

Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Tanzi’s motion for leave to amend.

E. Records Request

Next, Tanzi argues that the trial court erred in denying his request for the Monroe County Sheriffs Department to produce its rights advisory card, used in providing warnings to suspects under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), as well as the personnel file of Detective James Norman. However, we affirm the trial court.

The scope of requests made pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.852(g) and (i) are governed by Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.852(1), which provides that the records must not be privileged or immune from production and that the records are “either relevant to the subject matter of the proceeding” or “reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” In reviewing a trial court’s denial of public records requests, this Court applies an abuse of discretion standard. Diaz v. State, 945 So.2d 1136, 1149 (Fla.2006).

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Tanzi’s request for the Monroe County Sheriffs Department’s Miranda card since the card was not used in this case. Tanzi acknowledges that officers from the Monroe County Sheriffs Department were not the officers who gave him Miranda warnings. Therefore, the card used by that department has no relevance here.

Regarding Detective Norman, the trial court ordered the production of his internal affairs file and training records. And the Monroe County Sheriffs Office filed a notice of compliance indicating that it had produced the records as ordered. No other portion of Detective Norman’s personnel file appears to be reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion with regard to these records requests.

III. HABEAS PETITION

In his habeas petition, Tanzi alleges that his appellate counsel was ineffective on direct appeal for failing to raise a claim regarding misstatements of law during voir dire and for failing to raise a Crawford claim. For the reasons that follow, we deny his petition.

Claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel are appropriately presented in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. See Freeman v. State, 761 So.2d 1055, 1069 (Fla.2000). Consistent with the Strickland standard, to grant habeas relief based on ineffectiveness of counsel, this Court must determine:

[F]irst, whether the alleged omissions are of such magnitude as to constitute a serious error or substantial deficiency falling measurably outside the range of professionally acceptable performance and, second, whether the deficiency in performance compromised the appellate process to such a degree as to undermine the confidence in the correctness of the result.

Pope v. Wainwright, 496 So.2d 798, 800 (Fla.1986); see also Freeman, 761 So.2d at 1069; Thompson v. State, 759 So.2d 650, 660 (Fla.2000).

“If a legal issue ‘would in all probability have been found to be without merit’ had counsel raised the issue on direct appeal, the failure of appellate counsel to raise the meritless issue will not render appellate counsel’s performance ineffective.” Schoenwetter v. State, 46 So.3d 535, 563 (Fla.2010) (quoting Williamson v. Dugger, 651 So.2d 84, 86 (Fla.1994)). “In fact, appellate counsel is not necessarily ineffective for failing to raise a claim that might have had some possibility of success; effective appellate counsel need not raise every conceivable nonfrivolous issue.” Valle v. Moore, 837 So.2d 905, 908 (Fla.2002) (citing Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751-53, 103 S.Ct. 3308, 77 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983); Provenzano v. Dugger, 561 So.2d 541, 549 (Fla.1990)).

Tanzi contends that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise a claim on direct appeal based upon allegedly incorrect statements of law during voir dire. More specifically, Tanzi’s habeas petition alleges that prospective juror Covina and prospective juror Plowden were improperly instructed upon whether a death sentence is required in certain circumstances. But neither of these prospective jurors in fact served on Tanzi’s jury. Therefore, the allegedly defective statements of the law could not have affected Tanzi’s trial, and appellate counsel cannot be considered ineffective for failing to raise this meritless claim.

Tanzi also argues that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise an unpreserved Crawford claim on direct appeal because the error constitutes fundamental error. Tanzi contends it was fundamental error for the State’s DNA analyst to testify to others’ findings about the presence of Tanzi’s blood on the inside of the victim’s pocket because this evidence supported the commission during the course of sexual batteries aggravator. “A fundamental error is error that ‘reach[es] down into the validity of the trial itself to the extent that a verdict of guilty could not have been obtained without the assistance of the alleged error.’” Rodriguez v. State, 919 So.2d 1252, 1282 (Fla.2005) (quoting Brown v. State, 124 So.2d 481 (Fla.1960)).

Under the circumstances of this case, the Crawford violation relating to evidence supporting the during the course of sexual batteries aggravator cannot amount to fundamental error because this Court concluded on direct appeal that it was harmless error for the trial court to find two separate during the course of a felony aggravators, one for kidnapping and one for sexual batteries. See Tanzi, 964 So.2d at 117. Additionally, the evidence associated with the Crawford violation only pertained to forced vaginal penetration, and the during the course of sexual batteries aggravator was assessed by the trial court for forced oral sex as well as forced vaginal penetration. See Brown v. State, 473 So.2d 1260,1266-67 (Fla.1985) (where multiple felonies were stated as supporting the during the course of a felony aggravator, the validity of the aggravator would not undermined even if one of the felonies were eliminated). Moreover, in addition to the testimony of the State’s DNA expert that violated Crawford, the forced vaginal penetration portion of the aggravator was also supported by the medical examiner’s testimony that the victim had suffered a laceration to her labia shortly before death. Consequently, the error does not reach down into the validity of the penalty phase itself. And because the unpre-served Crawford error does not constitute fundamental error, Tanzi is not entitled to relief.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the denial of Tanzi’s postconviction motion and deny his habeas petition.

It is so ordered.

CANADY, C.J., and LEWIS, QUINCE, POLSTON, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur.

PARIENTE, J., concurs in result with an opinion.

PARIENTE, J.,

concurring in result.

I concur in affirming the denial of post-conviction relief and rejecting Tanzi’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim, but I would focus only on Tanzi’s failure to establish prejudice. Simply stated, even when considering counsel’s questionable actions in calling Dr. Vicary as an expert and in failing to provide him with Tanzi’s videotaped confession, Tanzi is unable to establish prejudice in this case.

As the facts recited by the majority opinion reveal, this murder is unquestionably one of the most aggravated murders — not just as compared to all other murders, but as compared to all death penalty cases. The fact that the trial court correctly found six separate statutory aggravators, all deservedly given greatest weight, reinforces this conclusion — as does the jury’s unanimous recommendation of death. None of the testimony put forth at the evidentiary hearing casts any doubt whatsoever on the existence or strength of these aggravators. Further, while the trial court found mitigators that were entitled to some weight or small weight, including mental health mitigation, it is difficult to imagine any additional mitigation that would serve to outweigh the aggravation.

The reason I would focus on prejudice is because I question counsel’s performance, and more specifically, his decision to call Dr. Vicary as an expert in the case. Counsel knew that Dr. Vicary would be, and in fact was, subject to significant impeachment based on his admission to altering his notes in another murder case — the infamous Menendez brothers’ murder trial in California. Although counsel claimed that the decision was based on the fact that Dr. Vicary was the only expert to testify to a bipolar disorder, Tanzi clearly had other experts who could and did testify to the serious mental health issues Tanzi suffered throughout his life. Coupled with not providing Dr. Vicary with Tanzi’s videotaped confession, I have concerns as to counsel’s deficient performance in this regard. However, I ultimately conclude that in no way does this failure undermine confidence in the outcome of the penalty phase, given the facts of this crime, the six statutory aggravators, and the “new” mitigation now presented.

In addition, I agree with the majority that Tanzi failed to establish prejudice regarding his other ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Tanzi claims that his counsel was ineffective for failing to present evidence of Tanzi’s XYY genotype, a claim that at first blush seemed a fruitful avenue. However, after considering all of the evidence submitted in support of this claim, the genetic abnormality did not amount to a change in the evaluation of the mental health mitigation because no expert could link the abnormality to any specific mental illness that Tanzi might have suffered, nor could it otherwise explain his unfathomable actions in committing this horrendous crime.

Further, Tanzi suggests his counsel was ineffective in failing to present the testimony of Tanzi’s abuser. However, as the trial court observed, presenting testimony from the individual who abused Tanzi would have weakened the mitigation because this witness minimized the nature of the sexual abuse that he committed against Tanzi.

In short, based on the total absence of demonstrated prejudice, I concur in affirming the denial of postconviction relief.

      . We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const.

      . The trial court found the following aggrava-tors:
      (1) that the murder was committed by a person previously convicted of a felony and under sentence of imprisonment or on felony probation; (2) that the murder was committed during the commission of a kidnapping; (3) that the murder was committed during the commission of two sexual batteries; (4) that the crime was committed for the purpose of avoiding arrest; (5) that the murder was committed for pecuniary gain; (6) that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC); and (7) that the murder was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated (CCP) manner. The court gave each aggravator "great weight" except the HAC aggravator, which the court gave "utmost weight.” The court found the following mitigators: (1) that Tanzi suffered from "axis two” personality disorders; (2) that he was institutionalized as a youth; (3) that his behavior benefited from psychotropic drugs; (4) that he lost his father at an early age; (5) that he was sexually abused as a child; (6) that he twice attempted to join the military; (7) that he cooperated with law enforcement; (8) that he assisted inmates by writing letters and that he enjoys reading; (9) [that] his family has a loving relationship for him; and (10) that he had a history of substance abuse. Tanzi, 964 So.2d at 112 n. 1.

      . In addition to a claim based on Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002), Tanzi raised the following issues on direct appeal:
      (A) the trial court erred in denying Tanzi’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea; (B) the trial court erred in permitting questions regarding lack of remorse; (C) the trial court erred in permitting impeachment of Tanzi's expert witness by a specific and unrelated act of misconduct; (D) the trial court erred in admitting Tanzi’s confession to sexual battery; (E) the trial court erred in assessing the murder in the course of a felony aggravator twice; and (F) the trial court did not properly consider and weigh mitigation evidence.

        Id. at 112. This Court ruled that the trial court erred in assessing the committing during the course of a felony aggravator twice. Id. at 117. However, this Court determined that the error was harmless. Id.

      . Huff v. State, 622 So.2d 982 (Fla. 1993).

      . Spencer v. State, 615 So.2d 688 (Fla.1993).


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: PER CURIAM.

license: Public Domain

text:
    George Michael HODGES, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. SC11-762.
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    April 26, 2012.
    Rehearing Denied July 23, 2012.

      Linda McDermott of McClain and McDermott, P.A., Estero, FL, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, FL, and Katherine V. Blanco, Assistant Attorney, Tampa, FL, for Appel-lee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. See Walton v. State, 77 So.3d 639 (Fla.2011).

. It is so ordered.

CANADY, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, POLSTON, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur.

QUINCE, J., recused.


text:
    William Lee THOMPSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. SC11-493.
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    April 26, 2012.
    Rehearing Denied July 6, 2012.
    Neal A. Dupree, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Terri L. Backhus, Assistant CCR Counsel, and M. Chance Meyer, Staff Attorney, Southern Region, Fort Lauderdale, FL, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, FL, and Sandra S. Jaggard, Assistant Attorney General, Miami, FL, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. See Walton v. State, 77 So.3d 639 (Fla.2011).

It is so ordered.

CANADY, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, POLSTON, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur.


text:
    Daniel Jon PETERKA, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. SC11-1660.
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    April 26, 2012.
    Rehearing Denied July 6, 2012.
    Linda McDermott of McClain and McDermontt, P.A., Estero, FL, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Charmaine M. Millsaps, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, FL, for Appel-lee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. See Walton v. State, 77 So.3d 639 (Fla.2011).

It is so ordered.

CANADY, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, POLSTON, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur.


text:
    Robert Ira PEEDE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. SC11-1631.
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    April 26, 2012.
    Rehearing Denied July 23, 2012.
    Linda McDermott of McClain and McDermott, P.A., Estero, FL, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, FL, and Scott Andrew Browne, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, FL, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. See Walton v. State, 77 So.3d 639 (Fla.2011).

It is so ordered.

CANADY, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, POLSTON, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur.


text:
    Mark Allen DAVIS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. SC11-359.
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    April 26, 2012.
    Rehearing Denied July 24, 2012.
    Linda McDermott of McClain and McDermott, P.A., Estero, FL, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, FL, and Candance M. Sabella, Chief Assistant Attorney, Tampa, FL, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. See Walton v. State, 77 So.3d 639 (Fla.2011).

It is so ordered.

CANADY, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, POLSTON, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur.

QUINCE, J., recused.


text:
    Norberto PIETRI, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. SC11-947.
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    April 26, 2012.
    Rehearing Denied July 23, 2012.
    Neal A. Dupree, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, M. Chance Meyer, Assistant CCR Counsel, and William M. Hennis, III, Litigation Director, Southern Region, Fort Lauderdale, FL, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, FL, and Leslie T. Campbell, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, FL, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. See Walton v. State, 77 So.3d 639 (Fla.2011).

It is so ordered.

CANADY, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, POLSTON, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur.


text:
    Ian Deco LIGHTBOURNE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. SC11-878.
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    April 26, 2012.
    Rehearing Denied July 6, 2012.
    Neal A. Dupree, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Suzanne Myers Keffer, Chief Assistant CCR Counsel, and Anna-Liisa Nixon, Staff Attorney, Southern Region, Fort Lauderdale, FL, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, FL, and Kenneth S. Nunnelley, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Dayto-na Beach, FL, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. See Walton v. State, 77 So.3d 639 (Fla.2011).

It is so ordered.

CANADY, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, POLSTON, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur.


text:
    Patrick Charles HANNON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. SC11-843.
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    April 26, 2012.
    Rehearing Denied July 24, 2012.
    Neal A. Dupree, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Suzanne Myers Keffer, Chief Assistant CCR Counsel, and Anna-Liisa Nixon, Staff Attorney, Southern Region, Fort Lauderdale, FL, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, FL, and Katherine V. Blanco, Assistant Attorney, Tampa, FL, for Appel-lee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. See Walton v. State, 77 So.3d 639 (Fla.2011).

It is so ordered.

CANADY, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, POLSTON, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur.

QUINCE, J., recused.


text:
    Anthony W. BROOM, Petitioner, v. Kenneth S. TUCKER, etc., Respondent.
    No. SC11-2313.
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    May 3, 2012.
    Rehearing Denied July 30, 2012.

      Anthony W. Broom, pro se, May, FL, for Petitioner.
    Jennifer Alani Parker, General Counsel, Florida Department of Corrections, Tallahassee, FL, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

Anthony W. Broom, an inmate in state custody, filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus with this Court challenging his conviction and sentence. We dismissed the petition in this case by way of an unpublished order, determining that it was unauthorized pursuant to Baker v. State, 878 So.2d 1236 (Fla.2004). In disposing of the petition in this case, we expressly retained jurisdiction to pursue possible sanctions against Broom. See Fla. R.App. P. 9.410(a).

Broom was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment for committing second-degree murder in Polk County, Florida (Case No. CF81-1860-A1XX). Broom appealed his conviction and sentence to the Second District Court of Appeal, which affirmed the judgment of guilt and the sentence imposed. Broom v. State, 422 So.2d 848 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982) (table decision)! Since his criminal case became final Broom has filed numerous postconviction cases, to no avail. It is patently evident from the record before this Court that Broom’s criminal case has been fully litigated in the appropriate courts below, to no avail for him.

Since 1988, Petitioner has filed multiple extraordinary writ petitions with this Court seeking relief from the results of his criminal case. And in none of the petitions Broom filed in this Court has any relief been granted to him. Because the petition filed in this case was dismissed as unauthorized and was also his seventh extraordinary writ petition pertaining to his criminal case, we issued an order directing Broom to show cause why he should not be prohibited from filing any further pro se filings in this Court related to case number CF81-1860-A1XX. However, Broom chose not to file a response to our order. By disregarding our order to show cause, Broom has left us to conclude that his unauthorized petition is a frivolous proceeding brought to this Court by a prisoner. See § 944.279, Fla. Stat. (2011). We take notice that Broom has compiled a history of pro se filings in this Court that, like the instant habeas corpus petition, were devoid of merit or inappropriate for review in this Court.

Accordingly, the Clerk of this Court is hereby instructed to reject any future pleadings, petitions, motions, documents, or other filings submitted by Anthony W. Broom that are related to case number CF81-1860-A1XX, unless such filings are signed by a member in good standing of The Florida Bar. Counsel may file on Broom’s behalf if counsel determines that the proceeding may have merit and can be brought in good faith. Furthermore, since we have found Broom’s petition to be frivolous, we direct the Clerk of this Court, pursuant to section 944.279(1), Florida Statutes (2011), to forward a certified copy of this opinion to the Department of Corrections’ institution or facility where Broom is incarcerated.

It is so ordered.

CANADY, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, POLSTON, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur.

      . We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(9), Fla. Const.

      . See id. at 1238 ("We further conclude that we should not continue denying ... petitions [that attack the results of a petitioner’s criminal case(s) ] either on the merits or on grounds that the claims raised are procedurally barred from being considered in collateral postconviction relief proceedings. Instead, we conclude that we should dismiss such petitions as unauthorized.”).

      . Broom v. Tucker, No. SC11-2313, 2012 WL 375322 (Fla. Feb. 6, 2012) (dismissing the petition and ordering petitioner to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed and why the petition should not be deemed frivolous).

      . See, e.g., Broom v. State, 28 So.3d 52 (Fla.2d DCA 2010) (No. 2D10-285) (dismissing habeas corpus petition) (table decision); Broome [sic] v. State, 790 So.2d 412 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (No. 2D01-1322) (affirming the judgment denying a motion for postconviction relief); Broom v. State, 504 So.2d 531 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987) (No. 87-608) (affirming the judgment denying a motion to vacate conviction and sentence); Broom v. State, 487 So.2d 298 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986) (No. 86-538) (affirming the judgment denying a motion for postcon-viction relief) (table decision).

        .See Broom v. State, 54 So.3d 489 (Fla.2011) (No. SC 10-2049) (habeas corpus petition— dismissed pursuant to Baker); Broom v. State, 53 So.3d 229 (Fla.2011) (No. SC10-2059) (mandamus petition — denied); Broom v. McDonough, 965 So.2d 121 (Fla.2007) (No. SC07-1350) (habeas corpus petition — dismissed pursuant to Baker); Broom v. Crosby, 929 So.2d 1051 (Fla.2006) (No. SC05-1917) (habeas corpus petition — dismissed pursuant to Baker); Broom v. State, No. SC02-2212 (Fla. May 21, 2003) (habeas corpus petition— transferred to circuit court); Broom v. Moore, No. SC01-1187 (Fla. Oct. 1, 2001) (habeas corpus petition — transferred to circuit court); Broom v. Singletary, 718 So.2d 166 (Fla.1998) (No. 92,995) (habeas corpus petition — denied); Broom v. District Court of Appeal, Second District, 525 So.2d 876 (Fla.1988) (Case No. 72,249) (prohibition petition — denied).

      . See State v. Spencer, 751 So.2d 47, 48-49 (Fla.1999) (stating prior to the imposition of sanctions, a court must afford the litigant a meaningful opportunity to show cause why the sanctions are inappropriate).

      . In recent years, we have imposed comparable sanctions on other litigants whose pro se filing practices have exhibited their disregard for abusing scarce judicial resources in this Court. See, e.g., James v. Tucker, 75 So.3d 231 (Fla.2011): Johnson v. Rundle, 59 So.3d 1080 (Fla.2011); Steele, v. State, 14 So.3d 221 (Fla.2009); Pettway v. McNeil, 987 So.2d 20 (Fla.2008); Tate v. McNeil, 983 So.2d 502 (Fla.2008).

        .See, e.g., James, 75 So.3d at 232; Johnson, 59 So.3d at 1080; Steele, 14 So.3d at 221.


text:
    William TELLI, Petitioner, v. BROWARD COUNTY, et al., Respondents.
    No. SC11-1737.
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    May 10, 2012.

      William R. Scherer, Jr., Daniel S. Weinger, and Eric J. Rayman of Conrad & Scherer, LLP and Bruce S. Rogow of Bruce S. Rogow, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, FL, for Petitioner.
    Joni Armstrong Coffey, Broward County Attorney, Andrew J. Meyers, Chief Appellate Counsel, and Benjamin R. Salzillo, Assistant County Attorney, Fort Lauder-dale, FL, for Respondent, Broward County-
    Burnadette Norris-Weeks, Fort Laud-erdale, FL, for Respondent, Dr. Brenda C. Snipes.
   PER CURIAM.

This case is before the Court for review of the decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal in Snipes v. Telli, 67 So.3d 415 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011), which held that the Florida Constitution permits Bro-ward County to impose term limits on the office of county commissioner. Because we recede from this Court’s decision in Cook v. City of Jacksonville, 823 So.2d 86 (Fla.2002), we approve the Fourth District’s decision and hold that Broward County’s term limits do not violate Florida’s Constitution.

I. BACKGROUND

In 2000, Broward County voters approved an amendment to the Broward County charter providing for term limits on county commissioners. The charter, as amended, limited county commissioners to no more than three consecutive four-year terms:

Effective with the terms of the Commissioners that commenced in November 2000, an individual shall not be eligible for election as a Commissioner for more than three consecutive four-year terms. Service as a Commissioner prior to the terms that commenced in November 2000 shall not be considered in applying the term limitations of this Section. Service of a two-year term, or any other partial term subsequent to November 2000, shall not be considered in applying the term limitation provisions of this Section.

Broward Cnty. Charter art. II, § 2.02 (2010).

In February 2010, William Telli filed a complaint against Broward County for declaratory relief in the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, arguing that the term limits were unconstitutional under the Florida Constitution. The Seventeenth Judicial Circuit Court found that this Court’s decision in Cook, 823 So.2d 86, required a determination that Broward County’s term limits for commissioners were unconstitutional. Broward County appealed to the Fourth District.

The Fourth District reversed the circuit court’s judgment. Snipes, 67 So.3d at 415. In reversing,' the Fourth District reasoned that, because “[t]he holding in Cook, by its express language,” did not apply to county commissioners, it would have to extend Cook’s holding in order to find those term limits unconstitutional. Id. at 416. The Fourth District further “conclude[d] that such an expansion of Cook is inappropriate when the case is read in light of the broad powers accorded charter counties” in the Florida Constitution. Id.

The Fourth District drew a distinction between the article VIII, section 1(d) offices at issue in Cook and the office of county commissioner as set forth by article VIII, section 1(e). See 67 So.3d at 419. Specifically, the Fourth District found that the office of county commissioner is not a “constitutionally authorized office” for purposes of our determination in Cook that “constitutionally authorized offices” can only be term-limited by amendment to the constitution. Id. at 418.

II. ANALYSIS

Provisions throughout the Florida Constitution impose or specifically delegate imposition of “qualifications” for specific offices. But in Cook, this Court held that term limit provisions imposed disqualifications from office, and that article VI, section 4, of the Florida Constitution, entitled “Disqualifications,” “provides the exclusive roster of those disqualifications which may be permissibly imposed.” Cook, 823 So.2d at 90. Article VI, section 4, provides:

(a) No person convicted of a felony, or adjudicated in this or any other state to be mentally incompetent, shall be qualified to vote or hold office until restoration of civil rights or removal of disability.
(b) No person may appear on the ballot for re-election to any of the following offices:
(1) Florida representative,
(2) Florida senator,
(3) Florida Lieutenant governor, [or]
(4) any office of the Florida cabinet,[] if, by the end of the current term of office, the person will have served (or, but for resignation, would have served) in that office for eight consecutive years.

At the time article VI was amended to include section 4(b), separate constitutional provisions already imposed term limits on the governor, art. IV, § 5(b), Fla. Const. (1992), and age limits on justices and judges, art. V, § 8, Fla. Const. (1992).

Not allowing Broward County in this case to decide whether its county commissioners should be subject to term limits brings into focus the broad implication of the Court’s prior ruling in Cook, and the limitation it has on the exercise of Florida counties’ home rule power as authorized by the Florida Constitution. The Fourth District properly described the holding in Cook and the issue with which it was presented:

The reasoning in Cook may be briefly summarized. First, the Supreme Court held that “a term limit provision is a disqualification from election to office.” Id. at 92 (citing Advisory Opinion to the Attorney Gen. — Limited Political Terms in Certain Elective Offices, 592 So.2d 225 (Fla.1991)). Next, the Court held that “article VI, section 4, Florida Constitution, imposes those disqualifications which may be validly imposed upon offices authorized by the Constitution.” Id. at 92-93. The Court relied on the canon of construction expressio unius est exclusio alterius, and held that the imposition of term limits by article AT, section 4(b), Florida Constitution, on certain constitutionally authorized offices necessarily excluded their imposition on other offices, except by constitutional amendment. “By the constitution identifying the offices to which a term limit disqualification applies, we find that it necessarily follows that the constitutionally authorized offices not included in article VT, section 4(b), may not have a term limit disqualification imposed.” Cook, 823 So.2d at 93-94 ( [emphasis] supplied). Crucial to this case is what the Supreme Court meant by its use of the term “constitutionally authorized offices” and the other variations of that phrase in Cook.

67 So.3d at 416-17.

In Cook, 823 So.2d at 87-88, this Court reviewed two consolidated cases in which county charters were amended to impose term limits on, among other officers, those county officers listed in article VIII, section 1(d), of the Florida Constitution: sheriff, tax collector, property appraiser, supervisor of elections, and clerk of the circuit court. The two consolidated cases, from the First and Second District Courts of Appeal, are described below.

Cook v. City of Jacksonville— First DCA

In the 1992 general election, the voters in Duval County cast separate votes to amend the Charter of the Consolidated City of Jacksonville to impose a two-term limitation on the sheriff, supervisor of elections, properly appraiser, tax collector, clerk of the circuit court, members of the Duval County school board, and member of the Civil Service Board. 823 So.2d at 87. Each section of a proposed ordinance amending the charter was voted upon separately, with the voters approving the ordinance as it related to the clerk of the circuit court. Id. Section 12.11 of the charter, as adopted, provided:

Section 12.11. Two term limit. — No person elected and qualified for two consecutive full terms as Clerk of the Court shall be eligible for election as Clerk of the Court for the next succeeding term. The two-term limitation shall apply to any full term which began in 1992 or thereafter.

Id. at 88.

In 1988, Henry W. Cook was appointed clerk of the circuit and county courts for Duval County. Id. He was subsequently elected in 1988 and was reelected in 1992 and 1996. Id. Under section 12.11 of the charter, Cook could not run for clerk in 2000. Id. In November, 1998, Cook presented the Duval County supervisor of elections with his “Statement of Candidate” papers, which indicated his intent to seek reelection as clerk. Id. The supervisor of elections refused to accept the completed papers. Id.

Cook, in his individual capacity, sued the City'of Jacksonville and the supervisor of elections for a declaratory judgment, seeking to invalidate section 12.11 of the charter, and a writ of mandamus directing the supervisor of elections to accept his candidacy papers. Id. Cook presented the testimony of former Justice Alan Sundberg concerning the conflict within Florida’s constitution between article V, section 16, which provides that there “shall” be a clerk of the circuit court in each county, and article VIII, section 1(d), which provides that the term of office for the clerk of the circuit court is four years, just as it is for the other officers established in that section: the sheriff, tax collector, property appraiser, and supervisor of elections. See City of Jacksonville v. Cook, 765 So.2d 289 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000), quashed, 823 So.2d 86 (Fla.2002).

The trial court concluded that nothing in article VIII, section 1(d) authorized the City to impose additional qualifications or disqualifications, rather that the provision only provided for the manner by which the clerk was to be selected pursuant to article V, section 16. Cook, 828 So.2d at 88. The trial court held that section 12.11 added an additional qualification and thus was unconstitutional. Id. Accordingly, the trial court granted mandamus and ordered the supervisor of elections to accept Cook’s candidacy papers. Id. The First District held that the charter provision was constitutional and reversed. See Cook, 765 So.2d at 293.

The First District analyzed applicable Florida Supreme Court cases and held that the charter’s term limit was not unconstitutional as an additional qualification for the clerk of the court because it was not expressly prescribed by the Florida Constitution. Id. at 289-93. The First District discussed State ex rel. Askew v. Thomas, 293 So.2d 40 (Fla.1974), where the Florida Supreme Court “held that a state or local qualification for a constitutional office is only unconstitutional if it conflicts with a qualification for that office set forth in the constitution.” Cook, 765 So.2d at 291. The Askew Court concluded that Florida’s Constitution did not address qualifications for school board members, and only addressed the manner of choosing the members. 293 So.2d at 42. Therefore, the Askew Court concluded that the statute providing that the office of a school board member shall be vacant when the member removes residence from the area from which elected was not contrary to the constitution. Id. The First District then concluded that, under Askew, the term limit under the county charter was constitutional. Cook, 765 So.2d at 291.

Similarly, the First District relied on State v. Grassi, 532 So.2d 1055 (Fla.1988), to hold that the charter’s term limit was constitutional. See 765 So.2d at 291-92. In Grassi, a county commission candidate challenged a statutory requirement that he be a resident prior to election as in conflict with the constitutional requirement of residency in the commissioner’s district at the time of election. Id. at 292. This Court, in Grassi, stated, “We have consistently held that statutes imposing additional qualifications for office are unconstitutional where the basic document of the constitution itself has already undertaken to set forth those requirements.” 532 So.2d at 1056 (quoting Askew, 293 So.2d at 42). The Grassi Court construed the Florida Constitution, which required that one commissioner “residing in each district shall be elected by the electors of the county,” as requiring residency at the time of election. Id. (quoting art. VIII, § 1(e), Fla. Const. (1968)). Therefore, the Court held in Grassi that the statutory requirement of residency at the time of qualifying for the election was an unconstitutional additional qualification. Id.

The First District also noted that the trial court had relied on two older cases, and distinguished them:

The trial court in the instant case relied on two cases which preceded Askew and Grassi to support its position that the constitution does not authorize Jacksonville to establish qualifications for the office of the clerk of the court: State ex rel. Attorney General v. George, 23 Fla. 585, 3 So. 81 (1887); and Thomas v. State ex rel. Cobb, 58 So.2d 173 (Fla.1952). In Cobb, the supreme court relied upon the opinion in George and held that the constitution prescribed qualifications for governor, senators, members of the House of Representatives, and circuit and supreme court judges, but no others. See Cobb, 58 So.2d at 176-177. The Cobb court further held that the constitution’s silence as to qualifications for other officers indicated the framers’ intent that any person should be allowed to run for office regardless of qualifications. See id. at 180-181. Nevertheless, the Cobb court’s actual conclusion was similar to that held by the supreme court in Askew and Grassi, in that the Cobb court held that the Florida statute at issue was unconstitutional because it prescribed qualifications for the office of superintendent of public instruction in addition to those prescribed by the constitution. See id. at 183. Such a conclusion is not inconsistent with the supreme court’s later decisions in Askew and Grassi. Justice Terrell’s concurring opinion in Cobb reached the same conclusion the court reached in Askew 22 years later. Justice Terrell wrote,
I do not agree with the general theory of the majority opinion that the legislature can require nothing more in the way of qualification for county superintendent of public instruction than that he be a qualified elector of a prescribed age and such others as are mentioned for county and state offices generally. I think it competent for the legislature to prescribe liberal educational, professional and other qualifications for those who contemplate being appointed or who expect to run for the office of County Superintendent of Public Instruction. There is no prohibition in the constitution against this, and being none, the way is open for the legislature to prescribe such qualifications.
Id. at 184 (Terrell, J., concurring) (emphasis added).

765 So.2d at 292.

The First District noted that Jacksonville’s home rule powers gave it' authority to establish a governmental framework that “may affect all county officers enumerated in the constitution, which would include establishing term limit qualifications for the clerk of the circuit and county court.” Id. at 293. Because Florida’s Constitution is silent in both article V, section 16, and article VIII, section 1(d) as to specific qualifications for clerk of the court, the First District held that Jacksonville was not precluded from adopting and enforcing term limits. Id.

DeBlaker v. Eight .is Énough in Pinellas-r-Second DCA

Pinellas County is a charter county whose charter was initially proposed by special law. Cook, 823 So.2d at 88-89 (citing ch. 80-590, Laws of Fla.) The Pinel-las County electorate ratified the charter in 1980. Id. Pursuant to the terms of the Pinellas County Charter, Eight is Enough in Pinellas, a political committee, initiated a petition drive to amend the charter. Id. at 89. “The goal of the initiative was to impose term limits on members of the board of county commissioners, the sheriff, tax collector, property appraiser, supervisor of elections, and clerk of the circuit court.” Id. The Pinellas County electorate adopted the term limit amendment with one vote applicable to all positions in the 1996 general election. Id. The amended provisions of the charter read:

Sec. 3.01. Board of county commissioners.
The legislative body of county government shall be the board of county commissioners in accordance with general law. The composition, election, term of office and compensation of members shall all be in accordance with general law except that no person may appear on the ballot for re-election to the office of county commissioner if, by the end of the current term of office, the person will have served (or, but for resignation, would have served) in that office for eight consecutive years.
Sec. 4.08. County officers.
This document [Charter] shall in no manner change the status, duties, or responsibilities of the [following] county officers of Pinellas County: The clerk of the circuit court, property appraiser, tax collector, sheriff, and supervisor of elections except that no person may appear on the ballot for re-election to the office of clerk of the court, property appraiser, tax collector, sheriff or supervisor of elections if, by the end of the current term of office, the person will have served (or, but for resignation, would have served) in that office for eight consecutive years.

Pinellas County v. Eight is Enough in Pinellas, 775 So.2d 317, 319 n. 2 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) (emphasis represents language added as a result of 1996 ratification vote), quashed sub nom., Cook v. City of Jacksonville, 823 So.2d 86 (Fla.2002).

Other relevant provisions of the Pinellas County Charter included:

Sec. 2.01. Powers and duties.
The county shall have all powers of local self-government not inconsistent with general law, with special law approved by vote of the electors, or with this Charter.
Sec. 2.06. Limitation of power.
The county shall not have the power, under any circumstances ... to change the status, duties, or responsibilities of the county officers specified in section 1(d), art. VIII of the state constitution.

Pinellas Cnty. Charter art. II, § 2.01, 2.06.

In 1996, Clair Johnson, a resident and registered voter of Pinellas County, sued the county seeking a declaratory judgment that the proposal was invalid, and an injunction prohibiting the proposal from being placed on the ballot. See Cook, 823 So.2d at 89. Eight is Enough and its chairman intervened. Id. The trial court denied Johnson’s motion for summary judgment and motion for temporary and permanent injunction on September 6, 1996, finding the proposed amendment was not contrary to the state constitution and that the ballot language did not violate section 101.161, Florida Statutes (1995). Id. The trial court also found that the disqualifications enumerated in article VI, section 4, Florida Constitution, did not prohibit charter counties from imposing term limits within their counties. Id. Finally, the trial court found within the constitutional grant of home rule authority (article VIII, section 1(g), Florida Constitution) the authorization for a charter county to impose term limits on its county officers and board of county commissioners. Id.

Shortly thereafter, Fred Petty as tax collector, Karleen DeBlaker as the clerk of the circuit court, Everett Rice as sheriff, Jim Smith as property appraiser, and Dorothy Ruggles as supervisor of elections intervened as plaintiffs. Id. On January 26, 1999, after further proceedings, the trial court issued an amended order and final judgment. Id. In that order, the trial court ratified its order of September 6, 1996. Id. The trial court further held that the charter conferred plenary power on Pinellas County subject to the constraints of the charter, and that nothing in the charter required submission of charter amendments to the Legislature for its approval. Id.

Pinellas County, the clerk of the circuit court, tax collector, sheriff, supervisor of elections, property appraiser, and Johnson appealed the amended order to the Second District. Id. The Second District rejected the argument that the Legislature in passing the special law which became the charter reserved to itself the sole authority to propose charter amendments. See Pinellas County v. Eight is Enough in Pinellas, 775 So.2d 317, 319 (Fla. 2nd DCA 2000). The Second District also rejected the argument that the charter itself by virtue of sections 2.06 and 4.03 prohibited the term limit amendment. See id. at 319-20. The Second District found that term limits did not affect the “status, duties, or responsibilities” of the county officers. Id. The court likewise found that a term limit amendment did not affect the “composition, election, term of office and compensation of [county commission] members.” See id. at 320. The Second District then found no statutes or constitutional provisions prohibiting a charter county from imposing term limits. See id. Accordingly, the Second District affirmed the trial court. Id.

Cook v. Jacksonville — Florida Supreme Court

This Court in Cook quashed both district court decisions, concluding instead that the county charter-imposed term limits on those offices were unconstitutional:

[AJrticle VI, section 4, Florida Constitution, provides the only disqualifications which may be imposed upon offices authorized by fhe constitution. Clearly, by virtue of article VI, section 4(b), the Florida Constitution contemplates that term limits may be permissibly imposed upon certain offices authorized by the constitution. By the constitution identifying the offices to which a term limit disqualification applies, we find that it necessarily follows that the constitutionally authorized offices not included in article VI, section 4(b), may not have a term limit disqualification imposed. If these other constitutionally authorized offices are to be subject to a term limit disqualification, the Florida Constitution will have to be amended to include those offices.

Cook, 823 So.2d at 93-94. This Court further noted in Cook that the “the broad authority granted to charter counties” does not include the authority to impose additional “disqualifications which pertain to these offices authorized by the constitution.” Id. at 94.

The Court distinguished the First District’s reliance on Askew on the basis that Askew involved qualifications, but the issue before it related to disqualifications. Id. The Second District was not found persuasive by the Court on the rationale that the county charter must still comply with the Florida Constitutional provision on disqualifications. Id.

Justice Anstead dissented and indicated that he would affirm both the First and Second Districts’ opinions. Id. at 95-96. He analyzed the broad home rule authority granted to charter counties under the Florida Constitution:

This broad language was obviously intended to allow charter counties wide latitude in acting regulations governing the selection and duties of county officers .... The term limit provisions in the charters in these cases are not inconsistent with any provision of general law relating to elected county officers. Given this grant of broad authority and consistency with general law, I can find no legal justification for concluding that charter counties should not be allowed to ask their citizens to vote on eligibility requirements of local elected officials, including term limits, since they could abolish the offices completely or decide to select the officers in any manner of their choosing.

Id. at 96.

Justice Anstead also disagreed with the majority’s position that article VI, section 4(b), Florida Constitution, listing the state elected offices with mandatory term limits, somehow excluded charter counties from imposing term limits. Id. He pointed out that there was “no wording in article VI, section 4(b) (or anywhere else in the Florida Constitution or the Florida Statutes) that indicates that the named officers in article VI, section 4(b) are subject to term limits to the exclusion of all other government officers, state or local, in the State of Florida.” Id. The “disqualification” distinction was not persuasive to him because regardless of whether it is called a “qualification” or “disqualification,” it determines whether someone will hold office. Id. “[T]he reference to term limits as a ‘disqualification’ cannot logically be stretched to mean that the absence of a reference to county offices in article VI, section 4(b) precludes term limits from being enacted at the county level.” Id.

This Case

The implied prohibition in Cook against term limits for county officers and county commissioners from the lack of inclusion in article VI, section 4, of the Florida Constitution, overly restricts the authority of counties pursuant to their home rule powers under the Florida Constitution. The opinions of the First and Second Districts should have been affirmed, as Justice An-stead stated in his dissenting opinion. Because we now agree with Justice Anstead’s dissenting opinion, and recede from Cook, we need not reach the issue of whether the office of county commissioner is one of those constitutional offices to which .Cook applies.

As described in Brown v. Nagelhout, 84 So.3d 304 (Fla.2012), stare de-cisis does not yield just because a precedent is merely erroneous; the “gravity of the error and the impact of departing from precedent must be carefully assessed,” guided by the following factors:

In deciding whether to depart from a prior decision, one relevant consideration is whether the decision is “unsound in principle.” Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 546, 105 S.Ct. 1005, 83 L.Ed.2d 1016 (1985). Another is whether it is “unworkable in practice.” Ibid. And, of course, reliance interests are of particular relevance because “[ajdherence to precedent promotes stability, predictability, and respect for judicial authority.” Hilton v. South Carolina Public Railways Comm’n, 502 U.S. 197, 202, 112 S.Ct. 560, 116 L.Ed.2d 560 (1991) (citing Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 265-266, 106 S.Ct. 617, 88 L.Ed.2d 598 (1986)).

Id. at- 309 (quoting Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, 504 U.S. 768, 783, 112 S.Ct. 2251, 119 L.Ed.2d 533 (1992)).

In this case, the prior opinion in Cook undermines the ability of counties to govern themselves as that broad authority has been granted to them by home rule power through the Florida Constitution. Interpreting Florida’s Constitution to find implied restrictions on powers otherwise authorized is unsound in principle. We agree with the First District in Cook that express restrictions must be found, not implied.

It is unworkable to negotiate the type of distinctions that the Fourth District made in determining whether the county commissioners are constitutional officers subject to the Court’s Cook opinion. It would undermine the ability to predict what offices may be included within the scope of Cook’s prohibition on term limits and would result in apparent inconsistencies between county officials. Receding from the Cook decision will promote stability in the law by allowing the counties to govern themselves, including term limits of their officials, in accordance with their home rule authority. Because the qualifying deadlines have not occurred, there are no reliance issues implicated by this ruling.

III. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, we recede from Cook and the rationale it relied upon in Thomas v. State ex rel. Cobb. Therefore, we hold that the term limits provided in Broward County’s charter do not violate the Florida Constitution, and approve the Fourth District on different grounds.

Any motion for rehearing must be filed within five days of the date of this opinion, and any response must be filed within three days of the filing of the motion.

It is so ordered.

CANADY, C.J., and PARIENTE, QUINCE, POLSTON, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur.

LEWIS, J., concurs in result only.

      . This Court has jurisdiction to review the decision. See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. We review de novo questions of constitutional interpretation. Browning v. Fla. Hometown Democracy, Inc., 29 So.3d 1053, 1063 (Fla.2010).

      . The complaint also named Dr. Brenda C. Snipes, in her official capacity as Supervisor of Elections for Broward County.

      . -See, e.g., art. II, § 5, Fla. Const, (public officers); art. Ill, §§ 5, 15, Fla. Const, (legislators); art. IV, § 5, Fla. Const, (governor, lieutenant governor, and cabinet members), art. IV, § 8, Fla. Const. (Parole and Probation Commission); art. V, § 8, Fla. Const, (justices and judges); art. V, § 12(a), Fla. Const. (Judicial Qualifications Commission); art. V, § 18, Fla. Const, (public defenders).

      . Subsections (5) and (6), imposing the same term limits on U.S. Representatives and Senators from Florida, have been omitted. This Court's decision in Ray v. Mortham, 742 So.2d 1276 (Fla.1999), severed subsections (5) and (6) and rendered them unenforceable as violative of the Qualifications Clause of the Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.


text:
    Cathy ANTUNES, et al., Appellants, v. SARASOTA COUNTY, Florida, Appellee.
    No. SC12-109.
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    May 10, 2012.
    Andrea Flynn Mogensen of Law Office of Andrea Flynn Mogensen, P.A., Sarasota, FL, for Appellants.
    David P. Persson of Hankin, Persson, Davis, McClenathen & Darnell, Sarasota, FL, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Cathy Antunes appealed a judgment of the circuit court to the Second District Court of Appeal, which certified to this Court that the judgment is of great public importance and requires immediate resolution by this Court. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(5), Fla. Const. The order on appeal was an interlocutory order in which the circuit court denied Antunes’ motion to dissolve a permanent injunction barring enforcement of Sarasota County’s term limits on county commissioners. We reverse and remand consistent with our ruling in Telli v. Broward County, 94 So.3d 504 (Fla.2012).

Any motion for rehearing must be filed within five days of the date of this opinion, and any response must be filed within three days of the date of filing of the motion.

It is so ordered.

CANADY, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, POLSTON, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur.