source: Caselaw Access Project

author: WEIMER, Justice. KNOLL, J.,

license: Public Domain

text:
    Melanie CHRISTY, individually and on Behalf of her minor son, Justin Christy v. Dr. Sandra McCALLA and the Caddo Parish School Board.
    No. 2011-C-0366.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 6, 2011.
    Rehearing Denied Jan. 20, 2012.

      Cook, Yancey, King & Galloway, APLC, Robert Kennedy, Jr., Shreveport, LA, for Applicant.
    Nelson & Hammons, APLC, John Layne Hammons, Shreveport, LA, for Respondent.
   WEIMER, Justice.

|! This court granted a writ application to determine whether a school board has tort liability for expelling a high school student after a fifth-sized bottle of whiskey fell from the student’s backpack and broke on the classroom floor. The student claimed he was denied due process in the disciplinary proceedings that resulted in his expulsion. The district court agreed and awarded the student $50,000.

At trial, the student presented evidence that school system administrators ignored a claim of responsibility by the student’s friend for placing the whiskey bottle in the student’s backpack. Ultimately, the student was not expelled by these administrators, but by the full school board after a hearing at which the student presented all the evidence he wanted considered, including the claim of responsibility by his friend. At trial, the student presented no evidence whatsoever of being denied due process at the school board hearing. Finding the student failed to carry his 12burden of proof to show a denial of due process by the school board, we reverse the judgment of the district court.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Justin Christy was a senior at Captain Shreve High School in Shreveport. On the morning of Monday, October 6, 2003, Justin drove to school after having spent much of the weekend at the home of his friend, Andrew Heacock. Justin brought his backpack into his first period classroom. Accounts vary as to what happened next. By one account, Justin opened his backpack, and a fifth-sized whiskey bottle fell out and broke on the classroom floor. By another account, Justin had retrieved an assignment from his backpack and had left his desk and was walking to bring the assignment to his teacher when the bottle rolled out of his bag onto the floor and broke.

By all accounts, after the bottle broke, Justin was referred to the school’s disciplinary administrator, Marvin Hite, who, along with a police officer regularly assigned to the school, separately interviewed Justin. In both interviews, Justin claimed that he did not know the bottle was in his backpack and did not know how it had come to be there. At the close of the interviews, Justin was arrested by the officer. Justin was released from custody that same day with a citation for possessing alcohol while under the lawful age for possession.

A short time after Justin’s arrest, his friend, Andrew Heacock, who was the school’s Student Council President, came forward and explained to school officials that the bottle belonged to him (Andrew). Andrew also explained that he had put the bottle in Justin’s backpack without telling Justin.

|sWithin the school system, several procedural steps followed. First, on October 10, 2003, Mr. Hite, as well as a school district’s supervisor for child welfare and attendance, Larry Anderson, held an informal hearing with Justin and his parents. At the conclusion of the hearing, Mr. Anderson recommended that Justin be expelled from Captain Shreve. Mr. Anderson further determined that Justin would be placed at Hamilton Terrace Learning Center, an alternative school, until March 12, 2004.

Next, because Justin and his parents contested Mr. Anderson’s expulsion recommendation, the school system conducted a preliminary appeal hearing on October 24, 2003. This hearing was conducted by an appeals committee and not by the full Cad-do Parish School Board (School Board). The appeals committee was convened by Diane Watkins Atkins, the director of the School Board’s Attendance and Census Department, and was comprised of Ms. Atkins and six other school system administrators. After the hearing, the committee recommended to the School Board that Justin be expelled. However, the committee noted that it had reduced the duration of the expulsion (to end December 19, 2003, rather than March 12, 2004), because the “[parents] did not know that they could call witnesses” and a “[w]itness had asked the administration to come to the hearing prior to it being scheduled.” This witness was Andrew Heacock.

After the determination by the appeals committee, the full School Board then took up the matter and held a hearing on November 18, 2003. At the request of Justin’s parents, the hearing was conducted as an “executive session” which is closed to the public. No transcript was made of the School Board’s hearing. However, Justin would later testify at the tort trial that during the School Board’s hearing, he presented his full defense to the school’s allegations, including testifying himself and calling his friend, Andrew Heacock, who testified that he (Andrew) was responsible |4for the whiskey bottle making its way into Justin’s backpack. At the tort trial, Andrew testified that a School Board member expressed disbelief of Andrew’s overall claim of responsibility for the whiskey bottle and, more specifically, disbelieved the claim that Justin was unaware that the bottle was in his backpack. By a vote of 9-2, the School Board voted to expel Justin.

From the day of the whiskey-bottle incident, Justin was prohibited from attending Captain Shreve and was instead assigned to the alternative school. However, the alternative school did not provide the college preparatory courses in which Justin had been enrolled at Captain Shreve. Rather than remain at the alternative school, Justin elected to obtain his General Educational Development Certificate/Credential.

Although another avenue for an appeal to a district court existed under La. R.S. 17:416(0(5), Justin and his parents did not appeal the School Board’s expulsion decision. Instead, on February 10, 2004, Justin’s mother, on her own and on Justin’s behalf, filed a lawsuit against the School Board, alleging that it violated Justin’s right to due process and imposed an “excessive and irrational punishment.” Justin and his mother also alleged that the School Board’s action caused “extreme mental anguish and distress, grief, humiliation and inconvenience.” Notably, Justin and his mother claimed that the disciplinary process was tainted because the school system had [^prevented Andrew from explaining that he, not Justin, was responsible for the whiskey bottle being placed in the backpack.

The lawsuit also named Dr. Sandra McCalla, the school’s principal, as a defendant. However, prior to trial, the School Board sought and obtained Justin’s consent to dismiss Dr. McCalla as a defendant.

Following a bench trial, the district court ruled in Justin’s favor. The district court awarded Justin $50,000, finding that Captain Shreve’s disciplinary administrator, Mr. Hite, had failed to present the full version of events known to him about the whiskey bottle and “in some short order there was sufficient evidence to stop the prosecution of Mr. [Justin] Christy.” The district court explained that “Mr. Hite, the Court believes, commenced a series of actions that effectively concealed the true subject of his conversation early on with Mr. [Andrew] Heacock.” The district court also explained that “Mr. Hite ... rather than bring all the evidence forward, commenced a [series] of actions that helped conceal the evidence or at least mischaracterized the evidence.”

The district court also addressed the actions of the school district’s supervisor for child welfare and attendance, Mr. Anderson, who also recommended expulsion after the informal hearing. “[T]o listen to Mr. Anderson was unnerving because Mr. Anderson did nothing but determine that the whiskey bottle had broken — had fallen out of the backpack and broken. He exercised no discretion.... And it was just unnerving to hear him sit in the witness chair and respond to a hypothetical where drugs, for example, might be planted on a student and to hear him say essentially that student is expelled.” The district court found that while Mr. Hite had acted intentionally, Mr. Anderson was “at least grossly negligent.” Mr. Anderson never Reven considered the possibility that Justin should not be expelled, although neither expulsion nor any other penalty was required for Justin under the circumstances where Andrew had taken responsibility and demonstrated that Justin was unaware of the whiskey bottle in the backpack.

The district court concluded that it had “no problem at all finding liability” and that if punitive damages were allowed the district court might have awarded more than $50,000 because Justin “was not treated appropriately or fairly.”

The School Board appealed. By vote of 3-2, the court of appeal affirmed on both liability and damages. The majority reviewed liability under the duty/risk analysis for negligence. The court of appeal found the School Board owed a duty to Justin to ensure that the board’s policies were applied correctly. The School Board had discretion to fashion a punishment appropriate to the situation but refused to exercise that discretion. The School Board breached this duty and instead predetermined that if it were shown that Justin had whiskey on campus, regardless of how or why, then Justin would be expelled.

The court of appeal also found that the School Board owed a duty to ensure that the fact finding was thorough and fair. This duty was breached and the whole student disciplinary process was tainted by Mr. Hite’s failure to inform later decision makers of Andrew’s confession to having placed the whiskey in Justin’s backpack without Justin’s knowledge. Moreover, the disciplinary process was tainted by Mr. Hite’s decision to refuse to allow Andrew to testify at Justin’s informal disciplinary hearing.

The court of appeal found that causation was established by the testimony of Ms. Atkins, the director of the School Board’s Attendance and Census Department. Ms. Atkins testified at trial that if Mr. Hite had provided all available information to |7later decision makers during the disciplinary process, Justin would not have been expelled.

Finally, as to damages, the court of appeal noted that “[a]s a result of his expulsion, Justin was not afforded the opportunity to participate in any of the age-old ‘senior year’ events with his classmates, including prom and graduation.” Noting also that a district court has wide discretion in awarding damages, the majority found no abuse of discretion in the award of $50,000.

Two judges of the court of appeal would have granted the School Board’s request for a rehearing. Judge Caraway commented: “Regardless of the actions of Marvin Hite or Larry Anderson in reaching their disciplinary conclusions regarding Justin Christy, the discipline imposed was properly appealed through the school system pursuant to the statutory framework so that the punishment eventually became the product of a decision of the elected members of the school board.” Christy v. McCalla, 45,754 (La.App. 2 Cir. 12/15/10), 53 So.3d 689, 703 (on reh’g; Caraway, J. dissenting).

The School Board applied for a writ of review, and this court decided to consider the matter. See Christy v. McCalla, 11-0366 (La.6/17/11), 63 So.3d 1042.

DISCUSSION

The School Board makes two procedural arguments for reversing the judgment of the courts below. The School Board argues that Justin cannot recover in tort because the School Board is afforded quasi-judicial immunity from tort liability and that Justin is barred from tort recovery for his school expulsion because he did not appeal to the district court for school reinstatement as provided by La. R.S. 17:416(C)(5). We pretermit these two procedural arguments because we find the |sSchool Board prevails under a third argument — we agree with the School Board that there is no merit to the claim that Justin should recover for being disciplined in connection with the bottle of whiskey he brought to school. More specifically, as discussed below, Justin failed to carry his burden of proving that the School Board denied him due process in rejecting his version of events and disciplining him.

The School Board does not dispute that Louisiana law allows for an award of tort damages for a wrongful expulsion and/or for denying a student due process. Instead, the School Board argues that the lower courts erroneously allowed Justin to recover in tort by overlooking the legal cause of Justin’s expulsion and by finding a due process violation where there was none. Although the School Board does not dispute the availability of tort recovery, a brief review of tort and public education law is nevertheless helpful in evaluating the merits of the School Board’s arguments.

A tort remedy is broadly available under La. C.C. art. 2315(A) (“Every act whatever of man that causes damage to another obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it.”). See also Smith v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 247 La. 695, 174 So.2d 122, 125 (1965) (“The general tenor of Article 2315, creating a cause of action in favor of injured parties against those by whose fault the injury happened, makes that article universal in its operation unless a specific exception is established by law.”).

Louisiana courts have adopted a duty-risk analysis in determining whether liability exists under the facts of a particular case. Under this analysis, a plaintiff must prove five separate elements: (1) the defendant had a duty to conform his or her conduct to a specific standard of care; (2) the defendant failed to conform his or her conduct to the appropriate standard of care; (3) the defendant’s substandard conduct was a cause-in-fact of the plaintiffs injuries; (4) the defendant’s substandard conduct | flwas a legal cause of the plaintiffs injuries; and (5) actual damages. Pinsonneault v. Merchants & Farmers Bank & Trust Co., 01-2217, p. 6 (La.4/3/02), 816 So.2d 270, 275-76. In reviewing the factual findings of a trial court, we are limited by the manifest error rule. Fontenot v. Patterson Ins., 09-0669, p. 8 (La.10/20/09), 23 So.3d 259, 267, citing Hill v. Morehouse Parish Police Jury, 95-1100, p. 4 (La.1/16/96), 666 So.2d 612, 615.

Louisiana has established a public system of education and requires “[e]very parent, tutor, or other person residing within the state of Louisiana having control or charge of any child from that child’s seventh birthday until his eighteenth birthday [to] send such child to a public or private day school, unless the child graduates from high school prior to his eighteenth birthday.” See La. R.S. 17:221(A)(1). This public education system is “perhaps the most important function of state and local governments.” Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 576, 95 S.Ct. 729, 42 L.Ed.2d 725 (1975), quoting Brown v. Bd. of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873 (1954). A child has an interest, rooted in the constitution, “in not being stigmatized by suspension” or expulsion. See Swindle v. Livingston Parish Sch. Bd., 655 F.3d 386, 393 (5th Cir.9/8/11). The school system, therefore, has a duty under the Due Process Clause of the federal constitution to not arbitrarily suspend or expel a child. Id.‘Where a person’s good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the government is doing to him,’ the minimal requirements of the Clause must be satisfied.” Swindle, 655 F.3d at 393, quoting Goss, 419 U.S. at 574, 95 S.Ct. 729. Louisiana law likewise requires due process. See La. Const, art. I, § 2.

|inViolations by a school system of constitutional standards can give rise to damages under federal law, specifically 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Swindle, 655 F.3d at 399 (denying defendants’ summary judgment in a section 1983 action for claim that a student, after being expelled for smoking marijuana off of school property while attending a school dance, “was provided neither due process notice nor an opportunity to be heard regarding the denial of her right to alternative education.”). Analogously, this court has ruled that damages may be available for civil rights claims under the state constitution. See Moresi v. State, Dept, of Wildlife & Fisheries, 567 So.2d 1081, 1093 (La.1990) (analyzing hunters’ claims of unreasonable search and seizure, a plurality of this court answered affirmatively the question of whether plaintiffs could recover damages for violations of their rights under the state constitution, explaining that “[historically, damages have been regarded as the appropriate remedy for an invasion of a person’s interests in liberty or property.”). Recently, reviewing Louisiana’s statutory scheme to provide an expelled student with an education at an alternative school, our colleagues on the U.S. Fifth Circuit “conclude[d] that Louisiana’s statutory scheme provided [a student] an entitlement to receive alternative education during her expulsion, ie., [the student] had a property interest in continued alternative education of which she could not be deprived without due process.” Swindle, 655 F.3d at 395.

Against this legal background, and noting that the School Board does not dispute the existence of a duty, before turning to what is disputed in this case, we |nbriefly observe that the record establishes the duty components for tort recovery. See S.J. v. Lafayette Parish School Bd., 09-2195 (La.7/6/10), 41 So.3d 1119, 1125 (noting recovery against a school board must be premised on the existence of a duty and the risk of unreasonable injury being foreseeable). Specifically, the constitutional requirements already cited imposed a duty on the School Board to refrain from arbitrarily suspending or expelling Justin without affording him due process, and it was foreseeable that Justin would be “stigmatized” by breaching this duty in imposing a wrongful suspension or expulsion. See Swindle, 655 F.3d at 393, citing Goss, 419 U.S. at 576, 95 S.Ct. 729 (recognizing “state laws ... created a liberty interest in not being stigmatized by suspension.”). Indeed, Justin presented evidence that he went from being in senior honors classes at Captain Shreve to being placed in an alternative school where no honors classes were available. Moreover, testimony established that for the tests Justin missed at Captain Shreve before he was formally assigned to an alternative school, Justin would receive a grade of “F” on each if he ever returned to Captain Shreve.

Causation is the element of the tort claim which the School Board argues Justin cannot establish. The School Board essentially advances two arguments: 1) there is no due process violation because the School Board rendered all process due; and 2) the court of appeal “disregarded] the ability of a school board to correct the errors of its employees (or to determine those errors to have been harmless).” Because each of these arguments seeks in some way to negate the causation element of a tort by pointing to the fact that the School Board conducted a full disciplinary hearing, our analysis below also focuses on the effect of the School Board’s hearing.

112The School Board correctly points out that by law, school personnel cannot expel a student. Under La. R.S. 17:416, the process to expel a student for contraband has two or three main procedural steps, and school personnel are directly empowered to undertake only the first step. In the first step, under paragraph (A)(3)(a), “[a] school principal may suspend from school ... any pupil who” commits any one of certain enumerated offenses, including “possess[ing] alcoholic beverages.” See La. R.S. 17:416(A)(3)(a)(vi). As a practical matter, because the principal is empowered to suspend a student, a suspension may occur the same day as the student’s commission of a “serious offense.” See La. R.S. 17:416(A)(3)(a)(xvii). However, to actually expel a student requires a second step, which under paragraph (C)(1) involves a hearing conducted by the superintendent or the superintendent’s designee to determine the facts of the case and make a finding of whether or not the student is guilty of conduct warranting a recommendation of expulsion, after which the “the superintendent, or his designate, shall determine whether such student shall be expelled from the school system or if other corrective or disciplinary action shall be taken.” Then, if a parent or tutor wishes to dispute the decision made at the superintendent’s level, a third step provides for review by the school board. According to paragraph (C)(4):

The parent or tutor of the pupil may, within five days after the decision is rendered, request the city or parish school board to review the findings of the superintendent or his designee at a time set by the school board; otherwise the decision of the superintendent shall be final. If requested, as herein provided, and after reviewing the findings of the superintendent or his designee, the school board may affirm, modify, or reverse the action previously taken.

11sThe trial record shows that Justin attempted to prove causation by focusing on the first procedural step, that is, Justin presented evidence to show that school personnel deprived him of due process. The school’s disciplinary administrator, Mr. Hite, testified about his handling of the investigation of the whiskey-bottle incident. When questioned at trial about how he investigated the incident in light of Andrew Heacock promptly coming forward to take responsibility for the whiskey bottle, Mr. Hite testified, “I should have called Heacock. I didn’t call him.”

Justin obtained other admissions of improper handling of his disciplinary case shortly after the whiskey bottle broke on the floor. Mr. Anderson, the school district’s supervisor for child welfare and attendance, testified that he felt he had sufficient information to make a disciplinary recommendation and he did not need to hear from Andrew Heacock. Thus, at the informal hearing on October 10, 2003, four days after the incident, Mr. Anderson actually did not call on or otherwise gather any information whatsoever from Andrew about the classroom incident. Instead, considering Justin’s version of events, Mr. Anderson rejected the claim that Andrew was responsible for the whiskey bottle being placed in the backpack and recommended that Justin be expelled.

Although Justin points to a less-than-exemplary effort by school administrators to consider all available evidence of the whiskey-bottle incident, the admissions Justin obtained at trial from the school administrators fail to advance Justin’s burden of proof under the law. Notably, the evidence Justin adduced at trial was not directed to showing a due process deprivation by those who ultimately determined Justin’s discipline — the superintendent and the School Board. See La. R.S. 17:416(C)(1) (expulsion decision is made by superintendent or designee) and (C)(4) (expulsion decision made at the superintendent’s level is reviewable by the school board).

114Therefore, while it might be said that the school administrators did not render all process due to Justin by not considering Andrew Heacock’s explanation directly from the source (an issue we need not and do not decide because the administrators did not ultimately render the discipline), to recover in tort for a deprivation of due process for an expulsion, Justin had to prove injury that was caused by the superintendent or by the School Board. See Pinsonneault, 01-2217 at 6, 816 So.2d at 275-76. In our review of the record, we discern none.

The superintendent was required by La. R.S. 17:416(C)(1) to conduct a hearing or designate someone to conduct a healing and then make a determination. This procedure was followed. Ms. Atkins, director of the School Board’s Attendance and Census Department, convened a hearing by an appeals committee and, based on the findings adduced at the hearing, the superintendent decided to expel Justin. Due process here required not only that the statutorily-mandated hearing be held, but also that Justin have an opportunity to be heard. See Lott v. Department of Public Safety and Corrections, Office of Louisiana State Police, 98-1920, p. 7 (La.5/18/99), 734 So.2d 617, 621. Justin argues that his right to be heard was violated because at the hearing convened by Ms. Atkins (prior to the superintendent’s decision), Andrew Heacock did not testify. According to exhibits presented at trial, Justin suggested he was unaware that he could call witnesses. Even so, Justin undeniably testified at the hearing before the appellate committee about Andrew’s claim of responsibility.

If the hearing at the superintendent’s level, convened by Ms. Atkins, had been the last hearing at which discipline was imposed in this case, it may have been necessary to make a determination of whether having a hearing at which Andrew did not testify deprived Justin of due process or whether any such deprivation was | ¶ (¡harmless because Justin presented Andrew’s claim of responsibility for the whiskey-bottle incident. However, the hearing at the superintendent level was not the last hearing at which discipline was imposed in this case. Thus, we need not decide whether Justin was injured by a deprivation of due process at the superintendent’s level of the disciplinary process.

We turn instead to the hearing before the School Board, which Justin requested pursuant to La. R.S. 17:416(C)(4). The record shows that Justin was given the opportunity at the School Board hearing to not only testify himself, but also to present testimony from Andrew Heacock. The record also shows Andrew testified and claimed responsibility for the whiskey bottle being in Justin’s backpack. As for Justin’s claim of injury from being expelled without the opportunity to present Andrew’s testimony, Justin has failed to prove he suffered a deprivation of due process.

At the trial on his tort claims, Justin attempted to show not only that he had been denied the opportunity to be heard by the School Board (a contention this court has just rejected as unsupported by the evidence), but that the School Board’s decision was based on the opinion of school employees. Stated differently, Justin attempted to show that those employees who allegedly denied him due process by not hearing Andrew’s story directly from Andrew, tainted the School Board’s decision making.

However, Justin did not present any evidence to show that the School Board’s decision was in any way the product of a denial of due process. What Justin did present at trial was the testimony of a former School Board member who had served prior to Justin’s disciplinary proceeding. The former School Board member could not say that the School Board (in the executive session that he did not attend) had based its disciplinary decision on the alleged due process violations from the earlier stages |1fiof Justin’s proceeding. Specifically, when asked if he believed “there was a justifiable basis for handing out the type of discipline that Justin Christy received in this matter,” the former school board member admitted, “I’m not sure based on all of this there’s even enough information to know whether it’s justifiable or not.”

Therefore, the testimony of the former School Board member is insufficient to prove that the School Board deprived Justin of due process. In fact, in our review of the record, the only point that can be discerned about what any of the School Board members may have believed comes from Andrew Heacock. Andrew testified that it was his impression that some members of the School Board simply did not believe Justin could not have known his backpack contained a fifth-sized whiskey bottle. Such would be a reasonable conclusion, given that Andrew testified that after placing the bottle in Justin’s backpack, Andrew did not zip the backpack. Just as important is Andrew’s testimony that he thought Justin would notice the bottle of whiskey in his open backpack. Thus, from all that appears in the trial record, the School Board, by a 9-2 vote, obviously rejected Justin’s version of events, including Justin’s claim that he did not know the whiskey bottle was in his backpack.

Justin also points out that Ms. Atkins testified at trial that if her appeals committee had known school administrators did not fully hear Andrew’s claim of responsibility for the whiskey bottle, that her committee would have voted against expulsion. Ms. Atkins’ testimony proves a violation of due process, Justin argues, because the disciplinary process would have stopped at the level of Ms. Atkins’ committee and the School Board would not have had occasion to consider whether Justin should be expelled. However, the record reflects that Ms. Atkins was only one of seven disciplinary committee members. Aside from being conjectural because Ms. Atkins’ testimony reveals that her committee did not hear any testimony from 117Andrew, Ms. Atkins’ testimony does not indicate how the other six members of her committee would have voted. Under the preponderance of evidence standard applicable to Justin’s tort claim, Ms. Atkins’ testimony is insufficient to support a judgment in Justin’s favor. See Boudreaux v. American Ins. Co., 262 La. 721, 264 So.2d 621, 627 (1972) (“Probabilities, surmises, speculations, and conjectures cannot be accepted as sufficient grounds to justify a recovery to a plaintiff who is charged with the burden of proof”). Furthermore, we reject the unsupported invitation to hold that the highest level of review (the School Board) that Justin sought is somehow less reliable than a lower level (the preliminary appeals committee).

Because Justin had the burden of proof on all elements of a tort claim for wrongful discipline (see Pinsonneault, 01-2217 at 6, 816 So.2d at 275-76), one might expect Justin would have attempted to support his claim that he was unaware the bottle was in his backpack with physical evidence. The record shows that Justin did not introduce his backpack into evidence, nor did Justin adduce any significant testimony about the backpack’s contents, such as whether it was otherwise full of books. By inference from Justin’s testimony about how the bottle fell out of his backpack, it is reasonable to conclude that besides the whiskey bottle, his backpack also contained a written homework assignment and possibly some photographs from a homecoming dance. From all that appears in the record, Justin raised more questions than he answered at trial about whether he knew the backpack he carried into the classroom contained a bottle of whiskey. Thus, no deprivation of due process can be discerned stemming from a lack of an opportunity to be heard or to persuade the School Board to believe that Justin was unaware he carried a large whiskey bottle into class.

11RThe fact that the School Board’s decision was not favorable to Justin does not mean or even suggest that he was denied due process. Instead, as has already been observed, Justin received a full opportunity to present his version of events, including the testimony of Andrew Heacock, to the School Board.

Justin also argues, however, that the sanction imposed by the School Board violates his rights. Specifically, Justin argues that for possessing alcohol, the School Board was only authorized to suspend him, not expel him as it did. Justin points to La. R.S. 17:416(A)(3)(a), which provides that a “school principal may suspend from school ... any pupil who ... (vi) ... possesses alcoholic beverages.” The School Board, however, notes that the statute later provides that “[a]ny student after being suspended for committing any of the offenses enumerated in this Section may be expelled, upon recommendation by the principal.” La. R.S. 17:416(B)(l)(a). Justin’s argument suggests that there is some internal contradiction within La. R.S. 17:416 for this court to resolve. We express no opinion as to whether La. R.S. 17:416 could be interpreted to different ends such that an expulsion or only a suspension is authorized for possessing alcohol. The given facts simply do not call upon this court to do so. The discipline imposed on Justin by the School Board was less than a whole semester, and for purposes of La. R.S. 17:416, any disciplinary action, regardless of how the discipline is designated, is only a true expulsion if it lasts more than a semester. See La. R.S. 17:416(A)(2)(c). Thus, the penalty imposed here cannot be said to have _]^9violated La. R.S. 17:416; therefore, the penalty does not show a denial of due process nor can it support a tort judgment in Justin’s favor.

In sum, we find the evidence Justin adduced at trial proves only that he lost in his effort to persuade the School Board that he was not responsible for bringing a bottle of whiskey to school in his backpack. However, losing on the merits of one’s claim does not equate to a denial of due process. To have any prospect of recovering in tort, Justin would have had to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he was deprived of due process by the School Board. As has been shown, the School Board afforded Justin the opportunity to fully present his case, including the explanation that Andrew Heacock was fully responsible for Justin bringing the bottle of whiskey to class. Justin also brought other tort claims that do not, in a technical sense, have as an element a denial of due process. For example, Justin alleged he should recover for defamation. However, the defamation claim and the other tort claims brought by Justin are factually predicated on a denial of due process. Having found Justin failed to show a relevant deprivation of due process, we need not analyze the tort claims predicated on a denial of due process except to note that any award based on those other claims also cannot be sustained in Justin’s favor.

Finally, we observed in the record much consternation by the district court for not having a transcript or recording of the School Board’s disciplinary hearing. Because Justin did not predicate his tort claims on an insufficiency of the record and because we pretermit the School Board’s claim of quasi-judicial immunity, we do not reach the issue of what sort of evidentiary record school boards must maintain for expulsion hearings. Likewise, nothing in this opinion should be construed to dictate the types of proof required to show that a school board violated a student’s due 1 ¡^process rights in a disciplinary hearing. Under the standard of review applicable to this case, our task is complete once we observe, as we have here, there is an absence of proof to show the School Board violated the student’s due process rights.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is reversed.

REVERSED.

JOHNSON, Justice, dissents for reasons assigned by KNOLL, Justice.

KNOLL, Justice, dissents and assigns reasons.

KNOLL, J.,

dissents.

|!With all due respect, I dissent and would affirm the judgment of the trial court. I find there is a substantial amount of record evidence supporting the lower courts’ determination that the Caddo Parish School Board and its representatives acted negligently, if not arbitrarily and capriciously, in initiating and carrying out disciplinary proceedings against plaintiff Justin Christy. Indeed, there is evidence which would support a finding of negligence at almost every step of the disciplinary process. As a direct result, plaintiff was unable to complete his senior year of high school or graduate with his class. Ultimately, he earned a GED instead.

As an initial matter, I find the majority opinion holds plaintiff to an incorrect legal standard. The opinion assumes Christy was required to establish a denial of due process on the part of the School Board as part of his tort claim. While plaintiffs petition does allege a violation of due process, it also alleges a traditional negligence claim. The majority fails to properly distinguish between a |2due process analysis and a general tort analysis and, as a result, erroneously holds plaintiff to the strict legal standard necessary to show a deprivation of due process. In my view the majority totally fails to recognize the delictual nature of plaintiffs claim, leading to a confused analysis focusing on due process rather than negligence.

The majority opinion cites Swindle v. Livingston Parish Sch. Bd., 655 F.3d 386 (5th Cir.2011), which holds that a school board owes a duty to provide its students with adequate procedural protections as required by the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution' — at a minimum, notice of the pending action and an opportunity to be heard. Id. at 396; Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314, 70 S.Ct. 652, 657, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950). However, it does not follow that this is the only duty which a school board owes to its students. Notably, the Swindle court only addressed the due process claims because that is all that was alleged; there was no allegation of negligence under La. Civ. Code art. 2315. Swindle, 655 F.3d at 387. Prior Louisiana jurisprudence recognizes a cognizable claim for tort damages in the event of wrongful expulsion; indeed, the School Board does not dispute this point. See Jenkins v. Ouachita Parish Sch. Bd., 459 So.2d 143, 145 (La.App. 2 Cir.1984), writ denied, 462 So.2d 652 (La.1985); Williams v. Turner, 382 So.2d 1040, 1041 (La.App. 2 Cir.1980). By conflating the two standards of due process and negligence, the majority erroneously holds plaintiff to a higher standard.

While I certainly agree that a student is entitled to due process when faced with disciplinary action, due process is not the only duty that a school board owes to its students prior to expulsion. Dr. Miles Hitchcock, a former member of the School Board called by the plaintiff as an expert witness, testified the Board had a “duty to ensure that the board’s policies were applied correctly” and a duty to |3“perform its [disciplinary] duty in a manner which promotes ‘safety, well-being and the best interests of students.’ ” Christy v. McCalla, 45,754 (La.App. 2 Cir. 12/15/10), 53 So.3d 689, 695. He also opined the School Board had a duty to conduct a “full and complete investigation” at each step of the disciplinary process. Id. Both the trial court and the court of appeal agreed with Dr. Hitchcock.

By focusing solely on the due process claim, the majority opinion fails to recognize the tortuous conduct based on negligence. The majority opinion postures the plaintiffs claim as if a tort suit were based solely on deprivation of due process. This is an error of law. Plaintiff does not complain that he was deprived of the opportunity to have a hearing. Rather, plaintiff urges he was injured because of the conduct occurring before and during the hearings, specifically, the failure to conduct an adequate investigation of all relevant facts and the failure to take into account testimony from Christy and Andrew Heacock exonerating Christy from any knowing possession of the bottle of whiskey.

The proper question for this Court is whether, applying the manifest error standard, there was sufficient record evidence from which the trial court could have reasonably concluded that the defendant acted negligently. Under the manifest error standard, a determination of fact is entitled to great deference on review, and “where there is conflict in the testimony, reasonable evaluations of credibility and reasonable inferences of fact should not be disturbed upon review, even though the appellate court may feel that its own evaluations and inferences are as reasonable.” Guillory v. Lee, 09-0075 (La.6/26/09), 16 So.3d 1104, 1116 (citation omitted). This “well-settled principle of review is based not only upon the trial court’s better capacity to evaluate live witnesses (as compared with the appellate court’s access only to a cold record), but also upon the proper allocation of trial and appellate functions between the respective courts.” Id. at 1117 (quoting Perkins v. Entergy Corp., 00-1372 (La.3/23/01), 782 So.2d 606). For us to |4overturn a lower court’s finding of fact, we must find “no reasonable factual basis for the trial court’s conclusions,” and the finding must be “clearly wrong.” Kaiser v. Hardin, 06-2092 (La.4/11/07), 953 So.2d 802, 810.

The record established at trial reflects a reasonable factual basis for finding the School Board was negligent. The majority opinion admits that the School Board’s actions were “not exemplary.” (Op. at 300 n. 7). This is an understatement. Christy’s disciplinary case was mishandled almost from the start. Andrew Hite, the disciplinary administrator at Captain Shreve, knew early on that Andrew Heacock had confessed to placing the whiskey bottle in Christy’s backpack without Christy’s knowledge. Heacock’s confession was strong evidence indeed, as he had not previously been implicated in Christy’s disciplinary proceedings and would have much to gain by keeping silent and not getting involved. Hite testified at trial that, despite hearing Heacock’s confession, he nonetheless recommended that Christy be expelled. The next step in the disciplinary proceeding was before Larry Anderson, the school’s supervisor for child welfare. Anderson admitted that he performed no investigation at all, and instead chose to simply rely on Hite’s version of the story without taking into account Heacock’s confession. This is negligent failure to conduct even the most rudimentary investigation. To compound the injurious conduct, the School Board employees negligently ignored the evidence which may have benefited Christy.

Christy’s disciplinary case then went to the superintendent’s appeals committee, during which the committee failed to advise Christy or his parents that they were entitled to call witnesses such as Heacock. Without Heacock’s testimony, there is no way the appeal committee’s decision can be said to have been based on a “full and complete investigation” with all the facts.

The majority admits it “might be said that the school administrators did not render all process due to Justin,” but ultimately decides this is irrelevant because | sonly the School Board had the final say in Christy’s suspension and, thus, only the School Board’s actions could have “caused” any harm to Christy. As a policy matter, it is troubling to find the School Board was negligent at all levels of the disciplinary proceeding save the final level, yet act as though the final hearing can somehow wash away the negligent and unfair actions at every step prior to the final hearing. At any point in the process, the school administrators could have — and should have — recommended against suspension or expulsion, in which case there would have been no need for a hearing before the entire Board.

Causation under Louisiana law is based on the “cause-in-fact” test. Lasyone v. Kansas City So. R.R., 00-2628 (La.4/3/01), 786 So.2d 682, 690-91. A negligent action is a cause-in-fact whenever it was a “substantial factor in bringing about the harm.” Id. at 691. “While a party’s conduct does not have to be the sole cause of the harm, it is a necessary antecedent essential to an assessment of liability.” Id. Here, although the negligent actions of Hite, Anderson, the superintendent’s appeals committee, and others may not have been the sole causes of Christy’s harm, there is no question they were substantial factors in his eventual expulsion. If those responsible for the lower levels of the disciplinary process had performed their jobs adequately, it would have been resolved long before ever reaching the School Board.

Finally, I cannot accept the majority’s conclusion that Christy’s claim fails because he failed to introduce the actual backpack into evidence at trial. The majority opinion apparently recognizes the issue sua sponte, without prompting from the School Board. Its observance is misplaced. The size of the backpack is |finot the underlying or dispositive issue in this case. The issue is who placed the whiskey in the backpack. Plaintiff testified he did not, and Heacock testified he did. The trial court found the School Board and its representatives acted negligently in imposing severe disciplinary actions against Christy without conducting a full and fair investigation and without taking into account this extremely relevant testimony. The trial court judge is in the best position to view the evidence, hear the testimony, and observe the demeanor of the witnesses. If he believed, in his capacity as finder of fact, that Christy did not know the bottle of liquor was in his backpack, I would defer to his judgment.

This Court regularly cautions appellate courts not to lightly overturn the factual findings of the trial court: “Because the discretion vested in the trier of fact is so great, and even vast, an appellate court should rarely disturb its findings on review.” Guillory, 09-0075 at p. 14, 16 So.3d at 1117. I believe in this case we would be best served in taking our own cautionary advice.

      . A representative bottle of a brand known as “Kentucky Deluxe" is part of the record.

      . On December 18, 2003, the city prosecutor declined to pursue the criminal charges stemming from Justin’s arrest. Referencing a letter from Andrew taking responsibility for the whiskey-bottle incident, tire city prosecutor requested and obtained a dismissal of the criminal proceedings.

      . Citations to and quotations of La. R.S. 17:416 refer to the version in effect during the

        disciplinary proceedings in the year 2003. La. R.S. 17:416(C)(5) provides:
      The parent or tutor of the pupil may, within ten days, appeal to the district court for the parish in which the student’s school is located, an adverse ruling of the school board in upholding the action of the superintendent or his designee. The court may reverse or revise the ruling of the school board upon a finding that the ruling of the board was based on an absence of any relevant evidence in support thereof.

      . Having reached the age of majority, Justin was substituted as a plaintiff.

      . Reproduced, supra at n. 1.

      . The extent to which the state and federal constitutions may differ in their requirements for due process is not presented as an issue for us to decide in this case.

      . To its credit, the School Board does not dispute that approach taken by Mr. Hite and Mr. Anderson during the early phases of Justin's disciplinary matter was not exemplary. We also share in the concern expressed by the district court regarding testimony from school employees in response to hypothetical questions that an unsuspecting student, who is framed by a "thug” planting drugs on that student, would nevertheless face expulsion merely because the drugs were in the student's possession. Such a finding would offend our sense of justice and is unsupported by any rules or regulations. However, those are not the facts of this case, but a hypothetical situation, and we confine our review of this case to the operative facts. See Cat's Meow, Inc. v. City of New Orleans, Dept. of Finance, 98-0601 (La.10/20/98), 720 So.2d 1186, 1193 ("The jurisprudence of this Court is well settled that courts will not decide abstract, hypothetical or moot controversies, or render advisory opinions with respect to such controversies.”).

      . The procedure for imposing a suspension is described in further detail in La. R.S. 17:416(A) (3) (b), and includes a requirement for the principal or the principal’s designee to "advise the pupil in question of the particular misconduct of which he is accused as well as the basis for such accusation, and the pupil shall be given an opportunity at that time to explain his version of the facts to the school principal or his designee.”

      . See Lott, 98-1920 at p. 7, 734 So.2d at 621 ("Our state may determine the process by which legal rights are asserted and enforced so long as a party receives due notice and an opportunity to be heard.").

      . The applicable version of La. R.S. 17:416(A)(2)(c) provided, in pertinent part: "Unless otherwise defined as a permanent expulsion and except as otherwise provided by Paragraph B(2) of this Section, an expulsion shall be defined as a removal from all regular school settings for a period of not less than one school semester.” Here, Justin was removed from Captain Shreve on the date of the incident, October 6, 2003, and the School Board’s expulsion period ended on December 19, 2003, which was less than a full semester from the date Justin was removed from Captain Shreve. Because the period was less than a semester, the sanction did not meet the statutory definition of expulsion.

      . The School Board's claim that it is entitled to immunity for tort claims is unavailing. The doctrine of sovereign immunity is expressly disclaimed by La. Const, art. XII, § 10(A), unless there is a specific statute granting an immunity. Jacobs v. City of Bunkie, 98-2510 (La.5/18/99), 737 So.2d 14, 19. Defendant does not cite to any statute granting immunity to school boards, and its claim must fail.

      . It appears the majority may be applying a variation of the "last clear chance” doctrine, under which a plaintiff could not recover if he had the "last clear chance” to avoid an injury. See Patin v. State Farm Ins. Co., 395 So.2d 466 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1981). This doctrine only applied where the plaintiff had the last clear chance to avoid harm; here, the "last clear chance” was in the hands of the School Board, not Christy. Moreover, this doctrine has been superceded by the doctrine of comparative fault, and no longer acts as a bar to plaintiff's recovery. Watson v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Ins. Co., 469 So.2d 967, 973 (La.1985); Frank L. Maraist & Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Louisiana Tort Law § 9.06 (2004 ed. Supp.2010).

      . See Nolan v. Mabray, 10-373 (La.11/30/10), 51 So.3d 665, 672: "This all comes down to a matter we are faced with all too often in our discretionary review of civil cases-the failure to follow the manifest error standard of review by courts of appeal.”


author: JOHNSON, Justice.

text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Michael Anthony WRIGHT.
    No. 2011-K-0141.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Dec. 6, 2011.
    James D. Caldwell, Attorney General, Walter P. Reed, District Attorney, Kathryn W. Landry, Special Assistant District Attorney, for Applicant.
    Louisiana Appellate Project, Frank Sloan, for Respondent.
   JOHNSON, Justice.

| defendant, Michael Anthony Wright, was convicted by a jury of aggravated incest and sentenced to eighteen years imprisonment at hard labor. Finding the trial court erred in admitting certain evidence which was inadmissible pursuant to Louisiana Code of Evidence article 412.2, and in denying the defendant’s related motions for mistrial, the court of appeal reversed the conviction, vacated the sentence and remanded the matter for a new trial. We granted the State’s writ application to review the correctness of the court of appeal’s decision. For the following reasons, we vacate the decision of the court of appeal, and remand for further proceedings.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Defendant was charged by bill of information with aggravated incest in violation of La. R.S. 14:78.1. The offense was alleged to have occurred between 12February 15, 2007, and February 21, 2007, when the victim, “BK,” who had just turned seventeen, and defendant, BK’s biological father, stayed at a hotel in Slidell, Louisiana, during Mardi Gras.

Defendant and BK’s mother were never married, and BK lived with his mother in Slidell, Louisiana, until he was thirteen years old. Defendant only saw BK a couple of times during these years. Around 2003, when BK was thirteen years old, he became increasingly difficult at home, and continuously expressed a desire to know his father. BK’s mother contacted defendant, who agreed to let BK live with him in Lake Charles, Louisiana. BK lived with defendant on a discontinuous basis from the time he was thirteen until shortly after the alleged incident.

In 2005, defendant became sexually involved with “BC,” a seventh-grade classmate of BK. Defendant married BC in August of 2005, when she was fourteen years old and six months pregnant with his child. BC lived with defendant and BK. BK testified he was very fearful of his father, and witnessed defendant physically abuse BC:

Q [District Attorney]: Describe to the jury some of the things you saw him do with [BC].
A[BK]: Punching her, kicking her. Just beating her, and not just a hit and stop, I mean, beating her until she just was crying for him to stop. Bleeding, picking her up, throwing her, slamming her, duct-taping her, throwing her in a closet for three hours, beating her while she’s duct-taped. I’ve seen him, while she was sleeping, stick a bottle of hot Tabasco inside of her. It goes on and on.

| oFurther, defendant’s trial testimony revealed he had been convicted of domestic battery of his first wife in 1995 or 1996.

According to BK, he and defendant went to Mardi Gras in 2007, and they “stayed loaded the whole time on crack, weed— pain pills, drinking.” BK further testified “[t]he first night we stayed there, he had me do oral sex on him, and then we stayed another night and we did anal sex twice.” BK testified the intercourse was painful but he did not fight because he was scared of defendant and feared physical violence. BK did not inform anyone of the incident, and returned to Lake Charles with the defendant.

BK returned home to Slidell, Louisiana, in April or May of 2007, at which time he told his mother and grandmother about the incident. He eventually went to the police in July of 2007, after his mother convinced him to report it. He testified it took his mother a few months to convince him to go to the police, but he finally agreed because he “felt it was right, the right thing to do” and because he had brothers and sisters and he “didn’t want it to continue.” In addition to being fearful of his father, BK testified that he did not report the abuse immediately because he “did not want to go through this. I don’t want to be here now. I didn’t want to do it then. I just wanted to move on.”

Before trial, the State filed an “Other Crimes Notice” pursuant to La. C.E. art. |4412.2, stating it intended to offer other crimes evidence to demonstrate defendant’s lustful disposition to sexually assault young children. The notice included the facts that defendant “has committed other sexual assault crimes against young children; including sexual acts with a fourteen year old female BC, DOB: October 9, 1990;” and that “on August 5, 2005, to avoid criminal prosecution by the State of Louisiana defendant traveled from Lake Charles, Louisiana to Vidor, Texas to marry BC who was six months pregnant and fourteen years old.” Defendant filed an objection to the evidence. After a hearing, the trial court found evidence of BC’s age to be inadmissible. Specifically, the trial court stated:

The Court feels that, that those, the facts of those incidents, that is the involvement with the female as compared to the acts involving the 17-year-old son are of a disparate nature. And when balancing the probative value against the prejudicial effect, I do not find that the probative value significantly outweighs — I’m sorry, that I find that the probative value is significantly outweighed by the prejudicial effect, and I’m going to disallow the, the evidence with regards to the age of the female at the time they began their sexual involvement and actually had a child together.

At trial, the defendant generally asserted that BK’s story was completely fabricated. The defense argued: “This is a totally made-up story for whatever reason that this poor, disturbed, young person had put in his mind, that this is some way that I can get back at my dad for whatever reason.” Defendant portrayed BK as a difficult and disturbed youth with behavioral problems, who had difficulties in school and with his parents. Defendant testified he took BK into his home to try to help.

Relative to the court’s in limine ruling regarding BC’s age, three instances arose during trial wherein defendant argued the State ignored the court’s ruling, and introduced prohibited evidence to the jury.

First, during opening statements, the prosecutor informed the jury of BC’s age. Specifically, in describing how BK would testify, the prosecutor stated:

IsHe will tell you subsequent to that, he introduced him — [BK] introduced the defendant to [BC], that [BC] came to live with them. Subsequent to that, [BC] and Michael Wright got married. The defendant’s mother took them to Vidor, Texas, to get married. [BC] was 14 years old.

Defendant objected and moved for a mistrial. After hearing arguments, the court denied the motion for mistrial, reasoning: “[T]he fact of the matter is that, that there has been no evidence or suggestion made that — that that was a criminal act or other wrong. I simply don’t think that at this stage that it warrants a mistrial.” The court continued by admonishing the prosecutor not to “step over the line again” and reiterating its earlier ruling that “the age of this — of his wife is not relevant to the charge in this case.”

Later, during the direct examination of BK’s mother, the State inquired as to how she learned of the incident and her reaction:

Q [District Attorney]: What did he [BK] tell you?
A [BK’s mother]: He came over, him and my mom came to my house. [BK] sat on the couch and told me that — he said, “My dad had sex with me.”
Q: Did you ask him any additional questions about that?
A: All I told him was that we needed to call the police.
Q: What was his response?
A: He didn’t want to call the police because he said his father gets away with everything. And he said that when he reported his father having sex with [BC]—

At this point, defendant objected and moved for a mistrial. The trial court overruled the objection and denied the motion for mistrial stating: “I’m going to overrule the objection on that standpoint because all he [sic] said was — I mean, the testimony is already that he was married to [BC], so I don’t find anything at this point that is unduly prejudicial about that. Clearly not grounds for a mistrial,.... ” The court further elaborated:

|fiBut let me tell you where we are because you need to know where we are. Number one, the fact is he was married to [BC], and that’s coming in. That’s part of the overall picture in this thing.
The second thing is you — all raised it in the opening question, why would he say what he said, why would he make a quote, false report, about what happened? And we may be getting to why he would say that.
You — all have asked questions rhetorically and the trial may very well end up saying — now, whether that helps or it hurts you, that’s not for me to decide. That’s for the jury to decide. But that’s where this thing is headed.
And so, at this point, you know, I’m overruling the objection, overruling the motion for the mistrial, denying the motion for the mistrial. I still think that at least at this point we are not to a point where this witness — I’m not going to allow this witness to refer to anything as far as other offense reporting and other offense in this case.
But I’m telling you guys, this thing— and you have framed it in your opening statement — this thing is set up to say why he said what he did, why he reported it. He either reported it because it happened or he reported it for a multitude of other reasons. And if that’s one of the reasons, then it may end up one of reasons that they — but at this point in time, we’re not there yet.

Lastly, an issue arose during defendant’s testimony. Defendant testified on his own behalf. During that testimony, defendant denied ever having any homosexual experiences, and testified that he had been married twice, both times to women. Believing defendant had opened the door to BC’s age, on cross examination the State asked defendant how old BC was when he married her and defendant responded that she was fourteen years old. Defense counsel objected. The court overruled the objection, and allowed the question, giving extensive reasons for changing his initial ruling:

Of course, I anticipated we were headed here whenever he decided to testify. Couple of things I have had heard in listening to his testimony ... I know that earlier there were some inferences that were made about his disruptive behavior in Lake Charles. It was related to fact that [sic]. That his father was involved with apparently one of his friends [BC] who he was in school with, who he testified he was in school with. That testimony came in on direct examination by — I’m sorry, it was either on direct or redirect examination of [BK] that they were in school together.
17The thing that he also testified to on his direct examination here was that both of his marriages were to women, which obviously would include the female sex, but I think it raises the question as to whether a 14-year-old would be considered a woman at that point or not.
The fact of the matter is that this issue has been nibbled around the whole time, primarily because of the credibility issues that this case has drawn: Credibility issues of the victim, credibility issues of the defendant, both of which are absolutely critical in this case.
At this point, there’s been no physical evidence. In fact, the State has, has rested. And there was no physical evidence introduced in connection with this case, so the case totally comes down to whether or not they believe and find the victim credible or whether they believe and find the defendant credible, which could be turned on a multitude of different facts and factors.
Given the fact that his disruptive nature, that is the victim’s disruptive nature, has been front and center of this whole case, the Court feels like in order to complete the picture, that all the different elements of why his nature [sic] and why he may have been disruptive should be explored.
I think that given the testimony of the defendant at this point, as well as the credibility issues that have been put at issue in this case, that he should be allowed to be questioned on that issue as well, because it goes to the explanation of why he may or may not have been disruptive in the times that he left Lake Charles.
Again, I think that without it, we’ve gone into every conceivable thing that may have caused him to, quote, according to the defense, falsely accuse his father of this. To me, that’s one of the elements that is part of the overall equation of determining the credibility of this case.
So, I am going to, based on the testimony that’s come in, the defense in this case as well as the credibility issues at stake, I’m going to allow him to question the witness as to, I mean, the question on the table was the age of [BC]. It is also obvious at that time that that relationship began while [BK] was living with him.
And so for all those reasons, I think that it goes to credibility in the case and I’m going to allow him to question the witness on that.

After the court changed its ruling on the evidence, the State fully questioned defendant eliciting testimony as to BC’s age, how many months pregnant BC was when defendant married her, and the fact that defendant was still married to another woman when he impregnated BC.

| ^Following the trial, the jury found defendant guilty of aggravated incest, and he was subsequently sentenced to eighteen years imprisonment at hard labor. Defendant appealed, arguing the trial court erred in allowing the State to ignore the in limine ruling that evidence regarding BC’s age was inadmissable, and in denying his related motions for mistrial.

The court of appeal reversed the conviction and sentence, and remanded for a new trial. The court agreed with the trial court’s initial finding and ruling that the evidence of “defendant’s sexually as-saultive behavior with a female child whom he ultimately married and bore a child with is not similar to the charged misconduct in this case, homosexual, incestuous sexual intercourse with his seventeen-year-old biological son or admissible under Article 412.2.” Wright, 10-0858 at p. 4, 2010 WL 5464421 at *4. The court went on to reason that the “evidence was impermissibly introduced to attack the character of the accused. Any probative value this evidence may have is far outweighed by the danger this evidence would unfairly prejudice defendant in the eyes of the jury, leading it to render a guilty verdict because of the prior acts rather than on the strength of the evidence of the offense for which he was charged. Thus, the evidence is barred by the balancing test of Article 403.” Id. Applying a harmless error analysis, the court found it could not “conclude that the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the erroneously introduced evidence.” Id. at p. 5, 2010 WL 5464421 at *5.

The state filed a writ application with this Court, which we granted.

DISCUSSION

The issue before this Court is whether the court of appeal erred in reversing the ^defendant’s conviction and sentence based on its finding that the trial court erred in its eventual admission of the State’s evidence regarding BC’s age, and in its refusal to grant a corresponding mistrial.

La. C.E. art. 412.2(A) provides:

When an accused is charged with a crime involving sexually assaultive behavior, or with acts that constitute a sex offense involving a victim who was under the age of seventeen at the time of the offense, evidence of the accused’s commission of another crime, wrong, or act involving sexually assaultive behavior or acts which indicate a lustful disposition toward children may be admissible and may be considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant subject to the balancing test provided in Article 403.

The underlying basis of the court of appeal’s rationale for finding evidence of BC’s age to be inadmissible pursuant to La. C.E. art. 412.2 was the dissimilarities in acts due to the gender difference between BC and BK. Specifically, the court of appeal found that evidence of the defendant’s sexually assaultive behavior with BC was not similar to the charged incest with BK, defendant’s seventeen-year-old son.

Parties’ Contentions

The State argues the court of appeal erred in reversing the ruling of the trial court on the admissibility of evidence that defendant married a fourteen-year-old girl. The State does not argue this was a crime, but rather argues such evidence was relevant and admissible to explain the actions of BK, to complete the story of what happened and the context in which it happened, and to show the defendant’s lustful disposition toward children.

The State argues the court of appeal erroneously focused on its perceived dissimilarities between defendant’s sexual conduct with BC and the conduct at issue in this case. It argues the court of appeal ignored the fact that in both instances, defendant was engaging in sexual intercourse with a child, which is admissible to show his lustful disposition toward children. La. C.E. art. 412.2 does not limit the 1 inadmissibility of prior acts only to those identical or similar in nature. Moreover, the trial court provided a limiting instruction to the jury regarding any evidence of other crimes, thereby instructing the jury as to the proper treatment of such evidence.

Further, the State asserts that as the evidence unfolded at trial, and based on defense strategy at trial, this evidence was necessary. The defense attempted to prove BK’s story was fabricated, and made an issue of the delayed reporting of the offense. Thus, BK’s credibility, including the reasons why he did not protest during the acts at issue, and why he failed to report the crime sooner, was put at issue by the defense. The State argues the objected-to testimony by BK’s mother goes to that issue.

By contrast, defendant asserts the court of appeal’s decision was correct. Defendant argues there was a pattern of calculated prosecutorial misconduct, a failure of the trial court to control the proceedings, and an abuse of discretion by the trial court in denying the motions for mistrial. Defendant argues the trial court was correct when it initially excluded evidence of the sexual relationship between defendant and BC under La. C.E. art. 412.2, and the court abused its discretion in permitting this evidence because of credibility issues between the alleged victim and the defendant, as well as to “complete the picture” of BK’s disruptive behavior in Lake Charles. Further, defendant argues that the homosexual crimes against nature allegedly forced upon BK are markedly dissimilar from the consensual heterosexual relationship defendant had with BC, whom later became his wife.

Additionally, defendant reads Article 412.2 as only applying when the victim is under the age of seventeen. Thus, because BK was seventeen at the time the alleged crime occurred, he was not a child for the purpose of La. C.E. art. 412.2.

Analysis

A trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence is reviewed for an abuse Inof discretion. State v. Cosey, 97-2020 (La.11/28/00), 779 So.2d 675, 684. This same standard is applied to rulings on the admission of other crimes evidence and evidence under La. C.E. art. 412.2. State v. Merritt, 04-204 (La.App. 5 Cir. 6/29/04), 877 So.2d 1079, 1085, writ denied, 04-1849 (La.11/24/04), 888 So.2d 228; State v. Humphries, 40,810 (La.App. 2 Cir. 4/12/06), 927 So.2d 650, 656, writ denied, 06-1472 (La.12/15/06), 944 So.2d 1284. After review of the record and law, we find no error in the trial court’s admission of evidence of BC’s age because we find it is admissible pursuant to La. C.E. art. 412.2. Thus, we hold the court of appeal erred in vacating the conviction and sentence.

First, we reject defendant’s argument that Article 412.2 only applies when the victim is under the age of seventeen. The statute specifically applies in two situations: 1) when an accused is charged with a crime involving sexually assaul-tive behavior, or 2) when an accused is charged with acts that constitute a sex offense involving a victim who was under the age of seventeen at the time of the offense. Here, defendant is charged with aggravated incest, a crime involving sexually assaultive behavior. Thus, evidence of defendant’s other acts which involve sexually assaultive behavior or acts which indicate his lustful disposition towards children may be admissible.

In looking at admissibility of Article 412.2 evidence where victims are of different genders, existing Louisiana jurisprudence involves victims of the same general age and same gender. Similarly, there is a dearth of federal jurisprudence | ^regarding the issue of different genders of victims when analyzing the similar Federal Rule of Evidence 413. However, after considering this issue, especially in light of the purpose behind Article 412.2, we find no reason to prohibit the admission of such evidence simply because the other acts involve a victim of a different gender. While this Court has not previously addressed the issue directly, we have implied that such evidence would not be inadmissible strictly on the basis of a difference in the victims’ gender. In State v. Crochet, 05-0123 (La.6/23/06), 931 So.2d 1083, this Court considered whether the court of appeal erred in reversing defendant’s eonvic: tions on the grounds that the trial court allowed a joint trial of three charges involving sexual abuse by defendant towards his children (both male and female) and evidence of his similar misconduct regarding two of his stepchildren. In finding the defendant was not prejudiced by the consolidation, this Court noted:

Moreover, consolidation of the cases did not expose the jury to evidence that was admissible as to one or more of the counts but inadmissible as to other counts. Evidence of defendant’s sexual abuse of his biological and stepchildren was, as the trial court determined, admissible to show his “lustful disposition toward children.” La. C.E. art. 412.2.

Crochet, 931 So.2d at 1087.

Further, in enacting Article 412.2, the Legislature did not see fit to impose a restriction requiring such evidence to meet a stringent similarity requirement for admissibility. We have previously examined the legislative history behind the Article in State v. Williams, 02-1030 (La.10/15/02), 830 So.2d 984. In Williams, this Court 11snoted the enactment of the Article was prompted primarily by two decisions of this Court, State v. McArthur, 97-2918 (La.10/20/98), 719 So.2d 1037, and State v. Kennedy, 00-1554 (La.4/3/01), 803 So.2d 916. Both cases involved prosecutions for aggravated rape in which the State sought to introduce evidence of other sexual offenses committed by the defendants pursuant to what the State labeled a “lustful disposition” exception to other crimes evidence. In both cases, this Court refused to recognize the so-called “lustful disposition” exception to Article 404’s other crimes prohibition, but, in doing so, noted that the evidence sought to be introduced would be admissible if Louisiana had a rule similar to Federal Rule of Evidence 413. This Court stated “the enactment of Article 412.2 was apparently the legislature’s response to this Court’s statements in McArthur and Kennedy as the language of Article 412.2 closely follows that of Federal Rule of Evidence 413.” Williams, 830 So.2d at 986. Thus, Article 412.2 was enacted to loosen restrictions on “other crimes” evidence, and to allow evidence of “lustful disposition” in cases involving sexual offenses.

Based on the facts of this case, we find the trial court properly allowed evidence of BC’s age to be admitted. The trial court is afforded great gatekeeping discretion in determining what evidence is deemed admissible. Here, the trial court evidently determined, after testimony was developed at trial and reconsidering its previous ruling, defendant’s ephebophilic proclivities were substantially similar enough to be both relevant and not unduly prejudicial. We agree.

Disregarding the difference in gender, we find the similarities between BK and BC were sufficiently probative to support the admission of evidence of BC’s age | Uunder Article 412.2. The record evidence demonstrates defendant had a propensity for sexual activity with adolescents where he held a position of authority, and where the adolescent children were in his household. Defendant met BC because she was a seventh-grade classmate of BK. Before marrying the defendant, BC lived with her mother down the street from the defendant’s residence, but spent time at defendant’s home. Both victims were small-statured and in them mid to late teens — BK was only eight days past his seventeenth birthday at the time of the alleged incest; BC was two months shy of her fifteenth birthday, and already six months pregnant, when she married the defendant. Both were living with defendant in a domestic setting with him as the head of household when they were subjected to abuse. The evidence further demonstrates that defendant had sexual inclinations toward adolescents that manifested in the physical and sexual threatening and abuse of those under his domestic dominion. BK lived in the household with defendant and BC, and observed defendant’s severe physical abuse of BC. BK testified he suffered defendant’s incestuous actions under his perceived fear of physical abuse due to his father’s violent nature. Having witnessed defendant’s brutal treatment of BC, it was reasonable for BK to conclude that he would suffer a similar fate if he resisted defendant’s sexual assault. In sum, the record demonstrates that evidence regarding BC’s age was relevant to show defendant had a lustful disposition towards adolescents living with him in a domestic situation, where his advances could be carried out at will with threats of, or actual, physical violence to ensure compliance.

We also do not find the evidence to be so prejudicial as to warrant exclusion under La. C.E. art. 403. La. C.E. 403 provides: “Although relevant, evidence may be | ^excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, or waste of time.” Regarding the proper balancing between the probative value of evidence and its prejudicial effect required by Article 403, this Court has explained:

Any inculpatory evidence is “prejudicial” to a defendant, especially when it is “probative” to a high degree. As used in the balancing test, “prejudicial” limits the introduction of probative evidence of prior misconduct only when it is unduly and unfairly prejudicial. The term “unfair prejudice,” as to a criminal defendant, speaks to the capacity of some concededly relevant evidence to lure the factfinder into declaring guilt on a ground different from proof specific to the offense charged.

State v. Rose, 06-0402 (La.2/22/07), 949 So.2d 1236, 1244 (internal citations removed).

The court of appeal concluded that any probative value of this evidence was far outweighed by the danger this evidence would unfairly prejudice defendant in the eyes of the jury leading it to render a guilty verdict because of the prior acts, rather than on the strength of the evidence of the offense for which he was charged. The court found the evidence was imper-missibly introduced to attack the defendant’s character. We disagree. Considering the purpose behind Article 412.2, we find the evidence was properly admitted by the trial court. We do not find the admission of this evidence alone could “lure” the jury into finding defendant guilty of the charged incest with his son. Moreover, any possible prejudice resulting from the introduction of evidence of BC’s age certainly pales in comparison with evidence regarding defendant’s extremely violent treatment of BC. Given the evidence of defendant’s violent nature, his violence towards BC, and evidence of his prior conviction for domestic battery of his first wife, we do not find evidence of BC’s age to be overly prejudicial.

11fiCONCLUSION

For the above reasons, we find the court of appeal erred in vacating defendant’s conviction and sentence. We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision to allow evidence of BC’s age to be submitted to the jury. Such evidence is admissible pursuant to La. C.E. art. 412.2. Because the court of appeal found the admission of other crimes evidence constituted reversible error, it did not address defendant’s remaining assignment of error. Accordingly, we vacate the appellate court’s decision, which reversed the defendant’s conviction, and we remand the case to the court of appeal for consideration of the defendant’s remaining assignment of error.

DECREE

DECISION VACATED AND CASE REMANDED TO THE COURT OF APPEAL.

      . La. R.S. 14:78.1 provides, in pertinent part:
      A. Aggravated incest is the engaging in any prohibited act enumerated in Subsection B with a person who is under eighteen years of age and who is known to the offender to be related to the offender as any of the following biological, step, or adoptive relatives: child, grandchild of any degree, brother, sister, half-brother, half-sister, uncle, aunt, nephew, or niece.
      B. The following are prohibited acts under this Section:
      (1) Sexual intercourse, sexual battery, second degree sexual battety, carnal knowledge of a juvenile, indecent behavior with juveniles, pornography involving juveniles, molestation of a juvenile or a person with a physical or mental disability, crime against nature, cruelty to juveniles, parent enticing a child into prostitution, or any other involvement of a child in sexual activity constituting a crime under the laws of this state.
      (2) Any lewd fondling or touching of the person of either the child or the offender, done or submitted to with the intent to arouse or to satisfy the sexual desires of either the child, the offender, or both.
      C.Consent is not a defense under this Section.

      . The victim is referenced herein only by his initials. See La. R.S. 46:1844(W).

      . BK provided the following statement to the police department: "During Mardi Gras of 2007, my father and I stayed at the La Quinta Motel in Slidell. The first night of our stay there, my father put my head below his waist and had me go down on him. The second night of our stay at the motel, my father had sex with me, twice. Although it was something I didn't want to do, he didn’t force me, he didn’t have to because I was scared of what would happen if I said no. My father is a very violent person. He was on a lot of drugs when this happened. When he gets messed up on drugs he beats his wife. I’ve witnessed him duct tape his wife's whole body and kick her and punch her until she couldn’t breath. He left her in the closet for 2 and a half hours. He then asked me if I would help him bury her if he killed her. I said no and he let her out the closet and unduct [sic] taped her. He has been arrested several times for domestic violence. I lived with him from January 07-April 07. I moved in with my aunt in Slidell in April 07.”

      . State v. Wright, 10-0858 (La.App. 1 Cir. 12/22/10) 2010 WL 5464421 (unpub’d).

      . State v. Wright, 11-0141 (La.6/17/11), 63 So.3d 1042.

      . See, e.g. State v. Cotton, 42,509 (La.App. 2 Cir. 9/19/07), 965 So.2d 1016, 1019-20, writ denied, 07-2070 (La.3/7/08), 977 So.2d 898 (probative value of "lustful disposition” evidence, involving defendant's past sexual abuse of victim's mother when she was between six and nine-years-old and defendant's six-year-old niece, was properly admitted): State v. Verret, 06-1337 (La.App. 1 Cir. 3/23/07), 960 So.2d 208, 221, writ denied, 07-0830 (La.11/16/07), 967 So.2d 520 (evidence concerning sexual abuse incident involving defendant's 10-year-old female cousin was relevant in aggravated rape prosecution; incident involved evidence of defendant’s lustful disposition toward young child, victim of charged offense was eight-year-old female, and charged offense occurred shortly before incident involving cousin); State v. Williams, 41,731 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1/24/07), 950 So.2d 126, 131-32, writ denied, 07-0465 (La.11/2/07), 966 So.2d 599 (other crimes evidence that defendant raped six-year-old daughter of a girlfriend was admissible at trial for aggravated rape of 11-year-old girl; other-crimes evidence was clear and convincing and was relevant and probative of occurrence of incident and of defendant’s disposition toward children, and differences between charged offense and other crime, such as victims’ ages, were comparatively minor); State v. Wallace, 41,720 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1/24/07), 949 So.2d 556, 560 (similar prior conduct with a female child of similar age highly probative of the requisite intent for the crime).

      . F.R.E. art. 413(a) provides: “In a criminal case in which the defendant is accused of an offense of sexual assault, evidence of the defendant’s commission of another offense or offenses of sexual assault is admissible, and may be considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant.”

      . La. C.E. art. 404 provides, in pertinent part: “Except as provided in Article 412, evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or accident ... or when it relates to conduct that constitutes an integral part of the act or transaction that is the subject of the present proceeding. La. C.E. art 404(B)(1)."

      . See State v. Humphries, supra (other crimes evidence permitted where it showed "a common mode of action and demonstrated a propensity for sexual acts with a young child where defendant held a position of authority.”)

      . Defendant assigned as error the trial court’s refusal to grant a mistrial after the prosecutor compared the defendant to Adolph Hitler in closing argument.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Willie ROGERS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-0595.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Jan. 20, 2012.
   In re Rogers, Willie;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. John, 40th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 85-006; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 11-KH-20.

Denied.

GUIDRY, J., recused.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana in the Interest of G.P. and G.P., Jr.
    No. 2012-CJ-0162.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 3, 2012.
   In re P. Sr., G.;— Other; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Orleans Parish Juvenile Court, No. TR-D-20050083; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-C-1557.

Denied.


text:
    Phil WILLIAMS v. The NEW ORLEANS ERNEST N. MORIAL CONVENTION CENTER.
    No. 2011-CC-2481.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 3, 2012.
   In re New Orleans Earnest N. Morial Convention Center;—Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. B, No. 2011-^=432; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-C-1412.

Granted. Remanded to court of appeal for briefing, argument and opinion.


text:
    PRESCOTT-FOLLETT & ASSOCIATES, INC., et al. v. ARETE, LLC, et al.
    No. 2011-CC-2594.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 3, 2012.
   In re Alma Finance Group; Alma Finance, LLC; Alma Fund Group; Mahabir, Krishna;—Defendant(s); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. N, No. 2006-6139; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-C-1277.

Granted. The evidence attached to the application reveals the application to the court of appeal was filed timely. See Rambo v. Willis-Knighton Bossier Health Center, 00-2157 (La.7/28/00), 766 So.2d 1262. Accordingly, the application is remanded the court of appeal for consideration on the merits.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Carlos STEVENSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2012-KH-0159.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 3, 2012.
   In re Stevenson, Carlos;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. G, Nos. 02-11-0458, B12-10-0560; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, Nos. 2011 KW 1254, 2011 KW 2165.

Denied.


text:
    In re Appeal of Decision of DISCIPLINARY BOARD 11-PDB-034.
    No. 2011-OB-2519.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 3, 2012.
   In re Slocum, Helen F.;—Other; Applying For Appeal of Decision of Disciplinary Board Office of the Disciplinary Board, No. 11-PDB-034.

Leave to appeal denied.


text:
    In re Appeal of Decision of the DISCIPLINARY BOARD NO. 11-PDB-055.
    No. 2011-OB-2540.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 3, 2012.
   In re Johnson, Vester;—Other; Applying For Appeal of Decision of the Disciplinary Board Office of the Disciplinary Board, No. 11-PDB-055.

Leave to appeal denied.


text:
    In re Appeal of the Decision of the DISCIPLINARY BOARD NO. 11-PDB-052.
    No. 2011-OB-2570.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 3, 2012.
   In re Hampton Sr., David; Hampton, Linda—Plaintiff(s); Applying For Appeal of the Decision of the Disciplinary Board Office of Disciplinary Board, No. 11-PDB-052.

Leave to appeal denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Andrew James FRANKS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-0270.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 3, 2012.
   In re Franks, Andrew James;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Terrebonne, 32nd Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 505,710; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2009 KA 2273.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Spencer ELZIE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-0300.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 3, 2012.
   In re Elzie, Spencer;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Tangipahoa, 21st Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 77846; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 CW 2147.

Denied. Relator must obtain a cost estimate of the public records he seeks from the District Attorney’s Office for Tangipa-hoa Parish, the custodian of the records. See State ex rel. Barbee v. State, 10-0275 (La.2/4/11), 57 So.3d 318; State ex rel. Leonard v. State, 96-1889 (La.6/13/97), 695 So.2d 1325.

WEIMER, J., recused.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Jeffery W. McLAMB v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-0317.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 3, 2012.
   In re McLamb, Jeffery W.;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. G, Nos. 386,-616, 405,217; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 KW 1912.

Denied. State ex rel. Fleury v. State, 93-2898 (La.10/13/95), 661 So.2d 488.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Andrew PAYNE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-0505.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 3, 2012.
   In re Payne, Andrew;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 99-2560; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 10-WR-829.

Denied.

GUIDRY, J., recused.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Robert McQUEEN v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-0508.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 3, 2012.
   In re McQueen, Robert; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 414477-2; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 KW 2097.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Brandon WATTS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-0514.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 3, 2012.
   In re Watts, Brandon; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 97-7407; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 08-WR-978.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Donald R. BROWN v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-0515.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 3, 2012.
   In re Brown, Donald R.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 08-95-0613; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 KW 2230.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; State v. Parker, 98-0256 (La.5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694; La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.

WEIMER, J., recused.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Milton WILSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-0516.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 3, 2012.
   In re Wilson, Milton; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 413805; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 KW 2002.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Michael LeBLANC v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-0521.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 3, 2012.
   In re LeBlanc, Michael; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 04-91-0739; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 KW 1978.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Jamie WILLIAMS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-0630.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 3, 2012.
   In re Williams, Jamie;—Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Tangipahoa, 21st Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 110425; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 KW 2013.

Denied. Repetitive. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4(A).


text:
    STATE ex rel. Burnell PEARSON, Jr. v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-0637.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 3, 2012.
   In re Pearson Jr., Burnell; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 2-01-208; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2004 KA 0490.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Billy VAUGHN v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-0638.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 3, 2012.
   In re Vaughn, Billy; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Lafourche, 17th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 442110; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 KW 2086.

Denied.

WEIMER, J., recused.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Bradford McKAY v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-0710.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 3, 2012.
   In re McKay, Bradford; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Bossier, 26th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 159913; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 46447-KH.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Samuel ROSS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-0764.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 3, 2012.
   In re Ross, Samuel; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 08-3941; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 11-KH-22.

Denied.

GUIDRY, J., recused.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Robert E. JACKSON, Jr. v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-0787.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 3, 2012.
   In re Jackson Jr., Robert E.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Red River, 39th Judicial District Court Div. O, No. 96366; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 46,-449-KH.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Lawrence WILLIAMS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-0788.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 3, 2012.
   In re Williams, Lawrence; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. N, No. 00-1318; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 11-KH-188.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Edward A. LOWERY, Jr. v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-0831.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 3, 2012.
   In re Lowery Jr., Edward A.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedíal Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. J, No. 87-3131; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 11-KH-170.

Denied.

GUIDRY, J., recused.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Darrin ROBINSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-0859.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 3, 2012.
   In re Robinson, Darrin; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. E, No. 341-472; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-K-0307.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Calvin Lee CRADDOCK v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-1983.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 3, 2012.
   In re Craddock, Calvin Lee; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of West Feliciana, 20th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 11-WCR-208; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011 CW 1124.

Denied.


text:
    Trinette CLAY-PETERS, et al. v. George LEE, III, et al.
    No. 2011-CC-2150.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 3, 2012.
   In re City of New Orleans; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. K, No. 00-11710; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-C-0647.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Martin G. LEMOINE.
    No. 2011-KK-2383.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 3, 2012.
   In re Lemoine, Martin G.; Lemoine, Veronica; Morel G. Lemoine Distributors, Inc. et al.; — Defendant(s); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Pointe Coupee, 18th Judicial District Court Div. B, Nos. 70287-F2, 70287-F, 70287-F1; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011 KW 0890.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Blain McDONALD, et al.
    No. 2011-KK-2486.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 3, 2012.
   In re McDonald, Blain; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. E, No. 499-649; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-K-1445.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Jeremy BROWN.
    No. 2011-KK-2492.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 3, 2012.
   In re Brown, Jeremy; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Allen, 33rd Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 2008-2335; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KW 11-01225.

Denied.

KNOLL, J., recused.


text:
    Leonard MULLER, Wayne Muller, Gary Muller, Margaret Muller Gaudet and Keith Muller, individually and on Behalf of their Deceased Mother, Margaret Muller v. ST. JOSEPH NURSING AND REHABILITATION CENTER.
    No. 2011-CC-2521.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 3, 2012.
   In re St. Joseph Nursing and Rehabilitation Center; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. M, No. 659-107; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 11-C-950.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Reginald KENT.
    No. 2011-KK-2522.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 3, 2012.
   In re Kent, Reginald; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. O, No. 10-3076; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 11-K-880.

Denied.


text:
    Dennis B. ANDERSON v. Deborah Dorsey ANDERSON.
    No. 2011-CC-2539.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 3, 2012.
   In re Anderson, Dennis B.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. J, No. 2010-08339; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-C-1233.

Denied.


text:
    47, INC. v. CLOVERLAND ESTATES LLC.
    No. 2011-CC-2565.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 3, 2012.
   In re Cloverland Estates LLC; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. O, No. 568741; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011 CW 1218.

Denied.


text:
    Joann ZAUNBRECHER v. GENERAL HEALTH SYSTEM, INC., d/b/a Baton Rouge General Medical Center, Dr. Clint B. Griffin, Dr. Pamela E. Payment and Dr. Jim Crowell.
    No. 2011-C-2602.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 3, 2012.
   In re Glynn, Donald; Zaunbrecher, Joann et al.; Zaunbrecher, Kelson; Zaun-brecher, Mary Catherine; — Plaintiff(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 468476; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011 CA 0149.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Bernard EDWARDS.
    No. 2011-KK-2603.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Feb. 3, 2012.
   In re Edwards, Bernard; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. L, Nos. 02-08-0417, 03-10-0101; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011 KW 1608.

Denied.