author: WARNER, J.

text:
    Marc ROZZO, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Nos. 4D09-3913, 4D09-3914, 4D09-3915.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    Dec. 7, 2011.

      Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Gary Lee Caldwell, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Diane F. Medley, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
   WARNER, J.

This appeal arises out of the trial court’s refusal to suppress evidence that was discovered during a warrantless search of appellant’s home. At issue in this appeal is the validity of his father’s consent to the search, which was obtained after appellant was taken into custody outside the home and the officers performed a protective sweep of the home. We hold that the protective sweep violated the Fourth Amendment and tainted the father’s subsequent consent to search.

Appellant was on probation in two underlying cases. While on probation, the police conducted a controlled drug buy from appellant. Detective Brown of the Broward Sheriffs Office testified that he and Detective Hodgson made a controlled call to appellant to purchase “Roxies.” The officers sent a “source” to meet with appellant near appellant’s house. The operation occurred at about 4:00 p.m.

Detective Rush observed the transaction, while Detectives Brown and Hodgson were hiding. When Detective Rush gave the signal that the transaction was “going down,” Brown and Hodgson approached appellant. Appellant tried to walk away and threw some tablets on the ground as Detective Brown was approaching him. Detective Rush found five oxycodone pills in the grass near appellant. The officers then placed appellant in custody and had him sit on the street curb.

Because their surveillance was compromised, the officers performed a “security sweep” of the house where appellant lived with his father and his stepmother. Detective Brown admitted that during the security sweep, he ordered appellant’s father and stepmother out of the house and to remain out of the house. The protective sweep took less than five minutes. The officers looked through any areas where a person could be hiding. When asked why the officers decided to clear the house, Detective Brown responded that it was because they were concerned about officer safety and contraband in the house. No further details were offered.

After clearing the house, the officers went outside and met with the father and stepmother. According to Detective Brown, the officers explained to the parents what happened with appellant. The officers further explained that they had some concerns that there was more contraband inside of the house. The parents said there was nothing inside the house and that the officers were welcome to check. The officers waited about twenty minutes for another officer to arrive with a Consent to Search form. During this time, the parents did not express to the officers that they did not want the officers to search the house. The officers did not threaten the parents. Detective Brown denied telling the parents that they would be arrested if the police were not allowed inside the house.

Appellant’s father signed the Consent to Search form, which was admitted into evidence without objection. The form advised the father of the right to refuse permission to search. According to Detective Brown, appellant’s father was friendly, cordial, and “more than willing” to let the officers go through the house. Brown testified that obtaining a search warrant was “never an issue” because the officers had probable cause. Brown stated that even though the officers were invited in the house, they had a probable cause affidavit if the father did not allow them inside, “but it did not come to that.”

Once the form was signed, the officers entered and appellant’s father accompanied them through the house. The father took them to appellant’s bedroom, where the officers found a pipe containing “Roxie” residue, multiple tablets of narcotics, and $900 in cash. After the search was over, the parents thanked the officers. The testimony of the other officers was consistent with Detective Brown’s recitation of the events.

Not surprisingly, the parents’ testimony presented a drastically different version of events with respect to the detectives’ conduct in obtaining the father’s signature on the Consent to Search form. The father and stepmother both testified that the officers ordered them out of the house and then threatened them with arrest if the officers had to wait for a search warrant and then found drugs in the home. Being a commercial airline pilot whose career would have been threatened by an arrest, the father felt coerced into signing the consent. The father stated that he did not thank the officers and expressed no knowledge of his son’s drug activity.

After considering the parties’ arguments, the trial court first found that there was probable cause to take appellant into custody. With respect to the search of the parents’ home, the trial court found that the officers received voluntary consent for the search. The trial court specifically found as follows: “I find that the officers were credible. There was no coercion. They received consent voluntarily.” Accordingly, the trial court denied the motion to suppress.

Following the denial of the motion to suppress, the parties reached a negotiated plea agreement in all cases. Under the plea agreement, appellant’s probation was revoked and he was sentenced to concurrent three-year terms of imprisonment for all offenses, but he reserved the right to appeal the denial of the motion to suppress. This appeal follows.

In this appeal, appellant does not raise any argument challenging the seizure of the pills found near his person, but rather challenges the trial court’s refusal to suppress the evidence found inside his parents’ home. Relying primarily on Vasquez v. State, 870 So.2d 26 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) and Diaz v. State, 34 So.3d 797 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010), appellant argues that the officers illegally entered his house to make the initial sweep, his parents were illegally ordered out of the house and detained, and his father’s subsequent consent to the search was the fruit of an illegal entry. The state responds that the initial sweep of the house was not illegal and did not invalidate appellant’s father’s signed consent to search the house. More specifically, the state argues that the limited and brief sweep of the home was based on the exigent circumstances of preventing the destruction of evidence — drugs which could have been disposed of easily and quickly.

“A trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress comes to the appellate court clothed with a presumption of correctness and the court must interpret the evidence and reasonable inferences and deductions derived therefrom in a manner most favorable to sustaining the trial court’s ruling.” Terry v. State, 668 So.2d 954, 958 (Fla.1996). An appellate court is bound by the trial court’s findings of historical fact if those findings are supported by competent, substantial evidence. Pagan v. State, 830 So.2d 792, 806 (Fla.2002); Hunter v. State, 32 So.3d 170, 173 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010). However, an appellate court applies a de novo standard of review to the mixed questions of law and fact that ultimately determine constitutional issues. See Schoenwetter v. State, 931 So.2d 857, 866 (Fla.2006); Falls v. State, 953 So.2d 627, 629 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007).

At the core of the Fourth Amendment stands “the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.” Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511, 81 S.Ct. 679, 5 L.Ed.2d 734 (1961). Accordingly, a private home is an area where a person enjoys the highest reasonable expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment. Ruiz v. State, 50 So.3d 1229, 1231 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011). Indeed, physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980). Absent consent or exigent circumstances, police officers may not enter a dwelling without a warrant. Rebello v. State, 773 So.2d 579, 580 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000).

A protective sweep is a “quick and limited search of premises, incident to an arrest and conducted to protect the safety of police officers or others.” Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 327, 110 S.Ct. 1093, 108 L.Ed.2d 276 (1990). Where a defendant is arrested outside his or her home, a warrantless protective sweep of the defendant’s home is permissible only if the officers have a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the protective sweep is necessary due to a safety threat or the destruction of evidence. See Diaz v. State, 34 So.3d 797, 802 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010); see also Klosieski v. State, 482 So.2d 448, 450 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986) (holding that warrant-less entry of house to conduct a protective sweep was not justified where suspects were arrested outside the house and “the police had no reason to believe that other individuals, dangerous to their safety, were inside the house”).

A protective sweep of a home, incident to an arrest outside the home, cannot be justified routinely. See Mestral v. State, 16 So.3d 1015, 1018 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009) (holding that a protective sweep was impermissible because “the officers entered the residence as part of a routine practice and not on the basis of any articu-lable facts which would warrant a reasonable belief that there was any dangerous individual inside who posed a threat to those on the arrest scene”). The arresting officer must have both “ ‘(1) a reasonable belief that third persons are inside, and (2) a reasonable belief that the third persons were aware of the arrest outside the premises so that they might destroy evidence, escape or jeopardize the safety of the officers or the public.’ ” Diaz, 34 So.3d at 802 (quoting United States v. Flores, 2009 WL 55022, at *2 (M.D.Fla. Jan.7, 2009)).

Similarly, “exigent circumstances exist where the occupants of a house are aware of the presence of someone outside, and are engaged in activities that justify the officers in the belief that the occupants are actually trying to escape or destroy evidence.” Lee v. State, 856 So.2d 1133, 1138 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) (citing Benefield v. State, 160 So.2d 706 (Fla.1964)) (emphasis in original). Fears for officer safety based on generalizations about drug cases, rather than on any specific risk presented by the facts of defendant’s case, do not qualify as exigent circumstances. Lee, 856 So.2d at 1139-40.

Two cases illustrate under similar facts that the protective sweep conducted in this case violated the Fourth Amendment. In Vasquez v. State, 870 So.2d 26 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003), the Second District held that a search of a motel room was not a permissible protective sweep, nor was it justified by exigent circumstances. There, the police were investigating a robbery and encountered the defendant outside his motel room. As the officers approached the room where the defendant claimed he resided, the co-defendant suddenly opened the door and stepped outside, leaving the door open behind him. From the hallway, the officers observed in the room a full syringe, a pipe intended for drug use, and a bullet inside the room. The officers then secured the defendants outside their motel room, entered the room, and performed a “protective sweep.” During this entry, an officer observed bandanas, cash, and other evidence related to the robbery. The defendant later signed a form consenting to a full search of the motel room, and also gave a statement implicating himself in the crime.

The trial court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence, but the Second District reversed. Relying on Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 34, 90 S.Ct. 1969, 26 L.Ed.2d 409 (1970), the court determined that the officers could not justify a protective sweep of the motel residence based upon the arrest of the occupants outside the home. No exigent circumstances were present, nor could “ ‘an arrest on the street ... provide its own ‘exigent circumstance’ so as to justify a warrantless search of the arrestee’s house.’ ” 870 So.2d at 30 (quoting Vale, 399 U.S. at 35, 90 S.Ct. 1969). The Vasquez court stressed that the officers lacked a reasonable basis to suspect that a third person was inside the room, and thus concluded that there were no exigent circumstances and that the “protective sweep” was an unlawful search. 870 So.2d at 29-31. The court also noted that because the protective sweep was illegal, the consent to the search and the confession obtained thereafter were presumed invalid. Id. at 31. However, the Vasquez court did not direct that the trial court suppress the evidence, but instead remanded the case for the trial court to consider whether there was an unequivocal break in the chain of illegality resulting from the protective sweep. Id. at 31-32.

More recently, in Diaz v. State, 34 So.3d 797 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010), this court held that the police were not justified in entering the defendant’s house without a warrant and conducting a protective sweep. There, the defendant, Diaz, was a known drug dealer, and the police were watching his home. A detective saw a female leave the defendant’s house and deposit suspected narcotics into the pocket of an unknown male, later identified as Steadham. Stead-ham was detained and implicated the defendant as his drug source. Steadham also told the police that there were probably more drugs inside the defendant’s home and that the defendant was there with his girlfriend. The female then came out of the home again and was arrested a few feet from the front door, which remained open. An officer could tell there were other people inside the house, based on movement in the back. Five officers then entered the home with guns drawn and performed a protective sweep. An officer testified that the protective sweep was for officer well-being and to make sure nobody was armed. The officers detained Diaz and his girlfriend, bringing them outside where they signed consents to search the home. Diaz, 34 So.3d at 799-800.

Diaz moved to suppress the contraband found in his home, arguing that the protective sweep was illegal and the consents to search were invalid. The trial court denied the motion. On appeal, this court reversed, concluding that the police were not justified in entering the defendant’s house without a warrant and conducting a protective sweep. Id. at 801-04. We explained:

[N]o evidence was adduced at the hearing to establish the required “reasonable, articulable suspicion” that these individuals posed a danger and might jeopardize the officers’ safety or destroy evidence. The officers testified only about their general safety concerns with narcotics investigations. Their testimony suggests that they entered the residence as part of a routine practice, rather than on the basis of any articulable facts which would warrant a reasonable belief that the occupants posed a threat to officer safety.

Id. at 802. We further found that the state failed to present evidence of any exigent circumstances that would have made procurement of a warrant not feasible. Id. at 803. Finally, because the state failed to prove that the taint of the illegal protective sweep was dissipated by subsequent events, this court held that the consents to the search given by both Diaz and his girlfriend were invalid, and reversed the denial of Diaz’s motion to suppress. Id. at 803-04.

Applying these principles to the facts of this case, it is clear that the war-rantless entry and protective sweep of the Rozzo home violated the Fourth Amendment. Appellant was arrested outside his home. Unlike both Vasquez and Diaz, the officers observed no open door to the home and no illegal activity within. Detective Brown admitted in his testimony that he ordered the parents out of the house so that the police could conduct a protective sweep of the home. No reasonable person would feel free to simply terminate an encounter with the police after having been ordered out of his or her home.

Like Diaz, the officers’ testimony in this case suggested that they conducted the sweep as a routine practice out of generalized concerns regarding officer safety and the possible presence of contraband, not based on any articulable facts relevant to this particular case. Moreover, just as in Diaz, in this case the officers did not have any objectively reasonable basis to suspect that the occupants of the house were aware that appellant had been arrested outside the home, nor did the officers have an objectively reasonable basis for believing that the occupants of the house posed a safety threat or were actively trying to destroy evidence. Furthermore, the facts here present an even more compelling case for suppression than in Diaz, because in Diaz the police knew that a suspected drug dealer was inside the home. Here, the occupants of appellant’s home were his parents, and there was no testimony that anyone suspected appellant’s parents of being involved in his drug-related activities. The state failed to present evidence of any exigent circumstances that would have made applying for a warrant impractical.

The officers’ own testimony, which the trial court found credible, establishes the illegality of the protective sweep. Because the “protective sweep” was an unreasonable warrantless entry into the Rozzo home, the father’s subsequent consent to the search of the home was presumptively tainted. See Gonzalez, 578 So.2d at 734 (unlawful police action presumptively taints and renders involuntary any consent to search). The state bears the burden to show that the taint of illegal entry was dissipated by subsequent events. State v. Sakezeles, 778 So.2d 432, 434 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001). Here, only about twenty minutes elapsed between the initial sweep and the time when the written consent form was signed. The consent to search was nothing more than an acquiescence to a show of authority after the officers had ordered the parents out of the house to conduct a protective sweep.

The state argues, however, that the taint was dissipated because the father was advised that he had a right to refuse the search, citing State v. Boyd, 615 So.2d 786 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993). In Boyd, the Second District stated, in dicta, that “even where a consent is obtained after the taint of illegal police action, the taint may be dissipated by advice to the defendant of his right to refuse to consent so as to render the subsequent consent free and voluntary.” Id. at 790. However, the operative words in Boyd are “may be.” Knowledge of the right to refuse the search is simply one relevant factor in determining whether consent is voluntary. See State v. Gamez, 34 So.3d 245, 248 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (although knowledge of the right to refuse the search is a relevant factor in determining whether consent is voluntary, courts must look at the totality of the circumstances). This fact is not dispositive under the totality of the circumstances. For example, in Diaz, following the protective sweep, the defendant and his girlfriend were also advised of their right to refuse consent to the search, yet this court still held that the state failed to prove that the taint of illegal entry was dissipated. See Diaz, 34 So.3d at 800, 804. Likewise, in Gonzalez v. State, 578 So.2d 729 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991), the Third District found that the taint of an illegal protective sweep had not been dissipated even though the written consent form advised the signee of the right to refuse the search, where there was no showing that the written advice was ever read to the person who signed the form. Gonzalez, 578 So.2d at 737 n. 19. Here, the mere fact that the written consent form advised the father of the right to refuse the search is insufficient to dissipate the taint of the illegal sweep.

Because the state failed to dissipate the taint of the illegal protective sweep, we hold that the trial court erred in refusing to suppress the evidence inside the Rozzo home. However, appellant does not raise any argument on appeal that the trial court erred in refusing to suppress the five oxycodone pills that were found near appellant when he was arrested. Accordingly, on remand we direct the trial court to vacate appellant’s convictions and sentences in case number 09-8058 as to count I (trafficking in hydrocodone), count III (possession of hydromorphone), and count IV (possession of drug paraphernalia). Appellant’s conviction as to count II (possession of oxycodone) should stand.

As to cases 06-11491 and 07-8942, on which the trial court violated appellant’s probation, we direct the trial court to enter amended orders of revocation of probation, revoking only for possession of oxycodone, but vacating the remaining allegations of violation of probation.

Reversed and remanded with instructions.

POLEN and LEVINE, JJ., concur.

      . In case number 06-11491, appellant was placed on probation following a no contest plea to charges of possession of cannabis, possession of paraphernalia, and violating a driver’s license restriction. In case number 07-8942, appellant was placed on probation following a no contest plea to charges of burglary of a conveyance, petit theft, and felony battery.

      . Because the trial court found the officers credible, we need not consider the father’s testimony of additional coercive conduct on the part of the Broward Sheriff’s Department in obtaining his written consent to the search. Nevertheless, we note the similarity of the circumstances between Diaz and this case, both involving the Broward County Sheriff’s office.. In each case, the person whose consent to search was sought, i.e., the girlfriend in Diaz and the parents in this case, testified that the officers told them that they would be arrested if the officers were required to get a search warrant and subsequently found contraband in the residence.

      . This statement in Boyd is dicta because the court there stressed that the initial entry was not illegal.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: PER CURIAM.

license: Public Domain

text:
    Pablo Jose MARTINEZ, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 3D11-2713.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Dec. 7, 2011.
    Sara Elizabeth Dill, Miami, for appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, for appellee.
    Before RAMIREZ, SHEPHERD, and SUAREZ, JJ.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. See Hernandez v. State, 61 So.3d 1144 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011).


text:
    Kenneth BROWN, K.W. Brown & Co., d/b/a K.W. Brown Investments and 21st Century Advisors, Inc., Appellants, v. TRAMONT GUERRA & NUNEZ, P.A. f/k/a Rodriguez, Tramont, Guerra & Nunez, P.A. and Andrew Tramont, Appellees.
    No. 4D10-4464.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    Dec. 7, 2011.
    Russell L. Forkey of Russell L. Forkey, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for appellants.
    Andrew V. Tramont and David E. Cha-cin of Tramont Guerra & Nunez, P.A., Coral Gables, for appellees.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. See Reuter Recycling of Florida Inc. v. City of Hallandale, 993 So.2d 1178 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008).

CIKLIN, GERBER and CONNER, JJ., concur.


text:
    Armando AMAYA, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 3D10-573.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Dec. 7, 2011.
    Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender, and Michael T. Davis, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.

      Pamelo Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Keri T. Joseph, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
    Before RAMIREZ, SUAREZ, and CORTIÑAS, JJ.
   PER CURIAM.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking the defendant’s probation, as the record contains sufficient evidence from which the trial court could have found any of the alleged violations of probation occurred, under the preponderance of the evidence standard. Further, the trial court did not prejudice the defendant’s due process rights in its conduct of the hearing. See Shores v. State, 765 So.2d 166, 167 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000); McPherson v. State, 530 So.2d 1095, 1099 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988); Wilson v. State, 506 So.2d 1170 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987).

Affirmed.


text:
    David R. JOHNSON, Former Husband, Appellant, v. Nancy M. JOHNSON, Former Wife, Appellee.
    No. 1D11-5402.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Dec. 7, 2011.
    Mark Lee Smith of Mark Lee Smith, P.A., Pensacola, for Appellant.
    Clayton J.M. Adkinson of Adkinson Law Firm, DeFuniak Springs, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

DISMISSED. See Hoffman v. O’Connor, 802 So.2d 1197 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002); see also Demont v. Demont, 24 So.3d 699 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (dismissing appeal rather than allowing lower court to enter a final order where an indeterminate amount of judicial labor remained to be done before a final order could be entered).

VAN NORTWICK, THOMAS, and RAY, JJ., concur.


text:
    Lillian REYES, Appellant, v. FLORIDA UNEMPLOYMENT APPEALS COMMISSION, Appellee.
    No. 1D11-4665.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Dec. 7, 2011.
    Lillian Reyes, pro se, Appellant.
    A. Robert Whaley, General Counsel, Unemployment Appeals Commission, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

DISMISSED. See generally Durando v. Palm Beach County, 719 So.2d 1258 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) (dismissing untimely appeal without prejudice to appellant’s right to petition agency for relief).

VAN NORTWICK, LEWIS, and THOMAS, JJ., concur.


text:
    Mauro SOLIS, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 1D11-6227.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Dec. 8, 2011.
    Mauro Solis, pro se, Petitioner.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

DENIED. See Fla. R.App. P. 9.141(d)(5).

WOLF, HAWKES, and ROBERTS, JJ., concur.


text:
    Craig GRANT and Caboodle Ranch, Inc., Appellants, v. Carolyn Camp LOGAN, Gary L. Conley, and Pamela Jonasson, Appellees.
    No. 1D11-4741.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Dec. 8, 2011.
    Robert W. Bauer, Gainesville, for Appellants.
    Lucas J. Taylor of Sellers, Taylor & Morrison, P.A., Live Oak, for Appellees.
   PER CURIAM.

DISMISSED. See Jensen v. Whetstine, 985 So.2d 1218 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008).

WOLF, HAWKES, and ROBERTS, JJ., concur.


text:
    John CARSWELL, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D11-2056.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Dec. 9, 2011.

      Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, Paula S. Saunders, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Donna A. Gerace, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Appellant was convicted by a jury for possession of a firearm by a felon. After reviewing the record, we conclude that the State correctly concedes the trial court erred below.

At the sentencing hearing, the trial court improperly considered its own opinion that Appellant “lied under oath in [his] defense.... ” Accordingly, we reverse the sentence and remand for resentencing before a different judge. See Robinson v. State, 637 So.2d 998, 999 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) (holding: “A trial judge’s opinion as to whether a defendant testified falsely should not enter into a decision to impose a harsher sentence unless the court is determining the sentence after a separate perjury conviction.”); Smith v. State, 62 So.3d 698, 699 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) (“ ‘It is impermissible for a trial court to consider a defendant’s assertions of his innocence and refusal to admit guilt in imposing sentence.’”) (quoting Hannum v. State, 13 So.3d 132, 135 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009)).

REVERSED and REMANDED with instructions consistent with this opinion.

VAN NORTWICK, THOMAS, and ROWE, JJ., concur.


text:
    Mark Devone STALLWORTH, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D10-4711.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Dec. 9, 2011.
    Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender and Glenna Joyce Reeves, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General and Giselle D. Lylen, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. See Flagg v. State, 74 So.3d 138 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011).

BENTON, C.J., CLARK, and MARSTILLER, JJ., concur.


text:
    Jorge Ivan ALVAREZ, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D09-4048.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    Dec. 14, 2011.

      Michael E. Allen of Guy E. Burnette, Jr., P.A., Tallahassee, for appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Daniel P. Hyndman, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
   WARNER, J.

In this appeal from his conviction for false imprisonment and assault, appellant claims that the trial court erred in denying his motion to substitute counsel. Because the trial court made no inquiry of appellant and gave no reason for denying the motion for substitution and the short continuance requested so that private counsel could appear, the trial court abused its discretion. We therefore reverse.

Alvarez was charged with false imprisonment and aggravated assault with a firearm arising out of an October 2008 domestic dispute in which he allegedly threatened Dawn Alvarez, his estranged wife, with a gun. Jury trial was set for August 25, 2009. Prior to the commencement of trial, attorney Scott Skier addressed the court and informed it that the day before Alvarez, who had been represented by the public defender to that point, hired Skier to represent him in the matter. Skier noted that he had filed a notice of appearance, a motion to substitute counsel, and a motion for continuance. He requested a thirty to forty-five day continuance to see if the ease could be worked out with the prosecutor or to prepare for trial. The state objected, stating that it was prepared to go to trial that day.

The court asked about the history of the case. The state attorney noted that the case had been handled by another state attorney until recently, and the ease was before Judge Colbath. He noted that it was an older case, dating from 2008, and the trial would be relatively quick. The court asked how long the case had been set and was informed by the public defender that it had been set two weeks earlier by Judge Colbath. The public defender also noted that because appellant had paid Skier to represent him, he could no longer be considered indigent for the purposes of public defender representation. Without any further inquiry, the court denied the substitution of counsel and started the trial, where appellant was represented by the public defender. Appellant was convicted, prompting this appeal.

We review the denial of a motion to substitute counsel and the trial court’s ruling on a motion for continuance under an abuse of discretion standard. See Lelieve v. State, 7 So.3d 624, 629 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009).

The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects the right of a criminal defendant to be represented by the attorney of his or her own choosing. See Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159, 108 S.Ct. 1692, 1697, 100 L.Ed.2d 140 (1988). Wheat acknowledges that this right is not absolute. In Foster v. State, 704 So.2d 169 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997), we explained that a trial court may exercise its discretion and deny a motion for substitution of counsel based upon considerations of judicial administration:

“[A] defendant does not have an absolute right to a particular lawyer and that it is within a trial court’s discretion to deny a defendant’s request for particular counsel when there is a ‘countervailing public interest in the fair and orderly administration of justice.’ ” Bundy v. State, 455 So.2d 330, 348 (Fla.1984) (quoting United States v. Salinas, 618 F.2d 1092, 1093 (5th Cir.1980)). For example, a defendant’s invocation of the right to choose his own attorney may not be made in bad faith or “for the sake of arbitrary delay or to otherwise subvert judicial proceedings.” See Holley v. State, 484 So.2d 634, 636 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); accord Cartwright v. State, 565 So.2d 784, 785 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990) (agreeing that a “defendant’s right to obtain private counsel is not a license to delay proceedings and waste the trial court’s time.”).

Id. at 173. In Foster, a defendant sought to discharge his court-appointed lawyer on the day of trial and utilize a private attorney retained by his family. The court denied the substitution, stating that it would not countenance further delay of the two-year-old case. We reversed, because the trial court did not find that any delay could be attributed to the defendant, that it appeared that the potential substitution had been discussed at a hearing prior to the trial; and because, despite the trial court’s concern over delay, it subsequently granted the defendant’s court-appointed counsel a short continuance. Accordingly, the trial court’s decision was arbitrary.

We considered the defendant’s right to discharge private counsel in Jackson v. State, 979 So.2d 442 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008). There, the defendant sought to discharge his private counsel on the day of trial. The trial court conducted a Nelson inquiry as to the reasons, and finding them inadequate denied the motion for discharge. Defendant proceeded to trial represented by the counsel he sought to discharge. In reversing, we noted that a Nelson inquiry was not appropriate, because appellant was not seeking to have court-appointed counsel. Instead, a trial court ruling on a request for substitution on the eve of trial should focus on the balancing of the defendant’s right to counsel of his own choosing with considerations of judicial administration. In Jackson, we noted:

The trial court made no finding that appellant’s request was made in bad faith or for purposes of delay, that the State’s case would suffer prejudice, or that the court’s schedule would not permit a continuance. The record does not support a conclusion that any of these scenarios existed and, even if it did, the trial court should have given appellant the option to proceed to trial with current counsel or discharge counsel and represent himself.

Id. at 445. Based upon the trial court’s failure to address these factors, we reversed and remanded for a new trial. In contrast, in Hurtado v. State, 760 So.2d 279, 280 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000), we affirmed the trial court’s denial of a motion for substitution on the day of trial where the defendant had not expressed his dissatisfaction with appointed counsel, and the trial court found that the request for substitution was an attempt to delay the process and obstruct the administration of justice.

In the present case, the trial court made no findings that the request to substitute was made in bad faith for the purpose of delaying the administration of justice, nor would this record support such a finding. The ease had been pending for about ten months. It had been set for trial just two weeks before, and there is no evidence that it had been delayed by the actions of the defendant. The state did not claim that it would be prejudiced (other than the fact that the state attorney was prepared to try the case that day), nor did the trial court state that its schedule would not allow a short continuance. Without ever interrogating the appellant himself on the reason for his seeking to change attorneys on the eve of trial, the court simply denied the motion for substitution. Nor did it offer the appellant the option of representing himself.

While the constitutional right to have counsel of one’s own choosing represent a defendant at trial may yield to considerations of the administration of justice, not every request to substitute counsel on the eve of trial may sufficiently impact those considerations such that a request may be denied without inquiry and without the court making proper findings to show that the defendant’s constitutional right is not being arbitrarily denied. Here, without such findings, we must find that the trial court abused its discretion.

Reversed and remanded for a new trial.

POLEN and LEVINE, JJ., concur.


text:
    Richard and Lynn MAINGOT, Appellants, v. UNIQUE VACATIONS, INC. and Sandals Resort International, Appellees.
    No. 3D10-2367.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Dec. 14, 2011.
    Michael D. Gelety, Fort Lauderdale, for appellants.
    Day Pitney and David B. Newman, New York, for appellees.
    Before EMAS and FERNANDEZ JJ., and SCHWARTZ, Senior Judge.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. See Borden v. Phillips, 752 So.2d 69 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000).


text:
    Sheldon SARGENT, Petitioner, v. Valencia SARGENT, k/n/a Valencia Duhart, Respondent.
    No. 3D11-2734.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Dec. 14, 2011.
    Martin Genet, Miami, for petitioner.
    No appearance for respondent.
    Before CORTINAS and ROTHENBERG, JJ., and SCHWARTZ, Senior Judge.
   PER CURIAM.

Upon consideration of petitioner’s application for prohibition seeking the disqualification of the trial judge, this Court issued a rule to show cause why that relief should not be granted. Neither the respondent, who was ordered, nor the trial judge, who was invited to do so, has replied. Upon consideration, we conclude that the petition for prohibition should be and is hereby granted. We are sure that it will not be necessary to issue the formal writ.

Prohibition granted.


text:
    Kareef CHERRINGTON, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE o/b/o Jeanine SANTIAGO, Respondent.
    No. 3D11-2733.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Dec. 14, 2011.
    Martin Genet, Miami, for petitioner.
    No appearance for respondent.
    Before CORTINAS and ROTHENBERG, JJ., and SCHWARTZ, Senior Judge.
   PER CURIAM.

Upon consideration of petitioner’s application for prohibition seeking the disqualification of the trial judge, this Court issued a rule to show cause why that relief should not be granted. Neither the respondent, who was ordered, nor the trial judge, who was invited to do so, has replied. Upon consideration, we conclude that the petition for prohibition should be and is hereby granted. We are sure that it will not be necessary to issue the formal writ.

Prohibition granted.


text:
    Stephen E. MIRON, etc., et al., Appellants, v. RIDA ASSOCIATES LLP, Appellee.
    No. 3D11-890.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Dec. 14, 2011.
    John L. Korthals, Pompano Beach, for appellants.
    Gunster, Yoakley & Stewart, Jack J. Aiello, West Palm Beach, and Scott W. Dangler, Fort Lauderdale, for appellee.
    Before WELLS, C.J., and RAMIREZ and CORTINAS, JJ.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. See Bentz v. McDaniel, 872 So.2d 978 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) (holding that, where servient owner shows that he or she continuously excluded or prevented an easement’s use by the dominant owner for seven years, extinguishment of the easement has been proven).


text:
    DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE o/b/o Elyse ALPERT, Appellants, v. Martin ALPERT, Appellee.
    No. 4D10-3078.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    Dec. 14, 2011.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and William H. Branch, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for appellants.
    Martin Alpert, for appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. See Lawrence v. Hershey, 890 So.2d 350 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004).

CIKLIN, GERBER and CONNER, JJ., concur.


text:
    Esteban SCHMIDT, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, UNEMPLOYMENT APPEALS COMMISSION and Interactive Response Technologies, Appellees.
    No. 4D10-4997.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    Dec. 14, 2011.

      Daniel J. Sullivan and Matthew D. Sullivan of the Law Office of Daniel J. Sullivan, Pinecrest, for appellant.
    Louis A. Gutierrez, Senior Attorney, Tallahassee, for appellee Unemployment Appeals Commission.
    Peter Penrod, Assistant General Counsel, Office of General Counsel, Tallahassee, for Agency for Workforce Innovation.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. See Velazquez v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 916 So.2d 1004 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006).

CIKLIN, GERBER and CONNER, JJ., concur.


text:
    Jack K. HODGKIN, Appellant, v. Michelle K. HODGKIN, Appellee.
    No. 4D10-2889.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    Dec. 14, 2011.
    Jack K. Hodgkin, Winchester, Kentucky, pro se.
    Kathryn M. Beamer, North Palm Beach, for appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. See Applegate v. Barnett Bank of Tallahassee, 377 So.2d 1150 (Fla.1979).

MAY, C.J., WARNER and GROSS, JJ., concur.


text:
    NORTHSTAR BEAUTY SALON, INC., Appellant, v. SOLEIL SALONS, INC., Joseph A. Tomonto, Kathryn Tomonto, Boris Wainstock, Chi Lam, Melchi International, Inc., Michael Beck, and Luxury Partners d/b/a Realty Associates Luxury Partners, Appellees.
    No. 4D11-2254.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    Dec. 14, 2011.
    Joseph P. Klapholz of Joseph P. Kla-pholz, P.A., Hollywood, for appellant.
    Wayne Kaplan of Wayne Kaplan, P.A., Boca Raton, for appellees Soleil Salons, Inc., Joseph A. Tomonto, and Kathryn To-monto.
   PER CURIAM.

We affirm the circuit court’s non-final order denying without prejudice the defendant’s emergency motion for release of assets. Our affirmance is without prejudice to the defendant renewing its motion before the circuit court if the plaintiffs fail to sufficiently plead or prove their allegations of fraudulent inducement against the defendant.

Affirmed without prejudice.

TAYLOR, DAMOORGIAN and GERBER, JJ., concur.


text:
    Luz Mery SALCEDO, Appellant, v. MARKET VISION CORPORATION, Appellee.
    No. 4D10-3042.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    Dec. 14, 2011.
    Paul B. Feltman, Coral Gables, for appellant.
    Cary A. Lubetsky, Joseph J. Huss and Amelia Gonzalez of Krinzman, Huss & Lu-betsky, Fort Lauderdale, for appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. See Dubai Islamic Bank v. Attorneys’ Title Ins. Fund, 778 So.2d 413 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001).

MAY, C.J., WARNER and GROSS, JJ., concur.


text:
    Patricia W. HULL, as legal guardian of Lola Brown Wheeler, Appellant, v. Jennifer BYROM, Individually and as the Former Voluntary Guardian of Lola Brown Wheeler, Jennifer Byrom, P.A., a Florida corporation; Fidelity and Deposit Company of Maryland, Appellees.
    No. 1D10-6520.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Dec. 15, 2011.
    Lois B. Lepp and Karen Sunnenberg of Lois B. Lepp, P.A., Pensacola, for Appellant.
    Kenneth B. Bell and Robert J. Powell of Clark, Partington, Hart, Larry, Bond & Stackhouse, Pensacola, for Appellees. ‘
   PER CURIAM.

We affirm the dismissal of Byrom, P.A. as a party to the underlying surcharge action. However, we decline to reach the issue of whether the trial court erred in striking portions of the surcharge petition as that issue was prematurely raised and is properly considered at the conclusion of all judicial labor. See Cole v. Bayley Prods., Inc., 661 So.2d 1299, 1800 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) (determining that an interlocutory order on motion to strike is not reviewable prior to final judgment).

AFFIRMED in part, DISMISSED in part.

WOLF, HAWKES, and ROBERTS, JJ., concur.


author: WOLF, J.

text:
    Dell POMEROY, Appellant, v. Cynthia Jo POMEROY, Appellee.
    No. 1D11-2315.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Dec. 15, 2011.
    Maria Perez Youngblood of Law Office of Robert W. Bauer, P.A., Gainesville, for Appellant.
    G. Cline Moore of G. Cline Moore, P.A., Perry, for Appellee.
   WOLF, J.

We find appellant’s argument that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction is without merit. In the General Assignment of Judges No. 2011-02, the chief judge of the Third Judicial Circuit appointed County Court Judge Stephen Murphy “as circuit court judge[ ] to adjudicate any issue pending in any circuit court case in the Third Judicial Circuit that will provide prompt disposition of cases and efficiently administer the courts.”

We reverse the portion of the trial court’s order requiring appellant to provide health, dental, and medical insurance for the parties’ daughter, who was over the age of eighteen. See Kern v. Kern, 360 So.2d 482, 486 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978) (finding “a parent owes no duty of support to an adult child except in extraordinary circumstances as when the child suffers severe physical or mental incapacitation”).

AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED.

HAWKES and ROBERTS, JJ., concur.


text:
    DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE obo Jennifer GRAHAM, Petitioner, v. Anthony Q. LOCKHART, Respondent.
    No. 1D11-4581.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Dec. 15, 2011.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Toni C. Bernstein, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Child Support Enforcement, Tallahassee, for Petitioner.
    Anthony Q. Lockhart, pro se, Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

The Department of Revenue seeks certiorari review of an order compelling genetic testing and argues that the administrative law judge departed from the essential requirements of law in ordering the testing. As the Department correctly contends, the administrative law judge lacked jurisdiction to order the testing in this child support proceeding brought pursuant to section 409.2563, Florida Statutes. See § 409.2563(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (providing in part that the administrative procedure set forth in the section concerns only the establishment of child support obligations and does not grant jurisdiction to the Department or the Division of Administrative Hearings to hear or determine issues of disputed paternity); see also Dep’t of Revenue ex rel. Clausen v. McDonald, 46 So.3d 1193, 1193-94 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010); Dep’t of Revenue v. Long, 937 So.2d 1235, 1236 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006).

Accordingly, we GRANT the petition for writ of certiorari and QUASH the order compelling genetic testing.

BENTON, C.J., DAVIS and MARSTILLER, JJ., concur.


author: ROWE, J.

text:
    K.R.R., A Child, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D11-3348.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Dec. 15, 2011.
    Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and Archie F. Gardner, Jr., Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Brooke Poland, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   ROWE, J.

K.R.R. appeals the trial court’s order placing her in a moderate-risk commitment program after she pleaded no contest to violating her probation for a fourth time by failing to attend or being suspended from school. The Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) recommended that KR.R.’s probation be continued. K.R.R. argues that in departing from DJJ’s recommendation, the trial court failed to engage in the appropriate level of analysis as set forth in E.A.R. v. State, 4 So.3d 614, 638 (Fla.2009). For the reasons discussed below, we reverse and remand. See C.M.H. v. State, 25 So.3d 678, 680 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010).

K.R.R. was before the trial court on charges that she had violated her probation for a fourth time. K.R.R. was initially placed on probation in April 2009, after pleading no contest to the charge of petit theft. Four months later, in August 2009, the state filed a petition alleging that K.R.R. violated her probation by committing a new law violation (petit theft), failing to obey a court-ordered curfew, and failing to live with and obey her mother. K.R.R. pleaded no contest and her probation was continued.

K.R.R. was charged with violating her probation for a second time, in September 2009, by committing a new law violation (petit theft and battery) and failing to attend or being suspended from school. K.R.R. again pleaded no contest and her probation was continued. K.R.R. was charged with violating her probation for a third time, in March 2010, by failing to attend or being suspended from school. K.R.R. again pleaded no contest and her probation was continued.

In connection with the order being appealed here, K.R.R. was charged in February 2011, with violating her probation for a fourth time by failing to attend or being suspended from school. K.R.R. again pleaded no contest. The court ordered DJJ to prepare a pre-disposition report. DJJ recommended that K.R.R.’s probation be continued.

After conducting the disposition hearing, the trial court deviated from DJJ’s recommendation and ordered that K.R.R. be committed to a moderate-risk program. Although the trial court articulated KR.R.’s basic disrespect for authority and the apparent ineffectiveness of probation in light of her repeated violations as reasons for not continuing her probation, these findings fall short of the scrupulous analysis required under E.A.R., See 25 So.3d at 680. As this court recognized in M.H. v. State, 69 So.3d 325, 328 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011), E.A.R. requires the trial court to conduct a rigorous and detailed analysis when deviating from DJJ’s recommendation:

[I]t is important for trial courts to understand that deviating from a DJJ’s recommendation is a difficult matter pursuant to the dictates of E.A.R In order to deviate lawfully, a trial court must do more than place generalized reasons on the record; it must engage in a well-reasoned and complete analysis of the PDR and the type of facility to which the trial court intends to send the child. This is no easy task and will take time and consideration.

Here, the trial court did not articulate on the record why a moderate-risk commitment program was better suited to serving the rehabilitative needs of K.R.R. “in the least restrictive setting and protecting the public from further acts of delinquency.” 25 So.3d at 680. Based on the strict requirements of E.A.R, we are constrained to reverse and remand. The trial court is provided with an “opportunity to enter an order in compliance with E.A.R., or, if the trial court cannot, impose the probation recommended by the DJJ.” C.M.H., 25 So.3d at 680; accord M.H., 69 So.3d at 329; M.J.S. v. State, 6 So.3d 1268, 1270 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009).

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

BENTON, C.J. and RAY, J., concur.


author: VAN NORTWICK, J.

text:
    STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Melissa Hope WILLIAMS, Appellee.
    No. 1D11-0834.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Dec. 15, 2011.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Heather Flanagan Ross, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and Steven L. Seliger, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   VAN NORTWICK, J.

The State appeals the trial court’s order granting the motion of Melissa Hope Williams, appellee, to dismiss the information. In the information, the State alleged that Ms. Williams failed to notify the State of her address change as required by section 943.0435, Florida Statutes (2008) pursuant to her designation as a “sexual offender” under section 943.0435(l)(a)lb, Florida Statutes (2008). The trial court ruled that the registration requirement of section 943.0435(l)(a)l distinguishes between adult and juvenile sex offenders and that Ms. Williams was not obligated to register under the juvenile registration provisions. We agree and affirm.

In 2005, Ms. Williams moved to Florida from Michigan where she had been adjudicated delinquent and required to register as a sex offender. She was thirteen years old at the time of her adjudication for a misdemeanor sexual offense that occurred when she was approximately eleven years old. Ms. Williams registered her address with the Florida Department of Motor Vehicles when she first moved to Florida, but failed to reregister when she changed residences in approximately May 2009. In granting her motion to dismiss, the trial court ruled that under section 943.0435(l)(a)ld, Ms. Williams was not a “sexual offender” required to register since she was under the age of fourteen at the time of the underlying offense and the adjudication occurred before 2007, the year subparagraph d of the statute took effect.

The State argues the trial court erred by applying subsection d of section 943.0435(l)(a)l, rather than subsection b of the statute. Subsection b defines “sexual offender” for the purpose of the registration requirement as “any person” who was designated as a sexual offender and required to register as such in another state. We agree with the trial court that only subsection d of section 943.04S5(l)(a)l applies to juvenile offenders.

Section 943.0485(l)(a)l defines the term “sexual offender” as a person who meets any of the criteria in subparagraphs a through d of the statute. Under these provisions, a person is a “sexual offender” when that person:

a. has been convicted of committing or attempting one of the offenses listed in certain statutory provisions;
b. is a resident of Florida and has been designated a sexual predator, a sexually violent predator, or “by another sexual offender designation in another state or jurisdiction and was, as a result of such designation, subjected to registration”;
c. is a resident of this state or another and has been convicted, in this state or another, of kidnapping of a child, false imprisonment of a child, or luring a child by an adult for an unlawful purpose; or
d. as of July 1, 2007, has been adjudicated delinquent for committing, attempting, soliciting or conspiring to commit certain criminal offenses[] in this state or another jurisdiction when the juvenile was 14 years of age or older.

The issue before us is whether Ms. Williams was required to register as a sex offender under the provisions of subpara-graph b, or whether subparagraph d is the only authority under which persons convicted as juveniles are required to register.

In K.J.F. v. State, 44 So.3d 1204 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010), this court considered the question of whether a juvenile, who was not adjudicated delinquent but who was placed under the supervision of the Department of Juvenile Justice, was required to register as a sex offender. Because the plain language of subparagraph d applies only to a person “adjudicated delinquent” and because there is no other provision specifically providing that a juvenile whose adjudication is withheld must register as a sex offender, we held that the child in K.J.F. was not required to register. Id. at 1211. In so holding, we noted the longstanding premise of Florida law that, as a general rule, juveniles are to be treated differently from adults. This court observed:

In 2007, the Legislature expanded the definitions of both “sexual offender” and “convicted” in section 943.0435 so that certain juvenile offenders would be required to register as sexual offenders. Ch. 2007-209, Laws of Fla. In expanding the definition of “convicted,” the Legislature simply added adjudications of delinquency as a category additional to the pre-existing language pertaining to determinations of guilt in adult trials. Therefore, the existence of the phrase “regardless of whether adjudication is withheld” in connection with the portion of the definition pertaining to adults does not mean that the Legislature intended for this same language to apply to juveniles.
The State’s position that such language was clearly intended to apply to juveniles also ignores the principle noted in E.A.R. [E.A.R. v. State, 4 So.3d 614, 617 (Fla.2009) ] that “Florida’s treatment of juvenile delinquency is largely sui gen-eris.”

44 So.3d at 1208-09 (bold added); see generally, Earl F. Martin & Marsha Kline Pruett, The Juvenile Sex Offender and the Juvenile Justice System, 35 Am.CRIm. L.Rev. 279 (1998) (supporting policy of treating juveniles differently under the law).

Only subparagraph d of section 943.0435(l)(a)l applies to juveniles. If registration is not required by the explicit terms of that particular subparagraph, then a juvenile is not obliged to register. Because Ms. Williams’ adjudication of delinquency occurred in 2000, at the age of thirteen, she was not required to register under the express terms of subparagraph d. This construction is consistent with the statement of intent adopted when subpara-graph d was enacted. The Legislature explained that, by this subparagraph, it was creating “conditions under which juveniles are designated as sexual offenders.” Ch. 07-209, § 2, Laws of Fla. Legislative intent is the polestar that guides statutory interpretation. Borden v. East-European Ins. Co., 921 So.2d 587, 595 (Fla.2006).

Regarding the intent in Florida law to distinguish juveniles from adults, the decision of the Florida Supreme Court in State v. J.M., 824 So.2d 105 (Fla.2002), is instructive. In J.M., the Court held that “an adjudication of delinquency does not constitute a felony criminal conviction for purposes of adjudicating a person to be a sexual predator under the Florida Sexual Predators Act.” J.M., 824 So.2d at 107-08. In J.M., a fourteen year old juvenile was charged as an adult with sexual battery. He pled nolo contendere, and the trial court, in its discretion, adjudicated the juvenile as delinquent. Id. at 108. Had section 943.0435(l)(a)ld been in effect at the time, the juvenile may have met the definition of a “sexual offender,” given that he was fourteen years old and had been adjudicated delinquent. Importantly, the J.M. court recognized that “a juvenile adjudication of delinquency will not give rise to the same consequences as an adult conviction unless the Legislature has expressly stated otherwise.” Id. at 114 (bold added).

As noted, it was not until July 1, 2007, that the Legislature expressly stated otherwise. In adopting subsection d, the Legislature limited its application to a juvenile who committed an offense when he or she was 14 years of age or older. Here, Mrs. Williams was only thirteen years of age at the time of her adjudication. While some juveniles were registered as sex offenders before 2007, the adoption of sub-subparagraph d clarifies instances in which registration by juveniles is required. Additionally, as the J.M. court noted, the Legislature has been specific when it intends a statute to apply to both “convictions” and “adjudicated delinquencies.” See id. at 111; see also K.J.F., 44 So.3d at 1209.

AFFIRMED.

DAVIS and CLARK, JJ., concur.

      . These certain criminal offenses are serious felony offenses: sexual battery, lewd and lascivious battery on a child under 12 years of age when force or coercion is used, lewd and lascivious molestation of unclothed genitals of a child less than 12 years of age by a person under the age of 18, or lewd and lascivious molestation of a child less than 12 by a person over the age of 18.

      . Ms. Williams originally registered as a sex offender in Florida on or about December 7, 2005, prior to the enactment of section 943.0435(l)(a)ld.


text:
    The MILAN GROUP, INC. (“Milan Group”), a Pennsylvania Corporation, Appellant, v. LATITUDE 30 GROUP, LLC, a Florida Limited Liability Company; Cornerstone Lenders Group, Inc., a Florida Corporation; and Brynee Baylor, Appellees.
    No. 1D11-5308.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Dec. 15, 2011.
    Niels P. Murphy and J. Rice Ferrelle, Jr. of Murphy & Anderson, P.A., Jacksonville, for Appellant.
    No appearance for Appellees.
   PER CURIAM.

DISMISSED. Heekin v. Del Col, 60 So.3d 437 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011); Sears v. Sears, 617 So.2d 807, 808 n. 1 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993).

WOLF, HAWKES, and ROBERTS, JJ., concur.


text:
    Viviana JONES/CAICEDO, Appellant, v. Jason C. JONES, Appellee.
    No. 1D10-4995.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Dec. 19, 2011.
    Viviana Jones/Caieedo, pro se, Jacksonville.
    No appearance, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED. Applegate v. Barnett Bank of Tallahassee, 377 So.2d 1150 (Fla.1979).

VAN NORTWICK, WETHERELL, and ROWE, JJ., concur.


author: PER CURIAM,

text:
    DOLLAR GENERAL CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. Cynthia BABCOCK, Respondent.
    No. 1D11-2280.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Dec. 19, 2011.
    Harold R. Mardenborough, Jr., and J.L. King, of Carr Allison, Tallahassee, for Petitioner.

      Louis K. Rosenbloum, of Louis K. Ro-senbloum, P.A., Pensacola, and James R. Green, of James R. Green, P.A., Pensacola, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM,

DENIED. See Target Corp. v. Vogel, 41 So.3d 962 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010).

WOLF, CLARK, and WETHERELL, JJ., concur.


text:
    LOUISIANA HEALTHCARE CONNECTIONS, INC., et al. v. STATE of Louisiana, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HOSPITALS.
    No. 2011-CC-2361.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 4, 2011.
   In re United Healthcare of Louisiana, Inc.; — Plaintiffs; Applying for Rehearing of this Court’s Order dated November 2, 2011; Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 603,910 C/W 603,911 C/W 603,915; to the Court of Appeal First Circuit, Nos. 2011 CW 1820, 2011 CW 1823; 2011 CW 1822; 2011 CW 1821.

Stay denied; rehearing denied. In the event plaintiffs are unable to complete the appeal proceedings within the delay set by the trial court, they may reurge their request for a stay from the court of appeal. See, e.g., Utah-Louisiana Inv. Co. v. International Dev. Inc., 262 So.2d 551 (La.App. 1 Cir.1972).


text:
    LOUISIANA HEALTHCARE CONNECTIONS, INC., et al. v. STATE of Louisiana, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HOSPITALS.
    No. 2011-CC-2363.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 4, 2011.
   In re Louisiana Healthcare Connections Inc.; — Plaintiffs; Applying for Rehearing of this Court’s Order dated November 2, 2011; Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19 Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 603,910 C/W 603,911 C/W 603,915; to the Court of Appeal First Circuit, Nos. 2011 CW 1821, 2011 CW 1823.

Stay denied; rehearing denied. In the event plaintiffs are unable to complete the appeal proceedings within the delay set by the trial court, they may reurge their request for a stay from the court of appeal. See, e.g., Utah-Louisiana Inv. Co. v. International Dev. Inc., 262 So.2d 551 (La.App. 1 Cir.1972).


text:
    LOUISIANA HEALTHCARE CONNECTIONS, INC., et al. v. STATE of Louisiana, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HOSPITALS.
    No. 2011-CC-2380.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 4, 2011.
   In re Amerigroup of Louisiana, Inc.;— Plaintiffs; Applying for Reheariñg of this Court’s Order dated November 2, 2011; Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. A, Nos. 608,910, 603,-911, 603,915; to the Court of Appeal First Circuit, Nos. 2011 CW 1823, 2011 CW 1822.

Stay denied; rehearing denied. In the event plaintiffs are unable to complete the appeal proceedings within the delay set by the trial court, they may reurge their request for a stay from the court of appeal. See, e.g., Utah-Louisiana Inv. Co. v. International Dev. Inc., 262 So.2d 551 (La.App. 1 Cir.1972).


text:
    LOUISIANA HEALTHCARE CONNECTIONS, INC., et al. v. STATE of Louisiana, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HOSPITALS.
    No. 2011-CC-2477.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 8, 2011.
   In re Amerigroup Louisiana Inc.; Louisiana Healthcare Connections Inc.; United Healthcare of Louisiana Inc.; — Plaintiffs); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. A, Nos. 603,-910, 603,911, 603,915; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011 CW 1820R.

Stay denied; writ denied.


text:
    Hazel Richard SAVOIE, et al. v. Alice T. RICHARD, et al.
    No. 2011-CC-2482.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 8, 2011.
   In re Louisiana Onshore Properties LLC, et al.; Shell Oil Company; SWEPI LP; — Defendant(s); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Cameron, 38th Judicial District Court Div, O, No. 10-18078; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW 11-01348.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Nelson BENTON.
    No. 2011-KD-2485.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 9, 2011.
   In re Benton, Nelson; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. C, No. 498660; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-K-1568.

Stay denied; writ denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Charlie WATSON.
    No. 2011-KK-2268.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 9, 2011.
   In re Watson, Charlie; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. B, No. 502-137; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-K-0811.

Denied.

WEIMER, J., would grant.


text:
    CMH v. DM & SDM.
    No. 2011-CJ-2326.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 9, 2011.
   In re DM & SDM; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Assumption, 23rd Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 817; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011 CW 1719.

Denied.

KNOLL, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Reginald VARNADO.
    No. 2011-KK-2444.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 9, 2011.
   In re Varnado, Reginald; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. F, No. 504-393; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-K-1528.

Denied.

KNOLL, J., would grant.


text:
    Hazel Richard SAVOIE, et al. v. Alice T. RICHARD, et al.
    No. 2011-CC-2483.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 9, 2011.
   In re Louisiana Onshore Properties LLC, et al.; Shell Oil Company; SWEPI LP; — Defendant(s); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Cameron, 38th Judicial District Court Div. O, No. 10-18078; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW 11-01349.

Denied.

GUIDRY, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Anthony PIERRE.
    No. 2011-KK-2488.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 9, 2011.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. A, No. 503-376; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-K-1404.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. John COLVIN.
    No. 2011-K-1040.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 14, 2011.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. J, No. 487-459; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2010-KA-1092.

Granted.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Aubrey BROWN.
    No. 2011-K-1044.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 14, 2011.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Tangipahoa, 21st Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 110284; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 KA 2107.

Granted.


text:
    SIX C PROPERTIES, LLC v. James H. WELSH, Commissioner of Conservation of the State of Louisiana Office of Conservation and Radius Operating, LLC.
    No. 2011-C-1353.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 14, 2011.
   In re Six C Properties L.L.C.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. M, No. 587,223; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 CA 1913.

Granted.


text:
    Joe OLIVER, et al. v. MAGNOLIA CLINIC, et al.
    No. 2011-C-2132.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 14, 2011.
   In re St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company; Susan Duhon d/b/a The Magnolia Clinic, Inc.; — Defendant(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 2005-3709; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 09-439.

Granted.


text:
    Joe OLIVER, et al. v. MAGNOLIA CLINIC, et al.
    No. 2011-C-2139.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 14, 2011.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Third Party; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 2005-3709; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 09-439.

Granted.


text:
    Joe OLIVER, et al. v. MAGNOLIA CLINIC, et al.
    No. 2011-C-2142.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 14, 2011.
   In re Louisiana Patient’s Compensation Fund; — Third Party; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Cal-casieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 2005-3709; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 09-439.

Granted.


text:
    In re Appeal of Decision of the DISCIPLINARY BOARD NO. 11-PDB-037.
    No. 2011-OB-2137.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 14, 2011.
   In re Lehman, Robert C.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Appeal of the Decision of the Disciplinary Board Office of Disciplinary Board, No. ll-PDB-037.

Leave to appeal denied.


text:
    In re Appeal of Decision of the DISCIPLINARY BOARD NO. 2011-ADMIN-934.
    No. 2011-OB-2145.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 14, 2011.
   In re Jagneaux, Sherry Lynn; — Plaintiff; Applying For Appeal of the Decision of the Disciplinary Board No. 2011-ADMIN-934 Office of Disciplinary Board, No. 2011-ADMIN-934.

Not considered. See Supreme Court Rule XIX, Section § A.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Thomas HENRY, IV.
    No. 2011-KK-1911.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 14, 2011.
   In re Henry IV, Thomas; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. D, No. 496,825; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2010-K-1744.

Not considered. Not timely filed. See Supreme Court Rule X, Section 5(d).


text:
    Brent BEAUVAIS and Cynthia Beauvais v. Mary Darmanin DALTON, Stephen Dalton, and Roseline Dalton Kimball.
    No. 2011-CC-1922.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 14, 2011.
   In re Beauvais, Brent et al.; Beauvais, Cynthia; — Plaintiff(s); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Pointe Coupee, 18th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 34,118; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011 CW 0923.

Not considered, not timely filed.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Christopher BUTLER.
    No. 2011-KK-1930.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 14, 2011.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. D, No. 503-032; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-K-0879.

Writ not considered. Not timely filed. See Supreme Court Rule X, Section 5.


text:
    In re Peter R. CHASSAIGNAC.
    No. 2010-OB-2569.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 14, 2011.
   In re Chassaignac, Peter R.; — Plaintiff; Applying for Rehearing of this court’s action taken on September 30, 2011.

Rehearing denied.

KNOLL and WEIMER, JJ„ would grant.


text:
    Wanda WAGNER v. J. William SHERAR, et al., United Services Automobile Association.
    No. 2011-CC-1196.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 14, 2011.
   In re Wagner, Wanda; — Plaintiff; Applying for Rehearing of this Court’s action dated September 30, 2011; Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 2009-15981; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011 CW 0510.

Rehearing denied.

CLARK, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Jeffery MOORE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-1656.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 14, 2011.
   In re Moore, Jeffery; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 409898; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 KW 0408.

Denied.


text:
    Kenneth PHILLIPS v. James LEBLANC, Secretary, Department of Corrections, Warden Goodwin and Tommy Garrett, David Wade Correctional Center.
    No. 2010-CI-1698.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 14, 2011.
   In re Phillips, Kenneth; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 568762; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2009 CA 2279.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. George McGEE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-1709.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 14, 2011.
   In re McGee, George; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 06-6530; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 10-KH-342.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Jessie WHEELER v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-1948.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 14, 2011.
   In re Wheeler, Jessie; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 12-78-390.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; Stale v. Parker, 98-0256 (La.5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Wesley GUILLARD v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-2443.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 14, 2011.
   In re Guillard, Wesley; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 96-5735; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 10-KH-645.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Willie HARMASON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-2455.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 14, 2011.
   In re Harmason, Willie; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 05-06-0211; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 KW 1423.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Russell ELLWOOD v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-2468.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 14, 2011.
   In re Ellwood, Russell; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Charles, 29th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 98-0109; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 09-WR-76.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Bobby C. TERRICK v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-2475.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 14, 2011.
   In re Terrick, Bobby C.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 01-4723; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 09-WR-116.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Ernest HUNTER.
    No. 2010-KH-2524.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 14, 2011.
   In re Hunter, Ernest; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. J, No. 293-626; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2010-K-1390.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Cardell K. FUSILIER v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-2529.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 14, 2011.
   In re Fusilier, Cardell K.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 100-348; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 10-00423.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. John DAVIS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-2530.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 14, 2011.
   In re Davis, John; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. J, No. 00-3404; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 10-KH-747.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Ira ARKANSAS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-2531.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 14, 2011.
   In re Arkansas, Ira; — Plaintiff; Applying, For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. 3, No. 245,044; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 45986-KH.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Ronald Earl WILLIAMS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-2541.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 14, 2011.
   In re Williams, Ronald E.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. 2, Nos. 205,611, 205,-771; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 46026-KH.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Stanley M. LeBLANC.
    No. 2011-KD-2424.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 18, 2011.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. B, No. 473^420; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-K-1358.

Denied. Moot.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Stanley M. LeBLANC.
    No. 2011-K-2300.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 18, 2011.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. B, No. 473^20; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2010-KA-1484.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Alex P. PAPILLION.
    No. 2011-K-1149.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 18, 2011.
   In re Papillion, Alex P.; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 3987-07; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 10-1317.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Raymond Louis STACK.
    No. 2011-K-1152.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 18, 2011.
   In re Stack, Raymond Louis; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Livingston, 21st Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 23118; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 KA 1845.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Vonnie Frank TODD, Jr.
    No. 2011-K-1160.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 18, 2011.
   In re Todd Jr., Vonnie Todd; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Mary, 16th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 2008-175376; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 KA 1591.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Sam COOPER.
    No. 2011-K-1173.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 18, 2011.
   In re Cooper, Sam; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Tangipahoa, 21st Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 700934; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 KA 1987.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Joshua Deon LACOX.
    No. 2011-K-1176.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 18, 2011.
   In re Lacox, Joshua Deon; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 03-080539; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 KA 1763.

Denied. Untimely.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Michael R. HART.
    No. 2011-KO-1178.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 18, 2011.
   In re Hart, Michael R.; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 08-4552; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 10-KA-905.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Joshua JOHNSON.
    No. 2011-KO-1179.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 18, 2011.
   In re Johnson, Joshua; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 455651-1; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 KA 1768.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Brian GUMTO.
    No. 2011-K-0998.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 18, 2011.
   In re Gumto, Brian; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. B, No. 478-458; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2010-KA-0876.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Lee E. MILLER.
    No. 2011-KP-1138.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 18, 2011.
   In re Miller, Lee E.; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. A, No. 352-263; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-K-0669.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Ray A. BROOKS.
    No. 2011-K-1148.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 18, 2011.
   In re Brooks, Ray A.; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 412111; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 KA 1864.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Darren Dewayne NICKLES.
    No. 2011-KO-0900.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 18, 2011.
   In re Nickles, Darren Dewayne; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. 5, No. 274785; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 46,189-KA.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Jessie H. SIMMONS, Jr.
    No. 2011-KP-0939.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 18, 2011.
   In re Simmons Jr., Jessie H.; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. H, No. 391-882; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-K-0343.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Shawn DRAKE.
    No. 2011-K-0838.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 18, 2011.
   In re Drake, Shawn; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. H. No. 09-02-0168; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 KA 1518.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. James E. TATE.
    No. 2011-K-0841.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 18, 2011.
   In re Tate, James E.; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 477258; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 KA 1723.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Delroy PATTERSON.
    No. 2011-KP-0863.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 18, 2011.
   In re Patterson, Delroy; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. K, No. 412-265; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-K-0205.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. James WILSON.
    No. 2011-KK-1867.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 18, 2011.
   In re Wilson, James; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. C, No. 494-358; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-K-0970.

Stay lifted. Writ denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Shawn LACOUR v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-0105.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 18, 2011.
   In re Lacour, Shawn; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 99-5954; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 08-WR-1044.

Denied. Cf. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4(D).


text:
    STATE ex rel. Gregory FRANKS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-0107.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 18, 2011.
   In re Franks, Gregory; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. 5, No. 231,489; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 45,-818-KA.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Clifton R. BOUDREAUX v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-0108.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 18, 2011.
   In re Boudreaux, Clifton R.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Plaquemines, 25th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 2005-227; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2010-K-1641.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Edward A. SHREFFLER v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-0011.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 18, 2011.
   In re Shreffler, Edward A.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 380891; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 KW 1829.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Jeffery FAIRCHILD v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-0022.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 18, 2011.
   In re Fairchild, Jeffery; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Avoyelles, 12th Judicial District Court Div. B, Nos. 150186-B, 150187-B; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, Nos. 10-151,10-152.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Allen JOHNSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2011-KH-0104.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 18, 2011.
   In re Johnson, Allen; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. G, No. 282-446; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2010-K-1565.

Denied. Repetitive. Cf. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4(D).


text:
    STATE ex rel. Bobby Ray SAM v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-2871.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 18, 2011.
   In re Sam, Bobby Ray; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. C, Nos. 01-95-0813, 04-96-424; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 KW 1785.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.

WEIMER, J., recused.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Tyrone WASHINGTON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-2872.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 18, 2011.
   In re Washington, Tyrone; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. J, No. 02-2220; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 08-WR-1093.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Ricky L. KING, Jr. v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-2873.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 18, 2011.
   In re King Jr., Ricky L.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. H, No. 415-236; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2010-K-1609.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 980.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; State v. Parker, 98-0256 (La.5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Kenneth R. DILLARD v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-2853.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 18, 2011.
   In re Dillard, Kenneth R.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. 3, No. 266,095; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 45,-633-KA.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Larry LEWIS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-2856.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 18, 2011.
   In re Lewis, Larry; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 06-1872; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 10-KH-782.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; State v. Parker, 98-0256 (La.5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694; La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Levar KING v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-2858.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 18, 2011.
   In re King, Levar; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. I, No. 422-216; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2010-K-1566.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; State v. Parker, 98-0256 (La.5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694; La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Calvin Lee CRADDOCK v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-2848.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 18, 2011.
   In re Craddock, Calvin Lee; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 397650; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 KW 1555.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Joseph HILLIARD, Sr. v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-2851.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 18, 2011.
   In re Hilliard Sr., Joseph; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. G, Nos. 06-91-0064, 10-91-0924; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 KW 1543.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Troy HARRIS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-OK-2764.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 18, 2011.
   In re Harris, Troy; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 08-08-0064; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010-KW-1613.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Clayton WEAVER v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-2794.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 18, 2011.
   In re Weaver, Clayton; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 01-4930; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 10-KH-944.

Denied. Repetitive. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4(A).


text:
    STATE ex rel. Edmond D. SPENCER v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-2795.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 18, 2011.
   In re Spencer, Edmond D:; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Washington, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. E, Nos. 47882, 48723, 48727; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 KW 1587.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.2; La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189


text:
    STATE ex rel. Bobby BENNETT v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-2798.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 18, 2011.
   In re Bennett, Bobby; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. J, No. 10-3261; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 10-K-875.

Denied. Moot. Realtor has pleaded guilty


text:
    STATE ex rel. Hedrick L. BICKHAM v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-2799.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 18, 2011.
   In re Biekham, Hedrick L.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Washington, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 09-CR1-102426; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 KW 1686.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Joseph HARTSHORN v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-2805.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 18, 2011.
   In re Hartshorn, Joseph; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Bernard, 34th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 310-974; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2010-K-1389.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Cedric WASHINGTON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-2838.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 18, 2011.
   In re Washington, Cedric; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 00429; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 10-KH-851.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Joseph L. SOILEAU v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-2844.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 18, 2011.
   In re Soileau, Joseph L.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Landry, 27th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 98-3547-B; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 10-00655.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. David DELANEY v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-2846.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 18, 2011.
   In re Delaney, David; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Pointe Coupee, 18th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 67848; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 KW1769.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; State v. Parker, 98-0256 (La.5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694; La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Nelson A. YOUNGBLOOD v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-2689.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 18, 2011.
   In re Youngblood, Nelson A.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. 4, No. 266,163; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 45,-576-KA.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Jerry E. HARRIS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-2724.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 18, 2011.
   In re Harris, Jerry E.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Ouachita, 4th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 00-F-1137; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 45,-954-KH.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Fred D. KIDD, Sr. v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-2748.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 18, 2011.
   In re Kidd Sr., Fred D.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Ouachita, 4th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 06F1423; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 45,-638-KA.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Clyde T. BACCHUS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-2753.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 18, 2011.
   In re Bacchus, Clyde T.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. F, No. 289^436; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2010-K-1558.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.2; La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Kedrick BURBANK v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-2763.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 18, 2011.
   In re Burbank, Kedrick; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 05^4743; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 10-KH-804.

Denied. Repetitive. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4(A).


text:
    STATE of Louisiana in the Interest of J.T.
    No. 2011-CK-0925.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 18, 2011.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Other; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Juvenile Court Orleans Parish, No. 2010-256-03-DQ-C; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2010-CA-1600.

Denied.


text:
    In re Robert MATIJASEC.
    No. 2011-OB-2253.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 18, 2011.
   In re Matijasec, Robert; — Plaintiff; Applying For Admission.

Denied.


text:
    In re the MARRIAGE OF Erin BLANCH and Juan S. Blanch, Jr.
    No. 2011-CJ-2388.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 18, 2011.
   In re Blanch Jr., Juan S.; — Other; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. A, No. 2006-3225; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2010-CA-1686.

Denied.


text:
    In re the MARRIAGE OF Erin BLANCH and Juan S. Blanch, Jr.
    No. 2011-C-2366.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 18, 2011.
   In re Blanch Jr., Juan S.; — Other; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. A, No. 2006-3225; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2010-CA-1686.

Denied.

WEIMER and GUIDRY, JJ., would grant.


text:
    Patrick E. PHILLIPS, Jr., et al. v. G & H SEED CO., et al.
    No. 2011-C-1861.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 18, 2011.
   In re Allianz Global Risks US Insurance Company; Bayer Crop Science LP; Red-lich, Michael G.; — Defendant(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Landry, 27th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 00-C-2220-D; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 10-1405.

Granted and remanded to the Third Circuit Court of Appeal for en banc opinion after briefing and argument.

KNOLL, J., recused.


text:
    Fannie GORDON v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY.
    No. 2011-CC-2143.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 18, 2011.
   In re State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Rapides, Alexandria City Court, No. 118,015; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW11-00681.

Granted. The judgment of the city court is reversed, and summary judgment is granted in favor of relator. See Lynch v, Kennard, 09-282 (La.5/15/09), 12 So.3d 944; Carter v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 07-1294 (La.10/5/07), 964 So.2d 375.


text:
    Harold Joe BLACK v. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND CORRECTIONS, et al.
    No. 2010-CI-2703.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 18, 2011.
   In re Black, Harold Joe; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. M, No. 579,-141; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 CA 0781.

Denied.


text:
    Warren E. JOSEPH, Jr. v. Buddy CALDWELL, Attorney General, State of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-CI-2849.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 18, 2011.
   In re Joseph Jr., Warren E.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 577,847; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2009 CA 1779.

Denied.

WEIMER, J., recused.


text:
    Angela STELLY v. Don STELLY.
    No. 2011-CC-2014.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 18, 2011.
   In re Stelly, Don; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. A, No. 2010-12482; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-C-1030.

Denied.


text:
    Joseph L. TUPPER, Jr., et al. v. BP AMERICA PRODUCTION CO., et al.
    No. 2011-CC-2058.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 18, 2011.
   In re Expando Production Company;— Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson Davis, 31st Judicial District Court Div. O, No. 168-09; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW11-00553.

Denied.


text:
    The BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON, et al. v. Whitney Blaine SMITH, et ux.
    No. 2011-C-2080.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 18, 2011.
   In re Bank of New York Mellon, et al.; Chase Bank of Texas, N.A.; Saxon Asset Securities Trust 1999-5; Saxon Mortgage Services, Inc.; — Plaintiff(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Grant, 35th Judicial District Court Div. O, No. 20282; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 11-60.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant.


text:
    Philomenia JOHNSON and Lonnie Johnson, Jr. v. ST. FRANCISVILLE COUNTRY MANOR, L.L.C.
    No. 2011-CC-2123.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 18, 2011.
   In re St. Francisville Country Manor, L.L.C.; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of West Feliciana, 20th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 20132; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2011 CW 0998.

Denied.


text:
    Justo E. ROQUE, Jr. v. Warrem Cherise MICHELLE.
    No. 2011-CC-2148.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 18, 2011.
   In re Roque Jr., Justo E.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. G, No. 10-3881; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2011-C-1272.

Denied on the showing made.