text:
    Anthony J. TRIPOLI, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D09-3248.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    Dec. 29, 2010.

      Bryan S. Gowdy and Jessie L. Harrell of Creed & Gowdy, P.A., Jacksonville, for appellant.
    Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Katherine Y. Mclntire, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
   DAMOORGIAN, J.

Appellant, Anthony J. Tripoli, appeals his judgment and sentence for sexual battery on a child under twelve and lewd and lascivious conduct with a child under twelve. Tripoli raises multiple issues on appeal. We address only his first issue, in which Tripoli argues that the trial court committed harmful error by admitting into evidence uncharged collateral acts which were not relevant to prove the crimes charged and were highly prejudicial. Because we agree that the trial court erred in admitting the collateral acts evidence, we reverse Tripoli’s convictions and remand for a new trial.

The following is a brief recitation of the evidence presented by the State. The charged offenses allegedly occurred on the campus of the school where the eight-year-old victim, K.H., was enrolled. Tripoli served as a volunteer reading tutor for students at the school. No one other than the victim witnessed the crime, and there was no physical or scientific evidence that tended to show that K.H. had been sexually battered or molested.

Multiple state witnesses testified that, when Tripoli arrived at the school to tutor students, he would regularly take the students out of the classroom for their tutoring sessions. This practice was initiated at the direction of the school’s principal on the belief that the classroom was too noisy and crowded. Several school personnel testified that they felt that some of the locations to which Tripoli and K.H. went for their tutoring sessions were insufficiently monitored. These included private offices, the printing room, a backroom in the library, and the stage in the cafeteria. While some of the locations used by Tripoli were selected by the school administration, no one instructed Tripoli to use the cafeteria stage. When Tripoli used the cafeteria stage, he sometimes tutored K.H. behind closed curtains.

K.H. was the first student to complain about Tripoli or make allegations of improper behavior. K.H. had been tutored by Tripoli for approximately four months when she reported the alleged abuse to her mother. According to K.H., while Tripoli was tutoring her, he would partially lower her pants and touch her “private area.” These acts included digital penetration. K.H. testified that she told her mother about the abuse because she wanted it to stop and was afraid of Tripoli.

Although K.H. reported the abuse five days after she alleged the most recent incident had occurred, the testimony at trial indicated that Tripoli was not at KH.’s school on the day in question. K.H. also showed partial uncertainty at trial regarding where the incidences of abuse had taken place.

K.H.’s mother testified that about two- and-a-half months before K.H. reported the alleged abuse to her, she had observed an incident involving K.H. and her Barbie dolls. A dressed male doll was touching the genitalia of a nude female doll with his hand. KH.’s mother had never seen K.H. play with her dolls in this manner.

The State also presented the testimony of Amanda Gooch, who was a teacher at the school. Gooch testified that Tripoli had previously tutored a male student in Gooch’s class during the 2005-2006 school year. This time frame was approximately two school years before the alleged incident with K.H. All tutoring of the student took place in Gooch’s classroom. At the end of the year, Gooch requested that Tripoli not return to her classroom because her “relationship” with Tripoli “didn’t seem to work well.”

During direct examination, the State asked Gooch if she “ever personally observe[d] anything ... out of the ordinary.” Tripoli’s counsel objected on relevancy grounds. The State had not given pretrial notice that it was offering Gooch’s testimony as Williams rule evidence. The following exchange then occurred outside the jury’s presence:

[THE STATE]: Uh, Your Honor, this is not Williams’ Rule. It’s not any—
THE COURT: He [defense counsel] didn’t raise — he didn’t raise Williams’ Rule.
[THE STATE]: Okay. Uh, I think it’s relevant for how she observed his interaction with young students and there’s not actual crime there, but I think it’s relevant to how he would (indiscernible) to students that she could see.
THE COURT: I don’t know what the answer is.
[THE STATE]: The answer is that, uh, he had a little more physical contact [than] she thought should be done....
[THE STATE]: Uh, sitting somebody on his lap....
[THE STATE]: Having somebody sit on his lap while he was reading with them in the classroom....
THE COURT: Your objection is?
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Your Honor, it’s not relevant to the issue. I mean [K.H] has never, never testified here in court or in her pretrial statements, her deposition that she was — ever sat on his lap. It’s not relevant to the issue of what was the conduct between my client and [K.H.] and this is just here to inflame the jury, that’s all it is. And Ms. Gooch here is just trying to throw innuendo at this time. She’s indicated she doesn’t like him.
THE COURT: Okay. I take it as a 90.403 objection. I do not find the probative value is substantially outweighed by the factors in 90.403 so the objection is overruled.

Gooch went on to testify in relevant part as follows.

[Tripoli] worked with one particular student in my class. When I would arrange an area for him to read with the student, uh, I would try to place chairs on opposite sides of the table and he would take the chair and move it around to the other side and actually bump them right next to each other was the initial thing I would notice that he would always move it around. And then, uh, he started becoming more physically affectionate toward the student in my class, more than what seemed appropriate to me at the time....
I would see Mr. Tripoli, uh, put his hand on the back of my student and kind of rub it up and down as the child was reading to him. He would also pat the student, uh, on his leg near his thigh, uh, and the hand would stay there longer as, you know it would progress, uh, to him keeping his hands on that child....

In closing, the State then made reference to Gooch’s testimony:

Ms. Gooch told you that after having [Tripoli] in her class for awhile and seeing his interactions with some of her students, she ... did not want him back. She saw him rubbing on the back, touching on the thigh, children. She did not want him back in her classroom.

Tripoli argues that the trial court erred in allowing the testimony of Amanda Gooch because it was only relevant to show character or propensity. Tripoli further argues that, even if Gooch’s testimony was relevant to show something other than character or propensity, its relevance was outweighed by its prejudicial nature. Finally, he contends that this error was harmful.

A trial court’s decision to admit collateral act evidence is reviewed for abuse of discretion, Zerbe v. State, 944 So.2d 1189, 1193 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (citing LaMarca v. State, 785 So.2d 1209, 1212 (Fla.2001)), but this discretion is limited by the rules of evidence. Id. (citing Nardone v. State, 798 So.2d 870, 874 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)).

Evidence of the collateral acts of a defendant is admissible under one of two provisions. Evidence “not linked or related circumstantially to the crime charged” is admissible under section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2008). Titel v. State, 788 So.2d 286, 288 n. 1 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000); see also Dorsett v. State, 944 So.2d 1207, 1212 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (“Similar fact evidence under section 90.404 is evidence totally unrelated to the charged offenses[.]”). Such evidence is commonly referred to as Williams rule evidence. See Dorsett, 944 So.2d at 1212; Griffin v. State, 639 So.2d 966, 968 (Fla.1994) (holding that evidence of acts inseparable from or inextricably intertwined with the crime charged is not Williams rule evidence). Williams rule evidence may be used to prove “a material fact in issue, including, but not limited to, proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident[.]” § 90.404(2)(a), Fla. Stat. In particular, it is often used to establish identity through a demonstration of modus operandi. See Williams v. State, 622 So.2d 456, 462 (Fla.1993); Miller v. State, 791 So.2d 1165, 1169-70 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001); Smith v. State, 539 So.2d 556, 558 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989) (Glickstein, J., concurring specially in part and dissenting in part). If the State wishes to admit Williams rule evidence, it must provide the defendant ten days notice “of the acts or offenses it intends to offer.” § 90.404(2)(c)l., Fla. Stat. (2008); see also Griffin, 639 So.2d at 968.

Notice is not required if the State seeks to introduce evidence of collateral acts which are inextricably intertwined with the crime charged under the general rule of relevance. See § 90.402, Fla. Stat. (2008); Dorsett, 944 So.2d at 1213; Griffin, 639 So.2d at 968. Examples of such evidence is evidence which is necessary to (1) “adequately describe the deed[;]” (2) “provide an intelligent account of the crime(s) charged[;]” (3) “establish the entire context out of which the charged crime(s) arose[;]” or (4) “adequately describe the events leading up to the charged crime(s)[.]” Dorsett, 944 So.2d at 1213 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

Conversely, evidence of the collateral acts of a defendant is not admissible if its only role is to show the defendant’s bad character or his propensity to commit the crime for which he is charged. Williams v. State, 621 So.2d 413, 414 (Fla.1993) (holding that evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is admissible only “if it casts light on a material fact in issue other than the defendant’s bad character or propensity.”).

The State concedes that Gooch’s testimony was not offered as Williams rule evidence under section 90.404(2)(a). Moreover, even under a relevancy analysis, Gooch’s testimony was not necessary to (1) adequately describe the deed; (2) provide an intelligent account of the charged crimes; (3) establish the entire context out of which the charged crimes arose; or (4) adequately describe the events leading up to the charged crimes. See Dorsett, 944 So.2d at 1213.

Instead, the State argues that Gooch’s testimony was offered to rebut Tripoli’s argument that he had minimum physical contact with the children he tutored. Tripoli counters that, at trial, the State did not make such an argument, and as proof, refers to the State’s response to defense counsel’s objection to Gooch’s testimony and its closing argument. Tripoli is correct that the State never raised this ground for admission of Tripoli’s conduct while in Gooch’s classroom.

Even if the State had properly argued this ground before the trial court, Gooch’s testimony would be inadmissible under section 90.608(5), Florida Statutes (2008). “Section 90.608(5) provides that any party may attack the credibility of a witness by contradictory testimony given by another witness as long as the facts testified to are not collateral to the issue.” Griffin v. State, 827 So.2d 1098, 1099 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002) (citations omitted). Moreover, “[a]n issue is collateral for purposes of impeachment by contradiction, if it cannot be introduced for any reason other than contradiction.” Id. (citation omitted).

The State argues that Tripoli had made claims, both during trial and during a taped police interrogation which was played at trial, indicating that he had generally not been affectionate with the children. According to the State, Gooch’s description of Tripoli placing another child on his lap while he was tutoring the child served to rebut these claims.

We find that, beyond its tendency to show that Tripoli had a propensity to molest children or that it was in his character to do so, Gooch’s testimony was not probative of Tripoli’s guilt or innocence of the charges of sexual battery or lewd and lascivious conduct against K.H. See Griffin, 827 So.2d at 1099; United States v. Payne, 102 F.3d 289, 291, 294-95 (7th Cir.1996) (holding that the proffered testimony of accomplice’s girlfriend was collateral because it was not related to the central issue concerning the defendant’s guilt or innocence on cocaine charges and was offered only for the sake of contradicting the accomplice’s testimony). Accordingly, the trial court erred by allowing Gooch to testify about Tripoli’s actions with another child.

Having concluded that the trial court erred, we next resolve whether the error was harmless. In the context of a criminal case, the harmless error test “places the burden on the [Sjtate, as the beneficiary of the error, to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict or, alternatively stated, that there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the conviction.” State v. DiGuilio, 491 So.2d 1129, 1135 (Fla.1986).

Here, the State cannot make this showing. Where the evidence supporting conviction is “not overwhelming,” it is more likely that the erroneous admission of evidence is not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Elisha v. State, 949 So.2d 271, 274 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007). Not only was the evidence here not overwhelming, but the credibility of K.H. and Tripoli was key to the case. See Arrington v. State, 700 So.2d 777, 778 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997) (holding error was not harmless because credibility was a major issue in the case).

Evidence suggesting Tripoli was guilty included: (a) K.H’s testimony as to the alleged events; (b) KH’s mother’s testimony as to the disturbing incident with the Barbie dolls; (c) testimony by school personnel indicating that Tripoli had the opportunity to commit the crimes; and (d) the propensity evidence provided by Gooch. Evidence suggesting Tripoli was not guilty included: (a) Tripoli’s testimony asserting that the alleged abuse never took place; (b) the absence of any physical signs of abuse; (c) the fact that Tripoli was not at the school on the Friday the most recent incident of abuse was alleged to have taken place; and (d) the testimony of KH.’s teacher and the Big Brothers/Big Sisters coordinator, who both testified that K.H. did not show signs that anything was wrong concerning her relationship with Tripoli.

The evidence taken as a whole, together with the abhorrent nature of the crimes for which Tripoli was charged, leads us to conclude that the error was not harmless.

Reversed and Remanded.

MAY and GERBER, JJ., concur.

      . Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654, 659-63 (Fla.1959).

      . We recognize that, under section 90.404(2)(b)l., Florida Statutes (2008), "evidence of the defendant’s commission of other crimes, wrongs, or acts of molestation is admissible” in child molestation cases, and "may be considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant.” See also Zerbe, 944 So.2d at 1194 (noting that, for collateral evidence of child molestation to be admissible, "the State must present clear and convincing proof that the collateral act occurred.” (citing McLean v. State, 934 So.2d 1248, 1262 (Fla.2006) (providing a non-exclusive list of factors for the trial court to evaluate to determine whether the probative value of evidence of prior molestations is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice))). Neither party raised subsection (2)(b) 1., and the State’s argument on appeal does not center on the relevancy of Gooch’s testimony, but on the use of the testimony to impeach Tripoli by contradictory evidence.

      . Courts are also less likely to find an error harmless where the State relies on the erroneously admitted evidence during its closing argument. See McKeown v. State, 16 So.3d 247, 249 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (holding that erroneous admission of officer’s irrelevant testimony was not harmless, in part, because the State "compounded the error by repeating the improper testimony during closing argument.”); Deville v. State, 917 So.2d 1058, 1059-60 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (holding that error was not harmless, in part, because the State mentioned the inadmissible evidence during its closing argument); Woodard v. State, 978 So.2d 217, 220 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (holding, in child molestation case, that the erroneous admission of collateral act evidence was not harmless, in part, because the State referred to it during both the opening statement and closing argument).


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: WHATLEY, Judge.

license: Public Domain

text:
    Anthony Ray CASEY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 2D10-598.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Dec. 29, 2010.
    James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, and Cynthia J. Dodge, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
    Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Ronald Napolitano, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.
   WHATLEY, Judge.

Anthony Ray Casey appeals an order revoking his probation and sentencing him to a previously suspended term of five years in prison. Casey was originally charged with and entered a plea to grand theft and was sentenced to five years in prison, suspended, and five years of probation. He thereafter admitted violating his probation and was given the suspended sentence. Casey argues, and the State correctly concedes, that his sentence must be reversed because the trial court mistakenly believed that it was required to impose the suspended portion of his sentence.

At the original sentencing hearing for grand theft, the trial court told Casey that if he violated the terms of his probation, “you’re going to get five years Florida State Prison because I’ve suspended it.... Because I’ve suspended it, so I won’t have any discretion. Unless the State agrees, I’ve pretty much bound my hands.” Thereafter, before accepting Casey’s admission to the violation of probation, the trial court stated as follows:

Is it your intention to admit your violation of probation today with the understanding that this is an open plea; I can sentence you to any lawful sentence, up to five years in prison — I believe, actually, you have five years in prison suspended, so there’s not a lot of mystery about what’s going to happen here, I don’t think.

Here, as in Nadzo v. State, 24 So.3d 690, 691-92 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009), the trial court was under the mistaken belief that it was mandatory to impose the previously suspended prison term. In Nadzo, 24 So.3d at 692, this court noted that the trial court could have continued, modified, or revoked the appellant’s probation and that, after deciding to revoke the probation, the trial court could impose a sentence less than the original sentence. See also Cowart v. State, 860 So.2d 1041, 1042 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003); Lacey v. State, 831 So.2d 1267, 1270 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002).

Because the trial court appears to have believed it was required to sentence Casey to five years in prison, we reverse and remand the case for reconsideration.

CASANUEVA, C.J., and BLACK, J„ Concur.


author: PER CURIAM.

text:
    Lazaro GALINDO, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 3D10-2969.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Dec. 29, 2010.
    Lazaro Galindo, in proper person.
    Bill McCollum, Attorney General, for appellee.
    Before WELLS, LAGOA, and SALTER, JJ.
   PER CURIAM.

This is an appeal of an order summarily denying a motion under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). On appeal from a summary denial, this Court must reverse unless the postconviction record, see Fla. R.App. P. 9.141(b)(2)(A), shows conclusively that the appellant is entitled to no relief. See Fla. RApp. P. 9.141(b)(2)(D).

Because the record now before us fails to make the required showing, we reverse the order and remand for further proceedings. If the trial court again enters an order summarily denying the postconviction motion, the court shall attach record excerpts conclusively showing that the appellant is not entitled to any relief.

Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.


text:
    PROGRESSIVE AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY, Petitioner, v. Maikel ORTEGA, Respondent.
    No. 3D10-2172.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Dec. 29, 2010.
    Seipp & Flick and Douglas H. Stein and Stephanie Martinez, Miami, for petitioner.
    Mark J. Feldman, Miami, for respondent.
    Before RAMIREZ, C.J., and SUAREZ and ROTHENBERG, JJ.
   PER CURIAM.

Denied. See Duncan v. United Auto. Ins. Co., 49 So.3d 312 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010).


author: ROTHENBERG, J.

text:
    Francisco MENDOZA, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 3D08-2750.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Dec. 29, 2010.
    Paul Morris, for appellant.
    Bill McCollum, Attorney General, and Ansley B. Peacock, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
    Before ROTHENBERG, LAGOA, and SALTER, JJ.
   ROTHENBERG, J.

The defendant, Francisco Mendoza, appeals his conviction for aggravated battery, as a lesser included offense of attempted first-degree premeditated murder on the basis that the information did not plead the necessary elements of aggravated battery. Although we conclude that the argument raised on appeal was not preserved for appellate review, we also find no merit to the argument raised. See Washington v. State, 912 So.2d 344, 346 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005) (holding that the allegation that the defendant discharged a firearm sufficiently alleged the use of a deadly weapon, and thus, the charging document contained the requisite elements of attempted aggravated battery); Bell v. State, 394 So.2d 570, 571 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981) (finding that aggravated battery was properly charged as a lesser included offense of attempted first-degree murder where the information alleged that the defendant did shoot the victim with a firearm).

Affirmed.


author: DAMOORGIAN, J.

text:
    Randy WILSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D09-4842.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    Dec. 29, 2010.
    Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Margaret Good-Earnest, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
    Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Diane F. Medley, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
   DAMOORGIAN, J.

We affirm the order denying Wilson’s motion to correct illegal sentence pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). With the assistance of the public defender, Wilson argued that the trial court should not have imposed a three-year mandatory minimum sentence pursuant to section 775.087(2)(a)l., Florida Statutes, on count two of the information for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The information, he argued, did not plead sufficient facts to permit imposition of the mandatory minimum. We hold that Wilson’s claims were conclusively refuted by the written sentencing order which imposed no mandatory minimum sentence for count two. We note that the State and the public defender both failed to note this fact in their briefs on appeal.

Affirmed.

GROSS, C.J. and MAY, J., concur.


text:
    Traci Scarleth GURTH, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D10-653.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    Dec. 29, 2010.
    Ira D. Karmelin, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
    No appearance required for appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the factual basis used to support her plea in this appeal of the denial of her Rule 3.800(a) motion. “A rule 3.800(a) motion cannot be used to challenge the factual basis for a plea.” Marshall v. State, 35 So.3d 121 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (citing Sanchez v. State, 979 So.2d 1004 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008)). Appellant’s challenge was to her conviction, not to her sentence, and was not cognizable in a rule 3.800(a) motion. See Cook v. State, 885 So.2d 911 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004). Moreover, appellant’s motion cannot be considered under Rule 3.850, because her time for filing a Rule 3.850 motion has expired. See Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.850(b).

Affirmed.

STEVENSON, TAYLOR and MAY, JJ., concur.


text:
    Marvin WIMBERLY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D10-1322.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    Dec. 29, 2010.

      Marvin Wimberly, Okeechobee, pro se.
    No appearance required for appellee.
   ON ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

PER CURIAM.

We have previously affirmed the circuit court’s summary denial of Wimberly’s motion for post-conviction relief filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 in Wimberly v. State, 42 So.3d 244 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010). We write here to explain the reasons why we now impose sanctions on Wimberly for his clear abuse of the post-conviction process.

Wimberly entered open no contest pleas in three 2002 prosecutions in which he was charged with sale of cocaine, possession of marijuana, possession of drug paraphernalia, violation of probation, driving while license suspended as an habitual offender, and possession of cocaine. He was sentenced in those cases to a total term of twenty (20) years in prison. Wimberly was allowed a belated appeal and this Court affirmed per curiam in Wimberly v. State, 958 So.2d 943 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007).

Wimberly also launched a campaign of filing motions for post-conviction relief. In his first rule 3.850 motion filed in 2004, Wimberly alleged: (1) ineffective assistance of trial counsel (IAC) for advising him he would receive no greater sentence than three years in prison; (2) IAC for failure to depose state witnesses, move to suppress or discuss trial strategy with him; (3) IAC for failure to move to withdraw plea prior to sentencing; (4) IAC for promising him a “cumulated lesser sentence” in exchange for his pleas; (5) IAC for not discovering and advising him that the prosecution had dropped certain charges; (6) IAC for failure to inform him of his right to withdraw his pleas; (7) illegal sentencing because the judgment of conviction on one count had been vacated prior to sentencing; and (8) failure of the prosecution to disclose favorable evidence prior to trial. The circuit court summarily denied this motion, and Wimberly did not timely appeal. His petition seeking to belatedly appeal this order was denied in our case no. 4D05-1481.

Wimberly next filed his second rule 8.850 motion in 2005, alleging: (1) IAC for failure to challenge counts two and three of the information which charged a co-defendant rather than him; (2) involuntary plea based on counsel’s misrepresentations on the offenses charged and the maximum available punishment for them; (3) involuntary plea based on the advice of counsel that if he did not enter a plea, the judge would be required to impose the maximum sentence on each conviction; (4) IAC for failure to advise that a jury instruction on lesser included offense of conspiracy could have been given in his prosecution if he had proceeded to trial; (5) IAC for failure to move to withdraw the plea to offenses charged against a co-defendant; and (6) IAC for failure to move to suppress or dismiss based on an illegal stop and search. The trial court summarily denied this motion as successive and repetitive of some of the claims in the first motion. Wimberly appealed and this Court affirmed per curiam in Wimberly v. State, 917 So.2d 204 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005).

Next, Wimberly filed his third rule 8.850 motion in 2007, alleging newly discovered evidence and two more claims of IAC. This motion was summarily denied as successive, procedurally barred on the IAC claims, and for legally insufficient claims of newly-discovered evidence. Wimberly appealed and this Court affirmed per curiam in Wimberley v. State, 986 So.2d 617 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008).

Finally, Wimberly filed this fourth rule 3.850 motion in 2009, alleging: (1) manifest injustice due to “erroneous advice of counsel” about sentencing; (2) involuntary plea due to his misunderstanding about the factual basis for the pleas and a substantial assistance agreement; and (3) IAC for failure to challenge the factual bases for the open pleas. The circuit court again summarily denied this motion as successive and procedurally barred, and further directed that a copy of its order be forwarded to the warden at Wimberly’s place of incarceration for consideration of sanctions pursuant to sections 944.279(1), 944.28 and 944.09, Florida Statutes. The circuit court recommended forfeiture of gain time.

In addition to our per curiam affir-mance of that order, this court issued an order to show cause why Wimberly should not be prohibited from filing future pro se appeals and other challenges in this court from his convictions and sentences in this case, as a sanction for his repeated and frivolous motions in the circuit court and appeals to this court from the orders denying them. This was pursuant to State v. Spencer, 751 So.2d 47 (Fla.1999). Wim-berly has now filed a response which is largely argumentative and which fails to overcome our conclusion that his appeal was frivolous and abusive. He also appears unaware of Ibarra v. State, 45 So.3d 911 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010), in which this court recognized that a circuit court can refer a defendant to the Department of Corrections for consideration of disciplinary procedures based on a finding that the defendant’s post-conviction motions were frivolous, without any requirement of prior notice or an opportunity to show cause.

While not all of the claims raised in this latest motion were identical to those raised earlier, this is not required for there to be an abuse of the post-conviction process. As this Court said in Johnson v. State, 44 So.3d 198 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010):

A claim need not be repetitive to be frivolous or to be an abuse of the post-conviction process. Under section 944.279, a court may sanction any frivolous post-conviction filing and/or appeal regardless of the prisoner’s history of filing. Untimely post-conviction challenges, which do not establish an exception to the two-year time limit, are abusive and sanctionable, and an appeal from the denial of an untimely claim is frivolous when no arguable basis for an exception to the time limitation exists. [e.s.]

Id. at 200.

Wimberly did not overcome the bar against successive and untimely filing for post-conviction relief in this latest motion. The record as summarized above demonstrates abuse of the post-conviction process. Sanctions are warranted. As we said in Marc v. State, 46 So.3d 1045 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010), the possibility of sanctions should cause prisoners to “stop and think” before filing frivolous collateral challenges of this nature. See also Spencer v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 823 So.2d 752, 756 (Fla.2002).

We therefore impose the sanction of prohibiting further pro se filings in this Court by Wimberly arising from the three cases here and direct the clerk of this Court to reject any future attempts by petitioner to file such papers. Rehearing will not be entertained.

STEVENSON, MAY and DAMOORGIAN, JJ., concur.

      . Wimberly’s last name appears to have been misspelled in the published decision.


text:
    Patrick A. FAIRCLOTH, Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
    No. 1D08-3685.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Dec. 29, 2010.

      Laura Anstead, Assistant Conflict Counsel, and Jeffrey Lewis, Regional Conflict Counsel, Region One, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Bill McCollum, Attorney General, and Ian M. Cotner, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Appellant, Patrick A. Faircloth, challenges the revocation of his probation, contending the State failed to prove various new law violations alleged in the violation of probation report. On cross-appeal, the State claims error in the allocation of credit for time served to both counts of consecutive sentences. We reverse and remand for reconsideration of the revocation, and, if upheld, appropriate modification of the sentences.

On May 21, 2004, the State charged appellant by information with aggravated stalking (Count I) and attempted burglary of a dwelling (Count II). After Faircloth entered a plea of nolo contendere to the offenses as charged, the trial court sentenced appellant to 286 days in county jail (less 286 days for time served) and 36 months’ probation, the sentences to run concurrently. On February 11, 2005, the court entered a judgment and sentence adjudicating appellant guilty of the crimes alleged.

On January 22, 2007, the State filed a violation of probation report alleging that Faircloth failed to live and remain at liberty without violating the law by committing the criminal offenses of resisting an officer with violence, fleeing and eluding a law enforcement officer, driving while license suspended, and battery on a law enforcement officer. The State filed two adden-dums to the report, alleging that appellant also gave a false identity to a law enforcement officer and committed fraud by insufficient funds.

After a hearing on the alleged violations, the trial court (Judge Hankinson) found that Faircloth violated the terms of his probation by giving a false identity to a law enforcement officer, resisting an officer without violence, driving while license suspended, and battery on a law enforcement officer. As a result of these new law violations, the court revoked probation on each count and adjudicated appellant guilty of the underlying offenses. The court sentenced Faircloth to 60 months in prison with credit for 439 days’ time served on Count I (aggravated stalking) and 24 months in prison on Count II (attempted burglary of a dwelling). In a written order revoking probation, the court announced that the sentences were to run consecutively.

In an amended motion to correct sentencing error pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b)(2), appellant asserted an entitlement to 792 days’ credit for time served. Reasoning that the court had sentenced him to concurrent terms on the original convictions, Faircloth also argued that the court should have allocated the jail time credit to both Counts I and II.

In its response, the State advocated that the motion be granted in part and denied in part. Though raising some minor disagreements with the computation of gain time, for purposes of this cross-appeal, the State argued that appellant was entitled to this credit on only one of the counts, because the court (Judge Hankinson) ultimately resentenced appellant to consecutive, rather than concurrent, terms. On June 22, 2009, the trial court (Judge Dempsey) entered an order granting the amended motion in its entirety.

We review an order revoking probation for abuse of discretion. See State v. Carter, 835 So.2d 259, 262 (Fla.2002) (recognizing that the “trial court has broad discretion to determine whether there has been a willful and substantial violation of a term of probation and whether such a violation has been demonstrated by the greater weight of the evidence” (citing Van Wagner v. State, 677 So.2d 314 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996))). As Faircloth points out, knowledge of the license suspension is a requisite element of the crime of driving while license suspended. See § 322.34(2), Fla. Stat. (2007) (providing that a person is guilty of driving while license suspended if the person, “knowing” that his “driver’s license or driving privilege has been ... suspended,” “drives any motor vehicle upon the highways of this state while such license or privilege is ... suspended ... ”). Here, we must conclude that the State failed to offer evidence that appellant knew his license or driving privilege had been suspended. Accordingly, the court erred in determining that Faircloth violated his probation by committing the offense of driving while license suspended. See id.

Though we do not question that appellant violated the terms of his probation in the other ways enumerated by the trial court, we are not constrained to uphold the revocation order:

Where revocation of a defendant’s probation ... is based on violation of more than one condition of probation ... and one of the grounds for revocation is found not to be supported by the record, but the other ground is a substantial violation supported by the record and could by itself support revocation, appellate courts have reversed the order of revocation and remanded for reconsideration by the trial court if it was unclear from the record that the trial court would have revoked the probation ... based solely on the remaining substantial violation.

See Gavins v. State, 587 So.2d 487, 491 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (citing Sampson v. State, 375 So.2d 325 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979)). Here, the record does not clearly reveal whether the trial court would have revoked probation based on the remaining violations. Accordingly, we will remand the matter for consideration of this question. See Gavins, 587 So.2d at 491.

Turning to the cross-appeal, we have de novo review. See Willard v. State, 22 So.3d 864, 864 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (holding that the appropriate standard of review for a motion to correct sentencing error is de novo, because such a motion “involves a ‘purely legal issue’ ” (citing T.L.S. v. State, 949 So.2d 290, 291 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007))). “[A]ny person sentenced must receive credit for all time spent in jail prior to the imposition of sentence.” See Barnishin v. State, 927 So.2d 68, 70 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (citing § 921.161(1), Fla. Stat. (2004)). When consecutive sentences are imposed, however, “the defendant ‘is not entitled to have his jail time credit pyramided by being given credit on each sentence for the full time he spends in jail awaiting disposition.’ ” See Daniels v. State, 491 So.2d 543, 545 (Fla.1986) (quoting Martin v. State, 452 So.2d 938, 938-39 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984)).

The hearing transcript and the written revocation order demonstrate that the trial court intended Faircloth’s sentences to run consecutively. Accordingly, appellant is entitled to credit “only on the first of consecutive sentences.” See Barnishin, 927 So.2d at 71. The order granting the amended motion to correct sentencing error fails to the extent that it applied jail time credit to both terms of the consecutive sentences. For these reasons, we REVERSE the revocation order, REMAND for reconsideration of the revocation, and, if upheld, for appropriate application of gain time.

KAHN, LEWIS, and CLARK, JJ., concur.


text:
    Carlos D. COTTON, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 1D10-4044.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Dec. 29, 2010.
    Carlos D. Cotton, pro se, Petitioner.
    Bill McCollum, Attorney General, and Edward C. Hill, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

The petition for writ of mandamus is granted. The trial court is directed to enter an order disposing of petitioner’s amended motion for postconviction relief within 30 days or, if warranted, enter an order scheduling an evidentiary hearing on the amended motion. Because we are confident the trial court will comply with this directive, we withhold formal issuance of the writ at this time.

BENTON, C.J., VAN NORTWICK and ROBERTS, JJ., concur.


text:
    Freddie Lee WILLIAMS, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 1D10-3963.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Dec. 29, 2010.
    Freddie Lee Williams, pro se, Petitioner.
    Bill McCollum, Attorney General, and Brooke Poland, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

The petition alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is granted. As the state concedes, appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to respond to orders of this court and permitting the appeal of the October 20, 2008, order denying petitioner’s motion for postconviction relief in Duval County Circuit Court case number 2003-CF-13411, to be dismissed. We conclude that under the circumstances of this case, the proper and most efficient remedy is to grant petitioner a new appeal of that order. Accordingly, upon issuance of mandate in this cause, a copy of this opinion shall be furnished to the clerk of the circuit court for treatment as a notice of appeal.

BENTON, C.J., VAN NORTWICK and ROBERTS, JJ., concur.


text:
    Freddie J. CASH, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D09-4107.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Dec. 29, 2010.
    Freddie J. Cash, pro se, Appellant.
    Bill McCollum, Attorney General, and Ian M. Cotner, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

The appellant, Freddie J. Cash, appears before this court for the ninth time in connection with his conviction of sexual battery in Duval County, Fourth Judicial Circuit case number 90-9224-CF. After reviewing the issue raised by Mr. Cash in this appeal and determining that it was without merit, this court issued a Spencer order directing Mr. Cash to show cause why he should not be prohibited from future pro se access to this court in this connection with this case. See State v. Spencer, 751 So.2d 47 (Fla.1999). After carefully reviewing Mr. Cash’s response, we conclude that Mr. Cash is abusing the judicial system. Therefore, he is prohibited from further pro se filings. See Tucker v. State, 40 So.3d 920 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010); Simpkins v. State, 909 So.2d 427, 428 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005).

Accordingly, in order to conserve judicial resources, we prohibit Freddie J. Cash from filing with this Court any further pro se pleadings or papers concerning Duval County, Fourth Judicial Circuit case number 90-9224-CF. The Clerk of this Court is directed not to accept any further pro se filings concerning this case. Such pleadings will be summarily rejected by the Clerk, unless they are filed by a member in good standing of The Florida Bar.

AFFIRMED; future pro se filings PROHIBITED.

BENTON, C.J., THOMAS and ROWE, JJ., concur.


text:
    Ebony BLAKE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 5D09-3611.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Dec. 30, 2010.

      F. Wesley Blankner, Jr., of Jaeger & Blankner, Orlando, for Appellant.
    Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Pamela J. Koller, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Ap-pellee.
   PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED. See Nguyen v. State, 858 So.2d 1259 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) (holding deadly weapon, within meaning of aggravated battery statute, includes any instrument likely to cause great bodily harm because of way it is used during crime).

GRIFFIN, ORFINGER and LAWSON, JJ., concur.


text:
    Willie A. LOCKETT, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 5D10-1065.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Dec. 30, 2010.
    James S. Purdy, Public Defender, and Kevin R. Holtz, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.
    Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Douglas T. Squire, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Ap-pellee.
   PER CURIAM.

We affirm as to all points raised by Appellant for the reasons stated by Appel-lee. We note one error on the face of the record that necessitates correction. Appellant was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days on count 3, a second-degree misdemeanor, which exceeds the statutory maximum for that offense. We therefore reverse the sentence on that count and remand for the imposition of a sixty-day sentence. § 775.082(4)(b), Fla. Stat. (2009). Appellant need not be present when the new sentence is imposed.

AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED.

PALMER, TORPY and JACOBUS, JJ., concur.


author: SUAREZ, J.

text:
    Nelson LLOMPART, Appellant, v. Pablo CAMEJO, Appellee.
    No. 3D09-3475.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Jan. 5, 2011.
    Juan Gabriel Miguel, for appellant.
    Pablo Camejo, in proper person.
    Before SUAREZ, ROTHENBERG, and SALTER, JJ.
   SUAREZ, J.

Affirmed. See Dudley v. Schmidt, 963 So.2d 297 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007) (citing no statutory authority to award fees as sanctions in a domestic violence injunction proceeding); Bierlin v. Lucibella, 955 So.2d 1206 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (holding that there must be a finding that the case failed to present a justiciable issue of fact or law).


author: WELLS, Judge.

text:
    Bonnie GREENBERG, Appellant, v. SCHINDLER ELEVATOR CORPORATION, a foreign corporation, Appellee.
    No. 3D10-678.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Jan. 5, 2011.
    Samuel M. Yaffa, Delray Beach; Marjorie Gadarian Graham, Palm Beach, for appellant.
    Sedgwick, Detert, Moran & Arnold, Lenore C. Smith, Jeannine C. Jacobson and Richard P. Hermann, II, Ft. Lauderdale, for appellee.
    Before WELLS, SUAREZ, and CORTIÑAS, JJ.
   WELLS, Judge.

Bonnie Greenberg, the plaintiff below, appeals from an order awarding attorney’s fees and costs to Schindler Elevator Corporation, pursuant to a proposal for settlement under section 768.79 of the Florida Statutes. Because this Court has reversed the underlying final judgment and remanded for a new trial, see Greenberg v. Schindler Elevator Corp., 47 So.3d 901 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010), the order awarding fees and costs to the appellee must also be reversed.

Reversed.


text:
    Kristopher FROTTEN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D08-4077.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    Jan. 12, 2011.
    Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Peggy Natale, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Mark J. Hamel, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

We affirm appellant’s sentence of four years in prison. Because appellant’s sentence was based on the type and seriousness of the crimes committed and was not tied to the calculation of the lowest permissible sentence, any error was harmless. We reverse the award of public defender fees because they were imposed without notice of appellant’s right to a hearing to contest the amount of the lien. See Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.720(d)(1).

GROSS, C.J., MAY and DAMOORGIAN, JJ., concur.


text:
    J.L., a juvenile, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 3D10-1282.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Jan. 12, 2011.
    J.L., in proper person.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, for appellee.
    Before CORTINAS, ROTHENBERG and SALTER, JJ.
   PER CURIAM.

We affirm the adjudication of delinquency. However, we remand for the trial court to correct the written restitution order to reflect the oral pronouncement that restitution shall start when J.L. becomes employed. Additionally, as the trial court may not impose restitution once a notice of appeal has been filed, that order, as corrected pursuant to this opinion, needs to be re-entered after the conclusion of this appeal. See Rahaim v. State, 21 So.3d 922 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009); L’Heureux v. State, 968 So.2d 628 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007).

Affirmed and remanded with directions.


author: CORTIÑAS, J.

text:
    The STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Dieter SCHMIDT, Appellee.
    No. 3D10-2509.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Jan. 12, 2011.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Linda S. Katz, Assistant Attorney General, for appellant.
    Richard Carroll Klugh, Fort Lauder-dale, for appellee.
    Before CORTINAS, ROTHENBERG, and SALTER, JJ.
   CORTIÑAS, J.

Dieter Schmidt (the “Defendant”) pled guilty to one count of armed burglary and one count of armed robbery, both of which were first degree felonies punishable by life in prison. Defendant was sentenced to 364 days in county jail and five years probation, to run concurrently as to each count. Approximately two years later, the Defendant violated his probation and was sentenced to consecutive ninety years in state prison as to each count. Following at least seven unsuccessful post-conviction pleadings spanning nearly three decades, in September 2010, the trial court granted the Defendant’s latest 3.800 motion to correct an illegal sentence. The State of Florida now seeks review of the trial court’s order vacating the consecutive ninety-year sentences and resentencing the Defendant to consecutive thirty-year sentences as to each count.

Upon review of the transcript of the hearing on the Defendant’s motion to correct illegal sentence, we find that the trial court provided no basis whatsoever for vacating the existing sentence and re-sentencing the Defendant and did not set forth any grounds upon which it was granting relief. The consecutive sentences imposed in this case did not exceed the statutory maximum lawful terms for the criminal offenses in question. Accordingly, we reverse.

Reversed.

      . As part of the plea deal, the State agreed to nolle prosse a remaining charge of unlawful possession of a firearm while engaged in a criminal offense.

      . The initial consecutive 90-year sentences were vacated due to improper retention of jurisdiction, but the Defendant was subsequently re-sentenced to consecutive 90-year sentences.

      . In addition, the Florida Parole Commission has considered and denied the Defendant's parole on multiple occasions.


text:
    F.C., a juvenile, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 3D10-301.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Jan. 12, 2011.
    Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender, and Marti Rothenberg, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Richard L. Polin, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
    Before GERSTEN, SUAREZ, and ROTHENBERG, JJ.
   ROTHENBERG, J.

The defendant appeals from a withhold of adjudication and order of probation. We affirm.

The defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of dismissal and convicting him of attempted robbery where the evidence showed he voluntarily abandoned his attempt to commit the robbery. We find the defendant’s arguments to be unpersuasive. The defendant did not abandon the robbery. Instead, according to the defendant’s own testimony, either the victim started to walk away (under one version of the facts); or, he was hit by another person (under another version of the facts). In either case, the defendant did not voluntarily abandon the robbery. See Carroll v. State, 680 So.2d 1065, 1066 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996) (noting that the law distinguishes between a voluntary abandonment and an involuntary abandonment, and an involuntary abandonment is not a defense).

Affirmed.


text:
    Joseph P. BAIN a/k/a Joseph Bain and Lashun D. Bain a/k/a Lashun Bain, Appellants, v. UBS REAL ESTATE SECURITIES, INC., Appellee.
    No. 4D10-2904.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    Jan. 12, 2011.
    Garry W. Johnson and Bruce K. Herman of 511-Law, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for appellants.
    Michael K. Winston and Dean A. Mo-rande of Carlton Fields, P.A., West Palm Beach, for appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. See Freemon v. Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Americas, 46 So.3d 1202 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010); Am. Bankers Ins. Co. v. Zapata, 761 So.2d 1216 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000).

POLEN, CIKLIN and LEVINE, JJ., concur.


author: DAVIS, Judge.

text:
    Michael W. FLESHMAN, Sr., Appellant, v. Michael W. FLESHMAN, Jr., Appellee.
    No. 2D09-2205.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Jan. 14, 2011.

      Keith D. Miller of Boswell & Dunlap, LLC, Bartow, for Appellant.
    No appearance for Appellee.
   DAVIS, Judge.

Michael W. Fleshman, Sr., seeks review of the one-year domestic violence injunction that was entered to prevent him from having any contact with his adult son, Michael W. Fleshman, Jr., after Fleshman, Sr., called and left a series of threatening telephone messages on his son’s voicemail. Because Fleshman, Sr., and his son never lived together in the same dwelling as required by the applicable statutes, the trial court erred in entering a domestic violence injunction and we are compelled to reverse. See §§ 741.28(3), .30, Fla. Stat. (2009).

Any “family or household members” may seek a domestic violence injunction as provided by section 741.30(l)(e). Section 741.28(3) clearly states:

“Family or household member” means spouses, former spouses, persons related by blood or marriage, persons who are presently residing together as if a family or who have resided together in the past as if a family, and persons who are parents of a child in common regardless of whether they have been married. With the exception of persons who have a child in common, the family or household members must be currently residing or have in the past resided together in the same single dwelling unit.

(Emphasis added.)

While there is no doubt that Fleshman, Sr., and his son are related by blood, it is clear from the transcript of the hearing that they did not meet until Fleshman, Jr., was an adult and that they never occupied the same single dwelling unit. As such, statutory domestic violence cannot occur between them. See generally Sharpe v. Sharpe, 695 So.2d 1302, 1304 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997) (“[Tjhere is nothing in Ms. Sharpe’s petition which claims that she and the appellant ever resided in the same household. Under the current law, statutory domestic violence between the pair has not occurred and cannot occur.”). Accordingly, it was error for the trial court to enter the order of injunction against domestic violence. We reverse and remand for the trial court to dissolve the injunction against Fleshman, Sr. We note that nothing in this opinion should be construed to relate to the injunction entered against Fleshman, Sr., regarding his adult daughter.

Reversed and remanded.

SILBERMAN and BLACK, JJ., Concur.


author: BLACK, Judge.

text:
    Kenneth FORD, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 2D09-4978.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Jan. 14, 2011.
    Eric John Kuske, Tampa, and David T. Weisbrod, Tampa, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Cerese Crawford Taylor, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Ap-pellee.
   BLACK, Judge.

Kenneth Ford appeals his conviction for trafficking in illegal drugs. Because we conclude that the trial court erred in failing to grant a new trial based on the prosecutor’s impermissible closing argument, we reverse.

In this one-day trial, a total of four witnesses were called in the State’s case. A confidential informant, two law enforcement officers, and a forensic chemist testified. Of the four witnesses, only the confidential informant was an eyewitness to the drug transaction.

The State’s case turned primarily on the credibility of the confidential informant who testified that he obtained a quantity of methamphetamine from Ford during a controlled buy. It is undisputed that the confidential informant had been convicted of approximately twenty prior felonies, and at the time of the transaction with Ford, he was facing drug charges carrying a minimum seven-year prison sentence. The confidential informant was working with the State in the hope that he would receive favorable treatment at his sentencing.

During closing argument, the prosecutor made a statement referring to other crimes committed by Ford. Specifically, in attempting to explain a six-month delay between the time of the controlled buy and the date that Ford was arrested, the prosecutor stated, “And the reason why he wasn’t arrested for sometime after, you heard [one of the law enforcement officers] say they were doing a federal investigation to try to get him on other things and they decided to make this a state case.” Defense counsel timely objected to the prosecutor’s statement as improper argument, and the court overruled the objection. At a bench conference following the defense objection, the trial judge stated, “You better be sure that’s what he said. If you say something in closing that he didn’t say, it’s ultimately very prejudicial and you’re going to end up being reversed in the next six months.” Thereafter, the trial judge gave the following curative instruction: “Ladies and gentlemen of the Jury, you will rely on your own memory about what testimony was present during trial.” The prosecutor’s statement was unsubstantiated — there was no evidence of other crimes elicited from any of the witnesses or otherwise presented during the trial.

Where, as here, the prosecution has made an improper argument, this court must examine the record to determine whether the statement by the prosecuting attorney “was so prejudicial as to vitiate the entire trial” or merely harmless error. See State v. Murray, 443 So.2d 955, 956 (Fla.1984) (quoting Cobb v. State, 376 So.2d 230, 232 (Fla.1979)). “It is well settled that a prosecutor must confine closing argument to evidence in the record, and must refrain from comments that could not be reasonably inferred from the evidence.” Ford v. State, 702 So.2d 279, 280 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) (citing Huff v. State, 437 So.2d 1087, 1090 (Fla.1983)). Further, “[unsubstantiated statements that concern references to other crimes committed by a defendant are ‘particularly condemned.’ ” Id. (quoting Ryan v. State, 457 So.2d 1084, 1090 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984)). Implicating a defendant in other crimes not charged “ ‘is presumed harmful error because of the danger that a jury will take the bad character or propensity to crime thus demonstrated as evidence of guilt of the crime charged.’” McCain v. State, 995 So.2d 1029, 1033 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) (quoting Straight v. State, 397 So.2d 903, 908 (Fla.1981)).

In this case, we cannot say that the prosecutor’s improper argument was harmless, that the State overcame the harmful error presumption, or that “there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the conviction.” See State v. DiGuilio, 491 So.2d 1129, 1135 (Fla.1986). The only direct testimony of Ford’s involvement in this drug transaction came from a twenty-time convicted felon who was working with the State. Additionally, the court’s curative instruction failed to remove the prejudice. Instead, the instruction left the jury with the impression that the argument may or may not have been accurate. Therefore, we find it necessary to reverse Ford’s conviction and remand for a new trial.

We also note that Ford raised an issue regarding the extent to which he should have been allowed to cross-examine the confidential informant on the issue of his bias and motivation for testifying. Although Ford is permitted to inquire into the nature of the charges pending, on remand, the trial court should engage in a balancing to determine whether the risk of unfair prejudice to the State substantially outweighs the probative value of allowing Ford a more detailed inquiry. See § 90.403, Fla. Stat. (2009). How far the inquiry may proceed into the details of the matter without becoming purely an attack on the confidential informant’s character is within the trial court’s discretion. Coolen v. State, 696 So.2d 738, 743 (Fla.1997) (citing Dufour v. State, 495 So.2d 154, 159-60 (Fla.1986)).

For the reasons stated herein, we reverse Ford’s conviction and remand for a new trial.

SILBERMAN and KELLY, JJ., Concur.


text:
    N.G., a juvenile, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 3D10-559.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Jan. 26, 2011.
    Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender, and Melissa C. Del Valle, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Jill D. Kramer, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
    Before WELLS, ROTHENBERG, and EMAS, JJ.
   CONFESSION OF ERROR

WELLS, Judge.

N.G. appeals from an adjudication of delinquency, claiming that the written order of adjudication does not conform to the trial court’s oral pronouncement that the juvenile’s adjudication be withheld. The State confesses error. Because, as the State concedes, the record confirms that the trial court ordered that the adjudication be withheld at the adjudicatory hearing, we reverse and remand to the lower court for correction of the written adjudicatory order to conform to the oral pronouncement. See S.S.M. v. State, 875 So.2d 763, 763 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004) (finding that a “written probation order must conform with the trial court’s oral pronouncements at sentencing”); see also S.D.F. v. State, 911 So.2d 887, 887-88 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005) (reversing and remanding to trial court to correct written adjudicatory and probation orders that were inconsistent with the trial court’s oral pronouncements at the hearing on petition for delinquency).

Reversed and remanded with instructions.


author: GERBER, J.

text:
    Ingemar KEITT, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D09-4542.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    Jan. 26, 2011.

      Ingemar Keitt, Blountstown, pro se.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Sue-Ellen Kenny, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
   GERBER, J.

We dismiss the appellant’s successive appeal of the circuit court’s denial of his Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a) motion challenging his conviction and sentence for driving while license suspended or revoked as a habitual offender. This court already has affirmed the appellant’s original appeal based on the same arguments which he raised in this appeal. Keitt v. State, 999 So.2d 658 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (Table). By pleading no contest to the charge of driving while license suspended or revoked as a habitual offender, the appellant waived any claim that he had not accumulated the predicate offenses to qualify as a habitual offender. Cf. Bayron v. State, 921 So.2d 719, 720 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (“The agreement to be sentenced as a habitual offender waives any claim of deficiency regarding notice of habitualization.”) (citation omitted). We caution the appellant that any further appeals of the circuit court’s denial of his rule 3.800(a) motion may result in this court referring the appellant to prison officials for disciplinary proceedings. State v. Spencer, 751 So.2d 47 (Fla.1999); § 944.279(1), Fla. Stat. (2010).

Dismissed.

POLEN and HAZOURI, JJ., concur.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Alfredo MORUA.
    No. 2010-KK-2437.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 1, 2010.
   In re Morua, Alfredo; —Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. E, No. 495-512; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2010-K-1396.

Stay denied. Writ denied.


text:
    Lois MORGAN and Dennis Morgan v. Johnny O. BELL, Johnny Bell’s Dump Truck Service, Scottsdale Insurance Company, and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company.
    No. 2010-C-2004.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 5, 2010.
   In re C.O.B. Enterprises of Louisiana, Inc.; —Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. N, No. 2006-6768; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2010-CA-0278.

Denied.


text:
    TRIPLE S MARINE, L.L.C. v. DAIGLE TOWING SERVICE, L.L.C.
    No. 2010-C-2012.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 5, 2010.
   In re Triple S Marine, L.L.C; —Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Mary, 16th Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 119,518; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2009 CA 1506.

Denied.


text:
    Betty Kelly MENGE, et al. v. HARTFORD ACCIDENT & INDEMNITY COMPANY, et al.
    No. 2010-CC-1928.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 5, 2010.
   In re Ethyl Corporation; —Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedíal Writs, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 2001-2756; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW 10-00572.

Denied.


text:
    STATE FARM FIRE & CASUALTY COMPANY v. Scotty ASSAVEDO, MCC Electric, LLC, and Gray Insurance. Leah Robein v. Scotty Assavedo, MCC Electric LLC, and Gray Insurance.
    No. 2010-CC-1930.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 5, 2010.
   In re Assavedo et al., Scotty; Gray Insurance; MCC Electric LLC; —Defendants); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. L, Nos. 610-491, 622-532; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 10-C-582.

Denied.


text:
    Virginia SANDERS wife of/and Nolan Sanders v. John E. POWELL, Sewerage and Water Board of New Orleans, National Union Fire Insurance Company, and ABC Insurance Company.
    No. 2010-C-1939.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 5, 2010.
   In re New Orleans Sewerage and Water Board of; Powell, John E. et al.; —Defendants); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. I, No. 2003-15986; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2010-CA-0265.

Denied.


text:
    Travis PALMER, Jr. and Denna Kilgore Palmer v. Kevin L. MARTINEZ and KLM Logging, Inc.
    No. 2010-C-1952.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 5, 2010.
   In re Palmer Jr., Travis et al.; Palmer, Denna Kilgore; —Plaintiff(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Desoto, 42nd Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 64,628-C; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 45,318-CA.

Denied.


text:
    Travis PALMER, Jr. and Denna Kilgore Palmer v. Kevin L. MARTINEZ and KLM Logging, Inc.
    No. 2010-C-1953.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 5, 2010.
   In re KLM Logging Inc.; Martinez, Kevin L. et ah; —Defendant(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Desoto, 42nd Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 64,628-C; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 45,318-CA.

Denied.


text:
    Travis PALMER, Jr. and Denna Kilgore Palmer v. Kevin L. MARTINEZ and KLM Logging, Inc.
    No. 2010-C-1955.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 5, 2010.
   In re Pace Insurance Managers; Pace, Mac; —Third Party(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of De-soto, 42nd Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 64,628-C; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 45,318-CA.

Denied.

KNOLL, J., would grant.


text:
    Linda BALLARD v. SCHERING CORPORATION, ABC Insurance Company and Walter Kirk Mullins, M.D.
    No. 2010-C-1978.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 5, 2010.
   In re Ballard, Linda; —Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 510,016; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No 2009 CA 2242.

Denied.

JOHNSON, J., would grant.


text:
    Claire Bradley URSIN v. Edward Taylor URSIN, II.
    No. 2010-C-1956.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 5, 2010.
   In re Ursin, Claire Bradley; —Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. L, No. 2002-12891; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2009 CA 1680.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant.


text:
    LOUISIANA STATE BOARD OF NURSING v. Sheriff Sid J. GAUTREAUX, III, In his Official Capacity as East Baton Rouge Parish Sheriff and Hillar C. Moore, III, In his Official Capacity as District Attorney for the 19th Judicial District, Parish of East Baton Rouge.
    No. 2010-C-1957.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 5, 2010.
   In re Louisiana State Board of Nursing; —Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Cer-tiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 578,649; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2009 CA 1758.

Denied.


text:
    Curtis C. KRONLAGE v. Parris Ann Amedee KRONLAGE.
    No. 2010-CC-1959.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 5, 2010.
   In re Kronlage, Curtis C.; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. A, No. 2008-6286; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2010-C-1050.

Denied.


text:
    HIT OR MISS, LLC, et al. v. Gregory J. LOGAN, et al.
    No. 2010-CC-1965.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 5, 2010.
   In re Cresscit Eundo L.L.C.; Deuces Wild '05 L.L.C.; Hit or Miss L.L.C. et al.; Travcal Properties L.L.C.; —Plaintiff(s); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 2009-2230; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW 10-00622.

Denied.

GUIDRY, J., would grant.


text:
    Francisco CASTRO v. Anthony DOMINIQUE, ABC Insurance Company and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company.
    No. 2010-CC-1966.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 5, 2010.
   In re Castro, Francisco; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 679-684; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 10-C-595.

Denied.


text:
    Richard L. KATZ v. Haim DAHAN, d/b/a Liberty Cab.
    No. 2010-CC-1996.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 5, 2010.
   In re Katz, Richard L.; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. L, No. 06-00925; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2010-C-0967.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Robert COLEMAN.
    No. 2010-KK-1967.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 5, 2010.
   In re Coleman, Robert; —Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. 3, No. 226,818; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 45768.

Denied.


text:
    Joann FLETCHER, Surviving Spouse of the Decedent, Harold R. Fletcher, and The Succession of Harold R. Fletcher v. SELECT SPECIALTY HOSPITAL OF NEW ORLEANS, INC., and Mary Jo Miller.
    No. 2010-CC-2000.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 5, 2010.
   In re Fletcher., Joann et al.; Fletcher, Succ. of Harold R.; —Plaintiff(s); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 636^462; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 10-C-590.

Denied.


text:
    Lisa Angela Blanchard HARDIE v. SAFEWAY INSURANCE COMPANY OF LOUISIANA, et al.
    No. 2010-CC-2001.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 5, 2010.
   In re Inter-Insurance Exchance of the Automobile Club; Kim, Patrick; — Defendants); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Beauregard, 36th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 2009-0359; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW10-00676.

Denied.


text:
    Jan P. JUMONVILLE v. CITY OF KENNER and Hamp’s Construction LLC.
    No. 2010-C-2003.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 5, 2010.
   In re Jumonville, Jan P.; —Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 662-174; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 09-CA-1042.

Denied.


text:
    Robin HAIK v. ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY and Gregory D. Beisel.
    No. 2010-C-1921.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 5, 2010.
   In re Beisel, Gregory D.; —Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. F, No. 2000-14174; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2009-CA-0860.

Denied.


text:
    Lena HEBERT, Spouse of Morgan Cephas Hebert, Sr. (Deceased), Diane H. Melvin and Morgan Hebert, Jr. v. PLAQUEMINE CARING, L.L.C.
    No. 2010-C-1920.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 5, 2010.
   In re Plaquemine Caring L.L.C; —Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Iberville, 18th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 58-454; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2007 CA 2243.

Denied.


text:
    Maurice PEARL and Jodie Pearl v. PELICAN POINT OPERATIONS, L.L.C. d/b/a Pelican Point Golf Club and Allstate Insurance Company.
    No. 2010-C-1918.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 5, 2010.
   In re Pearl, Maurice et al.; —Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Ascension, 23rd Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 76,693; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 CA 0190.

Denied.


text:
    Donald BRITTON v. Harris HAYES, Ed Kaglear, Good Shepherd Full Gospel Missionary Baptist Church, Inc., & Good Shepherd Resource & Substance Abuse Center, LLC.
    No. 2010-C-1917.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 5, 2010.
   In re Britton, Donald; —Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. M, No. 555,169; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2009 CA 2229.

Denied.


text:
    SUCCESSION OF Lorena P. CALDARERA, et al. v. Reginald ZENO, et al.
    No. 2010-C-1909.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 5, 2010.
   In re Side By Side Redevelopment Inc.; —Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. G, No. 2007-02615; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2009-CA-1397.

Denied.


text:
    Judi GUTH v. STATE of Louisiana, DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATION, OFFICE OF COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, Through Angele DAVIS, Commissioner of Administration.
    No. 2010-C-1871.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 5, 2010.
   In re Guth, Judi; —Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 577,572; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2009 CA 2149.

Denied.


text:
    Louis J. BRAQUET and Toni G. Braquet v. The OFFICE OF COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, an Agency of the State of Louisiana, DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATION.
    No. 2010-C-1632.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 5, 2010.
   In re Braquet, Louis J. et al.; Braquet, Toni G.; —Plaintiff(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 575,724; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 CA 0028.

Denied.


text:
    Gene GAGNARD v. ARCH INSURANCE COMPANY, et al.
    No. 2010-CC-1788.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 5, 2010.
   In re Arch Insurance Company, et al.; Gilchrist Construction Company, L.L.C.; Looney, Michael J.; —Defendant(s); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Avoyelles, 12th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 2008-2359; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW 10-00404.

Denied.


text:
    STATE EX REL. Tommie MOLETTE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-KH-1332.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 5, 2010.
   In re Molette, Tommie; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. L, No. 09-5339; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 10-K-877.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. James LAYMOND, Jr.
    No. 2010-KP-1102.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 5, 2010.
   In re Laymond Jr., James; —Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. L, No. 08-06-0773; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 KW 0166.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Artis D. LOGAN.
    No. 2010-KO-1099.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 5, 2010.
   In re Logan, Artis D.; —Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Ouachita, 4th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 07-F-2433; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 45,-136-KA.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Kenneth SMITH.
    No. 2010-KO-0843.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 5, 2010.
   In re Smith, Kenneth; —Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 05-4261; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 09-KA-769.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Theresa SHELTON.
    No. 2010-KO-0839.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 5, 2010.
   In re Shelton, Theresa; —Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 08-5674; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 09-^-713-

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Christopher S. GOODWILL.
    No. 2010-KO-0838.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 5, 2010.
   In re Goodwill, Christopher S.; —Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 5316-OS; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 09-996.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Corey ROBINSON.
    No. 2010-K-0824.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 5, 2010.
   In re Robinson, Corey; —Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. A, No. 466-759; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2009-KA-0922.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Brice M. GEORGE. State of Louisiana v. Robert Stevenson. State of Louisiana v. Gregory Tobias. State of Louisiana v. Howard White. State of Louisiana v. Ivory Grace.
    No. 2010-K-0812.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 5, 2010.
   In re George, Brice M.; Grace, Ivory; Stevenson, Robert; —Defendant(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. A, Nos. 476-787, 476-116, 482-849, .480-666, 481-174; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, Nos. 2008-KA-1193, 2008-KA-1338, 2009-KA-0561, 2009-KA-0630, 2009-KA-0867.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Clarence O. GIBSON.
    No. 2010-K-0802.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 5, 2010.
   In re Gibson, Clarence O.; —Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 07-6779; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 09-KA-486.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Kenley ROSE.
    No. 2010-KP-0782.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 5, 2010.
   In re Rose, Kenley; —Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. G, No. 375-597; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2009-K-1628.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana in the Interest of R.J.
    No. 2010-CK-0678.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 5, 2010.
   In re State of Louisiana; —Other; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Juvenile Court Orleans Parish, No. 2009-042-02 DQ B; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2009-CA-1296.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Shaun GUILLOT.
    No. 2010-KP-0359.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 5, 2010.
   In re Guillot, Shaun; —Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Livingston, 21st Judicial District Court Div. H, Nos. 09-MISD-93859, 06-FELN-021265; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2009 KW 2095.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Steven M. TILLMAN.
    No. 2009-KP-2741.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 5, 2010.
   In re Tillman, Steven M.; —Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Pointe Coupee, 18th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 73,116-F; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2009 KW 1848.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Delacie PHILLIPS.
    No. 2009-KP-2689.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 5, 2010.
   In re Phillips, Delacie; —Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. K, No. 424-507; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2009-K-1253.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Joseph BROWN.
    No. 2009-KP-2592.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 5, 2010.
   In re Brown, Joseph; —Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 04-04-0373; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2009 KW 1729.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Darryl SOILEAU v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2009-KH-2554.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 5, 2010.
   In re Soileau, Darryl; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 11440-97; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 09-00987.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Oliver TILLISON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2009-KH-2550.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 5, 2010.
   In re Tillison, Oliver; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 1 — 96— 452; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2009 KW 1147.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Leonard McGEE v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2009-KH-2549.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 5, 2010.
   In re McGee, Leonard; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 04-364; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 09-KH-645.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; Cf. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4(D).


text:
    STATE ex rel. Dairie SHERMAN v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2009-KH-2548.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 5, 2010.
   In re Sherman, Dairie; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Rapides, 9th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. CR-275,266; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 09-00179.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2380 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; State v. Parker, 98-0256 (La.5/8/99), 711 So.2d 694.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Robert Lee MARSHALL v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2009-KH-2540.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 5, 2010.
   In re Marshall, Robert L.; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. J, No. 383-667; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2009-KW-1785.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Tares WILLIAMS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2009-KH-2539.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 5, 2010.
   In re Williams, Tares; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Ascension, 23rd Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 19397; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2009 KW 1263.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Herbert BUTLER v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2009-KH-2538.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 5, 2010.
   In-re Butler, Herbert; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 05-88-1284; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2009 KW 1528.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Floyd Lafoe MOTON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2009-KH-2537.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 5, 2010.
   In re Moton, Floyd Lafoe; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Bossier, 26th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 102,390; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 45,-116-KH.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; State v. Parker, 98-0256 (La.5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Lucas RODDY v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2009-KH-2534.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 5, 2010.
   In re Roddy, Lucas; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Ascension, 23rd Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 14222; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2009 KW 0763.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Baron THOMPSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2009-KH-2532.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 5, 2010.
   In re Thompson, Baron; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. L, No. 04-02-266; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2009 KW 0735.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Dramont TURKS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2009-KH-2512.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 5, 2010.
   In re Turks, Dramont; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Bossier, 26th Judicial District Court Div. A, Nos. 142,500, 142,589; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 45,005-KH.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Lionel BONNER v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2009-KH-2509.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 5, 2010.
   In re Bonner, Lionel; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Morehouse, 4th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 97-2935F; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 45,072-KH.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Jerome NORMAN v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2009-KH-2508.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 5, 2010.
   In re Norman, Jerome; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 97-6753; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, Nos. 08-WR-848, 09-KH-388.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Isiah LANG, III v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2009-KH-2507.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 5, 2010.
   In re Lang III, Isiah; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 05-07-0663; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2009 KW1494.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Hilton WRIGHT v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2009-KH-2506.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 5, 2010.
   In re Wright, Hilton; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. G, No. 268-605; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2009-K-1389.

Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Floyd FALKINS v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2009-KH-2501.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 5, 2010.
   In re Falkins, Floyd; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. J, No. 00-6313; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 08-WR-1014.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Kim Robert HOGAN v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2009-KH-2482.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 5, 2010.
   In re Hogan, Bam Robert; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 387357; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2009 KW1383.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Sean M. COBB.
    No. 2009-KP-2449.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 5, 2010.
   In re Cobb, Sean M.; —Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. K, No. 389-848; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, Nos. 2009-K-0468, 2009-K-0468.

Denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Lisa Landry JOHNSON v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2009-KH-2445.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 5, 2010.
   In re Johnson, Lisa Landry; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedíal Writs, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 4985-05; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 09-00788.

Denied.


text:
    Curley Bell HENRY v. L & D COMMUNITY CARE, INC.
    No. 2010-CC-2270.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 5, 2010.
   In re Henry, Curley Bell; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs Office of Workers’ Comp. Dist. 4, No. 09-05114; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. WCW 10-01066.

Writ denied. Stay denied.


text:
    STATE ex rel. Harold Joe BLACK v. STATE of Louisiana.
    No. 2009-KH-2107.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 5, 2010.
   In re Lindsey, John S.; —Plaintiff; Applying for Reconsideration of this Courts action dated August 18, 2010; Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. I, No. 194,296; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 44,834-KH.

Reconsideration denied.


text:
    RACETRACK PETROLEUM, INC. v. CITY OF SHREVEPORT, a Political Subdivision of the State of Louisiana.
    No. 2010-C-1944.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 5, 2010.
   In re Shreveport City of; —Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 526,675; to the Court of Appeal/Second Circuit, No. 45,-120-CA.

Not considered; not timely filed.


text:
    Jeanine PRYOR v. IBERIA PARISH SCHOOL BOARD.
    No. 2010-C-1683.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 5, 2010.
   In re Iberia Parish School Board; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certio-rari and/or Review, Parish of Iberia, 16th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 106,274; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 10-23.

Granted.


text:
    Roland TOUPS, Individually and on behalf of Thrifty Liquor-15 v. CITY OF SHREVEPORT.
    No. 2010-C-1559.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 5, 2010.
   In re Shreveport City of; —Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 517,677; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 44,-933-CA.

Granted.


text:
    Stephan JONES v. CITY OF PINEVILLE.
    No. 2010-C-1373.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 5, 2010.
   In re Pineville City of; —Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Rapides, 9th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 220,225; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 09-1227.

Granted.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Michael PETITTO.
    No. 2010-K-0581.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 5, 2010.
   In re State of Louisiana; —Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Tangipahoa, 21st Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 703544; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2009 KA 1855.

Granted.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Lloyd BARNES.
    No. 2010-KK-2600.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 23, 2010.
   In re Barnes, Lloyd; —Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. E, No. 494-350; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2010-K-1250.

Sta/ denied. Writ denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Donald THOMPSON.
    No. 2010-KP-0956.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 23, 2010.
   In re Thompson, Donald; —Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 395878; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 KW 0317.

Denied on showing made.


text:
    In re Appeal of DISCIPLINARY BOARD Decision NO. 2010-PDB-024.
    No. 2010-OB-2180.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 24, 2010.
   In re Newton, David W.; —Plaintiff; Applying For Appeal of Decision of Disciplinary Board Office of Disciplinary Board, No. 20I0-PDB-024.

Leave to appeal denied.


text:
    Clyde A. “Rock” GISCLAIR, Assessor for St. Charles Parish v. The LOUISIANA TAX COMMISSION (Re: August 12, 2008 Decision in Commission Docket).
    No. 2010-C-1954.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 24, 2010.
   In re Gisclair, Clyde A. “Rock”; —Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. O, No. 570-485; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 CA 0272.

Application for writ of certiorari dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. See Metro Riverboat Assoc. v. La. Gaming Control Bd., 01-0185 (La.10/6/01), 797 So.2d 656; Loop, Inc. v. Collector of Revenue, 523 So.2d 201 (La.1987). See also LSA-Const. Art. VII, Section 18(E); LSA-R.S. 47:1989 & 1998; former LSA-R.S.47:2110(repealed by Acts 2008, No. 819, Section 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2009); LSA-R.S. 47:1853.

VICTORY and WEIMER, JJ., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana in the Interest of A.A.
    No. 2010-CK-0944.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 24, 2010.
   In re State of Louisiana; —Other; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Orleans Parish Juvenile Court, No. 2009-183-08-DQ-E; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2010-C-0207.

Not considered; not timely filed.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Vedo L. GUILLORY.
    No. 2010-KK-1231.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 24, 2010.
   In re Vedo Guillory; —Defendant(s); Applying for Rehearing of this Courts order dated October 8, 2010; Parish of Cal-casieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 28438-09; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No(s). KW 10-00299.

Rehearing denied.

VICTORY and WEIMER, JJ., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Keith Raymond FREMIN.
    No. 2010-KP-0954.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 24, 2010.
   In re Fremin, Keith Raymond; —Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. H, No. B78089; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 KW 0126.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Leonard LEWIS.
    No. 2010-KO-0967.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 24, 2010.
   In re Lewis, Leonard; —Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Vernon, 30th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 67408; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 09-846.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Terrell ANDERSON.
    No. 2010-K-0955.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 24, 2010.
   In re Anderson, Terrell; —Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. H, No. 475-297; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2009-KA-0623.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Clyde Matthew TROSCLAIR.
    No. 2010-KO-0974.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 24, 2010.
   In re Trosclair, Clyde Matthew; —Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Terrebonne, 32nd Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 495,605; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2009 KA 2002.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Johnny KITCHENS.
    No. 2010-KO-0985.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 24, 2010.
   In re Kitchens, Johnny; —Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. K, Nos. 472-572, 471-949; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, Nos. 2009-KA-0834, 2009-KA-836.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Floyd L. JEFFERSON.
    No. 2010-KO-0988.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 24, 2010.
   In re Jefferson, Floyd L.; —Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. G, No. 10-05-412; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2009 KA 1649.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Jasmine FRANCIS a/k/a Jass Faulk.
    No. 2010-KO-0996.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 24, 2010.
   In re Francis, Jasmine; —Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. K, No. CR 112,211; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 09-1006.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Wilkes LAIRD.
    No. 2010-KO-1018.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 24, 2010.
   In re Laird Wilkes; —Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Allen, 33th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. CR20071530; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KA 09-831.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Tyrone Dewayne GIPSON.
    No. 2010-KO-1019.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 24, 2010.
   In re Gipson, Tyrone Dewayne; —Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. 5, No. 263,641; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 45,121-KA.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana In the Interest of R.B.
    No. 2010-CK-1027.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 24, 2010.
   In re State of Louisiana; —Other; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Orleans Parish Juvenile Court, No. 2009-243-01-DQ-B; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2009-CA-1678.

Denied.

VICTORY, J., would grant.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Jemario Q. FREEMAN.
    No. 2010-KO-1043.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 24, 2010.
   In re Freeman, Jemario Q.; —Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. 2, No. 255,858; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 45,127-KA.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Toby James FRUGE.
    No. 2010-K-1054.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 24, 2010.
   In re Fruge, Toby James; —Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. I, No. CR 115665; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 09-1131.

Denied.


text:
    STATE of Louisiana v. Jose C. SANTOS.
    No. 2010-KO-1080.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 24, 2010.
   In re Santos, Jose C.; —Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 07-368; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 09-KA-789.

Denied.


text:
    Robert Charles BLANDA, Jr. and Catherine Vial Williams v. KATHRYN RAE TOWING, INC., M/V Tak # 1, Robert D. Mizell, U.S. Agencies Insurance Company, Inc., ABC Insurance Company and XYZ Insurance.
    No. 2010-C-2245.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 24, 2010.
   In re Blanda Jr., Robert Charles et al.; Williams, Catherine Vial; —Plaintiff(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Charles, 29th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 61,018; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 10-CA-96.

Denied.


text:
    Kurt Mitchell MIKESELL v. Linda Marie MIKESELL.
    No. 2010-CC-2248.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 24, 2010.
   In re Mikesell, Kurt Mitchell; —Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, East Baton Rouge Family Court, No. 137,-403; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2010 CW 1102.

Denied.


text:
    Susan and William LAURENDINE, et al. v. The BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF THE ORLEANS LEVEE BOARD.
    No. 2010-OC-2253.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 24, 2010.
   In re Louisiana State of; Sewerage & Water Bd. of N.O.; Transportation & Development Dept, of; —Defendant(s); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. N, No. 2005-11660; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2009-C-0149.

Denied.


text:
    Theodore Louis MANICHIA v. Carole L. Garell MAHONEY and Lanny Joseph Garell.
    No. 2010-C-2259.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 24, 2010.
   In re Manichia, Theodore Louis; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Plaquemines, 25th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 56-048; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2010-CA-0087.

Denied.