author: DAMOORGIAN, J.

text:
    Kemar ROCHESTER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D10-512.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    Aug. 8, 2012.
    Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Ian Seldin, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Richard Valuntas, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
   DAMOORGIAN, J.

Kemar Rochester appeals his judgment and sentence for lewd or lascivious molestation of a child less than twelve years of age, in violation of section 800.04(5)(b), Florida Statutes (2007). Rochester argues that the trial court erred in concluding that it could not downward depart from the mandatory minimum sentence of twenty-five years in prison followed by a term of probation for life for a violation of section 800.04(5)(b). We affirm.

The details of Rochester’s crime are irrelevant to our resolution of the issue in this case. Following Rochester’s conviction, he filed a motion for a downward departure sentence under section 921.0026(2)(j), Florida Statutes (2007) , on the grounds that the crime was committed in an unsophisticated manner, it was an isolated incident, and he had shown remorse for his crime. At his sentencing hearing, Rochester asserted that the trial court should not impose the statutory mandatory minimum sentence of twenty-five years because such a severe disposition was fundamentally unfair, and the trial court was within its discretion to impose a sentence that it deemed just. The trial court denied Rochester’s motion for a downward departure sentence, concluding that it had no discretion to grant a departure sentence. Pursuant to section 775.082(3)(a)4., Florida Statutes (2007), the trial court then sentenced Rochester to the mandatory minimum prison term of twenty-five years followed by a term of probation for life. This appeal follows.

The issue before us requires the interpretation of a statute. Accordingly, our review is de novo. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc. v. Meeks, 863 So.2d 287, 289 (Fla.2003); see also Wynkoop v. State, 14 So.3d 1166, 1171 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (“Whether there is a valid legal ground for a downward departure is a question of law, to be reviewed de novo.”) (citation omitted).

First, we reject without discussion the State’s contention that the issue was not preserved for review and that we have no jurisdiction to review this appeal because the sentence was within the statutory limit. See McCorvey v. State, 872 So.2d 395, 395 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (addressing appellant’s claim that the trial court erred when it expressed the belief that it could not consider any factors not enumerated in section 921.0026 for a downward departure sentence); Hines v. State, 817 So.2d 964, 965 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (discussing a similar issue as the one raised on this appeal as to whether the trial court misconstrued its authority to consider a downward departure sentence).

Turning to the merits of the issue, Rochester argues that the trial court incorrectly assumed that it could not downward depart from the mandatory minimum of twenty-five years. Rochester was convicted under section 800.04(5)(b), which states, “[a]n offender 18 years of age or older who commits lewd or lascivious molestation against a victim less than 12 years of age commits a life felony, punishable as provided in s. 775.082(3)(a)4.” § 800.04(5)(b), Fla. Stat. (2007). Section 775.082(3)(a)4. provides:

(3) A person who has been convicted of any other designated felony may be punished as follows:
(a)4. For a life felony committed on or after September 1, 2005, which is a violation of s. 800.04(5)(b), by:
a. A term of imprisonment for life; or
b. A split sentence that is a term of not less than 25 years’ imprisonment and not exceeding life imprisonment, followed by probation or community control for the remainder of the person’s natural life, as provided in s. 948.012(4).

§ 775.082(3)(a)4., Fla. Stat. (emphasis added). Relying upon the language- of the sentencing statute, Rochester claims that the trial court may depart from the minimum terms in the statute because of the use of the word “may” in section 775.082(3). Rochester reasons that the use of the word “may” in this context represents an express legislative intent that a twenty-five year mandatory minimum sentence is permissive and, therefore, a departure sentence under section 921.0026(2)(j) is not prohibited.

Our analysis begins by applying accepted rules of statutory construction. “Legislative intent is the polestar that guides a court’s statutory construction analysis.” Bautista v. State, 863 So.2d 1180, 1185 (Fla.2003). Only if the statute’s actual language “is unclear should the court resort to traditional rules of statutory construction and examine legislative history.” Bryan v. State, 865 So.2d 677, 679 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004). A specific statute “covering a particular subject matter is controlling over a general statutory provision covering the same and other subjects in general terms.” Adams v. Culver, 111 So.2d 665, 667 (Fla.1959). “The more specific statute is considered to be an exception to the general terms of the more comprehensive statute.” Floyd v. Bentley, 496 So.2d 862, 864 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986). Next, “when two statutes are in conflict, the later promulgated statute should prevail as the last expression of legislative intent.” McKendry v. State, 641 So.2d 45, 46 (Fla.1994) (citations omitted).

In McKendry, the Florida Supreme Court addressed the 1989 amendment to section 720.221, Florida Statutes (1989), the possession of short-barreled rifle, short-barreled shotgun, or machine gun statute. See id. at 45. The court held that the 1989 amendment replaced the permissive sentencing to mandatory minimum sentencing. Id. at 47. In reaching its holding, the court examined the legislature’s intent behind changing the language in the statute:

Legislative intent is also made clear by the 1989 amendment to section 790.221(2). Prior to 1989, section 790.221(2) read as follows: “[a]ny person convicted of violating this section is guilty of a felony and upon conviction thereof shall be punished by imprisonment in the state penitentiary not to exceed 5 years.” Ch. 69-306, § 10, at 1110, Laws of Fla. The 1989 amendment changed the statute to read “[u]pon conviction thereof he shall be sentenced to a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of 5 years.” Ch. 89-312, § 1, at 2042, Laws of Fla. The legislature specifically amended the statute to replace the permissive sentencing language limiting the maximum term of imprisonment to five years with mandatory sentencing language limiting the minimum term of imprisonment to five years. We find the 1989 amendment changing the language of section 790.221(2) to be a clear and unambiguous expression of the legislature’s intent.

Id.

In State v. Scriber, 991 So.2d 969 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008), the defendant was charged with aggravated fleeing and eluding. Id. at 970. Although the aggravated fleeing and eluding statute — section 316.1935, Florida Statutes (2007) — stated that “no court may suspend, defer or withhold adjudication of guilt or imposition of sentence” for such a crime, the trial court found mitigating circumstances under section 921.0026 and entered a downward departure withholding adjudication. Id. The State appealed the trial court’s ruling, and this Court reversed. Id. In reaching its holding, this Court reasoned:

Section 316.1935(6) clearly prohibits a withhold of adjudication for a section 316.1935 violation. Section 316.1935(6) was enacted in 2004, while section 921.0026 was passed in 1998. See Ch. 2004-388, Laws of Fla.; Ch. 1998-204, Laws of Fla. Because it is the later promulgated statute, section 316.1935(6) should prevail “as the last expression of legislative intent” on the subject of sentencing for an aggravated fleeing and eluding charge.

Id. (quoting McKendry, 641 So.2d at 47).

In 2004, the crime for which Rochester was convicted was a first degree felony punishable by up to thirty years in prison.

See § 800.04(5)(b), Fla. Stat. (2004); § 775.082(3)(b), Fla. Stat. (2004). Through its enactment of the Jessica Lunsford Act in 2005, the legislature made the following changes to the 2004 versions of sections 800.04(5)(b) and 775.082(3): (1) a violation of section 800.04(5)0») became a life felony; and (2) section 775.082(3) carried a twenty-five year mandatory minimum sentence. Ch. 2005-28, §§ 4-5, at 7-8, Laws of Fla. Similar to McKendry, the fact that the legislature amended sections 800.04(5)(b) and 775.082(3) in 2005 establishes a clear and unambiguous expression of its intent to impose a twenty-five year mandatory minimum sentence. Moreover, the sentencing statute provides a specific alternative available to the sentencing judge. The Jessica Lunsford Act applies to Rochester because he was charged with committing the crime in May 2008.

In the context of section 775.082(3)(a)4., we read “may” to mean that the trial court has the discretion to impose a mandatory minimum prison sentence of twenty-five years as an alternative to life imprisonment. However, the trial court does not have the discretion to go outside the two alternatives provided in section 775.082(3)(a)4. We reject Rochester’s interpretation that the legislature’s use of the word “may” is a grant of authority to the trial court to impose a sentence outside the confines of section 775.082(3)(a)4. Such a reading would lead to a result contrary to the legislature’s intent. See Sloban v. Fla. Bd. of Pharmacy, 982 So.2d 26, 33 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (“Under the plain meaning rule, ‘may’ denotes a permissive term; however, if reading ‘may’ as permissive leads to ... [a result] contrary to legislative intent, courts may look to ... the legislature’s intent to determine whether ‘ma/ should be read as a mandatory term.”) (citations omitted); see also Myles v. State, 602 So.2d 1278, 1281 (Fla.1992) (“[I]t is settled that the word ‘may1 is not always permissive, but may be a word of mandate in an appropriate context.”); Woodland v. Lindsey, 586 So.2d 1255, 1256 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991) (“The word ‘may’ in this context must be construed as an imperative to the court to exercise its authority.”).

We hold that sections 800.04(5)(b) and 775.082(3)(a)4. are controlling because they are the legislature’s last expression of intent and address the specific sentencing for the type of crime committed in this case as opposed to the general mitigating circumstances for sentencing any felony (except a capital felony) contained in section 921.0026. See Scriber, 991 So.2d at 970; McKendry, 641 So.2d at 46-47.

We recognize that our holding is contrary to Montgomery v. State, 36 So.3d 188 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010). In Montgomery, the defendant appealed his judgment and sentence for lewd or lascivious molestation in violation of section, 800.04(5)(b), Florida Statutes (2008). The Second District affirmed his judgment and sentence and clarified that section 775.082(3)(a)(4)(a)(II) — the 2008 version of the same statute Rochester was sentenced under — does not require a mandatory minimum sentence of twenty-five-years, and any ambiguity in the statute should be construed in favor of the defendant. Id. at 188-89. We disagree with Montgomery and hold that the legislature intended to impose a mandatory minimum sentence and the rule of lenity does not apply. Accordingly, we certify conflict to the Florida Supreme Court.

Affirmed; Conflict Certified.

WARNER and POLEN, JJ., concur.

      . Section 921.0026(2)(j) provides:
      (2) Mitigating circumstances under which a departure from the lowest permissible sentence is reasonably justified include, but are not limited to: (j) The offense was committed in an unsophisticated manner and was an isolated incident for which the defendant has shown remorse.
      § 921.0026(2)(j), Fla. Stat. (2007).

      . Section 921.0026(1) provides that "[a] downward departure from the lowest permissible sentence, as calculated according to the total sentence points pursuant to s. 921.0024, is prohibited unless there are circumstances or factors that reasonably justify the downward departure.” § 921.0026(1), Fla. Stat. The State argues that by its express terms, section 921.0026(1) is limited to those sentences calculable under the Criminal Punishment Code. See §§ 921.002-.0024, Fla. Stat. Therefore, section 921.0026 would not be available to Rochester because section 775.082(3)(a)4. is not a Criminal Punishment Code sentence due to the fact that section 775.082(3)(a)4. contains its own specific enumerated sentence. Based upon our analysis, we need not reach this argument.

      . Under the rule of lenity, "when the language is susceptible of differing constructions, it shall be construed most favorably to the accused.” § 775.021(1), Fla. Stat. (2008).


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: PER CURIAM. SHEPHERD, J.,

license: Public Domain

text:
    S.S., a juvenile, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 3D11-2604.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Aug. 8, 2012.
    Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender, Eleventh Judicial Circuit, and Kathryn J. Strobach, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Shayne R. Burnham, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
    Before SHEPHERD and ROTHENBERG, JJ., and SCHWARTZ, Senior Judge.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

ROTHENBERG, J., and SCHWARTZ, Senior Judge, concur.

SHEPHERD, J.,

dissenting.

I respectfully dissent.

This is an appeal from an order imposing $135 in restitution to be paid in installments of twenty dollars per month. Although this amount presumptively might seem reasonable, there is no record evidence of the juvenile’s expected ability to pay, nor was there any finding made by the trial court in that regard. Our case law is fairly consistent in the interpretation of section 985.437, Florida Statutes (2011), as requiring an ability-to-pay finding before a court orders juvenile restitution. See E.J. v. State, 1 So.3d 251 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008); K.T.M v. State, 969 So.2d 542 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007); M.W.G. v. State, 945 So.2d 597, 601 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (“When no evidence of what the child could reasonably be expected to earn is presented at the restitution hearing, the trial court cannot make a finding on this issue. In the absence of such a finding, an appellate court must reverse the restitution order and remand for a hearing on the child’s ability to earn and ability to pay.”) (citations omitted).

I would not deviate from this requirement for the sake of convenience, because what seems facially reasonable to the trial court might not be feasible for all families. Accordingly, I would reverse the restitution order and remand for the trial court to determine the ability of the juvenile or his legal guardian to pay the amount ordered.


author: PER CURIAM.

text:
    Vincent MANCINE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D11-274.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    Aug. 8, 2012.
    Vincent Mancine, Doral, pro se.
    No appearance required for appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

We affirm the summary denial of appellant’s rule 3.800(a) motion to correct illegal sentence, in which he challenges the Department of Corrections’ application of his court-ordered jail credit. Defendant should first exhaust his administrative remedies through the Department of Corrections. See Ward v. State, 974 So.2d 542 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008). If he is not satisfied with the Department’s ruling, he can then file a petition for writ of mandamus with the appropriate court. See Robinson v. State, 818 So.2d 543 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002).

Affirmed.

STEVENSON, DAMOORGIAN and CIKLIN, JJ., concur.


text:
    Richard WITHERSPOON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D11-1531.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    Aug. 8, 2012.
    Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and John Conway, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm- Beach, for appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Richard Valuntas, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. See State v. Adkins, 96 So.3d 412, 2012 WL 2849485 (Fla.2012).

MAY, C.J., DAMOORGIAN, J., and TUTER, JACK, Associate Judge.


text:
    Jason T. DEATON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D11-2223.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    Aug. 8, 2012.
    Jason T. Deaton, Wewahitchka, pro se.
    No appearance required for appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. Appellant is cautioned against future filings which include challenges on those sentencing issues raised and rejected in his rule 3.800(a) motion, the denial of which we now affirm. Such filings may result in a show cause order and consideration of sanctions. See generally State v. Spencer, 751 So.2d 47 (Fla.1999).

MAY, C.J., GROSS and GERBER, JJ., concur.


text:
    Leroy HUDSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Nos. 4D11-2683, 4D12-66.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    Aug. 8, 2012.
    Leroy Hudson, Milton, pro se.
    No appearance required for appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Leroy Hudson appeals the denial of his rule 3.800(a) motion, as well as the trial court’s order prohibiting him from filing future pro se pleadings unless signed by a member of the Florida Bar. We sua sponte consolidate the cases for review and affirm both orders. The trial court properly rejected Hudson’s rule 3.800(a) motion as an abusive and successive challenge to his conviction. In doing so, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it issued the sanction order barring further pro se filings from Hudson. See Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.850(m). The court’s order denying Hudson’s rule 3.800(a) motion provided Hudson with notice of the court’s intent to impose sanctions and an opportunity to be heard.

Additionally, we caution Hudson that filing future frivolous appeals or petitions involving successive post-conviction or other collateral challenges to his adjudication and/or sentence may result in sanctions from this court as well, including an order barring pro se pleadings or other filings under State v. Spencer, 751 So.2d 47 (Fla.1999), and/or referral to prison officials for consideration of disciplinary procedures which may include loss of gain time. See §§ 944.279(1), 944.28(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2011).

Affirmed.

MAY, C.J., TAYLOR and GERBER, JJ., concur.


author: SUAREZ, J.

text:
    Alberto REYES, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 3D12-819.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Aug. 8, 2012.
    Alberto Reyes, in proper person.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, for appellee.
    Before SUAREZ and FERNANDEZ, JJ., and SCHWARTZ, Senior Judge.
   SUAREZ, J.

This is an appeal of an order summarily denying a motion under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). On appeal from a summary denial, this Court must reverse unless the post-conviction record shows conclusively that the appellant is entitled to no relief. See Fla. R.App. P. 9.141(b)(2)(A), (D).

The appellant claims that the written sentence does not conform to the trial court’s oral pronouncement of sentence made at the plea hearing. Because the record now before us fails to make the required showing, we reverse the order and remand for further proceedings. If the trial court again enters an order summarily denying the post-conviction motion, the court shall attach record excerpts conclusively showing that the appellant is not entitled to any relief.

Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.


text:
    Albert DENNIS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D11-3913.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    Aug. 8, 2012.
    Albert Dennis, Mayo, pro se.
    No appearance required for appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. See Ives v. State, 993 So.2d 117, 120 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (citing Bover v. State, 797 So.2d 1246, 1251 (Fla.2001)).

STEVENSON, HAZOURI and CIKLIN, JJ., concur.


text:
    Tommy DOWELL, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 3D11-1314.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Aug. 8, 2012.
    Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender, and John Eddy Morrison, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Michael W. Mervine, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
    Before SHEPHERD, SALTER, and EMAS, JJ.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. See State v. Wooden, 92 So.3d 886 (Fla.2012).


text:
    William NELOMS, III, Appellant, v. Penelope TOWNSLEY, etc., et al., Appellees.
    No. 3D12-2049.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Aug. 8, 2012.

      Randy A. Fleischer, Davie; Greenspoon Marder and Joseph S. Geller, for appellant.
    Robert A. Cuevas, Jr., Miami-Dade County Attorney, Oren Rosenthal, Assistant County Attorney; Marko & Magol-nick, P.A. and Miguel M. de la 0 and David Everett Marko, Miami, for appel-lees.
    Before SUAREZ and FERNANDEZ, JJ., and SCHWARTZ, Senior Judge.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. See Ruiz v. Farias, 43 So.3d 124, 127 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010) (“[T]he ‘resign-to-run’ law addresses terms that will run concurrently, not terms that in some other hypothetical case might run concurrently.”)


text:
    Christopher T. MERRICK, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D12-2078.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Aug. 8, 2012.
    Christopher T. Merrick, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED. See Flagg v. State, 74 So.3d 138 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011).

VAN NORTWICK, WETHERELL, and MAKAR, JJ., concur.


text:
    Starlette COOPER, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 1D12-593.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Aug. 14, 2012.
    Starlette Cooper, pro se, Petitioner.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

The petition seeking a belated appeal of the judgments and sentences rendered on October 4, 2011, in Duval County Circuit Court Case Numbers 16-2011-CF-008216-AXXX and 16-2011-CF-008217-AXXX, is granted. Upon issuance of mandate, a copy of this opinion shall be furnished to the clerk of the lower tribunal for treatment as a notice of appeal. If petitioner qualifies for the appointment of counsel at public expense, the lower tribunal is directed to appoint counsel to represent her on appeal.

VAN NORTWICK, CLARK, and RAY, JJ., concur.


author: PER CURIAM. BENTON, C.J.,

text:
    Matthew Aaron BONCKOWSKI, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D12-0956.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Aug. 14, 2012.
    Matthew Aaron Bonckowski, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Anne C. Conley, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

PADOVANO and ROBERTS, JJ., concur; BENTON, C.J, Concurs with Opinion.

BENTON, C.J.,

concurring.

Mr. Bonckowski did not allege that any error in jail credit can be ascertained from the face of the record. He did not, therefore, present a facially sufficient jail credit claim pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). See Cabrera v. State, 62 So.3d 1171, 1172 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011). A motion pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 would, however, presumably still be timely. See Dennis v. State, 9 So.3d 761 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009).


text:
    Dominique HALL, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 1D12-1085.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Aug. 14, 2012.
    Dominique Hall, pro se, Petitioner.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

The petition seeking a belated appeal of the judgments and sentences rendered on August 20, 2010, in Clay County Circuit Court Case Numbers 2009-CF-001292 and 2009-CF-001293, is granted. Upon issuance of mandate, a copy of this opinion shall be furnished to the clerk of the lower tribunal for treatment as a notice of appeal. If appellant qualifies for the appointment of counsel at public expense, the lower tribunal is directed to appoint counsel to represent him on appeal.

VAN NORTWICK, CLARK, and RAY, JJ., concur.


text:
    Michael R. WYCOFF, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D12-1656.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Aug. 14, 2012.
    Michael R. Wycoff, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Charlie McCoy, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Appellant filed a rule 3.850 motion raising two claims. We find no merit in the first claim and affirm the trial court’s order denying relief. In claim two, Appellant asserts that he was jailed in the Lafayette County jail for 100 days after being arrested for violating probation and awaiting sentencing. He asserts that he received only 68 days of jail credit when he should have received another 37 days of jail credit. However, Appellant failed to list the dates he was allegedly jailed in Lafayette County. The trial court found the claim to be facially insufficient and denied the claim. Instead, because Appellant filed a timely rule 3.850 motion, the trial court should have allowed Appellant to amend his claim to provide the dates he was allegedly jailed in Lafayette County. See Spera v. State, 971 So.2d 754 (Fla.2007).

We therefore reverse and remand with instructions that the trial court permit Appellant to amend claim two of his rule 3.850 motion to include the specific dates for which he seeks jail credit. See id.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

MARSTILLER, RAY, and SWANSON, JJ., concur.


text:
    Antonio GRIFFIN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D12-2696.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Aug. 14, 2012.
    Antonio Griffin, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

The appellant filed a rule 3.850 motion raising what appears to be three claims. We affirm the trial court’s denial of relief on all of the claims, but note with particularity that the appellant has raised a claim that section 893.13, Florida Statutes, is unconstitutional due to Shelton v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, 802 F.Supp.2d 1289 (M.D.Fla.2011). We deny this claim as well for the reasons set forth in Flagg v. State, 74 So.3d 138 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011). See State v. Adkins, 96 So.3d 412, 2012 WL 2849485 (Fla. July 12, 2012) (affirming the constitutionality of section 893.13).

AFFIRMED.

WOLF, DAVIS, and ROBERTS, JJ„ concur.


author: WELLS, Chief Judge.

text:
    Jean Yves JACQUES, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 3D12-1735.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Aug. 15, 2012.
    Jean Yves Jacques, in proper person.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, for appellee.
    Before WELLS, C.J., and SHEPHERD and SALTER, JJ.
   WELLS, Chief Judge.

Jean Yves Jacques appeals an order denying his motion for postconviction relief filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800, claiming here that the court below erred in failing to continue his youthful offender status when he was re-sentenced following revocation of probation. Because the sentencing order does not confirm continuance of his youthful offender status, we reverse and remand for correction of that portion of the order.

Jacques was initially charged with trafficking in cocaine in violation of section 893.135(l)(b)l of the Florida Statutes. After pleading guilty to one count of trafficking in cocaine, he was sentenced as a youthful offender to six years probation. Thereafter, an affidavit of probation violation was filed alleging both technical and substantive violations on Jacques’ part. Following an evidentiary hearing, the court below determined that Jacques had violated the terms of his probation by engaging in a number of serious crimes (kidnapping with a weapon, armed burglary, armed robbery and sexual battery with a weapon). His probation was revoked and the trial court sentenced him to thirty years in prison.

In his postconviction motion, Jacques claimed that the lower court erred in failing to continue his status as a youthful offender and in imposing a sentence beyond the permissible sentence of no more than six years for a technical or non-substantive violation of probation. See § 958.14, Fla. Stat. (2012). The lower court denied the motion on both points. Jacques appeals the denial of his postcon-viction motion.

We find no error in the imposition of a sentence exceeding six years as section 958.14 provides that, for a substantive probation violation, a youthful offender may be sentenced to the maximum sentence allowed for the crime for which he or she was found guilty. See § 958.14, Fla. Stat. (2012) (providing that “no youthful offender shall be committed to the custody of the department for a substantive [probation] violation for a period longer than the maximum sentence for the offense for which he or she was found guilty ”) (emphasis added); Lee v. State, 67 So.3d 1199, 1202 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) (“[T]he court is not limited to imposing the usual youthful offender sentence of six years or less in prison if the revocation is based on a substantive violation.”) In this case, Jacques was on probation for trafficking in cocaine, a first degree felony, which permits a term of imprisonment not exceeding thirty years. See § 775.082(3)(b), Fla. Stat. (2012); § 893.135(1)(b)1, Fla. Stat. (2012). Because Jacques committed a substantive violation of his probation, the thirty year sentence imposed was an authorized sentence.

We cannot, however, discern from the new sentencing order that Jacques’ youthful offender status was continued as required. See Lee, 67 So.3d at 1202 (“Once a circuit court has imposed a youthful offender sentence, it must continue that status upon resentencing after a violation of probation or community control.” (quoting Blacker v. State, 49 So.3d 785, 788 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010))). We therefore reverse and remand the sentencing order on review to be corrected to reflect that Jacques’ youthful offender status will continue under the new sentence. Jacques need not be present for correction of the sentence.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions.

      . The' fact that these new charges were nolle prossed by the Slate at a later date does not affect this determination. See Flores v. State, 46 So.3d 102, 104 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010) (recognizing that the trial court may find a substantive violation of probation "even when the new charges are nolle prossed or dismissed”); Morency v. State, 955 So.2d 67, 68 n. 1 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) ("A new criminal offense can constitute a probation violation even if nolle prossed by the state.”).

      . As noted in Yegge v. State, 88 So.3d 1058, 1060 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012):
      Importantly, this is not a mere paper victory. A youthful offender designation carries benefits—including the availability of programs and facilities, and, though [the defendant] may not qualify, eligibility for early release — within the criminal justice system.


author: WARNER, J.

text:
    Antoine FAUST, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D10-2784.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    Aug. 15, 2012.

      Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Alan T. Lipson, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Richard Valuntas, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
   WARNER, J.

Antoine Faust appeals his conviction of first degree murder with a firearm. He raises three claims of trial court error. First, he claims that the court erred in admitting prior violent acts of appellant on the ground that they were inextricably intertwined with the commission of the present crime. We agree with the trial court that the acts were relevant to show motive for committing the murder. Second, he claims that the court erred in admitting two statements of a witness as past recollections recorded, when they constituted impeachment and the state called the witness for the sole purpose of introducing the statements. We conclude that one statement was admissible as a past recollection recorded and the other as impeachment. Finally, he claims that the court erred in admitting recordings of phone calls appellant made from the jail. As the calls provided relevant evidence, the court did not abuse its discretion in admitting them. We affirm the conviction and sentence.

Faust was charged with the murder of Andre Hall, whom the state maintained Faust killed because Hall was dating Faust’s former girlfriend. One of the state’s principal witnesses was the girlfriend. Faust met the girlfriend while he was involved with another woman. However, as the relationship with the other woman broke down, the girlfriend and Faust developed their own relationship. She suspected, however, that Faust was still involved with the other woman. The girlfriend told Faust she was breaking off their relationship. When she did this, Faust threatened to kill her and anyone she was with. Nevertheless, they still communicated over social media and by phone. The girlfriend told Faust that she thought she might be pregnant. Faust was neither happy nor angry about it. Later, she discovered that she was not pregnant.

The girlfriend knew that Faust was coming to Fort Lauderdale in October and told him over social media that she was looking forward to seeing him. In the meantime, she began dating a longtime friend, victim Andre Hall. On October 19th, the girlfriend spent the day with Hall, and they went to her home for dinner. She started getting phone calls and text messages from Faust that evening while Hall was with her.

Around midnight there was a knock on the door, and the girlfriend’s mother went to the door but didn’t open it. After that, there were several other phone calls which stopped around 1:00 in the morning. The girlfriend fell asleep around 2:00. At around 6:00 she walked Hall to the door. After he left, she returned to her room and heard her phone ring but didn’t answer it. Between five to ten minutes later she heard a gunshot. Ten seconds later she heard another gunshot. Her sister called 911. The police arrived and came to her apartment. She went outside once the police were there, and she saw Hall’s body.

At trial after the girlfriend’s direct testimony, the defense cross-examined her, suggesting that she was trying to entice Faust back into a relationship with her by her claim of pregnancy. She admitted having an intimate encounter with Faust two weeks before the murder. And she admitted having made 46 or 47 phone calls to Faust the morning before the murder. Significantly, when asked why her mother disliked Faust, the girlfriend testified that she wasn’t allowed to get into the reasons for that.

On redirect examination, the state argued that the defense had opened the door to bringing in Faust’s prior violent conduct towards the girlfriend to explain her conduct towards him. The state suggested that the girlfriend had been painted as being jealous of Faust, but the prosecutor argued that she was more scared of Faust than in love with him. Further, the defense had asked about the mother’s animosity to Faust, reasons for which the girlfriend told the jury she could not explain. Over a defense objection, the trial court permitted the girlfriend to testify on redirect that she was scared of Faust because of his prior acts of violence towards her. The court would not let the state delve into the number or kinds of acts of violence.

The girlfriend’s mother also testified. She was at home on the night of the incident and received cell phone calls from some woman, but she could hear Faust’s voice on the line. Around 6:15 in the morning, she received another call. She could not hear any voices but heard scuffling and then a gunshot. At the same time she heard a gunshot outside her home. She hung up and called back *69 to determine that the last call was from Faust’s phone. This was confirmed by cell phone records admitted in evidence.

On the morning of the murder, a family friend of Faust found Faust in her living room when she woke up. The family friend lived only a block or two from the girlfriend’s house. Faust asked to stay until someone came to pick him up. She went back to bed, but when she got up again, Faust was still there. She had a conversation with him, and he asked her whether, if someone said he had done something, he could be arrested. Later in the day, while Faust was still there, she found out that someone had been killed a street over from her home. Faust received a call on his cell phone from a detective, and the family friend discovered that the police had her home surrounded. Faust surrendered to the police at her home. The family friend then gave the police permission to search her house, which included the attic. She did not see them remove a gun.

During direct examination, the state asked the family friend whether she remembered seeing Faust go into the attic. She said she did not but did see him on a chair at the attic entrance. She also denied hearing Faust tell her that the girl he was dealing with said that he shot and killed someone. The state then attempted to refresh her recollection with a statement she made to police the day of the incident. The family friend recognized her voice on the audio statement, but it did not refresh her recollection of the statement. She did admit that when she spoke to the police on that occasion she spoke the truth, and her memory at that time of the incident was better than her memory at the time of trial.

The state also questioned the family friend about her boyfriend and cousin’s subsequent search of her home for a gun. At trial she testified that they searched the home, but she did not see a gun. The prosecutor then produced a second statement that she had given to police about two weeks after the murder. In that statement she told police that the men had searched her home and removed a gun. Again, even though she identified her voice on the audiotape, she could not recollect her answer regarding the gun. With respect to this statement, however, the family friend testified that her present memory was that she had not seen a gun.

Over objection, the state also introduced recordings of Faust’s telephone calls from jail to an unidentified woman (who apparently was “the other woman”) the day after the murder and one a few days later. In the calls, Faust told her to ask the family friend’s nephew to look for “the thing” and to ask another friend to vouch for him that he had been at her house the entire night before the murder. In the second call, Faust asked if the “money” and “books” had been gotten rid of, because that would save his life.

The cause of the victim’s death was two gunshot wounds to the head and chest. No gun, however, was ever found. On this evidence, the jury convicted Faust of first degree murder with a firearm. He was sentenced to life in prison and now appeals.

In his first issue on appeal, Faust claims that the court erred in allowing the state to ask the girlfriend on redirect about prior acts of violence against her. He claims that these were not inextricably intertwined with the event and brought up collateral issues, unrelated to the charges in this case. We should first note that at trial the thrust of the defense claim was to avoid getting into the specifics of the various violent acts against the girlfriend, particularly one occurring about a month and a half prior to the murder where the girlfriend alleged that Faust choked her into a state of unconsciousness after their breakup.

With respect to the verbal threats by Faust, to which the girlfriend testified on direct examination, these provided a motive for the murder of Hall. Faust threatened to kill both the girlfriend and anyone she was involved with. This is nearly identical to Floyd v. State, 18 So.3d 432 (Fla.2009), which involved a husband’s threat to kill his wife, or someone she loved, as a reprisal for her drinking or if she attempted to run or hide from him. The supreme court held that the threat demonstrated the motive behind the murder of the wife’s mother and was inextricably intertwined with the murder. Similarly, Faust’s threat to kill anyone with whom his girlfriend became involved provides the motive for the murder of Hall.

Faust also objects to the state being allowed to ask the girlfriend on redirect whether she was scared of Faust and whether he had committed prior acts of violence against her. In Sinclair v. State, 50 So.3d 1223, 1226 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011), we explained:

The concept of “opening the door” permits admission of inadmissible evidence for the purpose of qualifying, explaining or limiting testimony previously admitted. This concept is based on considerations of fairness where “redirect examination reveals the ‘whole story of a transaction only partly explained’ in cross examination.”

(citations omitted). By allowing the limited questioning of the girlfriend regarding her claim that she was the victim of prior acts of violence by the defendant, her testimony explained in some sense why the mother disliked Faust, a topic brought up, but not satisfactorily explained, in cross-examination. Further, the fact that she feared Faust was necessary to explain why she continued to see Faust on occasion even though she had broken off with him. The court appropriately did not allow specific acts of violence, or the number of them to be introduced, because such evidence may have been overly prejudicial. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this very limited redirect examination.

In the second issue, Faust contends that the prior statements given by the family friend to the police were improperly admitted as past recollections recorded. From our reading of the record, it appears that the first statement given the day of the incident was admitted as a past recollection recorded, but the family friend’s second statement regarding the gun was offered by the state as impeachment of her trial testimony. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting either statement.

Section 90.803(5), Florida Statutes, provides an exception from the hearsay rule for the admission of prior statements as recorded recollections:

(5) Recorded recollection. — A memorandum or record concerning a matter about which a witness once had knowledge, but now has insufficient recollection to enable the witness to testify fully and accurately, shown to have been made by the witness when the matter was fresh in the witness’s memory and to reflect that knowledge correctly. A party may read into evidence a memorandum or record when it is admitted ....

A witness who has no present memory of a statement must testify that he or she knew at the time of the making of the statement that it was accurate. See Montano v. State, 846 So.2d 677, 681 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003); Kimbrough v. State, 846 So.2d 540, 544 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003). Here, the family friend testified that, as to the first statement, she remembered giving the statement to the police but did not remember her specific answers as to some questions. Nevertheless, she testified that she gave accurate and truthful information to the police at the time, and her memory was better concerning the events at the time of the statement than when she was testifying. Therefore, the first statement was admissible as a past recollection recorded.

As to the testimony with respect to her seeing a gun removed from her home after a search by her boyfriend and cousin, this statement was admissible as impeachment. Section 90.608(1), Florida Statutes, permits the impeachment of a witness through the introduction of statements inconsistent with the witness’s trial testimony. In this case, the family friend testified at trial that she did not witness any gun being removed from her home. When confronted with her prior statement, she admitted having given a statement to the police. She affirmatively stated that she did remember the search by her boyfriend and cousin, and she did not see a gun. What she did not remember was her statement to the police regarding seeing a gun. She admitted that her prior statement was inconsistent with her present testimony. On cross-examination, she clearly stated that she did not see a gun and that any prior statement that she did would have been inaccurate and prompted by fear of her situation. Thus, the introduction of her second statement to the police regarding seeing the gun was proper as impeachment. See Rodriguez v. State, 65 So.3d 1133, 1135 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011).

While Faust also complains that the state called the family friend solely for the purpose of impeaching her, we find that this is patently not the case. Not only were some of her statements permissible as recorded recollections, she offered other testimony relevant and not covered by either of the prior statements. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting these statements.

Finally, Faust objects to the admission of the recordings of the jail phone calls. On appeal, he argues that the evidence was unduly prejudicial and in violation of section 90.403, Florida Statutes. The admission of evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion, limited by the rules of evidence. Hudson v. State, 992 So.2d 96, 107 (Fla.2008); Essex v. State, 917 So.2d 953, 956 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005).

The audio recordings were relevant. The recordings suggested that Faust was using code words to direct others to get rid of a weapon on the day after the murder. He referred to “that thing,” “the money,” “my books,” and “the coupons,” and told the woman to dispose of them as soon as possible because his life depended on it. Such conversations were admissible as they tended to show consciousness of guilt. See Hayward v. State, 24 So.3d 17, 38-39 (Fla.2009).

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the conviction and sentence.

DAMOORGIAN and CONNER, JJ., concur.


author: TAYLOR, J.

text:
    Anthony L. JONES, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D10-2515.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    Aug. 15, 2012.

      Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Narine N. Austin, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Melanie Dale Surber, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
   TAYLOR, J.

Appellant, Anthony Jones, appeals his conviction for strong arm robbery. Because the trial court committed harmful error in allowing the lead detective to testify as to her interpretation of statements appellant made during a police interrogation, we reverse for a new trial.

At trial, the victim testified that three men on bicycles approached him at night and cornered him against a fence. The men were dressed in all black, wearing cut-off gloves and “hoodies,” with the hoods covering their heads. The man on the victim’s right, later identified by the victim as appellant, took $180 cash from the victim’s pocket and then pushed him down. The victim testified that this perpetrator’s “hoodie” slipped back, showing the man’s face and revealing that the man had braids or twists in his hair. The victim estimated that the man who pushed him was about 170 pounds, but the victim stated that it was difficult to tell. The victim acknowledged that he had been drinking before he was robbed.

After the robbers left the scene, the victim immediately called the police. Within ten minutes, a police officer found appellant riding a bicycle alone about five or six blocks from the location of the robbery. The victim was taken to the location where appellant was detained. He positively identified appellant as one of the robbers.

Appellant did not have the victim’s money on him when he was arrested. When appellant was booked at the station, he weighed 145 pounds. Although appellant was wearing a black jacket, the jacket did not have a “hoodie.” While there was conflicting testimony as to the color of appellant’s pants, the video interrogation appears to show that appellant was wearing jeans of a grayish color. The testifying officers could not specifically recall if appellant was wearing cut-off gloves or full gloves on the night of the robbery, but one officer — after having his recollection refreshed by video of appellant at the police station — testified that the gloves taken from appellant at the station appeared to be full-fingered gloves.

The lead detective interrogated appellant at the police station. During the interrogation, appellant never confessed to the crime. Appellant told the detective that he had just left his brother’s girlfriend’s house and maintained that he had nothing to do with the robbery. The detective used a ploy in an attempt to gain information, falsely telling appellant that the police had apprehended the other two robbers and that both of them had implicated appellant in the robbery. The following exchange then occurred:

DETECTIVE: ... If you want to add in your side of the story, that’s great, man. If you don’t, that’s on you.
APPELLANT: Story to what, ma’am? I’m not going to put myself somewhere where I know I wasn’t nowhere near.
DETECTIVE: Well, you already told me you ...
APPELLANT: ... I’m not fitting to put myself somewhere where I know I was nowhere.
DETECTIVE: You just told me exactly where you were.
APPELLANT: Leaving my brother girlfriend [sic] house.
DETECTIVE: Which is exactly where shit happened, so you’re saying I’m not going to put myself where I wasn’t. I never told you where this occurred. How can you assume it is not right there where it happened?
APPELLANT: I don’t know where it happened.
DETECTIVE: See what I mean when you start to bullshit? You’re like oh, I was just right here the entire time. I’m not putting myself where it didn’t happen.
That implies that it happened in another location. That’s why I’m saying how would you know that because I never said that? See what I mean?
APPELLANT: Yea. I see what you mean, but ... you’re not fooling me.

After the tape was played at trial, the following exchange took place between the prosecutor and the detective:

STATE: When he indicates to you “I’m not going to put myself somewhere that I wasn’t” and you state to him “Well, you just told me where you are,” what was the purpose of that?
DETECTIVE: ... I wanted to establish that he was saying that this is where I am. This is where I know I told you that I was. I know the crime occurred over here, but I’m not going to tell you that I know where the crime ... not put myself there.

Defense counsel immediately objected and moved to strike the detective’s testimony regarding her interpretation of appellant’s statement, but the trial court overruled the objection and allowed the detective to continue giving her answer:

DETECTIVE: ... Again, the same thing that I answered before, that I’m not going to put myself where the crime is, I was telling you where I happened to be at my brother’s house,” that would indicate to me in my opinion that he knew then that the crime occurred somewhere else and not in front of the place where he told me that he was.

At the conclusion of trial, appellant was found guilty as charged and sentenced to five years in prison, followed by five years of probation.

On appeal, appellant argues that the trial court erred by allowing the lead detective to offer her opinion, over appellant’s objection, that the reason appellant said he was in another location was because he knew where the robbery took place. We agree with appellant’s argument that this was highly prejudicial and improperly bolstered the state’s case.

A trial court’s decision on the admissibility of evidence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Hudson v. State, 992 So.2d 96, 107 (Fla.2008). That discretion is, however, limited by the rules of evidence. Id.

“Generally, a lay witness may not testify in terms of an inference or opinion, because it usurps the function of the jury.” Floyd v. State, 569 So.2d 1225, 1231-32 (Fla.1990). For example, a witness’s opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the accused is not admissible. Martinez v. State, 761 So.2d 1074, 1079 (Fla.2000). However, a lay witness may offer an opinion or inference about what the witness perceived if:

(1) The witness cannot readily, and with equal accuracy and adequacy, communicate what he or she has perceived to the trier of fact without testifying in terms of inferences or opinions and the witness’s use of inferences or opinions will not mislead the trier of fact to the prejudice of the objecting party; and
(2) The opinions and inferences do not require a special knowledge, skill, experience, or training.

§ 90.701, Fla. Stat. (2009).

As a general rule, lay witnesses may not testify about their subjective interpretations or conclusions as to the meaning of another person’s statements. See Thorp v. State, 777 So.2d 385, 395-96 (Fla.2000). Although the rules of evidence allow the interpretation by a witness of coded conversations, the interpretation of clear conversations is not helpful to the jury and is inadmissible. See, e.g., United States v. Dicker, 853 F.2d 1103, 1108 (3d Cir.1988). Any inferences that may be drawn from a defendant’s statement ordinarily should be made by the jury and not by the witness. See Thorp, 777 So.2d at 395-96. Thus, in Thorp, the Florida Supreme Court held that it was error for the trial court to allow a witness to testify as to the meaning he ascribed to the defendant’s statement that he “did a hooker.” Id. The supreme court explained: “The exact meaning of Thorp’s words and the inferences that could be drawn from them, however, were matters for the jury to consider.... Under these circumstances, there was no need to resort to testimony concerning Bullock’s interpretation of Thorp’s words.” Id.

Likewise, in this case, it was error for the trial court to allow the lead detective to offer her opinion as to what she thought the defendant’s statements meant. While the detective did not offer an ultimate opinion regarding appellant’s guilt, the officer’s testimony as to her interpretation of the interrogation improperly bolstered the state’s case and was inadmissible. Appellant did not use any “coded” words which would have required the officer to testify in terms of inferences. Furthermore, the detective’s “interpretation” of appellant’s words was far more incriminating than anything appellant actually said. Indeed, it is doubtful that one could fairly interpret anything in appellant’s statement as some sort of admission that he knew where the robbery occurred. But even if such an interpretation could fairly be drawn from the interrogation, the exact meaning of appellant’s words and the inferences that could be drawn from them were matters for the jury to consider. There was no need to resort to testimony concerning the detective’s interpretation of appellant’s words.

Having concluded that the trial court erred in allowing the lead detective to testify in this manner, we must address whether the error was harmless. Our analysis is guided by Thorp, where the supreme court found the admission of testimony regarding a witness’s interpretation of a defendant’s statement to be harmful error:

By permitting Bullock to interpret the meaning of Thorp’s words, the trial court committed harmful error because it effectively turned Thorp’s obvious admission of involvement in a crime into a confession of murder. As the record reflects, however, Thorp never confessed to murdering Sharon Case. Rather, during the penalty phase of the trial, he admitted only to having sexual intercourse -with the victim, an act which is equally consistent with his admission to Bullock. Therefore, Bullock’s opinion testimony that Thorp’s statement that he “did a hooker” meant that he killed her, was undoubtedly prejudicial and we cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt that it did not affect the jury’s verdict in this case. Under DiGuilio, the admission of Bullock’s opinion testimony constitutes harmful error.

Id. at 396.

Likewise, the error in this case cannot be deemed harmless. See State v. DiGuilio, 491 So.2d 1129, 1135 (Fla.1986). By permitting the lead detective to interpret the meaning of appellant’s words, the trial court committed harmful error because it effectively turned appellant’s denial of involvement in the robbery into an admission that he knew where the robbery occurred (and thus, by implication, into an admission that he was involved in the robbery). This was undoubtedly prejudicial. As the record reflects, appellant never actually confessed to participating in the robbery. Moreover, there were some inconsistencies between the victim’s description of the perpetrator and appellant’s appearance when he was detained shortly after the robbery. The detective’s improper opinion testimony, which suggested that appellant’s statements meant that he knew where the robbery occurred, may have “tipped the scales” in favor of a conviction in a case where the parties hotly disputed whether the victim properly identified appellant as a participant in the robbery. We cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not affect the jury’s verdict in this case. Accordingly, we reverse appellant’s conviction and remand for a new trial.

Reversed and Remanded.

MAY, C.J., and CIKLIN, JJ., concur.


text:
    Albert M. GARCIA, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D11-3351.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    Aug. 15, 2012.

      Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Jeffrey L. Anderson, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Melynda L. Melear, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

The appellant, Albert Garcia, challenges his conviction after jury trial of misdemeanor fleeing and eluding. We affirm the judgment and sentence without discussion as to three issues Garcia raises. As for the fourth issue, we accept the state’s concession that the case should be remanded for entry of an order of probation which conforms to the judgment of conviction, because the order mistakenly reflects that Garcia was convicted of a felony fleeing and eluding after he pled guilty. See Rodriguez v. State, 61 So.3d 496 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011).

Affirmed and remanded.

GROSS, HAZOURI and CONNER, JJ., concur.


text:
    Kyle GRAY, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 1D12-1546.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Aug. 15, 2012.
    Kyle Gray, pro se, Petitioner.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

The timely notice of appeal has been received by this court and docketed in case number 1D12-3072. Accordingly, the petition for belated appeal is dismissed as moot.

THOMAS, WETHERELLj and MARSTILLER, JJ., concur.


text:
    U.V., a juvenile, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 3D11-2571.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Aug. 15, 2012.
    U.V., a juvenile, in proper person.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, for appellee.
    Before SHEPHERD and CORTINAS, JJ., and SCHWARTZ, Senior Judge.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

CORTIÑAS, J., and SCHWARTZ, Senior Judge, concur.

SHEPHERD, J.,

dissenting.

I would deny the Public Defender’s motion to withdraw under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), and: (a) order the appellant to supplement the record with transcripts of the pre-trial hearings of February 23, 2011, and/or March 7, 2011, and/or April 26, 2011; and (b) order full briefing on the following issues: (1) whether the inquiry made by the trial court regarding the State’s failure to provide the recording of U.V.’s statement complied with Richardson v. State, 246 So.2d 771 (Fla.1971), and (2) whether the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to exclude evidence of statements allegedly made by U.V. to the police, thereby forcing U.V. to choose between his rights to a speedy trial and his right to complete discovery.


author: SCHWARTZ, Senior Judge.

text:
    OCEAN BANK, Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. 107 AVENUE OFFICE PARK CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, INC., et al., Appellees/Cross-Appellants.
    No. 3D12-538.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Aug. 15, 2012.
    Louis K. Nicholas, II, Miami, for appellant/cross-appellee.
    Cuevas, Ortiz & Cubas and Jonathan S. Goldstein, Miami-Dade, for appellee/cross-appellant 107 Avenue Office Park Condominium Association, Inc.
    Before ROTHENBERG and SALTER, JJ., and SCHWARTZ, Senior Judge.
   SCHWARTZ, Senior Judge.

This is an appeal from an order concerning the rents paid pendente lite by the tenant of a condominium office unit which divided them between the appellee condominium association, which had filed an action to foreclose its lien, see § 720.3085, Fla. Stat. (2010), and the appellant mortgagee Ocean Bank, which maintained a separate but contemporaneous action to foreclose its mortgage and an accompanying assignment of rents. See § 697.07, Fla. Stat. (2003); Howard Sav. Bank v. E. Fed. Corp., 614 So.2d 1162 (Fla.1993). We find no error except for that portion of the order which credits the association for the attorneys’ fees payable in its foreclosure proceedings. There is no basis for deducting this sum from the mortgagee-assign-ee’s share of the rents. See Velasquez v. Ettenheim, 89 So.3d 981 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012). To that extent, the order under review is reversed in part and the cause is remanded for adjustment of the respective award accordingly. Otherwise, the order is affirmed.

Affirmed in part; reversed in part.


text:
    Courtney REID, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 3D12-1801.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Aug. 15, 2012.
    Junior Farquharson, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, for appellee.
    Before SUAREZ and FERNANDEZ, JJ., and SCHWARTZ, Senior Judge.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. See Hernandez v. State, 61 So.3d 1144 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011), review granted, 81 So.3d 414 (Fla.2012).


text:
    Oscar MURPHY, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 3D12-1831.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Aug. 15, 2012.
    Oscar Murphy, in proper person.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, for appellee.
    Before SUAREZ, LAGOA and EMAS, JJ.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. See Hernandez v. State, 61 So.3d 1144, 1151 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011), review granted, 81 So.3d 414 (Fla.2012).


text:
    Nelson LAUZAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 3D12-1167.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Aug. 15, 2012.
    Ricardo Corona and Sahar Razzaghi-Awal, Coral Gables, for appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, for appellee.
    Before SHEPHERD, SALTER and EMAS, JJ.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. Hernandez v. State, 61 So.3d 1144 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011), review granted, 81 So.3d 414 (Fla.2012).


author: STEVENSON, J.

text:
    STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Harvey M. HILL, Jr., Appellee.
    No. 4D11-927.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    Aug. 15, 2012.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Melanie Dale Surber, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
    Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Amy Lora Rabinowitz, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
   STEVENSON, J.

The State appeals the trial court’s dismissal of an aggravated battery with a firearm charge against the defendant pursuant to Florida’s Stand Your Ground law, section 776.013, Florida Statutes (2009). Because the defendant was a convicted felon in possession of a firearm at the time of the shooting, the defendant was precluded from use of the Stand Your Ground defense and, thus, we reverse the dismissal.

The defendant was charged by information with aggravated battery with a firearm (count I), carrying a concealed firearm (count II), felon in possession of a firearm or ammunition (count III), and retaliation against a witness (count IV). Prior to trial, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss count I, alleging that his use of force that led to the charge was justified under the Stand Your Ground law. During the hearing on the defendant’s motion, the defendant testified that he was involved in an altercation with Anton Peavy and Andre Solomon regarding a woman with whom he had been sexually involved. Peavy and Solomon approached the defendant while he was sitting on his porch and began questioning him. Solomon had a gun and the two men were much larger in size than the defendant. According to the defendant, Peavy “snapped” and both Peavy and Solomon “rushed” him. The defendant could not flee because he was cornered on the porch. The defendant pulled out a gun that he had in his pocket and shot Peavy once in the stomach. The defendant had previously been convicted of two felonies. The trial court reasoned that the defendant’s crime of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon did not preclude him from seeking dismissal under the Stand Your Ground law. Whether the trial court erred in its conclusion presents an issue of statutory interpretation that is reviewed de novo. See Anderson v. State, 87 So.3d 774, 777 (Fla.2012).

Florida’s Stand Your Ground law provides:

A person who is not engaged in an unlawful activity and who is attacked in any other place where he or she has a right to be has no duty to retreat and has the right to stand his or her ground and meet force with force, including deadly force if he or she reasonably believes it is necessary to do so to prevent death or great bodily harm to himself or herself or another or to prevent the commission of a forcible felony.

§ 776.013(8), Fla. Stat. (2009).

This court recently held that “possession of a firearm by a convicted felon qualifies as ‘unlawful activity’ within the meaning of the Stand Your Ground law.” Dorsey v. State, 74 So.3d 521, 527 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011). As such, the defendant’s crime of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon precludes him from seeking immunity under the Stand Your Ground law. Here, the defendant used the very instrumentality that he was not lawfully allowed to possess to injure his alleged assailant. This opinion does not, however, comment on any right the defendant may have to assert a justification defense. See Marrero v. State, 516 So.2d 1052, 1054 n. 3 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987) (stating “the defendant may very well be excused from his assault upon his assailant by reason of duress or self-defense without being excused from his possession of the firearm”); see also Dorsey, 74 So.3d at 527 (explaining that when “a defendant was engaged in an unlawful activity or was in a place where he did not have a right to be at the time he was attacked, the common law duty to retreat still applies”).

Reversed.

HAZOURI and GERBER, JJ., concur.


text:
    Xavier WILLIAMS, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 1D12-3230.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Aug. 15, 2012.
    Xavier Williams, pro se, Petitioner.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

DENIED. See Johnson v. State, 871 So.2d 294 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004).

LEWIS, ROBERTS, and ROWE, JJ., concur.


text:
    Gregory Lamar WALKER, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 1D12-3645.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Aug. 15, 2012.
    Gregory Lamar Walker, pro se, Petitioner.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

DENIED. Baker v. State, 878 So.2d 1236 (Fla.2004).

LEWIS, ROBERTS, and ROWE, JJ., concur.


text:
    STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Shaun Francis FLYNN, Appellee.
    No. 4D11-3096.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    Aug. 15, 2012.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Sue-Ellen Kenny, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
    Cindy E. D’Agostino of Cindy E. D’Agostino, P.A., Palm Beach Gardens, for appellee.
   DAMOORGIAN, J.

The State of Florida appeals the order granting Shaun Flynn’s Rule 3.800 motion to correct sentence. In his motion, Flynn sought the deletion of electronic monitoring as a condition of his probation. We reverse.

The facts giving rise to Flynn’s motion are not in dispute. In 2009, Flynn entered a plea of no contest to one count of failure of a sex offender to report to the DMV as required by section 943.0435, Florida Statutes (2008). Pursuant to a plea agreement, Flynn was placed on five years probation with three special conditions. The special conditions did not include electronic monitoring. While he was on probation, the probation office ordered that Flynn be supervised by electronic monitoring. Flynn objected on the grounds that the trial court had not imposed electronic monitoring at the time of sentencing or at any other time, and the plea agreement did not impose electronic monitoring as a condition of probation. He also argued that he did not meet the criteria for the mandatory imposition of electronic monitoring under sections 948.063 and 948.30(3), Florida Statutes (2008) and therefore, the probation office was without authority to impose such a condition. In response, the State asserted that under the Jessica Lunsford Act, electronic monitoring was a mandatory condition of Flynn’s probation sentence because Flynn had previously been convicted of a lewd and lascivious act in violation of section 800.04, Florida Statutes. The trial court granted Flynn’s motion and struck electronic monitoring as a condition of Flynn’s probation. This appeal follows.

“Because a motion to correct a sentencing error involves a pure issue of law, our standard of review is de novo.” Kittles v. State, 31 So.3d 283, 284 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010). Similarly, the issue of statutory construction is a pure question of law, which this Court reviews de novo. See Alvarado v. State, 9 So.3d 1273, 1275 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (citing Sutton v. State, 975 So.2d 1073, 1076 (Fla.2008)).

Both this Court and the Third District have acknowledged that section 948.30(3) compels electronic monitoring as a mandatory condition of probation. Grosso v. State, 2 So.3d 362, 364 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (noting that “[u]nder section 948.30, Florida Statutes, the trial court was required to impose electronic monitoring as a mandatory condition of probation because of [the defendant’s] prior convictions for violations of Chapter 794 and Section 800.04,” but reversing the court’s imposition of electronic monitoring on jurisdictional grounds); Harroll v. State, 960 So.2d 797-98 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) (holding that a “trial court is required to impose mandatory electronic monitoring as a condition of probation” under section 948.30 for defendants previously convicted of certain unlawful sexual activity); State v. Lacayo, 8 So.3d 385, 387 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009) (holding that mandatory electronic monitoring as a condition of probation was required in case where defendant, who had previously been convicted of sex crime, was convicted for fleeing and attempting to elude a police officer).

By the plain language of section 948.30(3), the trial court was prohibited from granting Floyd’s motion to modify the terms of his probation to delete mandatory electronic monitoring.

Reversed and Remanded.

WARNER and POLEN, JJ., concur.

      . The Jessica Lunsford Act ("JLA”) is codified in section 948.063, Florida Statutes. Witch

        ard v. State, 68 So.3d 407 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011); Blue v. State, 73 So.3d 358 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011).


text:
    Neil Leonard ROBINSON, Jr., Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 5D12-3090.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Aug. 16, 2012.

      Terry J. Shoemaker, St. Augustine, for Petitioner.
    Pamela J. Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee and L. Charlene Matthews, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

Petitioner, Neil Leonard Robinson, Jr. (“Robinson”), petitions this Court for a writ of habeas corpus, contending that his pretrial detention under a $500,000 bail bond is illegal. We conclude that the trial court set an excessive amount of bail, which is the functional equivalent of no bail. Consequently, we grant the petition, quash the order denying Robinson’s motion for reduction of bond, and remand for further proceedings.

Robinson was arrested and charged with two counts of aggravated child abuse, first-degree felonies in violation of section 827.03(2), Florida Statutes (2012). Robinson’s cumulative bail was set at $500,000 at his first appearance hearing. Robinson then moved to reduce his bond. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the motion, finding that the bail amount was reasonable under the circumstances. In so ruling, the trial court failed to take into account the statutory factors contained in section 903.046, Florida Statutes (2012).

We acknowledge that an accused seeking a reduction in bail has the burden to adduce evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption of correctness of the trial court’s order. See Mesidor v. Neumann, 721 So.2d 810, 811 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998). Evidence of Robinson’s financial status, attendance at court proceedings, family ties, long-term residence in the community and employment history was sufficient to show that bail in the amount of $500,000 was excessive. While Robinson has some financial resources, the record demonstrates that $500,000 is well beyond his financial abilities. Because “[b]ail should not be fixed in so excessive an amount as to preclude the probability of the accused’s being able to furnish it,” Matera v. Buchanan, 192 So.2d 18, 20 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966), we conclude that the bail is excessive, particularly given his ties to the community and employment. See, e.g., Leighton v. State, 55 So.3d 675, 676 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011) (determining that bail in amount of $1,600,000 for twenty-three-year-old defendant charged, inter alia, with attempted first-degree murder was excessive based on defendant’s financial status); Mesidor, 721 So.2d at 811 (finding $200,000 bail on life felony unreasonable where defendant had ties to community and no prior criminal record, was adjudicated indigent, and had no property other than automobile); Cameron v. McCampbell, 704 So.2d 721, 722-23 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (holding that one million dollar bail excessive where evidence is insufficient to show that petitioner could meet bail).

Accordingly, we grant the petition and direct the trial court to promptly hold a new bond hearing, taking into consideration Robinson’s financial circumstances as well as all other relevant factors. See § 908.046(2), Fla. Stat. (2012); Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.131.

PETITION GRANTED; REMANDED.

ORFINGER, C.J., TORPY and EVANDER, JJ., concur.

      . A petition for writ of habeas corpus in' the appellate court is the appropriate way to challenge a trial court’s ruling on the conditions of pretrial release. See State ex rel. Scaldeferri v. Sandstrom, 285 So.2d 409, 412-13 (Fla.1973).


text:
    Luis A. CASTILLO, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 5D12-1659.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Aug. 17, 2012.
    Luis A. Castillo, Lake City, pro se.
    Pamela J. Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee and Wesley Heidt, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

The petition for belated appeal is granted. A copy of this opinion shall be filed with the trial court and be treated as the notice of appeal from the judgment and sentence for violation of probation in case no. 2001-CF-11772, in the Circuit Court in and for Orange County, Florida. See Fla. R.App. P. 9.141(c)(6)(D).

PETITION GRANTED.

ORFINGER, C.J., PALMER and JACOBUS, JJ., concur.


text:
    William PAUL, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 5D12-2531.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Aug. 17, 2012.
    William Paul, Sneads, pro se.
    Pamela J. Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee and Wesley Heidt, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

The petition for belated appeal is granted. A copy of this opinion shall be filed with the trial court and be treated as the notice of appeal from the order denying motion to correct illegal sentence in case no. 94-CF — 498-B, in the Circuit Court in and for Marion County, Florida. See Fla. R.App. P. 9.141(c)(6)(D).

PETITION GRANTED.

TORPY, EVANDER and COHEN, JJ., concur.


text:
    Billy Joe LIBECAP, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 5D12-2554.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Aug. 17, 2012.
    Billy Joe Libecap, Madison, pro se.
    Pamela J. Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee and Wesley Heidt, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

The petition for belated appeal is granted. A copy of this opinion shall be filed with the trial court and be treated as the notice of appeal from the order dismissing application for writ of habeas corpus in case no. 05-1429-CFA, in the Circuit Court in and for Seminole County, Florida. See Fla. R.App. P. 9.141(c)(6)(D).

PETITION GRANTED.

PALMER, LAWSON and EVANDER, JJ., concur.


text:
    STATE of Florida, DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, by and on behalf of Kristen A. ZEOLI, Appellant, v. Sean H. KLINE, Appellee.
    No. 1D12-0318.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Aug. 17, 2012.

      Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Toni C. Bernstein, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    No appearance, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

The Department of Revenue appeals an order establishing the child support obligations of Sean H. Kline, appellee, and a custody arrangement for the parties’ child. Because the order was not made pursuant to a parenting plan under section 61.046(4), Florida Statutes (2010), we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

Appellant Kristen Zeoli and appellee Sean Kline are the biological parents of a child. On behalf of Zeoli, the Department petitioned for entry of an order setting appellee’s child support obligation. Following a hearing conducted by a court appointed hearing officer, the trial court entered an order setting child support. The order adopted the recommendation of the hearing officer who calculated the respective support obligations for each parent in accordance with section 61.30. In so doing, the hearing officer considered the number of nights the child resided with the appellee father and entered sua sponte a document entitled a “Stipulation for a Formal Visitation Agreement.” This so-called stipulation was not signed by either parent. Further, a review of the record discloses that, while the parents had established between them an informal time-sharing arrangement, neither stipulated on the record that the child stays with appel-lee in excess of 26% of nights per year, as the stipulation indicated.

While the determination of child support may consider time spent with a non-custodial parent, section 61.30(11), provides that any adjustment to the presumptive child support amount for substantial time spent with a non-custodial parent is to be made when the time with the non-custodial parent is pursuant to “a parenting plan.” A parenting plan, as defined in section 61.046(14), is a

document created to govern the relationship between the parents relating to decisions that must be made regarding the minor child and must contain a time-sharing schedule for the parents and child....
(a) The parenting plan must be:
1. Developed and agreed to by the parents and approved by the court; or
2. Established by the court, with or without the use of a court-ordered parenting plan recommendation, if the parents cannot agree on a plan or the parents agreed on a plan not approved by the court.

There is nothing in the record resembling a “parenting plan” as defined in section 61.046(14). The so-called “stipulation” created by the hearing officer neither reflects an agreement of the parents nor otherwise qualifies as a parenting plan because it does not establish a time-sharing schedule and was not established by the circuit court.

Accordingly, we reverse the order under review and remand the cause for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

VAN NORTWICK, CLARK, and RAY, JJ., concur.


text:
    Sean CASEY, Petitioner, v. Kenneth S. TUCKER, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, Respondent.
    No. 1D12-0366.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Aug. 17, 2012.
    Sean Casey, pro se, for Petitioner.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Daniel A. Johnson, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

The petition for writ of certiorari is denied on the merits.

VAN NORTWICK, WETHERELL, and MAKAR, JJ., concur.


text:
    Frederick DAVIS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D11-6189.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Aug. 21, 2012.
    Sheila Callahan, Office of Criminal Conflict and Civil Regional Counsel, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Appellant seeks review of his convictions and sentences for battery and felony battery by strangulation. Appellate counsel filed an initial brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), representing that no good faith argument could be made that reversible error occurred below, but identifying technical errors with the imposition of costs and fines at sentencing and a scrivener’s error in Appellant’s Criminal Punishment Code Scoresheet. Counsel preserved these errors in a timely filed motion to correct sentencing error pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b)(2). We reject counsel’s arguments that certain costs were improperly imposed. However, Appellant’s scoresheet incorrectly reflects that the date of his primary offense was June 12, 2008. The date of Appellant’s primary offense was July 17, 2010.

Accordingly, we affirm Appellant’s convictions and sentences but remand to the trial court for correction of his scoresheet.

AFFIRMED and REMANDED.

VAN NORTWICK, WETHERELL, and MAKAR, JJ., Concur.


text:
    James Lindsey HOWZE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D12-0831.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Aug. 21, 2012.
    James Lindsey Howze, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Heather Flanagan Ross, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

The motion to dismiss, filed June 11, 2012, is granted. This cause is hereby dismissed.

BENTON, C.J., DAVIS and SWANSON, JJ., concur.


text:
    Warren MACK, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 1D12-2341.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Aug. 21, 2012.
    Warren Mack, pro se, Petitioner.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

The petition for belated appeal is granted. Petitioner shall be allowed a belated appeal from the November 16, 2011, judgment and sentence, in Duval County Circuit Court case number 16-2011-CF-011778-AXXX-MA. Upon issuance of mandate in this cause, a copy of this opinion shall be provided to the clerk of the circuit court for treatment as the notice of appeal. Fla. R.App. P. 9.141(c)(5)(D). If petitioner qualifies for appointed counsel, the trial court shall appoint counsel to represent petitioner on appeal.

BENTON, C.J., DAVIS and SWANSON, JJ., concur.


text:
    George E. JOHNSON, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 1D12-2617.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Aug. 21, 2012.
    George E. Johnson, pro se, Petitioner.

      Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Edward C. Hill, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

The petition for writ of mandamus is dismissed. See Munn v. Fla. Parole Comm’n, 807 So.2d 733 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002).

BENTON, C.J., DAVIS and SWANSON, JJ., concur.


text:
    Michael JACKSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D12-1316.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Aug. 21, 2012.
    Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and Glenna Joyce Reeves, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Jennifer J. Moore, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED. State v. Adkins, 96 So.3d 412, 2012 WL 2849485 (Fla.2012).

PADOVANO, RAY, and MAKAR, JJ., concur.