author: GRAVES, Justice.

text:
    FRAZIER JELKE & CO. v. CHAPMAN MINERALS CORPORATION.
    No. 11131.
    Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Galveston.
    March 27, 1941.
    Rehearing Denied April 17, 1941.

      Sears, Blades, Moore & Kennedy and Fred W. Moore, all of Houston, for appellant.
    Vinson, Elkins, Weems & Francis and Fred R. Switzer, all of Houston, for ap-pellee.
   GRAVES, Justice.

This appeal is from a judgment of the 80th District Court of Harris County, en-, tered solely upon a jury’s verdict in response to special issues submitted — the court itself not having made any additional findings from the evidence — discharging the garnishee, the appellee here, upon its answer in such garnishment, and taxing a $2500.00 attorney’s fee in its favor against the appellant.

Appellant is a partnership composed of Frazier Jelke, Alexander M. Main, J. Hal-lam Boyd, John J. Moore, Charles L. Stacy, and F. Bartholomay Jelke, doing business under the firm name of Frazier Jelke & Company, while the appellee is a private corporation, with its principal bffice in-Houston, Harris County, Texas; the writ of garnishment, pursuant to Title 68, art. 4076 et seq., Vernon’s Texas Civil Statutes, had been issued on a $67,463.38 judgment theretofore rendered in cause No. 251,806 in the 61st District Court of Harris County, in favor of the appellant here, Frazier Jelke & Company, against O. R. Sea-graves. In so suing out the writ of garnishment in this cause on its cited judgment against Seagraves, the appellant made the statutory allegations against the ap-pellee herein, with the objective of requiring it to answer these three things:

(1) Was the garnishee indebted to O. R. Seagraves?

(2) Did it have effects in its hands belonging to Seagraves?

(3) Did O. R. Seagraves own any stock in the appellee corporation?

Tlje garnishee Iraving answered all of the questions propounded to it under the writ in the negative, appellant duly controverted that answer, and a jury trial of the issues thereby joined was had, as indicated supra, the jury’s findings in material substance having been these:

1. That Chapman Minerals Corporation was not,indebted to O. R. Seagraves at the time the writ of garnishment was served, or at the time of the answer.

2. That O. R. Seagraves was not the owner of any shares of stock in Chapman Minerals Corporation at the time the writ of garnishment was served, or the answer made.

3.' That Chapman Minerals Corporation was not organized as a mere tool of O. R. Seagraves, with a fraudulent intent of hin--dering his creditors.

4. That O. R. Seagraves was, on May 8, 1936, when the Chapman Minerals Corporation was organized, insolvent.

5. That Chapman Minerals Corporation, at the time the writ of garnishment was served upon it, was not holding one-half interest in the’ Morgan-Clark leases for the benefit of O. R. Seagraves.

6. That the 500 shares of stock of the Chapman Minerals Corporation, issued to ■ Mrs. Florence Seagraves (wife of O. R. Seagraves) was not community property at the time the writ of garnishment was served.

7. That the stock issued to Florence E. Seagraves by Floboots Corporation was a . gift from her daughter, Marguerite Sea-graves Davis.

8. That the stock issued to Florence E. Seagraves by the Barnsdall Oil Company was issued to her in exchange of stock held by her in the Greta Oil Corporation.

9. That the $217,429.75 recorded on the books of W. W. Chapman, Trustee, to be due Florence E. Seagraves, was due her on account of sale of stock issued to her by the Barnsdall Company.

10. That the $217,429.75 recorded on the books of W. W. Chapman, Trustee, as indebtedness payable to Florence E. Sea-graves, was her separate property.

11. That W. F. Morgan gave Florence E. Seagraves royalties in the Refugio area in the year 1937.

12. That Florence E. Seagraves used $3,000 of the proceeds of the royalty so given her by Morgan, to purchase royalties in East Texas conveyed to her by instruments dated April 9, 1931.

13. That Floboots. Corporation paid to Florence E. Seagraves, as the proceeds of such royalty in the East Texas area, a sum in excess of $8,000.

14. That the 500 shares of capital stock —issued by the Chapman Minerals Corporation to’ Florence E. Seagraves — was paid for by her with the proceeds of the East Texas royalties.

15. That this 500 shares of capital stock of Chapman Minerals Corporation, issued to Florence E. Seagraves, evidenced ’.by certificate No. 1, was her separate property.

16. That the 500 shares of capital stock, for which Chapman Minerals Corporation issued certificate No. 2 to Marguerite Davis, was her property.

17. That the $203,985.90 recorded on the ’books of W. W. Chapman, Trustee, as payable to Mrs. Marguerite Seagraves Dayis, belonged to her

Inveighing on appeal against the judgment so adverse to it below, the appellant thus in its brief summarizes what it conceives to be the controlling issues presented to this court:

“I. There is no evidence to support the jury’s finding, that Chapman Minerals Corporation was not indebted to O. R. Sea-graves at the time the writ was served upon garnishee, and at the time it answered.
“II. Garnishee asserted in its answer .that Mrs. Seagraves .(wife of O. R. Sea-graves) acquired her 500-share block of its stock with the sum of $6,000.00 paid her by Floboots Corporation, on account of her allowing Floboots Corporation to use the proceeds of a royalty, or part thereof, given her by William F. Morgan.
“III. There is no issue as to the fact of the payment of the $40,000.00-proceeds from the sale of O. R. Seagraves’ homestead in Kerr County, Texas, into Chapman Minerals Corporation in June, 1937, at which time Seagraves was insolvent, in the sense that he was unable to meet his obligations as they matured. That insolvency continued, there being no evidence of a change in his financial condition. In the absence of further evidence, it will be presumed that his insolvent condition did not change, even though his specific funds or obligations levied upon by appellant’s garnishment were sufficient to pay appellant’s debt.
“It is in evidence that the Morgan-Clark Lease in Nueces County, Texas, was paid for by Chapman, Trustee. At that time Chapman had in his account as Trustee $40,000.00 from the Seagraves homestead, and $53,050.00 cash secured from undisclosed sources, except one item of $750.00 which was a repayment from William F. Morgan.
“Since this $40,000.00 was intermingled with and placed in the fund, at that time in Chapman’s possession, of $93,050.00, there being no method of disassociating same from the other moneys, said fund of $93,050.00 was charged to the trust in favor of Seagraves’ creditors, including appellants, he being insolvent at that time. Said properties constitute part of the community estate held by Chapman Minerals Corporation.
“IV. The evidence as to whether or not the garnishee, Chapman Minerals Corporation, was a mere instrumentality, cloak, device, or blind, through which Seagraves was operating, showed conclusively that it was a mere alter ego or instrumentality of O. R. Seagraves, and did not carry on its operations as an oil company, but on the contrary, was operated merely as a cache or fund for the benefit of the Seagraves family. Consequently, appellants were entitled to judgment against said corporation as a matter of law.”

These four generic issues, as so in substance quoted from the appellant’s brief, are by it further developed into an enlarged number of species, through twenty propositions of law; these will be here disposed of bygrouping such of them as seem to deal with like, or at least properly groupable, subsidiary contentions.

Preliminarily, it may be noted that appellant’s only attack upon any of the given findings of the jury is that there was no evidence to support them—not that any one was' so against the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong, thereby invoking the power of this court to set it aside; so that, the only question it raises concerning the sufficiency of the evidence to support any part of the verdict is one of law only, arising from its assertion that all the findings attacked were without any evidence to support them. That being so, this court has carefully examined the statement of facts as to each detailed attack so made upon the verdict, with the conclusion that it cannot agree with the appellant that' any one of them is so wholly lacking in support; 'to the contrary, it finds from an extensive review of the statement of facts that each finding of the jury—epitomized supra—had behind it not only enough evidence to make of it a question of fact, but also to support the findings made thereon. So much for the jury’s findings in toto, when considered as properly being those of fact.

The detailed propositions will now be reviewed seriatim.

The first one in substance asserts, rather flatly, that the moneys, royalties, and shares of stock shown to have been issued or delivered to Mrs. Florence Sea-graves (wife of O. R. Seagraves), together with all the rights, titles, and interest held for her in the name of W. W. Chapman, Trustee, were community properties of herself and husband, O. R. Seagraves, since all were shown to have been acquired after their marriage. This is a non sequitur, when applied to the unchallenged applicable findings of fact by the jury, as already given on this specific subject; that is, all moneys, royalties, and shares of stock that were here involved, were found to be her separate property, “because the stock was paid for by her separate property and the indebtedness was due her on account of the sale of her separate property”; the principal items of these were the 500 shares of stock she held in the appellee corporation, together with the $217,429.75 that concern owed her. ,

In such circumstances, by the well settled law of this state, neither of those items constituted community property between herself and husband, but both originated as and continued to be her separate property; Mitchell v. Mitchell, 84 Tex. 303, 19 S.W. 477.

The second one, challenging the admission of the witness Bissonnet’s testimony that certain books kept by the Trustee, W. W. Chapman, showed that O. R. Seagraves did not owe the Trustee any indebtedness, and that—considering the records he himself had made—the money due from appellee corporation to Mrs. Sea-graves represented left-over proceeds of the sale by her of her Barnsdall Oil Company stock, is abortive as to both features of that testimony, for these reasons: (a) There was no objection made at the trial to what such books showed; (b) the statement as to the left-over proceeds of the Barnsdall stock sale was neither challenged in appellant’s motion for a new trial below, nor did appellant except there to the overruling of its objection; (c) Bissonnet was shown to have had personal knowledge, from his long experience with those transactions, of the facts he was testifying about and had already, without objection, given the same testimony as to the origin of the appellee corporation’s debt to Mrs. Sea-graves, as having been bought with proceeds from her Barnsdall stock. Stillman v. Kirsch, 128 Tex. 359, 99 S.W.2d 270; Barrera v. Duval County Ranch Co., Tex.Civ.App., 135 S.W.2d 518; Sunshine Oil Corporation v. Dooley, Tex.Civ.App., 238 S.W. 357; 2 Jones on Evidence, p. 1423.

The third group of the detailed propositions complain of the trial court’s having submitted, over appellant’s objection, its special issues Nos. 18 and 19, inquiring whether the $217,429.75 indebtedness of Chapman, Trustee, to Mrs. Seagraves was due her, as her separate property, on account of her sale of Barnsdall Oil Company stock, because the evidence did not support such assumption, it being mere conclusions of the witness Bissonnet, recitations from the books of Chapman, Trustee, which were not in evidence, the special issues further assuming that such books did show such an indebtedness, when they were not in evidence, and the evidence otherwise showing that, the Barnsdall stock-certificates had never been delivered to Mrs. Sea-graves, but to her husband personally; and finally, that issue 18 submitted a question of law only, in that the property here involved was “profits from the investment of moneys, or a speculation”, hence could not be treated as Mrs. Seagraves’ separate property, as special issue No. 19 assumed it to be.

These presentments seem inept, in still contesting the conclusive showing from the evidence as a whole that, according to the books of Chapman, Trustee, there was due Mrs. Seagraves the sum of $217,429.75, hence the only remaining issue-of-fact about that indebtedness was whether it constituted her separate estate; the submission of special issues 18 and 19, as described above, did not therefore constitute prejudicial error, since the plain objective of both was to elicit, one way or another, the determinative facts upon whether or not it was her separate property; while No. 18 does not inquire as to the capacity in which Mrs. Seagraves held that indebtedness, No. 19 supplied that requisite by propounding the ultimate issue upon that phase of the controversy, that is, whether or not it was hér separate property; the jury having answered that it was, the controversy ended there. Weatherby v. Guerrero, Tex.Civ.App., 82 S.W.2d 1059; Poteet v. Waggoner Estate, Tex.Civ.App., 96 S.W.2d 405.

The fourth group of appellant’s propositions, in another form, reassert that Mrs. Seagraves’ 500 shares of appellee-cor-poration stock, as well as the $217,429.75 debt so due her, were community properties between herself and her husband, because they constituted “profits derived from the investment of the wife’s separate funds”, and that these moneys and debts due her had been so mingled together in a common fund and used by the garnishee, Chapman Minerals Corporation”, with funds it held of her husband, that all semblance of a separate property right in her to them had disappeared; especially as she failed to discharge the burden upon her to trace those holdings through such intermingled processes and show them to have remained isolated as her own.

The record affords what seems to be .a complete answer to this contention, in that —as before pointed out — these two classes of properties, by the determinative tests applying in that regard, were conclusively 'shown to have been, not profits from the investment of Mrs. Seagraves’ separate funds, nor to have been commingled with any properties of her husband in the hands of the appellee or elsewhere, but to have been both the results of the sales of her separate holdings; that being true, under the law of Texas, their character as sep: arate property never changed, but at most there was the mere exchange of one form of her separate property for another. Parker v. Coop, 60 Tex. 111; Gillespie v. Gillespie, Tex.Civ.App., 110 S.W.2d 89; Stephens v. Stephens, Tex.Civ.App., 292 S.W. 290; Turbeville v. Commissioner, 5 Cir., 84 F.2d 307, 308; 23 Tex.Jur., Sec. 67; Estrada v. Reed, Tex.Civ.App., 98 S.W.2d 1042; Mitchell v. Mitchell, 80 Tex. 101, 15 S.W. 705; Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. v. Simpson-Fell Oil Co., Tex.Civ.App., 85 S.W.2d 325, 327; Ralls v. Ralls, Tex.Civ.App., 256 S.W. 688; Ochoa v. Edwards, Tex.Civ.App., 189 S.W. 1022.

Proposition group No. 5 presents one of the main bones of contention of the whole controversy — that is, six $25,000 notes, totaling $150,000, that the appellee was shown to have executed and delivered to O. R. Seagraves, which appellant insists “had been ear-marked and recognized by the parties as community-property of O. R. Seagraves, and still remained community-property liable for appellant’s community debt and garnishment.”

As to this transaction, the testimony showed and the jury, in effect, on sufficient evidence found, that these six notes had been executed, pn the dates they bore, by the appellee to O. R. Seagraves “to be used as collateral to secure certain indebtedness, and four of them were used for that purpose and the other two were never used, because the loans where they were to be used were never made, and that when the loans in which four of the said notes were used as collateral security were paid the four notes were returned to the corporation, and all six of the notes were marked ‘cancelled’, and the signature of the president thereof cut from same, and, therefore, the jury was warranted in finding in response to Special Issue No. 1, that the garnishee was 'not indebted to O. R. Sea-graves at the time the writ of garnishment was served upon it.”

In other words, the jury, with these can-celled notes before them, answered the inquiry by finding that such mere accommodation to Seagraves had been so afforded by the appellee in allowing him to use its notes as collateral, which purpose had already been subserved before that date and that on December 16 of 1938, when the writ of garnishment was served upon the appellee, it had not owed Sea-graves anything.

Since, as indicated, there was ample evidence to sustain this finding, even if it had been attacked as not sufficiently supported, .the jury’s arbitrament settled that phase of the case.

Group 6 reflects appellant’s claim that the $40,000 proceeds from the voluntary sale of O. R. Seagraves’ Kerr County homestead, “which was delivered by him to appellee on June 13 of 1936, and which was intermingled with other assets reaching the appellee, which continuously from that date, until it was served with the garnishment writ'on December 16 of 1938, remained heavily indebted to Chapman, Trustee”, was community-property, hence subject to such writ.

The facts and the findings, likewise upon this feature, show: (1) That the $40,000 was repaid by the appellee to Seagraves prior to December 16 of 1938, and (2) that on that date he was neither indebted to it on other accounts, nor did it have at that time any effects belonging to him in its possession. Neither does it appear that there was here any intermingling of assets, wherefore the legal consequences the appellant invokes did not attach to an instance of this kind; if, as the jury found, Seagraves.merely loaned the appellee money—such as the $40,000 and the $100,000 items involved—whether there was any express agreement about the transactions or not, there was at least an implied obligation that it should return him the money, and if it had done so, as the jury’s findings indicate, before this writ of garnishment had been served upon it, there was nothing for the writ to impound. Schwartzberg v. Friedman, Tex.Civ.App., 34 S.W. 335.

Appellant’s 7th group of contentions seeks in another way to show the $150,-000 item'—made up of' the six $25,000.00 notes above discussed—to be community property, hence subject to writ of garnishment ; but, as already determined, the proof and the findings show that none of these notes were obligations of the appel-lee on December 16 of 1938, when the garnishment writ was served, hence the jury’s finding that appellee was not indebted to Seagraves on that date entitled it to the acquittance the court awarded.

Appellant’s 8th group insists that W. W. Chapman and the appellee were agents and trustees for O. R. Seagraves, and as such held and commingled moneys belonging to him, as well as to his wife and daughter, Mrs. Davis, to the extent that the appellee was shown to have been indebted on those accounts to Chapman as Trustee on December 31, 1938, to the extent of $428,237.47; still unless and until it was further shown, first, that the ap-pellee was indebted to Seagraves, or second, that it had effects of Seagraves in its possession at the time this garnishment writ was served upon it, no liability against the corporation would result. That result of necessity follows, because both the proof and the findings were that the appellee corporation 'had, prior to the service of the garnishment writ upon it, paid all of its indebtedness on account of any money belonging to O. R. Seagraves that had been delivered to it through Chapman, Trustee, .or otherwise. Added to that, is the fact that there was no evidence showing that the funds of Mr. Seagraves, Mrs. Seagraves, and Mrs. Davis had been so commingled that the parts belonging to each of them could not be readily isolated and identified. It follows that no error in this respect was made to appear. Speer on Married 'Women, p. 433, Sec. 356; City of Ennis v. Telfair, Tex.Civ.App., 22 S.W.2d 327.

Further claims that appellee was not entitled to attorney’s fees, because it had been -an active litigant in this case, ' that it was not a mere stakeholder, because it was trying to “substantiate its title to the Morgan-Clark lease, and that it was a mere alter ego of O. R. Seagraves”, are overruled, without extended discussion, as being without substantial merit; it was shown to have litigated herein only the questions of whether it was indebted to O. R. Seagraves, and whether he owned stock in it. Under its answer thereto, pursuant to R.S. Article 4101, it was entitled to be discharged with its costs and reasonable attorney’s fees.

Further discussion is deemed unnecessary since these conclusions determine the merits of the appeal. They reqrtire an af-firmance of the trial court’s judgment; it will be so ordered. <

Affirmed.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: McDONALD, Chief Justice.

license: Public Domain

text:
    SIMMONS v. O'CONNOR et al.
    No. 14193.
    Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Fort Worth.
    March 21, 1941.
    Rehearing Denied. April 18, 1941.

      A. J. Clendenen, of Fort Worth, for appellant.
    Bryan, Stone, Wade & Agerton, of Fort Worth, for appellee Mrs. Alma Adamson and others.
    Smith, Young & Smith, of Fort Worth, for appellee Mrs. Idee T. Allen.
    Frank J. Ortman, of Detroit, Mich., and •Allen & Gambill, of Fort Worth, for ap-pellee Mrs. Antoinette O’Connor and another.
    Ashley Cockrill, of Little Rock, Ark., for appellee Mrs. Emma T. Rogers.
   McDONALD, Chief Justice.

This suit was brought by W. T. Simmons to recover -an undivided interest in certain real estate situated in the State of Texas. Judgment was rendered for the defendants, and plaintiff has appealed.

Major J. T. W. Tillar, for many years prior to .and at the time of his death a resident of Pulaski County, Arkansas, died in that county in 1908. He left a written will, which was executed in that county in 1901, and which was prepared by his friend and legal advisor, W. S. McCain, a practicing attorney of Little Rock, Arkansas. The will was duly admitted to probate in Arkansas, and a properly authenticated copy of it was recorded in the Deed Records of Tarrant County, Texas, as a muniment of title. Both at the time the will was made, and at the time of his death, Major Tillar owned real and personal property worth several hundred thousand dollars located in Arkansas, as well as real estate valued at $250,000, and a large amount of personal property, located in Texas. But the Texas land owned by Major Tillar at the time of his death is not the land involved in this suit. The will is copied herein in full:

“I, J. T. W. Tillar, declare this to be my last will and testament:
“My wife and children are to take the personal property just as if I had died without a will except as herein provided. I desire that my daughters Flora V. Holmes and Mai Tillar shall receive only the income of the part of my personal property and choses in action which would otherwise be inherited by them. I desire that all my real estate wherever situated, shall be kept together and the income and rents thereof applied and appropriated to the support of my children and their families, each of the children receiving an equal share of the rents and income of the real estate and to this end I constitute and appoint my wife, Antoinette and my son, Ben J. Tillar, trustees and executors of this my will and I devise and bequeath to them all of my real estate wheresoever situated, to have and to hold in trust, to apply the rents and profits equally among my children Ben J. Tillar, Thomas Franklin Tillar, Garland Tillar, Flora V. Holmes, Mai Carroll and Idee Allen after first applying and using whatever amount of such rents may be needed to support and maintain my wife if her dower in my personalty should prove insufficient at any time. If any of my children die leaving no children or their descendants, then the trustees are to hold their shares of the land in trust for the other children, but if any child die leaving bodily heirs such bodily heirs shall take such deceased child’s part of the real estate in fee simple.
“As to the personal property which would otherwise be inherited by my daughters Mary and Flora V. I devise that including choses in action, as part of such personalty to my wife and to my son Ben J. Tillar in trust to keep the same invested in, or loaned out on lands or good stocks, applying or appropriating the income thereof to the support of said Flora V. and Mai during their lives, respectively, and at their death to be paid over to their children, if they leave any and' if none then to be paid over to their heirs,
“I except from the real estate above devised all the real estate which I own situated in Pine Bluff, Ark. — which I hereby devise and bequeath to my grand-daughter Alma' Holmes and the heirs of her body, and if I sell any of the real estate in Pine Bluff then Alma is to receive as much as the proceeds thereof out of my personal estate.
“I have advanced to my daughter Flora V. Holmes $16,500.00 and to the other five children $5,000:00 each, all of which is charged in a book kept for that purpose, and I may advance to and charge them with more and these advancements are to be accounted for and charged to them in dividing my personal estate.
“I request my friend W. S. McCain to settle any and all disputes among my chil-' dren, as to their rights under this will, as I do.not want them to litigate with each other in the courts over my property, and if they refuse to abide by his decision any of them so refusing shall forfeit one-half of his or her share of my real e.state.
“The trustees may sell any of my real estate and reinvest the proceeds of the sale in other real estate, taking the real estate so purchased on the same trust as that which may be sold. My executors are not to be required to give any bond for the performance of their duties as Executors but they are to settle my estate as expeditiously as practicable.
“Witness my hand and seal this July 16th, 1901.
“(Seal) J. T. W. Tillar.”
“We are witnesses that on this July 16th, 1901, J. T. W. Tillar in our presence signed the foregoing instrument of writing and at the time of doing so he declared it to be his last Will and Testament, and in his presence and at his request and in the presence of each other we sign and attest the same as witnesses.
“George B. Pugh
“W. S. McCain.”

Mai Tillar, also referred to in the will as Mary, and as Mai Carroll, resided in Pulaski County, Arkansas, at the time of her father’s death. After her father’s, death, she married the plaintiff, W. T. Simmons, and moved to Fort Worth, Texas, where she resided to the time of her death in 1938. She died childless, and her mother had predeceased her. In addition to her husband, she was survived by one sister and four nieces. Other than the above named, she was not survived by any brothers or sisters, or any children or descendants thereof. At the time the will was made, and at the time Major Tillar died, the daughter, Flora V. Holmes, also resided in Pulaski County, Arkansas.

Antoinette Tillar and Ben J. Tillar, the trustees, accepted the trust contained in the will as to the personal properties left in trust for the benefit of Mai Carroll and Flora V. Holmes, and a portion of the personal property left in trust was invested by the trustees in the real estate involved in this suit.

The will provided that the wife • and children of the testator “are to take the personal property just as if I had died without a will except as herein provided. .1 desire that my daughters Flora V. Holmes and Mai Tillar shall receive only the income of the part of my personal property, and choses in action which would otherwise be inherited by them.” It further provided that the income from it should be appropriated to the support of these two daughters during their lives, “and at their death to be paid over to their children, if they leave any and if none then to be paid over to their heirs.’1’

The controversy in this suit hinges upon the interpretation of the word “heirs” in the provision of the will last quoted.

Plaintiff attempts to base his theories upon the rule of law stated in Holman v. Hopkins, 27 Tex. 38, and followed in later cases, including Crossland v. Dunham, 135 Tex. 301, 140 S.W.2d 1095, 1097.

“It is now the well'settled doctrine that the law of the actual domicil of a testator is to govern in relation to his testament of personal property, whether the property is situated within the domicil of the testator or in a foreign country. (Story’s Conflict of Laws, sec. 467; 1 Jarman on Wills, 3.) But in respect to the real property of the testator, the place where the property is situated is to govern not only as to the capacity of the testator, and the extent of his power to dispose of the property, but as to the forms and solemnities to give the will its due attestation and effect.”

Plaintiff contends that the word “heirs”, insofar as the Texas land acquired by the personal property trust is concerned, must be held to mean those persons who would inherit from Mai Simmons under the Texas statutes of descent and distribution, Vernon’s Ann.Civ.St. art. 2570 et seq. Plaintiff concedes that the word “heirs” is to be interpreted by the Arkansas law as far as the personal property still owned by the trust is concerned, and makes no claim to it. Under the Arkansas law, plaintiff would not be an heir of his deceased wife.

We believe that plaintiff has misconstrued the rule set out in Holman v. Hopkins, supra, Crossland v. Dunham, supra, and the other cases of like purport cited in his brief. In*79 A.L.R., beginnning at page 91, will be found a most complete collection of cases, and a lengthy editorial' discussion, pertaining to the discussion of conflict of laws as to the construction and effect of wills devising real property. From these authorities we believe it might be forcibly argued that the law of Arkansas should govern in the interpretation of . the word “heirs” in the present case, as determining the distribution of either real or personal property. But in our opinion, the decision of the case does not necessarily rest upon that question. We believe that the law of Texas supports the judgment of the trial court denying plaintiff a recovery of any interest in the real estate involved.

It is clear that only the Texas courts have jurisdiction to adjudicate titles to Texas lands, and that in such suits the laws of Texas must apply. Moseby v. Burrow, 52 Tex. 396, Barnett v. Pool, 23 Tex. 517, 518, Youree v. Pires, Tex.Civ. App., 5 S.W.2d 178. But the rule of law in Texas is that the word “heirs”, when used in a will, does not necessarily mean those persons who would inherit under the laws of descent and distribution.

“The prevailing inclination has been away from the application of a technical rule and to the ascertainment of the true intention of the testator. Accordingly, when we are asked to give the word ‘heir’ a technical meaning, the natural, and we think proper, inquiry is, Did the testator intend to use the word in its technical sense ?

“To paraphrase the often quoted language of Chief Justice Wheeler in Hunt v. White, 24 Tex. 643, 652, the intention of the testator must be ascertained from the meaning of the words in the will and from those words alone, but in order to discover the meaning attached by the testator to the words used and to apply them to the particular facts in the case, the law admits extrinsic evidence as to the situation in which the testator was placed, the state of his family, his property, and other circumstances relating to himself individually and to his affairs. See, also, Peet v. Commerce & E. Street Railway Co., 70 Tex. 522, 527, 8 S.W. 203; Cleveland v. Cleveland, 89 Tex. 445, 450, 35 S.W. 145; Jackson v. Templin (Tex.Com.App.) 66 S.W.2d 666, 668, 92 A.L.R. 873; Hunting v. Jones (Tex.Com.App.) 215 S.W. 959; Wallace v. First National Bank, 120 Tex. 92, 101, 35 S.W.2d 1036.” Federal Land Bank v. Little, 130 Tex. 173, 107 S.W.2d 374, 377.

The will in the above case contained a provision reading as follows: “I give devise and bequeath all the rest residue and remainder of my estate both real and personal to my son L. T. Little to have and to hold to him and his heirs forever in the event L. T. Little should die without an heir my estate to be divided equally between the heirs of H. H. Little Mary Davidson and R. C. Little.”

L. T. Little was the only son of the testator, and the other beneficiaries named in the will were the brothers and sister of the testator. L. T. Little died several years after the will was probated, leaving a widow. The opinion recites that the determination of the case turns upon the meaning of the word heir. The court then holds that, looking first to the language of the’ will, and then to the circumstances under which the will was executed, to discover the meaning attached by the testator to the word heir used in the will, the testator did not intend to include the son’s widow within the term “heir”.

In Hassell v. Frey, 131 Tex. 578, 117 S.W.2d 413, 414, it was held that the testator did not intend to include an adopted daughter within the term “my heirs at law”. The following are quotations from the opinion in the case:

“The -primary rule governing the construction of wills is to ascertain the intention of the testator. This intention should be, if possible, gathered from the instrument itself. In applying this rule it is well to keep in mind that a more liberal rule prevails in construing wills than in construing deeds. The reason for this distinction rests on the ground that a testator may not have had the same opportunity of legal advice in drawing a will as he would have had in executing a deed. Calvery v. Calvery, 122 Tex. 204, 55 S.W.2d 527; 4 Kent Com., 216; Andrews v. Spurlin, 35 Ind. 262; Williams, Real Property (5th Ed.), 212; Brockschmidt v. Archer, 64 Ohio St. 502, 60 N.E. 623. For an exhaustive annotation of authorities on this point," see 29 L.R.A.,N.S., 1038. * •* *
“In order to ascertain the intention of the testator expressed in a will, the language used therein may be construed in connection with the surrounding facts and circumstances existing at the time the will was made. If necessary, parol testimony may be heard to gather the true intention of the testator expressed in such will; and such intention, if legal, must prevail. Wallace et al. v. First National Bank of Paris, 120 Tex. 92, 35 S.W.2d 1036; Federal Land Bank of Houston v. Little [130 Tex. 173] 107 S.W,2d 374.”

The court concludes the opinion by saying that, construing the will and codicils as a whole, in connection, with the surrounding circumstances, it is clear that the testator did not use the term “heirs at law” in a strict or technical sense, saying:

“The courts of this State are liberal in construing the words ‘heir’ and ‘heirs,’ or other similar terms, in order to carry out the intention of the testator.”

Peet v. Commerce & E. S. Ry. Co., 70 Tex. 522, 8 S.W. 203, is to the same effect.

So, applying the Texas law, as set out in the above cases and in many other cases therein cited, we shall undertake to ascertain the meaning of the expression heirs as used in Major Tillar’s will. We shall first look to the language of the will as a whole, and then, if required to do so, will look to the circumstances surrounding its execution.

The second sentence of the will is:

“My wife and children are to take the personal property just as if I had died 'without a will except as herein provided.”

The testator must have meant that they should take according to the Arkansas law. Conclusive of this, we think, is the fact that he referred to the wife’s dower in the personal property. Such dower rights existed under the Arkansas law, but not under the Texas, law. The will created two trusts. One was the real estate trust for the benefit of the wife and all of the children. The other was the personal property trust for 'the benefit of .the two married daughters, Mai Carroll and Flora V. Holmes. If it be argued that the testator had in mind the general rule of law, followed by the Texas courts, to the effect that the law of the domicile should apply as to the personalty and the law of the situs of the realty as to the realty, this fact may be observed: He expressly provided that if any child should die leaving no children or their descendants, the trustees should hold such child’s share in the land for the benefit of the testator’s other children; but as to the personalty left in trust for the benefit of the two married daughters, he provided that, if either should die without children, the part so left in trust should be paid over to the heirs of such married daughter. Having created a real estate trust and also a personal property trust, by the same will, it is easily possible, and altogether probable, that he thought the law of Arkansas would apply as to the personalty, and used the word heirs with the Arkansas law in mind. The will does not contain any provision indicating that the testator intended that the final distribution of the personal property trust, after the death of the married daughters, should be affected by the fact that the trustees might invest in personalty on the one hand, or in realty on the other. There is nothing in the will itself to suggest that the word heirs should have a variable meaning, dependent upon the type and location of the investments later to be made by the trustees.

The will did not leave the corpus of the personal property to the two married daughters, but provided only that the income from it should be used for their support during their lifetime. The “heirs” of Mai Simmons do not take the corpus of the personal property by inheritance from her. Her only rights with regard to the property were to receive the income, and they terminated upon her death. The interest in the personal property, which, to use the language of the will, “would otherwise be inherited by my daughters Mary and Flora V. Holmes”, passes, not by inheritance from Mai Simmons, but by and under the terms ,of Major Tillar’s will. The word heirs was used to designate the class of persons whom the testator intended should receive the property after the purposes of the trust should have been fulfilled.

The will suggests that the testator was concerned as to the final disposition of his property. A construction of the will which would give . the word heirs a fixed, definite meaning under all circumstances, would be preferable to a construction which would give it a meaning varying from state to state, and even two different meanings in the same state. It does not seem reasonable to hold, in the absence of words indicating such, that the testator intended to surrender to the trustees the determination of the final recipients of the trust estate. And that would be the effect of holding that the will would have one meaning in one state, and another meaning in another state, one meaning as to investments made by the trustees in personal property, another meaning as to investments made by the trustees in real estate. We believe that the common sense interpretation of the will is that the testator intended one certain class of persons, and only one, by the use of the word heirs.

These views do no violence to the rule that the validity of the will, or the ‘capacity of the testator, or the extent of his power to dispose of the property, or the sufficiency of its execution, or the effect of the will, shall be determined by the law of the state where the land is situated. The courts of Texas will not give effect to a will disposing of land in Texas if it violates the rules of property prevailing in this state. The problem in this case is to determine the meaning of the expression heirs. The problem would, be the same if the will had been made in Texas. The problem would be to find the meaning of this word, as used by the testator,- whether personal property or real property were involved. If the word had a fixed, definite meaning, under all circumstances, if it were a legal term having one meaning1 and one meaning only under the Texas law, then the case might be different.

The holdings in the two following Texas cases show that the rule is not as broad as contended by plaintiff.

Lanius v. Fletcher, 100 Tex. 550, 101 S.W. 1076, 1077. Mrs. Gilpin, the testatrix, a resident of Illinois, made a .will in Illinois creating a trust for the benefit of her daughter. Her estate consisted wholly of personal property, most of which was in Texas. Although she died in Illinois, the will was probated in Texas. The daughter, the cestui que trust, brought a suit to terminate the trust. Under the law of Illinois she would have been entitled to terminate the trust, hut under the law of Texas she would not have been entitled to terminate it. The question was whether to apply the laws of Texas or the laws of Illinois. The court recognized the well settled rule that the law of the domicile should apply as to the personal property of the testatrix, unless it clearly appeared that she had in mind the laws of Texas at the time she made her will. The court then examined the circumstances of the case, and held that she did have the Texas laws in mind, and applied the Texas law denying the plaintiff the right to terminate the trust. The following is taken from the opinion:

“The object of construing all written instruments is to ascertain the intent of the maker. Granting that we should presume that the intent of- the testatrix was that the law of her domicile should furnish the rule of construction and execution of her will, unless we find that her intention was that the law of Texas should control, we must examine the facts to ascertain if she intended that the law of Texas should control, instead of the law of Illinois. Whatever may have been her intention, when discovered, it must govern the court in determining the issue presented. ”

King v. Lowry, Tex.Civ.App., 80 S.W.2d 790, writ of error refused. The plaintiff brought a suit in Texas, alleging that the testatrix, her aunt, a resident of Missouri, made a parol agreement in Missouri with a Mrs. Wood, a sister of the testatrix, to the effect that testatrix would devise certain real estate situated in Missouri to Mrs. Wood, upon the agreement that Mrs. Wood would support plaintiff, a cripple, with the income from this Missouri real estate; that Mrs. Wood agreed to do this; that the will was accordingly made; that after the death of the testatrix Mrs. Wood took possession of the Missouri real estate, sold it, and later invested the proceeds in real estate situated in Texas. The object of the suit brought by plaintiff was to impress upon this Texas real estate the parol trust alleged to have been impressed upon the Missouri real estate by the facts stated. The court referred to the rule that disposition of real estate, by will or otherwise, is usually governed by the law of the place where the land is situated. Under the law of Missouri, the creation of a trust of this nature was required to be in writing. The court held that since no trust could have been created under the Missouri law upon the Missouri real estate by an oral agreement, the plaintiff had no interest in the Missouri real estate, and consequently no interest in the Texas real estate which had been acquired with the proceeds of the sale of the Missouri real estate. In other words, since the plaintiff acquired no rights in the Missouri real estate under the laws of Missouri, she could not later acquire rights in the Texas real estate simply because a parol trust could be established under the laws of Texas.

It seems to us that the situation of the plaintiff Simmons, in the case on appeal, is similar to that of the plaintiff in the case just cited. He concedes that he would have had no right to the personal property in the form in which it was left by the testator. We are not able to see how he can acquire rights, which he otherwise would' not have had, merely because of a change-in the form of the investments of the trust fund. We cannot distinguish his situation from that of the plaintiff in the case just cited.

The Supreme Court refused an application for writ of error in the case just cited, and expressly refers to and approves the holding in it in the later case of Crossland v. Dunham, supra.

The testator resided in Arkansas when he executed the will. It was prepared by an. Arkansas lawyer. The testator died in Arkansas. The two married daughters lived in Arkansas. If the testator had in mind the law of Arkansas only, or if he also had in mind the rule that the law of the domicile prevails as to personal property, the reasonable conclusion is that he used the word in the sense in which it was commonly used in Arkansas, that is to say, that the husband was not included within the term. There is nothing in it to indicate that he intended to give to the trustees such power of appointment as woitld enable them to determine, by selecting the type and place of investment, who' should finally receive the estate. And in this connection it may be noted that the trustee actually in charge of the estate at the. time of Mai Simmons’ death was a corporation. The trustees named in the will had both died, and the District Court of Tarrant County had appointed a trustee to take charge of the property in Texas, while the Chancery Court in Arkansas had followed a similar procedure there. We should not hold that the testator intended that some corporation should eventually determine, by the selection of the investments to be made, the persons who should receive his estate under his will, in the absence of express language in the will to such effect.

Plaintiff argues that the power given to the trustees to invest the personal property in real estate is evidence that the testator intended that the word heir should be interpreted by the laws of descent and distribution of any state where the land might be acquired. We do not agree with this view. The testator expressly provided, as to the land owned by him, that if any child should die childless,’ his part should be held in trust for the testator’s other children. The provision of the will was that the trustees of the personal property should invest it in land, land loans, or good stocks. The reasonable interpretation of this is that he desired the trust assets to be invested in a sound, conservative manner: The direction to the trustees evidently was intended to pertain to the security of the trust fund, and not to the question of who should receive it after the death of the married daughters.

If we be mistaken in the views we have expressed, we think there is still another reason why plaintiff cannot prevail. The authorities are numerous to the effect that the character of a trust fund, whether personal or real, will remain the same, for the purposes of final distribution, whether invested by the trustees in real or personal property, except where the case is one of equitable conversion. It is not contended that an equitable conversion is presented in the case on appeal. The rule is stated in O’Brien v. Lewis, 208 Mass. 515, 94 N.E. 750, 751:

“Under these circumstances, a conversion not having been ordered by the testator, each kind of property in thq trust fund should be treated as retaining its original character until it shall have come into the hands of one who is entitled to treat it as his own absolutely and for all purposes.”

In Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. v. Harris, 20 R.I. 408, 39 A. 750, 751, it is said: “We are of the opinion that as the real estate was sold by the trustee subsequently to the death of the widow, not in pursuance of any direction by the testator, but merely for the purposes of the trust, its proceeds are to be treated as real estate, and are to be distributed among the persons who would have been interested in the real estate had it not been sold.”

In Vandewalker v. Rollins, 63 N.H. 460, 3 A. 625, 626, it is said: “The quality of 'property for purposes of transmission by will or inheritance is not changed from the character in which the testator or intestate has left it, unless there is some clear act or intention by which he has impressed upon it a definite character either as money or land. Story, Eq. 1214. A bequest of money, in trust, to be converted into land, to be held to the use of one for life, with remainder over, is a devise of the land which takes effect on the death of the testator, though the money has not then been converted; and a devise of land, with power of sale, and direction to pay the proceeds to particular persons, for particular purposes, is a bequest of the money as a legacy to the persons and for the purposes named. The property passes as land or money according to the quality impressed upon it by the testator. If no intention appears in the will to convert money into land, or if the conversion be made by the direction of the testator by judicial decree, or by operation of law, for the mere purpose of investment, or for the greater security of the fund, the land is substituted for the fund, and shall go to the same persons, and upon the same contingencies, whicih would have affected the fund had it remained specifically personal estate. Holland v. Cruft, 3 Gray [Mass.] 162; Holland v. Adams, [3 Gray, Mass.] 188; Oeslager v. Fisher, 2 Pa. 467; Craig v. Leslie, 3 Wheat, [563] 577, [4 L. Ed. 460]; Williams, Ex’rs. 658; 1 Jarm. Wills, *584; Perry, Trusts, 458.”

In re Alabone’s Estate, 75 N.J.Eq. 527, 72 A. 427, the same rule is followed.

While we have not been cited to any Texas cases, nor have we found any, in which this identical question is presented, the holdings in the cases, of Magnolia Park Company v. Tinsley, 96 Tex. 364, 73 S.W. 5; Scottish-American Mortgage Co. v. Massie, 94 Tex. 339, 342, 60 S.W. 544; Richardson v. McCloskey, Tex.Civ.App., 261 S.W. 801; Id., Tex.Com.App., 276 S. W. 680; McCanless v. Devenport, Tex.Civ.App., 40 S.W.2d 903; and Hardcastle v. Sibley, Tex.Civ.App., 107 S.W.2d 432, reflect that the Texas courts recognize that property of a trust or of an estate of a deceased will not lose its character as personalty or realty, though converted into another form, if such would defeat the purposes of the trust or the will of the testator or the rights of the parties entitled to it.

We believe that the intention of the testator would be defeated by allowing the plaintiff to recover; and since no rule of Texas law will be violated by giving effect to the • intention of the testator, it is our duty to do so.

Therefore the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.


author: SUTTON, Justice.

text:
    WILLACY COUNTY WATER CONTROL & IMPROVEMENT DIST. NO. 1 v. HOFER et al.
    No. 4057.
    Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. El Paso.
    March 27, 1941.
    Rehearing Denied April 10, 1941.

      R. F. Robinson, of Raymondville, for appellant.
    S. P. Nielsen, of Sebastian, for appellees.
   SUTTON, Justice.

The plaintiffs, Fred Hofer, Herman Hofer, Martha Hofer, a- single woman, and Margaret Plofer Plamilton, joined by her husband, Mark Hamilton, as heirs of a deceased mother and the defendant, Adolph Hofer, sued Adolph Plofer and his present wife, Fannie Hofer, and the Willacy County Water Control & Improvement District Number One to recover the total sum of $1,600, claimed by them to be due them as their part of the purchase price of a tract of land of 12.12 acres, the community property of Adolph Hofer and his deceased wife, Rosa Hofer. The suit was originally instituted against Adolph Hofer and his present wife, but the trial was on an amended petition, wherein the Water District was made a defendant. The trial was to the court without a jury, judgment was for the plaintiffs against Adolph Plofer and the Water District, jointly and severally, for $567.96, and against Adolph Hofer only for $106, and interest and costs. From this judgment the Water District alone has appealed.

The parties will here be designated as they were in the trial court.

The Water District in its answer alleged, in addition to the general demurrer, general denial, and specific denials of all allegations by the plaintiffs, that through its agent, Carl I. Baker, it approached Adolph Hofer with a view of purchasing a right of way for its canal across a 28-acre farm tract belonging to the Plofers. In the course of such dealings it discovered there were five children by the former wife interested in and owners of an interest in the lands; that Baker drove Adolph Hofer to see each of the children to obtain, and did obtain, their signatures to the deed conveying the right of way; that the plaintiffs appointed their father, Adolph, their agent to receive the consideration recited in the deed and distribute it; that there were large amounts of taxes due the State, County, School and Water District; that the District issued its check to the First National Bank of Raymondville for the benefit of Adolph Hofer, and it paid the taxes out of the proceeds of the sale, and the balance to Adolph Hofer; that if the plaintiffs did not expressly constitute their father their agent, then they acted in such a manner (without naming the manner) as to lead it to believe they had; that they, by their silence for more than a year, had ratified the payment to Adolph Hofer and he alone was responsible to them.

At the request of the District, the court carefully prepared and filed findings of fact and conclusions of law. The record ■supports the whole of the court’s findings.

The District has five assignments of error which are, briefly: That it is established as a matter of law that Adolph Hofer was the agent of the plaintiffs; that they put him in a position to deliver the deed and receive the money and are es-topped to deny the agency; that by silence they have ratified his acts and are es-topped;. that they made no effort to repudiate the alleged unauthorized acts of their agent and are estopped; and that the property was community property and sold to pay community debts and they were under no obligation to see the proceeds were properly applied.

The facts are, and the court found, the property sold was the community property of Adolph Hofer and his deceased wife, who died intestate, leaving surviving her said husband and the plaintiffs and another son, Walter Hofer. There were certain community debts existing at the death of Rosa Hofer and were unpaid at- the date of the sale of the lands and paid out of the proceeds. The Water District discovered the plaintiffs owned an interest in the lands sold and was unwilling to accept the same without the joinder of plaintiffs in the conveyance. It prepared the deed to be executed by Adolph Hofer, his present wife, and the five children by the deceased wife, Rosa. That deed recited: “That we, Adolph Hofer and his present wife, Mrs. Fannie Hofer, and the heirs of his deceased wife, Rosa Hofer, H. A. Hofer, Walter Hofer, Fred Flofer, Martha Hofer Clark, a feme sole, and Margaret Hofer Stevenson, in consideration of the sum of Four Thousand ($4000.00) Dollars cash, to us in hand paid by said Willacy County Water Control and Improvement District Number One, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged and confessed, of which said consideration the sum of Twenty-five Hundred ($2500.00) Dollars is in full and final payment of the lands, and the sum of Fifteen Hundred ($1500.00) Dollars is in full and final payment for all damages to any buildings or other property located on said lands, have Granted, Sold and Conveyed,” etc.

Carl I. Baker and Adolph Hofer made trips to see the plaintiffs for the purpose of securing their signatures to the deed and explained its terms to them. Adolph Hofer retained possession of the deed after it was . signed. September 9, 1937, Adolph Hofer went to the Honorable R. F. Robinson, attorney for the Water District, and told him he was ready to close the deal, and presented the deed. Robinson inquired about his (Hofer’s) authority to act for the children, plaintiffs herein, and was advised he was the agent for them. Robinson and Hofer went to the Bank and paid all the delinquent taxes, and the remainder of the proceeds were delivered to Adolph Hofer.

The court found that both Baker _and Robinson, the attorney, knew plaintiffs owned an interest in the land sold prior to the closing of the deal and at the time it was closed. He further found the District did not undertake to deal with Adolph Hofer as the community survivor, but with him and the plaintiffs as surviving heirs of Rosa Hofer, deceased, and in recognition of their interests. He further found Adolph Hofer was never constituted the agent of plaintiffs to make the deal nor to receive the proceeds for them. The evidence and record support these findings.

The trial court heard the testimony and saw the witnesses testify and reached the conclusion, and found as a fact, that Adolph Hofer was never constituted the agent of the plaintiffs to deliver the deed and receive the consideration. This finding is conclusive and binding.

The second assignment and the proposition made thereunder that the plaintiffs put their father in position to deliver the deed and receive the consideration and are estopped to deny the agency, cannot be supported by the facts. The deed was prepared by the Water District and its agent, who negotiated the whole deal, went with Adolph Hofer and procured the signatures of the plaintiffs. There is no suggestion from any witness that any of the plaintiffs told the father or the District’s agent (Baker) that he should or could deliver the deed and receive the money and distribute it. On the other hand, it is clear the Water District dealt with its eyes wide open, and with full knowledge of all the facts. It was in no wise ignorant of the true facts and could not have been misled by the plaintiffs. The evidence is that the attorney for the District questioned the authority of, the father to receive the consideration, but accepted his word and made no effort to ascertain the facts. The essential elements of estoppel are absent, and the assignment must be overruled. Blum v. Merchant, 58 Tex. 400; Bynum v. Preston, 69 Tex. 287, 6 S.W. 428, 5 Am.St.Rep. 49; Noxon v. Cockburn, Tex.Civ.App., 147 S.W.2d 872, 875, par. 12.

Assigments three and four are to the effect the plaintiffs were silent and made no effort to repudiate the unauthorized acts of their father for more than a year, and are estopped. These rest on questions of fact and the facts were found by the court against the contention. There is evidence, which is the only evidence on that point, that the plaintiffs commenced at once to collect their part of the consideration after they learned it had been paid to their father. It is true they first sought to collect from their father. He was liable for it and should pay it. When they discovered their efforts were fruitless they then sought recovery against the Water District, and pursued their course until they recovered the judgment rendered in this cause. The facts have been found against the District, and it is likewise bound by that finding.

The last assignment and proposition involve the authority of the community survivor to sell community property to pay community debts. It is well settled the survivor may sell to pay community debts, and the existence of debts, however small, will support the sale. We have here a different situation. The Water District did not undertake to deal with Adolph Hofer as the community survivor, but on the contrary insisted on the joinder of the plaintiffs as heirs of their deceased mother and prepared the deed to be executed by the grantors, including the surviving husband as ■vyell as the children, as heirs, thereby negativing the idea of a sale by the community survivor. They were dealt with upon the basis of heirs. Such a recitation, as said by Judge Brown in Mariposa Land & Cattle Co. v. Silliman, 87 Tex. 142, 26 S.W. 978, excludes the idea the sale is made by virtue of the authority of a community survivor. This has been referred to by Chief Justice Johnson in Griffin v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., Tex.Civ.App., 102 S.W.2d 231,’ at page 234, which case was affirmed by the Supreme Court, 133 Tex. 45, 125 S.W.2d 545: “* * * the grantors in that case expressly conveyed as heirs, which, of course, would negative the idea that the wife was conveying as community survivor.” In other words, it evidences a contract or agreement between heirs and not a community survivor. The facts are in the instant case, the Water District, at its own insistence, contracted with the heirs of the deceased, Rosa Hofer, and not with Adolph Hofer, as the community survivor. As people contract, so they must be bound. Though community debts may exist and authorize and.support a sale by the community survivor, yet, if the grantee otherwise contracts, he is bound by the contract. Hales v. Peters, Tex.Civ.App., 162 S.W. 386.

We find no error by the trial court, and the judgment is affirmed.


author: KRUEGER, Judge.

text:
    Earl BYARS, Appellant, v. STATE of Texas, Appellee.
    No. 21535.
    Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
    April 2, 1941.
    James F. DeLoney, of Nacogdoches, for appellant.
    Lloyd W. Davidson, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.
   KRUEGER, Judge.

The conviction is for forgery. The punishment assessed is confinement in the state penitentiary for a term of two years.

Since perfecting his appeal, appellant has filed a written motion, duly verified, requesting the privilege of withdrawing said appeal. The motion is granted and the appeal is dismissed.

PER CURIAM.

The foregoing opinion of the Commission of Appeals has been examined by the Judges of the Court of Criminal Appeals and approved by the Court.


author: BEAUCHAMP, Judge.

text:
    E. M. CHAMPION, Appellant, v. STATE of Texas, Appellee.
    No. 21591.
    Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
    April 23, 1941.
    A. E. Shepherd, of Marshall, for appellant.
    Lloyd W. Davidson, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.
   BEAUCHAMP, Judge.

Appellant was convicted on a charge of driving while intoxicated by the district court of Harrison County and his penalty assessed at $500 and 90 days in jail.

Appeal was perfected to this court, but appellant has subsequently filed herein, in accordance with law, his affidavit stating his desire to withdraw his appeal and to no longer prosecute the same. Accordingly, his motion is granted and the appeal is dismissed.


text:
    Frank TICE, Appellant, v. STATE of Texas, Appellee.
    No. 21593.
    Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
    April 9, 1941.
    H. R. Bishop, of Fort Worth, for appellant.
    Lloyd W. Davidson, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.
   KRUEGER, Judge.

The conviction is for burglary of a private residence at night. The punishment assessed is confinement in the state penitentiary for a period of 25 years.

Since perfecting his appeal, appellant has filed in this court his written motion, duly verified, requesting the privilege of withdrawing said appeal. The request is granted and the appeal is ordered dismissed.

PER CURIAM.

The foregoing opinion of the Commission of Appeals has been examined by the judges of the Court of Criminal Appeals and approved by the court.


text:
    Thomas Wallace TUCKER, Appellant, v. STATE of Texas, Appellee.
    No. 21594.
    Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
    April 23, 1941.
    H. R. Bishop, of Fort Worth, for appellant.
    Lloyd ' W. Davidson, State’s Atty.» of Austin, for the State.
   BEAUCHAMP, Judge.

Appellant was convicted of murder by the district court of Tarrant County and assessed a penalty of 14 years in the penitentiary. His appeal was perfected to this court, but he has subsequently filed herein, in accordance with law, his affidavit stating his desire to withdraw his appeal and to no longer prosecute the same. Accordingly, his motion is granted and the appeal is dismissed.


author: PER CURIAM.

text:
    UNIVERSAL LIFE & ACCIDENT INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant, v. Odessa LAMPKIN et al., Appellees.
    No. 10935.
    Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. San Antonio.
    April 2, 1941.
    C. O. Hamlin, of Corpus Christi, for appellant.
    Frank W. Nesbitt, of Corpus Christi, for appellees.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed without written opinion, on authority of Associated Indemnity Corporation v. Gatling, Tex.Civ.App., 75 S.W.2d 294.


author: per curiam:

text:
    Israel Rivera Soto, recurrido, v. Junta de Calidad Ambiental, peticionaria.

      Número: CT-2004-3

      Resuelto: 3 de marzo de 2005

      Roberto J. Sánchez Ramos, procurador general, abogado de la parte peticionaria; Germán A. Novoa Rodríguez, abogado de la Junta de Calidad Ambiental; Rosaura Rivera Trani, abogada de la parte recurrida.
   per curiam:

En esta ocasión nos corresponde determinar si la mera notificación al Estado de la presentación de un recurso de revisión administrativa activa automática-mente el término provisto en la Regla 63(A) del Regla-mento del Tribunal de Apelaciones para que el Estado pre-sente su comparecencia ante el Tribunal de Apelaciones. Resolvemos que, conforme al texto claro de la Ley de la Judicatura del Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico de 2003, Ley Núm. 201 de 22 de agosto de 2003 (4 L.P.R.A. see. 24 et seq.) (Ley de la Judicatura), la obligación del Estado a comparecer surge sólo luego de que el tribunal le requiera su comparecencia.

I — I

El 23 de septiembre de 2004 el recurrido, Sr. Israel Rivera Soto, presentó ante el Tribunal de Apelaciones un re-curso de revisión de una orden que emitió la Junta de Ca-lidad Ambiental (la Junta) el 14 de agosto de 2004, que fue archivada en autos el 24 de agosto de 2004. Mediante su escrito de revisión, el señor Rivera Soto impugnó la dene-gatoria de una solicitud de descubrimiento de prueba por parte de la agencia.

No surge del expediente notificación a los efectos de que el Tribunal de Apelaciones haya solicitado la comparecencia del Estado Libre Asociado en el procedimiento. De otro lado, consta en el expediente una resolución del Tribunal de Ape-laciones, notificada y archivada en autos el 20 de octubre de 2004, que indica que “[c]onforme a lo dispuesto por la Regla 63 del Reglamento del Tribunal de Apelaciones, la agencia recurrida, Junta de Calidad Ambiental dispone de 30 días para presentar su alegato”. Apéndice de la Solici-tud de certificación, pág. 2. Informa la resolución que “[d]icho término comenzó a decursar en la fecha en que le fue notificado el recurso de revisión”. (Enfasis suplido.) Id. En consecuencia, el tribunal determinó que el término provisto vencía el 25 de octubre de 2004.

El 22 de octubre de 2004, mediante Moción Informativa y en Solicitud de Término Adicional, la Junta manifestó que, contrario a la determinación del Tribunal de Apelacio-nes, el término para comparecer comenzó a decursar a par-tir de la fecha de la notificación del tribunal que requirió la comparecencia de la Junta. Además, solicitó una prórroga de treinta días adicionales para presentar su posición so-bre los méritos del recurso de revisión.

Estando la Moción Informativa y en Solicitud de Tér-mino Adicional pendiente de consideración ante el Tribunal de Apelaciones, la Junta acudió a nosotros en un re-curso de certificación. En el escrito presentado, el Procurador General, en representación de la Junta, nos indica que distintos paneles del Tribunal de Apelaciones han interpretado de forma divergente cuándo es que co-mienza a decursar el término de treinta días que establece la Regla 63(A) del Reglamento del Tribunal de Apelaciones para que el Estado se exprese sobre un recurso de revisión administrativa. Señala el Procurador General que para al-gunos paneles el término de treinta días comienza a trans-currir automáticamente, una vez notificado el recurso de revisión administrativa; mientras, otros entienden que ese término comienza a transcurrir cuando el tribunal expresamente ordena la comparecencia del Estado. El Procurador General señala que esta falta de uniformidad afecta adversamente la representación del Estado, por lo que nos solicita que expidamos el recurso de certificación y nos expresemos sobre la correcta tramitación de un recurso de revisión administrativa, conforme dispone la Ley de la Judicatura. Como único error, la Junta señala lo siguiente:

Erró el Honorable Tribunal de Apelaciones, al decretar que el término [de] treinta (30) días dispuesto para que las agen-cias y funcionarios del Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico comparezcan a expresar su criterio en cuanto a los recursos de revisión administrativa decursa automáticamente a partir de la notificación del recurso. Esto pues, el artículo 4.006(c) de la Ley de la Judicatura expresamente dispone que no será obli-gatoria la comparecencia del Estado Libre Asociado a menos que así lo determine el Tribunal. Solicitud de certificación, pág. 6.

Por tratarse de una cuestión de alto interés para la ad-ministración de la justicia y ante el conflicto existente a nivel del Tribunal de Apelaciones, ordenamos a la parte recurrida que, en un término de veinte días, compareciera a mostrar causa por la cual no debamos expedir el auto solicitado y revocar la determinación del Tribunal de Apelaciones. El término concedido transcurrió sin que la parte recurrida compareciera o solicitara prórroga para comparecer.

Evaluado el recurso de certificación presentado, resolve-mos conforme intimamos.

Tenemos ante nosotros una solicitud de certificación para que aclaremos cuándo comienza a decursar el término para presentar un alegato en oposición a una petición de revisión administrativa, habida cuenta de las posiciones divergentes asumidas por varios paneles del Tribunal de Apelaciones sobre el particular.

El Art. 3.002(e) de la Ley de la Judicatura, 4 L.P.R.A. sec. 24s(e), dispone sobre su competencia que este Tribunal puede entender

[m]ediante auto de certificación, a ser expedido discrecional-mente, motu proprio, o a solicitud de parte, podrá traer ante sí para considerar y resolver cualquier asunto pendiente ante ... el Tribunal de Apelaciones cuando se plantee la existencia de un conflicto entre decisiones previas del Tribunal de Apelacio-nes, [o] se planteen cuestiones noveles de derecho, o se plan-teen cuestiones de alto interés público que incluyan cualquier cuestión constitucional sustancial al amparo de la Constitu-ción del Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico o de la Consti-tución de Estados Unidos.

El auto de certificación es un mecanismo de carácter discrecional que nos permite traer de inmediato ante nuestra atención asuntos que se encuentran ante la consideración de foros inferiores, obviando el trámite ordinario de los procedimientos. Precisamente, por ser un recurso que nos permite circunvalar el trámite ordinario de un caso, su expedición es de carácter excepcional. Es preferible que los casos maduren paulatinamente a través del trámite ordinario, pues ello permite que las controversias se diluciden y afinen sin que él foro de última instancia tenga que inmiscuirse a destiempo. Ahora bien, cuando un asunto requiera urgente solución, bien porque se afecte la administración de la justicia o bien porque el asunto exija de una pronta atención por su importancia, el auto de certificación es un valioso instrumento para adelantar estos objetivos. E.g., Suárez v. C.E.E. I, 163 D.P.R. 347 (2004).

En el caso ante nuestra consideración, el Procurador General nos plantea que las opiniones divergentes del Tribunal de Apelaciones sobre cuándo el Estado debe compa-recer en casos en que se ha solicitado la revisión de una determinación administrativa, afecta adversamente la re-presentación del Estado ante ese foro apelativo. Nos indica en su escrito que ante esta situación se enfrenta a la disyuntiva de, o comparece automáticamente una vez es notificado de todo recurso de revisión administrativa, lo que resulta altamente oneroso para el Estado, o no compa-rece y se expone a que el caso sea resuelto sin su compare-cencia, en perjuicio de los intereses del Estado y la admi-nistración de la cosa pública.

Por entender que en el caso de autos la interpretación divergente de la Regla 63(A) del Reglamento del Tribunal de Apelaciones por parte de varios paneles del Tribunal de Apelaciones requiere atención inmediata, ante el impacto perjudicial que ello tiene sobre la representación apelativa del Estado, procede que se expida el auto de certificación solicitado.

Veamos entonces, con algún detenimiento, la controver-sia traída ente nuestra atención.

r — I h-i h-\

El recurso ante nuestra consideración requiere que ana-licemos las disposiciones de la Ley de la Judicatura rela-cionadas con los recursos de revisión de determinaciones administrativas. De igual modo, analizaremos aquellas disposiciones pertinentes de la Ley de Procedimiento Ad-ministrativo Uniforme del Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico (L.P.A.U.), Ley Núm. 170 de 12 de agosto de 1988, según enmendada, 3 L.P.R.A. see. 2101 et seq., y del Reglamento del Tribunal de Apelaciones, ambos reciente-mente enmendados para atemperar los cambios surgidos como consecuencia de la aprobación de la Ley de la Judicatura. En específico, evaluaremos el alcance de las Reglas 63(A) y 64 del Reglamento del Tribunal de Apela-ciones y cómo han sido interpretadas por éste. Veamos entonces.

A. En el 2001 la Hon. Sila M. Calderón, Gobernadora del Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico, solicitó que se evaluara el impacto que había tenido para el sistema judicial el Plan de Reorganización de la Rama Judicial, conocido como la Ley de la Judicatura de Puerto Rico de 1994. Para estos propósitos se llevó a cabo un exhaustivo estudio, en el cual participó no tan sólo el Poder Ejecutivo, sino también la Rama Judicial, a través del Señor Juez Presidente del Tribunal Supremo de Puerto Rico. El análisis efectuado reflejó que era deseable procurar un nuevo esquema que garanti-zara, aún más, el fácil acceso a la justicia.

Ante esta realidad, se determinó que era necesaria una reforma del sistema judicial vigente. A esos efectos se pre-sentó ante la Cámara de Representantes el P. de la C. 3484 para su aprobación. Luego del trámite legislativo corres-pondiente, el P. de la C. 3484 fue aprobado, convirtiéndose así en la Ley Núm. 201 de 22 de agosto de 2003 (4 L.P.R.A. see. 22 et seq.). La Ley de la Judicatura de 2003 reconoce y exalta los principios de autonomía judicial y de un tribunal general unificado, presupuestos básicos del sistema judicial dispuesto en la Constitución del Estado Libre Asociado.

Además, de la Exposición de Motivos de la Ley Núm. 201, supra, 2003 (Parte 1) Leyes de Puerto Rico 970, 971-974, como de las varias ponencias que antecedieron su aproba-ción, surge una clara política pública dirigida a proveer a la Rama Judicial los mecanismos para responder de forma rá-pida y eficiente a las necesidades y a los cambios de la sociedad puertorriqueña. En específico, se procuró promo-ver el acceso fácil y económico a los tribunales, sobre todo en la fase apelativa, a un gran sector de la ciudadanía que generalmente se había visto excluido y desprovisto de re-medios para hacer valer sus derechos. Fue así como, en-marcada en los principios de autonomía judicial y de un tribunal general unificado en cuanto a jurisdicción, funcio-namiento y administración, la Ley de la Judicatura dis-puso una serie de cambios significativos al actual sistema judicial.

Uno de esos cambios se relaciona con la jurisdicción del Tribunal de Apelaciones y la revisión de determinaciones administrativas. La Ley Núm. 201, supra, en su Art. 4.006(c), 4 L.P.R.A. sec. 24y(c), establece que el Tribunal de Apelaciones atenderá estos recursos de revisión obligatoriamente, como cuestión de derecho. Tradicionalmente, la revisión de las determinaciones administrativas son de carácter discrecional. Según el historial legislativo, la Legislatura estimó que éste era el remedio adecuado para que los sectores menos privilegiados pudieran contar con el beneficio de que se revisaran las determinaciones administrativas que les afectaban.

Durante el proceso de vistas públicas, esta disposición de la ley fue objeto de amplia discusión, particularmente, por el Departamento de Justicia (Departamento). Este ex-presó preocupación con algunas de las posibles implicacio-nes que la revisión obligatoria de decisiones administrati-vas tendría a nivel sistemático sobre el Estado. El Departamento planteó ante la Asamblea Legislativa su in-quietud de que, habida cuenta de que la mera presentación de una solicitud de revisión administrativa cuya atención es mandatoria conlleva la paralización de la decisión recu-rrida, ello afectará la implantación ordenada de la política pública del Estado en un sinnúmero de renglones. A modo de ejemplo, se apuntó que quedarían paralizados los per-misos otorgados por agencias tales como la Junta de Pla-nificación, la Administración de Reglamentos y Permisos, la Comisión de Servicio Público y las decisiones en protec-ción de la ciudadanía, tales como las que emite el Depar-tamento de Asuntos del Consumidor. Advertía el Departa-mento que ello crearía un disloque en el curso ordinario de los asuntos que atienden las agencias administrativas, cu-yas decisiones se presumen correctas y cuya revisión se da en forma limitada y no, de ordinario, de novo. Además, se planteó ante la Asamblea Legislativa el efecto práctico que la revisión obligatoria tendría en la litigación apelativa del Estado, tanto a nivel del Gobierno central como a nivel de las corporaciones públicas. Se adujo que ello sería oneroso para el Estado, dado el alto volumen de estos recursos ju-diciales y los costos que supondría para el Estado atender-los; además, del resultado innegable de dilatar el trámite de los casos a nivel apelativo.

Sobre estos asuntos, el Departamento indicó en su po-nencia:

En fin, la disposición que hace obligatoria la revisión judicial crea una sustancial barrera de tiempo entre el momento en que la agencia decide y el momento en que la decisión ad-viene final y firme, con lo cual se hace más difícil la consecu-ción de la política pública de la Rama Ejecutiva en la adminis-tración de la cosa pública, afectando los más diversos renglones de reglamentación pública: desde los internos (ren-glones presupuestarios, administrativos y decisiones operacio-nales), hasta los externos (en especial, la reglamentación de la actividad económica y la permisología crucial para el desarro-llo económico).
La situación procesal que se propone, implicará además un aumento en gastos operacionales no tan s[ó]lo de la Oficina del Procurador General, como advertí, sino también de las divisio-nes legales de aquellas agencias que se representan por sí mis-mas ante el Tribunal de Apelaciones (por ejemplo, corporacio-nes públicas como la Autoridad de Carreteras, la Autoridad de Energía Eléctrica, Autoridad de Edificios Públicos, entre otras); así como de otras agencias con personalidad propia con-cedida por ley que ordinariamente se representan por sí mis-mas en los foros apelativos (Junta de Planificación, la Univer-sidad de Puerto Rico, el Departamento de Asuntos del Consumidor) y otras que generalmente solicitan dispensa para recurrir por cuenta propia (por ejemplo, el Comisionado de Seguros).
Propongo, por consiguiente, que se eliminen del proyecto las disposiciones relativas a la revisión judicial obligatoria de las decisiones administrativas. Ello principalmente porque, en un balance razonable, las desventajas de tal norma sobrepasan, a nuestro juicio los beneficios. Alternativamente, de insistir se en el carácter obligatorio de la revisión judicial de las decisiones de las agencias administrativas, el proyecto debe aclarar, en primer lugar, que la simple presentación de la revisión no pa-ralizará los efectos de la decisión a menos que el tribunal así lo disponga y, en segundo lugar, que no será necesaria la compa-recencia del Estado a menos que el tribunal específicamente lo solicite. (Énfasis suplido.) Anabelle Rodríguez, Secretaria de Justicia, Ponencia ante la Comisión de lo Jurídico de la Cá-mara de Representantes para la consideración del Plan de Re-organización de la Rama Judicial, P. de la C. 3834, 21 de mayo de 2003, págs. 10-11.

El Senado tuvo a bien acoger la recomendación del Departamento, enmendando el citado Art. 4.006(c), para atender las preocupaciones planteadas. Así se hace constar expresamente en el informe rendido por la Comisión de lo Jurídico del Senado de Puerto Rico al Cuerpo, previo a la aprobación de la medida. Véase Informe del Senado de Puerto Rico sobre el P. de la C. 3834 de 24 de junio de 2003, pág. 5. Así, pues, el referido Art. 4.006(c) quedó aprobado de la manera siguiente:

El Tribunal de Apelaciones conocerá de los siguientes asun-tos:
(c) Mediante recurso de revisión judicial, que se acogerá como cuestión de derecho, de las decisiones, órdenes y resolu-ciones finales de organismos o agencias administrativas. En estos casos, la mera presentación del recurso no paralizará el trámite en el organismo o agencia administrativa ni- será obli-gatoria la comparecencia del Estado Libre Asociado ante él foro apelativo a menos que así lo determine el tribunal. El procedi-miento a seguir será de acuerdo con lo establecido por la Ley Núm. 170 de 12 de agosto de 1988, según enmendada, conocida como la “Ley de Procedimiento Administrativo Uniforme del Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico”. La revisión de las deci-siones finales de los organismos y agencias administrativas se llevará a cabo según se dispone en el Artículo 9.004 de esta Ley. (Enfasis suplido.) Leyes de Puerto Rico, supra, pág. 986.

Según se desprende de la anterior disposición estatutaria y del historial legislativo de la medida que he-mos reseñado, la obligación del Estado de someter su comparecencia surge al momento en que el tribunal así lo ordena; no a partir de la notificación del recurso. Así lo dispone el artículo y esa fue la intención del legislador al aprobarlo. Cuando el texto de la ley es claro y libre de toda ambigüedad, el Art. 14 del Código Civil, 31 L.P.R.A. sec. 14, ordena que hay que atenerse a su contenido. Alejandro Rivera v. E.L.A., 140 D.P.R. 538 (1996); Ferretería Matos, Inc. v. P.R. Tel. Co., 110 D.P.R. 153 (1980). Los tribunales tenemos la obligación de respetar la voluntad del legislador expresada en un estatuto y no le debemos añadir palabras y frases distintas a las que incluyó el legislador. Famania v. Corp. Azucarera de P.R., 113 D.P.R. 654, 657-658 (1982). Véase, además, First Bank de P.R. v. Mun. de Aguadilla, 153 D.P.R. 198 (2001).

El citado Art. 4.006(c) de la Ley de la Judicatura, según enmendado, busca alcanzar un adecuado balance de inte-reses al facilitar el acceso de los ciudadanos a la revisión judicial de las determinaciones administrativas, y del mismo modo ofrecer al Estado una oportunidad apropiada para exponer su posición sobre aquellos casos en que su comparecencia es necesaria para la solución adecuada del recurso. De este modo se reduce el efecto adverso de que el Estado Libre Asociado, a través de sus agencias, se vea en la obligación de dirigir recursos para atender reclamacio-nes que tienen poca posibilidad de ser acogidas por el tribunal; como por ejemplo, recursos presentados fuera de término o claramente inmeritorios.

B. Como antes mencionamos, tanto la L.P.A.U. como el Reglamento del Tribunal de Apelaciones fueron enmendados posteriormente para atemperar su lenguaje al mandato legislativo del Art. 4.006(c) de la Ley Núm. 201, supra. La Ley Núm. 331 de 16 de septiembre de 2004 enmendó la See. 4.6 de la L.P.A.U., 3 L.P.R.A. see. 2176, para conformarla a la recién aprobada Ley de la Judicatura. Luego de esta enmienda, la referida sección recoge las modificaciones de la Ley de la Judicatura al disponer, entre otras cosas, que las revisiones administrativas serán atendidas como cuestión de derecho; que la mera presentación del recurso no paralizará el trámite administrativo, y que la comparecencia del Estado Libre Asociado no será obligatoria hasta tanto lo ordene el tribunal.

De igual modo, el Reglamento del Tribunal de Apelaciones, vigente desde el 20 de julio de 2004, incorporó el precepto del referido Art. 4.006(c) en su Regla 64, la cual dispone que “[ri\o será obligatoria la comparecencia del Estado Libre Asociado, a menos que así lo ordene el tribunal, el cual podrá dictar las órdenes que estime apropiadas para la resolución expedita del recurso”. (Enfasis suplido.) In re Aprobación Reglamento T.A., 162 D.P.R. 444, 533 (2004). Conforme el análisis estatutario antes reseñado, no nos cabe duda que el mandato legislativo es contundente a los efectos que el punto de partida para la comparecencia del Estado en los procedimientos de revisión administrativa es la orden del tribunal a esos efectos.

IV

De otro lado, la Regla 63(A) del Reglamento del Tribunal de Apelaciones dispone que dentro del término de treinta días a partir de la notificación de un recurso de revisión, el Estado, a través de la agencia o funcionario, presentará su alegato en oposición al recurso de revisión. Como ya indicamos, varios paneles del Tribunal de Apela-ciones han interpretado que este término transcurre auto-máticamente con la notificación del recurso de revisión. Ciertamente, el lenguaje de la regla permite esa interpretación. Ahora bien, somos del criterio que la refe-rida Regla 63(A) no se puede leer aisladamente y en abs-tracción total del proceso legislativo que resultó en la apro-bación de la Ley Núm. 201, supra. Esta regla se tiene que interpretar conjuntamente con el Art. 4.006(c) de la Ley Núm. 201, supra, la Regla 64 del Reglamento del Tribunal de Apelaciones y la See. 4.6 de la L.P.A.U., supra. De esa forma se logra poner en vigor la voluntad del legislador.

El legislador, al acoger la posición del Departamento y enmendar el texto original del citado Art. 4.006(c), quiso evitar que se le impusiera al Estado la obligación de dedicar recursos para atender una gran cantidad de solicitudes de revisión que finalmente son desestimadas por los tribunales por carecer de méritos. De esta forma el legislador adelanta el reconocido interés público de promover la adecuada representación del Estado. Por consiguiente, resolvemos que, conforme a la Ley de la Judicatura, la obligación del Estado, sus funcionarios y agencias públicas, de reaccionar dentro del término de treinta días ante un recurso de revisión administrativa, comienza a transcurrir con la notificación del tribunal que ordena su comparecencia, y no automáticamente con la notificación del recurso de revisión.

Por los fundamentos anteriormente expuestos, se expide el auto de certificación solicitado y se revoca la Resolución que emitió el Tribunal de Apelaciones. Se devuelve el caso al Tribunal de Apelaciones para que continúen los procedi-mientos acorde con lo resuelto.

Se dictará sentencia de conformidad.

El Juez Asociado Señor Corrada Del Río concurrió sin opinión escrita. El Juez Asociado Señor Rivera Pérez hace constar lo siguiente: “El Juez Asociado Señor Rivera Pérez disiente por entender que el asunto ante nos amerita se-guir el trámite ordinario ante el Tribunal de Apelaciones. No entendemos cuál es la urgencia y necesidad para que este Tribunal atienda este asunto directamente, a la luz del caso pendiente ante el Tribunal de Apelaciones. El asunto traído ante el Tribunal de Apelaciones es una deci-sión interlocutoria de la agencia administrativa que no puede ser objeto de revisión administrativa ante ese foro. Este es el tipo de asuntos que este Tribunal no debe aten-der a través del recurso de certificación.” El Juez Asociado Señor Rebollo López no intervino.

       La Regla 63(A) del Reglamento del Tribunal de Apelaciones, en lo pertinente, dispone:
      “(A) Dentro de los treinta días siguientes a la notificación del recurso de revi-sión, la agencia, funcionario o funcionaría, así como cualquiera de las demás partes, deberán presentar su alegato en oposición al recurso.” In re Aprobación Reglamento T.A., 162 D.P.R. 444, 532 (2004).

       Véanse: Jorge Alicea Rodríguez v. Junta de Libertad Bajo Palabra, KLRA200400574, Resolución de 9 de septiembre de 2004; Zahyra Ramírez Mercado v. Departamento de la Familia, KLRA200400786, Resolución de 19 de octubre de 2004; Myriam Medina Candelaria v. Departamento de la Familia, KLRA200400724, Resolución de 20 de septiembre de 2004.

       Véase Francisco Mercado Alamo v. Administración de Corrección, KLARA200400329, Resolución de 28 de septiembre de 2004.

       La Regla 64 del Reglamento del Tribunal de Apelaciones dispone:

        “Regla 64 — Órdenes de comparecencia

      “No será obligatoria la comparecencia del Estado Libre Asociado, a menos que así lo ordene el tribunal, el cual podrá dictar las órdenes que estime apropiadas para la resolución expedita del recurso.” In re Aprobación Reglamento T.A., supra, pág. 533.

       El texto original del Art. 4.006(c), disponía lo siguiente:
      “Mediante recurso de revisión judicial, que se acogerá como cuestión de derecho, de las decisiones, órdenes y resoluciones finales de organismos o agencias administrativas. El Procedimiento a seguir será de acuerdo con lo establecido por la Ley Núm. 170 de 12 de agosto de 1988, según enmendada, conocida como la ‘Ley de Procedimiento Administrativo Uniforme del Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico’.” P. del S. 2290 de 12 de mayo de 2003.

      8) Ello, claro está, sin perjuicio que el Tribunal de Apelaciones pueda ordenar otro término si lo entiende apropiado, a la luz.de los hechos y las controversias que se le planteen en el recurso.