text:
    WALTER STOUGH et ux. v. STATE.
    No. A-10070.
    Sept. 2, 1942.
    (128 P. 2d 1028.)

      W. C. Peters, of Tulsa, for defendants.
    Mac Q. Williamson, Atty. Gen., Jess Pullen and Sam H. Lattimore, Asst. Attys. Gen., and Dixie Gilmer, Co. Atty., of Tulsa, for the State.
   BAREFOOT, P. J.

Defendants; Walter Stough and Jackie Stough, were charged in the district court of Tulsa county with the crime of conjoint robbery by means and use of force and fear, were tried, convicted and sentenced to serve a term of ten years in the penitentiary, and have appealed.

The record discloses that the defendants, Walter Stough and Jackie Stough, were husband and wife. That they were charged jointly, in Tulsa county, with Harlan Arnett and Bonnie Arnett, husband and wife, with conjoint robbery of R. F. Keene, in the city of Tulsa, Okla., on the night of January 2, 1940, by beating and wounding him with their hands and fists, and stealing from him one Gillette razor of the value of |15 and 75 cents in money.

Defendants were arrested on the 3rd day of January, 1940. Defendant Walter Stough, being unable to make bond, has remained in jail until he was convicted in this case on the 4th day of December, 1940, and both he and. the defendant Jackie Stough, being unable to make bond, were sent to- the State Penitentiary at McAlester, on the 10th day of January, 1941, where they have remained pending this appeal.

The record further reveals that the defendants were first tiled in the district court of Tulsa county on the 24th day of May, 1940, being, defended by the public defender of Tulsa county. The jury was unable to agree. The case was finally submitted to the jury at 5:55 p.m., on May 24, 1940, and after deliberation until about midnight, the jury was called into court by the trial judge, who, upon being informed that they were unable to agree upon a verdict, discharged the jury. Neither the defendant Walter Stough, who was in the county jail at the time, nor his attorney, nor the defendant Jackie Stough, nor her attorney, was present at the time the court took this action and discharged the jury.. The record in the court clerk’s office with reference to this action, as testified to by the court clerk, shows as follows:

“A. May 24, 1940, Jury returns into court, reports they are unable to agree on a verdict. Case declared a mistrial and jury discharged.”

This is the only record with reference to the discharge of the jury appearing in the office of the court clerk. The record is not full and complete, but it does show the proceedings and the evidence taken upon the motion or plea of former jeopardy filed in this case on the 14th day of November, 1940. No reply was filed by the state to this motion and no evidence was offered by the state in rebuttal at the time of the hearing thereon. From the entire record, it cannot be denied that at the time the jury was discharged by the trial judge, the defendant Walter Stough was confined in the county jail and was not brought into the courtroom until the jury had been' discharged and were leaving the courtroom. The defendant Jackie Stough, who was at liberty on bond during the trial, had remained in the courtroom, but with others: had gone across the street for the purpose of getting something to eat, and the jury was discharged before she returned to the courtroom. There is nothing in the record to affirmatively show the presence of either of the defendants or their counsel at the time of the discharge of the jury, or that any attempt was made to have them present at that time.

The record further reveals that the defendants were tried the second time on October 7, .1940, and were convicted and the jury assessed the punishment at five years in the penitentiary. On the 23rd day of October, 1940, motion for new trial was sustained and a new trial granted defendants. The record does not reveal the reason for this action. The following journal.entry is shown in the record.

“Motion for new trial sustained, and a new trial granted. Bond of defendants, Harlan Arnett, Bonnie Arnett, Walter Stough and Jackie Stough and each of them increased to $5,000.00, said defendants and each of them ordered committed to the Tulsa County jail in lieu of bond.”

The final and third trial was had on the 3rd day of December, 1940, and defendants were convicted, and each given a sentence of ten years in the State Penitentiary, from which this appeal has been perfected.

The question now presented to the court is whether the trial court erred in refusing to sustain the plea of former jeopardy, which was presented before the trial of this case on the 3rd day of December, 1940, in accordance with the facts as above stated, and second, whether or not the defendants have waived this right by reason of having gone to trial on the 7th day of October, 1940, not having filed the plea of former jeopardy at that time, or, in other words, can defendants now raise this question by reason of not having raised the same at their second trial on the 7th day of October, 1940?

An examination of the authorities reveals that there is a conflict of opinion as to the issues herein stated. Some of this conflict may be brought about by reason of the difference in the statutes, and in the absence of provisions in the statutes in others.

This court may not have passed directly upon the question at issue, and upon exact facts as here presented, but upon numerous occasions the statutes herein quoted have been construed by this court, and a review of those decisions throws light upon the question, here involved.

In the early case of Humphrey v. State, 3 Okla. Cr. 504, 106 P. 978, 139 Am. St. Rep. 972, Judge Owen wrote the opinion of the court and it was concurred in by Presiding Judge Furman and Judge Doyle. In that case the transcript of the clerk’s minutes failed to disclose the presence of the defendant in court during the argument of counsel and when the verdict was returned and received by the court. This case followed the rule theretofore announced by the Territorial Court in Day v. Territory, 2 Okla. 409, 410, 37 P. 806, and Le Roy v. Territory, 3 Okla. 596, 41 P. 612. The court said [ 3 Okla. Cr. 504, 106 P. 979, 139 Am. St. Rep. 972] :

“It may appear technical to reverse the case for the failure of the record to show the presence of the defendant, when in all probability the defendant was present at each step taken during the trial. Courts of last resort must establish precedents under which innocent men are to be tried. The law presumes every man innocent, and this presumption clings to him until overcome by competent evidence in a fair trial conducted according to law. Even though the evidence in this case isi sufficient to warrant the verdict of guilty, yet we must not declare a rule in this case that would deprive an innocent man of any substantial right. It is not the fault of appellate courts when such a precedent must be declared in a case where the proof shows the defendant guilty. The fault, if any there be, is with the trial court, the clerk, and the prosecuting attorney in their failure to have the record speak the truth.”

In the case of Loyd v. State, 6 Okla. Cr. 76, 116 P. 959, Presiding Judge Furman announces the conditions that must exist before jeopardy attaches:

“A defendant cannot twice be pnt in jeopardy of life and liberty for the same offense, but before jeopardy attaches each of the following conditions must exist: First, the defendant must be put upon trial before a court of competent jurisdiction; second, the indictment or information against the defendant must be sufficient to sustain a conviction; third, the jury must have been impaneled and sworn to try the case; fourth, after having] been impaneled and sworn the jury must have been unnecessarily discharged by the court; fifth, such discharge of the jury must have been without the consent of the defendant. When these things concur, then the discharge of the jury constitutes jeopardy and operates as an acquittal of the defendant, and he cannot again be placed upon trial for the same offense.”

These same principles were announced by Judge Edwards in the case of State v. Brooks, 38 Okla. Cr. 302, 260 P. 785.

In the case of Goodman v. State, 41 Okla. Cr. 405, 273 P. 900, Judge Davenport, in writing the opinion of the court, had before him facts not exactly like those here, but somewhat similar. The jury, after some time of deliberation, sent a note and asked with reference to the case. They were further instructed by the court. They did not agree upon a verdict and retired for the night and the next morning sent a note to the court asking if they could give the defendant 30 days in jail. Whereupon, the trial judge said to the jury:

“Gentlemen, this is all foolishness, you have been out on this case for several hours; there is no use asking foolish questions. You are discharged from the jury, and discharged from the panel. We have no use for you around the court. Go and get your pay.”

This action of the court in discharging the jury was excepted to by the defendant and the same was made a basis of a plea of former jeopardy. The court in its opinion said:

“The question to be determined is, Was the action of the court such an' abuse of discretion as to operate as an acquittal of the defendant? The testimony shows that the jury had not been considering the case for any great length of time, and did not consider it very long after they returned to the jury room on the morning of the 19th of November, 1924, when the jury was called in by the court and discharged. The court did not attempt to answer the jury on the question as to whether or not they could give the defendant 30 days in jail, but, instead of answering the question, discharged the jury. The question argued and urged by the defendant is not a new question in this state. In the early territorial days, in the case of Schrieber v. Clapp, 13 Okla. [215], 218, 74 P. [316], 317, Judge Burford, speaking for the Supreme Court of Oklahoma Territory, said:

“ ‘The general rule is that the prisoner has been put in jeopardy when he has been put upon trial before a court of competent jurisdiction, upon an indictment or information sufficient to sustain a conviction, and the jury has been empanelled and sworn to try the case, and the jury is discharged without sufficient cause, and without the defendant’s consent; and such discharge of the jury, although improper, results in an acquittal of the defendant.’ Cooley, Const. Lim. (6th Ed.) 399; Teat v. State, 53 Miss. [439], 453, 24 Am. Rep. 708; Whitmore v. State, 43 Ark. 271. * * *

“It is not disputed that conditions may arise where the court would he justified in discharging the jury. It will be seen that authority to- discharge exists under the statute, if at the expiration of such time as the court deems proper it satisfactorily appears that there is no reasonable probability that the jury can agree. The question as to whether they have been kept together, and where there is no- reasonable probability they can agree, are judicial questions. These questions cannot be arbitrarily determined by the court, but must be determined by the court from the facts and circumstances of the particular case, taking into- consideration the length of time the jury has been considering the case and the probability of reaching a verdict. The court cannot, at his pleasure, without some facts upon which to predicate its action, summarily discharge the jury before the jury has reported to- the court it is unable to reach a verdict. * *

“We hold that the jury was unnecessarily discharged, over the protest and objection of the defendant, and that the discharge of the jury operated as an acquittal of the defendant, and that he could not be again placed upon trial for the same offense. Love v. State, 41 Okla. Cr. 291, 272 P. 1035.”

While the facts in the cases from this court are not identical with the facts of the case at bar, they do construe statutes of this- state and there is a strong tendency in construing them to- hold that defendant should not be deprived of the right to be present in person during the proceedings of his trial, and at the time the verdict of the jury is received, in order that he may take such exceptions and action as he and his counsel deem advisable to properly protect his interest. All of the courts throughout the ages have announced this principle, and it is a right which the defendant has under the Constitution and statutes of this state. His privilege of waiving this right will be discussed hereafter.

The statute under which defendants were charged is Oklahoma Statutes, 1981, sec. 2552, O. S. A. (Stat. 1941) Title 21, sec. 800, and is as follows:

“Whenever two or more persons conjointly commit a robbery or where the whole number of persons conjointly commits a robbery and persons present and aiding such robbery amount to- two or more, each and either of such persons is punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary for not less than five years nor more than fifty years.”

Some of the statutes cited and pertinent to the issue in this case are:

Oklahoma ¡Statutes 1931, sec. 3087, O. S. A. (Stat. 1941) Title 22, sec. 896, as follows:

“Except as provided in the last section, the jury cannot be discharged after the cause is submitted to them until they have agreed upon their verdict, and rendered it in open court, unless by the consent of both parties entered upon the minutes, or unless at the expiration of such time as the court deems proper, it satisfactorily appear that there is no reasonable probability that the jury can agree.”

Section 21, art. 2, of the Constitution is as follows:

“No person shall be compelled to give evidence which will tend to incriminate him, except as in this Constitution specifically provided; nor shall any person, after having been once acquitted by a jury, be again put in jeopardy of life or liberty for that of which he has been acquitted. Nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy of life or liberty for the same offense.”

Oklahoma Statutes 1931, sec. 3053, O. S. A. (Stat. 1941) Title 22, sec. 583, provides:

“If the indictment or information is for a felony, the defendant must be personally present at the trial, but if for a misdemeanor not punishable by imprisonment, the trial may be had in the absence of the defendant ; if, however, his presence is necessary for the purpose of identification, the court may, upon application of the county attorney, by an order or warrant, require the personal attendance of the defendant at the trial.”

We have carefully read the two- leading cases cited in the state’s brief as upholding their contention. The first to uphold the contention that plea of former jeopardy does not apply, State v. Farne, 190 S. C. 75, 1 S. E. 2d 912, and the case of Territory v. Lobato, 17 N. M. 666, 134 P. 222, L.R.A. 1917A, 1226, 1232, to- uphold the contention that the defendants waived their right to a plea of former jeopardy by going to trial on October 7, 1940, without raising this issue.

The Fame Case is cited as the leading case, and though the facts are' not identical, it does uphold the plea that in a case of this kind the plea of former jeopardy should not be sustained and bases the decision principally upon the fact that the defendant should not have been, and was not, prejudiced by his absence. That if he had been present, he could not have prevented the court from discharging the jury, acting within its discretion. This decision quotes and relies upon the case of Yarbrough v. Commonwealth, 89 Ky. 151, 12 S. W. 143, 25 Am. St. Rep. 524, and State v. Vaughan, 29 Iowa 286, and State v. White, 19 Kan. 445, 27 Am. Rep. 137.

The facts in the Fame Case were somewhat different than in the instant case. In that case counsel for defendant was present in the courtroom from the time the case had been submitted to- the jury and on two- occasions prior to their discharge had waived the presence of the defendant. When the jury was formally discharged he was present, but was not specifically called upon by the court to waive the presence of the defendant. In the Vaughan Case, the jury had been out for a much longer time than in the case at bar. The record discloses that they were asked “if they could agree upon a verdict, when one of the jury said they could not. They were then asked how they stood, when the foreman or one of the jury replied that they stood five to seven, and had so stood since about 20 minutes after they went out, and that he did not think there was any chance of their agreeing upon a verdict.” They were then discharged. Defendant was not present, being confined in jail. His attorney was present, but being otherwise engaged, did not know what was being done. Upon this record, a plea of former jeopardy was submitted. The court, after stating that this was a question upon which the courts were discordant, says:

“Without reviewing the arguments in support of the holdings, or stating at length the reasons which prompt us thereto, we are very cordially agreed in holding to the latter view, that it is a matter of sound discretion, and, as a consequence, that the court did not err in refusing to discharge the defendant. See Rev. §§ 4821, 4822; State v. Redman, 17 Iowa, 329, and cases there cited.

“The defendant should have been present (Rev. §§ 4681, 4706, 4826, etc.); and the names of the jury should have been called. Rev. § 4827, etc. But if the defendant had been present, he could only have objected, and since such objection would and must have been unavailing, no prejudice can have resulted to him by his absence. And so, of calling over the names of the jurors; such act would only have shown them present, a fact of which the court could and did satisfy itself as certainly as by the calling over the names.”

In the White Case, the court says:

“It appears that the jury, in the charge of the bailiff of the court, were out deliberating in the case after the cause had been duly submitted to them fourteen hours— from four o’clock, p. m. of May 3d to six o’clock, a. m., May 4th — and the record shows that they were discharged because it appeared to the court that the jury could not agree. While it is true that the court should not have had the jurors called into the court-room and discharged in the absence of the defendant and his counsel, the error committed thereby was an immaterial one, and for which this court would not reverse the judgment. Neither should the motion, nor the plea in bar filed by the defendant have been sustained on account of such action. The irregularity of the court consisted in taking action in the absence of the prisoner, and his counsel, not in the fact that the jury were discharg-ed after it had been made to appear to the court that they could not agree upon a verdict, and after a finding and entry of this fact were duly made a matter of record. The court had a right to' discharge the jury after they had been kept together until it satisfactorily appeared that there was no probability of their agreeing. Gen. Stat. ch. 80, civil code, § 281; and ch. 82, criminal code § 208. In the case of the United States v. Perez, 9 Wheat. 579 [6 L. Ed. 165], it was held that the court had the right to order the discharge of the jury; and the security which the public have for a faithful, sound and conscientious exercise of this discretion rests in this, as in other cases, upon the responsibility of the judge, under his oath of office.”

The court then cited the Vaughan Case and adopts the reasoning of that case, that if the defendant had been present he could have only objected to the action of the court, and as this objection would have been unavailing, “no prejudice could have resulted from his absence,” and such action of the court would not operate to reverse the case.

The cases cited by the state as being leading cases to support the contention that the plea of former jeopardy should have been sustained, are: State v. Chandler, 128 Or. 204, 274 P. 303; Holt v. State, 160 Tenn. 366, 24 S. W. 2d 886; Ex parte Thomas, 127 Tex. Cr. R. 243, 75 S. W. 2d 681, and also a note reviewing the early decisions reported in 44 L.R.A. 694. This note follows the case of Upchurch v. State, 36 Tex. Cr. R. 624, 38 S. W. 206, and is one of the earliest leading cases upon the question here involved.

The Chandler Case, supra, so well states the grounds and reason upon which the opinion is based and so coincides with the conclusions we have l’eached after a careful study and examination of the authorities, we quote from it as follows [128 Or. 204, 274 P. 304’] :

“The defendant, Dan Chandler, was charged with the crime of assault and robbery, being armed with a dangerous weapon. The cause duly came on for trial on June 28, 1928, and was submitted to a jury for its deliberations at 5:50 p. m. on the following day. Five hours later the trial court, Hon. Robert G. Morrow, judge presiding, in the absence of the defendant and his counsel, and without their knowledge or consent, discharged the jury on account of its inability to agree upon a verdict. Neither was the district attorney present. At the time of this order of discharge, the defendant was confined in the county jail.

“The cause was again set for trial, and the defendant interposed a plea of former jeopardy ‘without conviction or acquittal/ alleging certain facts relative to the discharge of the jury. He claims that such discharge has the legal effect of an acquittal and is therefore a bar to another prosecution for the same offense. Among other things, it is alleged by defendant that neither he nor his counsel was present in court at the time the jury was discharged. It is also averred: ‘That there was no extreme, manifest, urgent, or imperious necessity, nor any special cause or reason, whatsoever, for the said discharge of such jury; nor any unforeseen occurrence arising rendering it impossible for a valid verdict to be rendered in said cause and that such jury was wrongfully and irregularly discharged.’ To this plea of former jeopardy a demurrer was sustained by the court over whichi Hon. Jacob Kanzler, judge, presided. The trial thereafter proceeded, Hon. Arlie G. Walker, judge presiding, under defendant’s plea of ‘Not guilty/ and, upon verdict of the jury, a judgment of conviction was entered against defendant; hence this appeal.

“Does the record disclose that defendant, in violation of his constitutional right, has been twice put in jeopardy for the same offense? It is well established in this jurisdiction that jeopardy attached in the first trial when the jury was impaneled and sworn. State v. Steeves, 29 Or. 85, 43 P. 947; Ex parte Tice, 32 Or. 179, 49 P. 1038. How was this jeopardy annulled? ' If the trial court, in the absence of the defendant, was legally authorized to discharge the jury for its inability to agree, then there is no- bar to the prosecution of the action; if, however, the absence of the defendant rendered the discharge of the jury an illegal proceeding, the plea of former jeopardy should have been sustained. In the consideration of this case we are assuming that the trial court exercised its sound legal discretion in determining that the jury were unable to agree upon the verdict. The finding of the trial court on the inability of the jury to agree is, in this state, absolute and conclusive, and cannot be made the basis of a plea of former jeopardy. Relative to this question, this court, in State v. Reinhart, 26 Or. 466, 38 P. 822, said: ‘There is some diversity of opinion and practice upon this question, but we believe the better view to be that when the jury, after having deliberated upon their verdict such a length of time as the trial court may deem reasonable, shall make known in open court, in the presence of the defendant, their inability to agree, and the court, having in view all the circumstances surrounding the case, and being satisfied with such report, causes a finding to that effect to be entered in the journal, and thereupon discharges the jury, the apparent jeopardy, which the record shows attached when the jury were impaneled, is annulled, and the defendant may again be put on trial for the same offense, and in such case the findings of the trial court are not subject to review by this court, and cannot be questioned on a plea of former jeopardy.’

“This is the rule in the federal courts. Logan v. United States, 144 U. S. 263, 12 S. Ct. 617, 36 L. Ed. 429. Also see 1 Bishop’s New Criminal Law, § 1041. However, this discretion should be exercised with caution. As was said by Mr. Justice Story in United States v. Perez, 9 Wheat. [579], 580, 6 L. Ed. 165, and quoted with approval in State v. Shaffer, 23 Or. 555, 32 P. 545:

* * The power ought to be used with the greatest caution, under urgent circumstances, and for very plain and obvious causes; and in capital cases especially, courts should be extremely careful how they interfere with any of the chances of life, in favor of the prisoner. But,' after all, they have the right to order the discharge; and the security which the public have for the faithful, sound and conscientious exercise of this discretion, rests, in this, as in other cases, upon the responsibility of the judges, under their oaths of office.’

“When a jury is discharged for its inability to agree, trial courts, in entering the order, should be careful that the jeopardy which is attached is affirmatively shown to-have been nullified. This can be done by adhering to the form of entry as suggested in State v. Beinhart, supra. In the instant case, the order of discharge of the jury is indeed meager. It does not recite the presence of the defendant nor that the jury reported in open court that it was unable to agree. We are not disposed, however, to decide this case upon the form of the journal entry. We pass to the vital question: Was the action of the court, in the absence of the defendant, unauthorized by law? Was there a failure to annul the jeopardy? Did it amount to an acquittal? If these questions be answered in the affirmative, then it follows that defendant hasl twice been put in jeopardy for the same offense.

“If there is anything fundamental and well established in criminal procedure, it is the right of an accused' person, on a felony charge, to be present during all of the trial. The statute, section 1512, Cr. L., in mandatory language, provides: ‘If it be a felony, he must be present in person.’ His presence is essential to the validity of the proceeding. Assuming there was a legal necessity for the discharge of this jury, it could not be done in the absence of the defendant, who at that time was confined in jail. The presence of the accused is not a mere form. It is a sacred and inalienable right which has been won through the struggle of the ages. To hold that a court could arbitrarily and capriciously discharge a jury ini the absence of the defendant, on a felony charge, would, indeed, be establishing a dangerous precedent. It is idle to argue that the discharge of the jury would not materially affect the rights of the defendant. Has he no right to be heard? Who can say that he might not have urged some reason which would have influenced the court in the exercise of its discretion? Indeed, we think it reasonable to assume that, if defendant had been present with his counsel and objection had been made to the discharge of the jury on account of the short time covered by their deliberations, the court would have been more reluctant so to act. We hold that the presence of the defendant was essential to the validity of the proceedings and the unlawful discharge of the jury is, in legal effect, an acquittal of the defendant. He cannot again be put in jeopardy. This conclusion is supported by the overwhelming weight of authority. Bagwell v. State, 129 Ga. 170, 58 S. E. 650; State v. Wilson, 50 Ind. 487, 19 Am. Rep. 719; State v. Sommers, 60 Minn. 90, 61 N. W. 907; State v. Shuchardt, 18 Neb. 454, 25 N. W. 722; State v. Alman, 64 N. C. 364; People ex rel. Stabile v. Warden [of] City Prison, 139 App. Div. 488, 124 N. Y. S. 341; Vela v. State, 49 Tex. Cr. R. 588, 95 S. W. 529; Rudder v. State, 29 Tex. App. 262, 15 S. W. 717; Upchurch v. State, 36 Tex. Cr. R. 624, 38 S. W. 206, 44 L. R. A. 694.

“It is said in 1 Wharton’s Criminal Law (11 Ed.) 525: ‘For whatever cause a jury may be discharged, in accordance with the provisions of law regulating the exercise of this extraordinary power, the discharge must take place in open court, and in the presence of the defendant ; otherwise the discharge of the jury will be equivalent to an acquittal of the accused.’

“In 16 C. J. 251, we find: ‘As accused has a constitutional right to be present during the whole trial, the discharge of the jury in his absence, for whatever cause, operates as an acquittal, unless such absence is caused by his flight, or illness, in Avhich case the court may discharge the jury and accused may again be indicted.’ See cases collated in note to Upchurch v. State (Tex.) 44 L. R. A. 694.

“We have been able to find only three cases to the; contrary. State v. Vaughan, 29 Iowa 286, State v. White, 19 Kan. 445, 27 Am. Rep. 137, and Yarbrough v. Commonwealth, 89 Ky. 151, 12 S. W. 143, 25 Am. St. Rep. 524, and they cite only one another in support of what we think is an erroneous conclusion.

“The precise question has never been decided by this court, although it is very apparent from the language used in cases closely analogous that it has approved the rule announced by the great majority of the courts. It can be said with certainty that an improper or unwarranted discharge of a jury in a felony case has the legal effect of an acquittal. State v. Turpin, 54 Or. 367, 103 P. 438; Ex parte Tice, supra. It is not essential to a plea of former jeopardy that there be a. formal judgment of conviction or acquittal. Ex parte Tice cites with approval State v. Wilson, 50 Ind. 487, 19 Am. Rep. 719, which is squarely in point and holds that the discharge' of a jury under the facts disclosed by this record is equivalent to an acquittal.

“In State v. Holloway, 57 Or. 162, 110 P. 397, 791, it was said: ‘The defendant having been formally charged with the commission of a felony, had a right to' be present during the entire trial (sec. 1378, B. & C. Comp.), and, if he was confined in jail and not represented by counsel when the first jury was discharged, as stated in the plea, his further prosecution, based on the charge specified in the indictment, might have been a matter of grave doubt. 12 Cyc. 270; State v. Wilson, 50 Ind. 487, 19 Am. Rep. 719.’

“In State v. Moore, 124 Or. 61, 262 P. 859, Mr. Justice Rossman, speaking for the court, said: ‘In State v. Spores, 4 Or. 198, and State v. (Holloway) Halloway, 57 Or. [162], 167, (110 P. [397] 791), we held that it was error to discharge the jury in the absence of the defendant. In the former case the jury had agreed upon a verdict of guilty. In the latter case the jury had disagreed. In both cases a substantial right of the defendant was affected; in the former the defendant might have desired to poll the jury. In the latter the important function of determining whether the jury should he kept together longer or discharged took place in the absence of the defendant.’

“In the light of the authorities, we are constrained to hold that the plea of former jeopardy should have been sustained. We are not responsible for the situation which has arisen. The failure to have the defendant present in court can only be attributed to inadvertence, but, whatever may be the reason, it is immaterial so far as the legal consequences are concerned.”

In the Holt Case, the facts were different, but the same principle is announced when the court said [160 Tenn. 366, 24 S. W. 2d 888] :

“It is a principle pervading the entire law of criminal procedure that no determinative step should be taken in a criminal prosecution, involving a felony, unless the accused is personally present. The accused has a constitutional right to be present during’ the whole trial and the discharge of the jury in his absence it is said operates as an acquittal, unless such absence is caused by the prisoner’s flight or illness. 16 C. J. 251.”

In the Thomas Case there was an application for wilt of habeas corpus to1 reduce bond. The exact question here presented was only incidentally before the court, but Judge Lattimore, speaking for the court, said [127 Tex. Cr. R. 243, 75 S. W. 2d 682] :

“If we understand appellant’s contention, it is that at a former time he was put to trial for the offense of rape, that a jury was impaneled, a plea of not guilty entered, and testimony was heard, after which the jury retired to consider the case. It is claimed that thereafter, and while appellant was in jail, said jury was brought ■before the court, and, upon their announcement to1 the court that they could not agree, a mistrial was declared and the jury was discharged, and that, when all this occurred, appellant was in jail and not present. Upon such facts, it would appear plain that, if this case should again be called for trial, appellant could successfully interpose a plea of jeopardy.”

In the Upchurch Case, supra, a jury was discharged by the court at 12 o’clock at night upon a statement of the bailiff that a juror’s wife was sick. This action was not in open court, and neither defendant nor his counsel was present. The next morning the eleven remaining jurors reported and defendant and his counsel refused to proceed with the trial. The court then discharged the jury, pronounced a mistrial over the objection and exception of defendant. The court said:

“It is not necessary in this case to discuss the question as to whether it is competent for the court, under our constitution and laws, to' discharge a juror on account of the sickness of some member of the juror’s family, pending the trial of a person charged with felony. The question we will consider is whether or not the court is authorized to take such action as was taken here in the absence of the prisoner, and not in open court. Our statute provides (Code Crim. Proc. 1895, art. 737 [Code Cr. Proc. 1925, art. 680]) as follows: ‘If, after the retirement of the jury in a felony case, any one of them become soi gick as to prevent a continuance of his duty, or any accident or circumstance occur to prevent their being kept together, the jury may be discharged.’ Conceding that the legislature had the power to enact this article, and conceding that the severe illness of the wife of a juror is such a circumstance as would authorize the discharge of the jury, — propositions about which we express no- opinion, because unnecessary, — still, it was absolutely necessary to judicially ascertain the fact of sickness before the jury could be legally discharged. This apprehends a judicial finding. It is a step in the progress of his tidal, and. an important one, so far as defendant’s rights are concerned. Mr. Bishop says: ‘That in all trials for felony, at every material stage in the trial, it is absolutely necessary that the accused be present, else there can be no valid judgment against him.’ 1 Bish. Cr. Proc. § 273. And he also' lays down the following: ‘If any fact is to- be established requiring- or necessitating the discharge of the jury before the verdict, as the sickness of one of the panel, plainly the prisoner must be present.’ ■Section 272, subd. 2. We also quote from the well-considered case of State v. Smith, 44 Kan. 75, 24 P. 84 [8 L. R. A. 774, 21 Am. St. Rep. 266]. This was a case that came up much in the same way as the case before us, and under a statute somewhat similar to- ours, with reference to the discharge of a juror on account of sickness. In that case one of the jurors was taken sick, and it was reported to the court, in the absence of the prisoner, that he was unable to be present in the court during, the trial, on account of his sickness. The judge thereupon, in open court, and when defendant’s counsel were present (but the prisoner was absent in jail), discharged the panel, and the question of jeopardy was presented. Among other things, the learned judge, in deciding said case, uses this language: ‘When an order is made by a trial court discharging a jury without verdict, to which has! been committed the question of the guilt or innocence of the person charged with the crime, the record ought to-show affirmatively the existence of the fact which induced such order, and justified the exercise of such extraordinary power. * * Now, the court in this case shows that one of the causes for which the trial court is authorized to- discharge a jury in a criminal case by the statute of this state happened on this trial, to wit, the sickness of a juror. The sickness did not happen in the immediate presence of the court. The juror took sick at home during a recess of the court, and the fact of sickness, had to be established in accordance with the rules that govern in all cases when the fact is to be judicially established, and made a finding, upon which to base a legal conclusion or judicial action.’ And, in conclusion upon this point, the court say: ‘We think that error wa¡s committed in determining the sickness of a juror as a cause for the discharge of the jury, in the absence of the appellant.’ Now, in the case at bar the action of the judge' was not in open court at all. It was at night, some distance away from the court room, in the absence, not only of the juror, but of the prisoner and his counsel. Not only so, bnt this action was taken on the ex parte statement of an officer of the court that someone had informed him that the wife of the juror Abbott was very sick. Could the court, under such circumstances, make a judicial finding of so1 important a fact in the progress of this trial, — one which involved the discharge of the jury? If so, the discharge of a juror in any case would appear to be a matter entirely within the arbitrary discretion of the judge, — a power which he could exercise in the absence of the prisoner, and without any judicial procedure to ascertain the fact which would authorize his action. :Such arbitrary power would place it entirely within the province of a judge to discharge a jury of his own motion, and without investigation. If, in any given case, he should desire the conviction of a defendant, and it should appear that the jury was not likely to convict, that the state had not entirely made out its case, by his arbitrary discretion he could discharge the jury, and upon a subsequent trial, the state being better prepared, secure a conviction. This was the practice of courts in the days of the Stuarts, but happily not so now. It is well settled that the court’s discretion is a judicial discretion, and not an arbitrary discretion. Take this case as it appears to us from the subsequent trial, in which the facts were presented; if this investigation had been had when the defendant was arraigned on his first trial, if he had been present, and had objected to the discharge of the jury, and insisted, as he had a right to do, upon an examination as to the necessity for such discharge, the record as it now presents itself to us, Ave think, Avould have shown1 that there was no such existing necessity for the discharge of the juror. At a subsequent term of the court, not at the time the jury was discharged, evidence was received bearing upon the fact as to whether the juror’s wife was sick or not. The testimony received relating to that fact, as we have said above, shows that the jury ought not to have been discharged, but the investigation into the facts should have been made before the jury was discharged, and not at the time the plea was interposed. The defendant had a right to- be heard then, and not forced to wait until a subsequent term to ascertain whether the court had acted correctly or not. In Wright v. State [35 Tex. Cr. R. 158], 32 S. W. 701, in a case involving the question of jeopardy, this court used the following language: ‘Again, the record informs us simply that the court discharged the jury. We are left to inferences as to the reasons prompting him to this action. There should have been a judgment of the court finding and declaring that the jury had been kept together such a length of time as to render it altogether improbable that they could agree,’ — citing Adams v. State [34 Fla. 185], 15 So. 905. If the court is to find and ascertain the fact which authorizes him to act in discharging a jury, this apprehends a trial, — a trial in open court, in the presence of the accused, and not an ex parte proceeding, at which he is neither present nor consenting.

“Because, in our opinion, the action of the court in discharging the jury was without authority of law, the defendant having once been placed in jeopardy, the judgment of the court below is reversed, and the defendant ordered to be discharged.”

We have examined all of the cases cited in the note following this case in 44 L. R. A. 694, this being the note in which the state in its brief cites conflicting authorities upon the question here involved. Practically every case cited sustains the contention, under facts very similar to the case at bar, that jeopardy has attached and that the plea should be sustained. See the following cases.: Rudder v. State, 29 Tex. App. 262, 15 S. W. 719; State v. Wilson, 50 Ind. 487, 19 Am. Rep. 719; State v. Alman, 64 N. C. 364; Ex parte Tice, 32 Or. 179, 49 P. 1038; People v. Higgins, 59 Cal. 357; Alston v. State, 109 Ala. 51, 20 So. 81; Price v. State, 36 Miss. 531, 72 Am. Dec. 195; State v. Shuchardt, 18 Neb. 454, 25 N. W. 722; Finch v. State, 53 Miss. 363; State v. Smith, 44 Kan. 75, 24 P. 84, 8 L. R. A. 774, 21 Am. St. Rep. 266; People v. Cage, 48 Cal. 323, 17 Am. Rep. 436; Nolan v. State, 55 Ga. 521, 21 Am. Rep. 281; Jones v. State, 97 Ala. 77, 12 So. 274, 38 Am. St. Rep. 150.

All of these cases sustaining the contrary rule are based upon cases where the defendant voluntarily absented himself from the court such as by reason of flight or escape, or that his presence had been waived by his counsel who was present at the time of the discharge of the jury by the court. State v. Wamire, 16 Ind. 357; People v. Higgins, 59 Cal. 357; Alston v. State, 109 Ala. 51, 20 So. 81; In re State ex rel. Battle, 7 Ala. 259; People v. Smalling, 94 Cal. 112, 29 P. 421; Wheelock v. State, Tex. Cr. App., 38 S. W. 182.

We have stated that the record in this case is not complete. This has special reference to the proceedings had at the second trial of these defendants on the 7th day of October, 1940. The reason for this is revealed in the hearing upon' the application of the defendants, after their conviction at the third trial, for a case-made to be furnished them at the expense of the county, in order that they might prosecute their appeals to this court. The trial court, before whom this application was presented, ordered, in compliance with the statute and decisions of this court, that the case-made be furnished, but in making the order said:

“There is no question but what the defendants in this case are entitled to have the court reporter’s notes extended at the expense of the county, in order that this case may be reviewed, but that brings up several questions in connection with the application.

“The next question is whether the other instruments he refers to' there and other records which he refers to there should be included in the order directing the reporter to extend his notes in this case and the next question presents itself. Counsel in this case is asking for the court to require the reporter in the other divisions of this court to furnish copies of certain proceedings that happened in other divisions of this court. That question presents itself in this manner. Should this court — should I, as the trial judge in division No-. 2 of this court attempt to require the record and proceedings that took place before other judges of this court at other times when this case was up before them, to be included in this? That is what Mr. Peters is asking* for on behalf of his clients, and the court- would like to know what position the state takes.” . . .

“You have not met the requirements with respect to the showing that is necessary to get the benefit of this statute, and in this case, gentlemen, the court will not direct the court reporter to- make a complete case-made as we usually refer to the term, at the expense of this county but, following the statute, the court reporter, Mr. McKinney, division No. 2 of the district court of Tulsa county is hereby directed to make out and file with the clerk of this court a transcript of his shorthand notes taken in the trial of this case before me, Oras A. Shaw, Judge of the District Court, Division No. 2, and it is so ordered.”

The record reveals that at least three different judges have passed upon and made orders at the trial of these defendants. Each of these judges had different court reporters. We do not think that a construction should be placed on the statute permitting a defendant to be furnished a record or case-made at the expense of the county which would permit the court to deny a defendant a full and complete record to the end that he could not present all of the issues involved in his appeal to- the appellate court. The fact that part of these notes were made by one reporter and a part by another reporter should not deprive the court of the right to order a full and complete record even though it required each of the said reporters to- prepare the same. This statute was enacted by the Legislature of this state for the benefit of a poor defendant, to the end that he may not be deprived of his legal rights. No construction should be placed thereon that would deprive him of those rights. It is true that the question of expense to the county-should be considered, but it was not intended by the lawmaking body of this state when it enacted this statute that the question of expense should deprive a poor defendant of the right to present his appeal to a higher court where he and his counsel believe they have a just right to appeal. The facts as revealed by this record well illustrates the correctness of this conclusion. We have made the above statement with reference to the record for the reason of its bearing’ upon the question as to whether the defendants, by their actions, had waived the right to present the question of former jeopardy a.t the time of the third trial. Is it consistent to ask the court, in view of the above record, to infer that the defendants were present when the jury was dismissed at the first trial, when the record does not affirmatively so show, and at the same time to ask the court to infer that no motion was filed at the second trial when the record is not before us? It is true that the courts have held that the right of former jeopardy is a right which may be waived, but it is also a sacred right of which a defendant ought not to1 be deprived by denying his constitutional or statutory rights. In the instant case, neither the defendants nor their attorneys were present when the jury was discharged.

It is true that in the back part of the case-made there appears an order, made on the 30th day of April, 1941, which bears the mark of “Nunc pro Tunc”, which recites:

“It is hereby ordered; that said court clerk’s journal entry made in said case on said date be corrected to show that all defendant were present in person and by their attorney, W. C. Peters, during all proceedings had in this court on said date,” but there is nothing in the record to show that any hearing was ever had before any court before this order was entered, or that the defendants or their attorneys were notified of any such hearing. It further appears that the order was made after the term of court had expired at which the jury had been discharged. Ex parte Dick Cook, 2 Okla. Or. 684, 103 P. 1041. It just seems to have been signed by the court and placed in the case-made after being filed and recorded in the court clerk’s office.

The defendants and their attorneys did not have an opportunity to object to the discharge of the jury and to take exception to the order of the court. The record does not reveal that the court made any inquiry as to the probability of the jury being able to arrive at a verdict. Just why the jury should have been discharged at 12 o’clock, midnight, after having deliberated only six and one-half hours in a case which carried a maximum penalty of 50 years in the penitentiary, is not explained. It has often been decided by many courts that it is the duty of the court to make a judicial finding before discharging the jury, and many of the courts have held that the record shall affirmatively show the defendants present at the time of the discharge. (See cases heretofore cited in this opinion.)

The only record in the instant case seems to have been made by the court clerk, and no formal order was made by the trial judge.

If the statute is to be construed that when the jury is to be discharged is within the discretion of the trial court, and this we think, is the right conclusion, yet it cannot be doubted that this discretion should not be abused, and defendants denied the right to be present either in person or by their attorneys, unless this right is waived as shown by the record.

It has often been decided by this court that when a new trial is granted this places the defendant in the exact status as if no trial had been had. Watson et al. v. State, 26 Okla. Cr. 377, 224 P. 368; Snelling v. State, 41 Okla. Cr. 124, 271 P. 687; Duncan v. State, 41 Okla. Cr. 89, 270 P. 335; Bayne v. State, 48 Okla. Cr. 195, 290 P. 354.

These cases hold that if a defendant has been tried for murder and convicted of manslaughter, the granting of a new trial does not deprive the state of the right to try the defendant for murder at the time of the new trial. The reasoning is that he cannot secure a new trial and claim the benefits of what he desires by reason thereof, and at the same time refuse to take that which is not to his liking or benefit. Why does not the same argument apply in the instant case? If the granting of a new trial to these defendants placed them in the same position, why could they not, on the third trial, raise those questions which they had a right to raise at the second trial? It may be, and is, argued that they should have raised it at the second trial, and not be permitted to speculate as to a verdict of not guilty at the time of that trial. But as above stated, the record as to what transpired at the second trial is not before us and through no fault of the defendants, and over their exception and objection.

We have heretofore referred to the question of whether the defendants by going to trial on October 7, 1940, without having filed a plea of former jeopardy had thereby waived their right to raise this question on the third trial on December 3, 1940. .

As before stated, in order to properly consider this question, it would be necessary to have all the record as to what transpired preceding the second trial of these defendants. The trial court refused to order this record, as before stated, and the defendants excepted to- the ruling of the court-. In the absence of this record, it is impossible to know or pass on what issues were made at that time. No reason being given' by the court as to why the new trial was granted, it is impossible to know the exact facts. Under these circumstances, we do not think that every inference should be held against the defendants. It is just as proper to infer that the question was raised at the second trial, and that this was the reason the court gave a new trial, as to infer that it was not raised. While it is recognized that it is the best practice to raise the question of former jeopardy by filing a written plea setting forth the facts and presenting this issue to the trial court, before the actual trial of the case and out of the presence of the jury, yet many courts have held that this is not absolutely necessary, and that when this issue presents itself by the evidence offered, that the same should be considered and decided.

From an examination of the record and the authorities, we have come to the conclusion that the great weight of authority, and the best-reasoned cases sustain the contention that the plea of former jeopardy should have been sustained. This is especially true in view of the early decisions of this court in construing the statutes! of this state, and that defendants did not waive this right.

There is one other issue in this case. These defendants, together with two co-defendants, were charged with conjoint robbery. The facts are that the prosecuting witness lived in New Mexico. He went to Flint, Mich., for the purpose of buying a new automobile. He was driving it to his home and arrived at Tulsa, Okla., about 10 o’clock p.m. on the night of January 2, 1940. He secured a room in the Bliss Hotel and put his car in a garage. He then went up town for the purpose of getting something to eat. After he had done so, he accosted a perfect stranger whom he had never seen, Orbie Childres, and told him he would like to see the city of Tulsa. Mr. Childres informed him he had no way, but would introduce him to some friends. Then went a short distance and he introduced him to two of the defendants, Harlan Arnett and Walter Stough. They had an old Buick car and he got in with them to' see the town. They only went a short distance until they entered a beer joint and saw some girls and a policeman. The girls afterward turned out to be the wives of Harlan Arnett and Walter Stough. They drank beer and then went to another place, and the prosecuting witness and one of the women went in and bought several bottles of whisky. The prosecuting witness paid for the whisky and beer. While at one of the beer parlors, Harlan Arnett excused himself and leaving in the car, found Orbie Childres, who had first brought the prosecuting -witness to the defendants, and Bud Brown, Arnett’s half-brother, and took them to an apartment where the defendants Harlan Ar-nett and Walter .Stough lived. He then returned to the beer garden and all five of the party got into the car and an attempt was made to get a third girl, but they were not successful in doing so. They drove west on the Sapulpa road, U. S. Highway 66, and Arnett, who was driving, suggested that they rent a cabin. They did so and the prosecuting witness paid the proprietor $1.50 for the same. This cabin had two' bedrooms and a kitchen. After drinking and dancing, the prosecuting witness claiming he had not tried to dance but that Mrs. Arnett insisted that they go through the motions, and he finally consented to do so. The defendant Jackie Stough tried to get Mm to drink some whisky. He told her he would, if she would. Finally the women turned down the bed in one of the bedrooms and told the prosecuting witness, Keene, that this was his room. He pulled off his coat and hung it on a chair, and took off his pants and placed them under the pillow. He had $420 in a.purse in the pants pocket, and there is no evidence to show that either of the four defendants ever saw or knew he had this money. When he lay down on the bed, Mrs. Arnett made an attempt to get in bed with him, but was pushed back by the defendant Jackie Stough, who got in bed with him, and the lights were turned out. The prosecuting witness heard someone in the room and felt down by the side of the bed and touched the defendant Arnett. He started to get up and was struck by the defendant Amett with his fists. There was some general fighting, and the prosecuting witness was bruised and beat up. He testified he was struck by the defendant Walter Stough and that his cheek bone was broken. He also' testified that the defendants told him that they wanted his money and demanded that he give it to1 them. He further stated that while he was being struck by defendants he took his purse from his pants pocket and placed the same between the mattress of the bed and a cover over the springs of the bed. He hollowed and left the room, leaving the defendants therein. He aroused the party from whom he had rented the cabin, and when they returned to' the room all of the defendants had left. When he returned to the cabin, he found his billfold with the $420 therein unmolested. He claimed he had lost a Gillette electric razor, of the value of $15, and 75c in money. His testimony was somewhat indefinite and uncertain as to when he lost the razor and the money. He ordered a taxi and went to the Bliss Hotel for the purpose of seeing that his car was not taken, as he claimed to have lost the check for the same. He was examined by a doctor, who testified to his physical condition as above stated. The state offered the witness Childres who introduced the prosecuting witness to1 the defendants Arnett and Stough. He testified that he and a half-brother of Arnett, Bud Brown, spent the night at the apartment of the defendants, and on the following morning he saw a Gillette electric razor on the table, and that the defendant, Arnett, attempted to shave his brother with it. That he and the brother carried it to the Bliss Hotel, but the record does •not reveal anything further as to what was done with' it, and it was not introduced in evidence or identified by the prosecuting witness.

The only other evidence offered by the state was that of a detective from the Tulsa police department, W. E. Wooley. Mr. Wooley testified to going to the apartment of the defendants on the following morning and finding all four of the defendants present there. That he placed them under arrest, and that they all stated that they did not know the witness Keene, and had never seen him. With this evidence, the state closed its case. The defendants placed no witnesses upon the stand.

The defendants were prosecuted for conjoint robbery, Oklahoma Statutes 1931, sec. 2552, O. S. A. (Stat. 1941) Title 21, § 800, hereinbefore quoted.

We are not attempting to dictate the procedure to be followed by county attorneys as to what charge should be filed by them against individuals in different cases. This is a matter for the discretion of the county attorney. The evidence and facts in this case as known by the county attorney may have justified their being charged under the conjoint robbery statute, which carries a maximum punishment of 50 years in the penitentiary, but certainly from the facts above stated it is a border line case. There are a number of statutes with a lesser degree of penalty under which charges could have been filed in this case. The prosecuting witness was not altogether blameless. He approached a perfect stranger in his desire to see the bright lights of a large city, and entered into the company of strange men and strange women. He luckily emerged therefrom without the loss of the |420 which he had on his person. He was certainly entitled to the protection of the law against individuals such as the record reveals the defendants to be, but he should also have been more careful in his pursuit of pleasure.

In the early case of Monaghan v. State, 10 Okla. Cr. 89, 134 P. 77, 80, 46 L. R. A., N. S., 1149, Judge Doyle, in an opinion where the facts were somewhat similar to the facts here, said:

“It would seem, and we would suggest, that always in a case of this character, where the line of demarcation between offenses, as in this case, has a very narrow margin, the safe practice, where the proof may be uncertain, is to charge the lesser offense.”

After careful review of the record, we are of the opinion that the plea of former jeopardy should have been sustained, and for this reason, the judgment of the district court of Tulsa county is reversed. The record in this case reveals that the defendants have already served one year and seven months in jail and in the penitentiary as a result of these charges.

It is therefore ordered that the warden of the .State Penitentiary at McAlester release the defendants, Walter Stough and Jackie Stough, to the sheriff of Tulsa county, and that the district court of said county enter an order sustaining the plea of former jeopardy filed in this case, and discharge said defendants.

JONES and DOYLE, JJ., concur.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: JONES, J.

license: Public Domain

text:
    TURNER CULWELL et ux. v. STATE.
    No. A-9997.
    Sept. 2, 1942.
    (128 P. 2d 1027.)
    T. Justin Hinshaw and John Law, both of Norman, for plaintiffs in error.
    Mac Q. Williamson, Atty. Gen., and J. Walker Field, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendant in error.
   JONES, J.

The defendants, Turner Culwell and Mrs. Turner Culwell, were jointly charged in the county court of Cleveland county with the unlawful possession of one-half gallon of whisky, were tried, convicted and sentenced to serve 60 days in the county jail and pay a fine of $100 each, and have appealed.

Three officers testified for the state that they went to the farm home of the defendants on the date in question and found one-half gallon of whisky in a jar in a woodbox. After testifying as to the finding of the-whisky, each of the officers, over the objection and exception of the defendants, were asked concerning the reputation of the defendants’ home as being a place where whisky is kept for sale, and the officers each testified that the reputation as such place in that community for that purpose was bad.

It is urged that the admission of this testimony without laying a predicate by first showing that said home was a place of public resort is prejudicial error.

The objection of defendants’ counsel to this testimony should have been sustained. It clearly appears from the record that the place searched and where the whisky was found was the home of defendants. Some attempt is made to justify the admission of this evidence in the brief of the Attorney General by reference to the testimony of the undersheriff on cross-examination that he had seen people driving out to said premises. No attempt was made by the state to show the home was a place of public resort on direct examination, and this statement by the undersheriff on cross-examination after the evidence had been admitted is tom meager to cure the error.

The testimony of the defendants was to the effect that the whisky was not kept by them for the purpose of sale, but was used strictly as a medicine, and that the whisky which was seized had other compounds mixed with it to give to a mare which was suffering from the colic.

The possession being admitted, the question of intent with which the possession was had was the material element, therefore, which the state had to prove, and the testimony of the officers as to the general reputation of the home of the defendants, no doubt, carried considerable weight with the jury in determining their verdict.

In the recent case of Hopkins v. State, 73 Okla. Cr. 292, 120 P. 2d 371, it is stated:

“Before evidence of the general reputation of a place may be received as evidence in a case of unlawful pos,session of intoxicating, liquors, it must be first shown! that the place itself was a place of public resort, not merely that it bore such reputation.” Conley v. State, 40 Okla. Cr. 128, 267 P. 491; Mason v. State, 53 Okla. Cr. 76, 7 P. 2d 492; Garrett v. State, 40 Okla. Cr. 195, 267 P. 683; Yakum v. State, 30 Okla. Cr. 184, 235 P. 253.

For the reason that evidence as to the general reputation of defendants’ home was admitted without a proper predicate being laid, the case must be reversed.

This case is accordingly reversed and remanded to the trial court, with instructions to grant defendants a new trial.

BAREFOOT, P. J., and DOYLE, J., concur.


author: DOYLE, J.

text:
    Ex parte ELMO ORTON et al.
    No. A-10312.
    Sept. 2, 1942.
    (128 P. 2d 1025.)

      E. P. Neal and Joe Simpson, both of Tulsa, for petitioners.
    Mac Q. Williamson, Atty. Gen., and Jess L. Pullen and J. Walker Field, Asst. Attys. Gen., for respondent.
   DOYLE, J.

The petitioners, above named, filed in this court on August 5, 1942, a petition wherein they allege they are illegally restrained of their liberty and held by Garland Marrs, sheriff of Tulsa county, in the county jail of said county.

That as petitioners are informed and believe, their illegal confinement and detension consists in this, to wit: That a warrant of commitment was illegally issued on July 27, 1942, by Krit Logsdon, a judge of said common pleas court of Tulsa county, division No. 2, upon a preliminary examination had upon a complaint wherein petitioners were jointly charged with the crime of larceny of one certain 1941 five-passenger Buick automobile, the personal property of Ed Rainbow, alleged to have been committed in said county on the 10th day of July, 1942, while acting in concert, each with the other; that under the evidence introduced on said examination, the defendants were entitled to have been discharged from custody for the reason that the evidence, if any there be, of' each of said defendant’s connection with the crime charged is so uncertain and inconclusive and insufficient to show probable cause to believe the defendants to be guilty of the crime charged, which it is alleged will more fully appear from the transcript of the testimony taken upon such examination, which is annexed to and made a part of the petition.

Wherefore, petitioners pray that a writ of habeas corpus be granted and that they be discharged from custody.

Upon the filing of the petition counsel for petitioners and for the respondent appeared and thereupon a demurrer to the petition was filed and it was agreed that the case be submitted upon the pleadings and the arguments of counsel.

The testimony taken upon the examination tends to show the following facts:

Ed Rainbow, a used car dealer, doing business at Third and Lewis streets, city of Tulsa, had a ’41 Buick, five-passenger coupe, color green, stolen from his place of business on the 10th day of July, 1942; and had an Oklahoma license tag, number two; that later he found and recovered this car at Lawton, Okla.

T. J. Pope, sergeant of police in Lawton, testified that on the 10th day of July, about 4 o’clock, he saw all three of the above-named defendants in a ’41 Buick coupe, five-passenger car, color green, in an alley between Second and Third streets, and meeting them, “they started their car and he stopped his car in front of them.” The defendant Orton was under the wheel, the defandant Walker on the front seat beside him, the defendant Rushing was in the back seat, beside him Avas a Avoman, Melba Anderson; he had them drive to the police station, there the defendant Orton told him that the car belonged to his brother in Oklahoma City, the tag on the car was an Oklahoma county license tag. Ed Rainbow came to Lawton, identified it as his car and he returned the car to him, taking a receipt. Neither the defendants Rushing or Walker made any statement.

Jack Smith testified that as a member of the Tulsa police department, oh the 15th of July, he went to Law-ton with Officer Sturgeon. He took the three defendants in custody and brought them back to Tulsa, that he knew these three boys and they had at times been around Tulsa. That in a conversation with them relative to the ’41 Buick coupe he asked all three of them what they did with the number tag. They said that they took the tag that was on the car from a 1937 Chevrolet, in Oklahoma City, and threw away the other tag outside of Oklahoma City, near Chickasha. Later on he heard the defendant Orton' repeat the statement. He said they broke into this place, stole the man’s keys, and threw them away. He took the defendant Orton to the place where he said they threw the keys; that they threw 40 sets of keys away; there we found two keys.

There was no' testimony offered upon the examination on the part of the three defendants.

When the state rested, counsel for the defendants, and each of them, demurred to the evidence and moved the court to dismiss the action, for the reason and upon the ground that the evidence is insufficient to connect the defendants with the offense charged.

Demurrer overruled. Exceptions.

The Court: Defendants held for trial in the district court, bond fixed at $2,500.

A preliminary examination before a committing magistrate is not a trial, and a finding that the evidence is sufficient to show that the crime charged has been committed and probable .cause to believe that the defendant is guilty thereof and an order of commitment issued thereon is not a “process issued on any final judgment” as named in § 693, St. 1931, 12 O. S. 1941 § 1342. Ex parte Johnson, 1 Okla. Cr. 414, 98 P. 461; Ex parte Turner, 3 Okla. Cr. 168, 104 P. 1071; Ex parte Beville, 6 Okla. Cr. 145, 117 P. 725.

In the case of Ex parte Miller, 29 Okla. Cr. 301, 233 P. 775, 776, it is said:

“The general rule is that the same measure of proof is not necessary in a preliminary examination as in the trial.

“In a preliminary examination it is not necessary that the evidence upon which the accused is hound over for trial be sufficient to support a conviction. Under the statute [sec. 2806, Sts, 1931, 22 O. S. 1941 § 264], it is enough if it is shown that an offense was committed and that there is sufficient cause to believe the defendant guilty thereof.

“In an examination of a complaint against Aaron Burr before Chief Justice Marshall, sitting as a committing magistrate, he said:

“ ‘On an application of this kind I certainly should not require that proof which would be necessary to convict the person to be committed, on a trial in chief; nor should I even require that which should absolutely convince my own mind of the guilt of the accused; but I ought to require, and I should. require, that probable cause be shown; and I understand probable cause to be a case made out by proof furnishing good reason to believe that the crime alleged has been committed by the person charged with having committed it.’ [United States v.] Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. [page 2], No. 14,692a.”

Upon a careful consideration of the evidence taken on the preliminary examination, we conclude that the committing magistrate was fully warranted in holding the petitioners for trial for the crime charged. Therefore, the application for the discharge of the petitioners on the writ of habeas corpus is denied.

BAREFOOT, P. J., and JONES, J., concur.


author: BAREFOOT, P. J.

text:
    OLGA HUDSON NOWLIN v. STATE.
    No. A-9750.
    Sept. 2, 1942.
    (128 P. 2d 1023.)
    Dudley, Hyde, Duvall & Dudley, of Oklahoma City, for defendant.
    Mac Q. Williamson, Atty. Gen., Jess L. Pullen, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Lewis R. Morris, Co*. Atty., of Oklahoma City, for the State.
   BAREFOOT, P. J.

Defendant, Olga Hudson Nowlin, was charged in the district court of Oklahoma county with the crime of murder, was tried, convicted of manslaughter in the second degree, and her punishment assessed at confinement in the state penitentiary for a period of three years, and has appealed.

These charges were the outgrowth of the killing by the defendant of her husband, Claude Nowlin, in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma county, on April 17, 1938. Defendant was charged wit-h murder and the jury returned a verdict of manslaughter in the second degree, leaving the punishment to the court. She was sentenced to serve a term of three years in the penitentiary. No- motion for new trial was filed by the defendant, but she filed a motion to vacate and set aside the judgment and sentence, which was overruled, and defendant appealed to this court. This appeal is based upon Oklahoma Statutes, 1931, § 3140, O. S. A. (Stat. 1941) Title 22, § 973, which is as follows:

“After a plea or verdict of guilty in a case where the extent of the punishment is left with the court, the court, upon the suggestion of either party that there are circumstances which may he properly taken into view, either in aggravation or mitigation of the punishment, may in its discretion hear the same summarily at a specified time and upon such notice to the adverse party as it may direct.”

The only contention made by the defendant is that the judgment and sentence is excessive. Evidence was submitted at the hearing upon the motion, touching upon this issue. This was proper under the statute above quoted. In re Sam Watkins, 21 Okla. Cr. 95, 205 P. 191, and Prather v. State, 14 Okla. Cr. 327, 170 P. 1176; Herren v. State, 74 Okla. Cr. 432, 127 P. 2d 384. We do not consider it necessary to give a long detailed statement of the evid'ence which was presented at the trial and upon the hearing of the motion to vacate. We have carefully considered the same in order that we might arrive at a proper conclusion as to the question submitted.

The deceased, Claude Nowlin, was an able and prominent attorney of Oklahoma City, and of the Oklahoma State Bar. For many years he was the general attorney for the Telephone Company. He had been married four times. The defendant, his fourth wife, was a trained nurse, the daughter of a well-known pioneer family of this state. :She had taken care of the deceased from the time that she had married him and during the time of his excessive drinking’ spells, and had attended him during an attack of pneumonia after their marriage. The deceased had two children by .reason of his previous marriages, and he and the defendant had adopted two children, whose ages were six and seven, respectively, at the time of the killing, and these two children now reside with defendant in Oklahoma City.

We shall not speak further of the prior life of the deceased and defendant except to state that deceased had wrecked a brilliant and useful life and career by overindulgence in the use of intoxicating liquor. His untimely death was the outgrowth of this indulgence. The evidence reveals that defendant was not altogether free from this fault, and had it not been for overindulgence on her part and on the part of deceased on the date of the killing, this tragedy would probably not have occurred. Her indulgence was, no doubt, brought about in an effort to be companionable with her husband, whom the evidence reveals she had assisted not only as a good companion, but also financially in his times of need.

A careful examination of the record does not reveal facts which would justify this court in coming to the conclusion that the judgment and sentence rendered is excessive. This is true even under the testimony of the defendant, herself, and statements made by her to the officers immediately after the tragedy. Upon the motion to set aside the judgment and sentence, evidence was presented which tended to show that defendant was suffering from tuberculosis, and that confinement in the penitentiary would be injurious to her health. It is also contended that the social standing of the defendant and the effect upon the future lives of the two small children whom she and deceased had adopted would be such punishment that justice does not demand. These, of course, are strong appeals to the heartstrings of the members of this court as now constituted, but our sympathy cannot be swayed by overlooking justice, duty, and the law of the land. As has often been said by this court:

“The power of this court to modify a judgment inflicting the death penalty for murder to imprisonment for life at hard labor when deemed proper in the furtherance of justice is in no sense the power of commutation of the sentence of the lower court. Commutation can be granted only by the chief executive of. the state, and is granted as a matter of clemency. The judicial power to modify a judgment and sentence and the executive power to pardon, parol, or commute are wholly distinct in their nature. The one is an award of justice and the other is an act of grace. Commutation is a matter of discretion and may be refused. Justice is imperative, and must not be denied.” Fritz v. State, 8 Okla. Cr. 342, 128 P. 170, 177; Mannon v. State, 68 Okla. Cr. 267, 98 P. 2d 73.

If, as shown by the record, defendant is suffering from disease (tuberculosis), it is well known that the state institutions of this state are amply provided with medical aid, which will, no doubt, be of great benefit to her.

It may also be observed that the jury and the trial court did not fail to take into consideration the circumstances surrounding defendant when the verdict was rendered and ■ sentence set by the court. Defendant was charged with murder. The jury rendered a verdict of manslaughter in the second degree, the least punishment that could be inflicted under the charges filed, and the instructions of the court. The punishment prescribed by the statute is not less than two years in the penitentiary nor more than four years, or by imprisonment in the county jail, or by a fine, or both fine and imprisonment. The court sentenced her to three years in the penitentiary. Under the circumstances, this punishment cannot be said to be excessive, requiring this court to reduce the same. We understand the many heartaches and humiliations suffered by defendant in her efforts to reform the deceased, but the law does not permit one to take into his own hands the responsibility of taking human life to correct a wrong.

After a careful consideration of the record, and without further discussion of the same, we are of the opinion that the judgment and' sentence of the district court of Oklahoma county should be affirmed, and it is so ordered.

JONES and DOYLE, JJ., concur.


text:
    R. H. PRICE v. STATE.
    No. A-9923.
    Sept. 2, 1942.
    (128 P. 2d 1021.)

      Edward M. Box, of Oklahoma City, for plaintiff in error.
    Mac Q. Williamson, Atty. Gen., and Lewis R. Morris, Co. Atty., and Walter Marlin, Asst. Co: Atty., both of Oklahoma City, for defendant in error.
   JONES, J.

R. H. Price was jointly charged with one Ed. W. Spivey and Frank Wilkins, by indictment presented and filed in the district court of Oklahoma county, with the crime of bribery, was tried, convicted and sentenced to serve five years in the State Penitentiary and has appealed.

For a full statement of the facts out of which this prosecution was instituted, reference is made to the cases of Spivey v. State, 69 Okla. Cr. 397, 104 P. 2d 263; and Wilkins v. State, 70 Okla. Cr. 1. 104 P. 2d 289.

Subsequent to the filing of the appeal herein the State of Oklahoma, acting through the Attorney General, filed its motion to dismiss the appeal of said defendant, which motion alleges in substance as follows:

“That subsequent to the! filing of the bribery case in the state court, the defendant was charged by indictment in the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma with evasion of income tax for the calendar years 1936 and 1937; that thereafter, on May 10, 1941, said defendant personally appeared in Federal Court, entered a plea of guilty to said indictment, and was sentenced to serve a term of three years in the Federal Penitentiary at Leavenworth, Kansas, said sentence to begin from the date of his delivery to said institution. That thereafter, on July 7, 1941, the defendant was transported by the United States Marshal and delivered to the Warden of the United States Penitentiary at Leavenworth, Kansas, where he is now confined.

“That said, indictment and plea of guilty arose from, the failure of the defendant to pay income tax upon the bribe money received by him upon which the indictment and conviction in the instant case was had.

“That at the time said defendant appeared in the Federal Court for sentence he was questioned by the United States District Judge concerning said transaction and admitted, among other things, that he received his portion of the bribe money upon which the state’s case herein was based. That defendant also admitted he received a part of the money which was paid as a bribe in what is known as the termite deals in connection with the Oklahoma City schools; he further admitted that he received money as a part of the bribes paid in a number of other transactions while he was a member of the Oklahoma City School Board, which other transactions were introduced in evidence as other offenses for the purpose of showing the common scheme or plan of defendant and his co-conspirators in connection with the specific offense with which the defendant stood charged in the instant case.

“That said defendant, by his admissions in open court, confessed that his testimony given in the prosecution in the state court, out of which this appeal was had, was false and perjured, and that the testimony offered by the state’s witnesses was true.

“That said defendant, by voluntarily entering his plea of guilty in said case and by surrendering himself to the United States Marshal and being transported beyond the jurisdiction of this court, has voluntarily removed himself from the jurisdiction of this court to where he cannot be made to respond to any judgment or order which the Criminal Court of Appeals may render or enter in said case.”

A copy of said motion was duly served upon defendant and his counsel, but no response nor brief has been filed in this court by or on behalf of said defendant, although many weeks have elapsed since said motion was filed. It is assumed, therefore, in the absence of a denial, that all of the allegations set forth in said motion to dismiss are true.

In the case of Hayes v. State, 50 Okla. Cr. 178, 296 P. 988, it is held:

“Where a defendant has been convicted and sentenced and perfects an appeal, this court will not consider his appeal unless defendant is where he can be made to respond to any judgment or order which may be rendered or entered in the case.”

In that case plaintiff in error had been convicted in the district court of Osage county of manslaughter in the first degree and sentenced to- serve a term of ten years in the State Penitentiary. A motion to dismiss the appeal was filed alleging that subsequent to the conviction of defendant he had entered a plea of guilty in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma on a charge of transporting whisky and was sentenced to serve three years in the Federal Penitentiary at Leavenworth, Kansas, where he was then incarcerated. The motion to dismiss was sustained.

There have been many other cases where the defendant, subsequent to his conviction in the state court, has entered his plea of guilty or been tried and convicted in the federal court, or some adjoining state court, and thus removed himself from the jurisdiction of this court to where he would be unable to respond to any order or judgment which this court might render, and in all of which cases, upon such matter being called to the attention of this court by a proper motion to dismiss, the appeal was dismissed. Tompkins v. State, 41 Okla. Cr. 265, 272 P. 490; Morgan v. State, 14 Okla. Cr. 466, 172 P. 974; Terrell v. State, 24 Okla. Cr. 301, 217 P. 900; Exline v. State, 48 Okla. Cr. 181, 290 P. 349; Evinger v. State, 35 Okla. Cr. 12, 247 P. 416.

Not only has this general rule above set forth been strictly adhered to by this court where the defendant has been convicted of another crime which resulted in his removal from the jurisdiction of this court, but it appears that said rule should especially apply to the instant case for the reason that the crime for which the defendant was sentenced in the federal court involved a part of the same transactions out of which the prosecution in the case herein was maintained. It appears to us that it would be a futile gesture to consider the appeal herein, as the defendant has now admitted that his evidence which is incorporated in the record filed in this court was false and perjured, and that the testimony of the witnesses used by the state was true, and that he was one of the school board members who betrayed his; trust by receiving, bribes to commit official acts as alleged in the indictment filed against him.

However, before disposing of this appeal, this court has considered the record and has found no error of a substantial nature but because the appeal will be dismissed, an elaborate opinion dealing with the various assignments of error presented by the petition in error will not be written.

It is our conclusion that under the rule hereinabove stated, the defendant has wavied his right to have the appeal herein considered and determined.

The appeal is therefore dismissed.

BAREFOOT, P. J., concurs. DOYLE, J., not participating.


text:
    JACK GREER v. STATE.
    No. A-10041.
    Sept. 2, 1942.
    (128 P. 2d 1018.)
    Jerome Sullivan, of Duncan, for plaintiff in error.
    Mac Q. Williamson, Atty. Gen., and Jess L. Pullen, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendant in error.
   JONES, J.

The defendant, Jack Greer, was charged in the county court of Stephens county with the unlawful transportation of intoxicating liquor, was tried, convicted and sentenced to serve 60 days in tlie county jail and pay a fine of $300, and has appealed.

It is first contended that the court erred in overruling the motion to' suppress the evidence of the state for the reason that the proof showed that the search of defendant’s automobile and seizure of the liquor in question was unlawful.

Only two witnesses testified in the presentation of the motion to suppress. The arresting officer testified that he saw the defendant coming up one of the principal streets of the city of Duncan at a speed which he estimated to be in excess of 50 miles per hour. That he pursued defendant through the streets of the city of Duncan and finally stopped him about ten blocks away after the defendant had started out on highway 81 northwest of the city. That he pursued the defendant because of his reckless and fast driving, but that when he stopped defendant’s automobile and approached it he smelled and saw liquor dripping from the car underneath the turtle-back. That he arrested defendant, took him to the county jail, and, after reporting to the county attorney, he and a deputy sheriff searched the automobile and found 679 pints and 144 half-pint bottles of whisky. That several bottles of the whisky had been broken, which was causing the liquor to drip through the turtle-back, and it was this liquor which the officer smelled as he approached the automobile.

Defendant testified in support of his motion to suppress that he never drove over 20 miles per hour; that there was considerable traffic on main street and that it would have been impossible, due to' traffic, for him to' have driven at the rate of speed and in the manner described by the highway patrolman. That there was no liquor dripping out of his car and none could be smelled.

A disputed question was thus presented to the court for his consideration. Under the testimony of the arresting officer' an offense was committed in his presence and it was not necessary to have a search warrant to search the automobile after the arrest of the defendant. The court heard the two witnesses and by his ruling it is evident that he came to the conclusion that the officer was telling the truth about the facts surrounding the arrest of defendant and seizure of the whisky. There is nothing in the record that would justify this court in reversing the trial court in his ruling upon this question.

It is next contended that error was committed because of the repeated statement in the argument of the assistant county attorney and the county attorney whereby they referred to the defendant as being in the whisky running business on a big scale.

This court has repeatedly held that the county attorney has the right to draw his deductions and conclusions from the evidence, and unless his argument is such that it arouses the passion and prejudice of the jury to the extent that they would be swayed from arriving at a just verdict, the judgment will not be set aside on appeal.

We have examined carefully the excerpts from the argument of the prosecution which are set forth in the record. We think the statements of the county attorney were justified from the evidence. The defendant was caught with over 700 pints of whisky. With such a state of facts proven it could hardly be said that it was an unreasonable inference that defendant was in the whisky running business on a big scale. Furthermore, the verdiet of the jury is not so large that this court could conclude that its verdict was tainted by prejudice and passion aroused by the argument of the county attorney. There is no merit to this contention.

It is contended that the court erred in the giving of certain instructions. Nowhere in the brief of defendant does he point out wherein these instructions are indefinite or misleading and no authorities are cited to sustain his contentions. We have examined the instructions complained of, together with all of the other instructions, and find that they fairly state the law of the case. It is true, as contended by defendant, that instruction No. 8, which reads: “You are further instructed, gentlemen of the jury, that under the law of this state a search is legal when made under authority of proper search warrant or when the defendant is properly under arrest for the violation of the law committed in the presence of the arresting officer”, should not have been given, as the question of the legality of the search was a matter for determination of the trial court and was a matter which the trial court did determine in the hearing on the motion to- suppress which was presented prior to- the commencement of the trial. However, we can not see where this instruction prejudiced the defendant in any manner.

Lastly, it is contended that the punishment assessed is excessive and the result of passion and prejudice. In the recent case of Greer v. State, 74 Okla. Cr. 286, 125 P. 2d 225, -where this same defendant had been convicted, we did modify the judgment and sentence from the maximum to 60 days in the county jail and a $200 fine. In that case, however, the- officers only found 24 pints of whisky and the proof against the defendant was wholly circumstantial. In the instant case an enormous amount of whisky was found in the possession of defendant. No proof was offered in his behalf and the 60-day jail sentence and $300 fine is certainly very moderate punishment to mete out to such an offender.

There is no material error in the record which would require a reversal, and the judgment and sentence of the county court of Stephens county is accordingly affirmed.

BAREFOOT, P. J., and DOYLE, J., concur.


text:
    Ex parte S. A. BERRIE.
    No. A-10236.
    Sept. 11, 1942.
    (129 P. 2d 88.)
    S. A. Berrie, in pro per.
    Mac Q. Williamson, Atty. Gen., and Sam H. Lattimore, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.
   JONES, J.

The petitioner, S. A. Berrie, has filed his verified application for a writ of habeas corpus, wherein it is alleged that he is unlawfully imprisoned in the State Penitentiary at McAlester, under a commitment issued from the district court of Muskogee county, upon a judgment rendered in said court upon a verdict finding the petitioner guilty of the crime of murder.

Tbe facts alleged in said petition are identical with the facts alleged in the petition by the petitioner heretofore presented to this court and which was denied. Ex parte Berrie, 73 Okla. Cr. 65, 117 P. 2d 807. The identical questions were also presented in the appeal which was taken to this court and were decided adversely to defendant. Berrie v. State, 55 Okla. Cr. 302, 29 P. 2d 979.

A demurrer to the petition was interposed on behalf of respondent.

The rule of this court is that where an application for writ of habeas corpus has been denied, this court will not ordinarily entertain a subsequent application for a writ based on the same grounds and the same facts, or any other grounds or facts existing when the first application was made, whether presented then or not.

For the reasons above stated, the demurrer to the petition is sustained and the cause is dismissed.

BAREFOOT, P. J., and DOYLE, J., concur.


text:
    WILLIAM R. VINCENT v. STATE.
    No. A-10068.
    Sept. 11, 1942.
    (129 P. 2d 196.)

      J. Forrest McCutcheon, of Dallas, Tex., for defendant.
    Mac Q. Williamson, Atty. Gen., J. Walker Field, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Lewis R. Morris, Co. Atty., of Oklahoma City, for the State.
   BAREFOOT, P. J.

Defendant, William R. Vincent, was charged in the common pleas court of Oklahoma county with the crime of unlawful possession of intoxicating liquor, to-wit, 49 pints and 3% pints of tax-paid whisky, was tried before the court without the intervention of a jury, by agreement, was convicted and sentenced to pay a fine of $50 and serve 30 days in jail, and has appealed.

It is first contended that the court erred in overruling the motion to .. quash the search warrant and suppress evidence. This is based upon the proposition that the search warrant had therein the name “John Doe” and not the name of the defendant, William R. Vincent, who was known to the officer making the affidavit. We have often announced that it was the best practice for officers, in making affidavits for search warrants, to state the name of the individual whose premises were to be searched. Denmark v. State, 71 Okla. Cr. 95, 108 P. 2d 550, and cases cited therein. We reiterate this statement, and it should be followed where the name of the defendant is known to the officer; however, we have not held that it was always imperative that this be done, especially where the name of the party was unknown. In the instant case the search was not so much of the defendant as it was of the place he occupied as a business. He was operating* the “Alamo Tourist Camp” and this was the place described in the search warrant to be searched. The officer testified that he found defendant, Vincent, there, and that he had seen him there on numerous other occasions when he had been to the premises for the purpose of searching the same. He also testified on cross-examination as follows:

“A. I did not know who might be in charge of the place. There had been another man, by the name of T. J. or J. T. Smith, at one time we raided and I didn’t know who would lie in charge of the place at the time we went there.”

• While we are of the opinion as heretofore stated that officers should give the exact name of the defendant where known, yet under the facts here stated this failure would not be reversible error. John Doe search warrants have long been recognized by the courts, but as above stated we do not approve their use unless necessary.

It is next contended that the court erred in overruling the plea in bar presented by the defendant. This plea is based upon the fact that county officers searched the premises of the defendant about 4 p. m. on the 5th day of October, 1940, and found 49 pints and SYz pints of tax-paid whisky in a plant on defendant’s premises about 25 feet from his back door, and that about 9:39 at- night of the same day other state officers from the State Highway Department bought whisky from the defendant and searched his premises and found nine pints of whisky in a separate plant. Defendant claimed, and SO' testified at the hearing on the plea in bar, that it was the same whisky and that county officers failed to find the nine pints at the time of the search at 4 p. m. This is an attempt on the part of the defendant to bring himself within the rule often announced by this court that there cannot be separate offenses charged where only one offense has been committed. Estep v. State, 11 Okla. Cr. 103, 143 P. 64; Hourigan v. State, 38 Okla. Cr. 11, 258 P. 1057; Jackson v. State, 11 Okla. Cr. 523, 148 P. 1058. See, also, Wiley King v. State, 73 Okla. Cr. 411, 121 P. 2d 1021. In other words, the state would not be permitted to find a defendant with intoxicating liquor in his automobile and charge him with conveying and also illegal possession of the same liquor at the same time or of finding the defendant in possession of a quantity of intoxicating liquor and so divide the amounts that separate charges could be filed as to each separate amount; but the facts as revealed by the record do not justify the contention. Here the defendant’s premises were searched at 4:30 in the afternoon by county officers. He made bond and was released about 7:30 on the same day. At about 9:30 a number of state officers came to’ his place of business and purchased from him a pint of whisky and paid therefor the sum of $1.50. He was immediately placed under arrest and the other officers, upon being signaled of his arrest, searched the premises and found nine pints of whisky in a plant on defendant’s premises. This plant, according to the evidence of the defendant himself, was a different one from the one in which the county officers found the 49 pints and the 3% pints at 4:30 in the afternoon. It was no doubt the contention of the state that defendant, on being released at 7:30, had returned to his place of business and again engaged in the sale of intoxicating liquor. The facts and circumstances sustain this conclusion. This appears to be one of those cases where the defendant just wasn’t going to quit. We know of no reason why a crime may not be committed by a defendant at 4:30 in the afternoon and another crime be committed by him at 9:30 in the evening, even though the crime be of the same character. The facts in the case seem that this was just what was done.

In the case of Beaman v. State, 69 Okla. Cr. 455, 104 P. 2d 260, this court in an opinion by Judge.Jones, has had occasion to consider this question. The facts in that case are different from the facts in the instant case. If defendant had been tried before a jury, he would have had a right to have submitted an instruction as to whether the liquor found at the time the county officers searched the premises, at 4' p. m., and the liquor found by the state patrolmen at 9:30 were a part and parcel of the same liquor. But a jury was waived and the case was tried before the court. The rule is that when a jury is waived by a defendant and his case tried before the court, the findings and judgment of the court are as binding upon questions of fact as if the case had been submitted to a jury and they had passed upon them.

We find no error in the overruling of the plea in bar filed in this case.

It is lastly contended by the defendant that the judgment and sentence is in violation of the constitutional rights of the defendant and contrary to> the law and the evidence. This contention is made upon the plea that defendant cannot twice be put in jeopardy for the same offense. The statement which we have above made clearly reveals that this contention is without merit.

It is revealed by the record that defendant’s place had been searched upon numerous occasions and liquor bad been found tbereon. Tbe search upon this occasion resulted in tbe finding- of 49 pints and 3% pints of tax-paid liquor in a secreted plant on tbe defendant’s premises. He admitted to tbe officers- it was bis liquor. Defendant did not take tbe witness stand or offer any evidence in bis own bebalf. Under these facts it is clear that tbe judgment and sentence of tbe court of common pleas of Oklahoma county should be affirmed, and it is so ordered.

DOYLE and JONES, JJ., concur.